

POUCH 70

SECRET

2-196

17 December 1945

*Herman Intelligence Service*

TO: SAINT (all stations)

FROM: SAINT, London

SUBJECT: Reports by Generalmajor LAHOUSEN: *Domin*  
"CANARIS SECRET ORGANIZATION, Part I";  
"CANARIS SECRET ORGANIZATION, Part II";  
"SIDELIGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 20TH OF JULY  
(pp. 1-7) and continuation of "CANARIS SECRET  
ORGANIZATION" (pp. 8-24).

1. The originals of the enclosed reports were brought to us in October by the case officer in charge of LAHOUSEN, former head of Abwehr II. Since neither the field nor the War Room was in a position to process them, and since they were obviously very important, we have translated them in this office. Several other reports by LAHOUSEN on matters connected with the Abwehr have also been translated, but are being given limited distribution because of their smaller general interest.

2. In writing these reports, LAHOUSEN was assisted by *Kurt* Operattleutnant FECHNER of Leitstelle II Suedost, who collaborated with LAHOUSEN almost from the beginning of the "counteractivity" ordered by CANARIS in Abwehr II.

3. The reports have been left in the rambling personal style in which LAHOUSEN wrote them. Some of their content appeared in the recent testimony of LAHOUSEN at the Nuernberg war crimes trial.

4. Their importance lies in the evidence that the Abwehr was not weak and ineffective merely because of corruption, defeatism, personal politics, and superannuation, but that even before the war, it was a principal center of opposition to the Nazi Regime, with the aim of sabotaging a German victory. On this basis, our views of the GIS, and specifically of the failures and inertia of the Abwehr need serious revision.

5. It would not be unnatural if LAHOUSEN were building up the roles of CANARIS, the Abwehr, and himself into something more definite and more active than they were really. It should also be noted that of the other witnesses who might confirm or complete his story, many are dead; the fates of *Adolf* ABSHAGEN, BENTIVEGNI, Kaptlt. *Adolf* FETZER, and *Wilhelm* PIECKENBROCK are unknown; and reports from the interrogation of Oberst *Karl Heinz* Friedrich RUDOLPH have so far not given any information on this subject.

6. On the other hand, nothing inherently improbable comes into LAHOUSEN's account. Moreover, two important witnesses, besides FECHNER, do confirm his story. One is *Frank Ercole* GISEVIUS, participant in the plans for the attack of 20 July 1944 on HITLER, and author of the best account we have of that putsch. The second is *Adolf* Genmr. von PFUEHLSTEIN, commander of the Brandenburg Division (of Abwehr II) from 1 February 1943 to 1 April 1944. Among other points, PFUEHLSTEIN states that he was appointed to the Brandenburg Division by CANARIS on the recommendation of OSTER, with the specific purpose of preparing the division to seize the western part of Berlin in the anti-Nazi putsch planned by CANARIS.

7. LAHOUSEN's statement that CANARIS and OSTER were hanged on 9 April 1945 is perhaps the only definite evidence we have of their deaths. A recently received report based on a statement of *Adolf* participants in the 20 July affair, however, states that when the Americans captured the camp where they were being investigated.

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8. In preparing the reports, we have omitted the chart referred to at the end of Part I, since it added little more than an index of names to the account in the text.

9. LAHOUSEN's "Raritaetenmappe", the "curiosity file" or "treasure portfolio" to which he repeatedly refers, may still be in existence, and a search for it has been instituted.

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REPORT BY GENERAL MAJOR LAHOUSEN

ON

~~CANARIS~~ SECRET ORGANIZATION

PART I

At the time of my entry on service in the OKW--May 1938--Gen. ~~Oberst BECK~~ revealed to me that my specially-favored assignment to the Abwehr had taken place on the basis of information given him by Admiral CANARIS in regard to my political attitude. He (BECK) in any case was very anxious for me to stay in the Abwehr. For the rest, I should receive from CANARIS exact instructions and directives as to how this service was to be carried out in the situation which at the time was extremely critical for Germany and Europe.

Shortly afterwards--I was at that time still assigned as Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff for training with Abwehr Abteilung I as I-H-Ost and deputy of the Abteilungschef (Obst.d.G. PIECKENBROCK)--CANARIS took me into his confidence, appealing to my anti-Nazi attitude, with which he was familiar, and unfolded to me his thoughts about the further development of the situation in Germany in the main as follows:

After the (unfortunately) smooth and all too easy occupation of Austria, HITLER was now resolved to attack Czechoslovakia and to ~~dismember it by opening the Sudeten~~ German question. This would mean a European war, since the Western Powers and the USSR would by no means accept this new provocation.

Therefore all these forces that had still kept a clear view for actualities must try to prevent this war, which would be a misfortune for Germany and all Europe.

In this sense, he was imparting to me the following secret directions for the handling of incoming Abwehr I material on Czechoslovakia.

Emphasis and overvaluation of all those reports and pieces of information that concerned the strength of the Czechoslovak fortification, the resolute will to defence of the Czech people and its government, as well as the probability of intervention by the Western Powers and the Soviet Union (Russian air force), in order in this way to counteract the optimistically colored, editorializing reports (Zweckberichterstattung) based on pure Nazi ideology of the SD and similar party agencies.

As persons in his confidence, who supported him actively or passively in his efforts toward this end, CANARIS gave me the following names:

~~Oberst OSTER~~ --at that time, I think, Abw III

~~Oberstlt. d.G. GROSSKURTH~~ --Chef Abw II

~~Oberst Graf MARCINI-REDWITZ~~ --Head, Ast Vienna *Rudolf*

Oberst d.G. PIECKENBROCK - Chef Abw I

*Karl*  
~~Hptm. Dr. FIEDLER~~ - Adjutant in Abw II

At the same time, CANARIS warned me against ~~Oberst d.G. BAMLER~~ *Rudolf* (who is now with SEYDLITZ), at that time Chef Abw III, and some other persons, whose names I can no longer recall.

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In this confidential discussion, I also received from CANARIS directions not to recommend for appointment to the Zentrale (OKW) or for high positions in the Abwehr any Austrian officers of National Socialist tendencies.

In executing this secret instruction, <sup>Hans(?)</sup> I recommend to PIEKENBROCK the Austrian Major ~~MELZER von ORIENBURG~~ (formerly in the Information Section of the Austrian Defence Ministry) and Oberst Graf MAROGNA, who then (1938/39) was already head of 1st Vienna, (and) the Austrian Major FECHNER, to be taken into the Abwehr.

Major MELZER-ORIENBURG was known to me from my services in the Austrian Information Section as an officer not, to be sure, outstanding intellectually, but absolutely reliable in his anti-Nazi attitude. He is married to a Swede; his brother died in a Nazi prison in Vienna. I do not know how far, or whether, MELZER was used or could be used in the frame of the "counteractivity" in Abw I.

As Oberst i.G. ~~HANSEN~~ <sup>Georg</sup> told me in 1943, MELZER was after all too inflexible mentally for this ticklish job, and was released by HANSEN from the Abwehr to a Wehrbezirkkommando.

Major FECHNER--a friend of mine from youth, was, with some other Austrian officers, on the search list that was accessible to me at the time of the German entry into Vienna. (Witness for this is ~~Major PANESCH~~, whose father, a former General in the old Austrian Army, over 70 years old, I was able with the aid of MAROGNA to liberate from the Nazi prison in Vienna.)

With the support of MAROGNA, I succeeded in removing the names of these officers--including FECHNER--on the quiet from the list, and thus to protect FECHNER against his immediately threatened arrest.

Further, immediately after my arrival in Berlin I caused the destruction of the dossier that contained politically dangerous material on FECHNER.

FECHNER, who in the meantime had been dismissed from the army for political and racial reasons and was exposed to the harshest political persecutions, turned to me for help in 1939, since he had to fear arrest on the basis of further accusations that had been brought against him.

In order to get him away from the threatening action of the Gestapo, I had only the possibility of taking him on into the Abwehr. At that time, you see, membership in the Wehrmacht still offered a relative protection against the persecutions of the Gestapo, the SD, and other party agencies.

But since FECHNER was not only under heavy suspicion politically because of his sharply anti-Nazi attitude, but furthermore was regarded as a first-degree "mixed-breed" under the Nuremberg laws, I had first to get, as coverage for myself, the consent of CANARIS.

CANARIS declared himself in accord with the proposed assignment of FECHNER, even for strictly confidential business, after my thorough description of FECHNER and his absolute reliability and suitability--although this assignment completely ran counter to the existing legal rules.

Oberst MAROGNA, the absolutely reliable head of 1st Vienna, a friend of mine, was requested to support FECHNER and to cover him as far as possible against future interference by the Gestapo.

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On my suggestion, CANARIS succeeded in preventing the dragging-away of FECHNER's father, which had been planned--an 80 year old Colonel in the old Austrian Army, who had been a Catholic all his life and suddenly was a "non-ryan" according to the Nuernberg laws.

After the departure of the former Chief of Abwehr Abteilung II, Oberstlt. d.G. GROSSKURTH, I took over the section at the beginning of 1939 after a long discussion with CANARIS. I am reporting in my autobiography on the motives that induced me to accept this command from CANARIS even as spiritual responsibility.

In the basic discussion with CANARIS before I took over the section, I received "open" instructions, intended publicly, and "secret directions".

The "open" orders to me concerning the conduct of Abwehr Abt II were:

1) Limitations to purely military tasks and absolute non-participation in political actions.

2) Sharpest rejection of all methods that were customary with the SD and the Gestapo. The struggle is to be carried on within the boundaries that have been maintained in past and present by all participants in the war, even in this special sphere.

3) No collaboration with SD and Gestapo. These basic "open" instructions were expressed and repeated by CANARIS and myself at every internal discussion, Abwehr II meetings, or--in much sharper and more definite form--in case of individual enterprises of Nazi or especially "activistic" officers.

These must be known to every officer of my former section.

CANARIS informed me of the following basic instructions for the "secret tasks";

With the successful pulling-in of Czechoslovakia into the sphere of power of the Third Reich--a process to which the last responsible Chief of the German General Staff, Gen. Oberst BECK, was sacrificed because of his hostile attitude--the way to war with Poland has been opened for HITLER and his clique of criminals.

I (CANARIS) am convinced that the other great Powers will not be caught this time by the "political sleight of hand tricks of this pathological liar". War means a catastrophe far greater and beyond comprehension for Germany and all mankind would be the victory of this Nazi system.

This must be prevented under all circumstances!"

With reference to the activity of my section, I received the following confidential tasks:

1) Formation of a secret organization within Abwehr Abt II and the Brandenburg Regiment, with the purpose of embodying the anti-Nazi forces and preparing them for all illegal acts that might be possible in the future against the system.

2) Gradual but systematic removal of fanatical Nazis or SD spies from the section.

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3) Passive conduct of Abwehr II work, with external show of apparent very great activity.

4) Failure to carry out enterprises whose execution can be avoided in any way.

Absolute prevention or failure to follow orders for kidnapping, assassination, poisoning, or similar actions related to the methods of the SD.

(With the beginning of the Russian Campaign, Points 3 and 4 of these confidential tasks were considerably loosened, and limited in their original version to the Western Powers. Against the Soviet Union I received a free hand in my work--with the exception of prevention, fully valid for this combat too, of atrocities, SD methods, etc. This corresponded to CANARIS' anti-Bolshevist attitude.

5) In collaboration with military representatives of Allied or neutral states, closest alliance with the anti-Fascist elements, with absolute non-contact, as far as possible, with any Fascist organizations (Phalange, Arrow Cross, Iron Guard, Fascists, etc.).

6) Current instruction of these anti-Fascist personalities of allied or neutral countries on the actual military and political situation of Germany, as a counterweight against the consciously deceptive and colored information of the Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, the Attache Abteilung, and other official German military and political offices.

Protection of these personalities against SD, NSDAP, and Foreign Office.

7) Extensive alleviation of the hardships created by the brutalities of the Nazi Regime, as far as the possibility for this is given in the sphere of influence of the section.

I recognized in this secret commission from CANARIS the possibility of making an active contribution toward freeing my home AUSTRIA from the Nazi terror and from Prussian-German militarism, and from this moment I placed myself completely at the disposal of CANARIS and his circle.

After I had gathered in my section and in the further area of my sphere of activity confidantes and like-minded people, and in part with their aid had removed from the section "activists" Nazi-adherents and officers who were suspected as SD agents (like Reg. Rat Dr. PETZOLD, Rittmeister SPIESS, Hptm. WEINERT, Hptm. Dr. HIPPEL, Hptm. BRUDOLFF, Major SEBERT and others), I began with the counteractivity that had been entrusted to me.

Hans  
Since my immediate homeland lay close to my Austrian heart, I entrusted FECHNER, the friend of my youth, with the construction and the direction of a secret organization of similar tendency for Austria and the Southeast.

