


THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 OCTOBER 1962
~~TOP SECRET~~



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1. Cuba-USSR

a. We believe Cuba is probably getting IL-28 twin jet light bombers. The IL-28 has a combat radius of about 700 miles with a bomb load of 4400 pounds and external fuel tanks; its top speed is around 400 mph.

b. [redacted] a Soviet ship which arrived in Cuba about 1 October [redacted] carrying ten aircraft crates identical to the distinctive, specially designed crates used to ship IL-28s [redacted].

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c. Several weeks would be required before these bombers could be assembled and made operable.

d. We have one shaky piece of evidence suggesting that Spanish-speaking pilots are receiving training in the IL-28 in the USSR. [redacted]

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2. Cuba-missile sites

a. [redacted] two more surface-to-air missile sites, making a total of twenty.

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b. At least some, possibly many of these sites could now be operational, but we are not sure of this yet.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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d. There is no evidence yet that Cubans are receiving training in any of the military equipment associated with the missile installations in Cuba.

[REDACTED]

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e. [REDACTED] Cuban personnel are being excluded from the missile sites [REDACTED] suggest that security preparations may not yet be far enough along in Cuba.

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
f. In any case, we believe the sites in Cuba will be made operational as soon as construction is finished, with Soviet personnel running them during the rather long (a year or more) transition to full operation by Cubans.

3. Cuba - external relations

a. The Arab delegates at the UN have been putting concerted pressure on Ben Bella not to go on to Havana directly after his Washington visit. They believe they have persuaded him.


b. He seems to be seeking a face-saving formula, and we are now informed he will probably return to New York to pursue his efforts to reconcile differences within the Arab World.

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e. The Alpha 66 raid of last Monday was apparently a flop, except in the organization's press releases. Cuban police reported one time bomb exploded, nobody hurt.

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4. Yemen

a. [redacted]

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[redacted] Sana's leaders last night declared war on Saudi Arabia.

b. The idea is to legitimize the presence of UAR forces by calling into play the "Jidda Pact of 1956, under which Egypt and Saudi Arabia undertook to defend Yemen against outside aggression.

c. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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d. To expedite deliveries to Yemen, Soviet pilots are now flying supplies and equipment in from Cairo in AN-12 conventional transports which have a capacity for upwards of 80 combat-ready troops.


e. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] morale of the government troops is poor.

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
5. Laos

a. The Pathet Lao are trying to get Souvanna's units in the field to back the North Vietnamese charge,



that US troops remain in Laos.

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d. The Pathet Lao have taken violent exception to assembly's grant of full powers to Souvanna to govern for one year. They say the assembly is not an assembly and has no authority to grant such power, but what they really mean is that they have no intention of letting Souvanna exercise full powers, however derived.

e. We are worried by the fact that the ICC team pulled out of Nhommarath on Monday, evidently thinking their job was done.

[REDACTED]

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6. Argentina

a. The Peronists have set their price for cooperation in returning the country to constitutional government.

b. Essentially they want full freedom for political activity including the return of Peron. They also want a new president installed by next May.

c. Since these demands are totally unacceptable to most of the military, they will not help Guido.

7. Brazil

a. Trends, such as they are, are mixed judging from early returns (about a quarter have been tabulated) in Brazil's election.

b. In Sao Paulo the conservative machine is overrunning former president Quadros. Elsewhere, the eleven races for governor are very close, with the conservatives holding a slight edge in all but two.

c. Most of the candidates for the senate are moderates, but in at least three cases where left extremists are running, they are ahead.

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NOTES

A. East Germany Nothing was said in Berlin yesterday when the Soviet party delegation arrived which gives any further clue to what might be afoot within the East German party and government.

B. USSR [redacted]
[redacted]

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C. Britain-EEC The Common Market countries are taking a dim view of intimations from across the channel that the British Labour Party, if and when in power, would not feel bound by any accession agreement. Well founded or not, their doubts will further complicate negotiations.

D. China-India Yesterday's engagement along the McMahan line in the Bhutan-Tibet area was the most severe so far. It was the result, we believe, of India's intention [redacted] to push the Chinese back from positions along the line.

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
USIB WATCH COMMITTEE REPORT -- 10 OCTOBER 1962

1. The United States Intelligence Board's Watch Committee this week saw no cause for altering its conclusion that no Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.
2. Its report notes the combined forces maneuvers in northeast Europe. Otherwise, however, military training activity and the call-up and release of conscripts in Soviet and East European forces are following a normal pattern.

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

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I.



