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HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE CENTER
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN AUSTRIA
APO 777 U.S. ARMY

Subject: Activities of Dr. THOST in connection with Aust VI during the war.

~~RETAIN OR DESTROY~~

FIRST DETAILED INTERROGATION REPORT

Source : THOST, Dr. Hans Wilhelm

Position: Author and Propaganda Agent

Case No.: S020

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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100 German I.S.

This report contains information on the activities of Dr. Hans Wilhelm THOST in connection with Aust VI during the war.

of the RSHA

Alfred E. Claus.
1st Lt. Ord. M.I.

for JOSEPH M. KOLISCH

Major, Infantry
Commanding

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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I. SOURCE.

For description and vital statistics of Dr. Hans Wilhelm THOST, see Preliminary Information Report, Reference No. SO20/USDIC/PC4, dated 16 October 1945 this Headquarters.

II. THE "DOLMETSCHER BEREITSCHAFTSDIENST".

When the war broke out Source was an independent writer living in Berlin, Grunewald. He had just finished his book "Als Nationalsozialist in England", which in some ways was opposed to the official foreign policy of RIBBENTROP. Financially, Source was independent because of his real estate in Leipzig.

Because he was severely wounded at the end of World War I, he was not fit for front line duty again. He expected the war to be over soon and did not care to change his personal status.

However, one day in the winter 1939-1940, he received a letter from the "Dolmetscher Bereitschaftsdienst" Berlin, Halensee, Kurfuerstendamm, with a questionnaire to be filled out, stating that everyone knowing a foreign language must report there by writing. Source believes that they secured his address from the Police, to whom everybody had to fill out questionnaires regarding "special knowledge" in languages, driving autos and trucks, piloting airplanes, etc.. He reported to the "Dolmetscher Bereitschaftsdienst" in writing, stating that he knew English fairly well.

A. Assignment in Translation.

Source did not hear anything more about the questionnaire throughout 1940, but in February 1941 he was visited by an SS officer, Hauptsturmfuehrer ZUCHRISTIAN, who inquired whether Source would be prepared to do some translation work for his office, which he said was some sort of political information institute. Source agreed and ZUCHRISTIAN left him many London newspapers, telling him to read them through and pointing out the articles of interest.

B. Source of Material.

The items of importance that Source was to familiarize

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himself with were as follows: Political leaders as to the internal situation in Great Britain; all the news thereabout, including the reports from Parliament; all news relating to the output of war factories as far as they could be traced in the commercial press; and all advertisements revealing shortages in England.

At first Source worked in his quarters, making some sort of report from these newspapers, translating parts of them and giving a general "Lagebericht" (report of the situation) as far as he could gather from the London Dailies.

As ordered, Source brought this report and the papers to ZUCHRISTIAN's office, Berkaerstrasse 32-35, and the work was favorably received. This was the time when large parts of British public opinion were opposed to the CHAMBERLAIN Government and to the conduct of the war. In addition, there was a "popular front" movement to end the war and, on the other hand, a movement to activate a British War effort and to bring Soviet Russia to the Allied side.

Source had to work through more bunches of newspapers, followed by periodicals such as "New Statesman and Nation", "Time and Tide", "The Nineteenth Century and After", "The Spectator" etc.. He also was given the book, "Guilty Men", and had to make an extract out of it.

III. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF AMT VI.

A. Initiation into Amt VI.

Towards the end of February 1941, ZUCHRISTIAN told Source that the office would accept him as its permanent translator and interpreter during the war. ZUCHRISTIAN explained that Source would be ordered to do some sort of war work and that it would be better for him to work with his office rather than wait until some military or industrial organization drafted him. Source accepted this offer. ZUCHRISTIAN introduced Source to his superior, the late SS Sturmbannführer Dr. GRAEFE (he died later following a motor accident), and to Brigadeführer SCHELLENBERG. Both received him only for a very short interview, admonishing him to keep everything secret, even the type of work done at home. Later, Source had to sign a statement to the effect that he was conscious of the fact that he would be subject to punishment by the SS and Polizeigericht in case of any breach of secrecy or other violation of the rules laid down by the Amt.

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His main work still consisted in reading through all of the important newspapers of England (The London Press, Yorkshire Post, Manchester Guardian, Glasgow Herald, etc.), plus the periodicals and occasional political books printed in England. All this literature reached Berlin via Lisbon within one week and arrived fairly regularly.

B. Documents from Belgrade.

After one or two months, a heavy case was brought into Source's room, coming from Belgrade. It consisted of letters, papers, documents, etc., collected in the British Consulate of that city. Source was ordered to sort it out and make the most use of it. There were numerous passports, identity cards, check books, money orders, etc., and these items were taken to VI F for further exploitation. The letters found were mostly of a non-political nature, dealing with affairs of the Church of England abroad. What interested Amt VI was the relationship between the Church of England and the Orthodox Church of Yugoslavia and about which subject Source wrote a short report. These relations seemed to be very cordial and a means to closer relationship between the British Colony in Yugoslavia with the Royal House of that country.

C. Report from Foreign Agents.

Occasionally Source received reports from the agents of Amt VI to read, but only infrequently since these reports were mostly in German and were read directly by his superiors without his help as translator. These reports showed the number of the agents and sometimes the place from which they operated (mostly from Madrid or Lisbon). When they were given to Source, he had to find out whether or not they were simply extracts out of British newspapers as some agents spent lazy days abroad simply compiling their reports from London newspapers and forwarding this material as their own information. These reports came mainly from neutral countries and first went through the department dealing with those countries (i.e., VI B for Spain and Portugal, VI D3 for Sweden). They were rewritten in the respective department and only then forwarded to Source's department (VI D2). The name of an agent was never mentioned in Source's presence except the cover name. Source concluded that Amt VI's best agent in Spain was "THEO", who was supposed to have been a high placed diplomat of Swiss nationality having close relations with FRANCO; he managed to bring very intimate reports out of the Spanish Legation in London.

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In Sweden Amt VI had an agent together with the Military Intelligence whose cover name was "JOSEPHINE". He was supposed to be a German doctor who had his sub agents directly in England and had very good connections with Swedish newspaper men.

D. Espionage in England.

Concerning agents working directly in England, Source was told that there were only very few of them, mostly neutral and Latin-American diplomats who were received directly by SCHELLENBERG and whose names and reports were unknown to the ordinary departments. Only later Source got to know the following agents:

1. BEWLEY, former Irish Minister to Germany, who during the war worked in Rome (or Vatican City) attempting to get Irish priests as agents to Britain. Source does not believe that BEWLEY was successful, but he had first class information concerning the internal situation in Italy. VI B, however, derived the benefit of his information and not VI D2.