From 1939 I initiated FECHNER--alone among the officers of this organization--completely into all plans. He alone knew also all my collaborators and confidantes, so that in case of my death he would have been able to maintain the continuity of the counteractivity. CANARIS and OSTER also knew this.

Already in 1940 I informed FECHNER of my collaboration with the group of "20 July", and gave him the necessary instructions for himself.

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On the activity of the "Secret Organization CAMRIS" and the successes attained in its counteractivity I am making a separate report.

An outline of the CAMRIS Organization, supplemented by my cross-connexion to General OSTER and other persons, is attached to this report.

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CANARIS SECRET ORGANIZATION

Part II

The meaning of the "confidential mission" (Part I), given to me by CANARIS, was, as he himself often pointed out, to co-operate in sabotaging a German victory. It was the last, desperate result of his efforts to prevent this second world war--efforts which came from his understanding of the aims and methods of HITLER and his creatures, from his exact knowledge of the mentality of the Anglo-American world, and from his clear and correct judgment of the industrial and armament potentialities of these countries.

CANARIS had already begun in 1937 to make exact notes of his official activities, and to collect all documents concerned with the development of the political and military-political situation in Germany, in order, as he often explained it to me and others who felt the same way, to show sometime to the world and to the German people, how this war was mischievously let loose (vom Zaune gebrochen) in a criminally dilettante fashion, and with immeasurable over-self confidence. ("The world should know how guilty these people were"- an often repeated sentence of CANARIS').

This diary, to which I as a person in whom he had special confidence contributed, seems unfortunately to have fallen into the hands of the Gestapo (SD).

CANARIS was hanged, after horrible torture, on April 9, 1945. Through this, in my opinion, the most important witness and extensive source of the most material for the prosecution of war crimes have been lost.

Immediately after taking over Abwehr Abt. II, i.e. in early 1939, I began to organize the counteractivity, in accordance with the meaning of the "confidential mission" given me by CANARIS.

As an Austrian, in other words as an officer considered as salvage (Beute-offizier), who had been pushed ahead of a whole string of much older officers, mosting stemming from imperial, Prussian-German circles, I had to go to work with the greatest of care.

My work was made easier through the fact, that, at that time the Abwehr was a collecting pool for all anti-Nazi forces.

Even though these forces had been enlarged mostly through the Rightist German Opposition parties and fighting corps (Stahlhelm, National Free Corps, National Youth groups etc.) yet there were representatives also of liberal tendencies, of all religious beliefs, and spiritual tendencies, German Separatists and Austrians everywhere, and even working actively.

Here I must point out a fundamental difference between the development of the career of an Abwehr officer and that of the Gestapo or the SD official,

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While the Abwehr officer, through his belonging to the army was separate from the party, cut off from Nazi ideology, and protected from them; proof of especially strong and fanatical National Socialist activity was a self-understood condition to becoming an SD or Gestapo official. They (the Gestapo and SD) were specifically National Socialist Orders.

The Abwehr officer might be a National Socialist also. Gestapo and SD must be proven Nazis, and were the uninhibited and unthinking executors of public and secret orders, which were signed with the names HIMMLER, HEYDRICH and KALTENBRUNNER.

My predecessor, Obstlt. d. G. GROSSKURTH, a true Prussian, who, however, as the son of a hard-pressed Protestant clergyman, was strongly against the HITLER system and a trusted friend of CANARIS, as well as a friend of OSTER, at that time Oberst, handed on to me his adjutant, Captain Lr. FIEDLER, and his secretary, Frl. Heddy VOIGT, whom he considered absolutely trustworthy.

After the separation of FIEDLER from the Abteilung (mid-1939) I appointed Captain (in the Reserve) ABSHAGEN, who had been recommended to me by FIEDLER and OSTER, as my adjutant and as leader of the difecting (Chef) group.

ABSHAGEN and my secretary VOIGT were my, and my successor's, Obstlt. KREYTAG VON LOBINGHOVEN's most responsible colleagues in the Abteilung in Berlin. *Wessel*

ABSHAGEN was imprisoned by the Gestapo for 6 months after the 20th July, 1944. After his release he was expelled from the army.

For Austria and for the Southeast I got my old childhood friend Major FECHNER (cf. Part I, p.3) and placed him in Aust Vienna (Head, General Count M.ROGNA. \*20.7.44).

I had intended FECHNER as a supporting figure and later as leader of the secret organisation planned for Austria and the Southeast.

FECHNER had for many years been an official of the Austrian military organisation called the "Wehrbund" which was directed against the Nazis.

Because of the terrible persecutions which he and his parents had been subjected to, he put himself with fanatical zeal to the tasks assigned to him.

Under his direction, in fact, the existing organisation in the Southeast received the greatest impetus and obtained the best results.

*Friedrich Wilhelm*  
With the setting up of the Brandenburg Regiment in 1940, Major HEINZ was installed (on the suggestion of CANARIS and OSTER) as Battalion Commander in this outfit.

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HEINZ received special missions from CANARIS and OSTER about which I was gradually though not altogether, informed.

All the members of this secret organisation mentioned so far communicated with other trustworthy persons, whose names however were only partly known to me, and whom I can only partly remember.

Along with the acquisition of anti-Fascist forces went the purging of the Abteilung of Nazis, Activists, and "SD informers". That could only be achieved gradually. ABSHAGEN, to whom I entrusted the personnel administration of the Abteilung, carried out this secret task with great cleverness and with characteristic intelligence.

During my time as Kommando leader 1939-1943 the following officers were, in accordance with this policy, separated from the Abteilung:

Capt. Dr. HIPPEL. An E-Officer of long-standing, somewhat confused, very activistic adventurer. An old Southwest African, who already during the first world war had been in English captivity. No Nazi. Most recently was leader of the Arab legion in Tunis, and was taken prisoner by either the English or Americans.

Major (now General) BEBERT. An old E-Officer. Vain, limited and obstinate Nazi.

Reg. Rat. Dr. PETZOLD. SS member. Was suspected of acting for the SD.

Rittm. SPIES. Intellectually unimportant, but a convinced and fanatical Nazi. Suspected of working for the SD.

~~Capt. WIECK~~ 1939 West Breslau. Killed? Former Austrian officer. Illegal, fanatical Nazi, who was proud of his dynamiting operations in Austria. Removed by me from the Abwehr even before the French campaign.

Captain RUDLOFF. "Research Activist". Over-bearing Prussian. Was removed by me (I believe in 1940) but turned up later in Abw III in Africa, last in Tunis.

Capt. WEINERT. Formerly Austrian Officer. Student-German. SD type. Took part in hangings and torturings of the Russian civilian population in the East (interrogation methods of the SD) not by order of the military posts. Witnesses present. Is a War Criminal.

~~Major WITZEL~~ *Witzel* Limited, ambitious Nazi. Was in the Abteilung (I believe 1941/2) as Group Leader in the West. Was transferred to an Abw. II Kmdo in the East.

ABSHAGEN should be able to tell about other people, whom I can no longer remember.

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My deputy, ~~(General) STOLTZE~~ (Group leader East) had been active in the ~~Abwehr~~ for 13 years. He is a born Prussian (Typical Berlin philistine).

In the "counteractivity" I could use him only with limitations, and even then only with the greatest care. At times he was a heavy drawback for me. STOLTZE was a moderate Nazi, with links out to Prussian reactionaries.

Within the narrow limits of his Prussian mentality he intrigued against me as the Austrian who had been advanced ahead of him.

FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN, at my suggestion, got rid of him immediately when he came into his Kommando (middle of 1943).

General i.G. FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN (he shot himself on the 26 July, 1944), before being arrested by the SD, to whom I handed over the "Secret Organisation", after giving him full instructions, in complete detail, continued this policy of purging the Abteilung after my departure for the front.

(Captain ~~HUMMEL~~ <sup>Friedrich</sup> during my time Bearbeiter of Abt II in the KO Spain, who turned out to be a fanatical SD man under SKORZENY was, unfortunately, not recognized and removed in time.

With these introductory measures, described in the foregoing, the basis was given for the realization of the principle of "passive leadership" ordered by CANARIS, under a pretense of the greatest apparent activity.

While for me, the passive direction was made easy by the personnel policy, entered upon by CANARIS, and surely therefore knowingly held to by my Abteilung, the apparent activity could be supported especially by the success reports (written by ABSHAGEN) which were edited and arranged accordingly.

The personnel policy of CANARIS was usable for his secret plans.

His directions to me in this connection were as follows:

Anti-Nazi sentiments were to come before Specialist qualifications. The younger, intelligent and technically-qualified people were to be taken and placed in leading positions only when they could be used for our purposes. By and large, the old, experienced ("the good old Santa Clauses" as he expressed it) should be retained and allowed to continue their work. A few Nazis should be used as cover and protection against the RSHA.

I went very far in the passive direction of my Abteilung. This was strongly criticised by the Nazis and other more active elements in the Abteilung.

Obstlt RECHNER, my representative in the Secret Organization in the Abteilung can tell you more about this.

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The impression of "Apparent Activity" was achieved especially through the so-called "success reports".

Any other head of the OKW than KEITEL and any other military leadership would have recognised, and seen through, these, in themselves, "daring" exaggerations and falsifications. But in a system built on lies, self-deception and over-weening self-confidence, this part of the counteractivity cost the least effort of all.

To give only one example out of many, there must be mentioned the astronomical figures (3-500,000 tons) reported to the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab at their urgent demand, on ship sabotage in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This immensely angered the Navy, who, indeed, saw through the deceptions, but drew the wrong conclusions as to the motive which inspired them. Furthermore, the responsible Referent of the Abteilung, who had been placed in Rumania, Kpt. Lt. FEJZER was well-known in the Amt and the Abteilung for his dunderheadedness, and for his ambitions quite other than for a successful career in sabotage ("A faithful, good sailor, but with a latrine outlook!" to quote CANRIS, who recommended him to me as the best qualified for carrying out this task).

I come now to a description of the actual counteractivity. It meant neglecting enterprises which had been ordered, and the non-execution of any orders which involved atrocities. Finally, all forms of sabotage of the war effort.

#### WESTERN EUROPE

In France, during the time of my leadership of the Kommando, Group II of 1st Paris (Chief, General RUECK, arrested 20.7.44) was under the direction of (Lieutenant-Col) DIEBITSCH (dead), engaging in what to me was undesirable political activity with Breton, Alsation and Basque organisations, who were friendly to the Nazis.

DIEBITSCH, who was close to the SS (he was formerly a Police officer), and came from Stuttgart, had brought, as a result of his close connexions with the Deutsches Auslandsinstitut in that city, a propensity for "Minorities Politics" into the Abwehr.

I replaced DIEBITSCH, who died shortly afterwards, with Freiherr von BRANDENSTEIN, a richly super-annuated officer of the Abteilung, and gave him clear instructions to cut down the personnel of Abt. II, suspend all II activity in France, and limit himself to the military tasks (sabotage against England).

So far as I know BRANDSTEIN put only one agent in England (Enterprise "Fritschen") during the whole period of his stay in Paris. The man returned via Portugal. I believed him to be a double agent for the English Intelligence Service.

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THE CASE OF WEYGAND

The role of Weygand in Africa in the military situation of that time (1940-41) was viewed by the German military command with the greatest suspicion. One day,--the exact one is noted in my, unfortunately unavailable, secret notes ("Raritaeten mappe")--CANARIS received the order from KEITEL to arrange for the removal of WEYGAND through my Abteilung.

Since the objections put forward by CANARIS were unavailing, we (CANARIS and I) were never for one moment undecided that this order--about which the other chiefs of the Abt PIECKENBROCK and BENTIVEGNI also knew--would not only not be transmitted any further, but, also that in no case would it be carried out.

Whether this order sprang from the head of HITLER, or was suggested to him by the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab, I no longer know. I believe the first.

Deeply angered, I talked with many people who felt the same way about it, even with officers outside of our circle, about this attempt of KEITEL to drag the Abw Abt II into the methods of the SD, and to force my subordinates, whose job was fighting, to become treacherous assassins.

CANARIS calmed (and disappointed) KEITEL later, by telling him that everything had been started by him, with the purpose of bringing the order to a successful conclusion.

THE CASE OF GIRAUD

The daring flight of GIRAUD from the General's Internment camp at Koenigstein and the accompanying circumstances of this flight put HITLER into a raging fury. He, and probably also the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab (JODL) suspected that GIRAUD must be an important political personality, and saw in him the man who would prepare for a landing of Allied forces in Vichy-France, which at that time was still unoccupied.

As in the case of WEYGAND, KEITEL ordered CANARIS to eliminate GIRAUD by having him murdered by Abt II.

The date of this order is also in my secret notes. It was probably about 6-8 weeks after GIRAUD's flight to North Africa.

The refusal to execute this order likewise, and the prevention of its transmittal to the SD was one of the most difficult and dangerous tasks of the active counteractivity.

In distinction from the case of WEYGAND, this time I had to deal directly and personally with KEITEL.

