

In order to achieve it, it is necessary to be moderate and be patient because only such an approach might overcome 30 years of bitter fighting and hostility. Mr President, you, who have broken through the wall of isolation surrounding Israel in the Middle East; you, who have shattered the psychological barrier of distrust between the nations; you, who have proved that there is someone to talk to--we call on you: presenting conditions to the negotiations will strengthen those who do not have faith in the sincerity of your desire to make peace and for whom your visit in Jerusalem constituted a mere episode. There are things that Israel will not be able to give up, the most important of which is its security. [end videotape]

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BEGIN SPEAKS BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR CAMP DAVID

TA022033Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1901 GMT 2 Sep 78 TA **FBIS-MEA-78-122**

[Address to the nation by Prime Minister Begin in Jerusalem on the eve of his departure for the Camp David summit--live]

[Text] A good week to you, citizens of Israel. This evening I came to talk to you on a number of political, economic and social issues. Let us begin, of course, with the tripartite conference at Camp David. Tomorrow, God willing, the Israeli delegation will depart for the United States. On Tuesday we shall go to Washington, and from there to the site of the conference.

This is certainly one of the more important events of our era. There are those who say that in international diplomacy such a conference is without precedence. We do not, however, accept certain views regarding this meeting. If anybody should tell us that this is a fateful meeting, we will not agree with him. The fate of our nation is not dependent on any kind of meeting. Our nation has existed for thousands of years before Camp David, and will continue to exist for thousands of years after it. If we are told: This is the last chance of reaching an agreement to make peace; we shall not accept this. There are no last chances in life; there is always another chance. The simple truth is that this is a very important meeting.

With what shall we go to Camp David? We shall go to this meeting with the utmost of good will to reach an agreement which will enable the continuation of the thorough and serious negotiations for achieving a permanent peace in the Middle East and for putting an end to all the wars between us and the Arabs--wars which we hate and do not want. We shall go to this meeting with an open heart and with confidence, because we have a peace plan based on justice and fairness.

There were people who asked me: How will it be when you meet with President as-Sadat, together with President Carter, or face-to-face, how will it be? I am going to answer simply: I will unhesitatingly stretch out my hand to the president of Egypt and tell him: In Jerusalem and in Ismailia you informed me that you were my friend. These are important words, and they are binding. Let us renew this friendship and maintain it despite all that has happened between Ismailia and the day you and I agreed to meet, together with the President of the United States, at Camp David.

It's true, there have been denigrating, vile and offensive statements in the Egyptian press. I have forgotten them. They will have no impact on our position. Let us decide together and reiterate to each other the most important announcement that you made to me and which I reciprocated, namely: No more war.

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There will never be a war again between us and the Egyptian nation, to which we wish all the best. Let us extend a hand to each other and let us agree to conduct negotiations toward the signing of a peace treaty, without anger and without drastic interruptions.

The Americans conducted negotiations about the solution of the Panama Canal problem for 14 years. The negotiations on the end of the war in Vietnam lasted 4 years. I am not talking in terms of years; but we certainly do need a reasonable period of time, several months, to conduct negotiations--[this is] true--for peace and on the conditions for peace.

I suggest to you, Mr President of Egypt, let us decide at Camp David that after this conference there will be negotiations which will take place for several months on a daily basis, except Friday and Saturday, and we shall deal with the conditions for peace until both of us--all of us, our cabinets--will be able to bring the message to our nations: the wars have ended, we have signed peace treaties, we shall live in peace, we shall help each other--one nation will help the other--and bring a blessing not only on ourselves, not only on this area, but also to other nations.

We shall definitely safeguard our nation's security and its vital interests. We shall safeguard our nation in Eretz Yisrael because in this cruel world, from Czechoslovakia through to Lebanon, we not only can, but must say: If we are not for ourselves, who will be?

The situation in Lebanon: I shall say a few words very briefly. We shall not reconcile ourselves to genocide. We have stood by the persecuted Christian minority in Lebanon, a minority which is being slaughtered by tanks and artillery--its men, women and children--and we shall continue to stand by it. It would be inconceivable that we, with our experience, would take in our stride--as other nations do--such a massacre, a genocide. We hope that soon a cease-fire will be enforced in Lebanon, and the Christian minority and the Moslem majority will be able to live [together], because a minority has exactly the same right to exist as the majority. Just as we apply this principle in our own lives, we shall insist on it also where our neighbors are concerned.

Now citizens, with your permission, let us turn to our affairs at home. Yesterday the school year began, and we saw Israeli school children going to school in good spirits with their briefcases. More than a million children and youths resumed classes. How we were proud of them--our hope, our finest, our beloved ones. Thank God that we lived to be blessed with such a wonderful generation.

On the eve of our departure for Camp David, I understand that over the heads of these hundreds of thousands of pupils in elementary schools and in high schools looms the threat of the suspension of classes. I call this evening on all the teachers: please, good citizens, do not take away teaching from the children of Israel. Do not bring about the closure of schools. I was a teacher, albeit a private tutor, but I know that a teacher lives, as a rule, modestly and frugally. It is the tradition of Israel to honor the teacher and the rabbi more perhaps than in any other nation. How does our adage go? Even if you learned a single letter--that would be enough. Here, nevertheless, there is this threat of a strike. What shall we do if we cannot--and I am saying this, knowing the facts--raise your salary by more than 15 percent?

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I'd like now, quite rationally, to prove to you why we are unable to do more than that. Even should you, God forbid, strike for weeks or months on end, we would be unable to help. Don't we want to better you state? Certainly, yes. But I had better show you the figures.

If the country gives the teachers--60,000 of them--an increment of 15 percent, it will expend from its treasury 1.2 billion Israeli pounds. If it is forced, or would be forced to give an increment of 35 percent, the expenditure would amount to 2.8 billion pounds. This is not yet the end of it. If the government surrenders and gives you 35 percent, all the other workers will demand exactly the same increment, certainly no less. They would be justified in this demand. If the civil servants get 35 percent, we shall expend 3,142,000,000 pounds. If there is a 35 percent increment throughout the public service sector, the expenditure will amount to 12,681,000,000 pounds. If all the wage earners--and rightly--demand the same increment, according to the model customary in Israel, the total expenditure will be 34,702,000,000 pounds.

Where shall the state get these fabulous sums of money? The one answer: It will print money. If one could by printing money solve economic and social problems, then all nations would be engaged in only two activities: printing machines and paper mills.

But, dear friends, teachers, I belong to a generation which saw a galloping inflation after World War I, and I am going to tell you something on the history of inflation. The provider was likely to bring home sacks full of banknotes, but every such sack was worth less than a sack of potatoes. A box of matches cost a million. Cigarettes cost millions. Now then, do we desire such inflation? It would destroy the economy. It would destroy us. This would be a kind of self-destruction.

We are a country of immigrants. Unfortunately, immigration is not considerable; it is not as it should be. We hope for the immigration of tens and of hundreds of thousands to Eretz Yisra'el, as this is our life, our hope and this the purpose of our existence as a Jewish state. We need investment to build a living, self-supporting economy, and who will come and invest in the event of such inflation?

Now, I presented you with the facts and figures. Do consider your steps well, please. Do not prevent little children from learning, and do not take away the joy from parents who see their children going to school every morning. Please, do prevent the closing of classes, and I hope that you will lend your ear to this, my appeal to you, teachers, an appeal issuing from the bottom of an Israeli citizen's heart.

No I am going to take up a very grave social problem. What I have in mind is dwellers in submarginal housing. They number 47,000 families--300,000 souls; almost 10 percent of the Jewish population in Israel--and all these families are still living in housing conditions that are unfit for civilized people. On seeing this, my eyes saw red. This is an inheritance we received from the former regime, and it is very painful to us and we have no intention to take this in stride. We shall do everything possible to solve this problem within a number of years.

We have already begun. The Construction and Housing Ministry last year provided solutions for 16,579 needy families. This figure breaks down into improvement of housing conditions for 9,431 families and for 2,231 needy young couples and loans to 5,017 needy families.

This is not enough. We have to provide a fundamental solution to the problem. I know that if I tell you this, if I give you these figures--and hear the head of a family together with his children and his wife in a miserable shack in an intolerable housing project--three, four, up to seven souls in a single room--he is certain to tell himself: What consolation is this to me if I am told that Shim'on and Re'uven already have tolerable housing, while I, myself? Yes, this contention is justified.

But you have to know that this problem cannot be solved in a day or even in a year. We have initiated a project to liquidate slums. This is a huge project. To implement it we need \$1.2 billion. At current prices this is more than 20 billion Israeli pounds. We have to come up with this money. Therefore, I called on the Jewish nation a year ago. At that time there were still doubts and some opposition. I am able to tell you tonight that the Jewish nation is enlisting in order to solve your problem. I shall give you an example: Last Friday night, at the Knesset, I met with 320 Jews from the United States and Canada. I wish you could have been present at this meeting. You would have seen Jews, good-hearted Jews. Yes, they are wealthy. But, in order to contribute to a humane goal, money alone is not enough, the heart is necessary. You would have seen those Jews, standing in line for half an hour and even more, to volunteer to raise that money. In one evening they pledged contributions of \$30 million, which is about 1/2 billion pounds. We shall not make do with this.

In about 6 weeks I will go overseas once more. In December I will again be in the United States. All my friends will do the same. We all shall go to the end of the world, until we raise those means, \$600 million from the Jewish nation, and the Government of Israel will give the same sum. With the help of this total we shall completely solve the problem of slum dwellings for more than 40,000 families in Israel. Well then, I only wish to make you understand: in 1 year we shall not be able to do this. In a number of years the problem will be solved for every family living in poverty, which is a shame to us and a disgrace to every civilized society. This problem will be solved, and you, too, will be delivered.

In connection with this important social subject it is worthwhile, and also desirable, to end my words with the sacred sentences in this week's Torah reading, the chapter Re'eh. This is what our Torah says: "If there is among you a poor man, one of your brethren, in any of your towns within your land which the Lord your God gives you, you shall not harden your heart or shut your hand against your poor brother," and so on. This is a biblical commandment and we will fulfill it, not only toward the individual but also toward the public.

A good week and a good month to all of you.

BEGIN'S REMARKS DRAW CRITICISM FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS

Call For Resignation

TA022128Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 2 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Shelli MK Me'ir Pa'il called on the prime minister immediately to resign because he does not have a very imaginative plan for the Camp David conference. He expressed his shock at the prime minister's speech.

Alignment MK Yosi Sarid also said that the speech was disgraceful and defined it as a piling up of flowery pathos.

Peace Now Scores Address

TA022052Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 2 Sep 78 TA

[Text] The leaders of the Peace Now Movement reacted an hour ago to the prime minister's speech and expressed deep disappointment because they claim that Begin has disregarded the demand made by the 100,000 participants at the movement's rally by not announcing his willingness to make concessions in Judaea and Samaria.

The leaders of the Peace Now Movement claim that the prime minister's words show that there is a serious lack of contact between the cabinet and the nation.

Labor Party Reaction

NC031313Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 3 Sep 78 NC

[Text] The Labor Party has expressed regret over the prime minister's remarks last night in his speech to the nation. These remarks, which the Labor Party terms "demagogic," concern Mr Begin's accusation that the blame for the internal situation rests on what he called "the former regime."

The Labor Party's reaction team has published a statement in which it asks the Israeli delegation to Camp David to make supreme efforts and to heed the Israeli citizens' desire for peace.

Peres, Talmi React

TA031635Y Jerusalem POST in English 3 Sep 78 p 2 TA

[Text] Labour Party Chairman Shim'on Peres last night reiterated his party's position that the Camp David summit could succeed only if the government agreed to apply the principle of withdrawal entailed in UN Resolution 242 to all sectors, including Judaea and Samaria.

Reacting to Premier Begin's address to the nation, Peres said in a TV interview that Israel's opening position needed changes both in content and in formulation.

The government should propose its readiness for territorial compromise on all fronts as one of its opening moves, he said.

Egypt too, has to change its opening position, Peres stressed, and should cease demanding Israel's return to the 1967 borders.

He believed that such a change was possible.

Peres held that the Camp David summit was the most important and perhaps most crucial conference Israel ever attended. Its failure would have most serious repercussions.

Although there was a national consensus on some points, there are also serious differences between the government and the opposition, Peres said.

Me'ir Talmi, MAPAM secretary-general, described the prime minister's speech as a disappointment, laced with expressions of good will but failing to come to grips with the essentials. Begin had failed to provide an adequate response to the tens of thousands of peace demonstrators who had turned out in Tel Aviv last night, he said. His remarks on social issues were also disappointing, Talmi added.

BEGIN, Menachem

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A spokesman for the teachers union, Mordekhai Batzali, last night rejected Premier Begin's appeal to the teachers to withdraw their strike today. He recalled that the cabinet ministers themselves were the first to break the 15 percent wage rise agreement.

FBI-MOA-78-172

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[BEGIN] MAKES AIRPORT STATEMENT ON DEPARTURE

NC030611Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0507 GMT 3 Sep 78 NC

[From the Morning Newsreel: Report from Ben-Gurion Airport on the departure of the Israeli delegation for the United States by correspondent Shalom Qital--live]

[Text] Good morning from Ben-Gurion Airport. Prime Minister Menachem Begin is about to say a few words. I say "a few words" because he will not hold a special press conference but will only make a few statements. Those who will accompany Mr Begin are all here: the ministers, top-level officials, Knesset members, friends and relatives. The press conference is about to start.

[Unidentified speaker] The prime minister will first make an announcement in Hebrew and then in English.

[Begin] Good morning ladies and gentlemen; good morning to you, citizens of Israel:

The delegation--the foreign minister, the defense minister and myself, our friends and advisers--will leave for the United States and for Camp David on a mission of peace. No other people in the world desire peace more than we do--or even as much as we do. Among our people, no one desires peace more than the current government. Because of this, we will exert every human effort possible so that the Camp David conference will result in an agreement that will enable us to hold negotiations and sign a peace treaty. We, the Israelis, are particularly interested in the success of the tripartite conference. We are an integral part of the free world, which is under continuous attack from the enemies of human freedom. Our people must defend themselves. Throughout the years, they have shrunk considerably in numbers and all of those who belong to our people now intend to stand together for the sake of Israel and for the sake of peace.

For the sake of the international prestige of the President of the United States--which is naturally the defender of the free world--we hope and are interested in seeing this conference, in which the representatives of the United States, Egypt and Israel are participating, end in success.

Upon our return from the Camp David conference, we will certainly have many additional things to tell you. Today, because of the delicate situation and the particular importance of the issues on the agenda, I beg you to forgive me for making do with this statement, and for not holding a question-and-answer session.

[Qital] Now that the prime minister is speaking in English, I return you to the studio.

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moshe ARENS, BAR-LEV INTERVIEWED ON CAMP DAVID TALKS

TA011823Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1505 GMT 1 Sep 78 TA

FRIS-MEA-78-172

[Interview with Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee Chairman MK Moshe Arens and Labor Party Secretary MK Hayyim Bar-Lev by Shalom Qital on the Weekly Newsreel program--live]

[Text] On Sunday, the Israeli delegation headed by Prime Minister Menahem Begin will leave for the Camp David summit. How should Israel act during the meeting? Are there signs of a breakthrough from the present deadend in the negotiations? We have called MK's Moshe Arens and Hayyim Bar-Lev to our studio to discuss these and other questions. The moderator is our political correspondent, Shalom Qital.

[Qital] Gentlemen, it seems that less than a week before the convening of the Camp David summit it is almost certain that a peace treaty will not be signed there. One can assume that the parties definitely would not like to risk a serious blowup. In any case, the forecast is that the only thing that will result from that meeting is the setting up of the framework for the continuation of the negotiations. This, at least, is the opinion of those who express a cautious evaluation prior to the meeting. If indeed this is so, Professor Arens, what framework for the continuation of the negotiations would you be satisfied with, if it should be so determined at Camp David?

[Arens] I would be satisfied with any framework that would insure the continuation of the contacts, free channels and the ability and the willingness to talk. I think that here we are discussing a process which is by nature--as any agreement toward an arrangement in the area--relatively long, and many more meetings will be necessary. What is important is that all the parties agree, that is, Egypt--and certainly we agree to it--that the framework will be created to enable the continuation of the negotiations which are necessary so that we could--if possible--reach an arrangement.

[Qital] What is your view of success, Hayyim Bar-Lev?

[Bar-Lev] In my opinion, success will be achieved if the obstacle which is currently, and has been over the past few months, in the path of the negotiations between ourselves and the Egyptians--the different positions with respect to the question of Judaea and Samaria--is removed. If that is removed and the parties reach an understanding in principle on the question of Judaea and Samaria and on the Palestinian question, and thus pave the road to negotiations between us and Egypt with the aim of reaching a peace agreement, I would regard this as success. Any other thing, in my opinion, may perhaps postpone crises, but it will not prevent them.

[Qital] Mr Bar-Lev, how can this road be paved--on the issue of Judaea and Samaria--in practical and concrete terms?

[Bar-Lev] By having the Israeli Cabinet change its position, a position which maintains that sovereignty over any part of the territory of Judaea and Samaria should not be transferred to any Arab element. If the cabinet changes its position and says that it is prepared to withdraw from territories in the West Bank in return for peace, though not to the 1967 borders and without harming Israel's security--that is, continuing to hold on to and control territories which are vital to our security. If the cabinet says this, I believe it will be possible to reach a formula acceptable to As-Sadat as well.

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[Qital] In other words, a territorial compromise?

[Bar-Lev] You can call it a territorial compromise, which is a term the Alignment uses; you can call it an agreement in principle to withdraw from territories--not from all the territories; you can call it negotiations on new borders--which are not the 1967 borders. The terminology is less important than the essence; and the essence, in my opinion, is: we say that we are prepared to transfer territories in Judaea and Samaria to Jordanian sovereignty or Jordanian-Palestinian sovereignty in return for peace. In my estimation this would put off a crisis for a while, but it is not possible to completely avoid a crisis and the deterioration of the situation.

[Qital] Professor Arens, what is your opinion?

[Arens] From Hayyim Bar-Lev's words one could understand that the Israeli Cabinet's positions are the obstacles in the path to the possibility of reaching an arrangement with Egypt. I am sorry to hear him say this. In my opinion this is very far from the truth.

The gap between the positions, if we want to talk about the obstacle in the path to progress, stems from one thing which is very clear: the unwillingness on the part of As-Sadat--at least so far--to understand the security problems with which Israel is faced and with his unwillingness to agree with us and understand that the ability to defend ourselves requires an IDF presence in certain places. We have not seen any sign of understanding for these positions on the part of As-Sadat with respect to the Sinai, for which we have submitted a very generous proposal, while remaining in the Rafah approaches and keeping the airfields. This proposal has met with total rejection by As-Sadat. Of course, we have not seen any readiness or responsiveness to understand our problems in Judaea and Samaria, which are areas which border on Israel's industrial and population centers. As long as As-Sadat does not understand that this is Israel's major problem and also the major problem in the path toward reaching an arrangement, since any arrangement that will not insure Israel with the capability to ward off enemies, which is really the ability to defend itself, will not be a stable agreement. [incomplete sentence as heard] I hope that at Camp David and perhaps in talks that will be held after it we will observe a willingness on the part of Egypt and As-Sadat to understand our real problems, which must be solved before an arrangement can be reached.

[Qital] Mr Bar-Lev, you maintained that Israel should change its position while Professor Arens, in contrast, points to the need for Egypt to demonstrate more flexibility, that is, accept an Israeli military presence in areas necessary for Israel's security. It seems to me that ultimately all the parties will have to conduct a self-examination. What in your opinion, is the introspection which Egypt must carry out, after you touched only on Israel's introspection?

[Bar-Lev] I touched on Israel's self-examination because I regard it to be evading the real problem--and this is what Professor Arens has just done, and also what the cabinet is doing--by saying that Egypt is not ok, Egypt is not prepared [to see our point], the United States is not ok and is not prepared--instead of first of all saying what we are prepared to do.

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We do not control Egypt, nor do we control the United States. We, the Israelis, can influence and control Israel. In my opinion, the first problem is us, and I say that in order to achieve peace it is necessary to draw new borders, which are not the 1967 borders, and which will allow us to remain in the Jordan River Valley and insure the demilitarization of the West Bank so that if a war should break out, it will break out at the Jordan River and not along the old border. We are prepared to have such new borders for the sake of peace. This depends on us.

This does not mean that we do not have demands of Egypt and the United States or that we have nothing we do not hold against them. However, to direct all the arrows only toward them and hide the fact that there is no change for the better in their lack of forward movement and their lack of consideration, this is simply throwing sand in the eyes. The first question over which we have control, and the only one on which the cabinet has 100 percent control, is our own position. I repeat, as long as the cabinet says that we are not prepared to transfer Nabulus and Tubas and so on to any foreign sovereignty, as long as this is the stance, putting the blame on Egypt and the United States and other elements will not help. I see in this something Israel can use to open the road to the continuation of the negotiations.

[Qital] Gentlemen, we...

[Bar-Lev] As for Egypt, if you will allow me, obviously Egypt, if it adheres to its public stance, that is, demanding a total withdrawal, then there will not be any arrangement, because we, the Israelis--I believe close to 100 percent of the Israelis--are not prepared to return to the 1967 borders. However, before we sweep someone else's house, let us organize our own.

[Qital] Gentlemen, we are talking about a comprehensive arrangement, about what Israel and what Egypt must do when a peace treaty is signed, when there is an arrangement on all fronts. Let us deal with several concrete questions which are less than a peace arrangement and which may crop up during the Camp David summit, such as a substitute for a peace arrangement, or a step toward a peace arrangement--what is called a permanent partial arrangement. What is your opinion, Professor Arens?

[Arens] I would suggest, especially in view of what has been said now by Hayyim Bar-Lev and things that are being said through the Egyptian propaganda channels, that the Camp David agenda--after the Lebanon issue, and I hope that this is indeed the first subject, so as to insure that an end is put to the massacre that the Syrian Army is carrying out there...

[Qital] The foreign minister yesterday promised that indeed there will be talks with the United States at the highest level.

[Arens] Yes, I hope this is true and I think it will be very interesting to hear what President as-Sadat's position is with respect to what is happening in Lebanon. However, immediately after it, I would suggest discussing the Sinai issue, because it constitutes the real test of As-Sadat's willingness to understand our problem and to reach an arrangement with us.

[Qital] To put the Sinai issue on the table separately before they get down to the discussion about Judaea and Samaria?

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[Arens] First of all, in the Sinai we have a detailed and very generous proposal, but despite this we have so far heard from him that our settlements must be plowed under and that we must leave our airfields. Let us see whether with respect to the Sinai area, on which As-Sadat is able to and authorized to reach an agreement with us--with respect to Judaea and Samaria, he is not authorized to sign an agreement, I doubt if he is even authorized to conduct negotiations with us, but with respect to the Sinai, he certainly is authorized to conduct negotiations and to conclude them--let us see whether it is possible to conclude things concerning the Sinai and see if he has that minimal degree of understanding which would enable him to agree that we continue our presence in the Rafah approaches and at our airfields.

[Qital] Yes. Mr Bar-lev, with reference to a partial arrangement for an unlimited period of time?

[Bar-Lev] Our party, or rather, the Alignment, in its platform published prior to the election, stated that we regard as the first priority the reaching of a full peace agreement, but that if a full peace cannot be reached, we would also be prepared to reach it by stages. In contrast, the Likud's platform and its election campaign rejected any other solution but a contractual peace agreement. Recently, we heard from the prime minister that Israel is prepared to have a permanent partial arrangement, which in fact means an interim arrangement, because an interim arrangement does not mean an arrangement which is limited in time but an arrangement which is something between a state of war and a final peace agreement. I think, in principle, that an interim agreement--and you can call it a permanent partial agreement or any other name--I do not rule it out as a way through which, under certain circumstances, it is possible to reach peace. I doubt it very much if that permanent partial arrangement which the prime minister hinted at with reference to the Sinai is acceptable to--or has been accepted by--the Egyptians. In effect, Egypt has rejected it. I am not sure that with respect to Judaea and Samaria, it is impossible--after the final arrangement is agreed on--to reach a temporary stage, an interim stage.

[Qital] Another issue, briefly...

[Arens] As-Sadat is not authorized to conduct negotiations on Judaea and Samaria and is not authorized to sign an agreement with respect to these territories.

[Bar-Lev] Look, my friend, I do not represent As-Sadat, and neither do you. He is the head of a state, he is a party to the agreement, and you cannot force him to decide what he will deal with and what he will not deal with.

[Arens] Neither will he force me to make concessions when he is not authorized to sign an agreement!

[Bar-Lev] Certainly not, but you are not prepared to make any concessions in Judaea and Samaria. Now, anyone who knows the Arab world to a certain extent, and both of us ought to know it by virtue of our positions, knows that As-Sadat cannot sign a separate peace agreement with us and totally disregard the problem of Judaea and Samaria and the Palestinian problem.

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All he wants is that between us and himself, and with U.S. consent, we reach a declaration of principles, as it was called at the time--nowadays the United States is also one who understands things about words and for 2 weeks has been sitting around trying to find some other word and will probably find one--an agreement in principle in which the element of evacuating territories on our part exists, so that As-Sadat will be able to face the Arab world and say: In principle, I regard this as a solution to the problem. Only then, so he has said so far, will he be prepared to sit with us and seek a final solution to the problem of the Sinai.

[Qital] Professor Arens and Hayyim Bar-Lev, gentlemen...

[Bar-Lev] One can say that it is not nice of him, but he is your interlocutor and you have no choice but to either accept it or reject it. I would not recommend rejecting it.

[Qital] Gentlemen, I suggest, our time...

[Arens] Propaganda, which is part of As-Sadat's tactics, I think this is clear to all of us.

[Bar-Lev] I am not saying that he is a bad tactician. I wish we were like him. He plays it very well, however, we are now not dealing with games, we are going to Camp David and the question is whether, on the issue of Judaea and Samaria, the cabinet presents a different position, which will enable the continuation of the negotiations with Egypt.

[Qital] At this point, gentlemen, I would like to thank you. We have somewhat exceeded the time allotted to us. Thank you, Professor Arens and Hayyim Bar-Lev.

