

# The President's Daily Brief

June 14, 1976

2

Top Secret 25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013400010028-8

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3) declassified only on approval of the Director of Central Intelligence June 14, 1976

#### Table of Contents

<u>Lebanon-Syria</u>: Syria shows no sign of easing its military pressure on the Palestinian and Lebanese leftists, despite its agreement in principle to a withdrawal plan worked out by Libyan Prime Minister Jallud. (Page 1)

Arab League Secretary Riyad continues to play out the pan-Arab mediation charade. (Page 1)

25X1

(Page 2)

2)

25X1

Syria-Iraq: The Syrian Baath Party newspaper published Damascus' version of the proposed political agreement Syria has been negotiating with Libya, Algeria, and Iraq. (Page 2)


Damascus will attempt to continue its talks with the Libyans in the hope that it can win some financial assistance.  $(Page\ 3)$ 

Rhodesia: Government forces have again attacked guerrillas across the border in Mozambique. ( $Page\ 4$ )

Notes: France-FTAI; India-USSR; Egypt-Syria (Pages 5 and 6)

At Annex we present the key points of an interagency intelligence memorandum on communist military assistance to the Rhodesian insurgent groups and their supporters in Tanzania and Mozambique.

#### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



LEBANON-SYRIA: Syria shows no sign of easing its military pressure on the Palestinian and Lebanese leftists, despite its agreement in principle on Saturday to a withdrawal plan worked out by Libyan Prime Minister Jallud. The Syrians apparently are playing along with the Jallud effort to gain time to resupply their forces in the Beirut area.

The Jallud plan calls for total Syrian withdrawal within 10 days and, as a first step, Syria's agreement to lift its siege of Beirut. Some Syrian and Saiqa forces were pulled out of the city on Saturday, but these were regrouped around the Beirut airport. The city remains under effective Syrian siege.

No major Syrian withdrawals occurred elsewhere, and Syrian forces stepped up their attacks in the mountains east of Beirut and in the vicinity of Rashayya, where they overran two fedayeen camps used for staging raids on Israel. Syrian troops were also fighting in the town of Rashayya vesterday.

the Syrians are continuing to consolidate 25X1 their control in the Bekaa Valley by arresting both Palestinian and Lebanese Arab Army elements and transporting them to Damascus.

The Syrian navy apparently has resumed searching ships off the Lebanese coast.

25X1

Arab League Secretary Riyad continues to play out the pan-Arab mediation charade. Riyad has admitted, however, that no action has been taken to determine even the size of an Arab peace-keeping force. Riyad also stipulated that no Arab force would be allowed to enter Lebanon without the approval of the Lebanese president and until there was an effective cease-fire.

Both conditions are tantamount to admitting that the Arab League can do nothing but allow Syria a free hand in Lebanon. Lebanese President Franjiyah has repeatedly denounced the Arab League effort, and president-elect Sarkis has no authority to call in the force.

--continued

1

### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

25X1

25X1

no

Libyan, Algerian, or Sudanese peace-keeping contingents have entered Lebanon.

SYRIA-IRAQ: The Syrian Baath Party newspaper yesterday published Damascus' version of the proposed political agreement Syria has been negotiating for a month with Libya, Algeria, and Iraq. The disclosure was intended to counter Iraq's charge on Friday that Damascus has reneged on a commitment to allow Iraqi forces to enter Syria.



25X1

25X1

Syria's account of the agreement makes clear that Damascus told Libyan leaders that Syria would under certain conditions accept Iraqi forces on Syrian territory and declare Syria's "noncommitment" to two UN Security Council resolutions that are the basis for the Geneva Middle East peace talks. The Syrian statement also makes clear, however, what the Libyan intermediaries probably did not tell Baghdad: that Damascus was demanding prior political coordination, financial support, and a unified military command to include all four states.

According to the Syrian account, even these preliminary steps would be implemented only after they had been considered and approved by a joint political-military-economic committee that would meet in Tripoli, endorsed at a four-party summit conference of the states involved, and presented to a summit conference of all Arab heads of state.

Damascus obviously hoped to elicit immediate and badly needed political and economic support from the radical Arabs, but at the same time avoid making any real concessions. Syria's conditions would have taken years to implement even if Damascus intended to follow

--continued

Damascus will attempt to continue its talks with the Libyans in the hope that it can still win some financial assistance and protect against the possibility that Tripoli or Algiers might adopt a pro-Palestinian stand in the Lebanese negotiations.

through. Given its current political and security interests, Syria is not prepared either to allow Iraqi forces to enter Syria or to reject the two UN resolutions.

Unlike the Libyans, the Iraqis appear to be convinced that Syria will make no concessions, and Baghdad is intensifying its propaganda attacks on Damascus. Iraq is condemning Syria for backing out of its agreement with the radical Arab states and for abandoning the struggle against Israel to attack the Palestinians.


Iraqi officials insist, however, that if Syria does not give approval for Iraq's forces to enter Syria, Baghdad will consider the current buildup a training maneuver and will later return the units to their permanent locations. The Iraqis' equivocal statements tend to confirm that Baghdad has massed its forces in the border area primarily to force Syria into withdrawing its troops from Lebanon.

cate that major elements of at least five Iraqi divisions, in addition to a surface-to-air missile brigade, have now moved into the border region. We do not yet know the actual size of the Iraqi force, but it probably totals at least 20,000 to 30,000 men.

