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8 February 1946

TO: SAINT, Washington  
FROM: SAE, London  
SUBJECT: War Room Bibliography of the SIS  
(SP 52/21)

1. Enclosed are two copies of this document, which in conjunction with the general study of the SIS already issued, and with the Liquidation Reports, represents a final summary by the War Room of our knowledge, and the sources of it, concerning the SIS.

2. The Bibliography is particularly valuable for its material on the Abwehr and the Militaerisches Amt. The comments on Amt VI might be supplemented by reference to numerous other Interrogation and Liquidation Reports; and it may be noted that no references are given for the Gestapo's intelligence service.

Attachment: 2 cpye subj. rpt.  
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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE WAR ROOM

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE G.I.S.

SF. 52/21

PREFACE.

The bibliography which follows is limited to captured documents and interrogation reports on captured G.I.S. agents and personnel. It is not claimed to be in any way complete, even for these sources. It should, however, be useful as a general survey of the basic sources for a comprehensive study of the G.I.S. In most cases emphasis has been laid on sources which are easily available, but a certain number of earlier reports have been included for the sake of completeness, because they are considered essential. Some of these, which were circulated before 1944, may not be available to all the recipients of this paper.

For more detailed bibliographies on specific subjects, the relevant Liquidation Reports should be consulted.

The originals of captured documents mentioned in this bibliography are mostly stored at Camp Ritchie in Maryland. They can be traced either through the War Department or the War Office. The W.R.D. reference will be useful only in locating the results of War Room exploitation of the documents.

A. BIBLIOGRAPHY. ABWEHR and MIL.AMT 1935 - 1945.

1. Pre-war period 1935-39. The sources for this period are at present scanty. Among captured documents there are two sets of basic interest:

- (a) a full account of the functions and organisation of Abwehr Abteilung III dated 1937. (Original held by Section V; largely reprinted in ZIP/PAL 1 of 1.1.43).
- (b) The records of Abwehr Abteilung III D (Deception) for the period 1935-39, recently discovered at Bad Blankenburg. (W.R.D. reference G/Bad Blankenburg/III/2).

These two give a general picture of the organisation and methods of work of Abteilung III which was by far the most important section of the Abwehr in this period. Of less value, but useful for indicating the early personalities at Abwehr H.Q. is an extract from the Stellenbesetzung des Heeres dated 1938 which gives the names of German Army officers then serving with the OKW/Abwehr. (Reference M.I.14(d)/08/32/42; copy held by WR/E). Other documents which may have some general interest are certain Abwehr administrative dossiers on communications (for 1939), transport (1936-39), finance (1939) and internal administration (1936-39), which were found at Bad Sulza. (WR/D reference G/Bad Sulza/VII,XII, XXIII and XXIV).

The natural emphasis in interrogation on the Abwehr's more recent activities has meant that though many officers with experience of this pre-war period have been captured, few have given a full or satisfactory account of it. The best reports so far published include -

ultimately led to its dissolution, are easily deducible from the prohibitions which make up most of the lecture, e.g. "No jobs of a political nature for agents.... Activity against Jews no concern of ours.... No bureaucratic inhibitions.... No Black Market activities", and from the significant exhortation "Loyal attitude towards S.D. and Gestapo necessary". This document is also of value for giving the size of the Abwehr at this date - over 20,000 in all, excluding agents - which illustrates the top-heaviness of the organisation. (WR/D reference GI of 15.3.45).

Other documents are worth mention for this period. First, there is an order issued by the Io/AO attached to Heeresgruppe A dated 8.2.40, which lays down the organisation of the Abwehr in the field at that time. This is of interest when studying the work of the Abwehr's mobile units during the campaign in the West of 1940. (No reference available. Presumably originates from M.I.14. Copy held by WR/E). Secondly, there is a telephone directory for Abwehr Abt. II H.Q. dated 24.10.41, captured in France in 1944, which gives over a hundred names alphabetically with their departments against them. Finally, the administrative dossiers cited above cover these years and may contain useful facts.

