

The President's Daily Brief

Top Secret 13 January 1969

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 13 JANUARY 1969

1. Middle East

Lebanese nervousness over the Israeli threat is increasing. Some of this may stem from fear that De Gaulle may not make good on his promise of "total support" -- which the Lebanese apparently believed included French troops if necessary.

We are not certain that French troops were indeed offered. As former colonials of the French, the Lebanese would have highly mixed feelings about accepting them. Their misgivings might fade, however, if the crunch became greater.

2. Israel-France

Those two French-built patrol boats that the Israelis recently spirited away, under the pretext of a predelivery test, arrived at Haifa last Friday.

3. South Korea

Pak is setting the machinery in motion for a third-term try in 1971. A nationwide campaign to generate public support for removing the two-term constitutional limit will start soon. To undercut criticism of the regime's most glaring fault, the campaign's first step is said to be an anticorruption drive aimed at civil servants, the press, and perhaps some politicians.

4. Czechoslovakia

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movements--50X1

at present of unknown size—probably have to do with joint Soviet-Czechoslo-vak maneuvers, possibly in reaction to NATO exercises in West Germany. While they do not appear related to internal Czechoslovak political developments, they may raise further fears among the populace of renewed Soviet intervention.

5. Brazil Foreign Minister Magalhaes

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Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto is reported ready to hand in his resignation as a protest against the government's assumption of dictatorial powers last month. He is no doubt aware that his popularity among the military is waning, and he may want to jump the gun on his ouster. More than that, his long-standing presidential ambitions may have persuaded him that now is the time to establish himself as a rallying point for the moderates.

6. Nationalist China

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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

- 1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
- 2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of US
 Political Attitudes

Top Secret

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13 January 1969

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

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I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi's Plans for Par	is:			· ·
the Communists do not experess in the Paris talks for while the new US administra situation.	or at lea	ast anoth	er mont	h
interim period to launch soffensives. The targets not South Vietnamese.				
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First Liberation Front Commentary on Appointment of Ambassador Lodge: In contrast to the guarded reaction of Communist spokesmen in Paris, Liberation Radio broadcasting in Vietnamese on 12 January was harsh and denigrating. The broadcast belittled Ambassador Lodge's past experience in Vietnam and took the line that Saigon instead of rejoicing ought to remember that under Lodge the US "changed horses" and overthrew the Diem government. Using this lead, the commentary launched into the Communists' favorite current theme that it is time for the US to replace the present Saigon government.

The commentary called both Lodge and Harriman "old foxes" and said that President-elect Nixon had chosen a man known for his defeats on the battlefield to replace another known for his defeats at the Paris talks.

North Vietnamese Air Defense Exercise: On 11 January, the North Vietnamese conducted what appears to have been the first air defense exercise involving the entire air defense network at one time. They appeared to be testing some sophisticated new radars against all types of simulated US aircraft. The results were good; activity was well coordinated, information was passed smoothly and on a timely basis.

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report today.

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
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	I. MAJOR PROBLEMS	
	EUROPE	
	Mindful of last November's run on the franc, the	
	European Community is considering a proposal for greater	
	monetary cooperation among the Six. The draft before the	
	Monetary Committee envisages that members running into pay-	
	ments troubles could first draw on automatic credit facili-	
·	ties; if these proved insufficient, further credits would	
	be available on certain conditions. Progress in the Committee	
	is likely to be slow, and the finance ministers are unlikely	•
	to agree on any cooperative mechanism of this sort before the	
	latter half of 1969.	
	Like all such schemes, this one confronts the chronic	
	question of whether the Six would prefer to consult and act	
	together as individual states, or to delegate new powers to	:
	the EC Commission and thus take a further step toward real	
.,	integration. The current monetary proposal stresses the	
	first of these methods, but this tendency is under continu-	
	ing fire.	50



VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese rejected Vance's offer on Saturday of a table divided by a strip of baize coupled with an offer that the Communist side can speak first at the opening expanded meeting. Lau also turned aside our second proposal of a table divided only by a line and a speaking order of AA BB to be determined by drawing two lots. The Communists are aware that the US is putting heavy pressure on Saigon to agree to the North Vietnamese proposal and they probably believe that Saigon will soon give in. If the allied fallback position on a round table and on a two-sided draw for speaking order is proposed to the Communists, our bet would be that they will buy it and that the way will be opened for the first expanded meeting.

Liberation Front officials in Paris are now promoting the idea of a "peace cabinet" in which Thieu, Ky and Huong would be replaced by men with whom the Front would be able


to deal.

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Vietnamese Communist spokesmen around the world have recently been holding out this same bait on the chance that US unhappiness with the Thieu government might have reached