One day (it appears in my secret notes) KEITEL asked me most urgently (CANARIS was in Paris at the time) for everything we had planned on the Operation Gustav (KEITEL's covername for GIRAUD) because he, KEITEL, had been sharply attacked about it by HITLER.

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But naturally nothing had been planned (I had probably told only ABSEHAGEN, my adjutant and confidant, about the existence of the order at that time; later, and only after the counteraction was completed, I told FRECHNER, and only November, 1944, during a vacation, did I tell my brother about the GIRAUD case). As a last resort I had taken the precaution to warn GIRAUD through a member of the resistance in the Vichy embassy in Budapest.

The situation was made even more difficult because KEITEL demanded that I should advise Ogruf. MUELLER (RSH.) as to when CANARIS (who had refused to carry out this assassination order for his Abteilung) had forwarded it to the SD.

I knew, however, that CANARIS had neglected to do this, in order to avoid letting the SD carry out what would have been a very appropriate job for them.

On the instructions of General OTTER I flew immediately to Paris, and discussed the affair with CANARIS, who was immediately very excited, as he realized the danger that menaced him.

Suddenly, during dinner, CANARIS asked me when the Abt II Conference in Prague had taken place, and when HEYDRICH had been shot. After I gave him the desired dates, he appeared a changed man, and in completely good humor. And I soon found out the reason for this transformation.

The order of KEITEL was dated before the assassination of HEYDRICH, and before the meeting of Abt III in Prague, CANARIS had invited HEYDRICH to the above-mentioned meeting of Abt III (one of the very clever gestures of CANARIS in the fight against his most dangerous enemy). On the basis of this chronology, the order--HEYDRICH's arrival in Prague -- HEYDRICH's death-- CANARIS made his plans for the deception of KEITEL and HITLER.

Flying back the next day to Berlin, CANARIS calmed KEITEL by assuring him that he had naturally arranged everything necessary, i.e. he had fully informed HEYDRICH at the above-mentioned Abw III meeting in Prague about which KEITEL also knew, and HEYDRICH had already set up a Special Kommando to "liquidate" GIRAUD.

HEYDRICH, however, had emphasised especially the strictest secrecy, and had asked him (CANARIS) not to mention the undertaking to anybody (not even MUELLER or the SD Fuehrer in Paris).

With that KEITEL seemed to be satisfied-- HITLER too, apparently. Witnesses to this counteractivity, which was based on the purely intellectual superiority of CANARIS over KEITEL were, besides myself, PIECKENROCK and BENTIVEGNI, and Admiral BUERKNER, who had been present at the dinner which I have previously described, as well as the 1st-Leiter of Paris, Oberst RUDOLPH.

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\* Others who knew of the order to murder GIRAUD were General ZETZLER (at that time Chief of Staff, Army Group West in Paris), and Ambassador RAHN, with whom CANARIS had spoken of it in Paris.

RAHN (or ZETZLER) remarked in addition, that HITLER esteemed GIRAUD far too highly, that he was a good soldier, but an equally bad politician.

RAHN derived his impression of GIRAUD supposedly from having been present at the discussions held with GIRAUD in the German-Occupied (French) territory. The purpose of these discussions was to persuade GIRAUD to return voluntarily to prison, in order to eliminate the repressive measures (the cessation of the exchange of French prisoners of war), which were the result of GIRAUD's flight, and were damaging Franco-German relations quite badly.

When HITLER learned that GIRAUD had not been immediately arrested at this meeting of Wehrmacht representatives, he exploded in one of his habitual rages, especially against those older officers, who had never understood the meaning of the National Socialist Revolution, and who clung to out-worn ideas of justice and honor.

#### NON-EXECUTION OF THE ORDER FOR LARGE-SCALE SABOTAGE AGAINST THE FRENCH FLEET AT TOULON

Before the Germans marched into unoccupied France, concern over the behaviour of the French Fleet, which lay in and before Toulon, played a large part in the preparatory measures of the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab. It was feared that the ships would slip away (by night) to African ports.

KEITEL, in the presence of CANARIS, had given me orders to sabotage the ships in the harbor, and those nearby, at least to such an extent (through technical sabotage), that for a certain period (I believe 12 or 24 hours were demanded) no ship could escape.

After CANARIS, in KEITEL's presence, had urged me to act most energetically, we left the room and he remarked laconically: "Naturally we shall do nothing". And thus it happened..

When, shortly afterwards, KEITEL commanded me to come to him, to inform him of what measures had been taken, I brought with me a sketch which I had drawn in great haste, of the first results of reconnaissance (position of the ships etc.) The sketch was pure imagination.

Major ABSHAGEN and the Navy specialist in the Abt., Kptlt. FETZER (described previously) are expert on the subject of "Sabotage in Toulon".

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PERSONAL FRENCH CONNEXIONS IN THE COUNTERWORK

The French citizen Madeleine BIHET-RICHOU had been known to me since 1933 as a teacher of French in Vienna.

She was an extraordinary French patriot, and had a special fondness for Austria. When the German troops entered Vienna, I was able to facilitate her trip to Paris, at that time somewhat difficult, especially for French people, with the aid of the French military attache (Col. Roger SALLAND, whom I knew well from the time of my assignment to the French Army (1936). I kept up my relationship with this woman even after this.

At the beginning of the war, Mme BIHET had gone, via Italy, which was at that time neutral, and was working 1939/40 at the French Foreign Travel Bureau (Division of Propaganda) in Budapest. In 1940 I renewed this relationship, at first through FECHNER, later, 1941, on a trip to the Southeast, personally. At this time I learned that Mme. BIHET, who in the meantime had been employed as assistant to the Commercial Attache in the Vichy-French Embassy, was considered by the German Abwehr service (Abwehr Officer, Budapest, Obstlt. FRANKESTIEL) to be a confidante of the French (De Gaulliste) Intelligence Service.

Since this fact, which became known to me officially at this time, coincided with my own personal observation that she was a de Gaulliste, I decided as an Austrian and an enemy of the Nazis immediately to warn her.

FECHNER made known to her, on my orders, the danger she stood in, and told her that she was watched and her telephone conversations properly monitored, and warned her with precise instructions against any connexions with all people suspected of being Nazi informers (Arrow Cross).

FECHNER continued to keep in contact with her, and later even set her on her way, when the Vichy French Embassy was transferred to Lake Balaton. This contact of FECHNER with her led finally to a regular exchange of intelligence, in which FECHNER informed her about the real situation in Germany and Austria, and she gave him all information coming to her which was of interest for the Austrian Resistance movement.

As, in consequence of the political situation the danger to FECHNER and myself as Austrians and anti-Nazis became more and more menacing, she urged both of us again and again to be sure to take refuge in the French Embassy, thereby implying that everything had already been prepared for this eventuality in the proper places.

At this point I must remark that the Military Attache of the Vichy embassy in Budapest, Col. CHILLIER, was an old acquaintance of mine from the days of my command in France (1936). In this affair I did not get in touch with him directly, in order not to attract the attention of either the Hungarian or the German Secret Service to this particular connexion. However, I frequently transmitted greetings to him indirectly at this time.

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For years I transmitted Mme BIHET's letters to France, and back again, by means of the German (Abwehr) courier service. This was carried out, practically, as follows: FECHNER received the mail in Budapest personally, sent it on to me, and I forwarded it by our own courier service to an officer designated by me in Paris, who transmitted it personally to its destination there. In this forwarding of mail, I indoctrinated Major ABSELGEN and my secretary Enl. VOIGT, too, in order to avoid its piling up during my frequent absences from Berlin.

I also knew that BIHET took part in arranging for the escape and subsequent care of French soldiers from German prisoner of war camps, under the orders of the French Military Attache. She also turned to me sometimes for help for French war prisoners, and I can still remember distinctly Col. LARREDE and Lt-Col. TROUILLET at the Oflag Lienz, and their illegal correspondence, which was forwarded through me.

In the case of Lt-Col. TROUILLET I was told by the Department for prisoners of war not to meddle any more as he was a violent de Gaulliste. Witness for this is Major ABSELGEN, who, on my orders, often had personal contact with the two officers.

Admiral CUNARIS knew of these French connexions of mine, though he was not informed of the details.

Just before the German collapse the news reached me that a strong De-Gaulliste organisation within the Vichy Embassy in Budapest had been blown, and that on account of this a number of arrests had been made. At this time it was learned that this organisation was closely connected with the Secret Service.

#### PORTUGAL

At a meeting under the German Air Attache in Berlin (so far as I remember in 1942), the Luftwaffe High Command (though it may have been the German Air Attache in Lisbon) expressed the urgent wish to start sabotage operations against the Portugal-U.S. Clipper service.

CUNARIS, who was at this meeting as well as myself and the two other Abteilung Chiefs (BENTIGONI and PIECKENBROCK) gave me the necessary instructions in front of the assembled Air Attaches.

Naturally CUNARIS and I had decided that the enterprise should not be allowed to go through. I gave the head of the Abt II in Portugal (I believe it was Sonderführer ALUM at that time) the official instructions which were necessary to carry out this operation; at the same time, however, CUNARIS himself flew to Lisbon, and on the spot strictly forbade any II action.

The letter of astonishment which was sent me by the head of Abt II, in which he pointed out the difference between the official order from me and the oral instructions from CUNARIS, is in my "curiosity file".

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Another sabotage operation, urgently and repeatedly ordered by the Special Staff for Industrial and Commercial Warfare (whose head at that time was Admiral SCHUSTER) was to be against the import from England to Portugal of scarce raw materials (? charcoal) or finished goods. This was either included in CANRIS' verbal prohibition of any II activity (described above) or, in some similar fashion, forbidden.

#### SPAIN

In his counteractivity on Spain, CANRIS pursued a clear-cut policy, namely, to keep Spain, a land of which he was especially fond, perhaps because of his earlier life, out of war on the side of Germany.

I know, that the Foreign Office, especially Herr von RIBBENTROP, often openly reproached CANRIS for having influenced the Spanish generals, who were known to him partly from the First World War (FRANCO), and partly from the Spanish Civil War, to keep Spain from joining Germany in the "Gibraltar Enterprise", and later, on his frequent trips to Spain, and during the discussions held at those times with Spanish politicians, for having counteracted the plans of the Foreign Office.

This reproach was, as I can prove, well founded in fact.

I was both an eye-and-ear witness to a conversation of CANRIS with JORDAN (I believe in the winter of 1942/3), and I myself formulated the report for the Foreign Office, significantly before the interview between CANRIS and ~~JORDAN~~.

At that time, as I remember it, it was feared that an Allied invasion would take place through the Spanish peninsula, and CANRIS was supposed to sound out what the Spaniards would do, and to ascertain whether Spain would be willing to allow the entrance of German troops as a preventive measure.

The report to the Foreign Office (through Amt. Ausland, OHW) which I made up according to a directive from CANRIS, before his meeting with JORDAN, went approximately as follows:

"Spain will continue to support, as heretofore, the Axis powers, but retains her status as "Non-belligerent", and will defend herself against every attack on her territory, even, if the case should arise, against Germany"

JORDAN actually expressed himself far more carefully and hesitantly in the attendant conversation when it did take place, (in the presence of General ~~VIGON~~ and General ~~MARTINEZ-CAMPOS~~) and especially in connexion with anything pertaining to German-Spanish relations.

I also know that CANRIS warned either General VIGON, or General MARTINEZ-CAMPOS, or both, or even perhaps FRANCO himself, against the activities of General ~~MUNEZ-GRANDE~~ (Commander of the "Blue Division" in Germany) which were directed against FRANCO.

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PIECKENBROCK knows far more than I about everything concerned with the relationship of CANARIS to FRANCO and to Spain, for he was his constant travelling companion.

From an Abw II standpoint CANARIS sharply curtailed the activities of the head of II (Obst HUMMEL), on whom I had only an indirect influence, as he was a part of KO Spain, and under the leader of the KO.

Details about this aspect of Abw II work, directed against Gibraltar after the "open orders", could be given by the former KO-Leiter in Spain, ~~Capt. KLENZ~~.

#### WESTERN EUROPE

#### WORK WITH THE IRA

Sabotage work against England was sharply curtailed by CANARIS.

In so far as I can remember, with a fair degree of accuracy, only three or four II-agents were sent to England and Ireland from the beginning of the war to the middle of 1943, despite the activity which was naturally ordered, especially after the attempted invasion had been given up, and the air offensive against England had been stopped.

Furthermore, all actions concerning Ireland-- I believe from 1940-41 on-- the military Abwehr Abt. II was referred to the Foreign Office Specialist on Ireland, Dr. VEESENMAIR, and was told in writing that the Foreign Office itself would carry out and be responsible for this diversion activity, and that Abw. Abt. II should only act at the instigation of the Foreign Office (~~Dr. VEESENMAIR~~), by giving technical help in the transport of people (dropping and landing of agents).

