

The President's Daily Brief

May 22, 1974

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF	
May 22, 1974	$(x_{i},y_{i}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$
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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS	
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MIDDLE EAST

Israeli aircraft yesterday again hit fedayeen positions several times in southern Lebanon and around Hasbaiya near Mount Hermon. An Israeli military spokesman said these actions were part of a "new phase" in Israel's war against Arab guerrillas after the attack at Maalot last week, a statement which probably means that the Israelis intend to continue punitive strikes against fedayeen bases and facilities inside Lebanon.

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raelis also bombed targets near Mahrunah. A press dispatch from Beirut claimed that Lebanese troops engaged an Israeli patrol in southeastern Lebanon, and that Israeli artillery shelled Lebanese positions in the area shortly afterwards.

Fighting on the Golan front continued yesterday at the reduced level of the past few days. Only sporadic exchanges of mortar and artillery fire were reported.

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USSR-LIBYA

The tone of the communiqué marking the end of the visit of Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to Moscow and its failure to mention specific new agreements except for a trade pact suggest that Jallud's negotiations were only partially successful.

Both sides set aside ideological differences to emphasize their common opposition to "imperialist advances" in the Middle East. They undoubtedly hope that the visit will promote the isolation of their mutual antagonist--Egypt's President Sadat. Nevertheless, the characterization of the talks as "frank" and the absence of specifics on the Middle East suggest that the USSR and Libya continue to differ on political tactics in the region.

Jallud undoubtedly discussed military purchases during his meetings with Kosygin and a two-hour session with Defense Minister Grechko, but there was no mention of military sales in the communiqué.

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SOUTH VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese are strengthening their air defenses in the central part of South Vietnam. In recent weeks, increasingly effective Communist fire has downed a number of South Vietnamese aircraft. If the losses continue to mount, Saigon could be forced to restrict its air operations over heavily defended Communist territory, thus giving the Communists a significant local firepower advantage.

In northern MR 3, South Vietnamese aircraft frequently encounter fairly heavy antiaircraft and SA-7 surface-to-air missile fire. The small, shoulder-launched SA-7 has been particularly effective despite its limited range. In the Tay Ninh area, the Communists have downed at least six aircraft with SA-7s since January, including an EC-47 hit on May 13.

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South Vietnamese aircraft operating in MR 3 may soon be facing an even more effective Communist air defense. According to intercepts a North Vietnamese AAA regiment is moving through eastern Cambodia apparently en route to the COSVN area. This unit has fire-control radar, and the South Vietnamese do not have the capability to counter such equipment.

In the western highlands of MR 2, the Communists over the past few months have doubled their air defenses by bringing in two AAA regiments from southern Laos. To minimize losses, South Vietnamese pilots have adopted the tactic of dropping their bombs from higher, safer altitudes, resulting in less accurate bombing.

Since the end of 1973 Hanoi has reduced its air defenses in MR 1, but it still has an imposing force in the region--an air defense division, 16 AAA regiments, and a SA-2 surface-to-air missile regiment. Most of this, however, is concentrated in the two northern provinces of MR 1, an area the government rarely overflies.

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THAILAND

The King will probably decide within the next few days whether to accept the resignation of Prime Minister Sanya and his government. Sanya tendered his resignation yesterday against the advice of his cabinet and presumably of the King as well, and the monarch may hope to persuade him to remain in office until elections can be held in the fall.

However the current cabinet crisis is resolved, it will set back the orderly transition from military rule to democratic government. Many Thai skeptics--especially within the military--will view the present paralysis of the government as characteristic of civilian rule.

There is no obvious candidate to replace Sanya. His resignation, however, may be merely a prelude to a cabinet reshuffle. In recent weeks there has been growing impatience with the government's indecisiveness on economic and administrative problems,

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POLITICAL FALLOUT FROM INDIA'S NUCLEAR TEST

Many countries have just begun to sort out the implications of India's nuclear test for them. It is nonetheless possible at this early stage to point to some of the factors they are likely to weigh in reaching considered judgments as to how they should react.

