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	FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT Source : SELBERT, Franz	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Position : Lieutenant Colonel, Abwe Case No. : SO65 Ref. No. : SO65/USDIC/DC5	HICROFILMED AUU J 0 1966 DOC. MICRO. SER.
	Date : 2 January 1946 Copy No. : LIC	ſ
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I. SOURCE

A. Reference

For description and vital statistics of Franz SEUBERT, see Preliminary Information Report, Ref. No. SO65/USDIC/PE9, this Headquarters, dated 30 November 1945.

A second detailed report, covering Subject's activities in Southeastern Europe from 1943 to 1945, will be issued at a later date, to be followed by a complete detailed report on the career of Franz SEUBERT.

B. Abwehr Activities

In connection with the following report, it should be men- A tioned that Subject was in charge of Referat 2 of Abwehr I-H West since early 1941, and thus had a first hand knowledge of its activities in North Africa at that time. Accompanying his immediate superior, Oberst MAURFR (chief of I-H West) he visited "Wido" at Zuara and "Dora" at Hon, two projects behind the Allied lines, in April 1942. When Abwehrkommando Tunis was formed, after the invasion of North Africa, Subject was put in command of an Aufklaerungsgruppe (Abwehr Abteilung I). Shortly before the surrender of the Germans in Tunisia, Subject left the area in General KESSELRING's plane and returned to Berlin.

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. ABWEHRABTEILUNG I-H WEST

A. The Referate

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The following information refers primarily to the organization and functions of I-H (West), under the command of Oberst Karl MAURER.

Besides a personnel section, I-H (West) was divided into three parts, called Referate:

Referat No. 1 (Auswertestelle) evaluated the intelligence supplied by the other two, edited the reports, and submitted them to the section "Fremde Heere" (foreign Armies) of the General Staff. Referat 1 was headed by Oberstleutnant THOERING who was next in seniority to Oberst MAURER and acting commander of I-H (West) when the latter was absent.

Referat No. 2 (Organisation) had the task of actually collecting intelligence and directing the activities of AST's (Abwehrstalle), KO's (Kriegsorganisation), and other agencies and special projects operating in or from Holland, Belgium, France, and North Africa. Since early 1941, Referat 2 was under the command of Oberstleutnant Franz SEUBERT, whose senior officer was Haupthann (Dr) BERGER; another officer in this section was Oberleutnant LANG. (LT)

Referat No.3 (Organisation) had identical tasks as Referat 2 in the territories of Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Italy. From May 1939 until his shift to Referat 2 in 1941. Source was in charge of Referat 3. He was succeeded by his assistant, (Major) H SCHRFIBER.

B. Functions of I-H West

Abwehr Abteilung I-H (West) was responsible for a steady supply of useful information revealing the intentions and plans of enemy as well as neutral governments and staffs, disposition and movement of troops, armament, equipment, installations, supplies, reports on the morale of troops (the officers as well as the men), and of civilian populations.

The office itself acted mainly as a channel and worked with a small staff; it was responsible, however, for keeping its agencies under continuous control and, if necessary to apply pressure

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<u>S E C R E T</u>

to insure sufficient and reliable information. It appointed or approved the personnel of its outposts and agencies and, in the case of confidants or secret agents, consulted the ZKV (Zentralkartei der V-Leute), which kept files on thousands of persons all over the world. The ZKV was an independent department of Amt Ausland Abwehr.

The KO's (Kriegs-Organisation) were usually built into the diplomatic staff accredited to a neutral government, their leaders being camouflaged as honorary consuls or other functionaries. Thus, as a rule, the Abwehr organization sent its material in the diplomatic pouch to a liaison man at Auswaertiges Amt, Berlin, whence it was forwarded, unopened, to the offices concerned, such as I-H West.

Abwehr also had its own radio net, and messages were frequently transmitted in this way. Daily changing codes were delivered to stations abroad by special courier in monthly periods, Chi-Abteilung, directly under Amt Ausland Abwehr, took care of preparing the codes, which grew more and more complicated as the war progressed and the ability of both adversaries in breaking enemy codes increased. Radio messages were received and immediately decoded by Abteilung FUNK, directly subordinate to Amt Ausland Abwehr, and forwarded in the clear to the offices concerned, such as I-H.

To increase the security of messages, particularly maps, overlays, and sketches sent by courier, especially if the latter had to fly over enemy territory or the open sea, such documents were often reduced to almost microscopic size, by way of photography, and could then be inserted in a prearranged spot of an otherwise unimportant message, even within the dot of an "i". This highly perfected process had been developped by Abteilung I-G, which also experimented with secret inks, chemical, and other tests used in counter-intelligence, censorship, etc.

In addition to its activities through agents and through collection of a variety of information from many different sources, Abwehr I-H West put great emphasis on the development of an efficient monitoring service. The great number of intercepted messages were relayed to Chi-Abteilung, which had to break down the codes and dispose of the decoded messages.

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C. Foreign Outposts

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Mong the outposts of Referat 2, the AST Haag (Holland) under Oberst HAUSWALD/was considered one of the weaker links. Most of the intelligence service directed against England was channelled through AST Brussels, headed by Oberst SERVAES. This AST organized projects into England, whereby agents were landed by submarines as well as from airplanes.

