

16P

LIQUIDATION REPORT No. 206 A

AUSSENSTELLE BREMEN

S.F. 52/16/12

I. INTRODUCTION

Aussenstelle Bremen, neminally an out-station of KDM Hamburg, was perhaps unique among Abwehr-Stellen in the degree of independence which it possessed, in the number of countries to which its agent-networks extended, and in its long history of activity.

From its inception in 1935 until the absorption of the Abwehr into the RSHA in 1944, the Bremen organisation was a Nebenstelle. Since the only practical effect on Nest Bremen of the Abwehr's re-constitution into Mil. Amt was its change of nomenclature, the Nest being thereafter known as an Aussenstelle of KDM Hamburg, and since a description of the Stelle's activities during the Mil. Amt phase would provide a totally inadequate picture of its interests and achievements, this report will comprise a brief account of the Bremen Stelle from its inception until its final dissolution, a division being made into pre-war and war-time developments.

Throughout its existence the Bremen Stelle comprised Gruppe I elements only; at no time was it concerned with Gruppe II or Gruppe III activities, and although before the outbreak of war the Nest was expanded to include IH and IL sections (which later disappeared) and interested itself in economic intelligence whenever propitious, the main concern of the Stelle throughout its history was with I Marine interests.

Nest, later Aussenstelle, Bremen, must not be confused with the I Wi Stelle situated in Bremen, known alternatively as Referat Roland and Stelle Frischmuth, and sometimes loosely named Stelle Bremen. The latter was an entirely separate organisation, bearing no relation to Nest Bremen and responsible only to Abt. I Wi Berlin. Referat Roland may be dealt with in a separate report if an interrogation report on its Leiter, Walter FRISCHMUTH, is received.

II. ORIGINS

In 1934 Erich PHEIFFER was working in Wilhelmshaven as a "Nachrichten-offizier" for the Abwehr, then in its infancy. He was occupied with the task of forming what cannot be rated higher than an "information" system, to bring dividends from all parts of the world in the shape of reports on foreign shipping and Naval matters. To this end PHEIFFER had established the following sources of information:-

- 1) Contacts in Belgium and Holland, who had undertaken to supply written reports on such information as could be gleaned in the ports of Antwerp, Rotterdam and The Hague.
- 2) Suitable informants recruited from the many regular business travellers registered at the Bremen Aussenhandelsstelle, who supplied material regarding foreign defences, and naval and shipping construction, collected in the normal course of their travels.
- 3) Merchant Navy Captains and officers whose ships were based on the port of Wilhelmshaven.
- 4) Stewards on vessels plying between Germany and New York, who obtained shipping publications and technical journals of all types while in New York, and also reported to PHEIFFER the results of their own observations of shipping etc. In addition, these men acted as couriers for 5) below.
- 5) Germans resident in New York who had volunteered their services, and who were asked to obtain details of military and air force, as well as

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naval, developments in the U.S.A., and to send reports to PHEIFFER by the couriers mentioned above.

It should be understood that at this stage PHEIFFER had not asked for any actual espionage to be undertaken on his behalf; informants were urged not to draw attention to themselves by unlawful or dangerous "snooping". Nevertheless, from these sources and from other individual informants too numerous to mention here, PHEIFFER had begun to build up a great deal of valuable material for the use of the Naval and Military authorities, and was laying the foundations of an extensive intelligence organisation which was to prove extremely valuable in later years.

It is amusing to learn that PHEIFFER was an admirer of Max RONCO, the Austrian "Master-Spy" of the 1914-1918 war, whose methods influenced his own approach to intelligence work.

By the beginning of 1935, PHEIFFER found the closed area of Wilhelmshaven, and the limited scope offered to him there, irksome and obstructive, and began to work more and more in the Bremen area, which as a world-wide shipping base offered more opportunities. Consequently, after making representations to CANARIS, during the latter's visit to Wilhelmshaven in April 1935, PHEIFFER was authorised to transfer his office to Bremen and was promised full facilities for conducting and expanding his work there. After he had submitted a scheme for the Bremen Stelle to Abwehr headquarters, it was officially agreed that PHEIFFER should concentrate on the obtaining of marine intelligence, and should seek information on world-wide, as well as North-Sea, traffic.

### III. NEST BREMEN, 1935-1939

The Stelle was opened officially, with the title of Nebenstelle Bremen, in October 1935. Its staff of four comprised PHEIFFER himself as Leiter, assisted by the shipping expert Hans BENDIXEN, one secretary and one chauffeur.

The Nest was conducted on the same lines as those previously pursued by PHEIFFER, and enjoyed complete freedom of action. BENDIXEN proved an asset to PHEIFFER, immediately proceeding with the recruitment of informants from among merchant marine officers based on Bremen, thereby building up a vital source of information from all quarters of the globe.

At this time and subsequently, both before and after the outbreak of war, PHEIFFER exploited personal contacts in the directorate of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Shipping Company for the purpose of recruiting agents and couriers from among crews on the company's vessels, and the company collaborated with Nest Bremen to the extent of presenting likely recruits for employment as agents or officials of the Nest.

In 1936, PHEIFFER commenced to explore the possibility of obtaining reliable intelligence regarding France's navy and defence systems.

Profitable sources of such material were contacts made in Rhine and Ruhr construction firms undertaking contracts in France. A second valuable source was a French Naval officer, Marc AUBERT, who volunteered his services as a German agent, and provided extremely high-grade material.

From travellers to England came reports on U.K. ports, shipping and the British Navy; while from his merchant marine informants PHEIFFER received excellent material dealing with shipping and defences in the British colonies, Japan and Russia.

It is of interest to learn from PHEIFFER that he welcomed reports on Russia obtained through that country's placing of contracts with German firms in the Ruhr. It was not until 1937 or 1938 that it was decided that intelligence from Russia did not fall within the aegis of Nest Bremen.

In the autumn of 1937 PHEIFFER was instructed to expand his work of espionage against the United Kingdom, from which country any type of intelligence was to be sought, and to facilitate the implementation of these

instructions the Stelle was considerably expanded, new officers being appointed to initiate IH and I Luft sections:

Personnel of Nest Branch, 1937/38.

Leiter : K.Lt. PHEIFFER  
Assistant : K.Lt. Hans HENDIXEN

<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>
<u>I Marine</u>	<u>I Heer</u>	<u>I Luft</u>
K.Lt. KLAPS (replacing UNTERBERG) Hans ALTER	Major AUGENER	Hpt. WENZLAU

One of the most important undertakings of AUGENER, the newly-appointed IH official, was the recruitment, training and control of an agent in Holland, Albert MEERMS, who until the outbreak of war was productive of material from the U.K., Western Europe, India and Malaya, all of which countries he visited under business cover.

HENDIXEN controlled a number of agents in the Nest East, who provided shipping intelligence from the Bosphorus and Dardanelles area, and later from Syrian ports.

PHEIFFER meanwhile continued to expand his existing sources, and was highly satisfied with results, until early in 1938, when to his surprise and dismay a major catastrophe befell his agents in the U.S.A., the majority of these being apprehended by the F.B.I. This disaster was followed very shortly afterwards by the arrest in France of Marc AUBERT, who had been providing useful information regarding French coastal defences and naval construction.

The denouement in America caused criticism of PHEIFFER, not only within the Abwehr but also by Norddeutscher Lloyd officials, since the arrests, which included that of a hairdresser, Johanna HOFFMANN, of the S.S. Europa, brought disrepute to the shipping line. However, PHEIFFER managed to excuse himself to CANARIS, who indeed showed considerable restraint and understanding, by explaining that the rounding-up of his group of agents had been due to the careless and confused behaviour of one of the couriers, Karl SCHLUETER, who, entirely without PHEIFFER's knowledge, had been utilised simultaneously by Ast Hamburg, and had also become involved in Nazi Party organisations in the United States.

CANARIS accepted this explanation, which was in fact legitimate, and PHEIFFER continued to enjoy both CANARIS' confidence, and the same degree of independence as hitherto.

During the same year, 1938, PHEIFFER had enlisted the services of two men who were to remain with Nest Bremen throughout the war, and who maintained and developed the Nest's resources with considerable energy and enterprise, namely Johannes BISCHOFF and Nikolaus BENSMANN. The former, a cotton merchant, had business connections in England, and during the frequent visits which he made to the U.K. up to the outbreak of war he produced information on industrial and aircraft developments in that country. BENSMANN, an expert in the oil industry, with innumerable contacts in Europe and America, was able to recruit agents who supplied intelligence regarding oil storage and refining plants in many countries. BENSMANN was also responsible for creating a secret writing and photographic laboratory in Bremen.

At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, Nest Bremen, in common with all Abwehrstellen responsible for offensive espionage in the West, was instructed to report on preparations for war on the part of Great Britain and France.

During 1938, the Nest was used as a training school for IH officials from other Stellen, evidence of the high regard which was held at Abteilung

headquarters for PHEIFFER's efficiency and achievements.

PHEIFFER himself was anxiously engaged in constructing a new network of agents to operate against the U.S.A. Convinced that, but for the utilisation without his knowledge of certain of his agents by Ast Hamburg, his previous methods would have continued to bring successful results, he proceeded along similar lines, first recruiting two stewards on a New York-Germany shipping route, and secondly gladly accepting an offer of services received shortly afterwards from Simon KOEDEL, a German in New York, whom he instructed to report on military matters and on shipping in New York harbour.