POSSIBILITY OF DEFENSE PACT WITH U.S. STIMULATES COMMENT

Begin's Views Reported

TA012045Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1825 GMT 1 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpts] And now for Camp David. Prime Minister Menahem Begin met with President Yizhaq Navon this morning in order to report to him about the cabinet discussions on the eve of the Camp David summit. Begin promised to report to the president again when he returns to Israel following the meeting. Correspondent Yoram Ronen reports on the meeting at the president's residence: [begin videotape]

The prime minister spent a full hour with the president. He laid out before him the various options Israel has before the Camp David summit as well as the various scenarios expected to take place during the talks. It seems that the prime minister will be the first to meet with President Carter on Tuesday, when he arrives at Camp David. President as-Sadat will arrive several hours later. The talks themselves will take at least 1 week.

Begin, who was--as always--optimistic, was not prepared to tell us what he told the president.

[Begin] If I could tell you what I reported to the president I would have come to you and not to the president. What I told the president and what he told me belong to the president and to me.

[Ronen] Perhaps you could elaborate somewhat on an idea you raised last night during your speech to the UJA delegates concerning a defense pact?

V. 14 Sep 78

N 4

ISRAEL

A senior U.S. official in Washington this evening gave clarifications on the framework agreement regarding Judaea and Samaria, and among other things he revealed that Israel will soon begin evacuating a considerable number of its soldiers from Judaea, Samaria and from the Gaza Strip. The official said that this is being done in accordance with the agreement signed last night. According to him, Israel will reduce its forces in those two regions to 6,000 to 10,000 troops. Those units will be concentrated in defined areas in the first days of the implementation of the agreement.

The senior U.S. official noted at the same time, however, that a full-scale Israeli withdrawal from Judaea and Samaria depends on the negotiations between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, together with the inhabitants of the territories.

REACTION TO CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS CONTINUES

(Arens) (Rabin) Interviewed

FBIS-MEA-78-182

TA180857Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] In order to discuss what was achieved at the Camp David conference and President Carter's announcement and that of Prime Minister Menahem Begin and the president of Egypt, Anwar as-Sadat, we have invited to our studio in Tel Aviv the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Prof Moshe Arens, the former prime minister and Knesset member, Yizhaq Rabin. In Tel Aviv the moderator is our political correspondent, Elimelekh Ram.

[Ram] Gentlemen, the prime minister said: We have not yet brought peace, there is a long process of negotiations still in front of us, and the first question is: What are the main problems which will have to be overcome before peace is achieved? Professor Arens, please.

[Arens] That question is difficult to answer, since we do not know exactly what was agreed on and what has not yet been agreed on. In fact, we only know one thing, that it has been agreed not to agree--and that is on the issue of the settlements. It may be that beyond this there are other issues. According to the information given us up to now, there have been far-reaching concessions here in the original Israeli positions, or in Israel's positions before we left for Camp David. It is not clear what more has been left.

[Ram] Does the future of the settlements, in your view, appear to be a condition for As-Sadat's agreement to signing a peace treaty?

[Arens] I think that, according to the reports we have just heard, this is what has to be understood, unambiguously.

[Ram] Mr Rabin, what, in your view, will be the hard points to deal with?

[Rabin] Before I deal with details, I would like to say that we have now watched, emotionally, a far-reaching event as regards the future of the State of Israel, the future of the area and I have no doubt that this is an opening for a new period, a period which can really guarantee peace to the State of Israel.

Although the details are not known, it is already possible to say that both sides have conceded. As I see it, the Israeli concessions were also significant and even painful, but Egypt also conceded.

1315-MEA-78-181

CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT DRAWS COMMENT, REACTION

Begin Interviewed

TA180707Y Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0605 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] An hour ago Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin granted an interview to our correspondent at the Camp David conference, Dani Wessely. Mr Begin says, this is a turning point in the history of the nation. [begin recording]

[Question] Mr Begin, what agreement are you bringing with you now?

[Answer] God willing, when I return home I will tell the public: We are bringing an agreement which has honor and security.

[Question] According to the agreement signed today, a peace agreement with Egypt is to be signed in 3 months. Will the removal of the settlements in Sinai be a condition for a peace agreement with the Egyptians?

[Answer] First of all, we undertook to sign a peace agreement during the next 3 months-- this does not necessarily mean at the end of 12 weeks. It is possible that we might do this earlier. It is true that President as-Sadat raises a condition and this is also what he wrote--in the signing of a peace treaty we should remove the settlements. We have not undertaken such a condition. However, we stated that we would submit this matter for a Knesset vote because the policy of removing the settlements goes against the government's decisions, which was approved by the Knesset. Therefore, the delegation--the foreign minister, the defense minister and myself and our aides--did not have the authority to change this policy.

Thus, our answer was that the matter would be submitted for a vote by the Knesset--and we will allow a free vote; there will be no party discipline on this vote, and since the coalition will allow a free vote I am sure that the opposition will do the same. Thus all Knesset members will vote according to their conscience. Each, personally, will decide--not according to the lineup of coalition and opposition--supporters of the government and its opponents--but according to his conscience. The decision will be made in the freest manner possible with the Knesset decision being binding on all.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, have you decided how you will vote on this issue?

[Answer] Were I able to tell you how I will vote then I would not tell you because the vote will be a free one--and I would be telling you how I would cast my vote.

I am still considering whether I will participate in the Knesset debate, because one of the considerations is that I prefer that the Knesset really decide in a totally free manner, and there is a possibility that I will keep silent, so that the Knesset will decide without my influence. Each according to his conscience.

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However, the main thing that I wish to say is that whatever the Knesset decision is, I wish to announce in advance that I will accept it and will not turn this into an issue of confidence. There will under no circumstances be any personal offense. I state: The Knesset vote will be binding on all of us without exception.

[Question] Will you, on your part, exert your influence to have this proposal passed?

[Answer] I said the opposite of what you have now assumed. I am not making a commitment. I said that I am considering the possibility of not even making a speech.

[Question] Will we have maximum security with the return of Sinai and the airfields to Egypt?

[Answer] We will have security. We have insured this. Maj Gen Avraham Tamir stands with us on this. He is a great expert on Israel's security--knows every grain of sand in the Sinai and if he supported the agreement from a security point of view than you can sleep with ease.

[Question] As for the settlement in the West Bank, in your assessment, will Jordan take an active part?

[Answer] Yes, in accordance with our peace proposal Jordan has a function--even functions. However, it must be clear: Our army will be present in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, and only our army. No other army will be in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

[Question] There was mention of a withdrawal of IDF forces from the West Bank. When, in your assessment, will the IDF begin the withdrawal from the West Bank?

[Answer] Any withdrawal will be implemented when the peace treaty is signed. However, I wish to refer you to the English version: a withdrawal, this is what we wrote, meaning in Hebrew a certain withdrawal [nesiga mesuyemet]. We have insured the IDF's remaining in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza in the following sentence: The remaining Israeli Defence Forces. This means the Israeli Army that will remain in Judaea and Samaria--there is a double meaning here--those that remain, out of those which withdraw. This means that there will be a certain withdrawal and the main force of the IDF will remain in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza in order to provide security for the people of Israel in Eretz Yisra'el.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, will there be foreign rule in Judaea and Samaria?

[Answer] No, there will not.

[Question] When will the military government be dissolved?

[Answer] After peace is made.

[Question] What is the meaning of the clause about the exchange of letters on East Jerusalem?

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[Answer] Today there is no exchange of letters, as there was to have been, but if we get a letter with a certain content which does not at all endanger Jerusalem on the part of the president, I will answer the president telling him that Jerusalem is one city which cannot be divided, ever, and it is the eternal capital of Israel. This is what I will answer him and I will explain to him that this is a decision of the Knesset of 11 years ago in accordance with a law passed on 28 June 1967 saying: The government may by order apply the state's law, jurisdiction and administration over all parts of Eretz Yisra'el as specified by the order. On the basis of this law the government then--that is in June 1967--applied the State of Israel's law, jurisdiction and administration over all of Jerusalem.

[Question] Mr Begin, how would you define the relations between you and the president of Egypt, As-Sadat?

[Answer] As you know, last November, in Jerusalem [words indistinct- and he answered me, you are my friend.

[Question] Are you still his friend?

[Answer] I answered this important remark and I believe that when a man tells another man; you are my friend, these are important things. However, after Ismailia there was a turnabout and bad things were publicized. Today I do not want to repeat the bad things because I think that we have a reason--even to be joyful. I think that what happened is a turnabout in the history of the nation. We will hope for the best.

I cannot yet say that we already have peace because we have not yet signed a peace treaty. But there is hope that we will have peace, as I hope, not only in this generation but for generations to come. Therefore, I do not want to talk about the bad things, I prefer to talk about the good things and as you saw today we again said to each other: We are friends.

I visited President as-Sadat at his cabin in Camp David. He met me. We conducted a friendly talk. He then returned the visit at my cabin--it is called a cabin--I wish every Israeli citizen had such a cabin--and we had a most friendly conversation--much friendship, much openness, an assurance that there would not be war, that we would make peace, that we would help each other. No better things could be said to those who used to be enemies and who became friends and who then became this and that and who again became friends.

[Question] Mr Begin, who will be the first Israeli ambassador to Egypt? Have you thought about this?

[Answer] I'll tell you the truth, I have not yet thought about sending an ambassador but we have many candidates. Look here at the U.S. Embassy, I can pull them by the hair and send them to Cairo. We also have people in Israel. I do not want to make firm statements otherwise they will ask me to keep my promise.

[Wessely] Thank you, Mr Begin. [end recording]

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ISRAEL

Dayan, (Weizman) Comment

TA180559Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] Correspondent Rasi Barqa'i managed to get inside the reception hall of the White House and tried to speak with a few people serving on the Israeli delegation. The delegation members refused to speak about the content of the agreement before it was officially publicized. Rasi Barqa'i spoke with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman and the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz. First, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. [begin recording]

[Barqa'i] Mr Dayan, could you say a few words to the radio?

[Dayan] I am very happy that a situation was created where the people, the public in Israel will have to make the decision. This is important in itself. I am sure that during the next 2 weeks this will extensively preoccupy the entire public--all sorts of Friday evening conversations, all kinds of criticisms and fault-finding. At least for this period, I hope, all these things will disappear and instead, each will give an account to himself, discuss things within the framework of his family, his party, in the press. The public will have to make a crucial decision.

For a long while I, at least, have thought that we have to come to a situation in which we should examine the conditions under which we can achieve peace and only then decide whether to accept or reject these conditions. In short, to get to this thorough and basic examination or clarification--not a declaration of principles and such things--but to get truly to the things on which peace depends and then to consider whether we prefer to make peace on these conditions. The situation now is that this is the question posed to us, and this question is posed to individuals, to the government, to this or that minister and this or that party. The question is posed to the entire public and I assume that this will not be a question discussed by the public in accordance with partisan affiliations. This giving oneself an account will be one of Israel's greatest moments. This in itself is of first rate importance. Later of course, the result of this, whatever it may be, will be one of the phenomena that will be most meaningful for Israel.

[Barqa'i] Sir, what is the account you give to yourself? Are you satisfied with this agreement?

[Dayan] I am satisfied from [word indistinct] of the agreement as an agreement as regards Egypt--both with regard to the agreement with Egypt and with regard to the agreement concerning Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip--the autonomy and the abolition of the military government are compatible with my views, except of course for this decisive question only, namely, the settlements and defending them. This is the only problematic point. As for the other clauses of the agreement--the military installations, the demilitarizations and so on--I think this is a good agreement.

[Barqa'i] Mr. Dayan, what can you say about your personal feeling at this moment?

[Dayan] I have a good, positive feeling, thanks to the fact that I am indeed taking part in this. This was the only reason why I was called on to join this government and because of which I decided to undertake my position in the government. What I assumed, that this year will be decisive on this matter, came true indeed. I could have killed myself if I had been home at this moment and not because I would have been unemployed but because I would have told myself: Here, you were offered to do this and you refused, whereas with my experience and ability, I can contribute something. These are things I believe in, first and foremost, the set of relations between the Arabs and us. I am pleased that my assumption that this would be the major issue concerning the government came true and that I am now here, an active partner to this.

[Barqa'i] We do not always see you excited, Mr Foreign Minister.

[Dayan] Am I excited now? Well, I am indeed so.

[Barqa'i] Thank you.

[Barqa'i] Mr Weizman, how do you feel after almost 2 weeks of being closed off from the world?

[Weizman] Stable. There are of course a lot of things to do and think about. These are difficult and exciting moments. The most important thing is to look ahead.

[Barqa'i] To look ahead and?

[Weizman] To look ahead and see how the State of Israel will get used to peace, at least with Egypt, but I hope with more countries. The country will have the first opportunity, since it was first established and since Zionism was first proclaimed, to live, at least with one people, the largest group of people, in understanding, in neighborly relations and to carry out all things that Zionism has tried to carry out for so many years, to reach the achievements that Zionism might not have been able to reach because of the wars.

[Barqa'i] You are talking of one people and mentioned the chance of peace with other countries. What indeed is the chance for a peace agreement with Jordan?

[Weizman] We have not signed peace with the Egyptians yet and you are already asking about Jordan. I suggest that we take care of one Turk and wait. There is a lot yet to do.

[Barqa'i] What about the security problems that may arise as a result of the agreement with Egypt?

[Weizman] Peace is one of the important factors of security, one with promises surely. We will have to carry out these promises with mutual understanding and supervision and with the help of the IDF, of course.

[Barqa'i] This means to evacuate settlements.

[Weizman] We will hold a short conversation this evening at the White House before the signatures. The problem of settlements will also be raised for a decision by the Knesset. I suggest that we finish our cup of tea this evening, comb our hair and sign a peace treaty with Egypt.

[Barqa'i] Thank you. Mr Dinitz, how do you sum up these difficult days in isolation?

[Dinitz] These were days of hard efforts. I am happy that we reached what we reached.

[Barqa'i] Can you describe a little the atmosphere in the talks?

[Dinitz] I think that there were days with a good atmosphere and days with a worse atmosphere. Everything is behind us now. Let's turn over a new leaf. This will demand efforts but the goal justifies this.

[Barqa'i] Are you excited?

[Dinitz] Yes. These are great historic moments. [end recording]

Peres Reacts Cautiously

TA180758Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] The head of the Labor Party welcomes the signing of the agreement, the plan as publicized by the communications media. In his opinion, the concessions made by the Israeli Government are too many. Correspondent Beni Rom heard Shim'on Peres' initial reaction. [begin recording]

[Peres] I am really happy that the summit did not fail. I am happy that the way to peace was properly opened, as it should be. In the wake of my talks with As-Sadat I believed that a settlement with Egypt could indeed be reached and this is what in fact happened. We should reach some framework of an agreement regarding the future of Judaea and Samaria.

As for the conditions of the treaty--we will be able to react only after we properly scrutinize it. There is no need to rush to a reaction. It is clear that this is not exactly similar to, let us say, the Likud's previous plan. However, this is no time for settling accounts. I clearly welcome the decision. As regards its content--this we will discuss after we peruse it.

[Question] Perhaps you could still react to the content of the agreement, as little as we know of it now. What is your opinion, for example about the issue of not setting up settlements in Judaea and Samaria any longer?

[Answer] I would not want to react to this or that detail. It is clear that Israel has to pay a price, and a heavy price, for peace. I am doubtful whether it is necessary to conduct the negotiations thus or to reach these conditions exactly. However, there is no rush to get into criticism today. I also think that immediately after making the statement to the U.S. Congress, the head of the delegation and prime minister, Mr Menahem Begin, should return home and report to the people and to the Knesset. Only then can we react at length and in detail.

[Question] From the little we heard from the communications media though, were there too many and far-reaching concessions made? Was this something that could be done earlier without all this dragging on and tension of the last 9 months?

[Answer] Many concessions were made. As I mentioned, I do not want to get into a discussion on this matter. However, I have no doubt that with the concessions made it would have been possible to end the negotiations earlier. [end recording]

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ISRAEL

Ehrlich on Agreement

TA180730Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich said that he foresees a revolutionary change in Israel's economy with the signing of the peace treaty. Mr Ehrlich believes that Israel has unlimited possibilities for economic cooperation with Egypt, a thing that will lead to the economic independence of both Israel and Egypt. Correspondent Moshe Nestelbaum talked with Minister Ehrlich. [begin recording]

[Question] Mr Ehrlich, you have probably heard the clauses of the peace treaty. What is your opinion?

[Answer] My opinion is very positive and I welcome the agreement. I am congratulating my friend and colleague the prime minister for bringing peace to the State of Israel after many generations. We are now embarked on a new road in the region, a road that is important to the future of the State of Israel.

[Question] Mr Ehrlich, if peace is established between Egypt and Israel, do you expect a change in Israel's economy?

[Answer] A revolutionary change. After As-Sadat's visit we already began preparing economic cooperation plans in the Finance Ministry. It became clear to us from the first checks that we had unlimited possibilities for economic cooperation between Israel and Egypt. This cooperation can lead to [benefits for] both the economies of Israel and Egypt. If we reach peace, the region will prosper economically.

[Question] Sir, Finance Minister, in which spheres do you foresee economic cooperation between us and Egypt?

[Answer] First, development of agriculture in Egypt and receiving the Nile waters in the Negev. Also, mutual industrial development, cooperation in industry, technology, and know how for the development of the two countries. In addition, exchange of merchandise and close commercial ties. Egypt has 40 million people; this is a potential market for us and we could also become a potential market for Egypt. [end recording]

Sharon Praises Agreement

TA180735Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] Agriculture Minister Sharon said that the settlement effort made in Judaea and Samaria is the element that enabled the government to reveal generosity and flexibility without jeopardizing Israel's security. Talking with our correspondent, Moshe Nestelbaum, Agriculture Minister Sharon reacted to the agreement for the first time and also to the decision not to set up new settlements in Judaea and Samaria. [begin recording]

[Sharon] This is a huge step toward a real peace over which I am happy, just as is the entire Israeli public. This is a personal achievement of Menahem Begin. Carter's contribution has certainly been great but without Begin's true aspiration for peace, this would not have been achieved. This is the true answer, and surely also a surprising answer, to all impatient people.

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However, we, who have been cooperating with the prime minister for many months for the success of these fateful negotiations, were not surprised. On Friday and Saturday the prime minister and I held several telephone conversations, and I experienced the great effort made in order to reach peace while at the same time maintaining Israel's security.

I have no doubt that the settlement effort in Judaea and Samaria in the last year is the element that enabled the government to reveal generosity and flexibility without endangering Israel's security.

[Question] How do you regard the decision not to set up new settlements in Judaea and Samaria during 5 years, except for military footholds of course?

[Answer] I heard the announcement of the commentators on this matter. I am waiting for the return of the prime minister and the other delegation members. I assume that these things will be presented and we will receive a complete picture. What is important to note is that what we have done in the last year gave us the ability and the required daring in order to go far with our flexibility, as the negotiations revealed. [end recording]

Yadin Praises Agreement

TA180854Y Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0605 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] Peace is achievable, boundless joy and a willingness to face the truth--this was said to our correspondent by Acting Prime Minister Prof Yigael Yadin. [begin recording]

[Yadin] Like all of us I am most happy. Yesterday, at 2330 I attended a circle of activists from our movement in a private house in Ashdod and to everybody's surprise I received a telephone call from the prime minister. He was very moved and he begged me not to go public until 0430, and he told me that the defense minister, the foreign minister, Professor Baraq were standing beside him and that a framework for total peace with Egypt had been achieved and another agreement for a settlement with our neighbors in the east and everybody was happy.

It can be said that the impossible was achieved there--that's what I think--and all of us in the very near future--in the coming weeks--together with the great joy, each of us will have to do some soulsearching, take very important decisions. However, if these things bring about peace, first of all between us and Egypt, and in the end peace between us and our neighbors in the east, what can be more important and of more concern to us?

I hope that the listeners will forgive me for appealing to the teachers. The impossible has been achieved. We have gone very far to meet the teachers, let the teachers go back to the classrooms together with the students so that all will be joyful and so that they will be able to discuss this issue with the students and I am sure that other details can be agreed upon later.

It can be said that as far as the agreement with Egypt is concerned, in the long run the agreement is based on the Israeli peace plan as submitted.

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ISRAEL

We still have the basic problem--as we have heard--the problem of the settlements which the Knesset and the people will have to decide upon. This decision means the bringing about of peace between Israel and Egypt and this is something very new. As I have said, in our peace plan we already announced that if peace is achieved we would bring the IDF back to the international boundary.

As for the West Bank, on the one hand the framework for a plan is based on the autonomy plan--on a solution to be implemented after 5 years. Here too we will have to make decisions. The most important element in the agreement is that the IDF--that is to say the Israeli security problem--will remain in key positions in Judaea and Samaria as will be decided and agreed upon. We have to wait for further details in order to be able to say things more explicitly.

The agreement was reached at the last moment but this is the framework agreement and I think that at this moment what we should feel is boundless joy about this achievement, and everybody deserves praise for this. However, at the same time we should be prepared for moments of truth, each with himself, each with his party, the entire people, and as I say, if we want peace, peace appears to be achievable despite the sacrifices and hard decisions that will have to be made by us and the other side.

I assume that the foreign minister and defense minister will return tomorrow and it appears that the prime minister will stay on for a day or two but I will know more about this when I read the telegrams when I arrive at the ministry. [end recording]

Zippori on Agreement

TA180845Y Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0605 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] The Camp David agreement carries many concessions which are significant from a security point of view. Apart from withdrawal from the territory, the Israeli airfields in the Sinai will be handed over to Egyptian civilian administration. Military correspondent Yosi 'Abadi spoke with Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay-Zippori about the significance and importance of the agreement from a security point of view. [begin recording]

[Zippori] I, together with all the people of Israel, am happy about the opening that we have. I think that this is an historic moment which we have been awaiting since the birth of Zionism. We have arrived at an opening with all Arab countries and achieved real dialog for peace with one of them. I believe that if there is a peace agreement with Egypt--even if the other Arab countries do not join it--we will have removed war from our region. At any rate, we have reduced the chance of war and increased the security of the State of Israel.

[Question] Mr Zippori, there are many concessions in the agreement from a security point of view--on territories, the airfields. What is the significance of these concessions from a security point of view?

[Answer] As far as Egypt and the Sinai are concerned we were aware of the concessions in advance and of the dangers that we were taking upon ourselves. From a military and comprehensively national point of view we saw the possibility of gambling on this risk for the sake of the achievement of a peace agreement with Egypt.

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As for the other details, I do not know them yet. I support and give full credit to Prime Minister Begin who is the first prime minister of Israel to bring the people of Israel to such a moment. He and his advisers, both of whom are well versed in military matters--both former chiefs of staff and one today's foreign minister, Dayan, and the other a former air force chief and former chief of the staff (operations) branch--and who are aware of security problems, were aware of all the problems that we might face and certainly took pains to insure that these be resolved properly. At any rate, since I do not know all the details, I cannot discuss them.

[Question] In the plans prepared before the summit--plans to which you most certainly were a partner--were the risks in the concessions taken into account?

[Answer] These were taken into account. We have an analysis of all the possibilities--what we can risk and what we cannot--and in principle I would say that there is a risk in war and a risk in peace. For 30 years we have experienced the risks of war. It appears that the time has come to face the risks of peace. [end recording]

General Cabinet Reaction

TA180842Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] Correspondent Sara Frankel sums up the situation in Jerusalem, including assessments in the government about the agreement achieved at Camp David.

Well, since the prime minister informed Professor Yadin at night about the agreement achieved with Egypt, relief is felt among the cabinet ministers that the Camp David summit was concluded successfully. There was fear of a failure and awareness of the difficulties. Since this is viewed as an important and great breakthrough, as an incredible achievement, as defined by Professor Yadin, a good feeling prevails here despite the questions arising regarding the details of the agreement.

Most of the ministers prefer not to comment on the content of the agreement since they do not possess all the details. In his telephone conversation the prime minister said that the agreement was achieved thanks to extraordinarily wonderful teamwork, with everyone making his special contribution. The prime minister also said that it was almost the incredible and impossible that was achieved here.

There are ministers, especially those who support settlement and continuation of settlement in Judaea and Samaria, who prefer to wait and learn the meaning of the clause in the agreement talking about not establishing settlements, whether this refers to the 5-year period or forever. Some emphasize that the part of the agreement touching on Judaea and Samaria is based on the autonomy plan and view this as an achievement. They also view the continued presence of the IDF in the West Bank as an important, positive achievement.

It is possible to say that shock and surprise also prevail among the cabinet members, a feeling that the unexpected has happened, almost out of the blue. On the other hand there are fears and there is uncertainty regarding the exact details.

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ISRAEL

Chief Rabbis React

TA180944Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Israel's chief rabbi, Shelomo Goren, said that the tidings about the sprouts of peace should be welcomed and received with hope and happiness. He expressed the hope that this will be a peace of honor and strength and remarked that our holy rights in the land of our forefathers should be preserved. He called on the people and its chosen representatives to discuss and consider all details prudently. Rabbi Goren congratulated the prime minister and his colleagues.

Chief Rabbi 'Ovadia Yosef called on the leaders and people not to open negotiations with lightning and storm but with moderation and quiet, in order to guarantee peace to the people and to the state. Rabbi Yosef expressed the hope that when complete redemption comes the intactness of the land will also be guaranteed as promised in the visions of Israel's prophets.

Horowitz, Shelli React

TA180949Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpts] Commerce and Industry Minister Horowitz objects to the evacuation of the settlements in the Sinai. He views the Egyptian demand that Israel evacuate the settlements as a sign indicating that As-Sadat does not have in mind a full and true peace. Minister Horowitz also expressed concern about the possibility that settlement in Judaea and Samaria will be stopped.

Shelli MK Arye Eli'av said that this is a step in the right direction although it is not yet peace. He said that the struggle to have Israel embark on this way has been going for 10 years.

The Citizens Rights Movement congratulated the prime minister and the delegation members on their achievements at Camp David. The head of the movement, MK Shulamit Alloni, called on the public to support the prime minister and to shore him up toward the signing of the peace treaty.