2. GOID (not positive if this is the correct name). He was a Polish sailor, very intelligent, who made several trips in a Polish boat to British ports and reported back in Lisbon. Early in 1944 he was ordered to buy motor taxis in Paris, sell them in Spain, and thus finance further trips to England. He disappeared in France after the Allied invasion.

3. COLLINS, a former Prisoner of War, corporal in the British Army and not very intelligent. He spent several years in Berlin, first as a Prisoner of War and later as an agent in training. For a long time he was a student in the wireless school of Amt VI, situated in Lehnitz near Berlin, and came several times into the office.

Later, a strict order from SCHELLENBERG prohibited the visits of agents to the main office Berkaerstrasse and ordered that all agents should be received in certain private flats, some of which were hired by the Amt especially for such purposes. Because of this Source did not get to know more of these agents.

E. Agents Captured in Ireland.

SCHELLENBERG's new order was the result of a foolish act committed in 1943 or early 1944 by the head of VI D2, Obersturmfuehrer Dr. SCHUEDEKOPF. He brought two Irishmen (who were

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to be dropped by parachute over Ireland) into the Main Office, where they became acquainted with practically all the staff members of VI D. Source does not remember their names, but they were caught by the Police immediately after landing in Ireland and their story was reported throughout the entire Allied Press. Amt VI was certain that the enemy got all the information they wanted about what was going on in the Berkauerstrasse. As far as Source knows, these two Irishmen had even worked in the Berkauerstrasse; they came into the office at least every two or three weeks.

F. Commanders of VI D.

SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. GRAEFFE was only head of VI D for a very short time. He transferred to VI C and was later killed in a motor accident. His successor was SS Sturmbannfuehrer DAUFEIDT (from Kiel) who laid special stress on complete files of enemy politicians under the following procedure:

1. One list of British politicians hostile to everything German.
2. One list of those friendly to Germany, but hostile to Nazis and Fascists.
3. One list of those who did not like Soviet Russia.
4. One list of those who made hostile remarks about France, U.S.A., and other Allied nations.

This type of classification was supplemented by newspaper clippings of the speeches they made in this respect. DAUFEIDT used to say that a well made "Kartei" (files) was the basis of every success. He had cards filled out on every person mentioned in "Who's Who" and other reference books.

Because SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ZUCHRISTIAN did not agree with his superior DAUFEIDT, he was transferred to Paris. DAUFEIDT however, left this office shortly afterwards and was succeeded by Sturmbannfuehrer SCHNEIDER, who was head of VI D for only a couple of weeks, succeeded by Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. PAETGEN. VI D2, which was primarily called VI D7, was temporarily in the hands of SS Hauptsturmfuehrer CARSTEN (who later went to Finland) and was later finally headed by SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. SCHUETDEKOPF. DAUFEIDT received a new assignment as an agent for Amt VI in Switzerland, being nominally made German Consul in Bern (?).

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G. Interception of Wireless Conversations.

1. Intercepting Station in Operation.

One day in the winter of 1942-1943 Source was called to the office of Dr. PAEFFGEN and introduced to a Dr. VETTERLEIN, high technical official of the "Forschungsamt der Deutschen Reichspost" (scientific laboratory of the German Post), who stated that he had already spoken with SCHELLENBERG and that he had an offer to make to PAEFFGEN and Source. Also present at the meeting was Dr. SCHUEDEDEKOPF. VETTERLEIN showed them some messages which he said he had been able to intercept from the conversations between Washington and London. A station was situated in Holland near Eindhoven. OHNESORGE, the German Minister for Post, would be greatly interested in this matter and would be prepared to spend millions on that station if it could be of any use to the department. VETTERLEIN added that OHNESORGE was reluctant to offer the results of that station to the Military because he distrusted them, especially the head of the German Communication troops, a General who later participated in the July 20 Putsch. VETTERLEIN asked them to read through these samples of picked-up messages and to decide whether they would want them or not. The matter, he said, would be of great future value, as the Ministry for Post was prepared to spend large sums on its development provided it was thought to be worthwhile. He added that there was even the possibility of listening in on messages between England and the U.S.A. just by putting a U-Boat near these cables. Of that prospect they never heard anything more.

Source opined that everything which could help in a major war was worth trying. The samples were obviously conversations between officials in London and Washington, but many words were missing and the whole contents did not make sense at the first glance. SCHUEDEDEKOPF was more skeptical about the matter, but PAEFFGEN agreed with Source saying that improvement on the technical side and schooling of the personnel would result in receiving these pickups clearly. PAEFFGEN, as chief of VI D, had the last word in the matter and decided in the affirmative. Consequently VETTERLEIN immediately returned to Eindhoven to start work.

2. Conversation between London and Washington.

After some weeks the first results arrived; they were, as a whole, not too discouraging. The telephone number in Washington was Republic 2020.

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(a) Between War Office, London, and British Army Staff, Washington.

Sometimes the British Ministry of Supply was on the London end of the phone instead of the War Office. General MCREADY, head of the PAS in Washington, did not speak himself; most of the time the speaker was Brigadier Leslie DAWES and in London, Brigadier Owen YOUNG. Frequently the officer in London spoke from the War Office line and a couple of days later from the Ministry of Supply line establishing the fact that the links between the ministries were very close. The contents of the conversations were obviously British orders for the U.S. War Industry, but the speakers used cover names for the items which they spoke about, such as "grapefruits", "pineapples", etc. It was evident that the speakers on that wireless telephone were aware of the possibility that their conversations might be intercepted. Sometimes they warned each other by saying: "Send me a cable about that, don't mention it on the telephone."

(b) Between the Ministry of War Transport, London, and British Shipping Mission, Washington.

The talks were about the distribution of the ordinary shipping space. The speakers used cover names for the theatre of war the ships were allocated to. For instance, the Washington representative of the Ministry of War Transport informed his colleague in London that he had to take 54 ships from "Arthur's place" to "John's place"; that the situation was "fairly critical", etc. On the German side, they could not read these messages like an open book, but certain general conclusions could be drawn if they got enough of these conversations. There was no possibility of drawing actual conclusions as to ship movements which could be of direct value to U-boat warfare, although a vague general picture of the shipping disposition on the Allied side was obtained.

(c) Between Ministry of War Transport, London, and Representative of Same in Washington.

These talks were about tanker allocation. Since the names of the men on the telephone were disclosed by the telephone operators, Source had only to look up the "WHITACKER" reference book to see in which department of the Ministry of War Transport the speaking official was working. This book also helped to find out which ministry was speaking because the Washington and London telephone numbers were announced by the operators. "WHITACKER" mentioned all the telephone numbers of these Ministries, Embassies, etc.