The most useful interrogation reports covering this period include those on PHEIFFER, LUDWIG, EITEL, MEISSNER and WICHMANN, already cited. EITEL continues his account of the intelligence activities of PHEIFFER both before and after the French campaign of 1940. His explicit details of a fudged mission to Italy early in 1940 and the junketings at the expense of public funds resulting from it, and of the black market background to the work of Nest Brest in 1940-41, explain the moral exhortations of CANARIS referred to in para 2 above. When this is compared with the tale of PHEIFFER's kommando during the actual campaign, the conclusion that the Abwehr's successes were often only the reflection of the Army's advances is plainly indicated. This is borne out by WICHMANN's account of Ast Hamburg's activities 1939-1941. Except in South America, where an agent network was working successfully in this period, he describes no successful undertakings and he remarks on the failure of the Abwehr's efforts to obtain information from England and the U.S.A. LUDWIG gives some details on the early activities of III F in Belgrade. MEISSNER, as deputy Leiter of Ast Oslo in 1940, and later as Ast-leiter Angers and Leiter III Paris (1940-41) gives information on C.E. work in occupied countries and details of personnel of those stations.

Other reports covering this period include those on :-

- (i) Major WURMANN (see below). This report gives details of the structure and personnel of Abt. I at Abwehr headquarters and of Asts Wiesbaden and Muenster and Nest Cologne for the period 1939 - 41. It also contains information on the German Armistice Commission in Africa and its liaison with the Abwehr, and a description of the sorting of Abwehr reports to interested commands and of the methods of recruiting agents within the Abwehr.
- (ii) Hans Karl SCHARF. This describes the preparation of an early sabotage mission of Abt. II directed against South Africa and illustrates the extent of Spanish collaboration with the Abwehr in Villa Cisneros. SCHARF was an Alsatian drafted at the beginning of the war into the Brandenburg Regiment and extracted from it by Abt. II for a sabotage mission. His information is reliable.

(viii) Hans KAUTZ. This man was an assistant in the economic espionage (I W1) section of Ast Berlin from 1938 to 1941 when he was transferred to Alst Paris. He is of interest as an example of the continuity of German espionage, as he was a member of the German Intelligence Service from 1917-18 and of its methods of economic espionage under cover of genuine business trips. He also names the more important officers in I W1 at Abw. H.Q. as well as at Ast Berlin and in Paris.

(ix) Ernst BEHRENS. This officer was originally a member of Ast HANNOVER (1937-40) and subsequently head of Nest Warsaw (1940-41) and Ast Kassel (1941-43). His statement (it is not an interrogation) is chiefly of interest for its general view of the Abwehr and for its criticism of CANARIS. It is particularly relevant to this period because it shows that even in its successful years, the Abwehr was constantly under pressure from the RSHA, and that corruption and favoritism in the selection and posting of officers made serious work exceptionally difficult. BEHRENS' account of his work at Warsaw is valuable because it gives a detailed view of the Abwehr's methods against Russia at this time and the extent of its success.

(x) Peter SCHAGEN. This report includes an account of Abwehr Abt. II H.Q. in September 1939 with details of the chief personalities and the aims of the department. SCHAGEN also describes a reconnaissance mission to Portugal on which he was sent in October 1939 to spy out the possibilities of sabotage measures against the Allies and an abortive sabotage undertaking in Switzerland in May 1940. After a brief period of training with the Brandenburg Battalion, then in its infancy, he was posted to Alst Paris's sabotage section (Gruppe II) of which he gives a brief description for the period up to April 1941.

3. The Middle War Years, 1942-1943. Three important documents or sets of documents are known for this period. The first is a telephone directory for the whole Abwehr H.Q. dated March 1943, which was captured in Wiesbaden in 1945. This lists the names and ranks of all the officers in Abw. I, II, III and Z as well as in A.G. Ausland department by department as at that date. (Reference SCI 12 A.G. Report S.853 dated 19.4.45). The second is an alphabetical list of the personnel in Alst France as at 30.6.42. This gives rank, departments and seniority of all officers and civil servants belonging to the station. (Reference SCI France, Paris Base Report S.141 of 26.9.44). The third is a set of agent reports of Ast Dijon which give a detailed insight into the operations of the Ast in attempting to penetrate French resistance movements and Allied intelligence organisations. The papers date from late 1942 to 1944. (WR/D reference :WR/D/G/Stuttgart/I).

A few secondary documents are also worth noting, viz :

(a) an alphabetical list of officers who served with Ast Kassel between 1939 and 1944 (Reference SCI 12 A.G. Report on Kassel operations dated 17.4.45.);

Abwehr (see below) it is of great value for its account of HANSEN's plans and policy during 1943. His bias is in favour of HANSEN and his story therefore balances LEDEBUR's. Many other interrogations supply details of the Abwehr's work in all areas during these years, but none is of wide interest or particular merit and the following selection has been chosen arbitrarily.

(i) Reports on WEBER, ABERLE, EPPLER and SANDSTEDE. These give an account of the Abwehr's work in Libya and Egypt.