In January 1939, PHEIFFER attended a special course for Abteilung I officers in Berlin, which was directed by BRASSER, Gruppenleiter I Luft, and which consisted of detailed instruction in aircraft recognition and technical aviation matters.

During the succeeding nine months, Nest Bremen received an increasing number of enquiries from headquarters regarding ports and shipping in the Levant, but was unable to achieve satisfactory results in this direction.

PHEIFFER, who had for some years been convinced of the inevitability of war, and who now realised its imminence, painstakingly brought his dossiers up-to-date from official and unofficial naval publications obtained from his own sources, considering that statistics and charts issued by Abt. IM were inaccurate. He thus was able to construct a plan of campaign in respect of naval intelligence, rendered himself independent of, or unlimited by, directives issued by the Kriegsmarine, and was ready to meet the altered demands which he anticipated when war was declared.

IV. NEST BREMEN, September 1939-June 1944.

Immediately after the outbreak of war Nest Bremen was given the priority assignment of obtaining detailed intelligence regarding foreign shipping in Northern European waters. To PHEIFFER's disappointment, he found that the majority of his contacts lapsed into silence and he received very little intelligence from pre-existing agents. It therefore became a vital and urgent necessity to activate new sources. To this end Nest Bremen officials toured the Low Countries and Denmark, recruiting agents mainly from amongst BENS MANN's business contacts; among these were agents who provided information regarding the R.A.F. and the aircraft industry in Britain. Meanwhile, BISCHOFF, following the tradition established by PHEIFFER, opened a new channel of communication with agents in the United States. The agent GRIMM was established in Milan with the task of recruiting and controlling members of crews of U.S. ships calling at Italian ports. GRIMM was assisted in this work by Karl EITEL, who before the arrests early in 1938 had been a steward on the S.S. Bremen, utilised as an agent courier by PHEIFFER. These sub-agents acted as substitutes for the couriers on the Bremen-New York liners used before the war to bring material from the U.S.A.; they were also utilised as couriers for BENS MANN's U.S.A. contacts, the exploitation of whom enabled Nest Bremen to keep au fait with the latest American technical developments. By the end of 1939 PHEIFFER was receiving from this channel excellent reports on shipping and Army training methods from a pre-war agent in New York.

Further contacts of BENS MANN proved useful agents in Roumania, and through yet another friend of BENS MANN, with good connections in Chile, a network of informants was created in South America.

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Heinz RUELHANSSEN, an agent of BISCHOFF dispatched to Colombia via Italy in 1940, was instructed to set up a W/T station there; and, by building up a sub-agent network in South America, another source of information on developments in the U.S.A. was established.

Activities on behalf of Nest Bremen in China are evidenced by the presence in 1940 of at least one agent, REMMCKE, in Shanghai, with whom the W/T station in Colombia made contact, while an agent dispatched to the U.S.A. in the spring of that year dispatched reports to Bremen via cover addresses in Shanghai, Switzerland and Milan, and probably communicated also by W/T via the Colombia station.

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A further important development in the early part of 1940 was the establishment of agents in France.

The spring of 1940 saw an attempt to expand the Nest's resources in the Western Hemisphere by the dispatch of an agent named MULACK to Canada; however, although the agent duly reached Canada, via the U.S.A., and successfully evaded detection by the U.S. and Canadian authorities, no reports were ever received from him.

At this time BISCHOFF undertook the task of contacting, through the Bremen Chamber of Commerce, persons entering and leaving the country. These travellers were discreetly interviewed prior to their departure and after their return, and while spectacular results were neither achieved nor expected, a certain amount of useful information was thus obtained. This interrogation was carried on under the cover-title of the "Seeverkehrs-Navigationsbuero", and the work was known as the Wirtschaftsbefragungsdienst.

A Schiffsbefragungsdienst was formed by other Nest Bremen personnel, who pruned and interrogated ships' captains and crews.

These two methods of seeking intelligence were abandoned in 1942; however, throughout the war the Nest continued to interrogate German nationals returning from abroad, both to obtain intelligence and with a view to selecting possible agent recruits. This work was described latterly as "Rückwandererbefragungsdienst".

In May 1940 PHEIFFER left Nest Bremen, taking charge of an Einsatzkommando which accompanied the German Army in its advance through the Low Countries and France, and he was replaced as Leiter by K.Lt. CARL, who from the outbreak of war until this date had been Leiter of Ip (Presse) Nest Bremen, a section formed to deal with the extraction of intelligence from foreign publications received in the Nest from all sources. CARL had been assisted in this work by SdF. SCHIERENBECK, and by BISCHOFF; the latter specialised in material from the U.K., Eire and the U.S.A. and also in the collection of economic material on South America, which last task he performed on behalf of Abteilung I W1, sending the results of his labours to Berlin headquarters. Most of the material derived from South America was received by BISCHOFF from GRIMM in Milan, who subscribed to all important South American publications.

From the time PHEIFFER left the Nest the prominent figures were not, as might be expected, the subsequent Leiters, but BISCHOFF and BENSCHMANN. Little is known of CARL's personal ability as Leiter, but much has emerged regarding the activities of these two subordinates, who continued in the traditions of their recruiter and first Leiter, PHEIFFER.

In the summer of 1940 an attempt was made to dispatch Albert MEHMS to India, after careful training had been given in secret writing and microphotography. This agent failed to advance beyond Belgrade and eventually returned to the Nest for re-employment elsewhere. No evidence has been received of any agents successfully operating from India during the war.

In this year also a W/T trained agent was placed in Antwerp to report on Channel shipping.

In addition to the above, by the end of 1940 Nest Bremen was receiving reports on Allied and neutral shipping from the following sources:

- 1) Officers of German cargo vessels based on Bremen, Bremerhaven and Emden;
- 2) German merchant navy vessels in Baltic ports;
- 3) Agents in Swedish ports;
- 4) An agent in Istanbul;
- 5) German merchant shipping still plying in the Mediterranean (reports from these being mostly dispatched to Bremen via Istanbul).

As a preliminary experiment, in the autumn of 1940 BISCHOFF had sent two agents to Portugal to set up in Lisbon a branch of a Bremen firm with

which one of them was connected. When the branch had been established in Lisbon, one agent, John OSMERS, returned, Johann KASSNER remaining and for six months sending economic and naval intelligence in secret writing to BISCHOFF. By the spring of 1941 it had been decided that more serious attention should be given to the exploitation of the Iberian Peninsula as a base for the obtaining of naval and shipping intelligence, and therefore GRIMM, in whom BISCHOFF placed great confidence, was recalled from Milan and after instruction and preparation in Bremen was sent to Lisbon to construct a large-scale agent network in the Peninsula, and to establish a W/T station for the rapid transmission of intelligence to Bremen through the Hamburg W/T Stelle.

In June 1941 CARL attempted to supplement the existing sources of intelligence in France, in particular by the establishment of agents on the Riviera coast. Negotiations with Alst Paris, however, fell through and after the frustration of successive attempts CARL ceased to pursue this aim.

No major developments followed during the winter of 1941/42. It is of interest, however, to note that, always in search of fresh fields, Nest Bremen dispatched two agents to Africa. The first was sent to Portuguese West Africa, where it was intended that he should establish himself with a W/T transmitter. He was also instructed to recruit a sub-agent to operate in South Africa, and both were to collect shipping and economic intelligence, for transmission to Hamburg. Abteilung IM and Aust le Havre co-operated in arrangements for the agent's dispatch. He was arrested shortly after landing in Africa, and no reports were ever received from him.

The second agent, a Belgian national named WESTERLINK who had spent many pre-war years in the Belgian Congo, and was recruited by Aust Antwerp, and trained jointly by the Antwerp Stelle and by Nest Bremen, was sent to Lisbon en route for the Belgian Congo, where he was to establish W/T contact with Hamburg and to transmit intelligence of an economic and general nature. While in Lisbon, this agent was entrusted to the care of GRIMM. The agent failed to reach the Belgian Congo, being arrested on arrival in England, in which country he had hoped to procure a visa for the Congo.

In April 1942 a second agent, Alfred LANGBEIN, was dispatched to Canada, this time by submarine; however, although the agent had been trained and controlled by Nest Bremen officials, this mission was directed by Abteilung IM.

During the same year Frank Wasa JORDAN was dispatched by BISCHOFF to South America; this agent was directed to settle in Rio de Janeiro, and shortly after his arrival he established W/T contact with Bremen, transmitting shipping intelligence which proved of little value.

GIOVANNI organisation in Portugal

By the summer of 1942, GRIMM had established a large network of agents in Lisbon, Madeira, the Azores and Portuguese Africa, from whom he received excellent shipping reports. The whole network, which probably comprised at least two dozen agents, was known as the GIOVANNI organisation. Through the recruitment of members of crews of Portuguese vessels, GRIMM organised a courier system of communications with outlying agents.