Other Reaction Reported

TA180846Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpts] MK Ge'ula Kohen has said that she will demand that a meeting of the Herut center be convened and will express no confidence in the prime minister. In her opinion, Begin has lost the people's trust and the agreements he signed are an act of national suicide and the ultimate wiping out of Judaea and Samaria. She said that this is in fact partition and such a suicidal proposal has never come from Zionist leaders.

MK Yehuda Ben-Me'ir, one of the MAFDAL heads, said that he was shocked and that he did not expect such results. He said that there was a heavy price involved here and it was hard to digest this. However, we are dealing here also with the issue of a full and ultimate peace which is the aspiration and desire of the people. He said that he would convene the MAFDAL Knesset faction at noon.

The Democratic Movement will support the government in its efforts to sign a peace agreement within the coming weeks. The movement congratulated the prime minister and the negotiating team for achieving the agreement.

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MK Amnon Rubinstein has said that all of As-Sadat's demands were achieved. He foresees opposition to the agreement even within the Likud faction. Nevertheless, he said that his party would support the government's position. In his opinion, in return for these concessions the government could have signed the same agreement 9 months ago.

MK Me'ir Bar'iam, acting chairman of the Alignment Knesset faction, has announced that the faction will convene today to decide on an initial position regarding the agreements.

Alignment MK Bar-Lev said that as far as we have learned this was doubtlessly a great achievement for Carter but there was also vagueness regarding Judaea, Samaria and the Sinai. It seems to him that Israel has made total concessions in this connection. However, on the whole, a basis was created for the continuation of the negotiations.

MAPAM MK Me'ir Talmi said that the agreements were an opening for a future of peace in the region. According to his assessment what is being talked about is a separate agreement with Egypt and this will lead us to a grave decision on the fate of the settlements in the Yamit region. In his judgment, an exchange of territory will solve the problem of the Israeli settlements in the Sinai.

MK Me'ir Wilner from RAKAH, basing himself on the details, has said that no basic problem was solved. The only things solved perhaps were the problems of Carter, As-Sadat and Begin who are planning, in his opinion, a military alliance.

REPORT ON JOINT NUCLEAR REACTORS DENIED

TA161920Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 16 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yizhaq Moda'i denied this evening to our political correspondent Elimelekh Ram the report appearing in the Boston HERALD today according to which Israel proposed to Egypt a joint operation of two nuclear reactors in the Sinai. The paper claimed that Minister Moda'i was urgently summoned to Camp David in order formally to present the proposal to the Egyptians. Mr Moda'i told our correspondent that this is totally unfounded. He was recently in the United States but was not invited to Camp David and the entire report is fictitious.

BOMBS EXPLODE IN JERUSALEM; SEVEN INJURED

NC160937Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 16 Sep 78 NC

[Excerpts] This morning two bombs exploded near the Jaffa gate in Jerusalem. Seven persons sustained light injuries. The hospital to which they were taken has announced that all of them will be sent home today.

The Jerusalem police commander has noted that merchants located near the site of the explosion had maintained a very poor state of alert, in spite of information efforts made by the police.

HANDGRENADE THROWN AT IDF BUS IN W. BANK

TA181006Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] A handgrenade was hurled at a bus carrying soldiers near the old mosque of Al-Birah. The handgrenade exploded on the road. No casualties were inflicted and no damage was done. Security forces combed the area and arrested several suspects.

MASSING OF TROOPS ON SYRIAN, LEBANESE BORDERS DENIED

JN170724Y Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World 0530 GMT 17 Sep 78 JN

[Text] Israeli military sources denied in Tel Aviv last night reports circulated by the sabotage organizations in Beirut yesterday that the IDF is massing troops all along the Israeli-Lebanese border and in the Golan Heights. The sources affirmed that everything is proceeding normally in these two areas.

TV REPORTS IDF AIRCRAFT OVERFLY BEIRUT

TA171952Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 17 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpt] Now to the situation in Lebanon. Two Israeli aircraft overflew Beirut, breaking the sound barrier. Relative calm continues in the city for the fourth day.

At the same time, Lebanese sources also denied reports alleging that Israeli forces are concentrating along the northern border.

The terrorists report that they are continuing to maintain a defensive alert in the southern area.

RADIO REPORTS ON CLASHES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

NC171234Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 17 Sep 78 NC

[Excerpt] In the eastern enclave in southern Lebanon, artillery exchanges were renewed at noon between the terrorists and the militias and the Phalangists.

Our reporter Yehezqel Hame'iri says that the terrorists directed intermittent fire from their positions in Ramat Arnon against the enclave's villages. The militias returned the fire.

CHIEF OF STAFF COMMENTS ON SITUATION IN LEBANON

TA171423Y Jerusalem POST in English 17 Sep 78 p 2 TA

[Text] (ITIM)--Syria has decided to impose its rule in Lebanon, whether by force or through other means, Chief of Staff Rav-Aluf Rafa'el Eytan said in a special Rosh Hashana interview on the army radio yesterday.

Eytan said the terrorists are not taking part in the current fighting, because the Syrians are doing their work for them, intending to end all Christian opposition, in both the north and the south of the country. He added that, in his estimation, the Syrians are capable of doing this.

Eytan confirmed reports of terrorists infiltration into southern Lebanon despite the presence of UN soldiers there. He also said the UN forces were trying to carry out their duties, and the Israel Government has expressed its satisfaction over this fact.

In answer to a question, Eytan said the strength of Israel's opponents on the eastern front was building up more quickly than that of Egypt.

The IDF has made no changes in its battle readiness because of the current peace talks with Egypt, Eytan said. "When the government finishes talking and tells us what has been concluded, then we'll begin to think about what to do." On the question of local arms production, Eytan said he favored it wherever possible, because locally produced arms are better adapted to Middle Eastern battle conditions, and their potential is unknown to the enemy.

KNESSET APPROVES NEW FACTIONS AFTER DMC DISSOLUTION

TA171646Y Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 17 Sep 78 TA

[From the Afternoon Newsreel]

[Text] Here is a report from our Knesset correspondent: The Knesset committee today officially recognized the dissolution of the Democratic Movement for Change [DMC]. The committee approved granting the status of a faction to the two segments of the former DMC, the Democratic Movement and the Movement for Change and Initiative.

MK Assaf Yaguri, who did not join either faction, has not yet approached the Knesset committee with a request to recognize him as a single-member faction.

Knesset correspondent Moshe Hakohen adds that the representatives of the two new factions have informed the Knesset committee that the representation of their members on the various Knesset committees will, for the time being, remain unchanged. The representatives of the two new factions will soon convene to discuss possible changes in representation of these committees, as well as the division of the other assets of the former DMC in the Knesset.

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT COMMENTS ON COALITION AGREEMENT

NC170754Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 17 Sep 78 NC

[Text] Professor Yadin's Democratic Movement opposes canceling the clause in the coalition agreement which gives the movement the right to protest government decisions on settlement issues. Canceling the clause was suggested by Knesset member Ge'ula Kohen.

A spokesman for the Democratic Movement said that a change in the coalition agreement cannot be made unilaterally. He added that the Democratic Movement is the successor of the Democratic Movement for Change and that as far as it is concerned, the coalition agreement remains valid.

MEETING OF LABOR PARTY'S NEW ARAB BODY REPORTED

TA152047Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 15 Sep 78 TA

[Text] About 100 self-employed Arab citizens, attorneys, physicians and teachers met at noon with the head of the Labor Party, MK Shim'on Peres, in a new forum of the party, the Social-Political Club sponsored by the Arab Department. The meeting took place at Bet Berl in Zofit. The head of the Arab Department, Ra'anah Kohen, told our correspondent that the heads of the local councils of the Triangle villages of Baqa Al-Gharbiyya, Kafr Qari' and Jatt, were among those present at the meeting.

COURT ORDERS HALT WORK AT BET-EL SETTLEMENT

TA171538Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 17 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Twelve inhabitants of the Bet-El area prevailed upon the high court of justice to issue an injunction against the defense minister, the military governor of Judaea and Samaria and the commander of the Ramallah District, asking the three to explain why IDF soldiers should not be prevented from building houses for Israeli inhabitants in the area. The court has also issued an interim injunction ordering the defense authorities to refrain from carrying out any construction or excavating work or populating the existing buildings until a permanent decision on the appeal is made.

Reacting to this, Gush Emunim members told correspondent Shemu'el Tal that in their opinion the decision will have grave repercussions for the future of settlement beyond the green line.

The Gush secretariat was scheduled to convene this afternoon to discuss its reaction to the court's decision.

Gush Emunim Reaction

TA171951Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 17 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpt] The Gush Emunim secretariat decided tonight to make an urgent approach to the cabinet to get it to make the settlements in Judaea and Samaria subject to Israeli law. This came after they learned about the injunction issued by the high court of justice ordering the security forces to stop construction work and efforts to populate the settlement of Bet-El.

The appeal to the high court of justice was submitted by 12 Arab inhabitants of the adjacent village of Al-Birah. The court ordered the defense minister, the military governor of Judaea and Samaria and the commander of the Ramallah District to explain-- within 40 days--why the IDF soldiers should not refrain from undertaking construction work for settlers from Israel inside the territory of the camp.

Our correspondent says that this is the second case in the last few months in which the high court has ordered work in the settlements halted following appeals by inhabitants from Judaea and Samaria.

However, the Bet-El settlers managed to move into the settlement's new buildings before the court order was issued, and today approximately 40 families reside in the area.

JERUSALEM: JORDAN'S PLAN TO AID W. BANK FAILS

NC170832Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 17 Sep 78 NC

[Text] Correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that Jordan has not succeeded in its efforts to recruit sufficient amounts of money from the oil countries for the benefit of institutions in Judaea and Samaria.

The budget for the coming year is now being prepared in Jordan and several mayors in Judaea and Samaria have been asked to refrain, at this stage, from submitting requests for development projects and from visiting Amman.

Sources in East Jerusalem told our correspondent that the oil countries have apparently notified Jordan that they are not willing to pay twice, that is directly to the municipalities and again through Amman.

The most important thing, which has impressed me up to now, is that Egypt--true, after the fulfilling of all its demands--is prepared to sign a peace treaty with Israel, to allow an interim period of 5 years in everything involving the future of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip; the solution of the Palestinian problem and peace with Jordan, beyond what Israel has agreed to to date. If it turns out that the problem of the sovereignty over the territories--if it turns out that the future of Jerusalem, first and foremost, the future of East Jerusalem and also the future of the settlements, the footholds, in Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, these three things, their problem does indeed remain open for a decision at the end of the 5 years, I think that this is a great and impressive achievement. [sentence as heard]

I have no details. Is there an Israeli commitment, of any kind whatsoever concerning the fate of Jerusalem, concerning the future of the sovereignty over the territories, concerning the fate of the settlements, the footholds in Judaea and Samaria? If these have remained open questions on which Israel still has freedom of maneuver with regard to how these things will be decided in another 5 years, that is, after peace is made between Egypt and Israel, after we experience having peace between the main Arab country, Egypt, and Israel-- I regard this as a great achievement. I saw this even before the Camp David conference and I also wrote about it, as the main direction guaranteeing peace.

[Ram] What about the future of the settlements in the Rafah approaches?

[Rabin] I have the impression that Egypt will present this as a condition and I hear that the prime minister and the Israeli delegation at Camp David have in fact left this issue for the Knesset's decision. I imagine that the problem will be put to the nation and the Knesset. Will peace rise or fall on this?

[Ram] Professor Arens, what are the main changes which have occurred, as far as we have heard and as far as the information changes in Mr Begin's, the prime minister's, peace program, as it was presented in December?

[Arens] Yes. On the basis of what has been reported up to now, and if I have not forgotten anything and not made any mistakes, it appears to me that this is: A. In Sinai, the withdrawal from the demand for control over the airfields; B. Agreement to the fact that diplomatic relations will be founded only after the main withdrawal, if I have understood correctly what has been reported, not with the signing of the agreement, but only after...

[Rabin] That was in the peace program prepared by the cabinet...

[Arens] That peaceful relations would be founded...

[Rabin] Only after...

[Arens] That may be so. At any rate, I regard this as a concession, because, traditionally, peaceful relations, diplomatic relations, are established right away with the signing of a peace agreement.

With regard to Judaea and Samaria, there is an understanding, as was reported, for a halt to settlement in the area. These are not things we agreed to, or discussed a willingness to agree to, beforehand. If I have understood correctly, there is a willingness to permit the Jordanian police to enter Judaea and Samaria; there is a willingness to restrict the IDF presence to certain bases.

It appears to me that this is the main list of the things which represent concessions on our part, agreement on our part to things we have not previously agreed to, before leaving for Camp David.

[Ram] What reactions do you expect in your party, in the Herut; in view of the concessions, or the changes, in the peace program?

[Arens] Yes. That is hard to say at this stage. We have to see all the details. Apparently a great many things are not yet clear. I would say--on the main issue, to which I attach no inconsiderable weight--that, at this stage, it is not at all clear, whether Egypt's willingness to sign an agreement in accordance with that timetable mentioned at Camp David, a peace agreement with us, is this an irrevocable commitment? [sentence as heard] Or, is it dependent on the fact that the Jordanians come; that we agree to make additional concessions, is it dependent on negotiations which are to be held over Judaea and Samaria, with the Palestinians, is this an irrevocable commitment which will lead Egypt and Israel to a peace agreement even if no agreement is achieved on the issue of Judaea and Samaria? This is not clear and it appears to me that it will determine the position of many people.

[Ram] Mr Rabin, do you expect a new political deployment in Israel?

[Rabin] It is still too soon to evaluate. I have no doubt that in several significant things, Israel, the Cabinet of Israel, has made concessions when compared to the [Likud] peace program. When the reference is to Sinai, in fact, all the Egyptian demands have been accepted, apart from the question of the settlements, which, I have no doubt will stand as a painful and difficult problem facing everyone in Israel, facing all the parties in Israel, facing everyone of the Knesset members who will have to vote on it when the matter is put to the Knesset.

[Arens] The speed of the withdrawal from Sinai is also faster than in the original program.

[Rabin] Yes, these are secondary things...

[Ram] Two or 3 years...

[Rabin] Secondary things. The main problem is that of the settlements in Sinai.

The second question, as I said before, is what, in fact, is Israel committing itself to today--in the framework agreement on which Egypt makes its signing of a peace agreement with Israel dependent--with all the details, the main ones of which are connected with the future of the territories, the fate of Jerusalem, the fate of the settlements and the security arrangements. I have no doubt that Egypt will not make peace with Israel before a framework agreement is also achieved, not a declaration of principles, but a framework agreement which will contain clear words, or, at least, there must be clear words in it, and the questions to which I have as yet no answer are what Israel is taking on itself with regard to the fate of Jerusalem, with regard to the problem of the sovereignty and the borders, with regard to the fate of the settlements in the Jordan rift valley, the Jerusalem area and Gush 'Ezryon.

[Ram] Professor Arens, we heard that the Egyptian foreign minister, Ibrahim Kamil, has resigned in reaction to this agreement. Is it possible that there may be changes in the Cabinet of Israel, on the part of ministers, let us assume, on whose flag settlement is engraved, the need for settlement?

[Arens] It is very hard to say. First of all, the main minister connected with the issue of the negotiations--the defense minister and the foreign minister--were in Camp David and they are partners in the negotiations and they are also pleased with the results. Concerning the rest, I am sure that everyone will certainly say that he wants to see the details, wants to see all the things agreed on and not agreed on, before he expresses his view.

[Ram] Gentlemen, a last question. Peace is talked of. We hear the bells of peace. What is the meaning of peace in the Middle East, in the State of Israel, after 31 years?

[Arens] I think that, first of all, it is worth emphasizing the decisive question as far as we are concerned, which is: Is the reference to stable peace, what we call real peace, when we will no longer have to face security dangers, or is the reference to another stage in the moderation of the dispute, when we will still have to be on our guard? It appears to me that we mean the second one, even with all the hopes which are linked with that agreement which has just been signed. Syria, Iraq, the eastern front, the problems in Lebanon today, it appears to me that we have not yet reached that point where we can begin to speak about the disbanding of the IDF and of the end of the need to be on guard.

But, without any doubt, if this agreement brings at least a separate agreement with Egypt for a moderation of the tension on the southern front, enables us to decrease the forces we send to that area, this will be a great relief for Israel and Egypt, economically, a great step toward the fulfilling of some of our dreams in the area.

[Rabin] Even if peace is achieved, this will not yet be by way of being the actualization of the ancient vision of the prophets of Israel, since the reference is to peace with a section of the Arab world, peace to which time must be given to examine to what extent the two, or the three nations, will come closer, those with whom there is at the moment a chance of reaching peace; to what extent this rapprochement will lead to an erosion in the warlike motivation of the whole Arab world and will really create friendly relations.

But there is no doubt that there is in this an opening, an opening for a change in national preferences, not in the first stage, and many difficult problems will arise, problems connected with what is our unity, what is our place in the Jewish world, what will the Jewish people's link be to the State of Israel when it is at peace; how will this influence aliya, how will this influence lifestyles in Israel, how will this find its expression in the new reality we have not yet experienced? There are many questions, few answers.

[Arens] I would maybe add two questions. It appears to me that these are questions which each of us will have to cope with in the coming weeks and months. The first question is: What is the degree of risk we are taking on ourselves? What is the degree of risk when we leave the airfields in Sinai? When we will, maybe, for all that, have to again face the need to defend ourselves, and this time without those bases, and of course there are other security assets we have conceded.

The second question is: To what extent will the agreement, if it is signed, restrict the project of Zionism. Are we entering into a stage in which the project of Zionism will slow down; will it be seriously restricted, to certain areas of Eretz Yisra'el, or will we be able to continue with the momentum and the impetus of the project of Zionism?

[Ram] Gentlemen, I thank you very much. We are returning to the news studio in Jerusalem.

'Amit on Agreement

TA181649Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Text] Let us begin with the evaluation of someone who was the minister of transport and communications until the beginning of the week: Me'ir 'Amit, who is today one of the leaders of the SHAY movement. [begin recording]

[Question] Mr 'Amit, let us open with a personal question. In fact, less than an hour ago you took leave of the staff of the ministries over which you were in charge, with your resignation having come, among other things, against the background of what was happening on the political plane. In view of last night's events, do you regret this step you took?

[Answer] I do not regret it but there is no doubt that today I had mixed feelings at the farewell party. I said to my friends at work that I would have had mixed feelings in any event, how much more so after the signing of the framework agreement. Here there is no question of regret; when you enter the road of politics, of statesmanship, forces work on you over which you have no control. To get down to basics, there is no doubt that I regret the fact that I am leaving the Ministry of Transport at the beginning of a process which I developed, which I began; many beginnings, many hopes, the same goes for the Ministry of Communications, maybe even more. They are standing at the threshold of a new era and I have musings, of course, about this, but, as I said, when you begin to be a politician, in quotes--I am a very small politician--you run along a track and that's the situation.

[Question] Do you not also regret the fact that you are resigning at the beginning of the peace process?

[Answer] I said, I mentioned that....

[Question] You said the process in the ministry....

[Answer] No, I said how much more, in view of what happened this morning. By the way, I believe, I do not know details, only what I hear over the communications media, I believe that there has been a real breakthrough here, that is, that it is not a technical matter but a substantive one. I think that the hard decision was made by As-Sadat considering the fact that he will have to stand up against the Arab world. I estimate that Saudi Arabia has stood at his side, otherwise he would not have done it or, at least, only tacitly--and I estimate that Saudi Arabia supported him in view of what is occurring in Iran--but he will have a problem in the Arab world, a much more difficult problem than that Begin will have with all kinds of domestic rebels because, in the final analysis, and I have always said this, if anyone can make a concession here, it is Begin; if anyone has strength, domestic and political strength on the national level to do this, it is Begin and I am very happy, I very much admire--this morning I sent a cable to the prime minister, a cable of admiration and hope because of what has happened, admiration for what has happened and hope for what still should happen and today I am happy just as is every good Jewish citizen. If I may add to this, peace is not something static, it is dynamic. It will be possible to achieve it if an atmosphere is created, if cooperation is created and both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Communications have a key role in this process. We will--we, I say--but you, in the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Communications, will be the spearhead, the arrowhead of this process.

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Whether it will be flights to Cairo or ground transport or a regional communications center, all these things will not only be a result of peace but components of the road to peace, important components which will guarantee the success or the achievement of peace.

[Question] Would you like to return to the cabinet today?

[Answer] That is a hypothetical question. It is not a matter of personal desire.

[Question] The faction could decide on this, the party....

[Answer] The party will discuss and examine and this matter has several aspects. I would like to say that it is true that the external political issues were a part of the factors in the decision, because we always said that they were all interlinked, but the part which was no less important, maybe more important, was the way in which the cabinet functions and how it deals with domestic problems and I was very unhappy about it. I fought over this for the whole year. I think that these are things that are very substantive. The approach here must change. The prime minister--maybe, today, after he frees himself from the great mission, he will become partly free, he will be able to devote a greater effort to the domestic matters. Our domestic affairs require very much improvement, very much attention and, in my view, a change of values and changes in the establishment so that, if you ask me if I resigned on the foundations of the external problems, I would say both on the basis of this and of the fact that there has been no progress over the year. I am happy that the elements, the different elements at Camp David, including As-Sadat-- I never said that the matter was unilateral--but our forces, too--we made no few concessions.

[Question] Maybe we will come to that sphere. How do you feel about the details agreed upon at Camp David? The chances? Are there also risks as well as chances?

[Answer] As I said, I am not in on the details, but there is no doubt that the fact that, at least, as it is reported, that we made a full concession in Sinai. This also has security significance. I do not know how much was decided--how much attention was devoted to the matter of demilitarization. I regard this as being of prime importance, the matter of demilitarization. I do not know what happened about Sharm ash-Shaykh and other questions which are hard for me to deal with, but there is no doubt that in Sinai we made a significant concession. This--it may be--this loss may come out as the cost of the peace process, which is a no less important component in the security factors.

[Question] In another 2 weeks, or within 2 weeks, you will be asked, as will all the other members of Knesset, to decide on the fate of settlements in the Rafah approaches. What is your position.

[Answer] I will determine my position after receiving further information. I regard the peace process as being of prime importance. I, as I said, if this is real peace--and I believe that As-Sadat wants that, I believe it, I always said so--I want to consider the matter seriously. This does not mean that we have to throw the settlements out. In my view, if there is a positive atmosphere it will be possible to find a modus vivendi on this matter, too. Altogether, when we begin to live together, things will look different.

[Question] What about what was agreed and achieved concerning Judaea and Samaria?

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[Answer] I have no problems in this issue. I think that what was achieved, again, as it appears from the information I have today, the existing settlements exist, there will be no new settlements, the IDF is in key positions, it will be possible to enter Jordan and the inhabitants will be able to run their lives, a formula which appears acceptable to me, completely, and I will support it with all my heart. [end recording]

Yadin Interviewed

TA181232Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin by Zevi Lidar in Jerusalem on 18 September--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Professor Yadin, what details do you know at this stage about the agreement reached in Washington?

[Answer] Today, at 1800 the full version of all the documents signed there will be publicized in Cairo, Washington and Israel. Then we, too, will know many details that we have not received yet. I assume that we will receive them before 1800. Except for this I can say at the moment, and I will not get into additional details, that what was broadcast this morning on the radio that the agreement apparently states that the settlements will be frozen for 5 years--this is not true. I cannot say what the precise clause is and we will learn this at 1800. Except for this I think that it is quite clear that one issue that was not agreed on there will be brought to the Knesset for a decision--this is the future and fate of the settlements in the Rafah approaches. If I understand correctly, this means that if a declaration is accepted in the spirit of As-Sadat's desire--and I do not yet know whether this means that the settlements should be evacuated now, or within 10 or 20 years--then, taking into consideration the framework agreement on the Jordanian front, Egypt will be prepared to get into negotiations and to sign a peace with Israel.

According to this agreement, at a certain stage during the process of evacuation diplomatic relations will also be established. In other words, the Knesset will have to decide on one concrete issue, besides the general discussion of course about endorsing the agreement or not: whether to evacuate at this stage or to leave the settlements in the Rafah approaches under Egyptian sovereignty, and I am not getting into details at this stage. If the decision will be in favor then Israel and Egypt will sign a bilateral agreement.

[Question] When are they saying that diplomatic relations will be established with Egypt?

[Answer] I think that when the documents are made public at 1800 that this will become clear. There are two stages: first the stage of signing the agreement. This will be followed by a certain stage connected with recognition. There is a second stage--and I do not want to go into detail on this at this moment--that when it arrives diplomatic relations will be founded. This is a matter of a few months.

[Question] There is a subject that requires clarifications. Is there a link between the two agreements signed in Washington? In other words, if the agreement regarding Judaea and Samaria is not implemented--let us say that King Husayn refuses to enter--will this have an influence from the point of view of relations with Egypt?

[Answer] I cannot give you an answer but I can tell you what I understand. It was necessary to reach the framework agreement in everything pertaining to Judaea, Samaria and Jordan as a condition for the bilateral agreement and in connection with the Rafah approaches issue. The moment an agreement was achieved on this subject, then the issue of peace between us and Egypt is not subject to the negotiations there. This is how I understand the state of affairs at this moment.

[Question] Let us now refer to the content of the agreements, that is, what was published. How do you assess these agreements? Do you think that the price is too heavy, as some moderate members of the opposition have expressed?

[Answer] At this moment I, like everybody else, I may say, have not had enough time not only to peruse the documents carefully but to consider this thing. However, generally I think this was a first-rate achievement for the government since today it is really possible to say--in contrast perhaps to that euphoria prevailing after As-Sadat's visit here--today in a concrete and not a hypothetical manner, that if we decide to go this way then we have a separate peace with Egypt. This is a great thing. What is the price for a separate peace with Egypt? Everybody will have to give an account to himself on this with utmost earnestness.

[Question] What is the account you give to yourself?

[Answer] I cannot give you a final answer yet. However, I think that every reasonable price which is subject to all defense arrangements is worth paying for a settlement with Egypt. I will think about a final answer to this question after I consider the details. Generally speaking, this is my feeling at the moment.

