THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 OCTOBER 1962
TOP SECRET
Page Denied
Site of unidentified activity, possibly missile-related

MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CUBA, OCTOBER 1962

- Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
- Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
- Support facility for processing equipment
- Airfield with MiG aircraft
- Coastal defense cruise-missile site
- Effective air defense perimeter (estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
2. Cuba  

a. two more SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites, both in Oriente province. One of these within range of the air approaches to Guantanamo.

b. one of the previously confirmed sites has now been abandoned, making the present total twenty-one.

c. Seven of the twelve sites observed on this occasion now have missiles on launcher; some of these are probably operational.
3. Saudi Arabia - Yemen

a. King Saud has named Crown Prince Faysal prime minister and given him authority to form his own cabinet—which amounts to forced abdication.

b. Jordan's King Husayn has been putting pressure on Saud to intervene in force in Yemen before it is too late.

c. The new regime may now reverse this, however, for the same reason that Saud was persuaded to step aside, i.e., to avert a revolt against the Saudi monarchy which could all too easily be ignited by an adventure into Yemen.
4. Congo

a. Adoula's government is boiling up around him, and may compel him to disavow the accords reached so far.

b. The cabinet is in virtual revolt over what it considers unwarranted liberties taken by UN officials in promoting these deals.

c. The more rabid members are demanding that Adoula issue a statement repudiating the agreements and invite the UN to leave.

d. The government radio is already deprecating as sheer propaganda Tshombe's actions under his commitment to McGhee. It is also saying the cease-fire accord is not binding on the Congo Army, which it says responds only to orders from the central government.

e. Ambassador Gullion has his finger in the dike, hoping that with the arrival of Bunche and the return of Gardiner today, some repair work can be done.
5. USSR

party Central Committee plenum coming up in November.

b. We think Khrushchev intends the session to focus on domestic affairs, presumably including the "major reorganization"

c. We still can only speculate about what this impending reorganization might entail. The only new approach to current problems being floated publicly is the radical Liberman proposal (described in last Sunday's Times) for putting industrial enterprises on a profit rather than plan fulfillment basis.
6. Laos

   a. Souvanna plans next week
to balance off his trip to Bangkok
with one to Hanoi where, he says,
he will pursue the matter of troop
withdrawals. He intends to go on
to Peiping if he can get no satis-
faction in Hanoi.

   b. The matter of German
recognition seems well on its way
to solution with Bonn ready to
recall its ambassador and instead
establish a commercial mission.
Souvanna has promised in this case
not to accord diplomatic recognition
to the East Germans who will also
be limited to a commercial delegation.

   c. Souvanna's relations with
the Pathet Lao continue to worsen.

7. Nationalist
China
NOTES

A. USSR Khrushchev will be making a speech today (the 150th anniversary of Borodino) during which he will touch on foreign policy.

B. South Korea Ambassador Berger warns that a student protest movement against the institution of national standard exams could blow up quickly into a major political crisis.
US INTELLIGENCE BOARD WATCH COMMITTEE REPORT—16 October

1. On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the US Intelligence Board again concluded that no Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

2. On Laos, the Committee noted no evidence that any more North Vietnamese troops have left Laos. It also noted serious friction within the coalition government, but saw no clear sign of early collapse of the government or of renewed hostilities.

3. The Committee also pointed to the likelihood of further serious clashes along the Sino-Indian border.