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**Executive Summary
Multidisciplinary
Baseline Report to the
NSC/Special Coordination
Committee for
Counterintelligence**

Enclosed is information which if compromised would have an extraordinarily adverse impact on national security or would be a major loss of sensitive intelligence. Personal accountability is required.

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1 May 1978

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
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NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MULTIDISCIPLINARY BASELINE REPORT
TO THE
NSC/SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCEI. Introduction

The NSC/Special Coordination Committee for Counterintelligence (SCC/CI) requested on 3 March 1978 that a draft Baseline Report be prepared by the DCI and the Department of Justice addressing "among others" questions on the foreign intelligence threat to the United States and the countering of it. Although the questions were HUMINT-oriented, the DCI decided to expand the scope of the report to SIGINT, imagery, international terrorism and protective security, thereby bringing together for the first time in one paper the totality of the intelligence and terrorist threats to the U.S. and the countering efforts against those threats.

Although this report is thus broader in scope, its purpose is in accordance with the original SCC/CI objectives for it, i.e., (1) that it be a basic reference and educational aid for the SCC principals, and (2) that it be self-critical and seek to raise as many issues as seem to merit SCC/CI consideration. These issues were not to be given full staff study, with pros and cons of alternatives carefully weighed and solutions recommended. Furthermore, it was expected that the issues would vary in importance and priority. The objective is to enable the SCC/CI to look at a wide range of issues and decide which to address, and when.

The report lays the groundwork for the multidisciplinary national net counterintelligence assessment to be undertaken next by the SCC/CI for the President. The Baseline Report covers both threats and their counters, but does not net, i.e., assess the effectiveness of our counters to the threats.

The organization of this report is simple. Each threat is discussed separately, with the countering program(s) immediately following: HUMINT, Counter-HUMINT, SIGINT, Counter-SIGINT, Imagery, Counter-Imagery, International Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Protective Security, and a final summary view of a Multidisciplinary Approach to the overall problem. There is more extensive coverage of HUMINT and Counter-

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HUMINT than of other subjects because of the need to respond to more detailed SCC/CI terms of reference for HUMINT and Counter-HUMINT.

Issues and problems appear in the above sections of the report wherever the particular topic best fits. Situations are designated as "problems" to highlight them for SCC/CI information, not action. "Issues" on the other hand, are tagged for possible SCC/CI consideration and action.

This Executive Summary highlights significant aspects of the report, but is not an overall summary. The report's comprehensiveness and its related function of serving as a basic reference make a selective approach more appropriate. Further, the Summary is intended for use with the Issue Appendix to the report, and does not therefore cover the issues. Their separate collection in the Appendix is for convenience of SCC/CI reference. Relevant background for particular issues appears in the body of the report; the issue statements are not intended to stand entirely on their own.

This report has been prepared by the Intelligence Community (IC) Staff on behalf of both the DCI and the Attorney General. Inputs to it were obtained from the U.S. Army ACSI, CIA (Operations Directorate, Office of Security, Office of Communications), DCI Committee on Exchanges Staff, DIA, DoD (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Defense Investigative Programs Office), FBI, JCS, Naval Investigative Service, NSA, AF Office of Special Investigations, DCI Security Committee Staff, and Treasury. The ensuing IC Staff working draft product was circulated to the contributors plus the National Foreign Assessment Center (CIA), the Department of State, and the staffs of the DCI SIGINT, COMIREX, and the Human Resources Committees for comment. Further change was then made and this final product prepared by the IC Staff.