Intelligence service in France was contralized in Abwehr Leitstelle Paris, under the command of Oberst WRUDOLF, a close associate p // of Oberst MAURER, chief of I-H (West), who usually handled matters concerning France directly, somewhat by passing Referat 2. This Leitstelle directed the activities of AST's Paris, Dijon, Angers, Bordeaux, and St. Germain.

KO Switzerland was headed by Oberstleutnant WAAG. It was one of the oldest establishments in this organization and worked smoothly, although its effectiveness was greatly reduced after the occupation of Southern France. In 1942 WAAG was transferred to Paris, where he became chief of Abteilung I of the AST, and his successor in Berne was Kapitach MEISSNER. One of his most efficient aids was Hauptmann von und zu gue UEHLEN.

IV. INTELLIGENCE WORK IN NORTH AFRICA.

The North African territory came within the zones of both Sections 2 and 3; Section 2 obtained intelligence on this region through the AST's in France, particularly AST St. Germain, and to a lesser extent through AST Bordeaux. Before the campaign against France it had received a small amount of information, which was at that time of little interest, through the AST's at Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, and Muenster. In addition to the AST's in France, Referat 2 established a special outpost, called Aussenstelle "Wido" which became a cornerstone in the North-African intelligence set-up, and which will be described in detail later in this report.

Another source of information that came to Referat 2 from Africa were the Abwehr officers attached to the various detachments of the German Armistice Commission. They were located in Algiers, Oran, Tunis, Casablanca, and the officer attached to the latter detachment was Kapitaan UNTERBERGER. These reports were channelled through the Armistice-Commission at Wiesbaden, where they were partly evaluated and screened.

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As a result, reports that did not suit the taste of the Armistice Commission were withheld, others forwarded with comments and deletions. They were not considered very reliable for these reasons.

Referat 3 obtained reports on North Africa through its KO Spain, headed by Kapitaer LENZ. (His cover name was SOMMER, his real name LEISER). LENZ was accredited at the German Embassy in Madrid as an honorary consul. He had collecting points (Meldestellen) in San Sebastian, Algeciras, Tanger (which was under the direction of an Abwehr II man, specializing in sabotage and propaganda), and Ceuta (whose chief was Oberstleutnant dor Luftwaffe RUDOLF) not to be confused with RUDOLF of AST-Leitstelle Paris). The KO Spain dated back to the days of the Spanish Civil War and was staffed by former members of the Condor-Legion. It worked efficiently, had the important task of controlling traffic in the Straits of Gibraltar, and maintained a very effective monitoring system of French radio communications. Its reports and manuscripts were flown to Berlin, in the diplomatic pouch, and turned over to Abteilung Chi.

Reports on North Africa which came via Spain were usually reliable and frequently of a pessimistic and alarming nature. The strong influence of the high-ranking officers of the German Armistice Commission at the High Command in Berlin caused these reports to be considered as exaggerated. In one instance, a report obtained through high Horoccan personalities, via the outpost at Ceuta, pointed out that British or American landings were expected in the Casablanca region, and that preparations lead to believe that these landings were planned for a certain period not far off. This report was ridiculed, torn up, and thrown away in the I-H office; the Allied invasion did take place at the predicted time and location.

Thus, the surcess and stupidity of the members of the Armistice Commission in North. Africa contributed greatly to the unproparedness of the German defense in that area.

The German Abwehr suffered under an insufficient number of capable officers who could understand the Arab mentality and be willing to deal with the Arabs accordingly. The AST Ste Germain became a center of Abwehr activity toward North Africa since there were a number of prison camps in the vicinty from which they drew volunteers who pledged to supply information after their return to their homes in North Africa. The selection and training of these returnees was handled in such a poor manner that a huge per-

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centage deserted promptly and many of them disappeared with valuable equipment. SEUBERT, as the chief of Referat 2 of I-H (West) at that time, contacted Hauptmann PRETZEL who had an insignificant assignment in France. PRETZEL had been a Catholic Priest and had studied Semitic languages. He became so enthused about the Koran that he converted to the Islam. As a Mohammedan he married and subsequently became a university professor in Munich, where he tought Arabic and similar subjects. He was assigned to AST St. Germain and put in charge of the selection and training of North African agents. As a result, the Abwehr in that region improved rapidly. PRETZEL was killed in an airplane accident in 1942 during a flight to Athens.

V. AUSSENSTELLE "WIDO"

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Early in 1941, ABW I-H (West) established Aussenstelle "Wido", Tripoli. General WAVELL had carried his first great counter-offensive to El Agheila, and the new outpost was created to serve in preparation and support of General ROH EL's first drive which began on 24 March 1941.

The commander of the new outpost was Rittmeister (i.R.) Witilo vor GRIESHEIM. The cover-name of the post and its leader was "Wido" von GRIESHEIM had been an officer of the German cavalry in 1936 and 1937 and spent several months on detached service with the Italian Army, during which time he acquired an excellent knowledge of the Italian language. He was last attached to the German General Staff, but was forced to resign in 1937. His abnormal sexual disposition is said to have been the cause of incidents which led to his resignation.