Moreover, I want to say that the framework agreement regarding Judaea and Samaria is in fact a great achievement of ours since it is based, like the Sinai issue, on the government's peace plan. There are all kinds of variations here. There, too, [at Camp David] we did not say that that was the final word. We said let us conduct negotiations. There were many details that had to be discussed. However, the principle, namely, having the 5 years of autonomy, that only after these 5 years will the sovereignty question be determined, that in any case, from the defense point of view, the IDF will be in those spots agreed on, that there will be some sort of a link with Jordan--all these issues are detailed in the autonomy plan and from this point of view I regard this as a great achievement.

[Question] There is also a clause about the settlements...

[Yadin] I have told you that the clause of settlements, as broadcast, is not correct. The situation is completely different. However, at this moment when I am talking with you I cannot detail it. It will be known at 1800.

[Question] Could you generally say whether there is a concession on the subject of settlement?

[Answer] It is difficult for me to give you the answer. The matter is connected with a certain timing. I cannot elaborate at the moment. [end recording]

(C) Peres Interviewed

TA181725Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Text] We invited MK Shim'on Peres to our Tel Aviv studio at noon. Our correspondent for party affairs is talking with him.

[Sara Frankel] Mr Peres, in the light of the announcements and publications so far regarding the framework agreement that was signed--what are, in your opinion, the positive and negative points in this agreement?

[Answer] First, the positive points. The very fact that there is peace, this is the positive and important point that puts all other considerations in shadow. Moreover, in my opinion, we should consider what could have happened if we had not reached a peace settlement. The Middle East would have entered a state of chaos and Israel would have found itself isolated in the world. In every political situation one should consider what was achieved and what was prevented. What was prevented is part of the thing that was achieved. Second, I believe that peace will indeed create a different climate in the Middle East, will open horizons of economic and social development. It will enable the peoples to defend their independence, will lead to the building of large development enterprises. As you know I have always believed that it is possible to reach a settlement with As-Sadat even when it is only he who conducts the negotiations. I am happy that this is what happened.

[Question] But?

[Answer] Without but. The price now, the painful things, I am not getting into this now--we will read the documents and react. It is clear that we gave up the Sinai airfields. Peace is a great thing but we should not forget that this is peace only with part of the Arab world and we should be very particular about the defense options of the state. It was agreed in fact to return the entire sovereignty in the Sinai so the settlements that already exist there will be under Egyptian sovereignty. In my opinion, the price for Judaea and Samaria is also very high. There is no point in hiding this. The autonomy plan according to this settlement has turned into a temporary 5-year plan. After these 5 years there will in fact be an independent Arab rule with considerable independence. I do not know the precise word that will be used for this but it does not make that much of a difference, because there are 700,000 Arabs there with an elected self-rule and with strong national desires and with the support of the outside world. The police duties will be handed over to Arab hands, the IDF presence will be limited to only a number of positions--these are certainly far-reaching concessions.

[Question] This means, as I gather from your words, that too little was achieved, or that it was too late.

[Answer] At this moment, I am not giving out grades, I must see the overall picture. Neither am I dealing with hypothetical situations. You asked me what were the positive points, and I certainly see some positive points; you asked me what the price was, and I told you what the price was.

[Question] In your estimation, what is the discussion, or rather, where does the Labor Party focus--or where will it focus--its discussion. In other words, where are the weak spots which the Labor Party will have to face?

[Answer] Obviously they are with respect to the Rafah approaches and the fate of the settlements in Judaea and Samaria, with respect to the future of Judaea and Samaria. Not so much with respect to the entire Judaea and Samaria area, because the autonomy plan--let us not forget this--applies to the 1967 borders.

We will also have to see what exactly is in the agreement with reference to Jerusalem, that has not yet been publicized--whether there is an agreement, or whether there is none--but as I said when As-Sadat came to visit Jerusalem, we are in no opposition to peace.

[Question] I would like to read to you a few lines from a member of the party bureau, MK Eliyahu Speiser, who said that he will unconditionally support the agreement, the agreement being the best thing that has happened to Israel, and so on. Why am I quoting specifically Eliyahu Speiser, and not Yosi Sarid, for example, but specifically Speiser? How, in your opinion, does it happen that people who are considered, let us say, as hawks, or people who are doves regard this agreement as a breakthrough, let us call it?

[Answer] I am very glad that this is Speiser's opinion, but in every democratic party there are various opinions and each person must see the whole picture. Thus, it is impossible, for example, to separate the achievement of peace and its price. These are not two separate things, they are one comprehensive thing, and when a person makes an overall summary, he can reach either this or another conclusion. After all, we are not dealing with images but with decisions and these--as we have always claimed--are difficult and must be made despite the price involved.

[Question] Following the signing of the framework agreement and the ensuing debate which will take place in the Knesset--and in general it seems that all the parties and the entire political system will discuss this issue in the next few months--in light of this, do you foresee any turbulence within various parties?

[Answer] From a certain point of view, I think that the decision made at Camp David put an end to the political polarization which existed. Obviously the Likud is no longer what it used to be and what you read from Eliyahu Speiser's words we would probably be able to read from other party members in other places as well.

[Question] Yes, of course. At this very moment, for example, a meeting is taking place at MK Ge'ula Kohen's place, taking the other extreme, of course.

[Answer] Yes, and I assume that if it had been the Alignment which had made such an agreement, certainly Mr Begin and his colleagues would have attacked it, but this is not the consideration, as I have said before. There will certainly be a discussion in our party. Today the bureau is convening and I do not foresee crises in the Labor Party. We have been educated in making great decisions and have never demanded of others things that we ourselves cannot carry out. We have argued for peace and for security. I, for example, am very happy that Mr Begin will now enjoy the support of the Peace Now Movement; perhaps the movement itself indeed fulfilled a certain role in this issue. So, on the one hand there is an end to the national polarization even though, of course, there are still various marginal activities.

[Question] Do you think that in general our political system is constructed in such a way that it can accept a peace agreement?

[Answer] I never doubted this for even a moment. I believe that it is easier for us as Jews to stand up against big things than to cope with everyday life. We are a nation of great historic decisions, a nation which encounters difficulties in everyday life. I assume that the big decision will be accepted for the greatness of it, both regarding its greatness with respect to the achievement and regarding its price and its sorrows, and in my opinion the course of our history should have been redirected toward peace, and I am glad that this change has taken place. This is my basic, deep feeling.

[Question] That is, whatever happens, you think that this is an historic hour--positively or negatively?

[Answer] I did not say: whatever happens. Even when one makes peace, one must not forget the security needs, and I have also described with utmost restraint the security problems that might arise.

[Question] Thank you, Mr Peres.

Horowitz Worried

TA181308Y Jerusalem.Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Interview with Commerce and Industry Minister Yiga'el Horowitz by Zevi Lidar in Jerusalem on 18 September--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Minister Horowitz, this morning when I called you and asked you how you were, you said you did not know. Does this mean that you are not at peace with what was achieved in Washington?

[Answer] Yes. I am worried, and I am worried although I assume that information is fragmentary and we still do not know the whole picture. I assume that Mr Begin, Mr Dayan and Mr Weizman, when they arrive here, will report to us and we will hear details about the U.S. involvement in or influence on the decisions.

I am worried first about the Sinai. The fact that As-Sadat demands that we remove the settlements from the Sinai--if this is true then it indicates that his peace intentions are not true. This is so since if they agreed to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai why should he not want to have Jews or settlements in the Sinai? This is not clear to me. If he insists on this and this is a condition to peace, then I put a question mark next to his peace intentions.

[Question] You are not ready to accept this condition?

[Answer] It is very hard for me to digest this. I was happy to hear that Mr Begin agrees--and he will not view this as a matter of confidence--that every Knesset member votes on this matter as he thinks.

[Question] What about the fate of the Sinai airfields? How do you relate to this chapter in the agreement?

[Answer] I view our right to settle in the Sinai, to keep the existing settlements in the Sinai, as a natural right which is hard to relinquish. As for the airfields--this is a clear military matter and it is difficult for me to express an opinion on this matter.

[Question] If we say--and this is what transpires from the reports from Washington--that the issue of settlements in the Rafah approaches is As-Sadat's condition for peace, do I correctly understand from your remarks that when you reach the point of voting about this matter that you will prefer a situation of no peace and to leave the Rafah approaches settlements in their places?

[Answer] Ask me this after the report of our delegation in the United States. It is very hard for me to digest that we will have to remove the settlements and return the settlers to the green line boundaries.

[Question] What about the framework agreement with regard to Judea and Samaria?

[Answer] I do not know for sure what was decided. However, if it was correctly reported that Jewish settlement in Judaea and Samaria will be forbidden--it is very hard for me to put up with this.

[Question] Despite the fact that the prime minister, who is known for his loyalty to Judaea and Samaria, and Mr Weizman and Mr Dayan supported this?

[Answer] I mention this again. I want to know what is the degree of involvement of the Americans in this decision. I want to hear about this and only then will I be able to say clear things to you.

[Question] In other words, you believe that the three personages representing us at Camp David could not face and hold out against the U.S. pressure?

[Answer] It may be that they reached the conclusion [words indistinct] that the U.S. involvement was massive and things were put in such a way that we will all have to discuss things anew. However, I want first to know what was said there.

[Question] Do you then believe that the price that was paid was too high?

[Answer] Yes, very high.

[Question] Mr Horowitz, do you not rely on the leading triumvirate that was at Camp David?

[Answer] I thought and still think that this is the best delegation the Israeli Government had for these difficult and complicated negotiations. Nonetheless, I reserve the right for myself to notify you only after hearing the details. I, as I have said--it is hard for me to accept the removal of the settlements from the Sinai and even more so to accept that Jews will not be able to settle in Judaea and Samaria.

[Question] You are known as one of Dayan's confidants and friends. Moshe Dayan upheld this agreement. This morning he said on the radio that it is for this in fact, in order to reach this agreement, that he joined the present government.

[Answer] I joined this government not for this reason. I wanted peace but I imagined peace with different conditions. With all my appreciation of Moshe Dayan, I do not always accept his positions. [end recording]

(Weizman) interviewed

TA181622Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] This morning correspondent Dan Shilon spoke in Washington with Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman. [begin videotape]

[Question] Mr Defense Minister, what does this day mean to you?

[Answer] I have had many great days in my life: days of war; days of successes; days of failures. I think this day is the beginning of something which is, perhaps, an essential change in our way of life in Eretz Yisra'el. If we indeed succeed on that path that we started last night, the path of achieving peace first with Egypt and then, I hope, with the other countries, we have perhaps, we hope, succeeded in achieving a part of a new way of life, one that we have been seeking for many years.

One has to be always ready for war; one has to be always ready to defend what we believe in. However, if peace can be achieved, this is above everything. I believe that the process that has been going on for almost a year, the peak of which has taken place at Camp David in the last 2 weeks--I think that this is more than the beginning of a way for accomplishing a different form and way of life in the Middle East.

[Question] If you tried to put it in words of your own--you have accumulated to your credit, I believe, more hours of meetings with the Egyptian president than any other Israeli leader has in the past--does Egypt indeed desire peace, despite all the obstacles that are still hidden even in the present agreement?

[Answer] I think it does; I thought so during all the recent months. I expressed my opinion to that effect on television, on the radio and in the press. I think that the Egyptian president is really and honestly seeking peace. He has, naturally, his own aspirations, desires, demands and problems. I have always believed this, and I think at the moment we have proof of this. If he, in spite of a part of his advisers, and in view of all the problems of the great Arab world--which I won't go into at the moment--took pen in hand today, and signed together with the Israeli prime minister, and with the blessing of the U.S. President, I think this means he is a valiant man. I think it pays to deal with him. If the deal is peace, I favor doing business with him.

[Question] Mr Defense Minister, in the course of the last few months, it seems that you have been the most conciliatory in the Israeli leading trio. Have some of your proposals indeed been adopted at the Camp David conference?

[Answer] I do not accept the term conciliatory. I did have my opinion, and I don't think it was solely my own. I may have expressed my view in a clearer, louder and more lucid manner than the others. I repeat I believed there was a chance to reach a settlement with the Egyptians. It was proved, in fact, that I have been right. All this was certainly against the background of my relations with the president of Egypt, the relations I have created, established with my counterpart, War Minister al-Jamasi. I believe we have reached a turning point in the relations between us and a part of the Arab world, a part with which we can find a way of coexisting, and not necessarily through the sights of guns, cannons or planes. There is no doubt that we shall have to maintain many gunsights, cannons and many aircraft, before we are assured of the knowledge that this is indeed the way. Hence, the IDF will have to continue being that IDF it has been for a long time to come. In the course of time we may, perhaps, be able to gradually relent a little. As for your question, however, I believed, since the day I met the president of Egypt in Jerusalem, that this may be perhaps a ray of light, the beginning of a road, and I think the Camp David conference proved that there is a chance.

[Question] You are saying that we shall need even more planes and troops to defend the border of Israel. We agreed to give up one of the airbases, 'Ezyon. You certainly understand better than anyone else the meaning of an airfield at 'Ezyon. How come you agreed to give up such a field?

[Answer] Look, Dan, first of all the term to give up is not the right one, because when you are in the midst of negotiations, you give and take, you discuss and you consider, and it is not 'Ezyon only. There is another field, there are even more fields, there are the vast spaces of the Sinai. There are contours and forms of soil between us and the Egyptians.

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The problem is whether between us and the Egyptians today there will indeed be a trust, relations, whether there will be open roads, open tourism, whether there will be joint projects, diplomatic relations and whether there will be understanding. If yes, then this is worth a lot of space. Sometimes it is even worth an airfield.

[Question] With your permission, let us go back to the Camp David summit. It seems that you have met with President as-Sadat--also at the Camp David summit--more often than any other Israeli. What was the stmosphere? Tell us something about the contents that have been so hidden from us in the last few days.

[Answer] It won't do to make too much of a mystery of Camp David. I think--first of all, I must point out that President Carter amazed me. I saw him, I met him once....

[Question] The question this time was about President as-Sadat.

[Answer] You'll excuse me, a moment. There was also another president there. There was also one prime minister. The stage was shared with quite a few partners. I have to point out that President Carter made a great impact on me. I discovered a wise, quick, brave, keen person, a person positively aggressive, and, as the prime minister put it, it wasn't Camp David, it was camp Jimmy Carter.

My relations with As-Sadat did not begin and they did not end at Camp David. They are very interesting; I do not want to analyze them. I think they are chiefly based on a certain mutual trust. What we agreed upon, what we talked about in the past, we did not reiterate to each other. It was nothing of any great importance. But a kind of sediment has been created of trust between two relatively adult people--he is older than I am-- who deal in essential political and security issues of two nations, which have been engaged for 30 years in a great debate. Since the day I met him in Jerusalem, and during those times I was with him in Egypt, and in Salzburg recently, we found a common language. We have not always agreed. This was manifested also at Camp David. If here and there there was some subject that got hung up on a trivial point--no little because of my relations with him-- I managed to put through things that I thought would be perhaps impossible to put through. I won't say that everything was built on the relationship, God forbid. But I do also hope that the relationship that has developed between us, and I definitely hope between our prime minister and the president of Egypt, will be part of the landscape; not only some hill, some tank, some plane or some distance, or this or that relation. But indeed relations between people will perhaps bring about more understanding.

I merely want to point out one thing, and I have to emphasize it all the time: The Israeli nation should know that we maintain the IDF on a high standard, and it will still take a long time before we reach the conclusion that we can reduce the number of training days, the years and months of service. I hope we shall see a time when Israelis will have to fight less and build their land more. But this will not be tomorrow or the day after tomorrow.

[Question] Mr Weizman, what is to be expected in the State of Israel as of tomorrow. The agreement speaks of concessions, the agreement speaks of airfields, of rural settlements, it speaks of an interim period, of an agreement the Knesset should decide upon within 2 weeks. What lies in store for the State of Israel in the next 2 weeks?

I think that the scope and the nature of the task we dealt with contributed to the fact that all those things that in a normal and open life cause--what did you call it--disharmony--here, at Camp David there was complete harmony.

[Question] Mr Defense Minister, thank you very much. [end videotape]

(Dayan) Interviewed

TA18144ZY Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] We will now broadcast an interview with Foreign Minister Dayan. [begin videotape]

[Dayan] In the long run there is no difference, that is, there is no contradiction between our autonomy plan and this agreement. However, it does have elements that were not there before, which are not contradictory but which were added to the autonomy plan, and second, the contents of the plan at the moment are not the real plan but a framework agreement which will have to be filled with content.

[Question] Looking at the other agreement, how far is it from the plan proposed by the prime minister?

[Answer] There is one basic question which is totally different from our peace proposal vis-a-vis Egypt: The Egyptian condition of the removal of the settlements. They are talking about the removal of the settlers and not the buildings--we are not interested in the buildings--and in addition to this of the 'Ezyon airfield which we assumed would remain a military airfield. From the Egyptian point of view, for this agreement to be implemented the settlers have to leave, the settlements have to be vacated and the 'Ezyon airfield must cease to be a military airfield. It can be a civilian airfield. I doubt if this means an Israeli civilian airfield. Perhaps it will be something in between. Of course when we talk about the difference between leaving the settlements according to our basic plan and their removal according to this proposal, this is also accompanied by the security arrangements that would have had to accompany the settlements were our plan accepted--Israeli security arrangements.

[Question] To what extent are the two documents interdependent and to what extent does each stand in its own right?

[Answer] This is a question to which I do not know the answer for the time being. However, since today two separate agreements were signed, they apparently do not depend on each other. If the Egyptians are willing to implement the agreement with respect to Judaea and Samaria, even to begin its implementation, that is, to conduct negotiations without making this dependent on the second agreement--the Sinai agreement--then this is possible. From a practical point of view I am unsure of how they will behave on this matter, especially since they would like Jordan to join this agreement, and I do not know if Jordan will join. So, if Jordan does not join and the Egyptians do not show a willingness to begin to implement this agreement, then there will only be the Israeli side while the other side--to which the Palestinian representatives will be joined--will not be there. Apparently, there are two different agreements: it is possible to implement the agreement with respect to Judaea and Samaria, even if the Knesset passes a decision not to remove the settlements in the Rafah approaches, resulting in the agreement with Egypt not becoming valid.

[Question] As for the application of the agreement with respect to Judaea and Samaria: To what extent is its application dependent on the degree of Jordan's participation?

[Answer] I wouldn't want to give any exact predictions at the moment. People will have reservations, exceptions, they will be sorry, and they will argue. There is no doubt that this constitutes an essential change in the way of life of the State of Israel. There are a number of very basic decisions that we have to make, both from the public view and the military view. The IDF, for example. I am returning home tomorrow. Beginning day after tomorrow, we shall sit down and see what the meaning of our political decision is. This has vast implications for the IDF, for all its arms, both on the ground and in the air. Some arms will be affected more, some less. There will certainly be arguments between us. There will be the basic question of the settlements in Sinai. The nation will have to decide; the Knesset will have to decide. There will be arguments pro and con. The question, really, is whether the settlement between us and the Egyptians will also bring in the Jordanians, perhaps also the Syrians, not today or tomorrow, perhaps the day after tomorrow. The question is whether we shall really consolidate one front that will be calm for many years, how it will affect our economy, the society, how it will affect the youth that will develop in Israel.

I said earlier: The chief problem in the State of Israel is to consolidate a Jewish, Zionist, Israeli state, as you, Dan and I desire. We all have questions and we all have arguments and we have not found yet where we are erring, where we can improve, where we can do much healthier things, so that our nation can really be a light for the nations as we would like, a light for us, not only for the goyim. Quite often it is darkness also for us. I hope that this move will bring about an essential change on the Egyptian front. This does not only mean the Egyptian front from a purely military point of view, of a tank versus tank and plane versus tank, but whether we really can find a common language with 40 million Egyptians, with all the risks and all the vast possibilities that are contained in a common life in the Middle East region, from Gibraltar, North Africa, Morocco and through to Bab al-Mandab, to Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. After all, we are 3 million in a huge edifice. Shall we be fighting all our lives? Maybe yes. If so, please. But it is perhaps also worthwhile to try to see how it is possible to live here. I think it would be worthwhile to try, and we are in the process of a trial. This process began here with the signing of an agreement between the Israeli prime minister, the president of Egypt and the President of the United States. The question is how we shall make use of it. I think that great possibilities are hidden in this.

[Question] The last question refers to the internal relations in the Israeli Cabinet. Recently there has been talk of a certain disharmony. You, too, have been mentioned in that connected, as Mr Disharmony. How would you explain what is happening at Camp David regarding the harmony and the common work in view of what is in store now.

[Answer] Everything is tops. I can even say, in several spheres better than expected. Maybe it is the atmosphere of trees all around us. We were hardly able to see the sky, all is green, the intimacy. But I think it is more than that. I think it is foremost the feeling of the three of us, the prime minister, the foreign minister and myself, and all the rest of the team, especially Dr Baraq, for example. Aharon Baraq, who made an extraordinary contribution to the entire subject. Major General Tamir, Me'ir Rosenne, all the people who were sitting, and we were all the time together, we were eating, talking, playing, thinking, fretting, worrying together, closed and locked up.

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[Answer] The peace agreement that is to come after the 5 years stands on its own. That is to say, we have two things: one is the determination of another regime in Judaea and Samaria--a regime based on the abolition of the military government and everything else involved. This does not have to cease after 5 years. But the agreement also talks about a peace treaty and this is not to be drawn up with the Arabs of the territories. It does not depend, therefore, on the abolition of the military government. A peace treaty exists only between states and we do not want to view the Arabs of the territories as another country. Therefore, the peace treaty should be drawn up between us and Jordan. So here we have an overlap in the timetable. As for the settlement referring to the autonomy: stage A refers to 5 years, and at the same time it is agreed that after 5 years peace will be signed with Jordan. But let us say that Jordan does not agree to sign a peace agreement with us after 5 years. This does not mean that the settlement regarding the Arabs of the territories will not remain valid.

[Question] To conclude, could you tell us, Mr Dayan, what your personal feeling is as a person who for many years has been involved in negotiations with the Arabs--after the signing of the agreement tonight?

[Answer] Are you asking a personal question or a public one? If it is a personal question it is a little uncomfortable. It is easier to answer from a public point of view--that is, my feeling as the person involved and so forth. Well, there is no doubt that this proposal for an agreement is a pinnacle compared to all the interim agreements and we have exhausted the whole dictionary--a cease-fire, armistice separation of forces, limitation of forces and so forth--but I want to say something to the heart of the matter if we have another couple of minutes.

Throughout the whole of the past year when for the first time we talked about a real peace agreement it was my position--and I stated it publicly--that we must fully clarify under what conditions we can achieve a real peace with the Arabs, and in this case with Egypt. Not a declaration of principles and not [word indistinct] but to really know what will happen to the settlements and what will happen in Judaea and Samaria and so forth. If and when we learned this, and this is one of the big successes--perhaps not ours but of U.S. President Carter--here we are talking about a total normalization of relations including diplomatic relations and so forth. [sentence as heard] When we know what is being proposed to us and the quid pro quo, so that we can say this is the peace that we are being offered and this is what we have to pay, then we have to decide whether we are prepared or not. This time I am very pleased that the decision on this matter will be in the hands of the people. We do not have the practice of holding referendums. Therefore, it will be in the hands of the Knesset. I am very pleased about this even in its own right. I can see the whole of the house of Israel sitting and discussing this during the next 2 weeks. Those who sit on their balconies on the Sabbath and gossip and so forth--everyone, with his family and children will ask himself whether we should do this or not. This time the people in Israel will have to think about this as will the parties and the newspapers and the people and their families. Is it worthwhile or not? Should we pay the price or not? This is one of the difficult decisions but one of the real tests. Compared to all the things that we deal with during the year this is one of the most basic questions and it is a good thing that it is being thrown to the people. You will think and I will think and in the end we will have to decide. This is what is being offered us this year, within the next 3 months, and this is the price. Are we ready or not?

[Question] What is your assessment? Will they accept it?

[Answer] I do not know. [end videotape]

Begin Interviewed

TA182105Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Interview with Prime Minister Menahem Begin by correspondents Dan Shilon and Eli Nissan in Washington--videotaped]

[Text] First, a special interview with the prime minister. Mr Begin says that it is not true that Israel has agreed to a joint Jordanian-Israeli rule over Judaea and Samaria and that the only army that will be in Judaea and Samaria even after the period of 5 years will be the IDF. At the same time, the prime minister recommended having joint Jordanian-Israeli guards to guard the border. Mr Begin says that there is no total freezing of settlement, but that in the next 3 months no new settlements will be established.

In a special interview with our U.S. correspondents Eli Nissan and Dan Shilon, the prime minister says: I am a lover of Eretz Yisra'el. I shall always love the Gush Emunim members, even if they demonstrate against me. Here is the interview with Prime Minister Menahem Begin as it took place today in Washington. [begin videotape]

[Shilon] Mr Prime Minister, can we celebrate already?

[Begin] To a certain extent, yes. There is no question that a shift has taken place in the relations between us and Egypt, and there is hope that such a shift will also take place with other Arab countries. However, not entirely; we still have time--several months--to negotiate on the actual peace treaties between ourselves and Egypt. As I said last night at the reception in the White House, I proposed to President as-Sadat maybe to make that period shorter. However, the reason to celebrate is mainly linked to what is called framework for making peace between ourselves and Egypt, which includes almost all the articles of the peace treaty, except for the settlement issue. As you know, we have announced that on this matter only the Knesset will decide, because only it is authorized to decide. However, I have also told President Carter--and he was happy to receive this announcement--that the vote in the Knesset will be totally free, and we will not impose any partisan discipline: neither by the coalition, nor--I hope--by the opposition. Every Knesset member will vote according to his conviction and his conscience: one way or the other. The majority will rule, and the majority's decision will be accepted by all and will be carried out.

[Nissan] Mr Begin, I understand that you are expecting a bitter discussion at the Knesset, a sharp debate on this question, which is, of course, a sensitive question. What will your personal stance be during the debate, or the vote?

[Begin] First of all, I am not expecting any sharp debate, and second, you must know that I am accustomed to sharp debates in the Knesset and that they do not frighten me.

No, I shall for now refrain from saying what my position will be. I still have to consider whether I shall actually participate in the debate. At Camp David I weighed things and have expressed this opinion of mine to the foreign minister, that perhaps, in order to insure that the vote in the Knesset will be totally independent, I will prefer to remain silent and not try to influence the Knesset members. However, I must admit that I have not yet made up my mind.

