



The President's Daily Brief

July 23, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

July 23, 1975

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EGYPT

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] *President Sadat maintained the tensions surrounding Middle East negotiations with his announcement last night that he has not yet decided whether to approve the extension of the UN forces' mandate in the Sinai, which expires tomorrow.*

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Sadat acknowledged that the Security Council's appeal on Monday for a favorable Egyptian decision indicates a concern about "the gravity of the Middle East situation," but he said that in making its decision, Egypt will take into account the council's responsibility not only for easing tensions but also for "implementing" past resolutions on Israeli withdrawal.

Sadat implied that Egypt still expects the UN to adopt a resolution clarifying that the UN force will not be used to perpetuate the status quo. Foreign Minister Fahmi told Ambassador Eilts yesterday that Egypt still wants an "acceptable" resolution that states the urgency of movement toward a settlement.

Egypt's ambassador to the UN told Ambassador Moynihan yesterday that he expects Sadat to reply to the Security Council's appeal sometime today. If Sadat's response is positive, the Egyptian diplomat says an extension resolution could be based on the most recent UN resolution providing for UN forces in the Sinai, but it must also include a reference to the Security Council's appeal, Egypt's response, and a paraphrase of the Secretary General's recent report on the purposes of the UN force. The US embassy in Cairo has interpreted Sadat's failure to make a decision now on the UN mandate as an indication that he is leaving the door open for an extension.


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Sadat did not mention the status of current negotiations at any point in his two-hour speech. The political congress he was addressing ends tomorrow, and he may speak again at its closing session.

The Israelis interpreted favorably Sadat's avoidance of the subject of negotiations. Quoting "senior observers" in Israel, Jerusalem's international news service reported their initial impression that Sadat is still interested in negotiations for an interim agreement and wants to keep the UN forces in Sinai.

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Israeli Defense Minister Peres told the Knesset yesterday that he was "taking seriously" the movement of Jordanian troops from the Syrian border to the Jordan River opposite Israeli forces. [redacted]

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[redacted] while the Jordanian deployment was "admittedly" of a "defensive nature," it could quickly change into an offensive posture. Peres did not suggest that Jordan had moved additional forces toward the Israel front over the past few days; rather he seemed to have had in mind movements that occurred over a month ago.

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
TURKEY

Opposition criticism of the Demirel government's decision to postpone action against the US bases has been neither as severe nor as sustained as the government had feared.

One leader of the opposition Republican People's Party has told a US embassy official that the party was exercising restraint because of the realization that there is little sentiment in Turkey for loosening ties with the US. Our embassy believes that Republican leaders do not want to open themselves to the charge that they forced the government to retaliate against US installations.

The Turkish government, despite this rather mild reaction, probably still believes that domestic political pressures require a new defense cooperation agreement with the US. According to the latest assessment from our embassy, the content of the new agreement will depend on the outcome of the Congressional debate on the arms embargo. Our embassy in Ankara believes the Turks will probably announce some form of provisional status for US installations as early as the end of this month, pending renegotiation of the defense agreement.

ANGOLA



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NOTES

An effort by troops of Angola's National Front to drive on Luanda has stalled near Caxito, 40 miles northeast of the capital, an area dominated by the rival Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

The Portuguese military [redacted] in Luanda [redacted] protect it against an offensive by the Front. [redacted] help defend the city for the Popular Movement if the National Front marches on the city. Recent substantial Soviet arms deliveries to the Popular Movement and harsher press treatment of the rival National Front indicate that Moscow is more firmly casting its lot with the Movement. [redacted]

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Two Portuguese Socialist Party officials' rejection of a request that they join the cabinet apparently reflects their party's continued commitment to a joint strategy with Revolutionary Council moderates of preventing Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves from forming a new government.

The two Socialist leaders [redacted] declined to accept cabinet posts [redacted]. The Prime Minister's position was further eroded by the refusal of three other non-communist members of the former cabinet to take posts proffered by Goncalves, and by the desertion of his key leftist economic advisers. Anti-communist mobs, meanwhile, defied the Revolutionary Council and continued to attack Communist Party headquarters and officials in northern and central Portugal.

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Amintore Fanfani yesterday resigned as leader of Italy's Christian Democratic Party after losing a vote of confidence at its national council meeting.

If he is replaced with another individual, rather than the "collegial leadership" desired by Prime Minister Moro, the new leader will almost certainly be a moderate who has reached an agreement with the party left. By ousting Fanfani, the Christian Democrats have met one of the conditions the Socialists have set for their joining a new center-left coalition government. The Socialists also want the Christian Democrats to shift their policies to the left and begin formally to consult the Communists on the content of the government's program.

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The two Soviet cosmonauts aboard Salyut-4 are planning to leave their space station on Saturday for the return trip to Earth after 63 days in space.

This mission sets a new Soviet record for manned space flights, but it falls short of the 84-day record set by the crew of Skylab-4 in 1974.

