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(Revised 10 Sept 1946)

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## TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, JAMES FORRESTAL BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1947

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What I say in this statement on the bill to unify and integrate our departments for national security is based on two main premises:

First, there is a need, apparent during and since the war, for the planned integration of all the elements, energies and forces in our nation which have to be drawn upon to wage successful war. In these categories come not merely the Army and Navy and the State Department but industry, labor, transportation, civilian economy, and not least important, a study of raw materials and stock-piling of those basic materials which in wartime have to be imported in greatly increased quantities.

Second, nothing in any plan for the unification or consolidation of the purely military elements of our national security system should destroy the morale and autonomy of the Navy and its components, including particularly the Fleet Marine Forces and naval aviation. The identity of the Naval Service, with all of the considerations of morale and corps spirit involved, must be preserved.

The character of modern war is global and the Navy's point of view is essential in the conduct of a global war. I believe that had the status of the Navy in the war recently ended not been that of an equal partner, it is probable that the Pacific operations would have continued long beyond August 14, 1945. Naval insistence that the Pacific War be vigorously waged concurrently with the struggle in Europe enabled the United States and her allies to compel the surrender of Japan within three and a half months after the fall of Germany.

Having stated these premises I will proceed with discussion of the bill now before you.

Both the War and Navy Departments, after the end of World War II, recognized the need for bringing our security organization into consonance with the demands of our international position and of modern warfare. Differences dealt not with the ultimate objective but as to the method of achieving it.

Those differences have been resolved. The War and Navy Departments are in agreement that the bill before you, considered in its entirety, is a sound and workable accommodation between three points of view:

One, of the Army -- that there should be a single department in which the three services -- Air, Navy and Ground Forces -- should be diffisions or branches:

Two, of the Air Forces -- that they were entitled to be placed on a parity with the other two older services;