GIOVANNI ORGANISATION

LISBON  
(Hans GRIMM)  
(Hans SCHOLZ)  
(Candido RAPOSO)

I	I	I	I
<u>PORTUGAL</u>	<u>HORTA, AZORES</u>	<u>PORTUGUESE WEST AFRICA</u>	<u>MADEIRA</u>
(c. 8 agents)	1 or more agents	Several agents, one of whom controlled agents in the <u>BELGIAN CONGO</u>	Helmut UHSE, controlling about 8 sub-agents.



In 1942 BENS MANN trained three or four moroccans for an I-network which he planned to establish in the Dakar neighbourhood, but while en route in Madeira these agents behaved irresponsibly and were sent back to Germany.

In the autumn of 1942, in view of the possibility that Spain would decide to deport German nationals, it was decided, firstly, that a number of Spanish nationals should be trained as W/T agents, and secondly that a courier service should be formed to convey letters by hand from the Franco-Spanish frontier to Bremen. This second aim was accomplished by the recruitment of links in Paris, Tourcoing, Tilburg and Groningen. Unfortunately for the first part of the plan, however, November saw the arrest in Lisbon of GRIMM and his chief assistant, who would have carried out the work of recruitment, before much progress had been made, and a few weeks later eight more of the GIOVANNI network were arrested by the Portuguese. In spite of repeated efforts by BISCHOFF he never succeeded in fully re-establishing the Renet in Portugal. However, after a number of visits and representations to K.O. Portugal, BISCHOFF succeeded in procuring the release of GRIMM and his assistant early in 1943, the majority of the network continuing to be held under arrest.

#### St. Jean de Luz

An Aussenstelle of Nest Bremen was set up experimentally in France in January 1943. This amounted to little more than a W/T post. Two W/T operators were sent by BISCHOFF to St. Jean de Luz, where they installed a transmitter and established contact with Bremen. The purpose behind this move is not clear, but, as far as is known, the Stelle was utilised mainly as a long-distance practice station, to which qualified Nest Bremen agents and operators were sent for short periods, and from which daily traffic was exchanged with students at the Bremen Stelle. GRIMM was in charge of this Funkstelle until May 1944 when he was replaced by Werner RUMPKE.

#### Appointment of DRIESSEN as Leiter.

In March 1943, CARL was transferred to Marseilles, and Adolf DRIESSEN was promoted to take his place as Nest Leiter. DRIESSEN proved to be an apathetic and ineffectual leader, and was content to allow BISCHOFF and BENS MANN to take the initiative in the Nest's enterprises.

#### Agent Network in the Iberian Peninsula

Throughout 1943, abortive attempts were made by BISCHOFF to re-establish and strengthen the GIOVANNI organisation in Portugal and to build up a network of W/T agents in Spain. Finally, GRIMM was sent to Madrid in this connection, but he probably had little success.

#### Switzerland

Another hunting-ground for intelligence was Switzerland, which Nest Bremen officials and agents visited from time to time throughout the war, generally under cover of personal business. A not inconsiderable quantity of material was amassed in this manner, the intelligence thus obtained being largely of an economic nature.

#### North Africa

In the summer of 1944, in the light of the termination of campaigns in North Africa, IM Sued considered it desirable to create an intelligence network in that country, and since HOMANN, an official of Nest Bremen, was in touch with Arab circles in Syria and Iraq, it was decided that Nest Bremen should undertake this task. Dr. Otto HOMANN was ordered to investigate the possibility of recruiting Arabs in France and North Africa through these contacts. A number of Arabs was interviewed by BENS MANN in France, but none was considered suitable for recruitment as an agent, and although the effort to find eligible recruits was sustained until the summer of 1944, the project had finally to be abandoned.

#### France

In January 1944, further unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain int-

elligence regarding Mediterranean shipping, through the establishment of agents along the South Coast of France.

#### Egypt

In the spring of 1944 a single agent, Josef FARRAQQ @ JUPP, was trained for a general intelligence mission in Egypt, but was killed en route and was not replaced.

#### V. AUSSENSTELLE BREMEN, June 1944-1945.

The absorption of the Abwehr into the R.S.H.A. appears to have effected little practical change in the Bremen Stelle. While its activities and staff gradually dwindled, there were no drastic alterations in function or administration.

#### Preparation to meet the Allied Invasion of Germany

In the summer of 1944 a half-hearted attempt was made to establish stay-behind agents in the south of France, who would report by wireless on the progress of the Allied Forces advancing from the south; no satisfactory results were achieved.

At this time a scheme, known as Unternehmen Sued, was devised by 3SKL in anticipation of landings on the north coast of Germany. This undertaking involved the assembly of a fleet of Dutch fishing vessels, and their disposition along the coast. Carefully selected W/T operators were placed on each vessel, with instructions to report any signs of an approaching Allied seaborne invasion force. Nest Bremen participated in this operation to the extent of inspecting and servicing the W/T transmitters on these vessels and at the controlling station in Delfzijl, BISCHOFF supervising this work.

