

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

3 FEB. 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

50X1

1. Laos

No significant changes in the political or military situation have been reported.

2. Argentine situation

The communique issued by Frondizi after yesterday's lengthy session with his service chiefs represents a temporary accommodation, but there is no indication yet that the President has met their basic demand: a complete rupture with Castro. Another round looks inevitable. (Full text of communique attached)

50X1
50X1

3. Congo

b. The UN, anxious to restore some semblance of order in Northern Katanga and Kivu provinces, is getting ready to move in reinforcements.

c. Restiveness among the unemployed in Leopoldville-estimated at 56% of the male labor force-has the government nervous.

50X1

4. European federation currents

The French are the focal point of contrasting pressures:

a. London [redacted]

50X1

[redacted] is not prepared to go beyond the half-way house proposals on political union laid out by the French last October.

50X1

b. The other 5 members of the EEC, on the other hand, have made plain their dismay over a later attempt by De Gaulle to water-down this formula and are pushing hard for something along more supranational lines.

[redacted]

50X1

5. Berlin

Embassy London reports its impression that the British Foreign Office, at least at the working level, is coming to the view that the Soviets have decided to put Berlin on the back burner for the balance of 1962.

[redacted]

50X1

6. Indonesian-Dutch negotiations

a. Djakarta is now banking on getting through to the Dutch in bilateral contacts at various points in Europe, leaving the talks at the UN at a virtual standstill. The shift in Indonesian tactics seems to be based on what we rate an erroneous belief that the Dutch government is internally divided, with a majority ready to concede that talks will deal only with the actual transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian administration.

b. In the meantime, Subandrio, on a rising note of urgency, tells Jones that time is fast running out on the negotiations front. This is doubtless a means of keeping the diplomatic pressure on, but we also believe that the Indonesians have been painting themselves deeper and deeper into a political and emotional corner, and, even though a full-scale invasion is still beyond their reach, air strikes against West New Guinea are not.

7. Italian political maneuvers

Fanfani, following his resignation as premier yesterday, will now try to overcome a last-ditch stand against his coalition plans by the minority right-wing Christian Democrats, who hope to saddle him with a party program which the left-of-center parties cannot buy. Fanfani also faces some tough bargaining over a cabinet line-up with his intended coalition allies. His political footwork will be further tested, but the odds are in his favor.

**8. Portuguese regime's
difficulties multiplying**

a. The anti-government demonstration in Oporto on Wednesday--an estimated 15,000-20,000 took part--was well-organized. Despite elaborate precautions, government forces had all they could do to keep control. Embassy Lisbon sees this as evidence that the opposition is growing in strength, organization and boldness.

b. New reverses in Angola, where the resumption of insurrectionary efforts is in the offing, and elsewhere in Portuguese Africa, would reinforce domestic dissidence.

NOTES

A. Hill has recommended postponement of today's scheduled visit of the USS Van Voorhis to the Dominican Republic in view of government reports that the leftist 14th of June party has plans to involve the crew members in disturbances.

B. It now appears that the Indian Defense Ministry's contested decision to purchase more Soviet transports, 50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

C. We expect some high-pitched Cuban oratory about Guantanamo during Sunday's mass rallies but there is nothing to indicate it will go beyond that.

D. [Redacted]

50X1

E. Lagos conference results: it produced more progress in the area of economic and technical cooperation among African states than seemed possible from an inauspicious start; it further widened the breach between the moderate Africans and the stay-away "Casablanca group."

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

I.

50X1

II.

50X1

III.

50X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE