


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23 August 1956

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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## INDONESIAN ARMY DISCONTENT

Increasing Indonesian army resentment toward the government, highlighted on 13 August by the attempted arrest of Foreign Minister Abdulgani on charges of corruption, is unlikely to result in an attempted coup by dissatisfied army elements in the near future.

Most top military leaders, unlike younger army elements, want to leave the administration in civil hands and have become involved in political matters only when they considered it necessary to safeguard the state or keep military affairs free from politics. Younger army groups, however, increasingly regard a military coup as the only solution to Indonesia's domestic problems.

Army officers are now resentful of high-level army transfers ordered by the chief of staff and cabinet, the corruption among high government officials, and the government's delay in implementing economic, political and military administrative reforms. They distrust the National Party, which heads the cabinet, and many regard the military as one of the few dependable guardians of the state.

Although resentment toward the government undoubtedly is again on the increase, the military is not believed to be sufficiently united to force a change in the government, and there is no support for such an effort from within the coalition cabinet or from the opposition at this time.

Moreover, Colonel Lubis, who has tried to co-ordinate army opposition, relinquished his post of deputy chief of staff on 20 August, and all seven territorial

commanders have either been transferred or are scheduled for reassignment by mid-September. These transfers would appear to strengthen army headquarters and the government.

The army's attempted arrest of Abdulgani on 13 August focused national attention on the problem of corruption, but little more than token remedies are expected. Following a parliamentary resolution demanding an explanation from the cabinet, Prime Minister Ali stated on 15 August that the government would combat corruption "on the basis of law" and "regardless of person." This statement was almost immediately negated by the justice minister, who announced that Abdulgani would not be interrogated--as demanded by the army--when he returns from the London conference.

In an apparent face-saving gesture for the military, it was announced on 20 August that President Sukarno and the government favor the army's suggestion of holding regular meetings with military leaders and that an anti-corruption bill would be forthcoming in the near future.

Should top military leaders or the army's young hotheads improve their position, the government might be induced to make genuine concessions. The army forced the fall of the cabinet in July 1955 and, given an issue which would unite the military and splinter the coalition cabinet, might again force such action. Corruption, however, does not appear to be such an issue, and the scattering of the army's strongest leaders would appear temporarily to weaken the military's potential for action.

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