(ii) Reports on Gottfried MUELLER and the MAMMUT undertaking. These describe an Abw. II expedition against Iraq and Persia.

(iii) Reports on Mirko ROT and Andre GYORGY. These deal with the Abwehr's chief source of operational intelligence from Russia and the British Mid-East area, i.e. the Luftmeldekopf Sofia of Richard KAUDERS @ KLATT. As KLATT is under interrogation, these reports may soon be replaced by his information; also Oberst. WAGNER @ Dr. DELIUS, who was head of K.O. Bulgaria from 1941-1944, should throw further light on the subject.

(iv) Report on Willy GOERTZ. This gives details of the Abwehr's stations in Vienna and Budapest and of the technical/military (I.H./T) section of Abw. H.Q.

(v) Report on Hans SALZINGER. SALZINGER was an officer in the Abwehr's C.E. section for Scandinavia (III F.6). He gives a full list of the important III officers at work in this period.

(vi) Reports on MEISSTUEFFEN and POILS. These two men were agents of Nest Cologne and give details of its personnel and activities.

(vii) Reports on DELGRANGE, D'HOOGHE, HAGEMANN and Werner UNVERSAGT. These reports taken together give a complete picture of the activities of Ast Brussels in the period. Werner UNVERSAGT is the only officer among them and is probably the most reliable; he was a I.H. specialist and he covers military espionage cases. HAGEMANN deals mainly with Ast Brussels' station in Paris. D'HOOGHE was a naval specialist and describes Ast Brussels' coastal network. DELGRANGE is useful for his list of personnel.

(viii) Reports on KLIEMANN, CLOEREN and SPECK. This is a selection of reports covering Abwehr activities in France during this period. They are all officers of the Abwehr. KLIEMANN covers the work of I Luft in Paris, CLOEREN of I.H. at Angers and SPECK of III F also at Angers.

(ix) Report on the German deserter, Luitpold HAFNER. HAFNER was employed by the I.M. section of K.O. Spain and gives details of its Gibraltar reporting service as well as of its main personalities.

(x) Reports on CHRISTENSEN @ LUCASSEN, ENGELS @ ALFREDO, Ottokar MUELLER and Walter NAPP. These four were the Abwehr's chief agents in Brazil in 1941-42. Their stories properly belong to the early war years, but they were not rounded up and interrogated until 1942. CHRISTENSEN was an agent of Ast Kiel I.N; ENGELS, by far the most important and dangerous of the batch, represented the economic espionage department (I W1) of Abw. H.Q; MUELLER and NAPP were part of Ast Hamburg's network run by OBLADEN and described by WICHMANN (see above).

Two other sources are available for this period. The first is the information given by the deserters VERMEHREN and HAMBURGER on the work of the Abwehr in Turkey and the Near East. Their evidence greatly expands LUDWIG's story which is restricted to counter-espionage.

VERMEHREN also discusses the decline of the Abwehr in these years and HANSEN's efforts to arrest it. His information on this aspect of the Abwehr supplements that of LEDEBUR and KUEBART. The second source for this period, which does not fall into the class of ordinary interrogations, is the commentary made on the Abwehr by several officers of the Italian intelligence services who surrendered in September 1943. The best accounts are given by Major NANI on the Abwehr's work in Tripoli and Tunisia, Colonel di CARLO on the Abwehr in Spain and Spanish Morocco, Major VACIAGO on the work of Abwehr II and Max PONZO on Abwehr I.M.

4. The Collapse of the Abwehr 1944 : the Mil. Amt 1944-1945. The sources for this final period are well known, numerous and increasing. A selection from them at this point cannot therefore be final and will not include reports or documents rightly considered to be of a higher standard than many cited above for the earlier periods. But this cannot be avoided; and the following selection is only intended to provide enough material to outline the fall of the Abwehr and the working of the Mil. Amt.

Two sets of documents captured early in 1945 provide information on the Mil. Amt. The first set consists of orders issued in June and early July 1944 under the signature of KAUFENBRUNNER, setting out in detail the organisation of the newly established Mil. Amt in relation to the old Abwehr. As these orders were issued before 20th July, they do not correspond to the final organisation of the Mil. Amt, but they cover all the main changes. (Reference WR/D/G/Koblenz/XVII/2). The second set consists of a map of the main withdrawal stations of the RSHA and a distribution slip giving, among others, the names of all section heads of the Mil. Amt. This is dated December 1944 and indicates the number and size of the Mil. Amt's evacuation centres. (Reference WR/D/G/Bad. Sulza/I. 1 & 2). Another document of the same date gives the organisation of the Nachrichtenregiment 505. (Copy available with R.S.S.(I)), but this is of little general interest. Finally a document of early 1944 gives the organisation of the Abwehr in Norway at the time of the change-over from static to mobile units. (Reference WR/D/Oslo/1/2). Many other documents for this period are still in process of being sorted and edited.