CANARIS was completely agreed with this policy, because through the rule, it meant that he would always (at least, for a certain period) know the far-fetched plans of the Foreign Office for Ireland, without, at the same time, being himself directly under the orders of HITLER and KETTEL (i.e. the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab) which would have put him in a difficult position from which to carry out either his policy of passive activity or active sabotage.

Dr. VEESENMAIR's Irish Bureau was becoming very active at that time (1940-41), but the military and political-military aims I can no longer remember very clearly. It must have had to do with the instigation of a civil war in Ireland, with the assistance of the IRA (Irish Republican Army), which would have served as the opening step to the possibility of a military invasion.

For this purpose, ~~JIM RUSSEL~~, a leader of the IRA, was to be brought to Ireland from America, via Italy and through Germany.

JIM RUSSEL saw RIEBENTROP, in order to receive from him the general political directives for his Diversion action. All further instructions RUSSEL received from Dr. VEESENMAIR.

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A U-boat was to have brought him to Ireland. But a few hours after its departure RUSSEL died--in my opinion under somewhat unclear circumstances.

I heard later, that certain circles of the Foreign Office accused CANARIS, by implication, of having liquidated him. That is absolutely untrue.

However, I think it is possible that he may have been poisoned by his very radical associate, Franklyn, who accompanied him until the U-boats departure. Internal difficulties and political rivalries within the IR. probably played a part in this matter.

With the death of Jim RUSSEL this particular, politically high-aiming, enterprise of the Foreign Office was settled. I know however that CANARIS had prepared a warning to England (through OSTER's bureau), in case the scheme actually went through.

#### AIR COURIER SERVICE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SWEDEN

During the war there was a regular English air-courier traffic between London and Stockholm.

As the airplanes crossed at night, and flew over the high mountains in Norway, it was impossible, or almost so, for the German defenses to attack them.

Therefore the High Commands of both the Air Force and the Wehrmacht demanded with increasing urgency, the effective sabotaging of this English courier traffic with Sweden, which was extremely unpleasant for the political and military leaders.

To keep up appearances, but in order at the same time to be absolutely sure that nothing would be undertaken, Major ABSEGEN was assigned to the execution of this enterprise, on my suggestion. He was indoctrinated by CANARIS and me personally, and attached to KO Sweden for a while.

Details of this indoctrination could be given by Major ABSEGEN (after July 20, 1944, he was expelled from the Army)

#### AUSTRIA AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The Vienna organisation had been active since the fall of 1939. During the following years, the organisation was able to direct innumerable orders into completely different paths in accordance with the meaning of the secret agreement. Thus, to mention but one example, the order, in 1940-41, to stage an insurrection and sabotage action in Yugoslavia was turned into a purely passive enterprise consisting in the defense of railroads and material. Even the extensive organisations for the defense of the oil wells, which were maintained through the war in Rumania, never went beyond a purely passive form of activity. Frequently the most varied orders of Army Group F, and later those of A.G. South, were declared to be unfeasible.

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or else impossible because of an alleged shortage of material. But the Vienna group was successful especially in hindering or at least limiting the execution of commands given by the Air Force. The example (Operation KINO) of such an undertaking which was completely successfully prevented has already been fully described in another place. Two other examples of such counterwork are described in the following.

#### ORGANISATION FOR THE DEFENSES OF THE DANUBE

This was an organisation, connected with the Vienna II group, whose aim was to carry out only completely passive defense against sabotage, and which had installed and maintained under cover soldiers in all the Danube ports, and on all the river ships. Again and again attempts were made to make of this organisation, which was fairly strong and knew the country well, an active sabotage group. However, despite orders, and in spite of the fact that it would have been perfectly feasible, they never undertook one real sabotage action. From the beginning of the war until they were taken over because of their inactivity by the SS Jagdverbande in 1945. The leader of this organisation, Korv. Kapitän von WEIHS, an Austrian, was absolved of a charge of suspected treason; a Captain SCHWARZ, also an *Maximilian* Austrian, was arrested in Rumania at the time of the capitulation of that country, and later investigated for the same reason.

#### COOPERATION WITH THE UKRAINIANS

The Vienna Group was able to develop special activities in the Ukraine problem. Cooperation, which had been ordered, with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationals was carried out mostly by Vienna in the early days of the war. The leader in that area of the combined organisation, Oberst JARY, a former K.u.k. officer of Ukrainian origin, was an old school friend of mine and FECHNER. Thus there existed a relationship of mutual confidence from the first. The unexampled unjust and unfair attitude taken by the responsible Nazi posts towards the Ukrainians had soon provoked a strained atmosphere, passive resistance and finally direct enmity, which at the end of the war showed itself clearly in the attitude of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army (UPA). The building up of the Ukrainian Nationalists into special fighting groups, which was ordered repeatedly by the OKW, was indeed, so far as appearances were concerned, carried out by the Vienna post in grand style; a few hundred Ukrainians were actually made ready, training camps were built, and great activity was apparently developed. The actual mission, however, both against Poland in 1939 and against Russia in 1941, was dragged out interminably and thereby prevented in practice. In both cases the formations set up by the Vienna post were finally brought in to the operations area in the rear, but in each case, mainly because of their belated arrival, they found there was no longer any fighting taking place. Therefore these formations were soon found to be useless, and, both in 1939 and in 1941, were shortly afterwards dissolved. Moreover, in 1939, because of the friendship pact with Russia, which contradicted all the promises made earlier to the Ukrainians, the purpose for which these formations were set up, was rendered totally imaginary.

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Also the Vienna group continued to maintain contact with the OUN, even after its leader was arrested and the organisation was dissolved, and even tried to mitigate the sentences of the arrested ones, as well as those of the lesser members of the organisation, to the best of its ability. Ruthlessly and successfully, it interned especially for the leader, Oberst JARY, who was also imprisoned in Vienna, and on behalf of his wife who was persecuted because of her non-Aryan background.

The Vienna group also had active connexions with the Vienna Resistance movement, as well as the most variegated opposition groups, and supported these in every possible way.

In time, the extensive and very active counteractivity carried out by the Vienna group, which was also numerically quite strong, led to the cropping up of certain suspicions, which even developed into actual reports about what was going on at the post.

Captain REINHARDT reported to the Army Group South that the long drawn out process for delivering material, especially transmitters, had meant abandoning the operation which had been fully prepared otherwise.

An Oberlt. ~~KOPS~~ <sup>aka Reinhard</sup>, a member of the SS, reported this directly to SKORZENY without going through channels. The most serious menace, however, came from a report of Lt. von MESOV.

THE CASE OF LIEUT. VON MESOV <sup>aka</sup> (MESSOW)

During an operation against the Partisan groups in Slovenia the Germans captured some coded documents. The Nazi University instructor, ~~Dr. REPP~~, who was in Slovenia as a soldier in the service of the Abwehr, successfully deciphered the documents, and it appeared that they contained, with names and addresses, statements about the connexions with Vienna, through which the Partisans received their strongest reinforcement. The documents also contained the names of the people close to the Vienna Resistance movement, who were living in Vienna, and were helping the partisans, as well as the addresses of members of foreign intelligence services, who likewise were connected with this movement. MESOV appeared in Vienna with an aide and Dr. REPP and demanded of FECHNER, by reason of the great significance of these captured documents, that rooms should be made available in order to carry on further action. FECHNER recognised the extraordinarily menacing danger, to the Resistance movement too, and ordered MESOV and his companions to start back immediately, the same day, directly for Slovenia. He based his order on the lack of authority of the Abwehr to undertake such investigations. MESOV obeyed the order, went however directly to Agram, and gave an official report there to the Army Group F on the conduct of FECHNER, adding, moreover, his personal complaints against him because of the brusque way in which he had been sent back. The Ic of the Army Group F, Oberst I.C. von HARLING, a well-known Nazi, took the report, and directed a personal letter to the RSHA, demanding urgently preparations for an investigation of FECHNER. The investigation was thereupon actually started, was

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drawn out endlessly, however, because of various understandings, and because of the air attacks, which disrupted mail and rail traffic, and fortunately had not been brought to any conclusion before the war ended. Others who know about the reports against FECHNER, and the reason for it, though not all its background, are Major ~~Dr. KLOOS~~, Capt. ~~Dr. EISENBERG~~ and Oblt. ~~Dr. FERID~~, from ~~MIT D.~~, and various officers from the Leitstelle.

All the statements in the preceding report, about Austria, and Southeast Europe, which go chronologically beyond the time of my leadership of the Abwehr Abt. II, were brought to my knowledge by my successor in the direction of the counteractivity, Oblt. FECHNER.

SOUTHERN EUROPE

THE RESCUE OF MUSSOLINI, AND OTHER PLANS OF THE SD. WARNING AGAINST THE SIM

One day, as I remember it in May or June 1943, CANARIS summoned me and Oberst i.G. FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN, who at that time was in the throes of taking over Abw. Abt. II, and told us that he was in the possession of information showing that the SD was planning the rescue of MUSSOLINI, the liquidation of the Italian king, and even the murder or abduction of the Pope.

CANARIS had received this information from the RSHA, through OSTER, who had a V-man there.

As he revealed this information, CANARIS said, among other things: "It is really amazing, that criminals can be so inconceivably dumb."

I remarked, in some connexion or other "We should really warn the Italians (AME) immediately". FREYTAG took up this thought with characteristic energy, and at the end CANARIS told me of the secret order to create a pretext for meeting, either the next day or the day after that, General ~~AME~~ (the Chief of the SIM).

The meeting took place at the Hotel <sup>Orto</sup> ~~D'Amicelli~~, in Venice, several gentlemen from the SIM accompanied General AME, and the KO Leiter for Italy, ~~Oberst HELEFERTICH~~ was also there. I still remember fairly accurately the following details: It was during the luncheon, where CANARIS sat on the left, and I on the right side of Gen. AME. AME was complaining to CANARIS that a number of SS and SD members were wandering around Rome in civilian clothes, of whose presence the Italians had not been officially notified. CANARIS remarked laconically: "Throw them out!" then, directly or indirectly pursuing the subject further, he added in an undertone: "Where is Mussolini? Where is the King? Where is the Pope staying at the moment?"

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(The answers of AME I can no longer remember exactly) Whereupon CANARIS said: "Be careful, very careful. Listen carefully." With CANARIS' approval, I cut in on this conversation, and said, I believe in French to my right-hand neighbor (General AME): "You can never tell what these people (Meaning the SS about whom we had been talking) will do."

AME nodded several times, and then drank to CANARIS and me.

After the meal, I said casually to FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN: "It's been done".

In the afternoon we met General AME and his companions at the Lido. CANARIS had asked FREYTAG and me beforehand to divert the companions of AME so that he might talk with AME alone. This we did, and CANARIS talked for nearly two hours undisturbed with AME.

Neither I nor FREYTAG was informed about the substance of this conversation.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEHRMACHTFÜHRUNGSTAB I.T. BERCHTESGADEN,  
SPRING, 1943

Sometime in 1943, i.e. before the downfall of MUSSOLINI, I was called up by General WARLIMONT from Berchtesgaden, and was ordered to fly to him immediately. I told CANARIS and flew off. On arrival in Berchtesgaden, I joined a meeting under the direction of General WARLIMONT, at which, among others whom I no longer remember, was General KAUSE, ROMMEL's Chief of Staff (ROMMEL's staff was, at that time, already in Munich).

Only six people took part in this discussion, all of whom had been previously marked on a special list. Before it opened, General WARLIMONT informed us, that on the express order of HITLER, the subject for discussion must be confined within this circle, and WARLIMONT also added "You gentlemen know what the slightest infringement of this order will mean".

The subject of the meeting was the military preparations for the entry into Italy, for at that time there was no confidence in Italy, none even in MUSSOLINI.

I was asked a number of questions, dealing with the part my Abteilung could play in conjunction with these operational preparations. I refused the cooperation of the Abteilung for practical reasons, reserving it for CANARIS' approval of my position. My refusal was maintained in the protocol of the meeting. To my intense astonishment, however, WARLIMONT informed me that on the express order of HITLER, CANARIS was not to be informed of the plans which had been discussed this day for military operations in Italy.

I thereupon told WARLIMONT that he had put me in the painful position, not only of having to conceal something from my superior officer, which officially concerned him, but also of having to lie to him. He insisted, however, and reminded me of the sharp order of HITLER, and warned me expressly in view of the consequences, which were well known to me, not to disobey.

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On my return to Berlin, I discussed this very difficult situation with my Adjutant and trusted friend Major ABSHAGEN. It was clear that both HITLER and the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab already deeply distrusted CANARIS.

ABSHAGEN, who knew, as I did, CANARIS' unpredictably impulsive and exclusively emotional way of reacting to all things which concerned him personally, advised me to disobey WARLIMONT's order, and cautioned me to exercise the greatest caution in talking to CANARIS.

The next day, as I sat opposite CANARIS, the man who had been my superior for so many years, and who already showed the marks of the desperate struggle against a system stronger than he, I told him against all orders of Herr HITLER and WARLIMONT the whole truth, and informed him of everything I had heard at the Berchtesgaden conference (I believe that this is, in my secret notes in the "Raritaetenmappe".)