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What I want to say is that Gush Emunim, even if it demonstrates against me or against my way, and even if it uses vile words--I shall always love the Gush Emunim people. I love them, they are true pioneers, they are men of conviction and of understanding. They may curse me as they wish, and I will return love to them. For selfless love, as you know, Israel has been redeemed.

[Nissan] Mr Prime Minister, several minutes ago you mentioned something about erroneous interpretations of this agreement on television and in the press. In this context, could you clarify what is called the rights of....

[Begin] Oh, I shall give several examples, such as: it was said that we have agreed to have a joint Jordanian-Israeli rule over Judaea and Samaria; nothing of the sort. We have, however, agreed that there will be joint Israeli-Jordanian guards to watch over the border. This is a beautiful thing and will demand cooperation which is good. It will also bear fruit in the future, but we will not introduce any foreign army into Judaea and Samaria. The only army that will be stationed in Judaea and Samaria--and not only for 5 years, but beyond that--will be our army, and it will maintain our national security: only it, nothing else.

[Nissan] Allow me only to continue on this note. On this point, during the briefing to the correspondents here at the signing of the agreement, it was said that the agreement in fact answers the question of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Can this definition, in your opinion, be accepted?

[Begin] Yes. We have accepted what is called in English legitimate rights, because everyone has his own interpretation. The word legitimate, which is linked to rights--as I tried to explain to my hosts at Camp David--has no meaning, really, because the English tongue is very rich. The two words are of Latin origin, so that one can also say: rightful rights. This would be a tautology, simply a repetition. So, when we saw that for our hosts and for the other party it is a matter of a feeling of dignity because they have already used that expression, and because it does not change reality, we accepted it, and everyone has his own interpretation of what the legitimate rights are. If it transpires that any demand is illegitimate, illegal, then we will not accept it.

[Shilon] As for the treaty with Egypt and the security assurances: Perhaps you could disclose to us what security assurances Israel will receive, if it receives them?

[Begin] We have no security assurances, we have never, and from no element, asked for security guarantees. I think that the arrangement we have accomplished, proposed and accepted in the Sinai is based on security for Israel. There will be totally demilitarized zones, where no soldier will be located; there will be thinned-out areas--we shall, of course, be on guard. We shall secure freedom of shipping not only in the Tiran Straits, but also in the Suez Canal; not only for goods, but also for ships flying the Israeli flag--this has been promised and concluded, and so it will be, and the arrangement with Egypt is based entirely on security for Israel.

[Shilon] Has the United States undertaken to establish an Israeli airbase in place of the bases which we will leave?

[Nissan] Is there no fear that this might be otherwise interpreted: you signed an agreement, reached an agreement, yet you are refraining from taking a position?

[Begin] I signed an agreement and I will recommend that it be accepted. We had two arguments: I wanted to convene the Knesset for a special session this coming Monday, during which I will fully report--including the documents and the relevant letters, everything--and will ask that the agreements be approved. Later, I wanted to convene another special Knesset session to decide only about the settlements. I might participate in that second session, but I may remain silent. However, I would like to be left to make the decision, because I must still think about it.

[Shilon] Mr Prime Minister, still, with respect to the internal political issue: What does this day symbolize to you as a politician--all of a sudden a movement like the Peace Now Movement is applauding you and several colleagues who certainly are dear to you, from your own movement, are criticizing you?

[Begin] First of all, I am not impressed by the miracles of the Peace Now. Second, I knew that I would have an argument with several friends of mine. I said so at the Knesset immediately following President as-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Sometimes, as the French philosophically say, it is a case of c'est la vie--you have to decide, even if you are in disagreement with your best friends, make a decision! I am convinced and believe with all my heart and soul that the way we have taken is the right one. I also said several weeks ago that according to our whole experience, this is the only way that might lead to peace. There is no other. Since we have now taken a very serious step toward peace, my conscience is clear and I shall face my friends. If I get several stones thrown at me, I am used to that too. I shall probably stay alive and continue along this path. Perhaps there are also various disagreements. I have heard various commentators on U.S. television and they gave erroneous, not exact, information. Things will straighten out, of course, during the day; here during this interview, too, and mainly through the Knesset debate, because I will present to the Knesset all the documents, every phrase, every comma will be brought before the Knesset. It appears that the commas, too, have significance over which we sometimes argued at Camp David.

[Shilon] How will you face Gush Emunim, for example, which is bound to request more settlements, which you have promised? You said--the day you entered office, or the day you were elected--there would be many more Allon More's?

[Begin] I have said there would be, and there are, many Allon More's. What have we committed ourselves to? We have a period, I said--true--we will refrain from settling--by the way, not in all the places, but in certain places. As I told President Carter, we will also take into account the possibility of establishing Nahal footholds. There is nothing like what is called a total freezing of the settlements, and all of this is out in the open, this is what I told the U.S. President. However, basically, I am prepared to admit that during this period of the negotiations, I think it wise specifically during--how long is it--90 days not to establish settlements, it is possible to wait for 3 months. The Israeli nation has waited for peace for a much longer period. That, I think, was done wisely and I have no regrets about it and I will argue with each one of the lovers of Eretz Yisra'el, among which I am numbered.

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[Begin] Yes, the United States has promised to establish two alternative airfields. This is not for the United States, it is for us, so that strategically there will be no change; neither in the north nor in the south.

[Nissan] Are there additional bilateral agreements between Israel and the United States, or between Egypt and the United States?

[Begin] There are exchanges of letters on various issues. The letters, too, will be publicized. They are not confidential.

[Nissan] Do you mean only on security issues, or on other questions as well?

[Begin] On various problems. We have exchanged letters, and they will all be publicized, so that in 24 hours, every individual in the United States, in Israel, will know about them. Especially since I will present them to the Knesset. We have not drawn up any secret agreements.

[Nissan] Perhaps you could clarify one point which was raised yesterday: To what degree are the implementation--or the realization--of the two documents, the agreement concerning the relations with Egypt and the document discussing the framework for making peace, conditioned on each other?

[Begin] They are not conditioned upon each other, but there is an understanding that a comprehensive peace must be reached. This means, as I have already told you, the mere framework has already given us the basis, almost 98 percent, for signing the peace treaty. As for Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, the principles have already been stated: there will be an autonomy, not a Palestinian state, under no circumstances will there be a Palestinian state, no foreign army in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, only our army will guard our security. However, all the practical steps must be taken, namely, to elect the administrative council, to abolish the military government, and first the administration of the military government, and allow them indeed to live in autonomy and live together with us in peace, equality and mutual honor--that is what we have always wanted. This is for a period of 5 years, a period of seriousness: we shall all observe and see what happens in reality. I can say that perhaps this period will be extended, and if it is extended, this will also be in accordance with the desire of our hosts--if it should be extended. Of course, everything depends on the agreements that will be reached, if they are reached--as I hope--in the next few years. However, for the time being, the difference, or the shift, is in that without giving up any principle--and I say this with respect to both parties--we reached a realistic agreement. In this way, it was possible--as I claimed a year ago--to reach an agreement, and reality has proved this.

[Shilon] Mr Prime Minister, do you have signs to indicate that King Husayn is going to join the negotiations?

[Begin] I have no signs as of yet, however, I hope he joins. In any case, in the document, we invited him to join.

[Shilon] Why, in the course of the entire summit, in fact up to the last day, was there no practical meeting--working meeting--between yourself and President as-Sadat?

[Begin] There was no need for one. We worked day and night. I went to President as-Sadat yesterday, after I had already been informed that everything was finished for the best.

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I called him and told him that I wanted to come to him. I also had to thank him for autographing--for my grandchildren--the picture showing himself, President Carter and me. President Carter signed too, so did President as-Sadat. It is interesting that Mr Carter was so kind as to bring these signed pictures to me personally. They are for Merav, for Mikhal, for Yehonatan and for 'Aminadav and for Orit and for Ayyelet and for Osnat. Did I mention all my eight grandchildren? [somebody mentions the name of Na'ama] Oh, and also for Na'ama, who is the beauty in our family, precisely her I had forgotten for a moment. I signed under my picture in Hebrew, granddad. That's all.

Then I told President as-Sadat that I came to thank him first of all for the autographs, and a very friendly talk ensued. We promised each other that we shall have negotiations between ourselves and that we shall show understanding to one another and try to overcome difficulties. Later, after I had left his cabin, as it is called in English, so to speak-- I wish every man in Israel had such a cabin, especially those living in poor housing--he replied: In a quarter of an hour I will be at your place. Indeed, he returned my visit, and then I invited all my colleagues: the foreign minister, the defense minister, all the members of the delegation. We worked as a team. I cannot remember a better team, honestly. I always work with a team, but this time our sessions would continue till 0400, because after the meetings with the Americans and the Egyptians I would convene the entire delegation to hear, and voice, a report, hold a debate on what was to be done the following day, what was to be accepted and what was to be rejected, and that is why, up to yesterday, during that special meeting with Mr as-Sadat, there was no need. When we finished, we made visits to each other, shook hands--we still did not embrace, that we did only at the White House--and said that we shall endeavor to sign a peace treaty, so that there is real peace with cooperation, with ambassadors and visits. Really, I wish for you to be able to travel and see the pyramids soon.

[Shilon] Did you find out from President as-Sadat why he called you the obstacle to peace?

[Begin] No. It was not tactful to return to the past. We had two talks together with President Carter which took 5 hours. The first talk was pretty hard, naturally, and we occasionally exchanged words which I would not say were hurtful, but which were sharp. There was a lot to talk about. However, we all agreed that all this belongs to the past, it is very personal and such things happen. One draws a line through them and turns a new page. I reminded President as-Sadat that both of us, without contacting each other, have used the same turn of phrase, he in Cairo and I in Jerusalem: Let us turn a new page, and indeed we have.

[Nissan] Mr Prime Minister, the representatives of the press do not recall such confidentiality, such successful confidentiality, being applied to a summit like this, and yet there were rumors of crises in the course of the summit. Perhaps you could say at what point in fact the breakthrough was made toward the agreement which we now see?

[Begin] There were crises, and this is just natural. Occasionally it seemed that we were going to go home, each delegation wanted to go home.

I told Professor Brzezinski: Listen, this is a deluxe concentration camp, what are we doing here? So he told me, according to your experience you perhaps had begun digging a tunnel, and I told him: Ya'aqov Meridor is in New York, and if things continue this way, I will invite him and he will immediately start working. Ya'aqov Meridor, you know, dug the famous tunnels in the British concentration camps [in Kenya].

But all this was done in good spirits and things are well known from all international conferences: the Vienna conference, the Berlin conference, that in Versailles--in all the international conferences someone throws out a hint that things are not working out and he wishes to book a train--in those days people used to travel by train, not fly in airplanes--and that he is packing and leaving. Slowly, slowly we will solve the problem. This is what happened several times at Camp David, too, because very serious matters were involved, and there was a crisis even at the last moment, yesterday noon. But I will not reveal today the minute details of that crisis. We thought that we would not be able to sign, but in only 1 hour we overcame the entire crisis and could with a light heart and a clear conscience sign. We have not given up any of the principles which we have believed in since our youth. [end videotape]

Major Haddad Reacts

TA181358Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] The Christian militia commander in southeastern Lebanon, Sa'd Haddad, joined those praising the Camp David agreements, but he voiced apprehension that Syria will try to thwart them through an intensification of the tension in Lebanon.

Talking to our correspondent in the north, Yehezqel Hame'iri, Sa'd Haddad said that the agreements regarding the Palestinians should oblige the Palestinians residing in Lebanon to settle in Judaea, Samaria and in Gaza.

Yamit Settlers Protest

TA190619Y Jerusalem POST in English 19 Sep 78 p 2 TA

[By Harry Wall]

[Text] Yamit--over 500 residents of Yamit gathered in the town plaza last night to hear plans for persuading the government not to return the Sinai settlements to Egypt.

Civic leaders urged residents to launch a campaign which would include public protests, media exposure and vigorous lobbying of Knesset members in order to keep this city under Israeli sovereignty.

Earlier in the day representatives of all the settlements in the Rafah area gathered at Moshav Netiv Ha'asara, where a "declaration of principles" was concluded to serve as a rallying point for the inhabitants of the region.

The meeting decided: "That the Rafah settlements fervently desire peace, but that real peace cannot be based on dismantling settlements and uprooting lives" and "that the proposed return of the Sinai settlements is an anti-Zionist act and goes against the history of the Jewish state."

Though clearly shocked and angered by the decision reached at Camp David, all of the Sinai residents interviewed by the Jerusalem POST yesterday expressed their willingness to abide by the forthcoming vote in the Knesset and not to stand in the way of a peace treaty with Egypt.

Regional Council Chairman Yossi Ma'as, who expressed cautious optimism that Sinai settlers might not, after all, have to leave their homes, will head a local delegation that will visit Jerusalem today to begin lobbying Knesset members.

While one speaker called upon yesterday's Yamit gathering to "look out for yourselves and begin thinking about compensation" (for their property), the large majority present were against any sort of acquiescence at this time.

Despite the attempts by local leaders to convey hope until the situation clears up, an unmistakable air of pessimism, if not fatalism, loomed over this scenic coastal town. Few people were willing to discuss what they would do if and when they had to leave, but the matter was clearly on everyone's mind. "There's still a lot of time ahead of us before we have to consider those details," said one of the town's veterans dejectedly.

Gush Emunim Condemns

TA181415Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] The Gush Emunim secretariat declared today that the Camp David accord is one of submission and betrayal. In a Gush Emunim resolution, which was made public only a short while ago, it was said that this is not a peace agreement but an agreement for betrayal in Eretz Yisra'el of the redemption of the people in its land. Further, members of Gush Emunim say, we cannot conceive of someone daring to cease settlement in Judaea and Samaria and uproot the settlements in the Rafah approaches. Moreover, agreement to this is a betrayal of the principles of Zionism. At the end of its statement, the Gush Emunim says that the person who endorsed this agreement does not deserve to be leader of the government. This evening members and supporters of Gush Emunim will hold an emergency meeting in Allon More.

Greater Israel Movement Reacts

TA181041Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] (Sevi Shilo'ah) F chairman of the Greater Israel Movement, has said that the Camp David agreement is a treacherous agreement and after the Egyptians get all of the Sinai they will seek to achieve the permanent goals of the Arabs. He said that 17 May, the day of the Likud's rise to power, is a black day for the country and Begin should resign or run for elections at the head of the Peace Now Movement. Shilo'ah is of the opinion that an emergency national government should now be established.

Professor Weitz Reacts

TA181022Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] A public storm was aroused some time ago by the remarks of the head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency about the conditional establishment of a Palestinian state. Correspondent Gad Shimron heard Professor Weitz' reaction this morning: [begin recording]

Political Parties movement cut

I do not know the details yet. One thing is clear: peace comes before all else. It seems to me that the proposal I made will now be most realistic and will have to be examined at length. There are parts I have not yet publicized. These concern the possibilities of carrying out development plans in the Sinai if an agreement is reached with Egypt and water can be carried from the Nile both for them and for us. This opens a great era for us and for our sons and grandsons, an era of far-reaching significance. [end recording]

Kollek Concerned About Jerusalem

TA181406Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] According to reports from the White House, at this stage the question of the future of Jerusalem in the expected agreement is unclear. It was only said that on this issue messages would be exchanged between Prime Minister Begin and President as-Sadat.

Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek sent a message of congratulations to the prime minister and thanked him for the great achievement at Camp David. At the same time, Kollek said, he is concerned, now more than ever, about maintaining the unity of Jerusalem. A real peace agreement will be one that insures Jerusalem's status as the capital of Israel, says Mayor Kollek.

West Bankers, Others React

TA180958Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Excerpts] Here are some up-to-date reactions which we received a few minutes ago, and some we received earlier.

The mayor of Bethlehem told our correspondent that this is a first and welcome step toward a real peace. In the opinion of Elyas Frayj, the freezing of settlements is a first step to solving the problem of Judaea and Samaria. As for autonomy, Mr Frayj proposes waiting to see the entire agreement.

Mustafa Dudin, an opponent of the PLO, did not hope for a better result than that which came out of the conference. Dudin hopes that the entire Arab world will be blessed by the agreement. He believes that there will be opponents of the agreement in towns in the West Bank; however, the participation of the Jordanians in the Middle East peace process will increase.

PLO supporters in the West Bank refused to react and they prefer to wait and see how things develop.

The leaders of the Rafah Approaches Action Committee are meeting at this moment in an emergency session to discuss the implications of the peace agreement to be signed with Egypt on settlement in the Yamit District. A member of the action committee, Yosi Maas, told our correspondent for settlement affairs, Yigal Goren: To our regret settlement has again been raised as a barrier to peace. The cessation of settlement is a mistake which casts doubts on the Zionism in Eretz Yisra'el over past years. The Yamit Action Committee is waiting for additional details on the fate of settlement in the region prior to deciding on how it will act and react.

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The Peace Now Movement is happy. This morning it welcomed what has been achieved at Camp David. The Peace Now Movement welcomes the prime minister's willingness to cease the establishment of settlements in Judaea and Samaria. In the movement's opinion this was a necessary step on the road to peace with Israel's neighbors. The movement points out that the majority of the people are willing to make far-reaching concessions for the sake of peace. Peace Now says that a majority of the people will stand behind the prime minister on this path.

More W. Bank Reactions

TA181003Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Excerpts] Our correspondent for Arab affairs, Arye Gus, brought the agreement to the attention of personages in Judaea and Samaria this morning and here is his report:
[begin recording]

The initial reactions in Judaea and Samaria are sympathetic. I should perhaps begin with the popular, spontaneous reaction. The first words I heard from several houses on which I called this morning for a reaction were: Mabruk! A poet of one of the Arab papers in East Jerusalem burst into tears.

The reactions of personages in Judaea and Samaria are more controlled. ('Aziz Shihada), one of the prominent people calling for an independent Palestinian state, says that the agreement seems good at this moment. I am happy that for the first time the Palestinians will be given the right to participate in the determination of their future. (Anwar Nusaybah), the former defense minister of the Jordanian Government, also says this is wonderful news and he welcomes it. AL-QUDS editor, (Mahmud Abu Zuluf): I personally welcome every peace agreement achieved. This is also the reaction of Tulkarm mayor, Hilmi Hamun. However, all of them want to peruse the details of the agreement.

This is the initial reaction. Informed sources, however, foresee that in the course of the day hostile elements controlled by the PLO will try to call people out into the streets for demonstrations. At any rate, the security forces are as prepared as ever to prevent demonstrations and disturbances. [end recording]

East Jerusalem Dailies Criticize

TA190655Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 19 Sep 78 TA

[From the Morning Newsreel]

[Text] The negative reactions in Judaea and Samaria continued this morning against the Camp David conference decisions, this time on the pages of the Arab papers published in East Jerusalem. Our correspondent Arye Gus studies them:

All the Arab papers this morning carry hurriedly-taken polls of personalities and notables in Judaea and Samaria, asking them for their reactions. The views heard by the editors of the Arab papers are no different from those we heard yesterday: a complete rejection and negation of the Camp David decisions. There is nothing new in the reasoning. The decisions ignore the right of the Palestinian people to independence and self-determination, several mayors say. The Camp David conference pushed the Palestine Liberation Organization out of the negotiations process. Others attack the idea of autonomy and self-rule, but, while the moderates present questions, the PLO supporters in the territories interpret these questions negatively.

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The paper AL-FAJR accuses Egypt of making a separate peace with Israel and denies that it has the right to speak in the name of the Palestinians. Both the extremist papers--AL-FAJR and ASH-SHA'B--apologize for not being able to publish editorials this morning. According to the editors, they were removed by censorship.

The paper AL-QUDS, on the other hand, this morning stresses the question of Jerusalem and in an emotional editorial it determines that the future of the area is not dependent on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights or even from Judaea and Samaria; the key is the future of Jerusalem, the ownership of the holy sites. The paper appeals to As-Sadat in a last-minute call not to make a peace pact with Israel without guarantees for the return of Jerusalem into the arms of the Arabs and Islam. It reminds the rulers of Saudi Arabia of King Faysal's vow not to abandon Jerusalem.

President Navon Comments

TA181459Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 18 Sep 78 TA

[Text] In Jerusalem here is the reaction, a few minutes ago, of President Yizhaq Navon: [begin recording] I do hope that it will open a new era in the life of the peoples of the Middle East. We have rivers, you can say, of blood dividing Israel from its neighbors and it is high time for peace to come and reign in this region. The peoples need it; they need it badly and I think that this agreement is a reflection and a genuine expression of the will of the peoples. The people themselves had an opportunity of expressing their will when they received so warmly As-Sadat here in Israel and when the Egyptian people received him so warmly on his way back, when he came to Egypt. There were difficulties and obstacles on the way, but it seems that President Carter made a real effort, and both sides to the discussions saw the importance of reaching an agreement at this state. [end recording]

GUSH EMUNIM ESTABLISHES NEW SETTLEMENT NEAR NABULUS

TA190643Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 19 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Last night Gush Emunim members demonstratively established a new settlement on a rocky hill south of Nabulus. Twenty families went there from the Qaddum camp and, together with hundreds of escorts, established a hut and several tents there.

The settlers were accompanied by MK Ge'ula Kohen, who stayed with them overnight, and she again called for an expression of no confidence in the cabinet.

Hanan Porat, a member of the Gush Emunim secretariat, said at the settlement site that he and his colleagues were planning to establish more such settlements.

Our correspondent reports that the new settlement is located on a hill where it is assumed that the biblical Elon More was located. The settlement is far from the highway and there is no paved road to it. The settlers carried all the equipment to the site.

Our correspondent was told that military personnel in the area did not disturb the establishment of the settlement, although IDF roadblocks were later set up on the roads near the one leading to the new settlement.

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BEGIN ADDRESSES KNESSET ON CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

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TA250936Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 0822 GMT 25 Sep 78 TA

[Speech to Knesset by Prime Minister Menachem Begin] on 25 September--live]

[Text] Mr. Chairman, I have no alternative but to repeat my remarks for the third time. [After several interruptions by MK Ge'ula Kohen.] I am bringing to the Knesset and, through it, to the nation, the structure for the making of peace with the strongest and greatest of the Arab countries and in the course of time, unavoidably, with all our neighbors. The documents agreed upon at the Camp David conference and signed by me on behalf of the Government of Israel, in the White House, are set out before you. Therefore I will not read them. I will not be able to make such a speech today, because of political, psychological reasons, I will not be able to reveal the contents of two other documents, which are the first Egyptian document which was presented to President Carter and me at our first meeting at Camp David, and the first U.S. document which was presented to the two delegations, the Israeli and the Egyptian. One of these days these two documents, too, will be published and then it will be made plain to everyone in Israel and the other countries of the world what we achieved and what we did not achieve; what we prevented, what we rejected, what we accepted and what sacrifices we made for the sake of peace, for the sake of preventing encirclement, for the sake of the wellbeing of our people and that of the people around us.

Before anything else, I wish, as is my duty, to thank the team: Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, without whose help and activity the achievement of the agreements would have been impossible; and our ambassador in the United States, Simha Dinitz and Professor Baraq and Dr. Rosenne, our two thoroughly expert legalists, who worked day and night. Maj Gen Avraham Tamir, one of the best of the experts on Israel's security; Brigadier General Poran; Col Ilan Tehila and Yehi'el Qadishay, Dan Pattir, Eli Rubinstein and our security staff, who guarded us night and day with boundless devotion and loyalty. We had a team. We worked as a team. After every meeting between us and the U.S. delegation, after every talk between one of our colleagues and one of the members of the Egyptian delegation, we would meet, whether it was day or night, for a joint consultation, and each of the delegation members, with no difference of national rank, expressed his views with complete freedom and everyone tried to take into account the views of the others. To this team I will say, in plain words, all honor is due.

From this podium I am again going to thank the President of the United States, Mr Jimmy Carter, for the very fact of his initiative in convening such an unprecedented conference. We searched through the history of the last century for precedents for the Camp David conference; we did not find any. This was a unique conference and the U.S. President initiated it, conducted it, devoted to it not only days, but nights, too; worked until dawn and after an hour or so was on his feet again; took a direct interest in the formulations and not only in the ideas, deliberated with us on every clause, on every sentence, on every word and sometimes, as I will yet prove, even on every letter. There were difficulties at the conferences. They were unavoidable. There were crises at the conference. Those, too, could not have been prevented from the beginning.

The U.S. President never despaired for even a moment, even at the gravest moments, and he believed that the end would be positive. He went from representative to representative and never did he hesitate to suggest visiting the cabins of the heads of the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. He did not rest, did not flag, he did not despair until the tripartite agreement was achieved. I am sure that I will express the views of all the members of the Knesset if from here, from Jerusalem, from the podium of the house of the elected, I send our heartfelt thanks and recognition to the President of the United States for his initiative, for his toil and for his devotion during the days of the deliberations at that important international conference.

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Mr Chairman, the decisive importance of the agreement with Egypt lies in the fact that this time we committed ourselves to sign a peace treaty. No more partial agreements. No more interim agreements, in which the state of war remains as it is, but a peace treaty, which, in accordance with well known international models, generally begins with the following sentence: The state of war between the two countries has come to an end. This is the difference; and it has great importance. It means the complete normalization of relations, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, economic and cultural relations, the ending of the economic boycott, free movement of people and goods. [indistinct heckling]

Security experts determine and confirm that we have achieved security conditions which are sufficient and satisfactory for the State of Israel through the setting of demilitarized zones, zones of thinning out of forces, early warning systems. It is, of course true that there is the problem of the airfields and in this regard a change occurred in the agreements as they were signed concerning the original peace program which we presented last December. We then proposed that, of the three airfields in Sinai--'Eytam, 'Ezyon and Ofira--two of them would be transferred to civil administration and one--the reference was to 'Ezyon--would remain in the hands of the Israeli Air Force even after the transition period. This time, with regard to those airfields, nothing helped and the Israeli delegation gave its agreement to transferring to Egyptian civil administration all three airfields established in Sinai. In contrast to this, we were given a promise that, with the help of our friends, the Americans, two airbases would be established in the Negev. From the strategic aspect, from the aspect of our security, whether southward or northwest, this makes practically no difference. The geographical distance between the existing airbases and those which will be established is nothing but a few dozen km and in our times, with supersonic planes, the difference in defense capability is practically nil. It was determined that we will not leave the existing airfields as long as there are no new, alternative, functioning airfields.