In 1940 von GRIESHEIM volunteered for military service and was referred to Admiral CANARIS who decided to employ him in Africa. After long negotiations with the Italian Ministry of War, permission was granted for von GRIESHEIL's assignment to Tripoli. The post "Wido" undertook to gather intelligence centering on Tunisia, Algeria, and French Equatorial Africa. It had to cooperate closely with the Italian Intelligence Service (SIM).

Aussenstelle Wide was located for a short time in the town of Tripoli, later in Nalut, Western Libya, and finally at Zuara near the Algerian border. In this last location Wide shared the office of <u>Hage</u> BRUNERO, commanding officer of the Italian Intelligence Service in the zone of Zuara, where you GRIESHEIM succeeded in

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becoming the driving spirit behind the Italian command. Magg. BRUNERO was directly subordinate to Magg. NANNI of the Italian General Staff.

Wido reorganized and intensified the Italian monitoring service in Mestern Libya (Nalut, Gadames, Murzuk, Ghat) and obtained valuable information from the territory of the French colonies, through Arabian agents and through members of the Tuareg tribes. GRIESHEIM's interpreter was a young native of one of the latter tribes. Information on the secret armament of the French Colonial Army, on the establishment and preparation of airfields, and on troop movements was thus obtained.

Intelligence reports from Wido went simultaneously to the Gorman ABW. I-H (West) in Berlin and to the Ministero della Guerra in Rome, where the Gorman liaison officer, Oberst HELFTRICH, was the direct superior to von GRIESHEIM for administrative matters. All communications between Berlin and Wido were channelled through that office. For matters of command and discipline Wido was subordinate to ABW. I-H (West) in Berlin.

For a short time, an Unteroffizier von STEFFENS was assigned to Wido. He had been a member of the French Foreign Legion between 1923 and 1930 and tried to rehabilitate himself by serving in the German army. He did not get along well with von GRIESHEIN, and was recalled upon the latter's request.

> Most of the time Wido's personnel consisted only of three radio operators and a driver, who all spoke Italian fluently. They wore civilian-type tropical clothing, associated freely with the Italians, and as a result gained excellent cooperation. The Italian Intelligence Service, like the average Italian officers and troops, was considered inefficient by the Germans. It showed little or no interest in the prosecution of the war. Von GRIESHEIM's appearance at Zuara led to great improvement of the service, partly by his diplomatic behaviour toward the ranking personnel, partly due to his generosity expressed in money and cigarettes directly to subordinate Italian soldiers, as well as to agents and civilians who volunteered information.

While von GRIESHEIM's little organization continued to work in the zone of Libya and Tripolitania it assisted in the preparation and direction of two separate undertakings, which were in connection with the last big Axis drive to the East eventually stopped at El Alamein.

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"Sonderkommando Salan"

The first one of these two expeditions was called Sonderkommando "Salam". It was organized toward the end of 1941 under the com-mand of Leutnant Laszlo von ALMASY, originally of the Hungarian Air Force, who had been taken over into the German Luftwaffe with the rank of a captain and had been assigned to ROMTEL by AST Hamburg as a recomparisance pilot. In that capacity AIMASY had to work with a Hauptmann RITTER. Because of grave differences between the two. AIMASY left the service of AST Hamburg and thus became available to ABW. I-H. ALMASY later wrote a book in Hungarian, "With Rommel in Africa", describing his experiences as a reconnaissance pilot. Before the war he had already published a book in English language called "Unknown Sahara". He had been in the service of the Egyptian government as a surveyor in car and plane expeditions to make maps of the Sudan. His experience was of greatest advantage to the Germans. ALMASY was in a position to correct books and military maps of the area and to give valuable advice when German airplanes were equipped for service in the desort. He was temporarily "leased" to the Luftwaffen Fuehrungsstab.

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General ROMMEL needed reliable information regarding broop movements to Egypt from Palestine, the Iraq, and India, and about the flow of supplies through Red Sea ports. It was decided to place two picked men in the rear of the British zone of operations. The men picked were Germans who had lived most of their lives in Egypt and returned to Germany before the outbreak of the war. These men, SANSTEDE and EPPNER (or ERPLER ?) were trained by the "Brandenburg" regiment. They volunteered for this assignment and worked under a special agreement with Abwehr ZR and ZF which involved a payment to each of a considerable sum, probably in the neighborhood of 30,000 Marks.

AIMASY was put in charge of the expedition, but he declined to drop these men by airplane, as the danger of discovery would have been too great. The project was to be done by automobiles across the desert. Toward the end of 1941 the members of the expedition were selected and arrived in Tripoli, where, with the assistance of Wido, the equipment was completed and the men acclimatized and well prepared within six or seven weeks. The cars used were captured Fords, with German markings, covered with sand and dust most of the time. The tropical uniforms were hard to distinguish from Allied tropical gear, and since every member of the expedition spoke English fluently, the danger of discovery was reduced to a minimum.