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VI. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

A. Threat



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- o In recent years there has been a trend of increasing contact and cooperation between international terrorist groups, often of widely differing political philosophy and purpose. To date this has been more in the nature of mutual assistance (training, funding, documentation, provision of sanctuary, and/or direct operational participation) than any actual coordination of operations at a supranational level.
- o Terrorists thus far have relied for the most part on handguns, machineguns, and ordinary explosives as armaments. There have been two instances of aborted attacks that were to have employed shoulder-launched SA-7 heat-seeking missiles against commercial airlines, and several cases involving use of anti-tank rockets against ground targets. Terrorist acquisition of more sophisticated weapons, such as highly destructive, portable nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, could add a major new dimension to the international terrorist threat. There has been no evidence to date, however, of a definite move in that direction.
- o Of the 50 to 60 organizations engaged in international terrorism, 15 are discussed in some detail in this report. The most dangerous may be

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[redacted]; the People's Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros (both in Argentina);

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
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VIII. International Terrorist Threat Against the United States

A. International Terrorist Threat Within the U.S.



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5. Latin America

[Redacted] The most active and dangerous Latin American terrorist organizations operating today are those associated with two Argentine revolutionary movements, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Montoneros. Both organizations, especially the ERP, have been badly battered by Argentine security forces in recent months. They have, however, managed to maintain a high level of terrorist violence directed against local government and military officials, the police, and both the Argentine and foreign business and diplomatic communities.

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a. Revolutionary Coordinating Junta

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In addition to the serious indigenous threat that it poses, the Argentine ERP is noteworthy for its efforts to both regionalize and internationalize its influence with and support to other "revolutionary organizations." In 1974, with the objective of coordinating a "continental struggle against the imperialist enemy," the ERP formed the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The JCR is not a terrorist action group; it is rather a coordinating body intended to provide the wherewithal (funds, arms, training, etc.) to member groups to enable them to undertake effective revolutionary action. JCR membership embraces revolutionary groups in five Latin American nations (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay). Additionally, it has systematically embarked on a campaign to maintain contact with and extend support to other terrorist or revolutionary groups throughout South and Central America.

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JCR efforts to extend its activities beyond Latin America are more recent, and sufficient information has not yet been obtained to assess this fully. However, it is known that the JCR has opened offices in Western Europe, and has embarked on propagandizing, proselytizing, and fund-raising campaigns aimed at Latin American exiles residing there. JCR organizational activity observed to date indicates a growing capability to support significant levels of terrorism both in Latin America and elsewhere.

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b. Montoneros

3.5(c) [REDACTED] The Latin American group currently posing the most significant threat to U.S. business and official personnel is the Argentine group known as the Montoneros. Its objective is the simultaneous overthrow of the current government and the expulsion of foreign, including U.S., "capitalists," all of whom are accused of exploiting Argentina's people and natural resources. The Montonero membership has been estimated at between 800 and 1,000 active, armed guerrillas; support membership is unknown. The Montoneros have their strongholds in the major Argentine cities, principally Buenos Aires. A number of the leaders have been forced to flee Argentina, traveling to Europe, due to the increasingly successful anti-guerrilla government operations. Nevertheless, the organization continues to have real potential to plan and carry out terrorist operations. Typical operations include bank, business, and personal robberies; bombings; kidnappings for ransom and assassinations. However, due to recent pressures from federal security forces, it appears that the trend is toward smaller and less complicated operations, such as assassinations and robberies. The Montoneros also conduct propaganda campaigns consisting of slogans painted on walls, pamphlet bombs, and press conferences in safehouses. Although foreign businesses had been removing their representatives from Argentina, most recently the trend appears to be for new representatives to return to the major cities, principally Buenos Aires.

c. People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)

3.5(c) [REDACTED] The second most important group currently posing a significant threat due to its terrorist/guerrilla activities is ERP of Argentina. It too has the objective of overthrowing the current government and forcing foreign businesses to leave Argentina. However, due to its relatively small size, about 150 armed and active members (with the number of supporters unknown), there is little likelihood of success. The Argentine government believes that most of this estimated membership is living in urban areas, hiding to avoid detection while at the same time trying to reorganize and recruit new members. Former operations include robberies and assassinations. Its weakness is its small membership and its inability to organize. As such, it will probably be eradicated during the next few years; government sources have estimated that the problem posed both by the Montoneros and the ERP will be eliminated within 18 months, but this appears to be too optimistic.

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