Interrogation reports and information from penetration agents cover every aspect of this period. Of interrogations already mentioned, LEDEBUR and KUEBART remain by far the most valuable for the story of CANARIS' fall and the short interregnum under HANSEN culminating in the events of 20th July. For the period after 20th July 1944 to the moment of collapse, the best sources are the interrogations of SCHELLENBERG himself and of his chief administrative assistant, SANDBERGER. These two between them cover almost all important questions. SCHELLENBERG deals with policy, important personnel and sources; SANDBERGER settles the dry problem of organisation and departmental symbols beyond all further question. Both bring out the failure of the Mil. Amt to achieve any positive success in the realm of intelligence. SKORZENY and RADL exhaust the subject of the Mil. Amt's sabotage section (Mil.D) on which SCHELLENBERG and SANDBERGER have little to say.

More detailed information on the work, organisation and personnel of the Mil. Amt at H.Q. and in the field is available in the following reports : -

(i) VON BECHTOLSHEIM, KURRER, OHLEITZ, GAMEKE, EISENBERG, FERID DUESTERBERG and MULLER. These all deal with Mil. Amt HQ. Von BECHTOLSHEIM analyses the sources and value of the Mil. Amt's naval espionage and describes the development of deception under the Mil. Amt (Mil. I). KURRER, OHLEITZ, GAMEKE, EISENBERG and FERID deal in detail with their respective departments - Mil. B, C and D. GAMEKE, EISENBERG and FERID are exclusively concerned with the East, and no equivalent is yet available for the West. DUESTERBERG was head of the Abwehr's accounts section and later incorporated in RSHA Amt II to administer the finances of the Mil. Amt. His report contains facts on the organization of the Abwehr department and figures for Abwehr and Mil. Amt expenditure. Obstlt. MUELLER's report gives a partial account of Mil. Amt G (Secret writing, forged papers, etc).

The obvious gaps left by these reports affect the remaining sections of the Mil. Amt H.Q. - Mil. E (Signals) and F (Kdos and Trupps). These gaps are expected to be filled by the interrogations of OESTERLE and BUNTROCK of Mil. E and F respectively.

(ii) KLIEMANN, BRANDSTETTER, CLOEREN, NIEMEIER, HAGEMANN and STRACKE. These deal with the espionage commands and trupps in the West. KLIEMANN and BRANDSTETTER describe the working of the Luft Kommando and trupps up to August 1944; CLOEREN, NIEMEIER and HAGEMANN cover the Army commands and trupps in Normandy, Belgium, Holland and North Germany. STRACKE deals with the Marine Kommando in Holland. Many other reports already exist covering the work of the I units in this period but these, taken together, contain most of the important points known. Of reports still to come, those on SCHUCHMANN for the Marine Kommando and LIND for a Luft trupp, will probably contain useful information and the reports expected on HERRLITZ, head of Leitstelle I West and Julius SCHMIDT, head of FAK 120, should clear up outstanding problems on I.H. commands and trupps in the West.

(iii) SCHAGEN, MAREEL and GERKEN. These deal with the sabotage commands and trupps in the West. SCHAGEN covers the commands and trupps in France up to August 1944. MAREEL gives a little information on the commands and trupps in Belgium and Holland for the same period. GERKEN expands MAREEL and takes the story on in great detail up to the German surrender. As with the I units, many other reports exist; but most of these are on low-grade agents with little information save on their own tasks and are not worth citing for general purposes.

(iv) RUPPOLT, SPECK, GISKES, HUNTEMANN, WAGNER @ WALTER, REILE and BLEICHER. These deal with the work of the counter-espionage commands and trupps in the West. RUPPOLT covers the work of the commands and trupps in Normandy and North France up to August 1944, and his story is taken up and continued in detail up to March 1945 by SPECK. GISKES and HUNTEMANN describe the commands and trupps in Belgium, Holland and North Germany, and WAGNER covers the parallel units in Alsace and Baden. The reports on REILE and BLEICHER on counter-espionage in the West are also extremely valuable.

(v) Von ENGELMANN, MOHR, KEILHOLZ, REME and STEINBERG. These reports contain information on all three types of commando and trupp in Italy. Von ENGELMANN and MOHR deal with the I units, KEILHOLZ and REME with the II units and STEINBERG with the III units.