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The group started from the Oasis Gialo with six vehicles. The first attempt was unsuccessful since they got into a region of shifting dunes and had to turn back after three days, with one casualty suffering a heart collapse. The second attempt was made through the region of Gilf Khebir which ALMASY knew particularly well. This time Sonderkommando "Salam" got through and reached the Nile in the vicinity of Assiut. It had run into several small British units and sentrics but remained undetected and unrecognized.

SANSTEDE and EPPNER (?) were left behind with the necessary radio equipment, and the rest of the group returned over the same route and arrived in Tripoli two weeks after it had left. The two men hoped to gain the needed information through the help of a political group of Britophobe young Egyptians, They were to be relieved after a successful entry into Cairo by the German army.

Although the most dangerous part of this expedition was thus accomplished, the result became nil when the control station near the staff headquarters of General ROM EL, which had to maintain communications with the "Salam" station on the Nile, was captured during a movement by a British armored unit. Hen, equipment, and operating instructions were thus captured before a single transmission had been made. SANSTEDE and EPPNER were warned not to attempt to communicate and have not been heard of again by the German command. Abwehr I-H strongly suspected that the two might have gone over to the British.

ALMASY made a personal report to General ROMEL and, since his part in the expedition had been entirely successful, was awarded the Iron Cross First Class and promoted to Major in the German Luftwaffe. Sonderkommando "Salam" was then dissolved and <u>ALMASY</u>, discharged upon his request.

"Unternehmen Dora"-

The second of the two special undertakings in which "Tido" assisted was called Unternehmen "Dora".

Air and sea traffic from the American continent to French Central Africa had been carefully observed and the frequent press reports about the formation of a French army under De GAULLE in French Equatorial Africa caused the German High Command to evaluate the seriousness of a threat from that direction. The OKW, as well as Luftwaffenfuchrungsstab, wanted to be informed about the possi-

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bility of moving sizeable bodies of troops, particularly mechanized units, from the south against ROMMEL's flank.

The maps of Libya which had proven to be unreliable, could not be used to answer this question. A special detachment "Theodora" of the AST Muenster had already begun a somewhat academic examination of poorly cartographed African territory. Following a suggestion of the young scientist SCHULZ-KAMPFHENKEL, and based on thorough study of geographical works and maps, a considerable amount of information was gained. The tedious work of piecing together such information was largely performed by university professors who were assigned to this task as Sonderfuehrers. Interrogation of prisoners from French colonial troops also brought some useful results. The High Command, however, was not satisfied with this theoretical approach to the problem.

It wanted quick and reliable on-the-spot exploration of the territory between Equatorial Africa and the North African zone of operations, and for that purpose the command "Dora" was organized by ABV I-H (West). With the consent of the Italian Ministry of War and the assistance of Wido, the expedition was equipped in Tripoli in the spring of 1942. It was based in Hon, Central Libya and consisted of approximately 30 to 40 men under the command of <u>Oberstleutnant HAPCKEL</u> of the Luftwaffe, with <u>Leutnant SCAULTZ</u> P.17 <u>KAMPFHENKEL</u> in charge of the scientific work. The latter established an office in Berlin, called detachment "Theo", equipped with the most modern instruments of its kind, which compiled and evaluated the results of the expedition Tsoff used soveral desert-going armored cars, two reconnaissance planes, and a glider plane in its work.

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After three months of this kind of combined research, the OKW was satisfied that a deployment of enemy troops from French Equatorial Africa into the German flank was extremely unlikely in view of the geographical and geological conditions and could be discounted.

It may be mentioned that the leader of the expedition "Dora", Lieutenant Colonel HAECKEL, was constantly at odds with the Italians and consequently received very little cooperation. After the battle of El Alancin, in October 1942, when the Germans were in retreat and British troops advanced from the direction of the Kufra oasis, HAECKEL's group got into a very difficult situation and the Italian troops in that sector did not bother to help him. Somehow he managed to evacuate his personnel, but all the valuable equipment had to be abandoned. Thereupon HAECKL was put at the disposal of Luft-

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waffe and the rest of his officers and men returned to their original units. Leutnant SCHULTZ-KAMPFHENKEL was retained and is said to have continued to work with a new group "Dora" in a different war zone.

While the two special commands "Salam" and "Dora" were in operation, Wido continued its assigned intelligence work, besides assisting in natters of communications with the two groups. When the British Eighth Army threatened Tripoli, von GRIESHEIM received orders to move his post Wido to Gabes, Tunisia, which had been occupied by the Germans after African invasion of the Allies.

Although the military situation was dangerous and confused, von GRIESHEIM succeeded in reaching Gabes, and on his way liberated a part of the Italian Armistice Commission to Tunisia, which had been captured by the French. Upon arrival at Gabes, Dienststelle Wido was re-activated under the direct command of Abwehrkommando Tunis. As the German-held area contracted von GRIESHEIM was dispatched to Sicily in March 1943 to establish an echelon to which Abwehrkommando Tunis could withdraw. Further developments rendered these preparations futile, and in May 1943 his service for the Wehrmacht was terminated as far as source knows,

VI. PERSONALITIES.

AIMASY, Laszlo von

BERGER, Dr.