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The "tanker calls" were by far the most frequent and interesting ones. The impression of Source and his superior was that the lack of tanker space was the weakest point of the Allies. Frequently tankers, once up to 70 ships, had to be taken from one theatre to another, and there seemed to be a lot of difference of opinion as to the allocation of this type of tonnage.

These talks were of decided military value and therefore did not belong to Amt VI, but to Military Intelligence. RAFFGEN was reluctant to send the messages directly to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). He stated that the possession of these messages was a most secret affair and could not even be disclosed to the OKW. He ordered Source to work out short reports concerning these pick-ups which he would forward to the OKW. These reports were to be written in a form that the reader could not draw the conclusion there or how this information was gained. This, of course, was impossible to do. Source, without having had any military or naval training, could not find out the real names in place of the cover names, but the trained people at OKW, and especially the naval people with all their information might have been able to use these pick-ups to great value. Source told RAFFGEN of the neglect and begged him to consult SCHELLENBERG again on the matter. Finally it was decided that these calls should be sent directly to the OKW without Source doing more than reading them through and passing them on. Source usually passed them on to Oberstleutnant ENGELHORN (who was executed because of his participation in the 20 July Putsch) and later to Korvettenkapitan von REDL (from Vienna) of Amt Mil B.

(d) Calls Relating to Political and Diplomatic Matters.

Discussions between the British Embassy in Washington and the Foreign Office in London were for the most part cleverly camouflaged, although at times interesting features could be concluded from them. It was learned, for instance, that certain discussions took place between the Allies and that Britain would act as the chief speaker for the American-British side towards the Russians. The subject of these discussions was not definitely known, but from certain hints and newspaper and radio announcements, the conclusion was drawn that the topic was "the oil supplies of Iraq and Iran". More and more it was concluded that these pick-ups were most valuable if combined with all the other sources of information, especially newspapers, radio and other 'open' news.

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Other purely political conversations took place between various Allied government representatives. The Dutch Government in London telephoned frequently to its representative in Washington, and once or twice the station overheard conversations between the Russian Ambassador in Washington and Mr. MAISKY's Embassy in London. In this case the Allied operator had to admonish the speakers frequently not to speak Russian but English.

Several times the conversations between CHURCHILL and EDEN, who was in Washington, were picked up. CHURCHILL usually spoke under the name of his secretary or was simply called "Captain", but it was not difficult to disclose his identity. The contents of these conversations were not of high political significance, but certain conclusions could be drawn out of the general atmosphere in which they were conducted.

These frequent conversations could be used by this office as 'fitting in' material to their other information. Sometimes the mere temper of the persons speaking allowed conclusions to be drawn as to the progress of certain negotiations between the Allies. For example: EDEN once spoke to one of his Foreign Office secretaries in London in a terrible rage. He called him a "silly ass" and "idiot", and it was evident that something went wrong on the other side.

(e) Calls Relating to Economic Matters.

As the war was nearing its end, economic matters seemed to gain the upper hand in these Washington and London calls.

The conversations between the State Department, Washington, and the U.S. Embassy in London were mostly conducted by FEA (Foreign Economic Administration) people, who telephoned quite openly about locomotives to be delivered to the French after the invasion and about the help of American engineers and equipment for the British mining industry.

When Governor LEHMAN was in London in 1944, he phoned frequently to Washington on behalf of the UNRRA and it was heard that the Cairo office of that organization got into trouble by buying clothes on the black market instead of waiting for cheaper ones coming from the U.S. Shipping difficulties were frequently mentioned as hampering the war effort of the UNRRA, and there were differences of opinion between the UNRRA authorities and the TITO Government, which wanted to have all the goods distributed under its own name.

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All the news gathered from these pick-ups were allocated by source to the various departments of VI; he sent the economic ones to VI W1 and Tech.

H. Description of Pick-Up Station.

1. Dr. THOST's Visit to Eindhoven.

In August 1944 Source was ordered to pay a visit to the listening station (south of Eindhoven, Holland), to hear some new proposals made by Dr. VETTERLEIN. This station was situated in a villa, and the entire technical installation consisting of an outfit (the dimensions of which were surprising) was located in the bomb proof cellar. The equipment filled at least three large rooms from top to bottom. On the outside surrounding the villa there were about six transmission poles.

2. Technical Details of Station.

VETTERLEIN showed Source the entire technical equipment. Source gathered that the interception of the radio-telephone conversations (r-t-c) was only possible because Eindhoven was especially suitable from a geographical point of view, being nearly in a straight line with Washington and London. Therefore, Washington was better heard in Eindhoven than London, because the London voice went around the world before being picked up in Eindhoven.

The voices were split by a special ciphering apparatus, the high waves being bent into low waves and vice versa, so that ordinary listening resulted in nothing but a squeezing noise. The American-British used, as far as Source remembers, five different ciphers changing every twelve seconds and practically the same machines had to be installed in the German station with a clock going exactly at the same speed as Greenwich time. These deciphering machines made the voices audible in a microphone as well as in head receivers.

All the talks were recorded on gramophone records and sent up to a lady typist. After typing, the talks were translated into English and sent by a special taper directly to Berlin into the taper center of the SS and the "SS Hauptamt", from where they were sent by messengers to the Berkaerstrasse into Source's office. These tapers were secret; all the letters were changed so that interception of the line was impossible. Source received the r-t-c in English marked as "Geheime Reichssache" and did the allocation according to the contents.

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3. Dr. VETTERLEIN's Proposals.

Source stayed at this station about three days, during the course of which he and VETTERLEIN thoroughly discussed the r-t-c's. VETTERLEIN explained the various technical installations, not yet fully developed, through which other types of radio-telephones could be tapped. He showed Source some samples of radio messages coming from American and British newspaper representatives to their respective editors in London and New York. They did not disclose many secrets but served Amt VI in receiving 'open' news much earlier than hitherto. Secondly, ciphered news was picked up and hidden in so-called five letter ciphers which had to be deciphered. As the Military Intelligence had a big deciphering office, Source thought it worthwhile to receive these pick-ups as well. VETTERLEIN stated that this extension of duties in his pick-up station meant more personnel and still more expensive machinery, although he, too, thought the matter worthwhile. Both agreed that the best thing to do would be to have a permanent representative of Amt VI in this station, a person who knew the value of the various pick-ups and one who could decide on the spot whether or not an intercepted r-t-c should be sent to Source in Berlin. Source thought of training one of their lady secretaries and then sending her permanently to Bindthoven. Regarding the cost of the technical extensions, VETTERLEIN undertook to ask his Ministry of Post people for the money, and Source tried to persuade SCHELLENBERG to write a letter to OHNESORGE, confirming that these investments would be of value for the conduct of the war.