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REPORT BY GENERALMAJOR LAHOUSEN

SIDELIGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE  
"20th of JULY"  
IN THE AMT/AUSLAND, ABWEHR, FOR  
THE END OF 1939-MIDDLE OF 1943

In the consideration of this topic I must separate the two chief ~~personalities who took their place~~ opposite me in this project, namely, CANARIS and OSTER.

Undoubtedly confederates, perhaps more than that, on matters pertaining to the "20th of July" both these officers constantly came to see me only as individuals, -- as I in general assume that CANARIS possibly and probably figured very actively behind the scenes of the plan to do away forcibly with Hitler, but did not, and did not wish to, take his stand in the group of those who labored for the realization of this project.

After my last conversation with Oster -- around October 1943 -- I even got the impression that CANARIS -- at least at this time -- was excluded from the "20th of July" circle. What role he then actually played in the occurrence itself in July 1944, I do not know, since I was at that date already a year away from the Lmt Ausland/Abwehr and leading a regiment on the East Front.

Beginning with his first very detailed conversation with me relative to my taking over Abt. II of the Abwehr (beginning of 1939) up until my departure from the Lmt/Ausland, Abwehr (middle of 1943), CANARIS had really spoken constantly -- whether by paraphrases and hints, or quite openly -- of the necessity of doing away with HITLER, HIMMLER, and HEYDRICH (the "3 Hs") and of deposing the whole criminal gang.

He (CANARIS) also explained therewith my appointment as head of Abwehr II and the real reason for forming the "Brandenburg" Regiment. In this connection CANARIS was already citing the name of General BECK as having put it to him most seriously that the conduct of this particular Abteilung should be entrusted only to an absolutely reliable officer (see also CANARIS' Secret Organisation, Part I, p.1).

Even in 1938 CANARIS had commissioned my predecessor, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) GROSSKURTH, to see to it that a definite stock-pile of weapons -- especially explosives, fuses, and hand-grenades -- was readily at hand in the house at No. 80, Tirpitzufer, and re-assigned this duty to me, with the at the time rather generally phrased hint "that for the war in the immediate offing it should by no means be revealed which road the internal politics of Germany was to follow."

Later, around the time of my taking over Abwehr, Abteilung II (beginning of 1939), CANARIS was more precise...

The role that he (C.) had destined for my Abteilung, specifically, for me and the "Brandenburg" Regiment, was as follows:

I was to prepare myself at a given time for the acquisition of materiel (explosives and time-fuses) for the accomplishment of the "action."

On the other hand, the "Brandenburg" Regiment was to a degree to be set up as Special Troops at the disposal of that first, powerful occupation by certain "key units" of the National-Socialist juggernaut (the RSHA, radio network, Intelligence branch of the OKW, etc.)

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These two assignments -- variously adapted during the course of time -- remained the leitmotiv of the conversations that CANARIS had with me on this subject.

His and also OSTER's particular confidant in the "20th of July" affair was Capt. HEINZ, at that time (1938-39) still assigned to Abwehr, Abteilung III.

With the establishment of the Lehrregiment ("Training Regiment") "Brandenburg" (LRB) -- 1940-41 -- HEINZ at the particular request of CANARIS and OSTER was "smuggled" by us into this outfit as Battalion C.O., in order thereupon to assemble around him a core of reliable officers. HEINZ commanded the Battalion, which was based in Brandenburg. HEINZ's confidant was 1st Lt. ~~HERZNER~~. Whether HEINZ had initiated others, I don't know, since generally speaking I was rather poorly up on the "goings-on" of the LRB -- official as well as secret.

HEINZ used to receive direct orders from CANARIS and OSTER concerning which I was very frequently not informed.

My connection with HEINZ was an impersonal one. His nature, which was very strongly determined by his political background, did not interest me (see also, "CANARIS, Secret Organisation", Part II).

In spite of this, I defended him unconditionally against the RSHA and even against his own regimental C.O. (Col. ~~HEILING~~ von ~~LANZENAUER~~), since I was familiar with his real outlook.

On the subject of "The LRB Mission within the Plan of the Projected Action against HITLER and thereby against the System" I have often talked with CANARIS and with OSTER -- latterly with Brig. Gen. von PFUHLSTEIN also.

I considered this idea completely off the track and am convinced that, however conducted, it would have led to the same catastrophe as that of the "20th of July 1944."

The great majority of those in this special outfit, comprised of Volks and Ausland Germans -- some ignorant idealists, others fanatical adherents of HITLER -- had reported voluntarily for a specially hazardous undertaking (the so-called "Ascension Day commandos").

These people -- particularly the young officers -- at the slightest suspicion that something inimical to the system was being undertaken, would at once have taken a stand against HEINZ and those few, mostly the more elderly, officers of his circle, to wit, would have shot them out of hand. This was recognised by OSTER also, who in my opinion acquiesced completely. CANARIS on the other hand clung to the view-point that HEINZ would make it work. HEINZ himself, however, may well have recognized the difficulties of a mission with such a "topsy-turvy order of battle" (Verkehrter Front), since from 1942 on the Brandenburg Battalion was manned very strongly by Russian -- particularly Mohammedan, I believe -- volunteers from the Caucasus whom HEINZ had levied with the secret thought of their utilisation in something like a "20th of July".

Lt. Col. HEINZ, who so far as I know is still living, should be able to give greater and more exhaustive details about the activities planned and the secret preparations made at that time (1940-1943) in the LRB.

In 1942, or the beginning of 1943, CANARIS suddenly brought me together in his office with a Mr. GISEVIUS, who had come from Switzerland and whose name I had often heard at OSTER's. (see also "CANARIS, Secret Organisation,"

## Part II.

This chap (GISEVIUS) had come rather suddenly to talk over the state of affairs, that is, he asked CANARIS more or less unblushingly when HITLER would at last be deposed, whereupon CANARIS, pointing to me, said, "Ask him, since he'll have to do it." At that time CANARIS left the room. Since by that time I knew CANARIS' sort very well and was not in the slightest inclined to discuss such a subject with an utter stranger, I, with some very general phrases on the matter, eased away.

Concerning the motives which may have bestirred CANARIS to side so early with those who saw in the forcible removal of HITLER the last means of ending this war and according to the hopes of this circle -- of ending it in a manner still tolerable for Germany, I can only conjecture...

CANARIS was, at the bottom of his varied make-up, a very sensitive man. Together with considerations of a rational, and even a speculative, nature, his honorable and profound revulsion from the bestial and brutal methods of Nazism therefore contributed very strongly (to his desire) forcibly to remove HITLER -- whom he saw as the "incarnation of the evil and the bad" -- or, to put it perhaps more correctly, to provide for his removal.

Even less authoritatively than for the motives can I talk about the political aims hovering before the eyes of the men with whom I came in contact from 1939-1943 on this question.

CANARIS indeed used often to speak of a "Pick-Up Organization" ("Auffangsorganisation") which, in a manner similar to the BADOGLIO Government, was to step at once into the plan for removing HITLER and his clique.

In this project even at that time (1940) the name of General BECK was cited as the senior military member. Also mentioned as members of this interim government were Staatssekretär von WEIZSÄCKER for Minister of Foreign Affairs and the names of a few South German Centrum politicians no longer recalled by me today. How the ultimate political solution was figured, I don't know. Neither CANARIS or OSTER spoke with me about this, nor have I ever directed a question on the matter to these two, or any to HEINE or DOHMANY. As an internal German affair this interested me just a little as the motives. The deed alone interested me.

If, looking back today, I should try to estimate the influence of CANARIS upon me in this matter then I should say that this was an unremitting thing, but at no time included a concrete assignment.

The only concrete thing, really, was CANARIS' desire under any circumstances and against all opposition to receive the then Capt. HEINZ into the Lehrregiment "Brandenburg".

Quite otherwise was the manner in which General OSTER came to me on this business. It was absolutely single-minded and purposeful.

In general, there were two conferences mainly in which OSTER requested and received my collaboration in plans for the assault on HITLER.

So early as my first appearance in May 1938 OSTER revealed himself to me quite openly as an opponent of National Socialism. (See also, "CANARIS, Secret Organisation" Part II). He and his closest friend -- my predecessor as C.O. of Abwehr, II, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) GROSSKURTH -- as well as my later woman-secretary VOIGT, were even at that period wholly committed and radical in their anti-Nazi point of view.

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One day -- it appears, from a memo in my private papers ("Curiosity File") -- OSTER had me come to him.

According to my certain memory, this was before the French campaign, perhaps even before the descent on Denmark and Norway, hence probably in March or April 1940. Still in OSTER's office at that time were Dr. DOHNALY and Capt HEINZ, who were witnesses to the discourse by OSTER that now follows.

OSTER prefaced this conversation with the following words (as they were subsequently explained):

"LAHOUSEN, you know me and I know you. You know what this criminal (HITLER) has in mind\*, and you know the methods of these bandits. Moreover, you have seen how Austria is being treated, and you are now experiencing for the second time in your own family the assault of the SD\*\*.

"Now here is how matters stand.

"We want to render this mad beast harmless.

"You must procure us explosives and time-fuses. Can you do that?"

Before I expressed myself on this, I asked OSTER:

"Does the Admiral know of this affair?"

Whereupon OSTER: "No. It is really better that you do not discuss it with him; it would just oppress him, and the old chap is already quite harried enough with out this."

Now I demanded further: "Do you already have the ~~man who is to carry~~ it out?"

OSTER: "Yes. The man is at hand."

I: "Can the person in question also manage time-clock fuses?"

OSTER: "No. That must first be explained to him."

There ensued now a lengthier debate, during the course of which I made known that it would be very difficult for me -- without taking in an extra person -- to get at the required explosives and the fuses and that it would be equally difficult to familiarise the perpetrators with the functioning of the fuses, since I myself understood nothing of that sort of thing... And I didn't in the Abteilung know of anyone with whom I could discuss this subject... But perhaps he (OSTER) could work the person in question into my Abteilung in such a way that, very unostentatiously -- hence best as an agent -- he might by a simple course of instruction come to learn the handling of time-clock fuses.

OSTER hesitated somewhat and did not enter into this proposal.

I had the feeling that he was by no means willing to identify this man, hence the perpetrator.

Under such circumstances, I opined to see no way out of these difficulties, but promised willingness to mull the matter over from the ground up.

\* -- Indicated was the imminent assault on HOLLAND, BELGIUM, LUXEMBURG.

\*\* - Following my brother, the brother of my wife was by this time also incarcerated. Adjudged of high treason, he spent nearly 3 years in prison.

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Lastly I requested OSTER to keep me completely out of the political angle, since as an AUSTRIAN I didn't want anything to do with that. I have in fact, except for the group about me in the Ant Ausland/Abwehr, known personally none of the "20th of July" personalities, or spoken on this subject with those whom I knew, such as Gen. BECK or (Lt. Col.) (Gen Staff) ~~BERNARDIS~~.

With OSTER's hint that no time was to be lost, this first consultation came to a close.

A few days later came the chance for me to help. In some connection it was reported to me by my deputy, Col. STOLZE (a non-accomplice), that explosives and fuses were to be fetched from an outside point.

I went immediately to OSTER and acquainted him with this opportunity. At the same time I proposed that he name a person in his confidence whom I would then "mislead in" ("zuschleichen") for the fetching of the explosives. OSTER, or HEINZ, then named for me on the very same day 1st Lt. HERZNER, who at that time was assigned to the "Construction and Training Company" in Brandenburg.

Concern with all such matters pertaining to explosives and fusing materials was the business of Group T (technical).

A formula now had to be found for getting HERZNER, who didn't belong to Abteilung II, to the explosives. This was instigated by OSTER with the connivance of BERLINGER to a degree that my deputy, Col. STOLZE, even asked me that I grant extraordinary permission for haulage of the explosives to 1st Lt. HERZNER, who wanted to visit a relative or fiancée in the city in question.

HERZNER carried out the trip, too, and removed from its place the pile of explosives contemplated for OSTER's purposes.

I then heard nothing more of the affair.

From later hints by OSTER I could only take it that the entire scheme was withdrawn at the last moment and deferred to a (mass-psychologically) more favorable period, since the unexpectedly sudden collapse of France had thrown all the calculations of this group onto the dust-heap.

Almost three years later -- I think before or immediately after STALINGRAD -- OSTER again summoned me to him and asked me (literally):

"Has your II man with Army Group Mitte (He meant the C.O. of the Abwehr/II Command, Maj HOTZEL) sufficient time-clock fuses?"

"I assume so," was my reply. Whereupon OSTER:

"Then you should know that the G-3 of Army Group von TRECKOW is very much interested in such things.

"In the near future HITLER is expected to visit at KLUGE's. More than this I don't need to say. We hope that HIMMLER is coming too. Fat-so (he meant GOERING) will then likewise burst of his own accord like a balloon.

"How's this HOTZEL?" continued OSTER.

"A born Nazi, in front of whom you've got to watch yourself," I replied.

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After some brief remarks by OSTER, I then said at last, "To set your mind at ease, I shall see to it in any event that this very morning a consignment of the best precision-fuses is shipped by plane to Smolensk."

With that this conversation -- at which, as I recall, DOHNALY was also present -- came to an end.

Either before or subsequent to this conversation with OSTER, I had flown with CANARIS to Field Marshall von KLUGE, at that time the Commander in chief of Army Group Mitte. (See also "CANARIS, Secret Organisation, Part II, p. 50)

Whether the assault on HITLER envisaged at that time did not eventually, because HITLER had not visited the Army Group Mitte, or because -- as CANARIS hinted to me (Part II, p. 50) -- von KLUGE had come to waver in his resolve, I do not know.

OSTER, who was implicated in the case of the by then (beginning of 1943) already apprehended Dr. DOHNALY (see also "CANARIS, Secret Organisation, Part II, p. 41), had to withdraw from the Amt and shortly thereafter was put on pension. Intercourse with OSTER was forbidden members of Amt Ausland/Abwehr by order of KEITEL.

When I spoke with OSTER, who at the time was already under surveillance, for the last time (October 1943) at his private residence, he was very resigned and also complaining bitterly about CANARIS, who in his haphazard, unreliable way was alleged to have "bucked into" a good deal that might now no longer be set right. (OSTER was alluding here among other things to the composition of the Officer Corps of the LGR).

CANARIS was also alleged to have completely mismanaged them (meaning those positively active in the "20th of July").

This was, really, the last conversation that I held with Oster.

Just prior to my departure for the front -- it must have been in November or December 1943 -- Col. FREYTAG asked me on one occasion whether I knew well Lt. Col. (Gen Staff) BERNARDIS, an Austrian attached to Col. (Gen Staff) von STAUFFENBERG's staff.

I said yes and added that BERNARDIS when in the Austrian Army had actually belonged to my machine-gun Company as a NCO -- sometime around the years 1926-28. Moreover, that I had spoken with BERNARDIS a short time ago in Berlin.

Whereupon FREYTAG said to me, literally: "Tell me, can one speak plainly with BERNARDIS? STAUFFENBERG requested me to ask you, since you're Austrian too, and BERNARDIS was mentioning that he knew you."

At that I replied to FREYTAG: "I think you can talk with BERNARDIS as you would with me. And say hello to him for me."

With that the conversation, insofar as it concerned BERNARDIS, came to an end.

At the beginning of January 1944 I took over the command of a Regiment on the East Front and was wounded on the 20th of July 1944. On the 22nd of July I heard of the ill-chanced attack on HITLER by Col. von STAUFFENBERG.

In the foregoing I have described rather exhaustively the persons and projects whereby, in the years 1939-1943, I came into contact with those circles that played an active part on the 20th of July 1944.

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CANARIS influenced me -- according to his type and his character -- unremittingly and very strongly, without ever having enunciated a definite plan or a clear project.

Seen by and large, I don't believe that his role was otherwise. Perhaps generally speaking he was father to the idea and the impetus to the carrying out of an attack on HITLER. I consider it improbable, however, that CANARIS was actively involved in the occurrence of the "20th of July."

OSTER on the other hand was a man of action. He hated HITLER and his system fanatically.

If on the 20th of July 1944 he was not actively involved, then he must have been kept from so being by some conclusive reasons.

I myself had placed CANARIS, OSTER and myself at the disposal of the deed assistants, and exclusively for this, since even in 1939 I had recognised what this HITLER really was, and hence as a human being was also privately drawing the ultimate conclusions.

I should like however to emphasize in closing -- and I have always emphasized this -- that I do not want to pass for a "20th of July" man.

This is first of all essentially false, and above everything does not correspond to the mood in which, for the plans here described, I assumed this risk, namely, that of co-assistant and helper.

The men of the "20th of July" were thinking about Germany --

I was thinking about AUSTRIA.

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#### SOVIET UNION

As already indicated in Part I, I had free rein from CANARIS in ~~Abwehr II~~ work against the Soviet Union--to be sure, here also with the express limitation of this activity to combat, with absolutely nonparticipation in all those cruel atrocities to which especially the Russian prisoners and the Jewish civilian population of the Soviet Union were exposed.

The treatment of Russian prisoners and commands regarding this, with which alone the German Wehrmacht befouled itself forever, were the object of several written and oral protests of Amt Ausland/Abwehr, all of which had CANARIS' signature or were issued in his name.

Along with the rejection of these methods on principle and on emotion, and the indignation over the fact that now the Wehrmacht too was forced--and permitted itself to be forced--on a large scale to such foul actions - there were also--especially in the sphere of Abwehr I and II--purely objective considerations that forced CANARIS to sharp protests against the treatment of Russian prisoners of war in 1941-43.

So, to give one example for many, in the "sorting-out" of Bolshevik infected Russian prisoners, Crimean Tartars or Azerbaijan men from the Caucasus were liquidated by the "Sonderkommandos" of the SD solely because as Mohammedans they were circumcised, and therefore were regarded as Jews by the race-fanatics of the SS and SD. Precisely from these peoples of the Soviet Union, however, had Abwehr Abt I and II especially gained valuable volunteer helpers (agents and combat units).

I myself, on behalf of CANARIS, had raised the serious objections of Amt Ausland/Abwehr to these orders, in a meeting (I believe prior to Stalingrad) held under the chairmanship of General REINECKE (Chef Allgem. Wehrmachtsamt) in the OKW, and had according to orders protested against their execution.

With the statement that this war was not a military dispute of two states or armies, but an ideological conflict of two concepts of life, and that the political objectives of National Socialism were to be given preference over all military or other considerations, these and similar protests (especially from the front) were rejected by some generals who were all too subordinate to HITLER. (I have reported on this elsewhere.)

CANARIS had protested and warned here too. It was in vain.

#### CO-OPERATION WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIED OR NEUTRAL STATES-- (ANTIFASCIST GROUP)

In co-operation with like-minded representatives of the intelligence system of allies or neutrals, or with their military attaches and other antifascist political or military personalities of these countries, CANARIS--to my knowledge and in my opinion followed two aims.

Either to prevent the entry into the war of the country concerned, on the side of Germany (e.g. in Spain) or to strengthen, or foster indirectly, efforts to quit the war (e.g. Italy and Hungary).

The names used in this were;

a) Orientation of the intelligence services of these countries on the actual political and military situation of Germany.

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b) Deception of the German political and military leaders regarding the extent and strength of the movements for an armistice in certain allied countries and

c) orientation of the military and political persons in these countries who were known as antifascists on the activities of their "Nazi-adherents" (Falange, Arrow Cross, Fascists etc) in Germany.

I know that CANARIS had engaged himself very strongly in this direction in Spain, Italy and Hungary--I suspect also Finland.

SPAIN

The constant companion on CANARIS on his numerous trips to Spain was Oberst i.G. PIEKENBROCK. He (PIEKENBROCK) could also report most extensively and thoroughly on the very active role of CANARIS in political and military collaboration with Spain under FRANCO. (In part, Vice Admiral BUECKNER could also).

Earlier in this report I have described only one incident (discussion with JORDANA, winter 1942-43) at which I myself was present.

I knew that CANARIS directly and indirectly supported all forces in Spain that turned against a still stronger participation of Spain on the German side, and against the policies of the Falange, from CANARIS's discussions with his friend Count ROCAMORE, Spanish Military Attache in Berlin.

Count ROCAMORE, educated in the Stella-Matutina at Feldkirch in Vorarlberg (Austria) has a Spanish princess as his wife, is a strong foe of FRANCO and a supporter of the pretender DON JUAN. He was regarded as such by the Auswaertiges Amt and the SD, and was spied on. With the arrival of the Spanish Ambassador FEINER (?) in 1942 (?) -- a Falangist -- ROCAMORE was recalled, but did not go to Spain, but to DON JUAN in Switzerland. ROCAMORE knows me as an Austrian, and was informed on my attitude toward the system and the Reich that I had to serve. I spoke with him not very frequently, but always completely frankly. He knew also that I helped CANARIS in getting to Spain a Polish aristocrat whose wife was Spanish, and he thanked me for this in 1939.

I remember also that CANARIS had very close relations in Spain with General VIGON and General Duce di MARTINEZ-CAMPOS and other Generals not personally known to me, and with the Alto-Commissario of Spanish Morocco, BEIGBEDER.

ITALY

In Italy was a close friend of the last head of the SIM, General AME. AME, a Piedmontese, was antifascist, anglophile, and a supporter of the King and BADOGLIO. CANARIS had presented me to him as an officer enjoying his absolute confidence, and indicated to AME that he could speak openly before me.

At the meeting in the Hotel Danielli in Venice, described earlier, in July 1943, I heard in the presence of AME and CANARIS the formulation of the report (which I later drafted) that was intended to assuage (i.e. deceive) the political and military leaders of Germany on the absolute loyalty of the BADOGLIO Government, and to dissipate their worries about all information countering this. CANARIS and AME were naturally completely oriented on the actual situation at the time in Italy.

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CANARIS knew through me of the plans of the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab that were laid down at the Berchtesgaden meeting (described earlier), which had been kept secret from him.

He had also good personal relations with the Italian Military Attache in Berlin at the time, and to his very clever predecessor, General ROATTA, both of whom were known as antifascists.

(I knew ROATTA from the time of Austrian-Italian collaboration as head of the SIM. At that time he worked very closely with Gen. Maj. BOEHME, head of the Austrian Intelligence under DOLLFUSS and SCHUSCHNIGG).

ROATTA's successor in Berlin was arrested immediately when Italy surrendered, since he was reproached with having an antifascist attitude and having reported in that sense as Military Attache.

I do not know through whom the contact of CANARIS to BADOGGIO went; but I suspect via AME (or possibly via the Vatican--OSTER Bureau).

#### HUNGARY

CANARIS maintained very good personal connexions with the Hungarian Intelligence, especially with its heads in 1939-42, General XANDORKA, later envoy to Spain, and General UJSZASZI, recently head of the Hungarian security service. Both were known as anglophile and Freemasons. General UJSZASZI was immediately arrested by the SD after HORTHY's fall.

CANARIS and I were good friends of the Hungarian Military Attache in Berlin, General HOMLOK, former Hungarian Military Attache in Paris then in 1938-39 head of the Hungarian V. Section, counterpart of Abwehr Abt II. Like me, a former Austro-Hungarian officer, HOMLOK had very frequent private contacts with me. I discussed with him all political and military events of the day in Germany, in complete and conscious frankness. I was as well informed about his attitude toward SZALLASI and the policies of the Third Reich as he was on mine and on CANARIS'. CANARIS and I spoke with him with absolute clearness about the activities of Arrow Cross Hungarian officers, e.g. of the Hungarian Military Attache in Sofia, Oberst i.G. XADLY-STANETZKI, Johann.

HOMLOK was of course very soon figured out by the SD, and his recall was demanded. (On this, Vice Admiral BUERKNER and PIEKENBROCK and BENTIVEGNI are informed.)

CANARIS was able to prevent this for a long time. Just before or at the time of, HORTHY's fall. HOMLOK also fell. I knew that he had intended as his successor Major i.G. XKUTY, whom I knew well, and who was like-minded. But it did not turn out thus. KUTY was tried by an Arrow Cross court, with other Hungarian officers well-known to me, for high treason. His fate is unknown to me.

#### FINLAND

I am not informed about the persons in Finland with whom CANARIS had contact in connexion with his anti-Nazi activity, since I never accompanied CANARIS on his trips to Finland. But I know that MANNERHEIM used CANARIS' intervention to liberate sons of Polish (former Imperial Russian) officers, known to MANNERHEIM or friends of his, from concentration camps.

I attended a discussion--I think in 1942--which was carried on by CANARIS' orders by Dr. DOHNANY (executed after 20 July) in this matter with SS-Gruf MUELLER. The discussion had generally negative results.

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HEINZ belonged in 1940 to a group of initiates who even then were preparing an attack on HITLER. I have heard that he was arrested on or after 20 July 1944. He is said however to have been released.

Generalmajor von PFUHLSTEIN took over the Brandenburg Division in December 1942. He had been proposed to CANARIS by General OSTER. A very obstinate Prussian, typical Reichswehr officer, he was an unconcealed foe of the Nazi regime. I know that OSTER, with and via PFUHLSTEIN, followed special purposes with the Brandenburg Division. PFUHLSTEIN is said to have been arrested, or at least interrogated, on or after 20 July.

Generalleutnant PIEKENBROCK--at that time Oberst d.G. and Head of Abwehr I, a very clever, open, generous and cheerful Westphalian, was a close friend of CANARIS. He is a Reichswehr type--i.e., as an officer, the typical unpolitical expert with modern professional training. He was the almost constant travelling companion of CANARIS, and, corresponding to the significance of his section, also his representative within the Abwehr. CANARIS had discussed with him all his intentions and plans, secret and official. PIEKENBROCK also knew of CANARIS' secret intentions with Abwehr Abteilung II and the Brandenburg Regiment.

