

# The President's Daily Brief

8 October 1969

( Q

0X1

Top Secret

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/04/27 : CIA-RDP79T00936A007600070001-6

## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The format of *THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF* has been changed. One major objective of the new format is to make more readily apparent the distinction between the essential facts of a situation and CIA's best analytic judgment as to the implications of these facts. To this end, regular typeface will be used to present the facts, and italics for our analytic comment. Italics will also be used to sketch in essential background information, to point up the intelligence problems associated with certain developments, and on occasion for the Director of Central Intelligence's personal observations on particularly sensitive matters.

### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

8 October 1969

#### PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow's willingness to discuss the border problem may take some of the sting out of the propaganda blast that accompanied Radio Peking's announcement. (Page 1)

The Soviet Government, through its mouthpiece, Pravda, has accused the US of "bad faith" in the Middle East negotiations. (Page 2)

The NATO allies have some serious reservations about the US - Soviet draft treaty on seabeds arms control. (Page 3)

|          |       | _     |    |   |     |
|----------|-------|-------|----|---|-----|
| (Tage 4) | India | (Page | 4) | * | 50X |

#### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

#### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

#### COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR

According to a UPI report from Moscow, Vasiliy Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister, will go to Peking on 20 October to discuss the border problem. By responding promptly to Communist China's radio broadcast announcing the talks, and by naming a top-level diplomat as negotiator, the USSR may minimize the impact of the propaganda that accompanied the Chinese announcement.

Radio Peking's statement attempted to place the onus for the present border situation on Moscow and stressed China's constant quest for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Peking's concern over the situation, however, was highlighted by further allusions to "nuclear war threats" by Moscow and a disavowal of any Chinese intent to launch a nuclear attack.

Peking renewed its contention that the present boundary is based on "unequal treaties" imposed on China, but stressed that it "had never demanded" the return of territory lost to Russia--the least provocative presentation of China's basic position to date. The statement then urged that, in the absence of a final settlement, the "status quo of the border" be maintained and such steps as troop withdrawals be taken to avert further armed conflict.

The Chinese announcement is the latest step in a process begun last month at the meeting between Kosygin and Chou En-lai.

the two men

reached a tentative agreement on border discussions. Since then Peking and Moscow have continued a dialogue on the border situation, although Peking initially failed to reciprocate Moscow's stand-down on propaganda after the Kosygin-Chou talks. More recently the Chinese softened their attacks against the USSR during their National Day ceremonies on 1 October, and there has been a sharp drop in Peking's domestic anti-Soviet propaganda.

The proposed border talks will not resolve the fundamental political differences between the two states. Nevertheless, given the tactical flexibility suggested by the Chinese statement, the talks will probably result in steps to reduce the level of tension now existing on the frontier.

50X1

## USSR - MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet press has accused the US of "bad faith" in the Middle East peace negotiations. On 2 October a Pravda editorial signed "Observer"--an indication of high-level authorship or approval-charged that the US had agreed to give Israel more arms at the same time it was carrying on negotiations with the USSR for a Middle East settlement. The editorial also blamed the US for Israel's refusal to implement UN resolutions on withdrawal and its rejection of efforts to arrange a settlement.

The charge of US bad faith has been picked up by other Soviet media. In addition to radio and television commentaries, both Pravda and Izvestiya have warned that Prime Minister Meir's visit to the US has made a peaceful settlement more difficult than ever, accusing the US of "duplicity" and "sabotage."

These articles are clearly intended to keep up pressure on the US and Israel for concessions. There is also a chance, although it is still too early to be certain, that they reflect a new and more gloomy Soviet appraisal of the prospects for a diplomatic settlement.

#### NATO

At the North Atlantic Council meeting on Monday the allies expressed substantial reservations about the US-Soviet draft treaty on seabeds arms control. They did not object to the US offering the document at Geneva, but some members were displeased with the short time afforded them for study. None would endorse the substance of the proposal in its entirety. The allies reserved the right to discuss the treaty further at the NAC and the UN.

The attitudes evident at the NAC meeting indicate the allies will be pressing for a fuller voice in future arms control talks. Those who are also members of the disarmament conference probably will raise substantive objections at Geneva.

|               | NOTES    |  |               |  |
|---------------|----------|--|---------------|--|
| West Germany: | ·<br>·   | <u>and the second </u> |               | 50X1<br>50X1                             |
|               |          |  | ]<br> :<br> . | 50 <b>X</b> 1                            |
|               |          |  |               |  |
|               |          |  |               | 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 |
|               |          |  |               | 50X1                                     |
| India - North | Vietnam: |  |               | 50X1<br>50X1                             |
|               |          |  |               |  |
|               |          |  | 2             |  |
|               |          |  |               |  |

# FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret