



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

### *SPECIAL STUDY:*

**Chinese Decision Making; The Long March and the Long War**

24 FEBRUARY 1966

**TOP SECRET**



The Long March left an indelible mark on Mao Tse-tung and his comrades. Chiang Kai-shek and various warlords harried them across 6,000 miles of China, and only one-fifth of the group lived to make it to Yen-an. Mao spent the next 12 years in the Yen-an badlands fashioning a revolution which brought his Communists to power in 1949. Their attitudes today remain deeply colored by the experience.


CHINESE DECISION MAKING:  
THE LONG MARCH AND THE LONG WAR

Summary

The men who control China's destiny today are veterans of the Long March and the revolution. These years molded them and still condition their attitudes toward the struggle they are waging against the "American imperialists," which they think of as the Long War.

- These leaders are acutely conscious of their Chinese heritage. This means they are quite sure of their own superiority and their duty to gain redress for the humiliation China has suffered at the hands of foreigners. The chief enemy to be overcome is the US.
- They are also Communists. This means that they are predisposed to totalitarian ways of doing business. This also means that they see the world divided into two irreconcilable camps.
- They are dominated by Mao Tse-tung. He is a thorough-going militarist with a history of violent conspiratorial activity. This makes him and the group around him ruthless and tough-minded.
- They are ambitious to make China a great world power. They are old and ailing, yet still command only a weak base. This has led them to try to do too much, too soon, sometimes with painful results.
- They have slim resources to parcel out. This has meant they cannot simultaneously satisfy even the minimum demands of agriculture, industry, the military, the party machine, and the government apparatus.
- They see themselves as virtually alone in a hostile world. This has created a siege mentality but has not dimmed their conviction of eventual victory.

## MAJOR FOREIGN ENCLAVES



CHINESE DECISION MAKING:  
THE LONG MARCH AND THE LONG WAR

The Leaders have a Chinese heritage.

In the first place, the men in Peking are acutely conscious of their Chinese heritage. Being Chinese, they carry a strong conviction of their superiority, in race and culture, to all foreigners. The Chinese call their country the "Middle Kingdom" and for 4,000 years have considered it the civilized center of the universe, surrounded by barbarians. To most Chinese, Chinese art is the finest, Chinese poetry the richest, Chinese food the tastiest, Chinese women the most desirable, and so on.


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China is also a dirt poor, agricultural country. Most Chinese are peasants whose life is nasty, brutish, and short. Life has always been cheap, the individual counting for little. Emphasis is on survival of the family or social group. The Chinese peasant lives in small villages, not in individual farm dwellings. Mao Tse-tung and his closest collaborators, except for the mandarin Chou En-lai, come from this land and out of this tradition. It helps make them hard-bitten and indifferent to suffering.

They are strongly nationalistic.

The Chinese have regarded the foreigner with disdain or contempt. After more than a century of exploitation by one foreign power after another, this turned to hatred. Starting early in the 19th Century, foreigners came with weapons the Chinese could not match. The foreigners, although contemptible, repeatedly defeated the weak Chinese armies. China was carved up into spheres of influence, and enclaves were set up where the foreigner could live on Chinese soil free of Chinese authority. Such treatment would leave deep scars on any people. It left the arrogant Chinese thirsting for revenge.

# THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION



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Under Mao and the Communists this hatred of foreigners has been focused on the US. In their eyes, the US sought to keep them from power. The US opposed them in Korea and interposed its forces to prevent them from seizing Taiwan. It continues to support the "renegade" Chiang as the legitimate ruler of all China. The US stands between them and their larger design of extending their sway over the former vassal states surrounding China. The US does its best to put down the very revolutions the Chinese support. Most of all, they fear that the US means to do them in. China has from time to time suggested that it is permissible under some circumstances to work with certain imperialists--but never with the US.

Though expressed in terms of fundamental Communist principle, Mao's fight with the Soviets is heavily nationalistic. In the late 1950s the Chinese leaders became aware that the post-Stalin group in the Kremlin would not, any more than Stalin himself, place Soviet power at Mao's disposal. Peking could see that the Soviets were dragging their feet on giving China nuclear weapons. The crowning blow fell in 1959 when Khrushchev went to the US and began, in Mao's eyes, to consort with the main enemy. Khrushchev stopped off in Peking on his way back but no bands played, no crowds cheered, not a handshake was offered.

They are Communists "stepped in struggle."