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		the point where a Communist hint of being read	dy to deal	
		with some compromise figure would spark a resp	oonse from	
		Washington. General "Big" Minh's name has cro	opped up in	
		several of these conversations but the Communi	ists clearly	
<u> </u>		do not want to pin themselves down on any one	name.	1.
		* * *		
		Numerous reports continue to point to an	imminent	
B		Communist military offensive. Thus far, however		
		Communists have limited themselves to a series		
	**	of allied bases on 11-12 January. The enemy p	orobably plans	
Á		to step up the level of his attacks over the	next few weeks	
		in order to demonstrate his capability to stay	y in the field	
	14	despite heavy allied military pressure.	·	
F		Thus far in January about one new infilt	cation group	÷.
		per day has been noted entering the pipeline	in North Vietnar	m. ·
		This is the same rate noted in early December	and is good	
	• .	evidence that the Communists anticipate taking		• •
		ties for which they will need replacements du	ring the next	
		few months.		
	*	SOVIET SPHERE		
_			Soviet space	50X1
	· •	support ships, which are on station in the At	lantic Ocean	
F	•	to support a manned space launch, may accompl	ish or rehearse	
	4	some phase of the operation today. Soviet in	strumentation	
		ships are also on station in the Pacific and	recovery forces	-
		have been deployed in the USSR.		
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	MIDDLE EAST
Arah news medi:	a are now reporting that Israel is
	a large-scale raid into Jordan, timed
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	ems to be no evidence substantiating
the Arab claims.	ems to be no evidence substantiating
che mus ciaims.	
	This mounting Arab
weekend's attack by	y be fed by any incidents such as last Israeli jets on suspected Arab commando
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The Lebanese are still convinced that an attack is
coming, although the arrival of De Gaulle's personal envoy,
Georges Gorse, on ll January may have had a calming effect.
nitial Lebanese impressions of the extent of French offers
of aid seem to have been overly optimistic, and no public
statements spelling out the details have been made since
Gorse's arrival. He has, however, announced that France
vill not remain idle if Lebanon's security is endangered.

The Lebanese continue their efforts to crack down on terrorist raids and deprive Israel of any pretext for an

terrorist raids and deprive Israel of any pretext for an attack.

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
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Their failure illustrates the growing

power of Arab commando organizations.

Eban has agreed to meet secretly with Jarring in Zurich this Tuesday and Wednesday. Jarring is telling only the US and the Soviets about the meeting. He hopes word will not get back to the Israelis that we have been informed.

At annex we take a look at some of the ingredients that make the Middle East so explosive at this time.



·	II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS	
	LAOS	
	North Vietnamese forces positioned along the eastern	
	rim of the Bolovens Plateau yesterday attacked the govern-	
	ment garrison at Ban Thateng with heavy mortar fire and	
	limited ground probes. This appears to be a fresh campaign,	
	after a three-week respite, to force the government out of	
	this strategically located position.	50
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	Evidence continues to mount that the Thateng opera-	
	tion is part of a wider Communist effort to reduce the	
	government's presence around the Bolovens.	
	In the north, the enemy is consolidating his hold in	
	the Phou Pha Thi area. North Vietnamese reinforcements	
	have overrun several outlying government bases in recent	
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III. ANNEX

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

The rapid growth of irrational Arab terrorism has become the most aggravating problem in the Arab-Israeli impasse. Terrorist actions are expanding in both frequency and scope. Rivalries between the several terrorist organizations and the irresponsibility of their leadership compound the problem. The growing public popularity of the terrorist movement has left Arab political leaders, such as Nasir and King Husayn, on the sidelines helplessly watching their own influence and power erode. Meanwhile, the terrorists' popularity has forced all Arab leaders into greater cooperation with the terrorists.

50X6

Lebanon, which up to now had managed to remain uninvolved, is the latest victim of this expanding disruptive force. Caught between militants, mostly Muslim, Arab Nationalist elements, and the traditionally pro-Western Christian sector, the country's political leaders have become increasingly paralyzed while awaiting what they believe to be an inevitable Israeli strike. Such an attack could only increase their ineffectiveness and could result in the loss of territory in southern Lebanon.

50X6

The French arms embargo has brought about a contemptuous anger toward France, Israel's old ally and arms supplier. At the same time Israel sees itself threatened by a Soviet-US "peace" deal. Israel fears that the Soviet Union aims at getting it to relinquish the Arab territory it now holds without a firm and durable peace treaty with the Arabs. Moscow probably has several motivations in proposing its peace plan. It wishes to minimize the possibility of another outbreak of war, which could well create a crisis between it and the US. It may also wish to lessen the threat that Moscow's Arab client regimes might be toppled as a consequence of the continued stalemate and the rise of terrorist influence. Of course the USSR would also benefit if the Suez Canal were reopened. What Moscow may not realize is that it may be too late to cut down the terrorist menace to the Arab regimes and that, even if Nasir and Husayn were to make peace, they are not likely to be able to make it stick with the terrorists. Many elements in the several Arab armies sympathize with terrorism. The general Western and US view is that,		• •
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while the plan cannot be accepted <u>in toto</u>, it may provide a basis on which to build.

Jarring's Mission, long nearly moribund, might get a new lease on life because of the Soviet peace proposals. With the active support of the Soviet Union in the peacemaking process, Jarring may feel sufficiently encouraged to continue his conversations with the parties. Thus Moscow's plan may serve to slow temporarily the rapid deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, but the prospects are slim that it can be anything but a palliative, and it may end in hardened positions all around. There will be no letup in terrorism, since the terrorists have no intention of making peace with Israel and the Israelis will stick firmly to their reprisal formula. Thus, a somewhat expanded irregular military action probably will develop.

The chance of another war may increase in the months ahead. Unless the Soviets intervened, any all-out war in the next few months would be lost by the Arabs. The dispersal of aircraft and the extensive building of aircraft shelters by Egypt would probably make an Israeli victory more costly and the war would last much longer than in June 1967. This would open the possibility of an expansion of the conflict.