PIEKENBROCK is the best section head who is best and most thoroughly oriented on CANARIS' personality as "Amtschef" and as human being. He was certainly not brought into the circle of 20 July, since there existed personal, rather deep disagreements between him and OSTER. He left Amt Ausland/Abwehr about April-May 1942, i.e. a year before I did.

Generalmajor Freiherr von BENTIVEGNI--at that time Oberst d.G. and head of Abwehr III--a somewhat ambitious Prussian, like PIEKENBROCK a typical Reichswehr officer, likewise maintained, so far as I know and can judge, strictly and correctly the line indicated by CANARIS. Forced to collaborate with Gestapo and SD and the NSDAP agencies of all sorts, as head of Abwehr III, he was officially more closely tied to these groups (diesen Gruppen gegenuiber gebundener) than at that time the section heads of Abwehr I and II. I know that BENTIVEGNI was also actively brought into the counteractivity, which had especially difficult form in his area.

His personal and confidential relationship to CANARIS was a very good one. It did not, however, approach the degree of friendship of CANARIS and PIEKENBROCK. He was entirely separate from the OSTER group. His personal relation to OSTER was good but reserved.

He left Amt Ausland/Abwehr about in the winter of 1943, thus half a year before me. I had worked very well together with both section heads (PIEKENBROCK and BENTIVEGNI) since the beginning of the war, in official and personal ways. I was a friend of PIEKENBROCK, and had a good personal relation to OSTER, who was not very popular with his German comrades; and in the matter that was his life's goal--the 20 July--I had an absolute relation of trust.

All officers named above knew me to be an Austrian in my attitude. I never appeared in this group to be otherwise than I think and feel.

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Oberst i.G. HANSEN -- PIKENBROCK's successor, and since April-May 1942 the head of Abwehr I--typical Reichswehr officer--an absolute foe of the system and of HITLER. After PIKENBROCK's departure, he was for this reason brought to the direction of Abwehr Abteilung I, in order to assure the continuity of the counteractivity. He was a very active, younger officer, who brought fresh elan into the inner circle of the CANARIS Organization which then, after three years of wearing struggle, was somewhat weakened in nervous strength.

Thus he and FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN e.g., in contrast to CANARIS, who was very conservative and inaccessible in questions of personnel, finally put through the point of view represented long and vainly by myself and other like-minded persons, that younger, reliable, but mentally and physically more flexible forces should be trained up.

HANSEN was executed after 20 July 1944.

Oberst RUDOLF--Leiter of Ast Paris, was a friend of OSTER and enjoyed CANARIS' absolute confidence. He was, for instance, also initiated in the GIRAUD case (see earlier in this report). I myself did not know RUDOLF further. He was arrested on 20 July.

Oberst ~~ARMSTER~~ took over Ast Vienna after MAROGNA. He was employed actively by MAROGNA (if not also by CANARIS and OSTER) for "counteractivity". I did not know him personally. He was executed after 20 July 1944.

Oberstleutnant Prinz ~~ARENBERG~~, assigned to Ast Vienna, was a friend of MAROGNA and one of his collaborators in the CANARIS-OSTER organization. I did not know him personally. He was arrested on 20 July 1944.

"Baron ~~NO~~" (a cover name) was head of Transmare, a disguised business enterprise for Abwehr purposes (I Wi). He was a Levantine, if I remember rightly Jewish; a Turkish citizen (at least he had a Turkish passport), and was very close friend of CANARIS and his family. For National Socialism and for HITLER, he had nothing but the biting wit of his superior intelligence. He went to South America before the beginning of the war. He is said to have returned to Switzerland (not Germany) in 1943-44. I am sure that he played a role in the "counteractivity", but I do not know what sort of duties he had.

#### FOREIGN OFFICE

CANARIS' relations with the Foreign Office were the worst imaginable. Even mention of names like Ambassador ~~BRITTER~~ (the special confidante of Vice Admiral BUECKNER, Chef Ausland), Dr. ~~GROEBEL~~, ~~WOERMANN~~, Dr. ~~KEPPLER~~ and other German diplomats could set CANARIS in a state of --sometimes manic-- excitement. (Let alone the mention of RIBBENTROP!)

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Dr. \*KRAMARSCH, successor of \*HEYDEN-RYNSCH, liaison man of the Foreign Office with Amt Ausland/Abwehr, was an SD-agent transplanted by RIBBENTROP into the office. CANARIS did not receive him.

The only person of the Foreign Office with whom CANARIS associated on terms of confidence was the Under Secretary Baron WEIZSAECKER, a very calm, sober and conservative professional diplomat. WEIZSAECKER, who had remained in Berlin, was either wholly uninformed about the military situation, or was informed only in the version censored and colored by the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab.

CANARIS supplied him currently with information about the actual development of the military situation in the theaters of war, and also informed him about all other projects and operations known to him of the military and political leadership, including the SD, of the Third Reich. Sometimes I myself made these reports to WEIZSAECKER, and I was once indicated to him by CANARIS as the officer before whom one could speak completely openly.

How far CANARIS brought WEIZSAECKER into his counteractivity I do not know.

#### GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMY

Corresponding to the system of "optimistic deception" in their own camp, CANARIS was very faultily oriented, or consciously misled, by KEITEL and the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab--increasingly since about 1941. He reacted in his own way to this attempted deception and the mistrust against his activity that probably played a part.

He immediately set up a "secret information service" against the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab. The network and the organization at his disposal were individual I-c's of armies and army groups, devoted to him and like-minded, or other officers in high positions. In this connexion, HANSEN and FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN had played a part since 1939-40. HANSEN, at that time with OQu IV (Fremde Heere, Near East, or West) and FREYTAG, I-c with an army group in the East, enjoyed CANARIS' special confidence, as did the I-c of Army Group Middle in the East (1941-42), whose name I do not recall.

In similar fashion, CANARIS had several other officers in high staffs and commands, as well as in the Fuehrer-Hauptquartier, who supplied him illegally and regularly with information on what was being worked on at the time.

#### ARMY HEADS

CANARIS' very frequent visits to certain army leaders served either for his personal orientation on the German military situation, or for the influencing of these generals for his secret projects, or for concrete discussions of his "counteractivity".

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~~Feldmarschall von WITZLEBEN~~ was visited by CANARIS several times in 1940 during his time of command in the West. From discussions with General OSTER, I learned that CANARIS even then was discussing the subject of "20 July".

~~Von REICHENAU~~ CANARIS and I visited him several times before the campaign in France in his headquarters, the Park Hotel in Duesseldorf. I know that CANARIS sought to influence von REICHENAU, who although a Nazi general was not wholly blocked up intellectually, by information and instruction about the methods being used in Poland, to a united act of protest of all army leaders in the West against the continuation of the war. (A project that was supported, in relation to the army leaders in the West, by the overvaluation of the MAGINOT Line, of the French will to resist, and the high German losses that were to be expected.)

REICHENAU, to my knowledge, in any case submitted to HITLER a memorandum called "The Guaranteeing (Sicherung) of German victory), which, as CANARIS had told me, had made use cleverly of many key-words given by CANARIS, and, disguised in the jargon of the Third Reich, demanded limitation to the success already achieved in Poland. I do not know whether this memorandum was read by HITLER at all.

REICHENAU died a natural death, from a stroke, in 1941. He carried on very actively all possible forms of sport and drank heavily. CANARIS had spoken to him a few days before his death. REICHENAU, at that time leader of an army in the East, expressed himself very skeptically, indeed pessimistically, on the chances of the war against Russia.

Feldmarschall von KLUGE: I accompanied CANARIS, I think before the drama of Stalingrad, on one of his frequent visits to von KLUGE, at that time Supreme Commander of Army Group Middle (Hq at Smolensk).

I know, although not present myself at the discussion, that CANARIS then spoke with KLUGE about carrying out an attack on HITLER planned for a visit of HITLER at the front (at that time HITLER still flew to the army group or army commands).

On the flight back, CANARIS said rather resignedly to me, referring to his conversation with KLUGE: "You can get nowhere with our marshals; as soon as even a tactical success is gained anywhere they draw back and get cold feet." (The tactical success to which he alluded was a counteroffensive by MANSTEIN that had begun well).

I will return to this plan of getting rid of HITLER on one of his visits to the front, in my report on "20 July".

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~~Feldmarschall von LEEB~~\*, at that time head of Army Group North in the East (1941) was often visited by CANARIS. I know that he was an outspoken foe of the system. Charged by the SD as being "religiously --i.e. clerically--involved", LEEB was very soon removed from his command.

It is significant, but explicable for every one knowing the internal political-intellectual structure of the three parts of the Wehrmacht, that CANARIS had not a single high-ranking Luftwaffe officer, to my knowledge, in his confidence.

He hardly had relations with the Navy, since he was generally regarded there as a renegade from his own arm. His relation to RAEDER and DOENITZ was more than cool. In this personal rivalries may have played a part, which I could not look into.

HEADS OF THE GENERAL STAFF

~~Generaloberst HALDER~~\*, Chief of the General Staff. CANARIS had made use of the very calm, somewhat professorial HALDER manifoldly and with varying success as an ally in his passive counteractivity (principally against the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab). He regretted, however, that HALDER could not be moved, aside from the purely military sphere, to any collaboration in the combat against the Nazi system.

~~General d. Inf. von SODENSTERN~~\*, 1941-42 Chief of Staff of Army Group South (Fm. BOCK, Generaloberst von WEICHS). A very clear-headed man, who observed happenings with somewhat phlegmatic and philosophical equilibrium. CANARIS had a very good confidential relationship to him. I believe that after being oriented by CANARIS he held his protecting and over the I-c of the Army Group, FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN.

~~Feldmarschall PAULUS~~\*, 1940, Chief of Staff with the Sixth Army (von REICHENAU) in the West. CANARIS at that time had a very good personal relationship with him, and spoke openly with him. (I myself was present at some conversations). When PAULUS declared that the methods being used in Poland were necessary and proper, he was (as CANARIS told me just after Stalingrad) finished as far as CANARIS went.

GENERALS

~~General d. Inf. GLAISE-HORSTENAU~~\*, 1941-42 German General in Zagreb. AS Austrian, an outstanding expert on the Balkans whose reports were distinguished by an objectivity that did one good, and absolute command of the very difficult Balkan problems. I believe that he also (perhaps only indirectly) stood in a certain contact with General OSTER. I know that he was under surveillance from 1942 or the spring of 1943 by the RSHA.

In my "treasure portfolio" there is preserved a conversation of CANARIS with GLAISE HORSTENAU (about May 1941 in Zagreb), in which the latter had expressed himself very clearly about the Third Reich and its policies.

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Général d. Inf. (or Kay. \*KOESTRING) until the war with Russia, was German Military Attache in Moscow. An outstanding expert on Russia, where he had grown up, with whom CANARIS agreed especially in all questions of the "treatment" of the Eastern Peoples by the Third Reich. To my knowledge, he had warned decidedly against a war with Russia, just as had his Ambassador Graf von der SCHULENBURG.

General d. Inf. \*WATZKI--OOQ IV (Fremde Heere) till 1940(?) German Military Attache in Tokio. A general very sober in opinion and judgment, to whom CANARIS had a very good personal relationship, and with whom he spoke very openly.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

Under Secretary \*SCHNEEBERGER was (with the collaboration of Dr. DOHNANY) brought in to intervene for persons who were persecuted or already imprisoned, by the Nazi system.

PROTESTANT CHURCH

Bishop \*HAECKEL (HECKEL?)-- I know that CANARIS supplied money to the Protestant Church through this bishop (allegedly for Abwehr purposes--(unter dem Titel fuer Abwehrzwecke)).

JEWISH PARTICIPANTS IN THE  
WORLD WAR

After the "Crystal Week" (excesses against Jewish shops, organized by GOEBBELS after the attempt on von RATH in Paris), the head of this association (Juedische Weltkriegsteilnehmer) appeared and thanked CANARIS for the help that CANARIS was granting, illegally, to his coreligionists. I know that CANARIS, with the help of OSTER and DOHNANY, made possible the emigration of Jews from Germany and used these "confidantes" for active counteractivity. I know further that CANARIS was summoned in 1943 (spring?) to Berchtesgaden to HITLER, and that the latter banned definitively, in very ungracious form, the use of Jews in Abwehr service, after the RSHA had informed HITLER about the real activity of these agents. At that time, CANARIS had to forbid the further use of Jewish VMen, in a written order to all Asts and KOs. So far as I know, he succeeded only in keeping

\*KLATT. Richard

In this connexion, I should like to mention that the SD also used Jews for agents (principally internally)-who however, in contrast to the motives that guided CANARIS, were forced with the worst extortions (threats to murder their relatives) to these services (informing and betrayal against their own coreligionists).