Upon Source's return to Berlin the progress of the Allied invasion brought the whole scheme to an end. VETTERLEIN succeeded in getting all his equipment out of Holland and subsequently attempted to resettle with his station on the Sieg river, but his r-t-c's slowly faded away. The last ones Source received as late as January 1945, but irregularly and with frequent interruptions. As the whole German communication system slowly became disorganized, the same complications arose with the r-t-c's.

I. Additional Amt VI D2 Enterprises.

1. Observation of Anti-War Elements in England.

Occasionally, travelling neutral people coming from London brought small and even obscure propaganda material from England to Spain or Lisbon in the form of newspapers which were ordinarily not available outside of Britain. These papers were picked up by

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Amt VI's men in Spain or Portugal and sent to the Berkaerstrasse. They were anti-war propaganda. It was soon discovered that the center of this activity was Glasgow. The organizations were the following:

(a) The I.L.P. (Independent Labor Party) with their newspaper, "The New Leader". Coordinated with them were the Conscientious Objectors with their various organizations and the activity of the Duke of Bedford.

(b) The Anarchists with their newspaper, "The Word", which was also printed in Glasgow.

(c) The British Protestant League, a very queer movement with its periodical, "The Truth", also in Glasgow. This was a religious movement, anti-war, anti-semitic, anti-catholic, and anti-Russian. The Duke of Bedford seemed to have connections with all three of them.

(d) The Trotskyists or Revolutionary Communist Party, which was dissolved in the course of 1944.

Source was ordered to find out to what extent these organizations had connections with the strikes in the British mining and other industries. Dr. SCHUEDEDEKOPF thought of contacting these organizations by agents but could not find persons who could do the job. Consequently, their knowledge was confined to what they could gather out of the newspapers. An order was given, however, (it was in the last year of the war) to select newly captured prisoners of war who came from Glasgow and/or were miners, and/or belonged to the ILP or other organizations mentioned, and/or could explain anything about the situation, for special interrogation. This activity was still in its first stages when Source left Amt VI on a special mission to be covered in a later report by this Headquarters.

2. Contacting PW's of Political Importance.

(a) Contacting Son of Edward GODFREY.

Much earlier, however, Source was sent on a mission to contact a PW of special political importance. This was in May 1943. Source had read in the London Press that Edward GODFREY of Hayes (Middlesex), a former fish merchant, founded a new party, the so-called English National Party, democratic but anti-war, pro German, and to a certain degree anti-Jewish. Furthermore, his son, a sailor, was in German hands as a Prisoner of War. Source was ordered to visit this young GODFREY and find out as much as was possible about his father.

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The PW Department of the OKW first gave Source a wrong address, resulting in his travel to Posen, where he found a GODFREY who was in no way connected with the said Edward. Source returned to Berlin, later being informed that the real GODFREY was in a PW camp near Heydobreck in Upper Silesia. Source went there to find that the so-called son was a nephew of this politician. This Charles GODFREY knew nothing about politics; he knew his uncle but could tell Source nothing more than personal things about him, his family, and pre-war business. He declined to have anything to do with politics, and Source scarcely received any information from him. Source contacted him under the pretext of being a newspaper reporter who was visiting PW camps to find out details on persons of special interest. In spite of his failure he tried again to contact young GODFREY when he was in a camp near Berlin, but this was also in vain.


(b) Contacting PW Wing Commander Baird SMITH.

A little later Source was sent to the Luftwaffe PW camp in Sagan to contact Wing Commander Baird SMITH, who was, according to London newspapers, a relative of the member of the British Cabinet, Sir John ANDERSON. Sir John's wife was a close relative of the Wing Commander. Source went to Sagan and had an interesting political discussion with Commander SMITH, but it did not disclose anything new. SMITH was convinced that the conservative spirit of Britain would survive the war, that the Conservative Party would be victorious in the long run even if Labor would win the first post war elections, and that there was no danger of Britain going Bolshevik. Regarding Germany, he thought that even a defeated Germany would not turn towards Communism, as people in Germany went through too much to again put their trust in the dictatorship of a few persons. Taken as a whole, the Wing Commander was optimistic about the post-war future.

In this same camp was young WINANT, the son of the U.S. Ambassador to Britain. Source wanted to interview him as well, but the Commandant dissuaded him, saying that Foreign Office people had already done so and that young WINANT was only concerned about his family and other personal things and not interested in politics at all. Source returned to Berlin without seeing WINANT.

S E C R E T
AMT VI

APPENDIX I



VI. A, VI. F, VI. S, VI. Kult, VI. Wistechnik were Technical Gruppen directly under Schellenberg;
 VI. B, VI. C, VI. D, VI. E..... were Laender Gruppen directly under Schellenberg
 VI. D2 was a "Referat" under Gruppenleiter Dr. Paeffgen
 VI. D2a, b, c, d, f, were "Sachbearbeiter" under Referatsleiter Dr. Schueddekopf

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HEADQUARTERS U.S.D.I.C..
UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA
APO 777, U.S. Army

RETAIN OR DESTROY

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION REPORT

Prisoner: THOST Dr., Hans
Wilhelm, author and
Propaganda agent

Case No.: SO20

Ref. No.: SO20/USDIC/PC4

Date : 16 October 1945

Copy No.: ///

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PRELIMINARY INFORMATION REPORT

I. PRISONER: DESCRIPTION AND VITAL STATISTICS.

Dr. Hans Wilhelm THOST, author, reporter, and propaganda agent for the Reich, was born in Hannover, Germany on 19 April 1899. The exact basis for his claim to the title of "Doctor" is not quite clear, as he has received no degree, honorary or otherwise, to warrant such claim. Nevertheless, the prisoner is definitely of better than average intelligence, extremely well-read, although inclined to act a bit eccentric.

Dr. THOST received an extensive education. Beginning with four years of elementary schooling, he continued with a full eight-year Gymnasium course. Upon graduation, he turned to his university studies and showed special interest in philosophy. His university life was limited to two years, equally divided between the University of Heidelberg and Hamburg, respectively. THOST, however, is a self-taught man. He is capable of learning much more than what is acquired in a formal education. The variety of subjects covered by the printed matter found in his personal possession upon arrest is ample proof of his initiative and capabilities. In addition to German the prisoner also speaks English fluently.

Hans THOST is a man of towering stature. He is six feet four inches tall, but weighs only 150 pounds. He has a long face, a very high forehead, and wears glasses. His hair is greying, and he is rapidly becoming bald. Other distinguishing physical characteristics are varicose veins on the lower part of his right leg, and an appendectomy scar.

The prisoner is not married, both his parents are dead, and his only known surviving next of kin is his sister, Hela Wuefing von MATITZ, age 48.

II. BRIEF PARTY OR SERVICE HISTORY.

THOST's career is an excellent example of success achieved through membership in the party. In 1929 he joined the NSDAP, and, thereafter, his worries were over. From 1930 to 1935 he was the London Correspondent for the Voelkischer-Beschafter. In 1936, he returned to Germany and worked for a year for the Freiheits-Kampf, a party paper in Dresden. The end of his reporter days came in 1937, which also marked the beginning of

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his career as a Nazi Propaganda author. Based upon experiences acquired during his five years in Great Britain, he wrote "National-sozialist in England" which was published in 1938 by the Eher-Verlag, one of the foremost Nazi publishing houses. Two years later, THOST wrote his second book, "Und Wir Werden Leben", which was again accepted for publication by the aforementioned publishers.

By this time, Dr. Hans THOST had already established his reputation, which did not go unnoticed in official circles. In 1941 he was employed by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). He worked for Amt VI, Geheimer Politischer Auslands Nachrichten Dienst, an agency in Berlin that collected information about the United States, Great Britain, and South America. His duties were those of interpreter and monitor of foreign newspapers. As far as can be determined to date, this was his last known position. (It should be noted at this point that when the prisoner was taken into custody he had in his personal possession numerous clippings taken from American newspapers and magazines, covering such subjects as the personalities associated with the creation of the atomic bomb, chemical formulae involving nitrogen compounds and their derivatives, German corporate stocks, and the activities of UNRRA in Europe.)

III. PERSONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH.

The prisoner's admitted connections have so far been limited only to personalities in the Berlin Amt VI of the Geheimer Politischer Auslands Nachrichten Dienst. Foremost in his associations was SS Brigadefuehrer (Brigadier General) SCHELLEMBERG. Others included SS Obersturmfuehrers (First Lieutenants) Max REINERS and SCHUETTELKOPF. The latter was, for a brief period, in charge of the U.S.A. Department, but later took over the Department which did research work on Great Britain.

IV. TIME, PLACE, SPECIAL REASONS, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARREST.

In order to obtain an Allied clearance, Dr. THOST posed as a German prisoner of war and surrendered to the French forces on the Island Reichenau, Bodensee, for discharge. The prisoner was arrested in Donau Eschingen on 25 May 1945. He was located by the OSS War Crimes Unit in the custody of AMZON in Stuttgart and brought to this Headquarters at their request.

V. INTENDED SCOPE OF INTERROGATION.

The scope of this interrogation is intended to reveal

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Dr. THOST's possible participation in certain crimes committed against OSS personnel.

VI. SUSPECTED CONNECTIONS.

It is believed that the prisoner has considerable knowledge about the organization and functions of the Geheimer Politischer Auslands Nachrichten Dienst and played a prominent part therein, especially as adviser on Nazi Propaganda for England.

VII. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION.

All agencies who have requests for further information beyond that of the above intended scope of interrogation should notify this Headquarters.


All agencies who have any information on this prisoner, his activities and associates, above and beyond the material noted in this preliminary report are requested to forward same to this command with the least practicable delay.

VIII. RELIABILITY.

The reliability of the information offered by Dr. Hans THOST may be rated as "Good".

IX. DISPOSITION.

Subject will be detained at this Headquarters pending detailed interrogation.


JOSEPH M. KOLISCH
Major, Infantry
Commanding

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not know if she still is alive, and I have a wife and two young sons, one of whom is due to enroll in Eton college this year. I do not think I am physically fit to be in the front line again; but I think I could do a lot to end this horrid war because I know Winston CHURCHILL very well. He is the cousin of my stepfather, Lionel GUEST. I know EDEN and many other leading British statesmen.

"The war might end in a German defeat, and in face of the Russian advance it might be better for Germany to come to a just and honest peace with the Western Allies. If this is the case, I could be of more use, for Germany as well as for Britain, if I were in England and tried to persuade people there that it is time for all of us to stop this war if possible. Here I am only an old British officer, doing nothing but eating your food away. In England I could be of some use perhaps for the good of the whole human race. It is nearly certain that Winston CHURCHILL will receive me.

"I do not want to go home on any sort of official mission. The Germans must release me unconditionally. I will go home just as a plain former prisoner-of-war officer, but this would show some sort of good will and I would go as an independant gentleman with fresh information regarding the war situation. There is no doubt that the British Government would hear my opinion."

Following this proposal source telephoned his chief in Berlin (Dr. PAEFFGEN), who investigated and confirmed DODGE's references to his relations. Source was ordered to further interrogate DODGE.

C. Family Background of Major DODGE

Major DODGE was born in the United States, a member of the well-known DODGE family, went to school there, and married an American girl. One of his forefathers was the founder of the Union Pacific Railway. One of his uncles was former U.S.A. ambassador to France, and another was a good friend of the late German Kaiser. A cousin is the American Minister to Switzerland.

Before 1914 DODGE's widowed mother, a BIGFLOW, remarried. Her second husband was the late British member of Parliament and steel mill owner, Sir Lionel GUEST. DODGE himself is partner of the London banking firm of LAZARUS, DODGE, and Co. Also, he is director of three British and British-American industrial firms (electrical instruments, safes, and tobacco). He was a Conservative member of the London County Council and official candidate of the Conservative Party for a constituency in the County of Kent. DODGE had become British subject

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in 1915 after joining the British Army. He is now reportedly living at Ferring by Sed, near Goring by Sea, Sussex, England; Telephone: Goring by Sea 25.

D. HIMMLER is Contacted.

After being satisfied that DODGE was a man of influence in Britain and the United States, Source reported the entire proposal to PAEFFGEN in writing. Dr. PAEFFGEN and source worked out a report to HIMMLER about the matter and suggested to him the release of Major DODGE. No mention was made to HIMMLER that DODGE was of the opinion that the HITLER government must resign before armistice talks could be opened; no mention of any specific conditions was made at all, as DODGE referred to them only in a very vague manner. The whole matter was to be treated as a purely private suggestion of DODGE, with the German government to do nothing except lease DODGE because of old age and long captivity. The time was towards the end of October 1944.