This plan exemplifies the desperate and ineffectual attempts of the RSHA to prepare for the Allied invasion of Germany. Such a scheme could never have produced any results, for the low-grade agents selected as operators would almost certainly not have had the courage to betray themselves to the enemy by transmitting had they in fact found themselves overtaken by an invasion fleet.

In September, in view of the progress of the Allies in France, an attempt was made to transfer the St. Jean de Luz Stelle to Bilbao, but shortly after his arrival in Bilbao the W/T operator was expelled from Spain by K.O. Madrid, objection being taken to his unheralded arrival in Spain.

An attempt was made in November to obtain information concerning activities on the Western Front, and about the current situation in France, by the formation of a stay-behind network of W/T agents, to which end BENSCHMANN visited the neighbourhood of Baden-Baden. This project was found impossible of fulfilment and had to be abandoned.

By the end of the year, with the occupation of Germany and the end of the war in sight, only three senior officials remained in Aussenstelle Bremen, namely BISCHOFF, BENSCHMANN and the Leiter DRIESSEN. BENSCHMANN found himself without work, and devoted his attention for the remainder of the war to the oil industry, joining a subsidiary firm under the Speer organization. BISCHOFF directed his energies to the establishment of stay-behind agents in the area for which Aussenstelle Bremen was responsible. The organization of stay-behind networks in Wehrkreis X was directed by KDM Hamburg, and Bremen's area of responsibility in the Wehrkreis was bounded by the Dutch frontier in the West, a line passing through Emden, Leer, Oldenburg and Bremen in the North, the river Weser in the East, and the Wehrkreis boundary in the South. The agents were to operate only beyond a depth of 50Km from the fighting front, the intervening 50Km being the responsibility of the Frontaufklaerungs organisation. By January 1945 BISCHOFF's stay-behind agents numbered about sixteen, and were apparently



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considered by KDM Hamburg to be satisfactory, although BISCHOFF himself admits that he was unable to obtain recruits of any calibre, and that the majority were apathetic and had no intention of operating after the Allied occupation. Each agent was trained in code and in morse, and was equipped with a transmitter. As far as is known, not a single agent made contact with his control station.

#### VI CO-OPERATION WITH ABWEHR AND MIL. AMT H.Q. & WITH NEIGHBOURING STELLEN.

In addition to the activities conducted on its own behalf, from time to time Nest Bremen supplied agents, recruited and trained by Nest Bremen officials, for missions directed by Abteilung IM from Berlin. For example, in the summer of 1944 IM Sud Ost transferred an agent of Nest Bremen, Hans GEORGLADES, to Athens, whence he was dispatched on an IM mission to Alexandria. A second example, previously mentioned, is that of Alfred LANGBEIN, sent to Canada by submarine in 1942 on a mission directed by Abt. IM.

Nest personnel also frequently assisted other IM Stellen, notably Aast Antwerp and Nest Brest, the latter Stelle being in origin an offshoot of Nest Bremen, although subordinated to Aast Paris.

#### VII SUBORDINATION

a) October 1935-1937: During this initial phase in its history Nest Bremen was subordinated administratively to Aast Wilhelmshaven, operationally to Abwehr H.Q. Berlin.

b) 1937-June 1944: In 1937 the Nest became subordinated administratively (for discipline, postings and transport) to Aast Hamburg, while operationally it remained under direct control of Abwehr H.Q., which also dealt with Nest's finance and promotions.

c) June 1944-April 1945: During the Mil. Amt phase, Aussenstelle Bremen was entirely subordinated to KDM Hamburg, all orders issued by the Mil. Amt being directed to Bremen through the KDM Leiter.

It is reiterated, however, that the Stelle enjoyed throughout its existence a unique degree of independence. Aast Hamburg exercised virtually no control over the Nest's activities, while such directives as were received from Berlin were those resulting from general changes in policy. Constructive or practical advice on methods of operation were apparently seldom given, and the successes achieved by Nest Bremen were due entirely to the ability of its officers and cannot be regarded as reflecting credit on the Abwehr as a whole.