OTHER PERSONS

Dr. \*GESSLER--former Reichswehr Minister. I saw him several times with CANARIS (1940?).

Baron \*KAULBARS--Russian (Tsarist) emigrant, was employed by Abwehr Abt. I. CANARIS made use of many memoranda composed by

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KAULBARS as reports delivered from abroad by V-men. Reports that in the main consisted of the key-words inspired by CANARIS as expression of an (imaginary) anti-Bolshevist secret organization in Russia; and very sharply directed against the measures of German Eastern Policy that were thrust upon the Russian people.

GISEVIUS -- a German official, or employee of the German Legation in Bern or of the German Consulate in Zuerich; was also one of General OSTER's men. Definitely anti-Nazi, and, I am convinced, at least mediatory for those contacts leading abroad which CANARIS maintained in Switzerland. On these contacts and the persons brought in in connexion with them I can say little, since I myself was never in Switzerland.

I know, however, that GISEVIUS was also initiated into the subject of the 20 July, since this matter was handled rather concretely in a conversation between GISEVIUS and another person, at which I was present (I believe in 1942 or at the beginning of 1943). In my report on "20 July" I shall return to this discussion.

\*  
Frau SZYMANSKA -- wife of the last Polish Military Attaché in Berlin. A very wise, also politically highly educated woman, whom CANARIS looked up regularly in Switzerland, and whose family in Warsaw was protected and especially looked after by the Abwehr. Her husband, Colonel or General SZYMANSKI, fought at that time with MONTGOMERY's Army in Africa.

I have various indications that she was one of the most active supporters in CANARIS' "counteractivity", just as in general I, and other like-minded persons, calculated that CANARIS maintained direct contacts via Switzerland to the Allied intelligence services.

\* Countess THEOTOKIS *Elena Alexandre* -- a very clever Greek, Jewish or half-Jewish, perfectly clear in her political attitude, was along with her family supported strongly by CANARIS. She lived at that time 1941-42 in Corfu. CANARIS met her often in Rome or Venice. I believe that she was connected with the British IS. The KO-Leiter Italy, Oberst HELFFERICH, should know more about her.

PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF INDIVIDUALS AGAINST NAZI PERSECUTION,  
AND ALLEVIATION OF HARDSHIPS CAUSED BY THE WAR

The Abwehr offered till about 1942, in accord with its personnel and its still independent position, certain possibilities of protecting individuals against acts of the Gestapo or SD, or at least of assuaging the lot of persons persecuted by the system. CANARIS made most extensive use of these possibilities, at the same time employing his "secret organization". He had not only helped innumerable people, among them citizens of enemy states, in all possible ways, but also had in individual cases saved people from sure death.

I mention in this connexion only the case of a German scientist, who lived in Paris and was condemned to death for alleged espionage. CANARIS, who was much aroused at the "juristic" handling of this case, had attained, by very clever influencing of

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GOERING, postponement of the execution, retrial of the case, and at the end the release of the person concerned. (BENTIVEGNI is very well oriented on the details of this matter).

CANARIS also took part in the repeated and very daring efforts to secure the release of Pastor NIEMOELLER from the concentration camp. Not the smallest reason for their failure was the fanatical but not very wise attitude of NIEMOELLER.

In the following I mention only a few persons whom I was able to protect from Nazi persecution, in my official sphere, with the support and knowledge of CANARIS.

(Austrian) Generalmajor d.R. Max ~~RONGE~~<sup>\*</sup>--last head of the Austro-Hungarian Secret Service in the First World War, and my teacher in the Austrian "rigid special testing commission" in 1930-33 (Austrian General Staff training). He was active in 1938 in the Austrian Chancellery in internal intelligence against the illegal Nazi movement. He was arrested immediately after the annexation of Austria. I refused to search his house, as was ordered by the Adjutants' Office of the Austrian Ministry of Defence; and secured his release, with the help of CANARIS and MAROGNA, after only 3 or 4 months' imprisonment in Munich.

(Austrian) Feldmarschalleutnant PANESCH-- a pensioned officer of the old Austrian Army, over 70 years old, who was arrested by the police when the German troops entered Vienna. With MAROGNA's aid, I was able to free him after a few days from the Nazi Prison.

FECHNER-- See Part I, pp. 2-3.

(Austrian) Hauptmann ~~SCHORR~~<sup>\*</sup>-- was in the Austrian Nachrichtenabteilung (Abwehr) in charge of the Referat "Germany". Turned to me for help because he was persecuted as a Jew. I sent him in 1939 as a V-man to Czernowitz, Rumania. He was under (at that time) Hauptmann BAUN of Abw I.

~~Hermann~~  
In 1941 SCHORR was in Jugoslavia, in the Hungarian zone of occupation), and he was recommended by me to the protection of the Hungarian IS.

Polish aristocrat --(name not given)-- was with the help of my section transferred via Italy to Spain in 1939.

Polish Colonel ~~BRABEC~~<sup>\*</sup> and son-- former Austrian Cavalry Officer (comrade of BOR-KOMOROWSKI), whose son was active in the Polish resistance movement. He was, on my orders, taken care of by ABSHAGEN, my adjutant and confidante.

Pastor of Versailles-- was taken prisoner of war by the Germans in 1940, and as a priest was imprisoned by the Gestapo. Through a request of the BIHET-RICHOU family (see Part II), I brought about the release of this priest. The Abbé thanked me personally in Versailles.

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\* Frau ZUCKERBAECKER-- Viennese emigrant, in Paris. On request of Graefin RESSEQUIER, now in Bad Ischl, I sent objects of value belonging to Frau ZUCKERBAECKER from Germany to France, in 1938 or 1939. The transfer of this jewelry was carried out by Mme. BIHET-RICHOU.

\* The father of Graefin RESSEQUIER, the Austrian Fmlt. d. R. ENGLISCH-POEPARICH was for almost a year in Dachau concentration camp. Like my brother, he had lived till now in exile from Austria, in Germany. For him, Generaloberst BECK and General OSTER had interceded at my instigation.

Colonel TERRADE and Colonel TROUILLER-- French officer PWs, TROUILLER a fanatical De GAULLISTE. Their supervision was carried on through Major ABSHAGEN. Independently of this, they maintained an illegal connexion to me via the Vichy Legation in Budapest (Mme. BIHET).

\* Hauptmann Dr. WEISENTHAL--Vienna, turned for help to me, since he was persecuted as a Jew. I destroyed the dossier with Abw III, which contained political material against him. If I remember rightly, he emigrated.

#### ACTIVITY OF THE CANARIS ORGANIZATION TILL THE END OF THE WAR

At the beginning of June or July 1943, I began to turn over Abw Abt II to my successor, Oberst i.G. FREYTAG von LORINGHOVEN. He was personally indoctrinated regarding the secret tasks by CANARIS and myself. Since I had no doubts about the result of the war, I had to count on the destruction of all the files of my section. Therefore, if memory serves, from 1941 or 1942--I had my secretary VOIGT (retroactively to the beginning of the war) make copies currently of the War Diary of Abteilung II.

Likewise, I had begun as early as 1939 with the collection and copying of certain reports and secret documents that were accessible to me (my "treasure portfolio"--Raritaetenmappe) which, beyond the frame of Abw II, reproduce conversations and remarks of leading personalities of the Third Reich.

I had firmly resolved to save these documents--diary and treasure portfolio--beyond the end of the war. I therefore transferred these papers, when I left for the front, to Austria, and turned over to FECHNER for secure and concealed preservation in Vienna. I hope that these documents will fulfil the purpose for which they have been consciously kept back for years.

FREYTAG had successfully continued the counteractivity, with his whole being, and above all had ruthlessly carried out the personnel policy already introduced by me and adapted to this purpose.

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\* In regard to the three Leitstellen which, in the course of the reorganization of the Abwehr were being set up in his sphere, he had, to be sure, to yield, in Leitstelle West, to the already considerably strengthened political pressure and accept the recommended assignment of the SD member Hauptmann HUMMEL to the command there; in the Southeast, however, he succeeded despite great difficulties in carrying out the appointment of FECHNER as chief of the Leitstelle.

When FREYTAG had to spend some time in Vienna in March 1944, because of preparations for the German march into Hungary, the situation was already so tense that he counted hourly on being arrested. For example, he gave orders on the occasion of each of his discussions with the SD that in case he had not returned at a certain time, certain offices were to be informed, under cover, of his arrest.

FREYTAG suffered in those days also under the order given him personally by HIMMLER to be responsible for all Abwehr plans connected with the march into Hungary, and especially for the ordered collaboration with SS-Oberfuehrer ~~PIERADER~~ of the SD. He and also MAROGNA extracted themselves, by subterfuge, from staying in Budapest as they had been ordered. They stated that they could no longer face their Hungarian counterparts, with whom they were familiar through years of collaboration, after the attack of the Germans and the customary methods being used in it once more.

Personally, I am incidentally convinced that FREYTAG and MAROGNA informed the Hungarian IS in time of the imminent measures of HIMMLER or HITLER.

After FREYTAG's departure, which was followed also by that of the chief secretary VOIGT, who had spent years in the office and was initiated into the plan, Major i.G. NAUMANN took over the deputy leadership of the Abteilung, since SKORZENY in the meantime was appointed chief of Abwehr Abt II (or rather of Mil D, which had replaced it). FREYTAG had, when he left, described NAUMANN as an officer who was to be sure still very young but absolutely decent and completely in accord with his own line--but nevertheless did not indoctrinate him fully into the counteractivity.

When, on 20 July 1944, NAUMANN as the temporary head at Baruth had the Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP there arrested, and in this was threatened with a machine-pistol by the SS-member Hpt. WITZEL, he was about through. He was replaced by the notorious friend of KALTENBRUNNER, Major Dr. LOOS, a Linz attorney. With this, the complete turning over of the still remaining members of Abw II to the SD had been realized.

\*The incidents given in the following report took place after my departure from Abw Abt II. I describe them according to the information received from different sides, and I believe I can, on the basis of exact knowledge of the existing circumstances, testify to the accuracy of the statements.

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The direction of the counteractivity, which had become very difficult under these circumstances, now was passed entirely to FECHNER, and relied essentially on the Viennese group, created by him and still existing as a unit.

With Mil D there were at that time the following like-minded officers: Hptm. Dr. EISENBERG, Hptm. ABTITNER, and especially Oblt. Dr. FERID. They supported FECHNER as far as was still possible, informed him in time of the plans of Mil D and in particular of measures being considered regarding him.

Meanwhile, FECHNER transferred the extraordinarily valuable documents that were in his care, contrary to LOOS' explicit orders, with a part of his office, to Tyrol, and at the beginning of April 1945 followed them, with the remainder of his people, although in the meantime SKORZENY had already ordered his replacement by Major PARTL.

#### CONCLUSION

I have tried, solely from memory, to sketch a picture of the "counteractivity" within the Abwehr and especially within Abteilung II.

Head and soul of this counteractivity was CANARIS.

A personality full of his own quality, with sharpest intellect, and--despite many contradictions of his extremely mobile spirit-- full of deep humanity.

Measured against the surroundings in which he--unmilitary even to the most external externalities!-- was set, in any case an individualist.

I believe I know the motives that induced CANARIS to this underground combat against HITLER and the system.

CANARIS knew what the ultimate goals were that HITLER and his clique had set for themselves, and he knew about the means and methods with which they wanted to realize these goals.

CANARIS led this combat very flexibly and with a wealth of ideas, but still always with sober measurement of the power-relations at any time. He conducted this fight with the weapons corresponding to his nature: cleverness, intuition, and --deceit. I know, however, situations where CANARIS showed decided moral courage.

It can, in my opinion, be assumed with certainty that HIMMLER and especially HEYDRICH (CANARIS' most dangerous foe) very soon got wind of this subversive activity of the chief of the Abwehr. Perhaps at first not complete knowledge, but surely sufficient hints and grounds for suspicion.

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That HIMMLER did not take strong action till the beginning of 1944, and even then spared CANARIS at first, I explain-- aside from the very clever, sometimes absolutely refined tactics of CANARIS toward the RSHA, --by the fact that they were making use of, and had to make use of, the personality of the Admiral-- it does not matter whether willingly or not--in order to get to certain circles abroad that were hopelessly inaccessible for exponents of Herr HIMMLER or RIBBENTROP.

It is very hard even approximately to pass on the enormous burden of spirit that this "counteractivity" demanded, partly in nerve-shattering guerilla warfare, partly in conscious taking-on of the ultimate risk.

As one of the few closest confidantes of CANARIS still alive, I feel myself bound to separate most sharply the members of this circle, of which a not too small number-- at their head CANARIS himself--were executed after preceding inhuman tortures, and who from the first day of the war and in many cases even before, have taken up a clear position toward HITLER and National Socialism--from those "opposition movements" that discovered their hostility to Nazism only in 1944 or even later.

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