



# The President's Daily Brief

October 31, 1975

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## LEBANON

*Fighting diminished in all sections of Beirut yesterday following an early-morning announcement of yet another cease-fire. Prime Minister Karami has threatened that he will resign if this agreement is not respected.*

Karami won approval of the accord at a meeting on October 29 of Lebanese leftist and Muslim politicians and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Lebanese internal security force, and the Lebanese army. Leaders of the large Christian political parties did not attend but had offered assurances that they would respect a new cease-fire.

Prior to the cease-fire, the Christian militias were gradually being driven from their forward positions in central Beirut and the city's Western hotel district. These setbacks resulted from the continued strengthening of leftist forces with increased numbers of commandos from the large fedayeen organizations.

Christian elements are said to have withdrawn and allowed internal security force units to replace them in one major hotel, and were negotiating a similar withdrawal from two others. Leftist forces reportedly also withdrew some distance, but they were in a stronger position than before the clashes spread into the area last weekend. The Phalangists now may be willing to engage in more serious political negotiations. At a minimum, a round of private talks would allow time for the Phalangist militia to regroup and obtain additional arms and ammunition.

The terms of the latest cease-fire are much like those of several previous accords, but they include a threat that the government radio will for the first time publicize the identity of persons or groups responsible for cease-fire violations. Although this tactic ordinarily would not intimidate the offending parties, they may in this case be sensitive to the fact that Karami has identified himself with this novel scheme.

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Karami almost certainly does not want to resign. He presumably put his job on the line to demonstrate that he has run out of ideas for solving the present crisis, but in the expectation that he would be urged to stay on. In fact, Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat immediately appealed to Karami to remain in office.

Arafat reportedly played a central role in negotiating the new cease-fire, and Fatah units were immediately instructed to adhere strictly to the terms of the accord. Violations of the agreement by Lebanese radicals and fedayeen rejectionists could be interpreted by Arafat as a slap at him, and might ultimately lead to more forceful efforts by the major Palestinian groups to control the rejectionists.

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## PORTUGAL

*The government, which has had some success in recent days combating military indiscipline, was presented with a new challenge yesterday when Lisbon's main arsenal was seized by troops charged with its security.*


The rebels issued a statement saying they had too few men to guarantee the security of the arsenal. Their action probably is related to wider concerns expressed by leftist military elements over the demobilization of the army. Eighteen percent of the army will be discharged today, and another 9 percent are scheduled for demobilization on December 2. The left has protested that these reductions are designed to transform the army into a reactionary corps.

Leftist military groups have been losing momentum recently, and efforts to keep pro-government military regional authorities under pressure have been somewhat less than successful. Two rallies this week sponsored by radical military elements were poorly attended and generally unimpressive. In contrast to the waning leftist fortunes, anti-Communists in the military appear to be organizing themselves more effectively. Officers sympathetic to the anti-Communist faction of Foreign Minister Antunes have formed a "Single Military Front" to combat radical attempts to bring down the Azevedo government.

The left also is losing ground on the civilian front. Dissident employees of a Communist-influenced Lisbon newspaper occupied the paper's editorial offices on Wednesday and demanded the removal of the left-wing management. Earlier this week the anti-Communist employees won by a 4-to-1 margin a vote to dismiss the pro-Communist management committee.

The Azevedo government is unlikely to move against the anti-Communist workers, since their action is consistent with its recent efforts to loosen the Communist grip on the press. The Prime Minister might even use the incident as an excuse to revamp the management of other left-leaning newspapers. He is particularly anxious to bring the left-wing press under control, since it is largely responsible for stirring up political tensions in Lisbon and spreading reports of alleged plots to return the country to right-wing rule.

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
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
ANGOLA

*The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola reportedly are preparing to form a provisional government that would unilaterally declare Angola independent. The move would be aimed at countering an expected similar declaration by the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.*

National Union leader Jonas Savimbi told US officials in London this week that he expects the Popular Movement to claim sole sovereignty on November 11. Savimbi indicated that his group and the National Front intend to declare their own government and to continue fighting the Popular Movement while seeking international recognition. Savimbi professed to believe that such a government could win a reasonable amount of international support. Its formation would also provide an excuse for countries to remain neutral if they did not want to recognize a Popular Movement government.