President as-Sadat and I agreed that, despite the fact that we committed ourselves in writing to reach the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within 3 months, we would try to shorten the period of time to 2 months. Therefore, I can say today, and I have a complete commitment, since the matter depends on both sides, that it may be--there is hope--that by the end of the year the peace treaty between the two countries will be signed. [heckling]

I did indeed say that it is so important--I stated a fact. I would ask MK Shamir to permit me to continue. I hope he will not repeat the precedent. [laughter; applause]

The most painful matter concerns our settlements in Sinai, in the north and in the south. There have been those who have claimed that we gave them up even before President as-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in order to permit that visit. Mr Chairman, I am stating from the Knesset podium, with all the responsibility of remarks made from it, that this claim has no shadow of truth in it and we have written proof of this and I am even amazed that serious people, who have in the past fulfilled central national posts, permit themselves to spread such malicious slander. There are also those who claim that we did not fight for these settlements at the Camp David conference.

[Interruption--The conceding of the sovereignty over Sinai and the granting of the sovereignty to Egypt clearly meant that this was the removal of the settlements, except that you did not want to recognize this and you began selling plots in Yamit instead.]

I asked for no heckling and I would ask the former minister of police to permit me to continue speaking. [more interruptions]

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[Chairman Shamir] Members of Knesset, I ask you, as far as possible, to refrain from heckling. [more heckling] Members of Knesset, MK Grupper, MK Grupper, you are constantly interrupting. [more heckling]

[Begin] Mr Chairman, members of Knesset.... [heckling] It is possible, it is also possible; heckling does not disturb me. Gentlemen, I understand that there are differences of opinion on this matter in all the parties today. Let us each respect one another's views. Afterward you will decide, each in accordance with his conscience. I am not hiding--I am not hiding--Mr Yigal Kohen, be kind enough to permit me to finish the sentence, please--each one will decide in accordance with his conscience in the decisive voting. In the meantime I ask you to allow me to explain: I am not hiding anything and I already got to this point at the beginning of my speech. Well--the incorrect report to the effect that the Israeli delegation did not fight for these settlements at Camp David: Were it possible, were it possible to ask President Carter, and also one of his main aides, just how the delegation of Israel fought for these settlements, you would receive the specific reply, but this is not the main point. [heckling]. Have you stopped banging on the table, MK Shamir? That table, in my view, was intended for writing and not for banging. [heckling] I knew that there were differences of opinion within all the factions. What is this impatience? I have not forgotten anything, madam.

Well, I will say what I have to say simply. This is a very painful matter, and not only will I not hide my pain, I will express it in any language in which I can express a man's feelings. However, today--however, today, as I know, we are faced with the following alternative: to accept the decision as the cabinet brings it, via me, to the Knesset, or the negotiations on a peace treaty not beginning at all and all the things which were agreed on at Camp David being completely cancelled. This is the alternative. [heckling] Sir... [heckling] Professor Rom, when you... [heckling] ...you will say different things...for the moment I am authorized by the Knesset to fill this post and be kind enough to listen to me with patience and respect. This is the alternative: these are the two possibilities; there is no third and I declare here that, with a heavy and painful heart, but with a clear conscience, I will recommend choosing the possibility we chose yesterday at the cabinet session, for this is the road leading to peace, this is the supreme national interest, for my friends and colleagues, the settlers, too. So I am going to propose to the Knesset for decision and voting the following proposal, which is agreed by the Cabinet of Israel: The Knesset authorizes the Camp David agreements which were signed by the prime minister in the White House on 19 September 1978. If, in the negotiations over the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, all the problems are agreed upon which touch on this treaty, and the agreement takes the form of a written document, the Knesset authorizes the cabinet to remove the settlers from Sinai and to resettle them. The basic... [heckling] ...you will vote--we are proposing. [heckling]

[Chairman Shamir] MK Shelomo Hillel, Mr Deputy Prime Minister, we are holding a debate and the debate is for the expression of the views of the factions and the views of the members of the Knesset. I ask you to permit a quiet and orderly Knesset session speech. I ask the prime minister to continue with his remarks.

[Begin] I thank the chairman. The basic agreement, the framework agreement regarding Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, is our autonomy program as we proposed it last December. It is, indeed, true that these are our proposals. The military government, including its civilian administration, will be removed. The Arab inhabitants will themselves elect an administrative council. We will not intervene in the administration of their daily affairs. From the aspect of our national security, the main point of all is the presence of the IDF in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. [heckling] Listen to the end, listen with patience. In the original agreement, we wrote as follows: There will be a withdrawal, and in English, a withdrawal, of Israeli armed forces and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into security zones which will be detailed. In other words: we agreed to remove a certain number of our troops, while

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the rest of the troops will be left in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. The deployment will be done shortly and they, Israel's soldiers, and only they, will guard our national security. Our army will remain in Judaea and Samaria beyond the transition period. This is the basic change in all the deliberations which have taken place over the last 2 years and up to this very day. [heckling] Again, dear friends.... [heckling]

[Chairman Shamir] Members of Knesset, I request you to refrain from arguments between the Knesset benches. Can there be heckling? No exchanges of remarks between members of Knesset is possible. MK Shelomo Hillel, will you please keep order, please.

[Begin] We left no doubt and we announced that after the transition period of 5 years, when the decision on the problem of the sovereignty is put forward, we will demand our right to sovereignty over Judaea and Samaria and Gaza. If an agreement is achieved against the background of counterdemands, fine. If no agreement is achieved--the result will be that the arrangements for autonomy and the security of Israel will continue. Now, I want to draw the Knesset's attention... [heckling]

Mr Tawfiq Tubi, I have already read a great many PRAVDA articles, why should I listen to your remarks. I would prefer the voice of Moscow, but I have read articles in PRAVDA, I don't need you. I know what the position is.

I now want to emphasize what we prevented concerning this agreement, with regard to the previous proposals presented to us. One: There is not, nor will there be, any referendum in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. We had, at the conference, to remind our friends that Meinetagen [British officer in Palestine who wrote a diary in which he maintained that Sinai was never Egyptian] writes in his memoirs that, in the twenties, it was suggested to Arthur James Balfour that a referendum be held on Eretz Yisra'el and the then British foreign minister replied: If there is a referendum on Eretz Yisra'el, it is correct that all the Jews throughout the world should participate in it. This proposal was struck and the authorization will be given by the elected of the inhabitants. Second: There is not, nor will there be, under any condition or any circumstances, a Palestinian state. Third:

[Heckling: It is impossible to make peace without a Palestinian state, just as no peace can be made by destroying the State of Israel.]

Members of Knesset, I ask for silence. Mr Wilner, I can say to you--I did not permit myself to say this to Mr Tawfiq Tubi--you should remember to whom [words indistinct] prophecy about building the temple. So please do not hurry to commit suicide.

[MK Wilner heckles about the agreement being built on sand]

Enough; enough heckling. You will take part in the debate. Enough, members of Knesset, I ask for silence. Third: The organization of murderers called the PLO [heckling] MK Tawfiq Zayyad... [heckling] and I want to tell you, the mayor of Nazareth in the State of Israel, I want to tell you that since the days of the Nazis there has never been such a barbaric organization, antihumane, as that called the PLO.... [heckling] MK Tawfiq Zayyad, I ask you to cease. I ask you to cease. [heckling]

[Knesset chairman] MK Tawfiq Tubi, do you want [words indistinct]. Do you want to vote in an orderly way? MK Tawfiq Tubi, MK Tawfiq Tubi, you know what heckling is, you know what heckling is and you know the difference between heckling and disturbances. I ask you not to disturb. Members of Knesset, I ask for silence. I ask the prime minister to continue his remarks.

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[Begin] Of course I will continue. What else; I should stop? I repeat what I said, the organization of murderers called PLO is not an element in the negotiations, nor will it be and we heard from the President of the United States the correct comparison between it and the Nazis' organization, because this is an organization which not only adheres, as it were, to sacrificing the State of Israel--it will never gain this--but it has made the civilian population the sole target of its attacks. In the end revenge will be taken against it and even now a vendetta is going on between its sections and you know very well what has happened recently in Beirut. Learn a lesson from this and take care, gentlemen. You too, one of these days, may be the victims of this organization.

[Heckling about PLO agreement to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip]

I must--MK Wilner--[heckling, arguments]

[Knesset Chairman] Members of Knesset, I request that you abstain from arguments on the Knesset benches.

[Begin] MK Abramovitch, if [words indistinct] it is because of your neighborhood....

[Begin] A question is always permissible, but in a quieter voice, so that I can hear.

[MK Moshe Shahal] I ask the prime minister to explain what was quoted today, in your name, in NEWSWEEK, about your willingness to meet and sit down with PLO members if they are elected by the public.

[Begin] No such thing. I was asked a question, if someone from among the PLO supporters is elected, what would our attitude be to that person if he were elected to the administrative council and I said, if he is elected, he is elected, and then we will tell him, if you behave correctly, then you will sit on this committee, but do not even imagine harming anyone in Israel and causing a breach of the peace. That was my reply and I stand by it.

[Violent heckling] That was my reply and I stand by it and if you have another reply, give it from the Knesset podium. [Violent heckling]

[Knesset chairman] Members of the Knesset, members of the Knesset, I request that you cease the arguments and discussions among yourselves.

[Begin] I must explain other problems. The first is that of Jerusalem. One day it was suggested to us at the Camp David conference that the flag of an Arab country fly over the temple mount. We refused, we argued, and the flag was taken down before it was raised. On the last day of the conference we were presented with a draft letter which was due to be sent to me and to President as-Sadat regarding the status of Jerusalem. We told the U.S. delegation that if that letter remained valid and was sent to us, we would not sign any agreements, so that letter was cancelled. In its place, another letter was sent to us and I replied to it as was required. Mr President, I am honored to inform you that, on 28 June 1967, the Israeli House of Representatives [Bet Hanivharim] passed a law, as follows: The government is authorized by law to impose law, judgement and the administration of the state in every area of Eretz Yisra'el, as is determined by the law. On the basis of this law, the Cabinet of Israel issued an order, in July 1967, according to which Jerusalem is one city, can no longer be divided, is the capital of Israel. [heckling] Those letters, Mr Shamir, those letters--Mr Shamir--after all, you are a proud Jew and I want to say to you that President Carter wrote a letter to Mr as-Sadat, and President as-Sadat wrote a letter to Mr Carter, and what I wrote in the name of the State of Israel is what will stand. Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, is indivisible for all the generations and for ever and ever. Did you understand that Hebrew? As a poet? [heckling]

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The problem of the settlements was put forward. [heckling] I ask you not to argue concerning the addition of manpower. There is no problem for the existing settlements. We will even reinforce them, in Judaea and in Samaria and on the Golan Heights, with more families. With regard to Judaea and Samaria and Gaza I had no doubt about it, I gave a promise to President Carter that, during the period of negotiations for the sake of signing a peace treaty, and today we have negotiations only with Egypt, that is, during the assumed period of time of 3 months we will not bring in new civilian settlements. This matter arouses misunderstanding and so, despite the fact that I had no doubt regarding the substance of that promise, and that alone, on Saturday evening we examined, with the foreign minister and the defense minister and Professor Baraq, all the notes and the documents and it was proved basically that that was how it was and in this spirit I am this week going to write the suitable letter to President Carter.

As for the terms, I was given confirmation by President Carter regarding the terms as they appear in the original version, the English one, regarding our understanding, that is: President Carter writes to me. I hereby confirm that you informed me of the above as follows: In every document of the agreed framework, the terms Palestinians or the Palestinian people are interpreted and understood and will be interpreted and understood by you as the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el and in every paragraph where the term West Bank appears, it is understood and will be understood by the Government of Israel as Judaea and Samaria.

Gentlemen, Members of Knesset, I request...

[Question about the legal rights of the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el]

Everyone uses his own language and our language is Eretz Yisra'el and Judaea and Samaria. This is what we agreed on and this is how it will be in the future. Mr Chairman, members of Knesset, I request that you cease the conversations among yourselves. We did not, either at Camp David, or at the White House, sign any secret document. All the documents have been published and the additional letter that I will send to President Carter will also be published. All the material is laid before you. I understand, Mr Chairman, that today there is a period in Israel of what may be called birth pangs. This is a free nation. It has differing views within it. This is a democratic parliament. It has different parties in it. Even within the parties there are differences of opinion. This is one of the greatest events of our generation, after 30 years of five wars, bloodshed, bereavement and making of orphans, we have arrived at the moment when it is given to us, with very hard sacrifices, to sign a peace treaty with an Arab nation numbering more than 40 million people, and afterward there is hope, foundations for belief, that the day is not far off when we will sign on a peace treaty with our other neighbors. This is a turn which may be called, without any doubt, a historic one. In our hearts there is a prayer: May we succeed in this, one after the other, and gain the peace which is longed for by all, without any factional difference. We made all the efforts and, as I said, we also made the sacrifices, for that day to come.

We have laid the documents before you. Everyone will think his own thoughts, will ask his conscience and will vote in accordance with his evaluation. Thus I call on all the members of Knesset, without concern for faction. I only ask that all the members of Knesset, the representatives of a great nation which has suffered greatly and fought a great deal, sacrificed much: Know how to evaluate the moral significance of this turn. There have been 30 years during which we have hoped for the moment when we would sit down for direct discussion on the signing of a peace treaty, on complete normalization of relations, on the cessation of the wars, on the guaranteeing of life not only for our generation, but also for our children and their children's children after us. This is the moment. It is a great moment. I thank the Knesset for listening. Let there be the will that, with the aid of the Lord, very soon we will come to the great moment of signing the peace treaty.

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() Peres Knesset Speech

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[Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres speech to Knesset in response to prime minister's address at opening of Knesset debate on the Camp David accords--live]

[Text] Knesset Chairman, honorable Knesset, yesterday, at the meeting of the Labor Party center, a woman, not young and dressed in black, one of the greatest women in the history of the redeemed Israel, a woman who lost her two sons, a pioneer in all her ways, the mother of sons, Rivqa Guber, took the podium. She approached the loudspeaker directly and without a piece of paper in her hands. She said, among other things: Dear colleagues, it is hard for me and I did not intend to speak since I have just completed the 7 days of mourning following the death of my husband. I have the impression that you will hear my words although I have nobody I can send, either to the Rafah approaches, nor to Di-Zahav, I have nobody to send.... [interjection by MK Me'ir Kohen who says that there are many bereaved people and Peres should not use this example.]

Stop for a minute. You do not know what I am saying, fool. I have nobody... [interjection] I have no one to send since my sons were lost and they left no grandchildren. I had nobody I could send but the surprising thing now is the wished-for peace. If we allow this hour to be lost to us--this was what this great woman said--we will not be able to justify ourselves. Peace requires risks just as war. She added: [We need this] in order that the new year may be good, that a booth of peace may be built, that green may prevail on both sides of the border, that we may live with our neighbors without fears and that this be not a dream. This is a great Zionist truth. We have hoped to realize Zionism in peaceful conditions and not in war confrontations.

Peace, Knesset members, was lacking on the Arab side, not on the Jewish side. It is the side that brought about the wars and had we not won them, albeit at a heavy price, the Jewish side would not have existed. In the great historic argument held between Professor Magnes and David Ben-Gurion, David Ben-Gurion told Magnes: The difference between us is that you believe that peace will bring the creation of a state, while I believe that the creation of a state will lead to peace. We have indeed established a state strong enough to bring peace. This is the first time there are two sides for peace. The State of Israel, the only Jewish state in the world, and the Egyptian republic, the biggest of the Arab countries. Mr Chairman, I unhesitatingly congratulate the Israeli Government and the Israeli prime minister on the difficult and awesome but also vital decision they have made to march toward peace in return for a price that seemed impossible for the present government, to free themselves from their commitments, conventions and ideology and progress toward a new direction in the history of the Middle East.

I want to say now why I have told you this. I did not make a demagogic use of Rivqa's words. It is you who should apologize. I want to express my full appreciation for President as-Sadat who, supported by his people and in the face of a loud and threatening refusal in the Arab world, came to Jerusalem, sought peace, proposed peace and found compliance for peace.

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I am sure that the house is united in its gratitude to the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, who showed resourcefulness, a sense of timing and adherence to the goal. He spared no time or effort and stretched his prestige like a bridge over some of the wide gaps created on the way to peace. Peace is born in labor and its progress is made through difficult decisions. Errors were accumulated during the conduct of the peace negotiations which are today loaded with charges that are liable to dissolve and disintegrate things that are vital to the State of Israel and its security. The peace agreement submitted to us today constitutes a double price: the price of peace itself which is inevitable; and the price of the errors made on the way, errors which could have been avoided.

In the course of the negotiations the government began settlements in the Sinai and in the heart of the West Bank. Settlements in this period in these places caused much damage to the State of Israel and the government had to stop them after the damage had already been done. The government first refused, later hesitated, to apply Resolution 242 to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Finally, it agreed, it surely agreed, again, after the damage had already been done. It estimated that As-Sadat would not move toward peace on his own. He did move and he also gained credit for that. The government hesitated about signing a general declaration of principles along the lines of the Vienna document, and instead signed detailed and dangerous principles that were not in the first draft declaration. It refused to answer the two U.S. questions. Finally it gave many answers, more far-reaching than it was initially requested to do. It did not believe that As-Sadat would agree to an IDF presence in the West Bank and again erred and was forced to agree to a partial presence. We have paid a heavy price for these mistakes.

Mr Chairman, this cabinet conceded all of Sinai on one clear Jerusalem evening. Afterward it held negotiations characterized by regrets, but this did not help. In Sinai, the cabinet shattered Israel's credibility. We stood on a defensible border, with settlements and airfields.

Mr Prime Minister, it is also worth your listening, but I must tell you that I was surprised by your reasoning today on the matter of the airfields. Since when do dozens of kilometers not count today? Previously you stood on this podium and you explained, concerning Judea and Samaria, that every kilometer and every gun matters. When you conceded, the territory changed, the guns have changed, the planes have arrived--really, on this matter you must be consistent. We gave up territorial continuity from Sharm ash-Shaykh to Elat.

Members of Knesset, there are those who say that this program recalls the Rogers plan. Regarding Sinai, it is worse than the Rogers plan, because, in the Rogers plan there was room to conduct negotiations over the future of Sharm ash-Shaykh. We have given up a land barrier in the Yamit Strip. This is what we told the settlers. This is what we said, Mr Prime Minister, to one another--you called this a national consensus--this is what we said to everyone, we said to one another--but to As-Sadat we said something else. The national consensus sank in the sands of Sinai.

We have returned to the 1967 borders. We have given up a defensible border, airfields--and, in my view, regarding airfields, we could have reached a better agreement--and I am saying this after a talk with As-Sadat.

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Now the cabinet says something which surprised me--I am turning to the foreign minister in this case--[it said] that the United Nations will be a buffer. If the United Nations is a buffer, this is also a precedent for the matter of the Golan Heights. Why say this? Let us remember that the model of Sinai will serve as a precedent and foundations for negotiations with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, for in the chapter on the principles accompanying the Camp David agreements, there is more than a hint of the fact that the agreement with Egypt will represent a signpost for the perplexed. [indistinct interjection] In a minute you will hear.

First of all, Moshe, I do not deny, neither to myself nor to others, on what I am voting and I say this frankly to both the house and the nation, not detracting from the gravity of the matter by an iota; we are standing today with the broken truth of yesterday and the grave truth of today, with the broken truth and the grave truth, facing the people of the Yamit strip, people who were the nation's envoys, who have remained the envoys of the people, they went because they were sent; they were sent with the agreement of us all. They made a desert bloom and created a security zone; pioneers with an honest conviction.

[Unidentified MK] Not only the Yamit District, but also the Straits of Tiran.

[Peres] Here they are, coming from Russia and from America, immigrants from the Arab countries and those born in this country. They and their children who have grown and their fields which grew and their homes which they built, they woke up one morning to discover that they were no longer pioneers in the camp, but, as it were, an obstacle to peace. Their mission was suddenly cut off and this after we told As-Sadat that if the soil is sacred to him, for us the settlements are sacred. This is what I said with everyone's agreement. Today, at their side stand the people of the Jordan Rift Valley and the people from the Golan Heights. Mr Chairman, can the Knesset give them an answer that contains honor, security and credibility?

No less grave and even more encompassing in its gravity is the situation concerning the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. It now emerges that the autonomy is not coming instead of 242, but in addition to it and that the decisions and principles of Resolution 242 will apply to all the territories. A joint committee, with Jordan and Israel and the elected representatives of the territories, will have to decide, on the basis of 22, [as heard] and I am quoting from the document, the siting of the borders. We will yet have to stake out borders, together with the security arrangements. Autonomy for security needs but, in fact it is a withdrawal in effect, and in the not too distant future.

The autonomy, in its midday editions--and if Jordan joints in, there will also be an evening edition--has turned into a temporary program, not into a permanent partial agreement, Mr Prime Minister, but into a passing partial agreement. According to this agreement, the military government will be abolished. The inhabitants will be given authority, authority of self-rule and full autonomy. You can say this is not a Palestinian state. This is a semantic game. [It has] all the indicators of a government without any exceptions, apart from the presence of the IDF, and this, too, Mr Prime Minister--and you must explain this to the Knesset--according to the best of my knowledge, is restricted in time.

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I want to say on what I base my remarks: In President Carter's announcement, in the White House, in your presence and in the presence of As-Sadat, the president said: "The framework document proposes a 5-year transitional period." He then specified that within this period there will be a withdrawal of the military government and added: "It also provides for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during this period, to protect Israel, Israeli security." It is written "during this period" that forces--this is a document by the President of the United States, which we heard over the television, in your presence, we heard no reservations. I beg your pardon? [heckling] I am reading what the President said, I have not seen any other documents. [indistinct remarks from Begin]

The authority will decide how day-to-day matters will be administered in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza; true, in accordance with the principles of the framework agreement, but it will decide--so what does a referendum matter? Again, it is a play on words. It will determine, by its elected representatives, the future of the West Bank and Gaza. It will be the final authority which will decide what the future of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza is. I do not expect that the cabinet [heckling]...an independent, elected authority, with administration, with a police, and, particularly, with aspirations in the heart, and the possibility of declaring them from a formal podium, both with regard to the continued IDF presence and regarding the possibility of self-determination. I do not expect, members of Knesset, that this authority will beg the IDF to remain in the territories and declare that it prefers the link with Israel to self-determination.

However, the main point is that this Cabinet of Israel, the one which, as it were, adheres to principles, is the one that declared that it agrees in advance, today, in public, that the results of the negotiations should include recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and its just needs. Thus a historic argument within our midst has ended. We have recognized the existence of a Palestinian people. It is not difficult to guess the legitimate rights of a people constituting a decisive majority in the land on which it lives. It is true that, in the exchange of letters, the prime minister expressed reservations, saying that the intention was with regard to the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza only. The reply he received from Carter says--now I know, Mr Prime Minister, what your views are. But, in fact, you too have two views: one view on which you signed a public and open document, which recognizes a Palestinian people with its legitimate rights, and a second view about which you whispered in a private letter to President Carter. Mr Chairman, it is impossible to settle a people in a post box, and what will appear as natural justice will overcome the textual justice.

In this argument, the Labor Party had a position. We said that a compromise must be made, MK Moshe Shamir. We said that there was a Palestinian problem. We are not ignoring it. We said that the problem of its identity, the identity of the Palestinians, must be solved in a Jordanian-Palestinian framework. We warned this cabinet that the alternative to our proposal is a Palestinian entity.

The cabinet... [heckling by Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism Horowitz] Yiga'el, you are not a member of my party, listen to the end, you will be given a reply. How does this fit in with the fact that you are sitting there?

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From where you are sitting you do not have to ask. Change your chair and then if you ask, you will be given an answer. The cabinet amused itself--after all, this is not a debate on inflation, on 3 billion Israeli pounds; here 2 days will not be enough, Yiga'el--the cabinet amused itself with formulations on sovereignty and, in my view, it lost the chance for security borders. It lost; the nation of Israel lost; peace lost. For the Palestinian people--including this time, not only the inhabitants of the territories, the Palestinian people, as the Israeli Cabinet recognizes them, including those who were uprooted from the territories since 1967--a Palestinian people with the right to return.

The consolation, as it were, that we will be able to purchase land is merely verbal consolation, because the right to purchase is connected with the willingness to sell, which does not exist. The IDF will remain in the area at certain points but the demand to evacuate it in 5 years--or earlier or later--is certain to come. Ultimately, the continued presence of the IDF will depend on the members of the committee who will determine a final settlement for the future of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Of course, in 5 years we will be able to demand sovereignty over the whole of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. We will be able to, why not? Who will respond to this? Who will agree to this? Who will support it? Who will demand it? Will you change your mind tomorrow on what you agreed upon today?

This plan cannot arouse triumphal cries in one's heart. It is this cabinet alone which is responsible for it. Israel was forced to accept--and it would be wise for the cabinet to say this explicitly--that the alternative and by this I am replying to you, Yiga'el, was the collapse of the Camp David conference--a collapse which I opposed, and I am saying this from the podium. This collapse would have brought about Israel's isolation--our people have limitations--I will not mention them--a collapse which would have harmed the United States and our relations with it, a collapse which would have been harmful to As-Sadat, the first Arab leader who came to speak with us openly about peace. It would have endangered the chance for peace in this generation and also, perhaps, in generations to come.

Mr Speaker, honorable Knesset, the opposition has never had a better opportunity to be an opposition than today. It is not difficult to guess what Menahem Begin would have said today were he to have stood here in my stead as leader of the opposition. Ge'ula Kohen did this in his place, even though not in my place. We have not done this, because we are a movement that has responsibility toward our people. We have not made life easy for ourselves and, when we saw the size of the danger together with the size of the chance, we have chosen to be supporters of peace--the sole existing possibility for peace...

[Unidentified MK] Support as a result of U.S. pressure.

...and we will not be an opposition out for easy political gain.