Oberleutnant der Reserve (later Major) of the Hungarian air force. He attended English schools and was a geographer, author, automobile racing ace, and pilot. Between the wars ALMASY worked for about ten years as a surveyor of the Sudan region for the Egyptian government. He lived in Budapest and returned there after discharge from the Abwehr early 1942, to devote himself to writing books. Subject met him last in November 1944, when ALMASY was getting ready to leave Budapest and to try to get into Switzerland. Subject believes he was stopped at the Swiss border and turned back, but he does not know what happened to him later.

Hauptaann der Reserve. Born about 1900, five feet eleven inches tall, has blond hair and wears glasses. Before the war Dr. BERGFR

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was in a leading position at Kloeckner-Werke in Rheinland-Westfalen. Speaks French well. His army career began at AST Muenster (Westfalen), and he was thence transferred to AST Angers (France) as I-H officer. In Spring 1942, he was called to Berlin and became assistant to Subject in ABW I-H (West), Referat 2. He took over in 1942 when Subject was appointed ABN I officer in Tunis. Dr. BERGER was assigned to an Abwehr Command in Italy in the summer of 1943 and took charge of a Frontaufklaerungstrupp (a front line intelligence section), which position he is said to have held until the end of the war.

Major, commanding officer of Italian Intelligence Service in zone of Zuara.

EPPNER (possibly EPPLFR) German from Egypt and was born about 1912, five feet eight inches tall. He had special training in Lehrregiment "Brandenburg". He was assigned to ABU I-H West for specialized service in Egypt. Subject believes EPPNER had his wife in Cairo. He never reported back to the German Command after the failure of the "Salam" expedition.

> Rittmeister a.D. Born about 1900, five feet ten inches tall. Lived with his mother in Berlin. Officer of the Reichswehr, then with a cavalry regiment of the Wehrmacht, until 1936 or 1937 when he had been attached to the General Staff. Spent several months in an Italian cavalry school taking part in an exchange project. Spent several months in Libya. Left the Wehrmacht about 1937 as Rittmeister (captain), but volunteered for service in 1940. Was taken over by Abwehr I, with a special contract, and assigned to the command of Aussenstelle Wido in Tripoli. Left the service in Spring 1943. Subject has not heard from him since.

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BRUNERO

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GRIESHEIM, Witilo von

HAECKEL

HAUSWALD

HELFERICH LANG, Karl SECRET

Oberstleutnant, Luftwaffe officer. Born about 1892, light blond hair, about six feet five inches, strong built. Took part in the Spanish Civil War with the Condor Legion. Tas then assigned to AST Muenster (Westfalen) and later to NEST Biarritz of AST Bordeaux. HAECKEL belonged to Abwehr III. Was in charge of special command "Dora", but because of continuous clashes with the Italians, who complained frequently about his drinking excesses and rabid behaviour, he was put to the disposal of Luftwaffe immediately after the conclusion of the special task of "Dora" in Africa, He left Abwehr toward the end of 1943 and is said to have taken command of a parachutist regiment in the Serbian theater of operations.

Oberstleutnant, Luftwaffe. Born about 1890, five feet nine inches and has grey hair. Vas assigned to ABM I-L at Berlin. Later he became successor to Oberstleutnant SCHULZE-BERNETT as commander of AST Haag, where he still was at the end of 1942. Since then Subject has not heard of him.

Gorman liaison officer in Rome.

Oberleutnant, born about 1908, five feet six inches tall, brown hair, and a dark compexion. Was from South Tyrol (Alto Adige) and owned a hotel (Hotel zur Post) in Bolzano. Had been a first lieutenant of the Bersaglieri. Around the end of 1941 was drafted into the Wehrmacht. After an eight-week exercise with a nechanized troop unit in North Tyrol he was transferred to Abwehr I-H West, Berlin, and was assigned to Referat 2 for training. He was used for courier trips to Paris, Rome, and Tripoli. Toward the end of 1943 he was assigned to an Abwehrkommando in Italy for service with a Frontaufklaerungstrupp III. LANG and Hauptmann Dr. BERGER had exposed themselves to a considerable extent by trans-

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LEISNER

MAURER, Karl

MEISSNER

MUELLER

MUNZINGER

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porting about 25 Jews from Berlin to Switzerland. Source had prepared and ordered this action during the summer of 1942 upon orders of Admiral CANARIS, chief of Ausland/Abwehr.

(alias LENZ), Fregattenkapitaen, born about 1892, five feet six inches tall. Had taken part in the Spanish Civil War as a member of the Condor Legion. During that war LEISNER was in command of KO Spanien and accredited to the German Embassy in Madrid as honorary consul. He was said to have been a close confidant of Admiral CANARIS.

Oberstleutnant, born about 1890, five feet nine inches tall. Before World War I he was a cavalry officer in Kolmar (Alsace) in the old German Army. About 1926 MAURTR entered the Reichswehr-Ministry as a civilian emplyce and changed his status to officer around 1935. Became chief of I-H West shortly after the new Abwehr organization was established and remained until Summer 1943 when he became commander of a Feldkommandantur in Italy. He became sick by the end of 1943 and subsequently was retired. He lived in Berlin and, after being bombed out in 1943, on the Schliersee, a lake resort near Berlin.

