

S E C R E T

CONTACT REPORT

□ with UTILITY and @Holm
UTILITY's office
1200 hours on 9 April 1965

1. I seized the opportunity of a prospective visit by □ to seek a meeting with UTILITY. I passed him our Yellow No. 32057. This dealt with his previous remarks to me about Greece.

2. After reading the Yellow, he said that his information from Greece was "reliable". He said the forecast, which I mentioned, was his own. He did not mean to imply that the situation was going to fall apart in Greece. He noted Headquarters admonition about false information being sold and commented that he thought he knew who might be selling it. Although it was not all that precise, I inferred from his remarks that this specific report of Soviet "views" (as he put it this time) on the situation in Greece had not come from a source in Greece, but elsewhere. He volunteered to give us an appraisal of the Greek situation if we sought it. I said I thought there was no need for this. I merely wished to get any single reports he might have available if that was what he meant. He referred again to the Soviet build-up in Cyprus and said he might differ from some of our people in the threat around the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

3. I then passed him a written reminder of the possible visit of □. He thought he might be able to change his plans to meet two visitors in Munich on that day. However, Holm interrupted to comment, "no, no, better not, those are very important meetings". I then brought up the matter of the Berlin crisis reporting. (While waiting for UTILITY, I had been called into Holm's office to sit awhile. I had mentioned the reporting situation to Holm as well.)

4. UTILITY gave me a perfect opening in that as the conversation evolved, he commented that his organization had just received a compliment from the government on their Berlin reporting. This gave me the handy opening to say that I wish that in the future they would make some of their views on this critical area available to us. This somewhat surprised UTILITY; his eyes bugged out and he headed for the inter-com to call @Kuehne. I stopped him with a gesture saying I was not objecting, I was just reflecting my own general views on the subject. Holm chimed in with yes, yes, we have just discussed this. I went on, however, to tell UTILITY that we naturally considered ourselves very engaged in the Berlin situation, and were naturally interested in their forecasts on the situation. I said that Kuehne had been very good about the situation. He had stopped, he told us, a number of low-level alarmist reports from being disseminated. I did, however, mention that a teletype information report to Bonn was casually sent to us via pouch. UTILITY reached for a paper on the Berlin situation and started reading from it. It

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forecast the situation and then backed up the forecast with single reports bearing on the Berlin crisis. One of them was dated January; some others, February; still others, March. I said I thought we had not had any of these. UTILITY said sometimes reports come to him and without the formal participation of the Evaluations staff, are sent directly off to Bonn (implying that this might have accounted for us not getting them). Holm corrected UTILITY to the effect that in this crisis the Evaluations staff had worked hand in glove with the operations people from the beginning. I made the point that we (i.e., [] had had a good discussion with Kuehne on the matter but only after the whole ruddy affair was half over.

5. I said I was in no sense coming over to gripe (which was exactly what I was doing) but merely took advantage of the meeting to mention our future wishes in the matter. Somewhat softening my general attitude, I commented that possibly we had objected to previous Berlin crisis reporting and the result was that, in this case, our faucet was turned off.

6. In any event, I think that the firm but gentle brace rendered to these gentlemen was worthwhile. I presume from comments made that UTILITY, at least, thought the stuff was coming through to our side. (He said quite casually at the beginning of the conversation, "but I'm sure our friends are getting all of this material".)

7. As agreed with [] by telephone, I confirmed to UTILITY and Holm that the inter-government conference was off. UTILITY said that was fine. He added that in writing up the government-to-government agreement, we had often been impatient with the Germans but there were reasons why delays were unavoidable on their side. In the final analysis, the agreement worked well. We should, at this time, also show patience because the reasons for not meeting were sound. I said we fully understood the nuances of the situation.

Typed: 12 April 1965

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