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All three liberation groups have unequivocally rejected a pre-independence coalition. Between now and independence the National Front and the National Union intend to mount major offensives designed to discredit the Popular Movement's claims to control all important areas of Angola.

Cooperation between the National Front and the National Union would be, at best, tenuous. Relations in the field between troops of the two movements are frequently strained, and if these differences were allowed to worsen it could seriously impede operations against the Popular Movement. The National Union's secretary for foreign affairs has reservations about the National Union's future relations with the National Front, and these reservations undoubtedly are shared by Savimbi. Furthermore, the National Union continues to believe an ultimate political settlement must include all three liberation groups, since no single group or combination of two of them can expect to govern successfully a country as sharply divided tribally as is Angola.

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## EGYPT

*President Sadat and other Egyptian officials are ambivalent about their position in the Arab world as a result of the second Sinai disengagement agreement. At times, they exhibit confidence that Egypt retains the support of most Arab states despite Syria's vitriolic criticism; on other occasions they show deep concern that the agreement has undermined Egypt's position of leadership and that as long as Syria and the Palestinians remain unsatisfied by negotiations, the Arab mainstream will not look toward Egypt for moral and political guidance. In fact, views of the other Arab states are not clear-cut.*

The Egyptians have not been hurt materially; no Arab state has cut off critically needed aid as a result of the disengagement. Only Syria, Iraq, and the Palestinians have officially denounced the agreement in public. None of the Arab states, with the exception of Syria, wants to risk burning its bridges with Egypt at this point.

On the other hand, few of the Arab states have supported Egypt with public statements. Sudan alone has repeatedly given open backing to Sadat and to the agreement. Saudi Arabia and Morocco initially praised the agreement, but since early September the silence from Riyadh and Rabat has been deafening. No Arab government has officially stood up to defend Egypt against the charges of treason that daily emanate from Syria, and none has seen fit to censor the anti-Egyptian criticism that is now the standard fare of virtually every Arab country's press.

The reaction among the Arabs is almost a reflex. None of them, no matter what their basic sympathies, wants to be seen condoning Egypt's compromises with Israel at a time when Syria and the Palestinians label accommodation treasonous. The impression left is of a subtle but steady erosion of Egypt's moral leadership. So far, this erosion has had no tangible effect, but it is gradually undermining Egypt's ability to exert a moderating influence on the Arabs.

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Saudi Arabia's position is typical. The Saudis understand Sadat's reasons for seeking the second Sinai agreement, and they continue to support him both materially and, in a quiet way, politically. They have given no indication that they intend to cut off their material support, which is critical for Egypt. Indeed, Saudi officials have recently urged the US to get on with arms deliveries to Egypt, for which Saudi Arabia would foot the bill. The Saudis are, nonetheless, caught in a political dilemma as a result of the Sinai agreement that could at some point weaken their will to continue material or moral backing for Egypt.

The Saudis are now skeptical, despite their sympathy for Sadat, that Egypt any longer intends to be part of the Arab struggle. Riyadh would be reluctant to continue supporting Egypt if this meant risking its own relatively new identification with the Arab cause. If the Saudis come to believe that Egypt has abandoned the cause through the Sinai agreement, and particularly if they become a target of Arab propaganda attacks along with Egypt, they will place their bets where their status as Arabs in good standing will be safe--with Syria and the Palestinians.

Jordan similarly is caught in the middle. The Jordanians worry about the possible implications of Egypt's isolation from the Arab world, and they, perhaps better than any other Arabs, appreciate Egypt's moderation and its desire to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are the only Arabs who have attempted to mediate between Egypt and Syria. But by its rapprochement with Syria earlier this year, Jordan had already cast its lot with Damascus, and its efforts to mediate have been half-hearted at best. The Jordanians have allowed their press to denounce Egypt and the Sinai agreement, and Prime Minister Rifai has permitted himself to be associated with Syrian statements criticizing the accord. Although Jordan has thus far avoided direct official criticism, King Husayn recently went on record in an American magazine interview

with a statement expressing reservations about the wisdom of Sadat's acceptance of the disengagement.