Fregattenkapitaen. Born about 1893, five feet nine inches tall, with a strong build and grayish hair. At the beginning of the war he was with Abwehr III-F in Berlin. Succeeded to Oborstleutnant WAAG as chief of KO Switzerland.

Oberstleutnant. Born about 1888 and is five feet seven inches tall. Prussian. Chief of I-G, the section which produced secret inks, from 1939 till the end of the war.

Hajor der Reserve. Born about 1888, five feet seven inches tall. German born abroad (Auslanddeutscher). Civilian occupation:

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Merchant. Became chief of a Referat at I-H (Ost) in 1939. Was arrested 1944, allegedly in connection with the attempt on HITLER's life.

Oberstleutnant. Former liaison officer in Budapest until Spring 1943.

Oberstleutnant. Born about 1900, six feet tall. From Westfalen and is very wealthy. Was chief of Abwehr I as well as of I-H. In the Spring of 1943 he went to the Eastern Front, became a general, was mentioned twice in the Wehrmachtsbericht.

Hauptmann. Born about 1888 in Bavaria, five feet eight inches tall, strong build, gray hair and a round face. Was a catholic priest, turned Mohammedan. Became a professor at Munich University. Had been lieutenant in World War I. After outbreak of war, PRETZEL was assigned to Abwehr. Died in plane crash 1942.

Hauptmann. Worked with AIMASY in AST Hamburg.

OberstLeutnant, Luftwaffe. Chief of NEST Ceuta, Spanish Horocco, which was part of the organization of KO Spain. Was born in Southern Baden, Germany, around 1890. He had been in Spanish Morocco during the Spanish Civil War. Because of a grave illness he spent some time in Germany in 1942. Subject is unaware as to whether RUDOLF stayed in Spain or Morocco until the end of the war.

Oberst. Born in the Rhineland about 1890, five feet eleven inches tall, slim, brown hair. Had been a cavalry officer before World Var I, later stayed with the Reichswehr. Until the campaign against France, he was chief of NEST Koeln, a Nebenstelle of AST Muenster. As a close confidant of Admiral CANARIS, RUDOLF always had a very

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RUDOLF

RUDOLF p. 5

free hand, even as chief of a subordinate unit. At the conclusion of the French campaign he became chief of AST Paris, which at the same time became controlling station of all other Abwehrstellen in France with regard to "I" matters. RUDOLF had always been an I-officer (Aufklaerung). Is said to have been transferred to Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab early in 1944 to organize Frontaufklaerung (Combat intelligence) there. Source has not heard of him since.

German, who lived in Egypt until the war, probably in Alexandria. Born about 1915 and is six feet tall. Was trained by Lehrregiment "Brandenburg" and assigned to Abwehr for specialized service.

Oberstleutnant. Born about 1890 in East Prussia. Is five feet ten inches tall and stooped. Had been a cavalry officer before World War I, later with Reichswehr. Joined Abwehr long before 1936 and became personal aide of PICKENBROCK. For a short time, in 1938 (?) he was assigned to AST Salzburg, then returned to Berlin and became chief of I-H (Ost). Became liaison officer in Budapest in the Spring of 1943, where he relieved Oberstleutnant PFANSTIEL. Left Abwehr in the summer of 1944 and became commander of a prisonerof-war camp in the vicinity of Vienna.

Major. Born about 1896 in Augsburg, five feet ten inches tall. He was in the Bavarian state service as fine arts expert until 1936, Joined Wehrmacht. From AST Wiesbaden \$CHREIBER went to I-H West in 1940; took over Referat 3 in 1941. Was assigned to KO Portugal in 1943.

Lieutenant. Young scientist in charge of scientific work of "Dora" expedition, with office detachment in Berlin called "Theo."

Oberstleutnant. Former commander of AST Haag.

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SECRET

SANSTEDE

SCHOLZ, Edgar

SCHULTZ-KAMPFHENKEL

SCHREIBER

SCHULZE-BERNETT

<u>S E C R E T</u>

Oberst. Born about 1880 in the Rhineland, five feet ten inches tall, white hair. Was a cavalry officer before World War I, then in the Reichswehr. Was chief of AST Stuttgart Abteilung I until the end of the French Campaign. Then established ASY Dijon, Fater took over AST Brussels. Is said to have been retired at the end of 1943.

Unteroffizier. Assigned for short time to Vido. Member of French Foreign Legion from 1923 to 1930.

Oberstleutnant. Born 1888, five feet nine inches tall, gray hair, far sighted, frequently ill with nervous stomach troubles. Lived with his family in Berlin-Lichterfelde. Before the war was a director of the Deutsche Landwirtschaftliche Gesellschaft (German Agricultural Association.) Lost this position in 1933 and started trading in horses. Strongly Anti-Nazi. At the beginning of the war he came, as a major of the reserve, to Amt Abwehr I-H (West), where he took over the evaluation department, Referat 1. Was transferred to AST Kopenhagen in Spring 1944.