#### VIII TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS OF NEST BREMEN

(1) W/T School: This school was established at the beginning of the war, under the charge of Sdf. SCHIERENBECK, in the Wachtstrasse offices of the Nebenstelle. In March 1943 SCHIERENBECK left Bremen and was replaced by Ogefr. LANGNER, and the W/T school was transferred for a few months to Hamburg. Towards the end of 1943 it was again set up in Bremen, with BISCHOFF as its controlling officer. Instruction was given to agents in morse, codes, W/T transmission and construction, but the training of important agents was frequently supplemented by a course in the Hamburg W/T school. The Hamburg Funkstelle exercised close control over the Bremen school, and regular supervisory visits were paid by Ii officials of the Aast Hamburg training school. A number of agents controlled by other Stellen were given full or supplementary training in the Bremen W/T school. Stellen known to have used the school for the training of their agents include Aast Wiesbaden, Aast Netherlands, Aast Brussels, and Aast Stettin.

The Ii section's functions comprised agent-training and the equipment and servicing of agents' transmitters only. No W/T communication was conducted with other Stellen, or with Nest Bremen overseas, whose traffic was handled by the Aast Hamburg W/T station.

In September or October 1944 the school was evacuated to Luebeck.

(2) Ig Section: The Leiter of Ig in 1939 was Lt. ESTORFF. He probably left in 1940, the work being continued by his assistant Walter HOEFIG. The office and laboratory was situated in the Haus des Reiches. In addition to the training of agents in S/W a large part of the work done by this section consisted in the development of films of defences, armaments, buildings etc. brought in by agents returning from abroad. HOEFIG also specialised in the preparation of microphotographs and the training of agents in this subject.

#### IX ST. JEAN DE LUZ FUNKSTELLE

Leiters: April 1943 - May 1944: Hans GRIMM.  
May 1944 - July 1944: Werner ROEPKE

Address: "Transportuaberwachungsstelle", Nanda Schokoa,  
Rue Vonbau(?), St. Jean de Luz.

The function of this outstation has been described above (p. 7). In addition, the personnel were able to facilitate the frontier-crossing of Nest Bremen personnel wishing to enter Spain. In August 1944 the office was closed and all equipment destroyed, the personnel leaving for Bilbao.

#### X OFFICES USED BY NEST BREMEN

- (1) Haus des Reiches, Herdentorwall, Bremen - PHEIFFER's offices in 1939.  
(? identical with (2) below).
- (2) Kriegsmarine Dienststelle, Haus des Reiches, Richteweg 7, Bremen -  
head offices and Ig laboratory of Nest Bremen.
- (3) "Seevag" offices - Seeverkens-und-Navigationsbuero, Wachtstrasse  
27-29, Bremen - BISCHOFF's offices and W/T school.  
(Formerly BISCHOFF's business premises.)
- (4) "Interfraco" (Internationale Frachtkontor).  
Ludendorfstrasse 32, Bremen (bombed early in the war)  
and Postfach 237, Bremen.

#### Offices used by GRIMM in Lisbon

Cia Comercio Iberio - Ultramarine Lda (OIBUL)  
Rua Eugenio dos Santos 27-30, Lisbon.

#### Offices used by GRIMM (under alias Sr. Don Harald GRASSHOFF) in Madrid

Calle de Rafael Calvo 42-1<sup>o</sup>, Madrid.  
Telephone Number of Nest Bremen - 29216.  
Feldpostnummer of Nest Bremen - 33039.

#### XI NUMBERING OF NEST BREMEN AGENTS

Agents controlled by Nest Bremen were allotted identification numbers in the following series:

2300 - 2399  
2600 - 2699  
4800 - 4899

and according to an unconfirmed source in the following additional series also:

2000 - 2099  
2100 - 2199  
2200 - 2299

#### XII APPRECIATION

Nest Bremen's achievements were undoubtedly considerable during PHEIFFER's

term of office as Leiter, although the ultimate value of the intelligence procured cannot be judged. PHEIFFER showed great initiative, was extremely industrious, and sustained considerable enthusiasm for his work. The succeeding Leiters lacked inspiration and indeed, most of the good qualities shown by PHEIFFER, and DRIESEN in particular gave the appearance of being entirely apathetic towards his duties.

The development of agent networks after PHEIFFER's departure in May 1940 was achieved largely by virtue of the extensive business connections possessed by BENSMANN and the industry and intelligence which BISCHOFF brought to his work, but both these officers lacked the authority and experience of PHEIFFER. Had they possessed these qualities, and had BENSMANN been less pre-occupied with his own business interests, they would no doubt have been able to carry out the various projects, notably in France and the Iberian Peninsula, with a greater measure of success.


Another factor which handicapped the Nest's undertakings was the poor standard of its agents, a disadvantage reflected in the majority of the Abwehr and Mil. Amt undertakings. Many of the agents possessed a low degree of intelligence, and almost all worked for mercenary rather than ideological motives. As more and more men became incorporated in Germany's armed forces the choice of recruits available to the Nest became increasingly smaller and the recruits were not of the type to make enterprising or loyal agents.