E. Source's Interview with SCHELLENBERG

Almost three months later, on 2 February 1945, Source was suddenly called to see SCHELLENBERG of the RSHA at his office in Berlin, Berkaerstrasse. Source went there from the Waldburg Lager in Kolpin near Storkow and arrived in Berlin late in the evening. SCHELLENBERG received Source for a very short interview and told him to change clothes and get ready to take Major DODGE to the Adlon Hotel for a dinner with Foreign Office people. He was then to be companion of DODGE for a couple of days and later bring him to Sweden.

SCHELLENBERG issued no political instructions, saying that the Foreign Office people would deal with that part of the matter. He instructed Source only to take precautions that DODGE did not see any military secrets, that he was well-fed and looked after, and that his release should officially go under the pretext that because American and British officers behaved very decently when the Soviet Army approached their prisoner-of-war camps in the eastern provinces of Germany the Fuehrer had decided to release ten American and ten British officers unconditionally as a sign of good will towards the Western enemies in face of the Bolshevik danger threatening, not only Germany, but the whole of Europe. DODGE would be one of these twenty officers, but his journey home should be made in civilian clothes, apart from the others, because DODGE was captured without uniform on the beach of Dunkirk in 1940.

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III. RELEASE OF DODGE TO THOST CUSTODY.

A. Meeting with Foreign Office BIG-WIGS

After the short interview with SCHELLENBERG DODGE was waiting for Source in a private apartment in Berlin, Innsbruckerplatz. The apartment belonged to an SS Sturmbannfuhrer who served on the front line and the flat was being used in the meantime by SCHELLENBERG for special purposes (interviews with agents, etc.). When Source arrived DODGE was in a new civilian suit. He was accompanied by a German Luftwaffe Major in uniform, who left when THOST appeared. DODGE and Source went to the Hotel Adlon in a car from SCHELLENBERG's office and met three higher officials from the German Foreign Office. They were:

- a) Botschaftsrat Dr. SCHMIDT, the internationally known interpreter of HITLER at all international conferences.
- b) Geheimrat Dr. HESSE, Chief of the British Department of the Bureau RIBBENTROP, the husband of Prinzessin WERTHEIM-LOEWENSTEIN-FREUDENBERG, formerly the head of the Deutsche Nachrichtenbureau (DNB) in London.
- c) The third was another high official of the German Foreign Office whose name and position Source does not remember.

B. Politics over the Dinner Table

All sat down to a late dinner. Dr. SCHMIDT made a short speech congratulating Major DODGE on his release and saying that in spite of all the horrors of war the common feeling of the peoples of Europe and the Americas towards humanity and a decent life should prevail. He declared that the main issue of the war at that time was not the question of victory or defeat for Germany. It lay in whether Europe and European civilization would sink into chaos, ruin, and Bolshevism, or whether some sort of order could be restored with the help of Western Europe and the U.S.A. The question of note was, he said, how far to the East this Europe would go, and he went on to emphasize that point. SCHMIDT suggested an immediate rapprochement between Germany and the United States and Great Britain to combat the danger from the East. He added that every other question - the future German frontiers, the extent of the new Poland, the peace conditions, etc. - were of secondary importance.

DODGE replied that he was not a person of any official standing or diplomatic experience, but that he was a keen advocate of humanity and peace and would be glad to forward any suggestion Germany might make as to the common aim of all the peoples of the world and the end

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of the terrible suffering and slaughter. He asked for information as to the conditions Germany would be prepared to accept in regard to her Western frontiers and the change of her government into a more democratic one.

Geheimrat Dr. HESSE explained that these conditions would, as Dr. SCHMIDT already said, be of secondary importance, but the Western frontiers of Germany could be subject to discussion, and the German Government would not insist on the status quo bellum. The Western frontiers of Germany might be revised on the basis of ethnographical realities, but, on the whole the pre-war frontiers conformed with those ethnographical, historical, and otherwise just solutions.

Source does not remember who brought the discussion to the subject of Alsace-Lorraine, but Dr. HESSE added that in his private opinion the people of Alsace-Lorraine were neither German or French and would be happy to become a small nation like Switzerland, thereby building a bridge between France and Germany, like Holland and Belgium. He said it would be worth while to consider the establishment of a strain of small neutral nations between France and Germany, extending from the North Sea to the Swiss border.

The main question, HESSE continued, was the extent of that new Europe to the East. There would be a new balance of power in Europe - the Europe proper and the Russian - influenced Europe, which in reality would be a stepping stone for Communism and Asiatic ideas. As long as Germany was victorious, HESSE averred, it tried to bring some sort of order and unity into Europe. This type of unity and the methods employed for its achievement did not meet the approval of the United States and Britain, but it stemmed from the fact that Europe had become too small to be the fighting ground of its nations and must be unified, if only for the pure purpose of saving its culture and precious civilization from further destruction. Germany had, he said, tried to do that.

Under changed military and political situations, he proposed that the U.S.A. and England be trusted with this task, and Germany would be prepared to cooperate in a spirit of common responsibility. As to the internal question of Germany's government, Dr. HESSE agreed that very important changes were due. He said that the present autocratic government was more or less a government born out of emergency, first of uniting Germany between 1933 and 1939 and then the emergency of the war. Democratic government would be satisfactory in peace time and during normal conditions, but in emergencies already the old Romans had resorted to dictatorships. Germany would be prepared to

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return to democracy after the restoration of peace and normal conditions, but it would be a great mistake to ask HITLER to resign, because he was the only person in Germany to settle the transition from war to peace, to negotiate with the Allies, and to restore and guarantee the conditions of armistice and peace. HESSE concluded, "There simply is no one else with authority in Germany except the Fuehrer."

DODGE asked whether the German Government would be prepared to change the German Cabinet as evidence in Washington and London of Germany's desire for a new policy. The third Foreign Office official replied in the affirmative. The discussion came, at this point, to the question of RIBBENTROP. Although the Foreign Office people were careful about what they were saying, Major DODGE and Source had the clear impression that all of them were of the opinion that RIBBENTROP had to resign at once. From what Source heard many months before in casual remarks by his chief, Dr. PAEFFGEN, most important men within the SS and other powerful Nazi circles were ardently opposed to RIBBENTROP and his foreign policy. DODGE was more or less assured that RIBBENTROP would be dropped the first moment any peace settlement was in sight. As to HITLER and the whole Nazi government, DODGE and Source had the impression that the government would resign and open the gates for general elections as soon as peace and normal conditions were restored. DODGE repeated that he had no official standing but would report the gist of these discussions to all the common men and women in England, Germany, and in other suffering countries as best as he could. According to THOST, DODGE added that he was very much impressed by what he saw in Berlin the first few hours when he was again a free man - the bravery of the women during the air raids, the calmness and patience in front of food shops, the politeness in crowded streets.