In response to the Iraqi moves, \$\frac{1}{25}\times1\$
Syrians apparently have sent at least two brigades--one of them armored--an SA-6 missile unit, and some aircraft to the border area. The aircraft have already begun to fly reconnaissance missions along 25X1 the border.

--continued

3



25X1

The US defense attache in Amman reports that Jordanian aircraft are flying daily reconnaissance missions over southwestern Iraq.

25X1

RHODESIA: Government forces have again attacked guerrillas across the border in Mozambique.

A government statement issued over the weekend provided no details, but the Salisbury press reports that the air force attacked the Mozambican border town of Espungabera on Thursday. The government acted after mortar and rocket fire hit a tea plantation near the border in southeastern Rhodesia.

Both the air force and Rhodesian irregular force units have occasionally crossed into Mozambique to attack guerrillas and Mozambican forces stationed with them in the border area.

Most of the new government troops mobilized in recent weeks have been sent to the southernmost of three operational areas. Officials hope to "clean up" the southern zone first and then move additional forces into the central sector.

Small insurgent groups are active in widely scattered areas of eastern Rhodesia. One group reportedly clashed with security forces over the weekend at Macheke, 100 kilometers (60 miles) from Salisbury.

--continued

4

#### NOTES

France has reached agreement on government reorganization with the three principal political groups in the French Territory of the Afars and the Issas. Paris hopes this will lead to formation of a broadly-based government better able to resist Somali efforts to annex the territory.

The agreement, reached after two weeks of talks in Paris, is designed to give a predominant political role to the Issas and greater representation to other ethnic Somali groups. The French are gambling that under such an arrangement, the Issas would be less likely to seek aid from Somalia than if their present limited role were to continue. As presently administered, the Afars-who constitute only a minority of the population--dominate territorial politics.

The newly agreed arrangement will probably ease political unrest temporarily but is unlikely to ensure a peaceful transition to independence. Somali President Siad will doubtless continue subversive efforts to incorporate FTAI into a "greater Somalia." Ethiopia, for its part, will see the Paris agreement as paving the way for Somali domination of the territory and will probably support the Afars against the Issas.

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's six-day trip to the USSR, which ended yesterday, essentially demonstrated the importance both countries attach to continuing close ties.

The joint declaration issued after Gandhi's departure mentioned no new major agreements. Neither was there any indication as to whether Gandhi obtained satisfaction on India's complaints arising from economic and military assistance arrangements with the Soviet Union.

--continued

5


#### FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The reconciliation meeting between the prime ministers of Egypt and Syria has been postponed until June 23 in Riyadh, reportedly at Cairo's request.

The Egyptians reportedly wanted the delay to allow a clear determination of whether Damascus will implement the recent Arab League resolutions on Lebanon. We see no evidence that President Asad will, as Cairo apparently believes, drop his demand to discuss the Sinai accord at the meeting. Since Asad is unlikely to accept rapprochement on Egyptian terms, the reconciliation meeting may well be delayed again.

--continued

6



## COMMUNIST MILITARY AID TO TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND THE RHODESIAN INSURGENTS

We present below the key points of an interagency in- 25X telligence memorandum designed to establish a base for assessing the extent of communist military assistance to the Rhodesian insurgent groups and their supporters in Tanzania and Mozambique.

the totals used in this memorandum should be viewed as orders of magnitude. We believe that they are conservative in nature.

Communist military assistance to the Rhodesian insurgents has been channeled through Tanzania and Mozambique, where Peking and Moscow have provided substantial military aid over the past decade.

--There are an estimated 11,500 insurgents--3,500 of whom are trained. At present, the military equipment requirements of the insurgents are modest and could easily go undetected among about 8,200 tons of military equipment estimated to have been sent to Tanzania and Mozambique since January 1975.

--The insurgents do not have heavy equipment such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, or aircraft, although they do have recoilless rifles, rocket and grenade launchers, mortars, small caliber artillery, trucks, sapper and communications equipment, and possibly some SA-7 missiles.

Since January 1975, we have identified about 2,200 tons of Chinese military equipment arriving in Tanzania, including small 25X1 arms and ammunition, rockets, automatic rifles, and armored cars. During this same period we have identified only one Chinese ship, carrying military equipment, going directly to Mozambique. In addition, Chinese military equipment has sometimes been unloaded at Dar es Salaam and then sent to Mozambique

25X1

From January 1975 through April 1976, Soviet military shipments to Tanzania totaled as much as 6,000 tons and included small amounts of ammunition, hand grenades, shotguns, trucks, rockets, armored vehicles, and spare parts for helicopters. In 1975, we identified \$12 million worth of Soviet military equipment sent to Mozambique, including air defense artillery, small arms and ammunition, and support equipment. In addition, several Soviet ships suspected of carrying military equipment called in Mozambique, but we have no evidence on the cargoes.

--continued

Α1

In recent years we have detected no movement of military equipment from Cuba to Tanzania or Mozambique.

--Military equipment and/or troops could be sent quickly to Mozambique by using Cuban ships which are in Angolan waters. Such movement would be hard to detect, and it is possible that we would not be able to provide complete and timely information on the movement.

We have no evidence that the Communist countries are moving mili-tary material to Tanzania or Mozambique by air.

--The chances are good that any long-range airlift operations would be detected, but short-range regional shuttle operations would be very difficult to monitor.

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/19 : CIA-RDP79T00936A013400010028-8