

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

6 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

THROUGH: Acting Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

SUBJECT: Report and Evaluation [redacted]
"Soviet Earth Satellite Program", dated
13 July 1976 [redacted]

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1. Subject report was received on 31 July 1976 and contains some significant data concerning the Soviet earth satellite program. These data provide the basis for the potential current intelligence item attached hereto, which cannot be published by CIA because of reasons detailed below.

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2. One of the most significant points in subject report concerns the statement that "the radar built by the United States will spot the Soviet satellite within a few minutes after launching". This statement undoubtedly refers to the [redacted] radar and its surveillance over the Kapustin Yar Guided Missile Test Range and furnishes the first indication that the Soviets probably intend to launch their earth satellite vehicles from the Kapustin Yar area. The importance of such information to both the US planners and collectors is readily apparent; however, [redacted] policy excludes any [redacted] agency from publishing intelligence which either recognizes the existence of the [redacted] radar or divulges its successes. I have been informed by the [redacted] member of the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee that this type of intelligence can be published and distributed to the community [redacted].

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3. In view of the physical size of the [redacted] radar [redacted] knowledge of our activities in [redacted] (including a [redacted] flight over subject radar), and the radiation from this radar, I believe that the USSR has been aware of the existence and purpose of the [redacted] radar for several months. This belief is [redacted] by the Soviet statement quoted above. I doubt, however, that the USSR is aware of the successes achieved by this collection technique. For these reasons, I feel that the existence and purpose of subject radar should no longer be held on such a sensitive and restricted basis, especially when such restrictions will seriously hamper our effectiveness in reporting current intelligence items and providing guidance to our collectors. The foregoing does not [redacted] policy that the success or failure of the endeavor should continue [redacted].

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SUBJECT: Report and Evaluation [redacted]
"Soviet Earth Satellite Program", dated
13 July 1956 [redacted]

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to be held within the tightest security boundaries and that the [redacted] should continue to publish such details on a limited distribution basis to the intelligence community. EO 13526 3.3(b)(8)>25Yrs

4. It is recommended that your office take action directly

[redacted] (the officer directly responsible for current [redacted] policy on this subject) to obtain sufficient relaxation of current [redacted] policy to permit CIA to prepare and publish intelligence items and evaluations similar to that attached hereto. Such relaxation need only include permission to acknowledge the existence and purpose of subject matter in Top Secret intelligence reports.

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[redacted] EO 13526 3.5(c)

EO/I [redacted] Missiles
Intelligence Coordinator

Attachments: 2

[redacted]
REF/115765-DRIVE, Cy. 3

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[redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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