# THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

**ISSUED BY THE** 

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31 AUGUST 1964 50X1 TOP SECRET

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#### 1. South Vietnam

a. The true locus of authority in the new temporary government remains obscure and the struggle for power would appear to continue.

b. Conflicting stories are coming out from the principals. General Khiem has said that acting premier Oanh is merely "filling in" and that Khanh would resume the active premiership early this week. Khiem denigrates General Minh and, despite his professed support for Khanh, may be maneuvering in his own behalf.

c. Acting premier Oanh has strongly implied to Deputy Ambassador Johnson that Khanh is politically finished and that he, Oanh, is destined to lead Vietnam out of its morass.

d. Ambassador Taylor saw Khanh today but we have not heard the results.

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2. Cyprus

f. The urban centers are reported to be calm, and Khiem, as armed forces commander, warned in a communiqué yesterday that the military would assist police in meeting further disorders.

a. The Turkish decision to postpone troop rotation, following urgent appeals from many quarters, has deferred the most immediate threat of open conflict, but tension continues high.

b. The Greek Cypriot blockade goes on, and Turkish Cypriots in the northwest feel themselves under considerable pressure, despite local Greek Cypriot assurance that no attack is intended.

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c. We have no hard information on what Makarios might have achieved in Egypt. A member of his entourage told the press today that Egyptians are "volunterring" to go to Cyprus. The Makarios-Nasir communiqué merely speaks of "all possible" UAR aid.

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d. Turkish demonstrators say they will continue their protests against US policy until a settlement is reached. Inonu, however, has come out against the excesses and security forces appear to be ensuring that nothing gets out of hand.

e. In Geneva Saturday, U Thant was relatively noncommital about any ideas he might have for seeking a solution.



3. Congo

a. There has been no essential change in the pattern.

b. Rebels moving slowly down the Congo River have reached the outskirts of Lisala, and fear and panic have preceded them 400 miles downriver to Coquilhatville. In the east, rebels are active around Bunia, near Uganda, although troops from Bunia have been operating westward against rebel-held Mambasa.

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c. In Katanga, the status of Albertville is uncertain, but the Congolese Army has retaken the rail center at Kabalo, west of Albertville, and a mercenary-gendarme force is being assembled to move on Manono, south of Albertville.

d. At least 250 mercenaries have now arrived in the Congo. They are a mixed bag of various nationalities with varying degrees of military training.

e. With the OAU emergency session on the Congo now apparently set for 5 September in Addis Ababa, all signs point to a determined effort by radical African states to push for a political solution. Some moderates, notably Tunisia, will probably go along with this.

f. CNL President Gbenye, now in Burundi, has asked for OAU intervention to stop "genocide" by American "imperialists" and for condemnation of Tshombé.

g. There are some straws in the wind that rebels in Stanleyville may intend to declare themselves the Congo's only legitimate government.

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h. In Leopoldville, where some Congolese politicians are displaying signs of opposition to Tshombé, Antoine Gizenga--silent since his release from prison--has announced the formation of a new "united" Lumumbist political party.

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i. Tshombé, however, still has the support of General Mobutu and security chief Nendaka, and President Kasavubu would appear to have no alternative to him.

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4. Communist China -North Vietnam

a. Chinese jet fighters sent to Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi may have been for the North Vietnamese. 50X11 50X1

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5. Communist China

6. Yemen

a. The government's control in southern Yemen is threatened by a flare-up of sectional and tribal rivalries triggered by revolts of army elements in two important towns.

Should additional troops b. be required to keep the lid on, this could affect the current Yemeni-Egyptian offensive in the north which is designed to roll up royalist forces before the 5 September Arab summit meeting.

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Cuba 7.



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#### NOTE

Ambassador Unger is worried about a lull Laos in government military operations, which he believes only partially attributable to bad He suspects Souvanna may have given weather. orders for a "standdown" during the Paris talks --not yet off the ground.

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