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GENERAL

1. Further indications of Gromyko's intentions on Spanish issue--Lie has told Stettinius that Gromyko is "very unhappy and concerned," and that other members of the Soviet delegation feel that Gromyko does not agree with his present instructions. Lie is "convinced" that Gromyko has sent a very strong wire to Moscow, urging that he be allowed to vote for the Australian proposal, or if not, that he be allowed to abstain. The Australian delegate believes that Cadogan has persuaded President Afifi to rule the Australian resolution procedural, in order to avoid a long debate.
2. Proposed Czech-Yugoslav treaty--According to Ambassador Steinhardt, Foreign Minister Masaryk will go early in May to Belgrade, where he will probably sign the proposed Czech-Yugoslav treaty. Masaryk has told Steinhardt that the treaty would (a) be directed specifically against Germany and the other Axis countries and (b) be similar to, but have no connection with, the recently signed Yugoslav-Polish treaty.
3. Masaryk asks Paris conference decision on Czech demands--Foreign Minister Masaryk has informed Ambassador Steinhardt that it is of "decisive importance" to Czechoslovakia that the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers (a) reach a decision on the Czech proposal to transfer an additional 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, (b) include in any discussion of "the German question" a decision on Czech territorial demands on Germany, and (c) allow the Czech Government to present its views through a Czech representative at the Conference.
4. British hope for consultation on Palestine policy--Bevin has expressed to Byrnes his hope that the US will consult with the British before making any policy statement about the report of the Anglo-American Investigating Committee on Palestine.
5. State Department advises against Hoover visit to Moscow--Acheson has informed Mr. Hoover that (a) the Soviets disclaim taking the initiative in inviting him to visit Moscow (see Daily Summary of 26 April,

Document No. 653

NO CHANGE in Class.

DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S **6**

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

DDA REG. 77/1763

Auth: 1 MAR 1978

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ By: 5/1

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item 3), and (b) "the Secretary feels that under the circumstances it would be unwise for him to proceed to Moscow."

6. Military alliance with Finland not requested by USSR--Ambassador Smith has been informed by the Finnish Minister that the question of a military alliance was not raised by the Soviets during the Finnish delegation's recent visit to Moscow (see Daily Summary of 17 April, item 6).

#### EUROPE-AFRICA

7. USSR: Attitude toward Acheson report on atomic energy--Embassy Moscow reports that no mention of the Acheson Committee's report on international control of atomic energy has been made in any Soviet publication and knowledge of this report presumably is confined to a very small circle. Smith believes that the Soviets regard this report with disfavor since it does not provide for turning over full technical information to the Soviet Government nor would it permit freedom of action in the use of this information.
8. POLAND: Poles in US, UK and French Embassies threatened--Ambassador Lane reports that Polish citizens employed by the US, UK and French Embassies are being threatened with death unless they (a) join the Polish Security Police and (b) report on the activities of the Embassies. Both Lane and the British Ambassador propose to register an emphatic protest with the Polish Government.
9. GERMANY: Kommandatura disagreement on recognition of leftist parties--Murphy reports that the Kommandatura has (a) rejected the US proposal to recognize both the reorganized Social Democratic (SPD) and the new United Socialist "merger" (SEPD) parties (see Daily Summary of 25 April, item 8); and (b) agreed to refer both questions to the Control Council. (The French and British, though willing to recognize the SPD, take the position that recognition of the SEPD must have Control Council approval, while the Soviets refuse to recognize the one without the other.) Murphy feels that the Soviets now "implicitly" recognize the

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Kommandatura's jurisdiction over political parties.

10. IRAN: Additional report on Kurdish attitudes--Acting US Consul Tabriz, supplementing his recent report on Kurdish-Azerbaijani agreement (see Daily Summary of 27 April, item 5), states that the Kurds have assured him that (a) they "would welcome US interference" on behalf of minorities in Iran and (b) would like him to visit Kurdistan to "see the primitive existence of the inhabitants." The Acting Consul (a) suggests that the above opinions may reflect Kurdish resentment against the USSR for failing to supply them with heavy arms and (b) remarks, in connection with the suggested visit, that "it is unthinkable that the Kurds" would create "an incident of any sort."

Instability of Kurdish movement--Charge Ward in Tehran reports that Qavam considers the Kurdish question relatively minor and susceptible of settlement "without difficulty" if the Azerbaijan negotiations "result satisfactorily." He adds that Qavam believes, as does Consul Rossow, that the Kurd movement will fall apart "once it loses the support of the USSR and Azerbaijani autonomy."

#### FAR EAST

11. JAPAN: Food policy--Political Advisor Acheson reports, "with the concurrence and approval of General MacArthur," that when the question of food policy comes before the Allied Council for Japan on 30 April, he is prepared to assert that (a) the amount of food the US sends to Japan to safeguard the occupation forces and the occupation is "solely for determination by the US." (The question had been raised by the British Commonwealth representative.)
12. JAPAN: Size of Soviet contingents--MacArthur has proposed to the War Department that the Soviet contingents of the Military Mission and Allied Council and the International Military Tribunal be limited to the number now in Japan (approximately 285 exclusive of families, which he considers "fantastically out of proportion") and that any requests for further increases be determined on the "highest governmental level."

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13. KOREA: General Hodge recommends withdrawal of US and Soviet forces--  
General Hodge reports that Soviet "intrigue, political penetration and methods of operation" have convinced him that continuation of the dual occupation (a) will prevent the development of Korea as a nation and (b) will result either in war between the US and the USSR or the complete discrediting of Americans in Asia. He urgently recommends that the ground work be laid "on a national level" for the withdrawal of US and Soviet occupation forces, as soon as possible after a Korean Provisional Government is in operation and not later than 1 January 1947.

#### THE AMERICAS

14. PERU: APRA denies bid for power--Haya de la Torre, leader of the Aprista party, has informed Ambassador Pawley that his party (a) does not intend to assume complete control of the Government (see Daily Summary of 25 April, item 15) and will exert every effort to prevent bloodshed; and (b) desires to keep President Bustamante in office, maintain a "true democratic Government," and prevent an increase in Communist activities in Peru.
15. NICARAGUA: Confusion in political scene--Ambassador Warren reports that political events are moving rapidly (see Daily Summary of 24 April, item 7) and that there is a possibility of an attempted coup d'etat by certain Guardia officers. President Somoza, however, considers himself the strongest force in the country and capable of handling the situation. Warren is apprehensive but considers a peaceful solution still a possibility.

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