Oberstleutnant. Born about 1896 in the vicinity of Isny, Wuerttemberg, five feet nine inches tall, blond. A nephew of Admiral CANARIS. Before the war he was assigned to AST Stuttgart; after the outbreak of war he was made chief of KO Switzerland and was accredited to the German Legation at Berne as a consul. He became compromised, had to be relieved around the end of 1941. Was transferred to AS^T Paris as chief of Abteilung I. Subject does not know what happened to him later.

Note: Colonels MAURER, PICKENBROCK, RUDOLF (of AST Paris), SCHOLZ, SERVAES, and THOERING belonged to the group of officers closely associated with Admiral CANARIS who showed a very reserved attitude tow-

SERVAES

STEFFENS von

THOERING

TILLIG

SECRET

- 18 -

ard the form of government of the Third Reich. This attitude probably caused their removal from the various offices they held.

Re: GRIESHEIN, Witilo von: Reference is made to Interrogation Report CSDIC/CMF/SD87, dated 7 November 1945.

There are no contradictions of consequence between these two reports. However, while Source states that GRIESHEIN had to quit the army service in 1937 because of his abnormal sexual disposition, the above mentioned CSDIC report quotes: "In consequence of some subversive expressions of opinion, he was induced to retire from the army in 1936." Source thought that von GRIESHEIM left the service in May 1943, whereas the CSDIC report shows that this was not the case.

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p.1347

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> > 32-5-3-425

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Berlin : Ant Ausland Abwehr.

	Togo	:	Radio central station Abwehr for Western Mediterranean,	Frascati	
VO Rome:		9:	Liaison Officer at Italian Ministry of War in Rome.		
	Vido	:	Aussenstelle of ABT I-H (West) in Tripoli.		
	Dora	:	Special expedition to Southern Libya.	· .	
	Salam	:	Special expedition to the Nile.		
	Brunero):	Italian major, commander of SIM in Zuara.		
Nalut, Gadames, Murzuk, Ghat: Italian outposts.					

HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE CENTER 6825 HQ & HQS COMPANY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN AUSTRIA APO 777 U.S. ARMY

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION REPORT		
Prisoner:	SEUBERT, Franz, Lt. Col., Abwehr	
Case No.:	S 065	
Ref. No.:	SO65/USDIC/PE9	
Date :	30 November 1945	
Copy No.:	89	

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RETAIN OR DESTROY

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SECRET = DAR-484

32-5-3-425

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION REPORT

PRISONER: DESCRIPTION AND VITAL STATISTICS.

Franz SEUBERT, alias SCHUBERT; Lieutenant Colonel in the Abwehr, was born on 13 March 1895 of German parents in Sarreguemines, France (Alsace). Subject's parents are deceased: his father, Franz SEUBERT, having died in 1927, and Elise SEUBERT nee HUBER, mother, having died in 1903. Other members of the family are: Wilhelm SEUBERT, died 1934; Hermann SEUBERT, age 21; Else WALDTHALER, age 46; Maria ALBERT, age 30; Gertrud SEUBERT, age 26; Hilde SEUBERT, died 1921; and a stepmother, Barbara SEUBERT nee WEGMANN. Prisoner's wife, Maria SEUBERT nee JUNGKUNZ, age 49, lives at his last known address, Uhlandstrasse 167, Berlin W 15, with their two children, Waldemar, age 17, and Otto, age 15.

SEUBERT's education included elementary school and high school in Alsace (1901-1913). He left high school to go to work as a civil service apprentice in the Buergermeisteramt, Strasbourg. Subject speaks French, English, Italian, and has a fair knowledge of Spanish.

SEUBERT is five feet nine inches tall and weighs 147 pounds. He has gray hair, an oval face, a ruddy complexion, and blue eyes. His one identifying mark is a scar from an appendix operation.

II. BRIEF PARTY OR SERVICE HISTORY.

In World War I Franz SEUBERT served with the infantry on the Western front and with the artillery on the Eastern front in the Carpathian mountains. He received a commission as a Second Lieutenant just before the close of the war.

Between 1919 and 1927 Subject held many jobs in the city administration of Wuerzburg. In 1927 he became publicity agent for the tourist trade of Wuerzburg, and in the next six years established a travelling agency representing the Hamburg-America Linie, Mitropa, and Thomas Cook Ltd. When the Nazis came into power in 1933, he was replaced by a National Socialist, since he himself was not a member of the NSDAP. He soon obtained a similiar job in the resort town of Fuessen. In 1933 he joined the Stahlhelm, and when it was dissolved into the SA he was put in charge of the local SA Sturm Company Fuessen. Promoted to Scharfuchrer in 193⁴ he was raised again to the rank of Obertruppfuchrer in 1938. He joined the NSDAP in 193⁴ and during his membership in the Party he encountered difficulties due to his rejection

SECHET

...]...

of the teaching of Atheism. He was a very devout Catholic, and he comp tinued the education of his children as Catholics. More troubles arose when the KdF (Draft durch Freude) wanted to make Fuessen a summer resort for its members.