Moreover, in expressing our support for the Camp David agreements today we are also--I know--indirectly accepting all of the cabinet's previous mistakes, against which we issued several warnings sufficiently ahead of time. We take upon ourselves also the burden of difficulties that can be expected in the future--this is not the end of the road--and we are doing this, MK Yiga'el Horowitz, without seeking a place next to the cabinet table. [indistinct interjection]

Democracy does not mean splitting the people but the freedom to represent correct opinion, and sometimes the correct opinion lies with the opposition; however, the opposition does not have a majority.

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The expected burden is great because if Jordan joins the negotiations it is clear that it will open with new conditions. If Jordan does not join and Egypt enters the negotiations it will make things hard for itself on the Egyptian clause without making things easy for us on the Jordanian clause. If neither of them join, a Palestinian entity will be consolidated. If nothing happens the problem will remain open with which the whole world will be busy and which will place a burden on peace, will commit the United States, will strengthen the rejectionist front and might even bring about a renewed Geneva conference, as President Carter's national security adviser said yesterday.

If Syria follows Egypt it will demand that the model of Sinai be applied to the Golan Heights. It is not difficult to guess who will support these demands.

[Unidentified MK] No, we will not support this.

[Peres] If Syria does not follow, Amnon, we, the Alignment brought up a different plan. Our plan did not have a majority and was not accepted, I cannot make a choice which is imaginary...

[Unidentified MK] You want to walk between the raindrops, but this is impossible!

[Peres] The rejectionist front will seek ways to express its dissatisfaction, almost certainly with threats and with terror. Calm in the south will be accompanied by tension in the north.

Members of the Knesset, the issue of multiplying the settlements is not simply a matter of interpreting the agreement. Under the conditions that have been created, it is hard to see how the cabinet will continue in its policy of many Allon Mores, and the policy of removing Allon Mores is not so pleasant, as this cabinet has learned after it believed that it would not have to do this.

We still face the serious issue of Jerusalem. In the past 11 years a dynamic man has headed the city--Teddy Kolley--who has shown a development drive and wisdom in relations. This city and its leader should today get comprehensive and maximum aid so that reality...

[Unidentified MK] If you win on the issue of Jerusalem, you would divide it!

[Peres] ...overcomes the hard and fast things set out in the exchange of letters on the future of the city. Mr Prime Minister, before you went to Camp David you made a speech on television. You settled partisan accounts. I am not settling partisan accounts. Teddy Kolley will in any case be elected. What he should be given is the necessary aid.

[Unidentified correspondent] Of course, the arguments here on the floor center on election propaganda Shim'on Peres is conducting for (?Kolley).

[Peres] Members of Knesset, after having defined most openly the balance of this policy which we were not responsible for shaping but in which we have found ourselves--and there is no alternative--one must also take a look at the chance that lies in the delivery room itself.

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Peace, which is at the gate, a peace which has yet to be born but is in the process of being formed; for the time being it is an only child, but it is being threatened by enemy brothers. Even when it is born it is expected to have childhood illnesses and an unknown lifespan. It might be capricious, and it might cause sleepless nights. But it is a creature that might come to life in our world and change it.

We have been accustomed to being concerned for Israel's security. We must not shirk this concern but perhaps, for the first time, Jewish and Arab parents, the ancient Egyptian people and the weary Jewish people will taste a flavor we have not known before--slogans of a prophetic vision will become men and women in a new reality.

It is possible that instead of barbed wire in the Middle East, a Middle East with open borders will come into existence; in deserts which were fields of death the wheat fields of our neighbors might grow. We might be able to construct a second story of a regional economy on our national economy. A region with a network of irrigation pipes to put an end to ancient deserts; [indistinct interjections] roads which will reveal to everybody the antiquities from our people's heritage; a scenery that gave birth to toil, courage and vision; seas that will provide a living for fishermen and will serve holidaymakers; an economy that might obtain energy from the sun's rays and from the bottom of the sea.

We call upon all peoples of the Middle East to achieve peace within the region and between all countries; peace that will enable us to conduct the only just war--against poverty, against sickness, against the wilderness, against ignorance, against corruption and against discrimination. Peace provides new opportunities for the Jewish people. This is a peace the achievement of which we owe to those who fell in Israel's battles, the hope for its realization depending on renewed immigration to Eretz Yisra'el.

The Alinement--the Labor Party and MAPAM--will take part in this energetic campaign for peace. Until it comes and when it comes we will also devote some of our efforts to changing the image of Israel so that it not be a country that lives off external support and is thus dependent on the charity of foreigners, but a country that lives from its own toil.

Let us not be a people of the stock exchange but a people of work; a society that only sits in deck chairs at the seaside, dotted with houses of entertainment and casinos, but a society that cultivates its fields, activates its industries and provides for itself; a country without masters and without servants, a country that does not live from hand to mouth but from tomorrow to today, from the society-at-large to the individual. Zionism...

[Interjection by Likud MK Olmert] Mr Peres, on behalf of which party are you speaking when you say this?

[Peres] Zionism is not a movement to change one's place of residence, but to change the content of a people. The Labor Party--a movement to build a hard-working people that knows how to work and create, to teach and believe...

[Knesset Speaker Shamir] Knesset members, I am asking for quiet.

[Peres] ...a people that knows how to defend itself and stretch the hand of peace to its neighbors. We will build the Negev to look like the Jordan Valley and the Jezreel Valley--not a Negev of farmers and paid laborers. We will work to settle the Galilee...

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[Likud MK Ehud Olmert] Nevertheless, on behalf of which party do you come with this vision?

[Peres] Ehud, did you personally build the country? We will build a defensible border built on depth and covered in greenery, because the seed of peace, in the words of Zechariah, is that the vine will bear its fruit. Moreover, it will be a peace that will enable the settlement of the remnants of the people.

Mr Speaker, honorable members of Knesset, we have to face the dangers with open eyes--I have described them without any embellishment--the series of mistakes--with an aching heart but with the knowledge that this cannot be changed, and face the hope of peace with decisive Jewish faith. In the end this is what we are all striving for.

[Shamir] Thank you.

[MK Dov Shilansky] I still do not know how you voted?

HOROWITZ REMAINS OPPOSED TO CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

TA251513Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 25 Sep 78 TA

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Text] La'am is inside, but opposed. Correspondent Zevi Lidar talked about this with the commerce and industry minister, Yiga'el Horowitz. [begin recording]

[Question] Minister Horowitz, are you able to vote for the proposal brought by the prime minister before the Knesset today?

[Answer] No, I will not vote for it. There was a meeting of the La'am Party executive yesterday in which a decision was taken to vote against this proposal brought by Mr Begin. Since there are many sharp expressions now--this subject causes great pain to us all; I imagine that the parties and the people themselves are divided on this matter--I want to seize the opportunity to say a word against the sharp and ugly expressions leveled at Mr Begin, Mr Dayan and Mr Weizman. They are called traitors and other serious names by well-known demonstrators. I want to protest against this. I am convinced that the delegation has done its best in Camp David, according to its conception and understanding, to bring about the best possible results from the point of view of the national interest.

[Question] Why do you not support them then?

[Answer] Although I am sure they have done their best, I do not support their position. However, it's a long way from lack of support to grave condemnations.

[Question] Why lack of support, if you say they have done their best?

[Answer] I say that I would have under no circumstances accepted the proposal to remove the settlements in Judaea and Samaria and I would have done everything to guarantee massive settlement in Judaea and Samaria and not to leave the issue open and vague. At any rate, I am convinced that they do not deserve any condemnations.

[Question] The prime minister said he will view a vote against the agreements as a no-confidence vote and will resign if the majority of the Knesset votes against him. Your vote against him, against his proposal means no confidence in the prime minister. Are you going to reach the conclusions called for by this?

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[Answer] No. I was happy to hear that Begin said that every Knesset member will vote according to his conscience. I think that this is the way the Likud faction should act. Although we have the decision of the La'am Party executive, I am convinced that our faction members will vote according to their conscience.

[Question] Will you later be able to continue sitting in a government that removes settlements?

[Answer] I want to tell you first that the moves are not operational yet and the negotiations are still going to be complicated and difficult. I do not see any reason for resigning from the cabinet at this moment, unless Mr Begin says that it is impossible for us to participate in this government after our vote. This matter is in his hands. I, at any rate, will not vote for the cabinet's position.

[Question] Will you continue to see yourselves as part of the Likud?

[Answer] I think so. At any rate, this subject is not on the agenda at the moment.

[Question] What are your next steps?

[Answer] Nothing; to do everything that needs to be done both in the ministry and in the party and to always say only what I think. [end recording]

PO'ALEY AGUDAT YISRA'EL AGAINST AGREEMENTS

TA252145Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 25 Sep 78 TA

[Text] The Po'aley Agudat Yisra'el Knesset representative, Rabbi Kalman Kahana, will vote against the approval of the Camp David agreements. The Po'aley Agudat Yisra'el members reached this decision because of the security and settlement aspects. They most fear that the principle of removing settlements will be applied to Judaea and Samaria in the future.

BEGIN 'WILL RESIGN' IF KNESSET DISAPPROVES ACCORDS

TA251310Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 25 Sep 78 TA

[Text] The prime minister said again that if the Knesset does not endorse the Camp David agreements, he will go to the president of the state and submit his resignation. Mr Begin said this in his talk with the MAFDAL heads today.

Correspondent Zevi Lidar learned that the prime minister insists that coalition discipline will be imposed on the vote on the agreements. Our correspondent says that there is opposition in the Likud faction to the imposition of coalition discipline and that Dov Shilansky and Kohen-Orgad are among the opponents' leaders. Our correspondent mentions that the Likud La'am Faction decided today to grant its members freedom of voting. The La'am executive has also recommended voting against the agreements. La'am Mk Yig'al Kohen said that each of his colleagues will be able to vote against, and that if the prime minister wants to he can draw conclusions from this. Yig'al Kohen said that if it transpires that the law forbids the ministers to vote against the agreements, they will be able to abstain.

BEGINI, Menachem

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TELEVISION CARRIES KNESSET SESSION SPEECHES

(C) DF
Dayan Addresses Meeting

FBI-MEA-78-190

TA280906Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 2352 GMT 27 Sep 78 TA

[Speech by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to the Knesset--live]

[Text] Mr Speaker, honorable Knesset: There was no U.S. pressure on us at Camp David. No one threatened us or hinted that if we did not meet their demands, proposals or views that the United States would reduce its aid to Israel in economic matters, in arms or in political aid. However, we were under pressure at Camp David, the same pressure that we all find ourselves under now. Not President Carter's pressure; he did not even hint that if we did not achieve a peace agreement we would be viewed as those not prepared to move toward peace.

We were under the same pressure that we are under now: the pressure with ourselves between peace--the desire to achieve peace negotiations with Egypt--and the price that has to be paid for it, between the hope for total peace with normal relations--this is the proposal and I know that there are Knesset members who say that this is not peace; we have never had formal proposals which speak about the normalization of relations as in the proposal for the framework achieved at Camp David--between the proposal for a total settlement and the demand for a total withdrawal, a total withdrawal of the army and a total withdrawal of civilians.

It was said here by Knesset Member Qatan that we came here with a fait accompli. We have not brought faits accomplis. We have brought a recommended proposal. However, it is the Knesset, in its vote, which can turn this proposal into a basis for negotiations for peace with Egypt or into a worthless piece of paper. If the Knesset approves this proposal I believe that there will be a basis for peace negotiations with Egypt. If the Knesset does not approve this proposal another piece of paper will be added to the archives of the various bits of paper. This is what the Knesset has to decide.

The question that we face--that the whole Knesset has to face is if we reject this proposal, what happens next? What will happen tomorrow and the day after, next year and in 2 years time. What conditions will be more convenient and which conditions will be created that will be better for Israel to be able to achieve peace then. Will it be more comfortable when the whole of the Arab world is united? With the United States and the Soviet Union together, will it be easier for us? Is King Husayn of Jordan becoming more moderate now? King Husayn's answers now and his rapprochement with Syria--do these show that as the years go by it is becoming easier for us to reach an agreement with him? The possibility of continuing the military government for another 10 years and continuing a state of war for another 10 years and the criticism that is showered upon us by the world, and the major dependence that we have on the United States--will these make things easier for us in the future? Does anyone have the security that the person who will rule in Egypt after As-Sadat will be comfortable for a settlement with Israel than As-Sadat's predecessor in Egypt? We have gone through these periods.

I remember at the end of the war of liberation in 1948 when Ben-Gurion was prime minister. He was prepared to make a peace agreement on the borders as they existed at the time. This was what could be achieved at the time. The Arabs did not agree to this. They did not agree to anything other than a cease-fire agreement.

However, from a border point of view--when we did not have Jerusalem--Ben-Gurion said this is what we have and if the Arabs are prepared to make peace with us on these borders we will do so.

In 1967, with Prime Minister Eshkol and a national unity government, after we got to the Suez Canal and the Jordan River and we took the Golan Heights--did we not offer the making of peace with a withdrawal from Sinai with security arrangements and freedom of shipping, and a return of the Golan Heights with suitable arrangements to insure the sources of the Jordan River? Did we not offer this? I am neither criticizing nor regretting the fact that when we got a negative answer from Egypt and Syria we decided not to stand idle and wait until they (?came) but established settlements in accordance with various plans on all fronts--on the Golan Heights and in Sinai and in Judaea and Samaria. Standing idly was no way to advance toward peace or toward the achievement of our yearnings.

However, from time to time we said that it was not the settlements that would determine the border if we achieved a peace agreement but that the borderline would determine the settlements, because we were dealing with ourselves. To the best of our minimal military and national considerations--not the desire to expand endlessly--there were differences of opinion in favor or against the Allon plan; there were questions around how far we should settle Sinai; should we settle Nahal Sinai west of Al-'Arish or be satisfied with the Rafah approaches. No one endlessly sought territory, but this predicament did have one solution: the solution was that we were discussing matters only with ourselves in an effort to consider what the Arabs would agree to. However, we were discussing only with ourselves.

At Camp David we faced a disadvantage and an advantage in the same thing. The disadvantage was what we saw in reality was not similar to our dream and this was also an advantage. The advantage was that what we saw at Camp David was no dream but reality, a concrete proposal. This is the reality that we are now approaching but this is a reality in which there are two sides and not a reality that we have created for ourselves. Egypt is not the only country and was not the first country prepared to make a total peace with us. Jordan--especially in the past 2 years--the Jordanian Government has said that it is prepared to reach a full peace agreement with us. This happened during the Rabin government and, if I am not mistaken, during the days of the Meir government. There were lengthy deliberations with the Jordanian Government which lasted for a long time and the Rabin government did not reach agreement with them.

If I may make a side remark here; when we did not manage to influence the Jordanian Government into accepting our concept--the Allon plan, let us say--we did not denigrate ourselves and did not call that government unsuccessful, worthless and gauche because Jordan did not accept our proposals. I did not hear anybody say that had he conducted the negotiations he would have convinced King Husayn to accept Allon's plan.

We said--and this was the truth--that what we want is unacceptable to the Jordanian Government and what it proposes we are not prepared to accept. That was not a question of capability, errors, incapability or all those terms of lefthandedness and numerous, continuous mistakes, of, let us do it better. This may be done better. However, there is a large gap between the Arab concept prevailing in each Arab country and what we want, and not only what we want--when the United States, in the framework of those proposals of ours and in order to help the two parties to find a way out of the conflict, proposed that a U.S., not an Israeli, air base be set up to replace the Eytam airfield, Egypt did not agree to this.

... only did it refuse us but it also refused the United States, even though we viewed this as an opening for a political settlement that would have answered some of our wishes. Egypt repeatedly rejected this despite the personal appeals of President Carter to President as-Sadat. With my own ears I heard Carter turn to him and say again and again: Agree to this since this will solve many things. They refused the Americans because of their concept.

We cannot but ask ourselves whether we are prepared to pay this price or to refuse to pay it, and in that case, what will happen in the future, in 5 or 10 years? Will most of the agreements we will reach with the Arabs be the results of war, with a sword put to the neck? Most of our agreements with the Arabs to date have been like that--in 1948, in 1967, after the Yom Kippur War with the disengagement of forces--with the sword laid to their neck, our army mobilized and the agreements being a result of war.

For the first time now an agreement is discussed without the pressure of the sword laid to the neck and not as a result of war. Do we really want to wait for the possibility of future negotiations stemming from a war, a war that we will win, but a war nevertheless? Will the chances of a settlement be better then than now?

We should also ask ourselves whether we are prepared to evacuate 14 settlements and 3 airfields beyond the border on condition that we get a full peace and after more than a year elapses from the beginning of the implementation of the agreement until those conditions of full normalization--of diplomatic ties, when the withdrawal constitutes half of the territory we should evacuate--are completed. We are either prepared for this or we say that we are not ready to evacuate 14 settlements and 3 airfields beyond the border even if this is connected to a full peace agreement with Egypt. Then we will have to ask ourselves, what is a better goal we should seek in the foreseeable future?

When we learned of the Jordanian demand for a full peace agreement--I am neither surprised nor disapprove that the various governments did not bring the Jordanian proposals to the Knesset's decision, while now, I together with the other cabinet members, recommend that this issue be decided in the Knesset. It is not that we should listen to every Arab proposal that may be raised and say: We shall see and decide one way or the other....

[MK Yig'al Allon] In light of remarks that you have just made--why did you vote against the interim agreement with Egypt in the Knesset in 1975?

[Dayan] I did so because that interim agreement did not give peace. We gave it in return for nothing, do you know why, Yig'al, if I may address you as Yig'al? It is because of the very reasons that moved you to refuse to sign that interim agreement at the beginning. You later changed your mind and decided to sign it.

[Indistinct interjections] Well, you asked one question and it is possible the answer does not satisfy you. Do you at least accept that that was not a proposal for a peace settlement but for an interim agreement?

[Interjection apparently by MK Aharon Yadin to the effect that there was not a total withdrawal and that it was a bilateral discussion not against the background of war but during a state of peace]

[Dayan] We are not talking now of a proposal for an interim agreement, and I can ask myself even sharper questions such as: What has changed from the time when I said we had better have Sharm ash-Shaykh without peace than peace without Sharm ash-Shaykh?

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At the time I said this, in 'Abd an-Nasir's time, I thought just as I said--that the one is preferable to the other. Eight years have elapsed since and there is a different situation and a different regime. When I look and ask what's next? What is ahead? I then say that peace without Sharm ash-Shaykh is preferable to Sharm ash-Shaykh without peace if freedom of navigation is guaranteed to Israel. I can cite examples, mine and others, and the question, in each period of time, is whether the issue is realistic.

I want to go back for a moment to the questions of the eastern and southern fronts. I want to say why, also in the event Jordan proposes to us a full peace under conditions it is raising today, I do not recommend that we discuss this. How do we, and should we, examine this? First, where will the proposed Arab agreement take us? To which border--to the border between Kfar Saba and Qalqilyah? This is demanded by King Husayn. Or, to the international border between Gaza and Elat? Will it bring us to security arrangements--the possible security arrangements described by the defense minister here--in the Sinai, or to impossible security arrangements when the Arabs refuse even to accept the Allon plan in Judaea and Samaria? In addition, another, a less concrete question--when we withdraw, in which land should we be ready to become foreigners and in which land not?

I am prepared to be a foreigner in the Sinai and do not desire to be one in Judaea and Samaria. I am not at odds with the position of the Rabin government that did not bring Husayn's plan to the Knesset for a decision, nor do I criticize those who conducted the negotiations for not succeeding in convincing the Jordanian king to accept the Allon plan. He adhered to his positions and was not amenable to being influenced.

The question facing us now is whether this agreement can constitute, under the present circumstances, an appropriate basis which we should endorse.

Finally, I would like to touch on a question raised by MK Rabin regarding the agreements or understanding with the United States connected with these peace accords. It is not true that the agreement we are now presenting, an agreement which is also connected with another agreement called the working paper and achieved between us and the United States in October 1977, does not include clauses of agreement and commitment between us and the United States or agreement to and understanding of our position on the part of the United States--primarily and foremost, the question of the Palestinian state. Furthermore, in the U.S.-Israeli working paper of October 1977 we find the clear distinction stating that peace agreements will be between Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt, Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon, while the issues of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be discussed with the Arab residents of the territories.

In the agreement submitted to the Knesset now the question of yes or no to a Palestinian state is linked to the question of a peace treaty and borders. It is most clearly stated in this agreement that what is now being done with the Arabs of the territories, with the representatives of the residents of Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip--and only with them--is not a peace agreement. The peace agreement that will be based on Resolution 242 should be made with Jordan, with the Palestinian Arabs being able to participate in the Jordanian delegation if they wish. It is only with this delegation that they will determine the peace agreement and the borders on the basis of 242. It is not only Prime Minister Begin and President as-Sadat who signed this agreement but also President Carter, as a witness. There cannot be a more precise definition for the lack of intention to view the Arabs of the territories or these territories as a state--when peace agreements and borders should be determined only with Jordan, and the Palestinians can of course join the Jordanian delegation.

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The same applies to IDF forces. It is indeed the 5-year transitional period that is primarily and foremost talked of now. However, regarding these 5 years, it is for the first time, and with those signatures and with that testimony of the U.S. President, determined that the IDF forces will withdraw and redeploy in the areas of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, or, in English--the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

There is no fear and no room for the assumption that what is being talked of is presence in closed camps. Among the various clauses, not to mention our discussions and our map scrutinies, we also find the clause talking of joint Israeli-Jordanian patrols for the safeguarding of the border--not of sitting in camps, but joint patrols, both Israeli and Jordanian border police along the Israeli-Jordanian border. These three points then: A. We talk of Arab representation of the residents of the territories only; B. When we speak of an agreement with a state we are speaking of Jordan--and it is only with it that we talk of borders based on Resolution 242, and the Arabs of the territories can join the Jordanian delegation; C. Presence of IDF forces in these territories during the 5-year period and maybe also beyond this.

I view the fact that not only the U.S. President signed this as a witness but also the president of an Arab state as a party, as being extremely important. For all the respect I have for agreements between us and the United States, when we have such an agreement on the issues of : No to a Palestinian state; presence of IDF forces; and Arab representation of the residents of the territories--an agreement signed by the president of an Arab state together with the U.S. President's testimony--this is much more important.

The Knesset can endorse or refuse to endorse the proposal submitted by the government. If it endorses it I believe that peace negotiations will open and if it does not endorse it, it is possible that in time, when we see, if we see, the developments of unity in the Arab world, the behavior of As-Sadat's successor, of As-Sadat himself after this proposal is struck off the agenda, of renewed Soviet intervention in the negotiations, we will be sorry that we have not started the peace negotiations under the present conditions--but it will be impossible to do so then, of course.

(Begin) ^{BF} Addresses Session

TA280218Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew.0016 GMT 28 Sep 78 TA

[Speech by Prime Minister Menahem Begin during the Knesset debate on the Camp David agreements--live]

[Text] Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, members of Knesset: At this early hour of the morning it is hard for me to make a speech. I would prefer to hold a talk with friends with whom I have been working for more than 30 years now, without any difference of faction, and in this speech I will possibly do a bit of pouring out of my soul, for which I ask your pardon in advance.

How is this night different from all the nights, from all the days, from all the evenings, from all the dawns? Despite all the nights we fought and signed cease-fire agreements the state of war remained as it was. Despite all the days we signed cease-fire agreements the state of war remained valid. During all the periods we signed interim agreements the state of war remained in all its significance.

Tonight we are debating the signing of a peace treaty the first clause of which will entitled: the state of war between Israel and Egypt has come to an end. "The state of war between Egypt and Israel has been terminated." [previous sentence in English] This is the first clause in every peace treaty.

I want to say, Mr Chairman and all members of the Knesset, with all my heart and with all my soul, blessed are we who have come to this night. For the first time since the state was founded the two countries will declare to all peoples of the world: There is no more state of war between us.

Now, with the permission of the chairman and by way of asking your pardon, permit me to say something personal. I have been serving the people of Israel for 50 years as well as its liberation movement, whose name is Zionism, and going on to old age I have now had to hear certain voices of the sort that are not fit to be heard from this podium. But even in the Knesset certain voices are heard, and to them it is my duty to reply.

MK Moshe Shamir stood on this podium and claimed that I had used a hammer concerning the voting in the Knesset and he himself participated in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in which another 20 members participated and they all heard me when I said, and the same goes for the Likud faction; I call on everyone, with no difference of faction, this time, to unite and vote in favor--for a new era is opening in the history of Israel. Not that there are no difficulties, not that there are no pains, not that there are no torments, but the great hope for the basic turn is what is before us. Let us unite. Let us unify. We will accept the good with the bad and I do not deny that sacrifices will be made, but the main thing is the first sentence, the end of the state of war with the greatest and strongest of the Arab countries.

With Egypt the cycle of wars comes to an end. Syria cannot attack us because it knows that if it does so it will commit suicide. Jordan cannot attack us because it knows that if it does so the king from the Hashemite dynasty will lose his crown. The cycle of wars has been closed--who knows--maybe for 5 years, maybe for 10, maybe for 50 years, maybe for a generation, maybe for two generations. After all, this is a historic turn in the full meaning of the term. Let us unite around this turn. This is what I asked.

And afterward I said to all my friends--all of them are sitting here as witnesses--vote as your souls tell you, according to your consciences. And for this I have to hear, as I sit here on the Knesset podium, a friend of mine say that an attempt was made to use a hammer on members of the faction so that they should vote, as though they were robots? They are like my father and mother. Is this true? Is this how one speaks in the Knesset, to the ears of living witnesses, only in order to harm a hated man? Mr Shamir--he is an author in Israel and he wrote a book, in my view a very great one, entitled King of Flesh and Blood, about our great king, Alexander Jannai. But the late Professor (Kloisner) did not like that book and wrote a shattering criticism of it and then, in criticism of the book, the late Professor (Kloisner), one of our greatest historians, said: There are those who excuse the author by saying he is no historian, but to such an extent no historian? [laughter] Now I want to ask: Sometimes it is possible to deviate from the truth--but to deviate from it to such an extent? When dozens of colleagues heard me: Vote as your souls tell you and according to your consciences? To speak about hammers?

And then MK Moshe Shamir said that I had lost my belief in the justice of Zionism.