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Congo Review

1. The UN's reconciliation plan for the Congo is making halting progress at best. Amidst the always present mutual distrust and cross purposes, Leopoldville and Elisabethville remain far apart on what the plan is meant to achieve and how it is to be put into effect. At UN headquarters the conviction is growing that new pressures will have to be applied on Katanga in order to break the impasse. Although Tshombé has pledged to Undersecretary McGhee that he is ready to take some of the steps laid out in the reconciliation plan, we have little doubt that he is on the lookout for pretexts to delay full compliance.
2. In the meantime, the strengthening of Katangan military forces goes on. As for Adoula, his success in regaining a hold in South Kasai province has helped him, leaving him still vulnerable, however, to political opponents in Leopoldville bent on unseating him.

Action on the Reconciliation Plan

3. Beginning after Tshombé's acceptance of the UN plan "as a basis for discussion" on 3 September, UN experts called in by Adoula have completed the draft of a new federal constitution. From what we know of its provisions, it is heavier on the side of centralization than anything Tshombé is likely to accept. Although both the US and UN had pressed him to do so, Adoula refused to let Tshombé's people have a hearing before the UN experts while the drafting work was under way.

4. The joint Leopoldville-Elisabethville commissions set up to work out the problems of financial and military integration are still sitting in Elisabethville, but for now are completely at loggerheads, with the central government representatives contending that the only object is to iron out details and the Katangans insisting that the overall issues themselves must be gone into.

Pervading Tensions

5. Tension between the two sides has been sharpened by the UN's dispatch of a Congo army unit under UN command to the Kamina airbase, clashes between UN and Katangan forces near Elisabethville, and by sporadic fighting in North Katanga where Leopoldville is attempting to consolidate its control over the new province of North Katanga.
6. Tshombé has continued to build his military capability. Mercenary strength estimated at 350 last July may have nearly doubled, and Katanga has added a minimum of 10 piston aircraft and possibly some jets. A recent UN recalculation of Tshombé's army strength upped the figure from 12,000 to 18,000.
7. Tshombé at the same time is abetting the hodge-podge of anti-Adoula elements in the Congo parliament who have come out against the UN plan and make no bones about wanting to topple Adoula. Some of these anti-Adoula groups--Gizengists and Lumumbists--are in contact with the Soviet bloc embassies in Leopoldville which are reportedly doling out financial aid.

The McGhee Mission

8. McGhee's four days of talks in Elisabethville (4-7 October) garnered these commitments "on his word of honor" from Tshombé: to go forward on implementation of the UN plan without first agreeing on the constitution; to work for an immediate cease-fire and an oath of allegiance from the Katangan military to the central government; to open the Lubilash bridge on the main route to Leopoldville and to resume telecommunications; to release the non-military part of the UN supplies he has been holding up; to provide financial information to the joint commissions and generally to speed up the meetings.
9. Tshombé was mute, however, on McGhee's suggestion for a manifest of good will in the dispatch of an immediate shipment of copper by way of central government territory and a token revenue payment to Leopoldville. He balked at releasing blocked UN jet fuel, and has since demanded that the UN forces be included in any cease-fire. It was also apparent with respect to the large issues that he will hold out for a loose federal constitution, that he will condition military integration on the withdrawal of Congo army forces from North Katanga and that he will not agree to the 50-50 split of revenues and foreign exchange entailed in the UN plan.

Tshombé's Strategy

10. Tshombé is little awed by the Congo army and he probably believes that well-timed gestures toward the plan will enable him to forestall economic sanctions or a UN military attack. He clearly thinks Adoula's days are numbered and that the UN operation in the Congo will fail. He appears to believe that in the event a more radical government takes over in Leopoldville, the West will be forced to shift its support to him.

Adoula's Position

11. Adoula has lately been able to enter one plus in his ledger. His re-establishment of the central government in South Kasai and the recapture of secessionist leader Albert Kalonji forestalled a possible link-up between Kalonji and Tshombé and gave him a financial boost (Kasai produces an annual \$40 million in industrial diamonds). However, the central government's writ does not run strong much beyond Leopoldville and the Congo's present six provinces are now on the way to subdividing into more than twenty tribal fiefdoms. Nor is this compensation for his failure to bring Tshombé around, which continues to eat away at his political strength and to shake his resolve to stay with the West.
12. Adoula is convinced that Tshombé will not carry through on the UN plan. He told McGhee this would be his last try for a peaceful settlement. If it fails, he says, his only choice will be to ask the UN to pull out, leaving Leopoldville to its own best devices.
13. Adoula has recently sounded out the US on supplying him directly with transport planes and pilots. He has so far given a cold shoulder to Soviet offers of economic and military assistance. But the new Soviet ambassador in Leopoldville is working overtime to persuade Adoula and his colleagues that the UN plan is bound to fail, and we see some evidence that his arguments are not falling on completely deaf ears.