Initial reaction in India to the nuclear explosion on May 18 has been euphoric. Except for predictable criticism from one communist faction, the event has evoked widespread enthusiasm. This enthusiasm, however, is likely to dissipate before long because of the hardships imposed by growing inflation and food shortages. India's economic problems may even get worse if, because of the test, the country runs into trouble securing new help from New Delhi hopes to receive more than \$1 abroad. billion in additional aid this year to meet the soaring costs of imported petroleum, grain, and fertilizer. The Indians will probably also ask for rescheduling of existing debts.

Pakistan

The slow movement in recent months toward improved Indo-Pakistani relations may be interrupted as a result of the test. Prospects for an early resumption of trade and diplomatic relations are poorer than they were. Islamabad has said it will ask the permanent members of the UN Security Council to provide Pakistan with a "nuclear umbrella,' but the Pakistanis are likely to concentrate on getting support and reassurance from China and the US. While the Pakistanis will probably not go so far as to seek a formal defense treaty with China, they will certainly press Peking to reiterate as strongly as possible China's support of Pakistan's territorial integrity. President Bhutto no doubt would like the CENTO countries to issue a joint condemnation of the Indian test, but his government will not place much reliance on CENTO itself to protect Pakistan's security.

USSR

Moscow's desire to maintain close relations with New Delhi will color the way it handles India's decision to join the nuclear club, but the Soviets too will worry about the implications.

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On the surface, it would appear that India's move is a net plus for the USSR. Moscow and New Delhi are close and the move will enhance India's position vis-a-vis China. Soviet leaders, however, share the concern that as more nations acquire the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, there is a greater danger these weapons may some day be used. They lobbied hard, though unsuccessfully, to get India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and kept on trying to dissuade India from going nuclear.

The Soviets therefore are probably also concerned that, with India's entry into the nuclear club, a close relationship with the USSR may become less useful in Indian eyes. That relationship owes much to India's fear of China; with a nuclear explosion behind them, the Indians may come to feel somewhat better able to stand up to Peking.

The Soviet press will put the best possible face on India's move. Behind the scenes, however, the Soviets will seek reassurance that New Delhi meant what it said when it announced that India would not develop nuclear weapons.

China

Peking will presumably conclude that India has become a more important security problem than before the explosion. An India hostile to China, close to the USSR, and eventually with some kind of nuclear weapons delivery capability could in the long run complicate Peking's strategic situation. The Indian nuclear test thus may add some urgency to China's already evident desire to normalize relations on the subcontinent and improve Peking's position there.

Chinese instincts in favor of a US naval presence in the Indian Ocean and warmer US-Indian ties are likely to be strengthened too. At the same time, Peking almost certainly would hope that the US presence would continue to serve as a restraint on India and the USSR and as an assurance to Pakistan against a nuclear India.

Japan

Tokyo has openly criticized India's test and will probably deliver an official protest shortly. The Japanese are concerned that other countries, particularly Israel, will be tempted to go nuclear. Many

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Japanese believe Moscow encouraged India's move in order to challenge China. The Japanese also are openly skeptical of the "peaceful" thrust of India's nuclear program. The Indian test will strengthen opponents of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Japan.

Israel

Israel's nuclear intentions are shaped by its concept of security in the Middle East, and Tel Aviv will not be influenced much by India's test. The test does, of course, make it psychologically easier for Israel--or indeed any government with the potential--to avow or show that it has a nuclear capability.

Iran

Although the Shah is unlikely to allow the Indian test to affect newly improved relations with New Delhi, he may be miffed at being upstaged by India. Even before the Indian test, the Shah had expressed interest in cooperating with the US to develop major nuclear energy facilities in Iran. So far, Iran has shown no interest in developing weapons-related technology. Unlike India, Iran has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Canada

Last summer, Canada informed India that Ottawa would no longer provide technology, heavy water, fuel, or any equipment designed for use in power reactors that are not covered by safeguard arrangements. Ottawa took this action because New Delhi has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Canada is still committed to assist in the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Rajasthan, which is scheduled to go into service in late 1976. Both Canadian-built reactors use natural uranium and are under safeguard arrangements that preclude their use in a weapons program. Despite Canadian criticism of India's nuclear test, Ottawa has given no sign that it will terminate existing agreements.

Latin America

In Brazil, the Indian test is likely to spur nuclear research and development. To many Brazilians, India has demonstrated that a developing country can achieve at least this attribute of great power status, and comment in the Brazilian press is tinged with admiration. The reaction in Argentina will probably be similar. Neither government has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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