C. DODGE and THOST as Companions

From 2 February on Source was DODGE's constant companion until the latter crossed the Swiss border on 25 April 1945. Both lived in the SCHELLENBERG apartment, had their breakfasts there, but went out to public restaurants for lunch, tea, and dinner. Source took DODGE to cinemas and other places, but their movements were limited by the constant danger of air raids, which were especially heavy during those days. They also had tea at Source's temporary home in his sister's villa, where he lived after being bombed out in November 1943.

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D. The Travels Commence

1. In Dresden

Five days later, on 7 February, Source received orders to take DODGE to Dresden and await further orders there. Berlin was being heavily raided, and even water was difficult to get. Because they had been told on the second of February that the journey to Sweden would start soon and only formalities were the reason for some days of delay, this order was disappointing to both of them. On the evening of 7 February the SD Hauptsturmfuehrer of VI D3, ZOELLNER, appeared and they went by train to Dresden. Source was slightly reassured because the Hauptsturmfuehrer was one of the men who worked in the Swedish department of Amt VI. Arriving in Dresden late at night, they were met by SD officers who brought them into the Hotel Schillet near Dresden Altstadt, Main Station. They were well-accommodated and were invited to lunch and dinner next day by various police chiefs (SD Chief and the Hoehere Police Chief Herr von ALVENSLEBEN).

Source was ordered by Dr. PAEFFGEN to take care of all the money and food coupons and to be with DODGE when they left the hotel, but he assured Source that he would not be held responsible if DODGE tried to get out of Germany on his own. DODGE and Source arranged to always go out together, but if DODGE wanted to go for a short walk alone Source did not stop him. Source supplied him with 20 Marks in small coins in case of need. There was some sort of silent agreement between them that DODGE would not try further escapes since it supposedly was the German intention to get him home as quickly as possible.

On the night of 13 February they went to the Circus Sarasani; as the last performance was about to start, a heavy air raid by the RAF began. They tried to go to their hotel but it was impossible to reach the quarter of the Main Station, Altstadt, where the hotel was situated. They learned from people streaming from there that the whole district was nothing but blazing ruins and therefore recrossed the Elbe and went to the emergency headquarters of the Police near Weisser Hirsch. The next day they learned that all of their luggage in Hotel Schiller was lost. Von ALVENSLEBEN billeted them in a private house in the Weisser Hirsch, which had an especially deep air raid shelter. The day raid by the American Air Force they survived in the deep mountain shelters of ALVENSLEBEN's Police Headquarters.

2. On to Weimar.

On the 17 February, von ALVENSLEBEN told them that he could not take the responsibility of leaving them in Dresden any longer as the

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food and shelter situation became worse and the Russian Army came closer every day. On his own responsibility he arranged to send them to Weimar by bus. Both were disappointed but hoped that from Weimar their journey to Sweden would start soon. Von ALVENSLEBEN gave Source a letter of introduction and explanation for the Police Chief of Weimar, and they were crowded into an SS bus bound for that city. In the bus were two daughters of the main Police Chief of Ghringia, Erbprinz von WALDECK-PYRMONT; they were asked to explain to their father the situation regarding DODGE and Source and to ask their father for all necessary help.

THOST and DODGE arrived in Weimar early the morning of 18 February and were billeted at the Hotel Elephant. Source tried to get in touch with Dr. PAEFFGEN, SCHELLENBERG, and even used personal links between Prinz WALDECK and Herr von ALVENSLEBEN to HIMMLER, but in vain. Telephone and telegraph was almost always out of order because of air raids, the police teletype was overcrowded and could not be used for these very secret messages, and the radio communication of the police was only fit for very short messages in which Source could not explain the situation properly. In addition, not even the high police officers knew where HIMMLER actually was; he seemed to have been everywhere and nowhere in those late months of the war. In short, Source could not get any orders regarding DODGE from PAEFFGEN and Amt VI, or via the Police Chiefs from HIMMLER.

The only occurrence between February 18 and April 7 was that SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ZOELLNER appeared again for one day, bringing them some money, food coupons, cigarettes, and cognac, and asking them to stay in the Hotel Elephant until further orders. ZOELLNER stated that he heard the rumor that HITLER was so incensed about the British air raid on Dresden, in which 160,000 people were reportedly killed, that he declined to negotiate with Great Britain and refused to let Major DODGE out. The rumor went that HITLER was prepared to fight to the last. On the other hand, SCHELLENBERG, and especially Dr. PAEFFGEN, refused to put DODGE back into a prisoner-of-war camp because it would spoil their plans. Amt VI asked Source to stay on with DODGE until further orders could be given.

Source did not tell DODGE about the HITLER and Dresden rumor and simply informed him that, to his own deep regret, they must remain at the hotel in Weimar and that he had done and would continue to do everything to get him home as soon as possible.

Parts of Amt VI were meanwhile transferred from Berlin to a

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castle about 50 miles south of Weimar, and one day a minor official from Amt VI came to their hotel. However, he said that he was only there for a personal weekend visit, without special news or orders. Further, Source met SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. WOLFF of VI B in the hotel, but had nothing officially to do with him or with his department.

Their spirit and patience were tested severely in those days. They felt that if DODGE's release were to be of any use for an early peace every day was precious, and they were wasting their time by just eating, sleeping, and talking day and night, very often interrupted by Allied air raids during which they had to take shelter in the deep tunnels underneath the Weimar Park. The spirit of the Weimar people became more hostile towards the Anglo Saxons with the effort that the two were arrested one day for a couple of minutes because they talked English in the shelter during an air raid. A telephone call to the police chief, however, corrected the matter again.

3. Discussions in Weimar

Both discussed the war situation daily. Source asked DODGE not to take the anti-Russian outbursts of the Foreign Office people too seriously. (DODGE had traveled in Russia and was once imprisoned in 1922 in Tiflis by the GPU.) Source pointed out that it would only be fair of the democratic Western powers to forgive Germany for her dictatorship if those powers were prepared to forget the dictatorial past of Russia. According to Source, DODGE replied that in his opinion the war was drifting more and more into some sort of civil war.

"The strife had to be stopped," he said. "Already the war between Germany, Britain and the U.S.A. is," DODGE continued, "some sort of civil war because America's population consisted mainly of sons and daughters of British and German descendants. America could not exist without that British and German blood, and Europe could not exist without the British and German races being united. It is a matter of life and death for all of us to unite and bring this senseless slaughter to an end." (Note: These quotations are given by Source, and their authenticity can not be checked).

