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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Mr. Helms

10 Jan 1947

Re: Mr. Helms' current "operations" in Munich and Switzerland.

A. As a follow up to my memorandum to you of 6 January on the subject of our Munich detachment, I am giving you below the date or dates of the major so-called operations now being conducted by that office.

1. WILK

Is a White Russian who, after the Russian Revolution, engaged in some sabotage activities against the Soviets in Finland, went to Berlin in the late 20's, was expelled from France in 1936 and thereafter worked in Germany as a journalist until 1944. He joined the "WILK" movement and was active in LIA intelligence. His first offer to us concerned his willingness to engage in collaboration between French and Soviet intelligence services in the French occupation zone of Germany. He has given us lists of possible sub-agents who might work with him, none of whom seem to promise very much either in the way of active intelligence, intelligence experience, or integrity. He has also given us a considerable amount of information on other White Russians which is of a rather low-level caliber. At about one time disseminated a report on Soviet intelligence activities in the French Zone (LX-G) based on information supplied by WILK, which certainly adds to previous information but does not contribute anything startling to our knowledge of Soviet techniques.

Another plan of WILK's was to penetrate for us the French L.I. However, in view of his own statement that he has very few contacts there, I cannot see that the prospects of his being successful in this regard are very good.

Sometime last summer WILK established contact with WILK, a White Russian organization formerly active in France, and with its "Most Secret Council" which may be considered the intelligence arm of this organization. One of the more dramatic episodes in this connection was the plan of one S. L. L., a prominent member of the "Most Secret Council" to dispatch agents to Soviet Russia for the collection of positive and CN intelligence. We were supposed to be helpful in the execution of this plan by supplying travelling papers, operational supplies, etc. As of this date nothing concrete has happened and, although there was a report that either one or 3 men were to be dispatched at the end of August, this has not been confirmed and no further reports on this operation have been received.

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The latest project in connection with this was a plan which may have been carried out in the meantime although I have seen no reports to that effect) to send him to Berlin under cover of a journalistic assignment to spend about three or four weeks there in order to give us a complete report on the various dissident White Russian and other Slavic groups in Berlin and their leaders. This plan was drawn up in a rather dramatic fashion -- our Berlin office being authorized to give him a lethal tablet at his request in case he were captured by the G.P. The purpose of this report was to give us good leads for contacts among such dissident groups in Berlin for the procurement of intelligence information. Since Berlin seems to be doing a very excellent job in recording the type of information on the Soviets that we want, I think it would be most unfortunate to get them also off on the path of chasing White Russians. I sent a call to that effect to all the several echelons, discouraging their launching any White Russian operations.

## 2. CLAM

member of various anti-border patrols for about 14 years, became disaffected with the Soviet system and after having been captured by the Germans during the war went over to the West. CLAM group where eventually he was put in charge of their operations. He also has submitted a grand plan for sending agents into Soviet Russia for the collection of positive intelligence information. CLAM went a step after initial contact was made with him, no concrete plan has been submitted.

CLAM reported to us on the activities of a certain group which is referred to as the Bakh group, which allegedly sends agents back and forth from the French zone of Germany into the Ukraine. He is said to periodically consult with the Soviets. Obviously a man who can give such vital counsel must know a great deal about intricate local laws and regulations; yet in answer to a question I recently raised with him as to whether CLAM had been thoroughly debriefed on his knowledge of the Bakh group I received the reply that this had not yet been done but that it was planned to send him to Oberursel for a time for a thorough interrogation. This incidentally brings up another problem and that is that I certainly see no reason why we should turn over to Oberursel's men who in the opinion of our mission in Germany does know a great deal about the Bakh group. We have several experienced interrogators on our staff and it would seem better policy to do the interrogating ourselves and then pass any vital information on to CIP. The

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other way the information becomes the property of CIA and they pass it on to us. Actually I am not at all certain that CIAM really is an expert on the KGB since border police is a rather low echelon in the KGB hierarchy.

It would take up too much of your time to go into a great many details as to items of information supplied by CIAM which have not seem ever to have been checked by AMCON as to their veracity. A good example, however, is the statement made by him that any anti-Communist intellectual could be sent to Turkey by the Turkish Registration Commission stationed in the American zone. In answer to my inquiry I was informed that this statement had not been checked and no details had been asked for. Yet if the statement made by CIAM were true it would certainly be extremely interesting to find out what the purpose of the Turkish Government is in letting anti-Communists come into their country in droves.

Any number of mostly unfeasible suggestions have been made by CIAM such as the setting up of screening centers, supplying agents with deception material, etc. The term "deception material" is being thrown around rather loosely by Munich and it might be worthwhile to explain to them that the passing of deception material is an extremely complicated and dangerous procedure which requires cooperation and approval from other government agencies. In order to make up deception material the originator has to be extremely well informed on political and military conditions in his and adjacent areas, which prerequisite I think does not apply to our representatives in Munich.

### 3. DUBOV

A highly productive White Russian in his late 30's who was active in the KGB movement and is said to have been the liaison man between Vlasov and Himmler. He was apparently principally interested in political developments and not in intelligence and has written innumerable pages on the unsuccessful endeavors of the Vlasov people to get on the side of the Allies -- this obviously after it was quite clear that Germany had lost the war, namely in early 1945. In addition he has supplied quite a lot of biographical information on other White Russians, one item of which is to the effect that CIAM, mentioned above, is one of the most unreliable characters in the White Russian organization, NWSP.

The single item which was of possible interest in his reports concerns a former Red Army officer who has been engaged in anti-Soviet activities since 1933 and is said to have established clandestine intelligence chains into Soviet Russia from Latvia, as well as to have been parachuted behind Soviet lines on two or three occasions during the war.

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This report on KLAY EZ was received in October but the idea of utilizing or at least debriefing him seems never to have been followed up.

B. SWITZERLAND

There is not very much to be said for current CE operations in Switzerland. We get a mass of information on various dissident Yugoslav groups which is probably of interest to the State Department but which has so far not gotten us any nearer the goal of finding out what the Russians are doing in Switzerland. We do have one Russian agent, a man by the name of SOKOLINE, who is connected with Soviet economic intelligence in Geneva and about whose present loyalty to the Soviet government there has been some question. He receives \$200 a month from our organization but to my knowledge at least has produced practically nothing. A few weeks ago we received a cable conveying the information, received from him, that there were rumors that in case of STALIN's exit a likely successor to him would be BERIANOV. The week we received this cable TIME MAGAZINE had BERIANOV's picture on the cover page and a three-page article on the likelihood of his becoming the most important figure in Soviet Russia in case STALIN resigned. Unless SOKOLINE has produced intelligence which I am not aware of, it seems to me that either \$200 is too much for information which you can get for 20¢ or he will have to be properly briefed and guided by our representatives in order to give us what we are after.

The whole Ukrainian problem is being dealt with by SPD-S. I have repeatedly discussed our Ukrainian operations with them and concur wholeheartedly in the recommendations they are going to make.

CC: ( )

Mr. Rositzke

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