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Canada plans to close its ports on the east coast to the Soviet fishing fleet after July 28, according to the Canadian ambassador in Moscow.

The Canadians intend to take this step because of "consistent and flagrant" violations of existing fishing agreements and the failure of the Soviets to respond to 15 official approaches made by Canada. The Trudeau government has been under heavy pressure from its fishing industry and political leaders in the maritime provinces to halt overfishing by foreign fishing fleets--especially Soviet and Japanese--in Canada's North Atlantic waters. The Soviets appear to be the principal violators.

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CSCE: A BALANCE SHEET AND FUTURE IMPACT

The summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is the culmination of negotiations that were frustrating as well as educational for all participants. For the Soviets the route to the summit was longer and bumpier than they anticipated. Nevertheless, they can, with some justification, view the successful conclusion of the conference as a triumph for their diplomacy. Moscow will gain more credit than anyone else for having persuaded the heads of 35 states to come to Helsinki in the name of European security. For Brezhnev, in particular, it will be a welcome accomplishment only six months before the next, and probably his last, party congress.

Soviet gains derive, in a sense, from the process of CSCE rather than from any specific wording of the document to be signed. In return for Western endorsement of the principle that post - World War II borders are inviolable, the Warsaw Pact states in principle accepted some constraints on their future behavior. The burden of implementing the agreements covering expanded human contacts, increased cooperation, and a reduction of political and military tensions will fall primarily on the communist states--but the pertinent articles give them considerable leeway on interpretation.

Constant exposure to the negotiating tactics of the Soviets was a useful reminder to the Europeans of the limits of detente diplomacy. The maintenance of solidarity throughout the negotiations was a major Western achievement.

The Inviolable Borders Question

The reason for Moscow's 20-year quest for inviolable frontiers in Eastern Europe rests in Soviet insecurity--a concern greater than would seem appropriate given the military balance in Europe, but nonetheless real. If the Soviet achievements at CSCE seem to be in the areas of atmosphere, psychology, and perception, they are no less meaningful to Moscow.

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The Soviets made a number of concessions in the wording of the CSCE agreement, but it may be that none was as significant as the unwritten obligation they assumed. The kinds of gains the Soviets have made at CSCE are exploitable only if the atmosphere remains undisturbed in Europe and Soviet behavior remains within the limits of acceptability. While no one would argue that CSCE will prevent the Soviets from taking any action that they considered vital to their interests, the CSCE atmosphere could have an effect on how Moscow weighs the pros and cons of any significant destabilizing action. There will almost certainly be differences within the Soviet leadership and between the USSR and the West over what is permissible, and the burden will be on the West to keep the margins as narrow as possible.

The Soviets also made some significant concessions to get CSCE. Before the conference began, Moscow had to:

- work out a satisfactory agreement on Berlin;
- accept US and Canadian participation;
- agree to enter the force reduction talks (MBFR).

In the conference itself, they were compelled to accept the idea that a CSCE agreement would include more than a statement of amorphous principles; indeed, it would cover tangible areas of considerable sensitivity to a closed society. There is good ground for skepticism about the practical consequences of the Soviet concessions of freer movement of people and ideas and the military-related "confidence-building measures." Nonetheless, the Soviets have, for the first time, accepted the principle that such matters are legitimate concerns of the European community and a legitimate part of "European security."

Movement of People and Ideas

CSCE was made possible when the participants agreed to trade recognition of the inviolability of frontiers for improvements in the "freer movement of people and ideas." In a sense, this represented an exchange of present realities for future possibilities. The West calculated that, while it was indicating acceptance of Europe's division, it might at the same time set in motion processes that could eventually attenuate that division.

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The Soviets did everything possible, short of scuttling the conference, to minimize their obligations on freer movement of people and ideas. In long months of tough bargaining, the West gradually retreated from its far-reaching objectives. Most of the surviving provisions are couched in terms of intent rather than obligation. The operative verbs are usually "intend," "hope," "encourage," "facilitate," "study." The Soviets consistently, and successfully, opposed inclusion of the verb "will."

Furthermore, many of the articles contain other escape hatches for the Soviets. The provision on improved working conditions for journalists, for example, contains a clause barring expulsion of journalists engaged in professional activity, but it adds the proviso that their activity must be "legitimate." In the USSR, the Soviets will determine what is legitimate.

The texts are divided into two broad categories: "human contacts" and "information." The Soviets, in assessing the risks involved in these items, probably employed a different division, distinguishing between provisions affecting Soviet citizens directly and those concerning the activity of foreigners in the Soviet Union. In the first category are statements dealing with family reunification, marriage between nationals of different states, travel, radio broadcasting, and other activities related to the dissemination of information. The second category consists primarily of improved working conditions for journalists, although items such as travel and tourism also fall into this category.