Source learned from DODGE that in his opinion there is right and wrong with all nations and political parties, and that the curse is caused by politicians who always overdo their jobs, not knowing the limits to which they can proceed. Source credits DODGE as saying that a little bit of National Socialism was all right for the Germany of

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1933, but HITLER pumped a hundred times more Nazism into Germany's body than it and the world could stand for. DODGE pointed especially to the Jewish question. He could understand, he said, German reaction when there was a big immigration of Eastern Jews into Germany just after the first World War; but he could not understand the wholesale slaughter and destruction of thousands of Jews, regardless whether they were of the Polish-Russian type or Jews whose families lived in Germany already for generations.

THOST replied that although he had heard rumors about mass executions of Jews in Poland, he was convinced that most of these rumors were either boasts of perverted men and women, or enemy propaganda like that of German atrocity stories of Lord NORTHCLIFFE during 1914 to 1918. However, he was beginning to doubt whether everything said about SS atrocities was mere rumor and propaganda. He had seen Mauthausen for four or five days.

These thoughts and mutual exchanges of opinion occurred during the many days of waiting in Weimar. What Source supplies above are extracts of those frequent conversations. In the months of being closely together DODGE and Source became close personal friends.

4. The Travels Resume.

At the beginning of April the American Army was approaching Weimar. In spite of the urgency of the situation Source could get no reply to all his messages, either from Amt VI, or from higher quarters. About 4 April high Party officials began to evacuate the city. The hotel, formerly overcrowded, began to become quiet and empty. Source thought of staying in the hotel with DODGE and waiting for the Americans to come. He did not know what the first American advance troops would do if they found a British officer in plain clothes waiting for them with a German of Amt VI. The Chief of Police, Prinz von WALDECK, advised him that the best thing to do would be to stay in Weimar. Source was of the same opinion, but the Gestapo chief finally decided the matter. He put the two men into a private car on April 7 and dispatched them to Hof with written orders to proceed first to Regensburg and later, as the situation required, to Munich.

5. On the Way to Regensburg

From Hof they were to take the train directly to Regensburg and report to the office of the Chief of Police. However, when they arrived in Hof they found rail transportation impossible. The next

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morning they boarded a truck bound for Ulm and hoped to get at least as far as Bayreuth. Shortly before they arrived the truck broke down, and DODGE and Source went into a small village to spend the night there. The next morning they found a car which took them to Bayreuth and from there continued to hitch-hike to Regensburg. At Kennath near Weiden they were arrested by several German police officers (in uniform and in plain clothes). They had spoken English and were reported. Source's papers were declared forged, and their identity was doubted. They were chained to each other, a rope was tied around THOST's waist, and the two were led a couple of miles through astonished rural crowds to the small town of Kennath, where they spent three nights and two days in prison without anyone having interrogated them. On the third day a Gestapo officer in plain clothes arrived, interviewed Source as to the looks and habits of several SD officers of Amt VI, and finally verified his identity. They then continued to Regensburg.

6. From Regensburg to Bad Toolz

They were now in the middle of the disorderly German retreat, and DODGE was fast getting the impression that the final German defeat was only a few days away. Therefore, Source attempted to get DODGE out of Germany as fast as he could. As they arrived in Regensburg near Regensburg they were stopped by military police saying that Regensburg was under constant air raids and that they had to report to a "Hoehere Polizei and SS Fuehrer" who happened to be in Regensburg. The radio-officer of this unit was able to communicate with one of HITLER's staff and received orders for THOST and DODGE to proceed to Munich and report to the SD Chief, SS Sturmbannfuehrer GLITZ. After spending three days in Regensburg they arrived in Munich on the morning of 18 April. GLITZ had no orders for Source but advised him to proceed to Bad Toolz, where he would meet his chief, Dr. PAEFFGEN. After spending the day in Munich they took the train (travelling was only possible in darkness because of American fighter-bombers) at night to Bad Toolz and arrived there on the morning of 19 April.

In Bad Toolz Source was surprised to meet not only PAEFFGEN, but some other people of his department of Amt VI: Obersturmfuehrer REIMERS, Untersturmfuehrer WAHLSTAB, Sturmbannfuehrer BUSSINGER, and one or two lady typists. PAEFFGEN told Source that he was without any contact to his superiors, except SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. STEINLE, who then acted as temporary head of Amt VI, with SCHELLENBERG absent. STEINLE had telegraphed instructions to PAEFFGEN for DODGE and Source

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to wait another couple of days in Bad Toelz. They were there from 19 to 23 April, and in the meantime communication between PAEFFGEN and STEINLE was also cut off.

PAEFFGEN and Source decided on their own to let DODGE proceed to Switzerland. PAEFFGEN gave Source money that Amt VI owed him for expenses in Weimar and a written "Marschbefehl" (travel order) made up for "Dr. THOST and one man on important secret mission to Bregenz". On 23 April they went with a truck as far as Kempten. During that journey they had the stream of the retreating Germans come in their direction and DODGE and Source could see more of the hopeless situation. In Kempten a bus took them to Bregenz the same night, arriving on that Lake Constance port in the early morning.

This last mission was without knowledge or approval of the head of Amt VI and/or of KALTENBRUNNER, HIMMLER, or HITLER, but only on the decision of Dr. PAEFFGEN and Source. Both, however, decided to use the name of HIMMLER as the authority for the "Marschbefehl" because the crossing of the Swiss border would otherwise have been impossible. To Source's knowledge, PAEFFGEN had instructed the SD Chief in Bregenz to let DODGE cross without difficulties.

7. Over the Border and Into Switzerland

In Bregenz the chief of the SD seemed to have been instructed (by PAEFFGEN) on the identity of Major DODGE and source. He arranged matters with the Gestapo which also acted as the "Grenz Polizei" (frontier police), and Source was told that DODGE could cross into Switzerland as soon as he wished.

On the evening of 25 April DODGE and Source took a local train (after a further air raid by fighter-bombers in the vicinity) to Hoechst near Bregenz. They walked to the border, and DODGE was taken across to Switzerland by one of the policemen. He crossed the border without any identity papers, passports, and the like. He had been taken prisoner by the Germans without such papers and, to Source's knowledge, was never in possession of any identity documents during the four years of his captivity.

IV. THOST'S ACTIVITIES AFTER LEAVING DODGE

After DODGE crossed into Switzerland Source's mission was at an end, and he was free to go where he wanted. He proceeded to the home of some relatives in Reichenau, remained there from 6 to 17 May and reported to the French commandant in that area after the arrival of

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French troops. After learning his story, the French sent him to divisional headquarters in Donaueschingen, where he was arrested on 25 May.

THOST was interrogated by the French several times, shifted from one camp to another, then later turned over to American custody. He is now being investigated by War Crimes Commission.

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