

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST



18 JAN. 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1. Dominican Republic

A. We believe General Rodriguez Echevarria can maintain his civilian-military junta only by strong repressive measures. At its inception it faces widespread public repudiation, active opposition of all organized political groups, and disunity within the armed forces themselves. The two Balaguer holdovers intend to repudiate the junta and may soon seek asylum in the US Consulate. Other members have little if any public following and the new regime now depends primarily on individuals discredited during the Trujillo era.

B. We feel the genuine Communist threat is now likely to grow as more Dominicans feel impelled toward violent action which the extremist-controlled 14 of June party is preparing to lead as an underground organization.

C. Rodriguez continues to hold 4 former members of the State Council while pressuring our Consulate to accept a letter to President Kennedy.

2. Djakarta asks for U. Thant mediation with the Dutch

A. Indonesian spokesman say this is the last hope to avoid war. The Dutch success seems to have taken Djakarta by surprise.

[REDACTED] 50X1

[REDACTED] Indonesia would not be prepared for "large scale" operations before late 1962. 50X1

B. Deputy Chief of Naval Staff Sudarso, lost his life commanding the abortive operation on Monday. Jones describes Sudarso as strongly anti-Communist and pro-American.

C. Sukarno, still protecting his rear, has arrested 12 opposition political leaders.

3. Laos

A. No meeting of the Princes yet in Geneva but hope is expressed for a session with the co-chairman by tomorrow. Meanwhile the US-UK-USSR seconds continue to work on their respective and opposing Laotian principals. Boun Oum has rejected the draft protocol provisions on neutrality and the continued French military presence in Laos. [redacted] From the toughness of their stand so far and statements made while transiting Thailand, we suspect Boun Oum and Phoumi may have decided on a separatist effort in southern Laos should an impasse result and we withdraw our support. We know Phoumi has taken contingency steps for a pull-back to Savannakhet and the bulk of Lao regular forces is located in the south. 50X1

B. The Thais, encouraged by our recent reassurances, are discussing Laos prospects more rationally. Still dead against Souvanna, they are now pushing Phoumi's favorite gambit--the King as chief executive. While appreciative of US support, they could not resist one more swipe at SEATO's ineffectiveness.

4. French await new outbreak of Algerian terrorism

A. They expect a major rebel campaign against the Secret Army Organization (OAS) to begin this week end. Although forewarned, security officials doubt they can head it off. Yesterday Paris experienced the heaviest series of OAS bomb incidents this year. They followed announcement of government determination to halt OAS violence in Algeria by any means including use of De Gaulle's "special powers." We believe further deterioration of public order may impel recourse to martial law--a step which would nullify De Gaulle's efforts to reduce direct army involvement in administration.

B. While both sides hope for further progress in negotiations, each believes the other has stiffened its position. The recent Algerian "declaration of war" against French extremists has complicated relations and we do not expect a quick settlement.

5. Soviets badger U Thant
on UN Gizenga action

A. Soviet delegate Arkadev "vehemently" and "heatedly" told off the acting Secretary General, reminding him of Hammerskjold's problems from his attitude toward Lumumba. Thant feels the "honeymoon is over" and expects a follow-up blast from Zorin.

B. Bunche speculates Thant is becoming disenchanted with his post and may not seek re-election in 1963.

C. The Soviets are not the only ones unhappy with the UN's African role.

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS--17 JANUARY 1962

No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

Berlin: Communist military activity, as in recent weeks, does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk serious military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future. Harassments over access and over East-West contacts, however, can be expected to continue.

Laos: Although it is unlikely that there will be any large increase in military activity in Laos while the three factions are meeting in Geneva, localized military engagements will probably continue.

South Vietnam: Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity continues at a high rate, despite counteractions in various regions by government forces. The Viet Cong has the capability of conducting large-scale attacks on preselected targets in some areas of the country at any time.

Indonesia: Following the 15th of January clash between Dutch and Indonesian naval units, Sukarno will probably accelerate preparations for an attack on West New Guinea. Meanwhile he will look for an opportunity to take retaliatory action. He is likely to take a more passive role in arranging negotiations for a political settlement.

Cuba: The possibility of a Cuban air attack on Guantanamo naval base on 21 January, [redacted] is considered unlikely, but the Castro regime may engage in spectacular demonstrations to coincide with the OAS Conference scheduled to begin 22 January.

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NOTES

A. The Panamanian press and radio again publicize demands for full canal sovereignty. President Chiari's coalition government is vulnerable to extremist pressures on this issue should radical leftist and pro-Castro elements choose to push it on the eve of Punta del Este.

B. Yesterday morning, just 24 hours after their previous shot, the Soviets again successfully test-fired a second-generation ICBM--making it four-in-a-row this year. [redacted]

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C. [redacted] Their extended period on station and the December space failure suggest the Soviets have encountered unexpected difficulties in their orbital recovery program. [redacted]

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D. While we note recent signs of indecision and uncertainty in Soviet foreign and domestic policy, our evidence fails to support press speculation that Khrushchev's leadership may be in jeopardy. We believe PRAVDA's attack yesterday on Molotov was aimed at invalidating Western press reports that his return to Vienna indicated rehabilitation and a political defeat for Khrushchev.

E. Sihanouk has confirmed his charges last week of a local Communist plot against his government. He says the matter is serious and has him "deeply worried". [redacted] it has a similar effect on bloc chiefs of mission. Nothing has yet appeared on this in the Cambodian press.

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- G. Guatemala's foreign minister announced reconsideration of a diplomatic break with London over British Honduras and has agreed to "informal" talks in a neutral country--probably the US.
- H. Bent on enhancing Ghana's influence in Africa, Nkrumah is expanding his armed forces. He has ordered a parachute battalion, tank squadron, and three infantry battalions formed this year to supplement his present four infantry battalions. A military delegation is en route to Moscow, reportedly to acquire jet fighters and feelers are being made for Soviet as well as British and American armor.
- I. The Japanese Socialist Party convention opening Saturday brings to a head the bitter struggle for control between the pro-Communist faction and the present moderate leftist leadership. At stake is whether the party emphasizes parliamentary processes or mass action and violence to achieve its ends. Strong adverse public reaction to the extremists recent reaffirmation in Peiping that American Imperialism is the "common enemy" of China and Japan has weakened the pro-Communist bid for control.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE