

# The President's Daily Brief

14 September 1973

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# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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#### PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Laos, the protocol to implement the peace agreement has been signed, but there may be some delay in carrying it out. ( $Page\ 1$ )

The Israelis claim they downed 13 Syrian MIGs yesterday in the first aerial engagement between the two countries since last January. (Page 2)

The junta in Chile is still encountering small pockets of armed resistance in Santiago, but elsewhere the country reportedly is returning to normal. The junta has been too preoccupied with security to consider government policy and organization. (Page 3)

Soviet officials have sought to mask any anxieties they may have about the impact of the Chinese party congress on Sino-Soviet relations. (Page 5)

The allies, now preparing for force reduction talks that begin in Vienna next month, remain divided on a number of major points. (Page  $\theta$ )

Thai Prime Minister Thanom has notified Nationalist China that a new Thai ambassador will be sent to Taipei. This will be regarded by Peking as a setback in its efforts to normalize relations with Bangkok. (Page 7)

Notes on	Scud missile	25 <b>X</b> 1
equipment	at the Soviet port of Nikolayev, and on	
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	e also notes on preparations for a major etnamese transportation effort through	
Luos		25X1
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
#### LAOS

The protocol to implement the February peace agreement has been signed, but there may be some delay in carrying it out.

The coalition government authorized by the protocol will not come into being until it is invested by the King, and that cannot happen until the right-ist-dominated National Assembly approves the protocol. Prime Minister Souvanna anticipates no major problems with the assembly. As a precaution, however, he is planning a parliamentary maneuver designed to gain de facto approval without a formal vote by the deputies.

Neither will key military provisions of the protocol go into effect until investiture is complete. The 60-day period for the removal of all foreign forces from Laos, for example, will not begin until the government is formally organized. Moreover, the neutralization of Vientiane and Luang Prabang-which involves the withdrawal of troops from both cities and the establishment of a joint security force--very likely will be subject to the same delay.

Some military provisions of the protocol, however, such as setting up boundary markers in the countryside, may be implemented before a new government is formed, and planning for others may begin in the interim.



## ISRAEL-SYRIA

In yesterday's dogfight in the vicinity of the Syrian port of Tartus, the Syrians apparently lost 13 MIG-21s and the Israelis one Mirage. According to the Israelis, their aircraft were on a reconnaissance mission over Syria and were intercepted; in the ensuing engagement, nine Syrian and one Israeli aircraft went down. The Israelis say that their efforts to rescue a downed pilot brought on a second engagement in which they got four more Syrian MIGs.

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Damascus

has acknowledged that eight of its planes were hit.

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The Israelis occasionally fly reconnaissance missions over the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia. The current mission may have been an attempt to determine whether the Soviets have delivered any Scud surface-to-surface missiles to Syria;

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such missiles may have been given to Egypt.

It is not clear why the Syrians decided to challenge the Israeli incursions, something they had not done since January, when it cost them six planes. Their heavy losses this time may cause them to think twice in the future.

#### CHILE

The military junta continues to encounter small pockets of armed resistance in industrial sectors and low income areas of Santiago, but elsewhere the country reportedly is returning to normal. Military leaders expect that it will take several days before the city is completely pacified. Arrests and casualties are numerous, and Chilean authorities have been calling urgently for blood donors, medicines, and sanitary materials.

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preoccupied with restoring order to consider govern- ment policy and organization. A major concern at	25X1
the moment is to ensure the distribution of food and fuel throughout the country.	25 <b>X</b> 1
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In an effort to portray an image of normalcy, the government-controlled radio network is broadcasting numerous messages of support from civic, industrial, and professional groups, and denying reports of damage or sabotage of public services. These efforts apparently are also aimed at countering reports being broadcast from a radio transmitter operated by followers of the late President. One such report alleges that former army commander General Prats is leading a column from the south to attack the junta's forces in Santiago. The existence of such a column remains unconfirmed, and Prats is at his home in the capital, according to a government spokesman.

International reaction to the coup continues to be largely critical. Protest demonstrations have been organized in major cities, and several Latin

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American countries have declared three days of official mourning for the death of Allende. Brazil and Uruguay, however, have recognized the new government. At the UN, the Cuban Ambassador has formally requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the attack on the Cuban Embassy in Santiago by the Chilean military.

The USSR has reacted by issuing a statement in the name of the Central Committee sharply denouncing the coup. The statement expresses "full solidarity" with leftist forces in Chile and "firm confidence" that they will continue the struggle. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets see much prospect that the military take-over will be reversed.

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The reaction of Moscow's closest East European allies has been relatively restrained thus far. The two Balkan mavericks--Yugoslavia and Romania--have weighed in with strong condemnations of the coup.

#### USSR-CHINA

Soviet officials have sought to hide any anxieties they may have about the impact of the Chinese Tenth Party Congress on current Sino-Soviet relations. In two recent conversations with US Embassy officers, Soviet officials took the line that the congress marked a victory for Chou En-lai, and that Chou is better than an unknown quantity.

The officials did not mention Chou's strong attacks on Moscow during the congress or Peking's careful endorsement of Sino-American rapprochement. Instead, Viktor Trifonov--a Foreign Ministry China specialist--professed to regard as a positive development the fact that Chou had "left the door open" to the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, and that for the first time this position had been endorsed by the Chinese party. When asked about signs that the USSR might declare that China is no longer a socialist state, Trifonov denied any such intention.

In an effort to encourage caution in the US attitude toward China, Trifonov argued that the congress had touched off a new round of domestic political infighting. He said that Chou's authority probably is unimpaired, but the prospects for continuing his policies are not bright once he passes from the scene. Trifonov claimed that leftist radicals now have the edge among the party vice-chairmen and the politburo's standing committee.

This line suggests the Soviets are concerned that even the appearance of further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations will be exploited by the US.

### NATO - FORCE REDUCTIONS

The allies, now preparing for the force reductions talks that begin in Vienna next month, remain divided on a number of major points.

At the September 12 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the West Germans argued that the concept of imposing a "common ceiling" on NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in central Europe should be introduced early in the negotiations, but that two negotiating phases are necessary to achieve this force reduction goal. The West Germans maintain that the allies should call early for explicit agreement to hold a second phase, making clear that the second phase would primarily involve European rather than US and Soviet forces.

The UK--which has now taken a position somewhat closer to that of the US--has warned that it would be dangerous to try to specify the contents of the second phase. Although the British accept for internal Alliance use the "common ceiling" figure of 700,000 troops, they hope it will not be necessary to mention the figure during the first phase of the actual negotiations. The British think it is a mistake to specify--as the US would like--a two- to four-month duration of the initial round of talks, since experience shows they might drag on a good deal longer.

Turkey, supported by Greece and Italy, continued to voice its fears that force reductions in central Europe could permit Warsaw Pact forces to threaten NATO's southern flank. The Turks have said they may hold up agreement on an allied position if they do not get satisfaction on these points.

NATO has set September 30 as the target date for settling these disagreements. Discussion could continue longer, however, since the force reduction talks themselves do not open until October 30.

# THAILAND-TAIWAN-CHINA

Thai Prime Minister Thanom, reversing an earlier cabinet decision, has notified the Nationalists that a new Thai ambassador will be sent to Taipei.

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the reversal represents an effort to maintain a balance between the "two Chinas." The Thai leaders evidently believe the improved relationship which Bangkok has developed with Peking over the past 18 months can be maintained.

Prime Minister Thanom has consistently had more doubts than other Thai leaders as to the wisdom of improving relations with Peking at Taipei's expense. His views may have been reinforced by the findings of a Thai Foreign Ministry delegation that visited China recently. The Chinese apparently were unwilling to comply with Thanom's demand that they abandon all assistance to Thai insurgents.

More important, Thanom is not under the same pressure he was a year ago when a bandwagon psychology was pushing most Southeast Asian countries toward early recognition of China.

Peking would regard the retention of a Thai ambassador in Taipei as a setback to the normalization of relations with Bangkok, which China has regarded as proceeding smoothly.

# NOTES

USSR-Egypt: the Black Sea port of Nikolayev indicates that equipment for the Scuda surface-to-		25X1 25X1 25X1
surface missile with a range of 160 nautical miles is still in place.  Some of it has not even been moved.	.  -  -	25X1 25X1
HCCD.		25X1
USSR:		25X1 25X1
Indochina: Preparations are under way for a major transportation effort from North Vietnam through Laos soon after the dry season begins next month. A major logistic unit just north of the Ban Karai Pass in North Vietnam reported on August 30 that it had received over 1,200 tons of munitions since the middle of the month—an unusual amount for this time of year. Recent intercepts indicate that two Communist transportation regiments are moving from South Vietnam to the main north—south road corridor through the Laos panhandle.		
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