As Communists the Chinese subscribe to the view that the world is divided into two camps engaged in an all-out struggle which the Communists are fated to win. China today is an orthodox Communist state in which the party alone makes policy and supervises its execution. The government and the armed forces are kept under constant party surveillance. The aim is total control, and in China it has virtually been achieved.

Being rigidly orthodox Communists, Mao and his associates must try to force the non-Communist world into the preconceived framework of nineteenth

## MAO TSE-TUNG AND HIS COMRADES-IN-ARMS



MAO TSE-TUNG

Age 72. Party Chairman. Top man since 1935. Health declining, often out of public view for months. No evidence he is losing control. Has never visited a non-Communist country. Understanding of the West limited and warped. Grasp of internal affairs may be slipping. A supreme egotist, considers himself to be the rightful leader of world communism.



LIU SHAO-CHI

Age 68. Mao's first lieutenant and his designated successor. A frail man, a colorless personality, he may be too weak to hold the top position long after Mao goes.



CHOU EN-LAI

Age 68. Once the most moderate member of the inner circle, reasonably well informed about the outside world. His relative moderation seems to be waning as he grows older. Runs the government. Has little party strength and little chance to win the struggle for succession.



TENG HSIAO-PING

Age 66. Tough, extremely militant, ambitious. Runs the executive arm of the party which puts him in a good spot to take over after Mao and Liu go.



PENG CHEN

Age 66. Smooth, capable, and tough. The most recent entry to the inner circle. Has played a key role in Chinese confrontations with the Russians.



LIN BIAO

Age 58. The only military man in the lot. Has a brilliant record as a revolutionary field commander. [redacted] Seldom appears in public. Recently credited with authoring article affirming Chinese intention to foment "anti-imperialist" revolutions wherever possible in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

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
century capitalism as Marx saw it. This requirement, coupled with an almost total lack of personal exposure to the non-Communist world, makes them parochial men. They do not really understand just what it is that motivates Westerners. Mao and his associates are the hard-bitten survivors of a savage struggle against enemies within the party, against the Chinese Nationalists, and against the Japanese. In their early years together they were hunted like animals, and Mao's wife died at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's police. The party was almost wiped out in 1927. Later, in 1934, Chiang forced them to pull up stakes and move their base of operations to the Yen-an caves in the northwest. This was the Long March, during the bloody course of which Mao seized control of the party. This history of prolonged armed struggle has left the leaders thoroughgoing militarists. Even political and social problems are attacked through military concepts, military directives, military organization, military discipline.

They are dominated by Mao Tse-tung.

Since the Long March, Mao has been paramount in the Chinese Communist movement. Only Stalin exercised a comparable measure of power. Mao's prejudices, opinions, and idiosyncrasies are perhaps the most important single element in framing Peking's policy. For all of his being Chinese, Mao is like Stalin in some ways. Like Stalin, Mao is a true totalitarian, seeking total control, including control of thought, and demanding total obedience, including professions of adoration. Like Stalin, Mao is vain and cruel, encourages a "cult," and relies on exhortation. And like Stalin, Mao is less an international than a national Communist.

The importance of military force is at the center of Mao's world view. He has even said that Chiang Kai-shek "did a good thing in massacring Communists" because this taught them how to wage war. He says, over and over again, "All political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." Thus his foreign policy is distinctively based on

# PEKING'S LOST EMPIRE



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This map was used by the Communists in a 1953 history text to show students how "imperialists" had seized territory once a part of China or under Chinese sway during the great days of the old Empire.

international tension and revolutionary war, and he incites these small wars wherever he can.

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Mao prefers, wherever possible, to let others do the fighting and is cautious about committing his own forces. Chinese troops poured into Korea only when the US advance posed, to Mao's way of thinking, a direct threat to China and its most important industrial region. Moreover, Mao saw it as necessary to prevent the destruction of a neighboring Communist State.

In Mao's view, talks with the enemy are possible, even advisable, as a device to buy time or gain an advantage. This does not mean that he believes in real give-and-take negotiations--only take, since the real solution is the destruction of the adversary.

Furious with the Soviets, the Chinese today assert their pre-eminence in doctrinal matters. They see themselves as the only true interpreters of the old texts, and Mao as the only Communist since Stalin to enrich the doctrine with creative additions. The Chinese now speak of the three great epochs of modern man--the epoch of Marx and Engels, the epoch of Lenin and Stalin, and the epoch of Mao Tse-tung. Only Mao has the stature to stand alone.

The combination of Chinese chauvinism and Mao's egotism is such a strong force that in recent years he has even changed his basic concept that the world is divided into Communist and imperialist camps. Since 1960 he has seen the world as divided into those countries responsive to his concepts and therefore in his camp, and those antagonistic to his views and therefore in the enemy camp. The Soviet Union is in the "enemy" camp, since Mao regards it as working with the US to frustrate and to bring down China.

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## THE SECOND LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP

	Age	Principal Posts
★CHEN YI	65	Minister of Foreign Affairs
★LI FU-CHUN	66	Chairman, State Planning Commission; Member, Party Secretariat
★LI HSIEN-NIEN	59	Minister of Finance; Member, Party Secretariat
★TAN CHEN-LIN	63	Director, Agriculture and Forestry Staff Office, State Council; Member, Party Secretariat
★LU TING-I	65	Director, Propaganda Department; Minister of Culture
★KANG SHENG	67	Member, Party Secretariat; intelligence specialist
★PO I-PO	59	Chairman, State Economic Commission
★LO JUI-CHING	59	Chief, PLA General Staff; Secretary, Military Affairs Committee; Member, Secretariat
★NIEH JUNG-CHEN	67	Member, Military Affairs Committee; Chairman, Scientific and Technological Commission
★HSIEH FU-CHIH	?	Minister of Public Security
★LI CHING-CHUAN	61	1st Secretary, Southwest Regional Bureau of the Party
TAO CHU	58	1st Secretary, Central-South Regional Bureau of the Party
LI HSUEH-FENG	60	1st Secretary, North China Regional Bureau of the Party
★LIU LAN-TAO	62	1st Secretary, Northwest Regional Bureau of the Party
★SUNG JEN-CHIUNG	62	1st Secretary, Northeast Regional Bureau of the Party

★High-ranking party members since at least the early 1930s. The majority accompanied Mao Tse-tung on the Long March to Yen-an in 1934-35.

They are old, ailing and isolated.

The men at the very top have been together for a long time. Mao has been a member of the party since it was founded in a back street of Shanghai in 1921. So has Chou En-lai. Virtually every meaningful post is filled by a veteran of 30 or more years in the upper levels. Rivalries have been submerged or suppressed and may remain so until the kingpin is removed. Mao believes strongly that the only really trustworthy men are those case-hardened through the crucible of revolution.

The Chinese leaders are old men. The average age of the seven top men is nearly 68. Decades of wielding virtually absolute power has left them fixed in their ways. Certain of their policies, some obviously bad, have been set in concrete by the very myth of infallibility they nurture so assiduously. They are increasingly intolerant of independent thinking outside their tight little circle, and Mao may not put up with much debate inside. It is hard for new ideas or suggestions to penetrate such barriers.

Mao and his favorites have therefore tended to become isolated, like the less successful emperors of old.

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They do not get all the facts they need for their own decisions, and have little feel for the factors that enter into policy decisions elsewhere.

Today the aging Chinese tyrants are in ill health and are deeply disturbed about what will happen to their revolution when they are gone.


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The leaders are plainly fearful about the younger generation, even though Chinese youth has been stuffed with Mao's propaganda since weaning. Mao suspects, and perhaps


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# FANTASTIC PRODUCTION CLAIMS of the 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' (1958-60)

## GRAIN



## CRUDE STEEL



with some reason, that once the Long Marchers are gone, the locomotive will be removed from the Chinese Communist revolution and it will grind to a halt.

They have vaulting ambitions.


Mao and his friends have set out to restore China to what they regard as its proper place as a great power in the shortest possible time. They started fast in the early 1950s. For the first time in decades a sense of unity and purpose was imparted to the nation. The people backed the regime and with Soviet help good progress was made.

Then in 1958 Mao's hubris found expression in two extreme programs. The first was the "Great Leap Forward" and the other was the commune movement. In the Leap, Mao tried by a massive application of manpower and exhortation to achieve a radical speedup in economic and military development.


These were heady days for the leaders, who for a time thought they had achieved a real breakthrough. With "politics in command," the party machinery reported what they wanted to hear. Statistics showing incredible gains showered in on them and were, strangely enough, believed. At one point Mao was so impressed with grain production claims that he announced a plan to let one third of the arable land grow all the grain China needed. A crash program for steel production led to the follies of the backyard furnaces. Primitive equipment blossomed in every village and city and turned out millions of tons of useless slag.

At the same time Mao ordered that the nation's peasants be jammed into communes. These monster collectives embraced 20,000-50,000 souls who would (Mao thought), work, eat, and live together--the sexes properly separated except for work heroes on "lucky Saturday night." The communes did not work, but Mao went even further.

## BASIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES



● POPULATION GROWS STEADILY WHILE AGRICULTURE STAGNATES



● ONLY 11 PERCENT OF THE LAND IS ARABLE, AND THIS IS ALREADY INTENSIVELY CULTIVATED

He decided that every Chinese male should become a militiaman. Dutifully, lists were compiled and Peking gravely announced that China had 200 million militiamen, a figure greater than the total number of Chinese males of military age.

These harebrained ventures had by 1960 seriously weakened Chinese industry and agriculture. At this juncture Soviet help was abruptly withdrawn. Disaster followed. China's economic and military advance came to a screeching halt. The Chinese are only now beginning to emerge from the ensuing depression and have yet to come to grips with China's basic economic shortcomings.

They need to get the economy going again.

Foremost among their weaknesses is the pressure of too many Chinese on existing resources. Last year grain output was about the same as in the year before the Great Leap. Now there are 100 million more mouths to feed.

Agriculture is the critical sector of the economy. Shortcomings here are the chief impediment to the development of a modern economy. Chinese agriculture requires massive investment and new technology. But the top command parcels these out in small amounts, preferring to put its resources elsewhere. The farmers need also to be freed from the fetters of the collective system. As in other Communist states, the tiny private plots allowed the peasants are far more productive than the collective land. But a departure from collective farming is unthinkable. Retreat here, Mao has said, would inevitably lead to a resurrection of capitalism. Finally, the situation calls for ruthless birth control measures, for which Mao long saw no need. He has recently permitted a limited program to begin in the cities, but even there it is too little and far too late.

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They need to improve their military machine.

Chinese industry took a terrible buffeting from the follies of the Leap Forward. It still shows idle capacity, wasted manpower, and technological lags. Resources for investment are so scarce, however, that industry cannot be moved ahead as a whole. There is not even enough for heavy industry alone. Accordingly, competition for resources is fierce. The military-minded Mao always shows a marked preference for the war industries. In recent years he has turned to advanced weapons.

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the Chinese nuclear force will be taken most seriously by other nations of the Far East. Since the ultimate objective is to reach the US, Mao will surely press ahead on an intercontinental ballistic missile or a nuclear-powered missile submarine as fast as he can.

Until this hope becomes reality, Mao must rely on his large infantry force. Any war Mao fights must be a land war in or near China. Moreover, he has to cut his military doctrine to fit this cloth.



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So Mao's soldiers are taught that man is superior to imperialist weapons. A current slogan runs, "the best weapon is not the atom bomb but the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

Actually the Chinese leaders greatly fear US nuclear strike capability. This fear lies behind the deep caution they display. It leads them to avoid direct engagement with US forces and wherever possible to fight their Long War with the US through proxies like the Vietnamese Communists.

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They need to reinvigorate their people.

Mao and his circle face a number of serious morale problems at home. Once they had the support of virtually all functionaries, the armed forces, and the people at large, but since the Leap Forward that support has fallen away. Disappointed hopes lie all about. Peasants are sullen and apathetic. The intellectual is alienated. The lower ranks of the party and the army are beginning to wonder. The sense of purpose has been lost and the Chinese have begun to suspect that Mao, after all, may not have the mandate of heaven.

Mao and the party are still exacting compliance, but they have to lean much harder on the people to get it. Much of the party's energy is burned up in the effort. For example, the party has greatly increased the number of watchdogs spotted all through the armed forces and government bureaucracy to ensure that Mao's will is carried out. Mao has had experience with disgruntled generals. The last big challenge to him came in 1959 from a group around Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai.

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Mao still believes that it is possible to motivate and control people by exhortation. He has

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## Strengths and Weaknesses of the Military Establishment

### CHINA HAS

THE WORLD'S LARGEST STANDING ARMY, FOURTH LARGEST AIR FORCE, AND THE THIRD LARGEST SUBMARINE FLEET.

ARMY		AIR FORCE		NAVY	
Men:	2.3 million	Men:	148,000	Men:	76,500
Tanks:	5,000	Jet fighters:	2,050	Submarines:	34
Artillery:	10,500	Jet light bombers:	270	Major surface vessels:	8
Antiaircraft guns:	3,500				

BUT - CHINA'S MILITARY HARDWARE IS OLD AND OBSOLESCE BY WESTERN STANDARDS.