Due to the above mentioned incidents, Subject joined the Wehrmacht in 1938 as a Second Lieutenant in Mountain Artillery Regiment 79, Garmisch-Fartenkirchen. In April 1938, SEUBERT was Attached to the Generalkommando in Munich and was promoted to the fank of Captain. Subject later took part in the invasion of Sudetenland, Winterberg, and Prachatiz. It was in Munich the Subject begane connected with General von SCHOBERT and Captain Rudolf LANGHAEUSER of the Abwehr. Through their influence he was assigned as an apprentice in the Abwahr in 1939, and later in the same year was put into IH West, Referat 3, and put in charge of the Courier service between Berlin and the Information offices main* tained in Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Another duty assigned to him was the receiving and reading of foreign newspapers for items of interest concerning the area assigned to his office. Items of interest were forwarded to the Abteilung Fremde Heere for evaluation. At the end of 1940 he was transferred to Referat 2, which had the duty of organizing the collection of information concerning Allied armies in North Africa, Egypt, and the Middle East, excluding Turkey. Also in the same year he organized WIDO, in Tripoli, Lybia, which was an information collecting point, charged with transmitting the intelligence to Berlin. In 1941 he took charge of the project, "Theodora", with the function of collecting information on the De Gaullist troops being massed under General Le Clerc in the Lake Tchad area. He transferred to Tunis in 1942 and became Leiter I, which meant that he was in charge of gathering information concerning enemy armies. When the German troops were forced to evacuate Tunisia, Subject escaped in Marshal KESSELRING's personal plane and reported to a new post in Bulgaria. In August 1943 he became Leiter I of K.O. Bu, with Headquerters in Sofia. His task was to collect information concerning the Near and Middle East, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, with special emphasis on the latter country's army and national defense. Subject states that in a conversation with von PAPEN, ambassador to Turkey, it was made clear to him that the foreign office wanted to avoid trouble with the Turks at all costs. The Turks in turn also wanted to avoid all incidents that might provoke irritation in Ankara. SEUBERT praised the very excellent Turkish counter-espionnege; he says that the Turks avoided arresting German agents even though they had conclusive proof of their work. They merely warned the Germans in a round-about way that they were about to be arrested, whereupon the Germans usually left the country without delay. When the Bulgarian government was about to declare war upon Germany (1944), Subject moved his Headquarters to Budapest. On 15 January 1945 Subject was transferred to Vienna where he became Leiter I for the entire Southeast area including the Near and Middle East. This was his last position held until the end of the war.

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III. PERSONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH.

- Admiral CANARIS, GIS, Berlin.
- · Colonel ENGELMANN, in charge of Abwehr in Itely.
- · Lieutenant Colonel FIEDLER, in charge of Abwehr in Tunis.
- 🦫 Captain LANGHAEUSER, Munich.
- Lieutenant von MANNTEUFEL, Sofia.
- Ambassador von PAPEN, Sofia.
- Colonel PICKENBROCK, Berlin.
 - Kreisleiter SAILER, Kaufbeuren.
 - General von SCHOBERT, Munich.
 - -> Lieutenant Colonel VOLKHAMMER, Munich.
 - Colonel WAGNER (alies DELIUS), Sofia and Budapest.
 - · ZINNSTEIN, Kempten.

🐹 Kreisleiter Baron von ZOBEL, Fuessen.

IV. TIME, PLACE, SPECIAL REASONS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARREST.

As a Lieutenant Colonel in the Abwehr and coming under the automatic arrest category, Franz SEUBERT was arrested in Lauterbach, Tyrol, on 27 May 1945. He was brought to the Salzburg jail under the custody of the CIC agent.

INTENDED SCOPE OF INTERROGATION.

Subject will be interrogated in connection with Abwehr activities, its organization, and its personalities. He is intelligent and his information is considered reliable. (See request for information).

32-5-3-42

VI. KNOWLEDGE BRIEF.

Frisoner has information on the following subjects, and this Headquarters will cover details thereof in subsequent reports:

<u>SECRET</u>

a. Organization and personalities of ABWEHR in Bulgaria, Turkey and Africa.

b. Organization and personalities in K.O. Bu.

- c. Organization and personalities in KdM, Vienna.
- d. Organization and personalities in IH West.

VII. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION.

As Subject is a very broad source for information and is able to give detailed accounts on a variety of topics, it is requested that interested agencies provide this Headquarters with specific requests for information of any period of interest covered by this preliminary report.

All agencies who have information on this Prisoner, his activities, and associates, above and beyond the material noted in this preliminary report and in the known references listed below are requested to forward same to this Headquarters with the least practicable delay.

VIII. KNOWN REFERENCES.

The following sources are listed as the known references bearing relation to the activities of Franz SEUBERT:

a. CSDIC report reference number 15AG/SD/9

b. CSDIC report reference number 15AG/SD/24

c. CSDIC report reference number CMF/SD/39

DISPOSITION.

IX.

Subject will be detained at this Headquarters pending detailed interrogation.

JOSEPH M. KOLISCH Major, Infantry Commanding

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