The Soviets negotiated hard to neutralize the impact of both texts, but if past experience is a guide they will be more concerned about provisions affecting Soviet citizens. The article facilitating marriage between nationals of different states is not likely to be particularly troublesome because the number of cases will probably remain small. The provisions dealing with family reunification and "contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties" may be more difficult because of increased emigration in recent years. The Soviets are not, however, obligated actually to increase the flow of emigrants. Furthermore, these provisions, as well as clauses having to do with travel, tourism, contacts among professional and religious groups, and similar subjects, are well covered in Soviet law, and there is little doubt that Moscow will apply its law to whatever degree is necessary to maintain control.

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On radio broadcasting, the CSCE text does little more than apply pressure on the Soviets to refrain from reinstating the jamming of Western broadcasts. Moscow stopped most jamming just as the second stage of CSCE was beginning, obviously in an effort to eliminate the topic as a source of contention.

Such provisions are not likely to affect the Soviet political order, nor are they likely to touch the lives or the imagination of the USSR's people. They will, however, raise certain problems. Any tough Soviet statements or actions against individuals whose plight gets attention in the West will be viewed as a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of CSCE. There is a good chance that Soviet dissidents will seize on CSCE provisions to argue their cases, and resorting to legalisms or the various escape clauses in the CSCE document will not get the Soviets off the hook. Western publicity will be the main weapon in the arsenal of Soviet citizens seeking greater personal freedom. In short, the Soviets are more vulnerable to the cause celebré than they were before CSCE.

Future Impact on the East

With CSCE out of the way, at least until 1977, the Soviets will now turn to other multilateral forums to keep the process of detente moving forward. They are already talking about the necessity for complementing political detente with "military detente," and their public focus no doubt will now shift to Vienna and the MBFR negotiations.

Moscow, however, will feel itself under no special pressure to make concessions to the West in Vienna as a result of CSCE. The once tight linkage between the two negotiations has disappeared, and the West will lose the option of trying to use Soviet intent in CSCE as a lever for progress in MBFR.

The Soviets may do more to promote regional agreements in Europe. Some manifestations of this have already been seen in the revival of Soviet interest in the long-dormant proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia and the first tentative probes toward becoming involved in Nordic economic cooperation. It is conceivable that the Soviets may eventually undertake similar initiatives in the Mediterranean. On a broader front, they may revive their proposal for a world disarmament conference. A major thrust of Soviet activity in the post-CSCE era will be outside the sphere of official conferences and multilateral initiatives. In particular, the Soviets will push for advancement of their idea for pan-European trade unionism.

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The Soviets have some work to do within the communist movement in Europe as a result of CSCE. They have been heavily engaged in organizing a meeting of the European Communist parties. One purpose of this meeting is to strengthen Moscow's voice on the ideological front in anticipation of post-CSCE pressures. In addition, the Soviets would like to have a more influential voice in determining the priorities, tactics, and policies of the various West European Communist parties. The growth in the influence and the potential governing role of these parties give Moscow more reason than before to do what it can to make sure that their activities contribute to, rather than complicate, Soviet policies.

Future Impact on the West

Almost three years of hard negotiations have tempered Western expectations for CSCE. West Germany, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, the Belgians will value CSCE for what it did not do. Their primary goal, for domestic political reasons, has been to block any external interference in their political affairs and assure that CSCE could not be used to hinder progress toward West European unity.

In West Germany, the coalition government may come under attack from the Christian Democrats and some West Berlin politicians for not securing stronger language preserving Bonn's right to achieve national reunification through peaceful means, but it should be able to ride out such protests.

The conference poses a dilemma for other Western states such as the UK, France, and Italy. Detente has become an important part of their foreign policies, and they cannot afford to dismiss the conference as inconsequential. On the other hand, too much emphasis on the positive results of CSCE could encourage overblown expectations for detente, weaken West European resolve, and increase pressures for reductions in defense expenditures. Detente euphoria could conceivably increase pressures on the West for concessions in the force reduction talks.

Concern in some Western quarters about such euphoria, however, appears exaggerated at this stage. The prolonged bargaining at CSCE has probably reinforced the predilection in the West to assume very little, be patient and, above all, maintain solidarity.

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In summary, the agreements that will be signed in Helsinki touch on virtually all areas of critical interest to Europe. But they will not in themselves have a decisive impact on European events, and the future course of detente in Europe will be much more affected by:

- the maintenance of West European solidarity and, in particular, the unity of the EC Nine;
- continued West European cooperation with the US;
- the possible emergence of new leadership in Moscow;
- the growth of economic interdependence between East and West;
- the progress of force reduction and strategic arms negotiations;
- the reaction to increased communist influence in Europe, particularly in Portugal and Italy;
- increased competition for influence in the Mediterranean; and
- development of a growing community of interest among the poorer states of southern Europe that could increasingly turn the attention of richer north European leaders inward.

These problems illustrate how difficult it may be to move beyond the stage of cold-war confrontation into the new era of negotiated detente presaged by the CSCE. The CSCE agreements will not assure this outcome, but at least they provide a touchstone measuring the commitment of both East and West to further this process.

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