For example, nearly 85% of China's jet interceptors are of the old MIG-15/17 (Fagot/Fresco) variety, aircraft comparable to the US F-86 (Sabrejet)


MIG-17 FRESCO



Radius: 540 n.m.  
Speed: 545 knots

Combat ceiling: 54,500 ft.  
Span: 31 ft.  
Length: 38 ft.

"W"-Class




Displacement: 800 tons  
Length: 249 feet  
Surface range at 18-knot maximum speed: 2,800 NM

Submerged range at 13-knot max speed 13 NM  
at 2.5-knot cruise speed 150 NM  
Main Armament:  
four bow 21" and two stern 21" torpedo tubes

China's large submarine fleet is made up almost entirely of the old "W"-Class medium range torpedo attack submarine.

T-34

Over half of China's tank inventory is made up of the World War II-designed T-34 medium tank.



Weight: 35.2 short tons  
Speed: 35 mph  
Cruising range on roads: 186 miles  
Main armament: 85mm tank gun M1944

recently launched another of the seemingly endless indoctrination drives. This one is backed up by a campaign to emulate two synthetic heroes; one a "rustproof screw" of the revolutionary machine, the second an "all-purpose screw." Both are said to have been simple soldiers who, so Peking's version goes, martyred themselves for the glory of Mao. They are presented as diligent readers of Mao's works, which made them frugal, diligent, selfless servants of the party. Returns on this sort of thing have been diminishing, and it is doubtful the leaders will get the success they so badly need at home through these tired devices and methods.

They feel besieged by foreign enemies.

If Mao's outlook at home is dim, it is scarcely brighter abroad. The Chinese have absorbed a painful series of setbacks lately in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Through stupidity and bad timing they have managed to turn sympathy into hostility. The border war with India alienated a sympathetic New Delhi. Bungling during last fall's Kashmir war soured the Pakistanis. The Chinese position in Indonesia has suffered greatly since the 30 September coup attempt. Japan is more wary and neighbors to the south more fearful. Peking's stock in the Afro-Asian world and in Latin America has fallen as a result of a series of arrogant efforts to force acceptance of Chinese positions. And even in the most radical part of the Communist world, the circle of loyal Chinese followers has been shrinking as more and more Communist leaders take exception to Chinese self-righteousness.

Just outside China's back door stands a great wall of Soviet hostility. The Chinese can no longer count on Moscow to honor its treaty commitment to China's defense.

In December 1963 Chen Yi declared that Soviet assurances of defending China were of no value. Chou En-lai told [redacted] that the USSR

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would not assist China in the event of an American attack, nor would Moscow attempt to prevent such an attack. The Soviets have done nothing to reassure the Chinese.

Peering anxiously from Peking, the Chinese leaders now profess to see themselves surrounded by enemies and threatened by attack. As they formulate it, a cabal, led by the US and including the treacherous Soviets, the militaristic Japanese, the dependent British, and the running dog Indians, is tightening a ring around China. Although this view has paranoid elements, there is also a measure of truth in it. What Mao does not realize is that he has brought this state of affairs on himself.

Nevertheless, Mao has been in many tight corners before. He spent more than a decade in the caves of Yen-an and emerged to destroy the Chinese Nationalists. He remains convinced that his policy will again triumph, because, as before, his enemies (capitalist and Communist) are soft, stupid, and lacking in staying power.

They have hopes in Vietnam.

In this time of adversity, the men in Peking place great importance on Vietnam. Besides a natural interest in the outcome of a war so close to the China mainland, they feel, as Chinese, that Vietnam is an area which rightfully should be under their influence. Although the war has brought added US power too close for real comfort, it is still a confrontation to Mao's liking. It is a war against the US being fought by proxies. Mao needs provide only military support and loud political backing.

Moreover, it offers a test case for Mao's theory on "liberation wars," that is, that small wars such as this can be fought and won without provoking a US nuclear response against either the local Communists or their larger sponsors. This idea is part of Mao's dispute with the Soviets. As Peking sees it, a military victory in Vietnam would deal a heavy blow to Mao's principal enemies, the hated Americans and the despised Russians.

For all of the war's importance to Mao, he is constrained in what he can do about the outcome by the weakness of his military machine and by his fear, however he may cloak it, of a US nuclear punch against China. He must, therefore, do all he can to keep the Vietnamese Communists in the fight until the moment comes when the US wearies of the struggle and gets out. His whole experience tells him that this will inevitably happen, if only the Communists persist long enough.

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