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
Of the other key Arab states, Algeria and the oil producers on the Persian Gulf also have adopted ambivalent positions. Because all are on the periphery of the Arab-Israeli dispute, none of these states has a direct interest in how negotiations are conducted, whether by the step-by-step method or through a multilateral approach. The principal interest of all these states, but particularly of Algeria and Kuwait, lies in ensuring that the Palestinians receive full satisfaction. None of them is prepared to denounce Egypt or the disengagement or to sever aid relationships with Egypt while Syria and the Palestinians retain hope of obtaining something from negotiations themselves. But, like the Saudis, these states are increasingly doubtful that Egypt remains dedicated to the Arab--particularly the Palestinian--cause, and are therefore increasingly doubtful that negotiations will be successful on other fronts. They will not speak out in defense of Egypt while the Syrians and the Palestinians remain unsatisfied.

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USSR-EGYPT


*Soviet-Egyptian relations have reached their lowest point since the 1952 Egyptian revolution*

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


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Moscow has demonstrated continuing nervousness over the future of the treaty. Pravda, in a scathing denunciation of Egyptian policies and Sinai II on the eve of President Sadat's arrival in the US this week, went to great lengths in alleging that it was Sadat himself who had called for the 1971 accord.



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NOTES

Syrian forces on the Golan Heights apparently remain on a high state of alert.

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Japan wants to sign a formal grain pact with the US to supersede the letter of intent signed last August which provided for the sale of at least 14 million tons of grain a year for three years.

Tokyo did not press for a more formal pact last August, but agriculture officials now feel a formal grain agreement will make it easier to win Japanese farmers' support for concessions at the multilateral trade negotiations. Japanese officialdom has uniformly applauded the US-Soviet grain agreement as contributing to the stabilization of the international grain market. They also are pleased with the escape clause, which assures that in poor crop years the US will honor its export commitments to Japan while cutting back exports to the USSR. The signing of the US-Soviet grain agreement has intensified interest in a binding US-Japan contract.

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*Two days of talks on Spanish Sahara among Spanish, Moroccan, and Mauritanian officials were suspended yesterday without any sign of progress toward a settlement.*

Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki reaffirmed Morocco's opposition to the inclusion of Algeria in the talks. The Algerian delegation, led by one of President Boumediene's closest advisers, has been holding parallel talks with Spanish officials and was still in Madrid when the Moroccan delegation left for home. The Algerians presumably are reiterating their position that the principle of self-determination for Spanish Sahara must not be ignored. Foreign Minister Bouteflika apparently is making similar demarches to UN Secretary General Waldheim in New York. Saharans would almost certainly opt for independence in any fair referendum.

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*Bangladesh President Mushtaque has joined other government figures in expressing deep concern to US officials in Dacca about Indian intentions toward his country.*

In a conversation on October 29 with Deputy Assistant Secretary Dubs and Ambassador Boster, Mushtaque accused India of recently increasing the number of troops on the Bangladesh border, stirring up trouble at Dacca University and elsewhere, and aiding a band of antigovernment guerrillas led by a supporter of former president Mujib. The President said he is presently able to manage these situations but is worried about what India may do in the future.



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*China has decided to transfer some provincial party chiefs to new provinces.*

Thus far, we have information on only one three-way shuffle, but according to some Chinese officials, more transfers are in the offing as an effort to prevent the provincial leaders from developing independent power bases. A widespread rotation of provincial party leaders, most of whom are civilians, also could be intended as a sop to the military. Several military men at the regional and district level have been relocated to remove them from their power bases. The transfer probably was not popular with some military men, but they may be placated somewhat by seeing similar rotations among their civilian counterparts.

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Spain's need for an active head of state, plus the near certainty Franco will not recover, apparently convinced Prince Juan Carlos yesterday to become temporary chief of state.



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The problem has grown more acute because of differences within the government over policy toward Spanish Sahara. Juan Carlos probably consented with a tacit understanding that his rule will be temporary in name only, thereby preserving his image and the future of the monarchy. He is expected to preside over a cabinet meeting today.

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