[Shamir] I did not say that.

[Begin] Just that. I ask you to examine the minutes. Sir, sir, it is too late for heckling.

[Shamir] To such extent not a historian, Mr Prime Minister-- there is

[Begin] I did not interrupt him, please allow me to speak. Be kind enough to permit me to speak and do not interrupt me, please. Those were the remarks that we made and I want...that is what I heard; prove it in the record, I beg your pardon. And many heard. I only want to say this: that in 50 years of serving the people of Israel and Zionism, my belief in the justice of Zionism has never lessened by even a molecule. Respected Mr Shamir; and I continued to believe in the justice of Zionism when you still believed in the justice of another ideology.

[Shamir] I was born in Zionism and have never left it, not even for a second, even in the days when I was in another movement. I have always been a loyal Zionist just like you, Mr Prime Minister.

[Begin] I am not denying that. After all, you cast doubts on my belief in the justice of Zionism. You said so. There is another member of Knesset who said things....

[Shamir] By the way, [word indistinct] I call a hammer.

[Begin] I see that you remain in your life under such a hammer. There is another member of Knesset who said certain things in a certain way the day before yesterday. I will not reply even with one word. And I will pass on to the main matter. Camp David. What happened in connection with the settlements at Camp David. This I will tell. For 12 days and 12 nights we did not cease explaining to the U.S. President and to every one of his aides--I beg you, members of Knesset. 12 days and 12 nights--we did not cease explaining to the President of the United States the essentialness of these settlements, their value from the security aspect, their importance from the moral aspect, the rightness of the previous governments which established those settlements. This is what we told him and he replied to me, in one of the night talks: I accept, and for a second time I will go and try to convince President as-Sadat. On this podium tonight I want to thank President Carter for that. He tried once to convince President as-Sadat to make an arrangement and let the settlements remain. He did not succeed. And, under the influence of our pleas he said, the President of the United States: I will go once more to the Egyptian president and try to convince him. And he went and he came back to me and said: I did my best. I used all the reasonings. I did not succeed. What I was told was: I cannot return home; my people will not accept; I will not be able to save the negotiations; I will not be able to sign any agreement; things you can call by all the names in the world, which I do not justify, but that was the judgment of the U.S. President after a second attempt to convince the Egyptian president about these settlements.

We consulted in our team. What should we do? Tell the U.S. President: If this is so, we agree to remove the settlements? Under no circumstances could we do this. First, because we were convinced that they should be left as they were. How could we deny our awareness? Second, because we also had to explain to our U.S. friends the difference between a presidential rule and a parliamentary rule. And we explained the approach with an "aphorism". [in English] saying: We are the slaves of the Knesset and not its rulers.

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ISRA

The Knesset authorized a certain cabinet program in which it was written that the settlements must remain as they were. We will not be able to move from this position; otherwise how could we say--when behind us was not only a cabinet decision, but also a Knesset decision, our parliament--that we are implementing its decisions?

But there was a second possibility--to tell President Carter: we are saying no to you, we will not agree to remove the settlements. And then the Camp David conference would have blown up the same day. No agreement would have been signed. The Egyptians would have returned to Cairo, we to Jerusalem, the Americans to Washington and I would have been a prime minister reporting to you. My dear and respected friends and rivals, in my heart of hearts, in my brain, in my conscience, with all my soul I knew if the Camp David conference were to blow up thus, the State of Israel would not stand up before it. Not in the United States; not in Europe; not before the Jews of the United States; not before the Jews of other countries; it would not stand up. It would all collapse. I know how to stand up to pressure. I do not have anything to regret. Who remembers as you do the last 9 months, between March and last month. [as heard] In all Europe there was one paper, called L'AURORE, which from time to time wrote a good word. And in the whole of the United States there was one provincial paper which published a favorable article. All the world press in all the democratic countries, without mentioning the communist and other countries, attacks; accusation; an obstacle to peace; warmonger. And in the Israeli press as well--why should I tell about it, after all, we all read it--all of it, without exception.

We stood up to those 9 months, of possibly unprecedented pressure, both international and from within the country. I do not have to boast. When you believe in your position, you have to know how to stand up to pressure. And after that attempt, I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, had the Camp David conference agreed to everything and only blown up over the matter of the settlements, Israel could not have stood--the whole of Israel--faced with the world.

And today, sometimes there is no alternative but to declare surrender. This is my evaluation. This is security. This is my recognition without any doubts. And so it was a question of responsibility and I proposed to my two colleagues a third way; We would not say yes or no. We could not say either. The Knesset must be asked. We could not say no. The Camp David conference would blow up over that. We had a third way. We would announce that we would go to the Knesset and it would decide, because it had decided in favor [of talks] and now it must decide which way to go.

And then, at Camp David, the idea of free voting was born. It was there, at Camp David, that the idea of separating the voting was born. Free voting. Everyone according to his conscience. First we will vote on the two agreements. I had no doubt that the decisive majority of the Knesset would raise its hand in favor and afterward, separately, we would vote on the problem of the settlements, everyone according to his conscience, and the Knesset's decision would be carried out. And I said to the U.S. President: "either way" [in English] we will rely on the Knesset and you must note down that if the Knesset decides to hold onto the settlements, they will be held onto, whatever happens. For we accept the verdict of the Knesset. That is the actual story of Camp David.

There is a small addendum. On our way to President Carter, I said to my friend, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan: I have another idea. I will tell President Carter that in order not to leave the impression that I am trying to influence the members of Knesset, I will not even take part in the debate. The foreign minister said to me: It is not befitting for you to inform the U.S. President that you will not take part in the debate. How can a prime minister not take part in such a debate? I took his advice.

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ISRAEL

And after we ended a night talk with President Carter and we told him, we cannot under any circumstances take on ourselves a commitment to disband the settlements, we must bring this matter to the Knesset for decision, we formulated the resolution three times. The first draft written by Mr Carter said that the Knesset would decide on the moving back of the settlements. We said no. That small, large word--no. Because had it been written that the Knesset would decide on the moving back of the settlements, we already would be hinting about the contents of the resolution. He proposed that we write "the future" [in English]. We said no to this, too. There is a hint in this, too, although a firmer one regarding the settlement. We agreed that he would write "the issue" [in English]--the problem would be decided by the Knesset. And after we had agreed on this, it was already midnight. The President asked us, he asked me a very interesting question, as follows: And maybe, Mr Prime Minister, you could not take part in that debate? Then Dayan and I nearly burst out laughing. He asked: Why are you laughing? So Dayan told him the story. That initiative came from the prime minister, but I told him: no, it is not possible, a prime minister must take part in this debate. And so it was. And had they accepted that idea in Israel, we would have had two votings this evening, one on the two agreements which were signed in the White House and the second, completely separate, on the settlements.

I returned home Friday afternoon and I also read back papers, particularly those of Friday, and I read and I was shocked. Sometimes in life such a case occurs to one of us. I do not understand how it comes. A sort of country fell on his head. Who knew? A complete surprise. And I read article after article, in nearly all the papers. Can it be? The same man. This is my day, the day of the prime minister. He wants to split the work into two. He will bring a peace proposal, but the second job, the not-so-clean job, of deciding on the removal of the settlements--that the members of Knesset will do for him, and especially the members of the opposition. It is not nice. How do the sabras put it: it is not fair. How do the Hebrews say: It is not honest. How could it be? I read all those articles and I said to myself, following the well-known verse from the Bible: Will I run away? And so, we consulted and we said: We will not run away from any campaign. We will not get out of any responsibility. You, if you want to separate between the two votings, we will accept it. We will write one draft resolution, and then came the question of what to write.

Now I would like to tell the members of the Knesset--on this side where I have opponents and those on the other side, where I have supporters, and on that side, where I have both supporters and opponents: I have named all, from the factions of the house--very simple things: What constitutes the cabinet's responsibility, and also what I had said at the time, you remember, MK Rabin, after Entebbe, what is the slightly larger responsibility of the prime minister. The choice is one of two.

During the previous session, someone interjected saying that this is a so-called ultimatum to the Knesset. This is not true, but I am explaining reality to you: if we today do not make a clear, distinct decision which is not questioned, no negotiations for peace will begin and everything agreed upon at Camp David, will be null and void. This is not what I presume or how I estimate; it is written; null and void. This is what is written. The negotiations will not start, this is the choice. There is no third possibility. This is no ultimatum, my friends, this is the explanation of reality. Each member of the Knesset must realize it and not have any illusions.

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I asked myself: Can you take the responsibility upon yourself and place it on your colleagues to make a decision today and not to decide about the settlements, or decide that they should remain, knowing that negotiations would not even begin, and all our toil of 12 days and 12 nights at Camp David would be in vain; would sink to a bottomless depth. Or, take the responsibility, place it on your shoulders, bear words of despise, bear words of vilification, both within this house and outside it, accept everything with love. This is the love without return, as has been a tradition with Israel. Take the responsibility and tell the Knesset and the nation: This is the most practical chance to reach a peace treaty for the first time in 30 years.

The peace treaty is almost already prepared, what has been agreed upon with respect to the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel is almost the entire peace treaty. One must only copy it, perhaps add several things, several clauses which normally do not cause differences, and we will have a peace treaty perhaps within the next 2 or 3 months. Everything I talked about previously is attainable. It lies in the palm of our hand. It is not November or December in Ismailia. It is not Leeds Castle. It is Camp David. We have in fact already attained the entire contents of a peace treaty.

How should you vote? How should you decide? To throw all this to the sea, and say that our settlements must remain?

I wish to tell you something about the settlements: How they are dear to me. I am not distinguishing between parties and settlements. Everyone knows that I love every settler. When I was a member of the National Unity cabinet, the MAPAM kibbutzim invited me to lecture there and heard, and saw, and knew what love from the heart is. Throughout my life you have not paid attention to this; perhaps you did not want to read.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky and also his disciples said that the pioneering enterprise in Israel is a great enterprise. In 1948, after we emerged from slavery to freedom, I told the members of the Irgun: The war is over, let us go and till our motherland, and thus the settlements were established. I love them all. All of them are entrenched deep in my heart. True, in the Rafah approaches there are three Betar Movement [established by Jabotinsky followers] settlements. There are young people, youth, and a relatively large number of them have come to me--as a member of the Betar Movement who joined the movement at the age of 16--and they, of course, say their thing: How it hurts, how the heart aches.

However, when I serve in the office of prime minister, it is my duty to think about the realities of another resolution, when I know that a peace treaty is within reach. Then, when I know this, may I--as a friend of theirs--think about their sons, lest they remain and the peace treaty slip from between our fingers, that same treaty which can be felt in the hand, and their sons might fall in battle if, God forbid, war breaks out? May a prime minister worry about the sons in these settlements or not? Even if they tell me: Do not worry, we are the fathers and the mothers and we worry about our children--even if they say so, still the prime minister is obligated to make sure that another war does not break out and there is not more slaughter and there are no more orphans and bereaved people, because this has been the aspiration throughout all these dozens of years of my service for this nation, not since 1967, but since 30 November 1947.

For 4 and 1/2 years we fought against the British rule, no Arab ever raised a hand against a Jew, total peace prevailed between Jews and Arabs. After the decision in the United Nations, the following days, there were the first battles, the first deaths, the first killed. Since then, there has been no man who wants peace more than I do. This is my confession. Like me, so all of you, but none more than I.

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N 15

ISRAEL

For 31 years, a man has been standing, dreaming about peace with the Arabs. He respects the Arabs, he extends a hand to them and calls on them to come and build this country together to be the glory of the world--and it can be the glory of the world--but let us stop the bloodshed.

Now, the chance has been placed in our hands, really, and the content has already been agreed upon. It only remains to sit for several days, or weeks, or a few months, in order to complete, to sign, and remove Egypt from the cycle of wars. Who knows, we may yet achieve symbolically what the verse says: And they remained quiet for 40 years.

Does a prime minister have such an obligation or not? When we hate bloodshed and want peace for us and the Arabs, when we want to live with them together in mutual respect, in freedom and justice as much as human nature allows. Therefore I had no choice. Perhaps the honorable abstainees have a choice, but I did not. I had to decide, together with my colleagues: these are the scales, here are the two issues, and I think that if we place the peace treaty on this side and on this side we put the decision concerning the settlements, the scales--according to the laws of morality in which I believe--will be here. [gestures to show movement of scales] There is no other way, with all the pain and the vilifications and the crying. There is no other way, this I believe and I shall continue to believe in this to my last day: this is the right choice for the people of Israel, including those living in the Rafah approaches--it was the right choice.

But, of course, there are people who deceive.

This decision is not to be carried out in 1 day, or in 1 month. In our resolution we said that the period should be determined in an agreement between the two parties. After we sign a peace treaty, within 3 to 9 months we, together with our forces, must withdraw to the Ra's Muhammad-Al'Arish line, which should remain for 2 years. We still have time to think about everything and to do everything. However, one thing must be clear: this is a crucial decision, and we accept it, we shall not deceive anyone. If the Knesset decides, its decision will be carried out. But in order.

Ariel Sharon took upon himself to handle the resettling of the people--if they want--when the time comes. We shall deal with each and every family, no family will be neglected--everything according to its wish; nothing will be forced on them by means of any force or decree. Rather, each family will be dealt with, until the problem is solved, when the time comes.

Now I have explained to you, ladies and gentlemen, the choice we faced. You can either accept it or not. But one thing I have a right to ask you: Have you understood? Is what I said clear? There is no shrinking here, no shirking of responsibility. There is here a full loading of the responsibility on the shoulders, and you shall decide.

Now I should like to address this part of the house specifically. You shall decide and vote as you wish, as I told you during the faction session. There are those among you who wish to oppose, and here, too, there are those who wish to abstain and their speaker was my dear friend Yehuda Ben Me'ir. He is a great orator, really a kind of Demosthenes at the Knesset. [laughter] No, really, I truly think so. He is a great orator. He stood on this podium. First he held his right hand up and said: With this hand I must vote in favor of removing the settlements, and I cannot--under any circumstances--do so.

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Then he raised his left hand: With this hand I must vote against peace, and I can in no way do so. Therefore I am abstaining: Then I asked him: Suppose you persuade all the members of the Knesset, then how would the Knesset decide? Then he said that the people would accept any decision made by the Knesset. How would they accept it?

[Unidentified MK] But they have been doing so all these years, Mr Prime Minister, it is a profession.

[Begin] I ask you, it is too late--or early--to stop my words with interjections.

Then the foreign minister said something very nice which he will allow me to quote. After Yehuda Ben Me'ir's speech he said: The righteous should live by his abstention. [laughter] I have also saved the world, because I quoted something and named its speaker. [reference is to the traditional saying that whoever quotes something in the name of the one who said it brings salvation upon the world.]

Abstention, my dear friends--I am addressing you in the presence of opponents--what is the meaning of abstention or voting against? This means that today, when you have four members in this movement of which I have been a member since, almost, the time when I was born, and in which I serve as the chairman, what is the meaning of the abstention? 'Ezer Weizman, Ari'el Sharon, Begin should do the job and decide on the removal of the settlements while every abstainee will say that he has saved his soul, has not lent a hand to this, it being a job he is not prepared to do and is prepared to let the others do, and me, too. Is this appropriate? Decide for yourselves, and after having heard what you heard from me--vote as you wish. [laughter]

I should like to say something, with all due respect, to the main opposition. I respect the opposition; I have always respected it. How could I not respect the opposition, opposition having almost turned into a profession of mine? I once heard a joke that a man was given a salary to call: Begin to power. He was asked: How much are you getting? He said: It is small, but it is for life. [laughter] I have heard even this about myself! Then I should not respect an opposition!

I wish to ask you, my honorable friends and opponents, how can it be--I have heard MK Yizhaq Rabin analyzing the agreement, and saying that there were difficult things, there are future risks, but the state of affairs is positive. This I understand. He says that despite the dangers and the difficulties I shall vote in favor. However, I heard another speech, made by Mr Shahal. He did not leave one stone in its place with respect to this plan. I beg pardon from the Knesset member...I did not mean this, I really didn't. I meant the actual stone. [laughter] He did not leave one stone in its place. At the end I did not even understand what he was saying. This is the truth. I did not understand his sentences. Later he finished by saying: So, I have no choice, and I will vote for.

God almighty, ladies and gentlemen, such a duplicity? When we have a peace treaty, the Israeli Army remains in Judaea and Samaria guarding the people of Israel, the Suez Canal is--this time definitely--open for Israeli flag ships, the Straits of Tiran are declared to be an international route open to all, there is a demilitarized zone in the Sinai and another zone where the military presence is thinned out, airfields will be built, a real peace treaty. [two Knesset members leave the hall] What happened to my two friends that all of a sudden they started walking about like this? [laughter]

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N 17

ISRAEL

As if this were a promenade, what is this? Why, this is the Knesset! All right. I am not criticizing. I understand, I understand, it is an important consultation. I understand.

Well, how can one talk with such duplicity? Then my friend Hillel, the former police minister, says: In this the prime minister is right. To place the peace treaty with Egypt in the dust and bury it many meters down and then say that he is voting in favor of it-- this is impossible, it is illogical. I do not wish to say that it is dishonest. You shall vote as you wish. But, how can one do this?

I have no special word for you, gentlemen of the opposition, regarding an idea which you have borne all these 11 years, and it is only a congenial duty to tell you about this, not a political one--I get no political benefit from this. I have sat with President Carter and with President as-Sadat in a pretty room in a cabin--I would like to sit with every Jew in Eretz Yisra'el in such a cabin, but this is what it is called--and by chance, incidentally, and not from me, came the words: Territorial compromise. You could have heard a lion's roar coming out of President as-Sadat's mouth: Never! After the Leeds Castle conference, when the Egyptian foreign minister told the Israeli foreign minister: Of course not, of course not. The foreign minister's superior came and said--I cannot repeat through the microphones in any way the tone, because it was a cry out to heaven, but I am repeating the words: Never, never!

[MK Yig'ial Allon] He also said never with respect to Jerusalem.

[Unidentified MK] Our prime minister could also have said these things in Jerusalem....

[Indistinct interjection from Allon]

[Unidentified MK] As-Sadat may also say never.

[Begin] Ok, Ok. My friend, why are you shouting? I can understand an interjection, but a shout? Do not shout; talk.

[Allon] [Words indistinct] a compromise [words indistinct] never. However, you left Shmuel David with a U.S. announcement that it does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

[Begin] Well, what do you want?

[Allon] I want [words indistinct].

[Begin] Do you want to speak, or do you want to interject? I beg your pardon. You were present in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee's session, and heard about a certain document. Well, then, in the previous session it was said that I was not revealing two certain documents because--I do not wish to end the sentence, but all the members of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee who heard all the documents know already that I must be very cautious in anticipation of the negotiations, and that if I had told about the two documents, I may have added a lot to the delegation, but then I may have endangered the negotiations. Is everything clear? Is this hint clear? The wise should suffice with a hint, and therefore I prefer to remain silent.

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N 18

You read the document, and we said on Sunday, 3 hours before the agreement was signed that we would not sign any agreement if that letter is not repealed. Later, when we received another letter, we replied with a letter which I have already read: Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, is indivisible.

So what do you want? I am merely telling the story. I do not wish to gain anything political. You shall hear this from President as-Sadat: Never, never--and draw the conclusion.

Dear friends, MK Allon proposed his own proposal. I would request him not to put it to the vote. No matter whether it gets a majority or a minority--we have a majority. I shall explain why. I want you to know, Yig'al, that if today there is no clear-cut decision, I have a fear in my heart--and I am speaking sincerely, not with certainty, but with a fear--that someone might use--in his opinion as a reason, and in our opinion as an excuse, and will not begin negotiations as stated in the document. Then, and this is my greatest fear--for we all want negotiations--it will be necessary to convene the Knesset for a special session to repeal that decision. Don't do this. Today, a clear-cut decision is required.

We are all sitting in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, it will always supervise the negotiations. If there is a proposal, we will consider it and we can raise it, we will gladly do so. However, tonight--I beg your pardon, this morning--we need a strictly defined decision one way or the other, this way or the other, so that we can announce that the negotiations could begin even next week, perhaps. [indistinct interjections]

I would request these benches not to interrupt my speech.

I wish to tell the Knesset that yesterday the Egyptians asked us to reinstate direct contact with us without delay, after they had been broken off. We were told by our American friends that the Egyptians wish to consider appointing a delegation to conduct the negotiations on the peace treaty perhaps even next week. I suggest that the members of the Knesset not wait, not put off, but do their duty as quickly as possible for reasons which I'd do better not to specify.

It is for this reason that I am asking the Knesset to make a clear-cut, well-defined decision today, just as the cabinet had proposed. When we decide on this and the negotiations on a peace treaty begin, we will look into every possibility in accordance with a decision of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. If you respond to my call, I shall thank you. However, if you do not--we shall decide. However, I am explaining to all the members of the Knesset--for heaven's sake--make only one clear decision today: you shall vote as you will, but a decision agreed upon by the majority of the Knesset will be made, and as of tomorrow, we shall start working so that the negotiations begin. And, God willing, also to reach the signing of the peace treaty.

[Allon] Mr Prime Minister, may I just...

[Begin] Yes, yes, please.

[Allon] In the additional article which our faction includes in the draft resolution there is no blurring of the Knesset decision concerning the approval of the Camp David agreements as they were presented by you here, on this podium, the day before yesterday.

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N 19

ISRAEL

[Begin] No.

[Allon] It has an importance, a moral importance and [word indistinct].

[Begin] I heard.

[Allon] It carries no violation of [words indistinct] because it does not depend on [words indistinct].

[Begin] Ok. Now you shall hear me. I have read over [as heard] draft resolution. There is an expression there: With all its components, and you interpret that the reference is also to the settlements. However, this is not written. [indistinct interjection by Peres] No, Shimon, not now. You must be recognized by me to speak while I'm talking, and I am not recognizing you. Right? You are asking permission, aren't you? So let me speak.

So, with all its components. While things were not stated specifically, and I am warning, because... [indistinct interjections] No, I cannot stop once again. I beg your pardon, they are helping me but by helping me they are disturbing me. Let me complete a sentence, Shim'on you shall speak afterward. I do not object. I am only asking that I be allowed to explain.

You put a general term: With all its components. It does not mean anything to the other party. What I wish to achieve today by a decision--and, yes, the entire responsibility is on the cabinet sitting here as well as on myself--is that it be clear that with respect to that demand we promised nothing at Camp David. We could, already tomorrow, begin negotiating on a peace treaty, so please do not blur, do not detract and do not add, just vote on a decision saying distinctly and with pain--though with a recognition of the truth--what we requested, and later we shall discuss in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee all the other aspects. Please, Mr Peres.

[Peres] First of all, I should like to add just one thing: First of all our draft says: as presented by the prime minister at the Knesset.

[Begin] These are still general terms, saying nothing.

[Peres] Excuse me. Secondly, we shall--at least a majority among us--vote for the proposal as presented by the prime minister.

[Begin] Very nice.

[Peres] We are not shirking. The national cause precedes the partisan calculation.

[Begin] Bravo.

[Peres] We said clearly and definitely, both in the party center and in the Knesset.

[Begin] Ok, Shim'on, Ok. So, I thank the opposition very much for being prepared to vote in favor of the cabinet's proposal. This would constitute a great degree of unity among the members of the house. This is a big night in Israel, and I thank you, indeed. But I ask, and I say again, Shim'on: Dayan, Ezer and I were at Camp David; the three of us will testify--they are sitting here--that if things are not clear-cut, there is all the fear that the negotiations could not begin. Therefore, let us accept our draft resolution, and I assure you that with respect to the last sentence of yours, we shall discuss it in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. What more can one promise?

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ISRAEL

I have finished. [indistinct interjections] I shall reply no more because I must end my speech because the time is already past 0300, and believe me, Shoshana, Shoshana, I would like to start resting, the time is 0300 it is enough.

Mr Speaker, I would now like to say--following that expression of confession from the heart--the nation is undergoing labor pains. True, every great thing is born through pain. The greatest miracle in the universe, human childbirth, comes with pain. Here we are talking about the greatest shift in the Middle East and the possibility of signing a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. I am not surprised by the pains, I am not complaining about the demonstrations--but only that they should not be carried out at night because my neighbors are suffering, for heaven's sake, and their children, and one can demonstrate in front of the prime minister's office and not come to his private residence and make up all the children of the neighborhood at 0030, after midnight. I do not even want to define what such a demonstration is, but it is not good manners. These comrades study their Torah and know what it is to insult one's friend in public. Yet I have no complaints, everything is forgiven. Why? Because there are pains.

This peace is first of all born out of our blood. For this peace we have sacrificed 12,000 of our best of sons in five wars, war after war, slaughter after slaughter. We want to put an end to this. This is now the chance, this is the opportunity. If you ask me about certainty--no, I still do not know what difficulties we will encounter. Clearly this is the opportunity, this is the time and this is the chance.

We want to save our sons' lives, they are the love of our soul and our consolation. We do not want war to occur every 5 years. Can anyone be blamed for this? Someone who has even sacrificed and against whom demonstrations are held and is even called insulting names and is accused of using--what a terrible word--concessions? No. This is what I believe, because this is something in which we all believe and which we all want.

One-third of our nation has gone in one generation; last night we saw the last part. [Final episode of the Holocaust on Israeli television] Twelve thousand of the best sons--the holy and brave ones--tears, pains, sorrow--this is what we want to put an end to, and this is the time for it, and that is why it is such a great hour.

Therefore, Mr Speaker, I am addressing every Knesset member no matter which faction he belongs to: Let us unite around the chance for peace and accept the decision and begin the discussions. Perhaps, God willing, as early as next year--approaching soon after Rosh Hashana we could say: The year of peace has come. Peace to Israel.

MINISTER PAT SPEAKS TO YAMIT SETTLERS

TA281736Y Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 28 Sep 78 TA

[Text] Minister of Construction and Housing Gid'on Pat, has said that there was no reference to an evacuation of Yamit until the 3d year after the peace agreement is signed. In that year there will be a discussion on the removal of the settlements and afterward the cabinet will put into operation a project for the resettlement of the inhabitants who agree to join the program. Minister Pat made these remarks at a press conference he called today in Yamit.