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10/89

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

10/C

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. [ ]				[ ]	Thought you might be interested in our first toe-meeting re policy problems. [ ]
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April 1, 1952

POSSIBLE POLICY PROBLEMS

(Note: This paper is intended to be merely suggestive of possible problems on which CFA may seek policy guidance.)

1. Determination of composition of national committees or selection of specific groups and leaders in each area to carry out specific Committee objectives.

(CFA support may tend to give persons composing the national committees or otherwise sparking CFA activities a degree of leadership which, in countries where leadership elements are comparatively small, may have implications beyond the CFA program itself - i.e. political implications. Moreover, the CFA program itself might be hampered by an attempt to link together persons or groups which are naturally rivals in other spheres of endeavor. Guidance on such problems will be necessary until the CFA representatives are themselves competent to make decisions.)

2. Determination of radio broadcasting priorities.

a. Given limited funds and the status quo as far as radio reception is concerned in Asia, are these funds better spent on broadcasting to the China mainland or broadcasting to the free areas?

b. If on broadcasting to the free areas, which countries have priority?

c. Given the alternative of spending funds on broadcasting to the China mainland or on enlargement of radio reception and production in the free areas (through assistance to enlarge local stations and through receiver distribution), in which way may the funds be most profitably spent?

3. Determination of Committee priorities of effort.

a. On basis of available opportunities.

b. In light of inter-Asian rivalries. (For example, even if Japan is No. 1 priority, and even though Japan may be most accessible, is it (a) desirable, from standpoint of CFA receptivity, to conduct major operations in Japan before initiation of activities in - say - India or Indonesia, and (b) in accord with U.S. policy to do so. Does U.S. policy favor giving Asian leadership to one or another country?)

2 MAY 1952

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c. In light of immediacy of Communist threat. (Although Japanese power in Asia is of greater significance than that of Burma and Thailand, would U.S. policy favor the development of resistance in Burma and Thailand through CFA action in preference to CFA action in Japan?)

d. In light of CFA desire to become a "voice of Asia".

e. In light of earliest most favorable effect on whole of Asia.

4. Determination of RFA policies with respect to "international" broadcasting (other than problem set forth in (2) above).

a. Problem of frequency allocation.

b. Possible objections by country of origin to serving as base for broadcasts targeted at other areas. (e.g. Will Philippines Islands object to CFA broadcasting to mainland of China from Philippines Island soil? Thailand?)

c. Possible objections by free Asian governments to programs originating off their soil but clearly directed toward their populations - e.g. would the French or Indochinese object to a program originating in Thailand targeted at that area? Would the Indonesian officials object to programs targeted at them from some other area?

5. Determination of RFA policies with respect to "national" broadcasting.

a. Possible problems with "official" stations, as in Japan, where competing commercial stations exist.

b. Conditions under which RFA may buy time on governmental stations, where only monopolies exist. Advice re best manner of securing governmental agreement in such countries to RFA local broadcasting.

c. Policies RFA should follow with respect to supporting broadcasts of organizations when it does not have full policy control over content of those programs. Shall RFA name be used? Shall RFA seek to eliminate political content?

d. Policies RFA should follow, in particular, with respect to sponsored local newscasts and commentary, where RFA does not bear full responsibility for the broadcast.

e. Whether any objections would exist to RFA developing a scheme of loans to existing radio stations to permit their enlargement or to groups for the establishment of new stations in the free areas.

6. Determination of propaganda "themes" to be used in all outlets - directly or through guidances to local committees - radio broadcasting, newspapers, magazines, comic books, etc.

a. Key topics for each country

b. Key topics for Asian-wide use

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7. Determination of types of groups for CFA to support; particularly where they are outside the educational-religious spheres and enter the social-political spheres:

- a. Local labor groups
- b. Cooperatives
- c. Land reform movements
- d. Groups seeking constitutional reforms
- e. Racial minority groups
- f. Groups, particularly student, with Marxist or non-Communist orientation

8. Determination of CFA policy with respect to refugees from China Mainland

a. How far may CFA go in pushing for entry of refugees into U.S.?

b. How far may CFA go in urging any area of FE to accept refugees; specifically:

- (1) Formosa
- (2) British-controlled territory
- (3) Philippines.

c. What support in these respects can CFA expect from State? To what extent must their activities be approved by State?

d. Must the selection of refugees be approved by State?

e. What should RFA policy be with respect to inciting defection in light of above decisions?

9. Determination of CFA objectives and priorities with respect to Communist China:

a. Which of the following alternatives should CFA follow?

(1) Take approach that the Chinese Communist Government could gain entry into the family of nations, with resultant economic and political benefits, on certain conditions.

(2) Take approach that only the overthrow of the regime and establishment of a new will gain international acceptance.

b. On the basis of the determination of the above, whether CFA shall give priority to one or the other of the following alternatives;

(1) To encourage disaffection between Communist leadership and the USSR.

or

(2) To incite disaffection between the populace and the Communist government.

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and

(1) To champion the emergence of new leadership on the Mainland.

(2) To champion a revitalized Formosa as the foundation of a new China.

10. Determination of CFA policy with respect to overseas Chinese: whether CFA should:

a. Encourage, directly or indirectly, support among overseas Chinese of the Nationalist Government, championing Formosa as the only hope and the foundation for a new China.

b. Advocate among overseas Chinese only an anti-Communist movement embracing all political elements, with the aim of forming a unified pressure group to effect reform on Formosa.

c. Advocate among overseas Chinese an anti-Communist movement embracing all political elements which ignores Formosa and fellows either 10 (a) or 10 (b) above.

11. Determination of CFA policy with respect to controls, if any, it will seek to establish over directly sponsored newspapers, magazines, etc., as to their editorial policy with respect to problems not necessarily related to anti-Communist objectives. It will be important to have agreement with State on the extent of CFA responsibility in such cases.

12. Determination of extent of controls, if any, and extent of responsibility in cases where CFA support of publications is indirect - i.e. through national committees, etc.

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In addition to the above policy problems, of specific nature, CFA personnel will be in need of general background guidance with respect to U.S. long-range policy in the Far East, over-all and by country, and with respect to current policy issues as they arise.

Advice will be helpful with respect to U.S. policy on the following questions:

1. Asian leadership. Does the U.S. champion any single country of the Far East for Asian leadership? (Japan vs. India)
2. Japanese-Communist trade and the Japanese-SEA trade question.
3. Japanese-Formosa relations.
4. Military defense of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina in case of attack?
5. Asian alliances of political or military nature?
6. Is there a U.S. policy with respect to economic systems followed by Asian countries undergoing industrialization? (On what

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7. How far is U.S. willing to go in support of independence of Associated States and their greater participation in leadership of their military defense?

8. To what extent will U.S. bring pressure on British in Malaya to accomplish greater participation of Chinese in government; to produce greater independence for Malayan people as a whole?

9. To what extent will U.S., through economic and political pressures, seek to affect the political complexion of the Japanese Government? What political grouping does the U.S. favor?

Other questions:

1. What tenuous relations and strains exist in U.S. official relations in each Asian country which CFA activity might improve or impair?

2. Where can CFA accomplish objectives which State approves but cannot officially support?

3. What is USIS currently projecting in each area?

4. What basic policy should CFA follow with respect to comment on devastating weapons, such as the atom bomb?

*due Burnett*  
*B.S.*

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