The history of Nest Bremen shows a gradual but continual decline in success and enterprise which dates from the autumn of 1942, when the GIOVANNI network was liquidated by the Portuguese.

Nevertheless, in its primary function, that of collecting naval and shipping intelligence on behalf of Abteilung IM, Nest Bremen, conspicuous among Abwehrstellen operating against the Western Allies, achieved results of value and won considerable credit for its leaders.

NEST BREMEN ESTABLISHMENT 1939-1940

Leiter : Dr. Erich FLEISSNER  
 Deputy : Major HAIENS  
 Assistants { Sdf. Dr. Nikolaus BENSMANN  
               { Sdf. Johannes BISCHOFF  
 Secretary : Frl. SZELINSKI



NEST BREMEN ESTABLISHMENT FEBRUARY 1941

Leiter : K.K. Hans CARL  
Secretary : FrI. SCHWOEBMANN

I I H	I I M	I I Luft	I I i	I I g	I Accounts	I Registry
Hpt. Adolf DRIESSEN (Leiter) Eduard ALBRECHT	K.Lt. UHRMACHER Sdf. BISCHOFF UTHE Lt. ADDICKS Sdf. CRUHN	Sdf. Dr. BENSMMANN	Sdf. SCHIERENBECK Uffz. LUERS Gefr. ONNEN	Sdf. BISCHOFF Walter HOEFIG	Walter FRICKE Uffz. WULFF	Werner ROEPKE

Ia

Major HAMENS  
Lt. DIESSEN  
ALBRECHT

Liaison with Gestapo  
Krim.Asst. HARTMANN

NEST BREMEN ESTABLISHMENT DECEMBER 1944

Leiter : Major DRIESSEN

I I Marine & Miscellaneous I duties	I I i	I I g
Hpt. BISCHOFF K.Lt. BENSMMANN	Hpt. BISCHOFF	HOEFIG

NEST BREMEN PERSONNEL

I Loiters: (1) October 1935-May 1940 : Dr. Erich PHEIFFER  
(2) May 1940-March 1943 : K.K. Hans CARL  
(3) March 1943-1945 : Maj. Adolf DRIESSEN

11 Officials and subordinate Staff:

+ADDICKS, Lt. z. See  
@ AHRENS @ ARYS  
AHLEFFELD, Rittmeister  
ALBRECHT, Hpt. Eduard

ALTER, Sdf. & Oblt.,  
@ ALTHOFF.

ANDREE, Ogefr.  
ARNOLD, Frau  
AUGNER, Major Andreas

BENDIXEN, K.Lt. Hans

+ BENSIMANN, Sdf. & K.Lt. Dr.  
Nikolaus @ BREMER @ NICK  
@ DOC

+ BISCHOFF, Sdf. & Hpt. Johannes  
@ KIRCHENFUERST @ ONKEL  
BISCH

+ BLOHM, Frl. Anne  
BOESE, Frl. Erika  
BOMM, Alfred  
BRAHMS, Frl  
BRIEGER, Waldemar  
BRINKER, Ogefr.  
BRUENY, Frl. Antoine

BUEDELMANN or BEDELMANN

CARL, K.K. Hans

CLAYTON, Egon @ CLAIRON @  
Dr. STEPHAN

+ DAHLHAUS, Hans Georg

+ DRIESSEN, Maj. Adolf Friedrich  
@ DRUISENBERG

ESTORFF, Lt.

+FRICKE, Sdf. & Stabsintendant  
Walther Friedrich Hugo

GEIRUNG, Frl.

GERDES  
GERSDORF, Hilda

GIESCHEN, Fw.  
GRAETSCH, Uffz.

- IM. 1940-Jan. 1944. Transferred  
to Wilhelmshaven.

- Ia.

- IH. 1941-Jan. 1944. Leiter IH  
April 43-Jan. 44. Transferred  
to Ast Hamburg III RM in Bremen

- Im. 1939-May 1940. Transferred  
to Brest with PHEIFFER.

- Secretary to FRICKE.

- Loiter IH 1938-1940 or 41.

- IM. Transferred to Aust  
Antwerp 1941.

- 1938-1945. Successively in IH,  
IL & IM, and specialist in oil  
industry.

- IM. 1938-1945.

- Secretary to BENSIMANN 1939-1945.

- Secretary 1938-early 1944.

- IM courier for BISCHOFF

- Secretary.

- IM until c. 1942.

- Army driver.

- Secretary and later Ia officer.  
(Until 1945.)

- Secretary to FRICKE.

- Nost. Leiter May 1940-March 1943;  
then appointed Harbour Master,  
Marseilles.

- Representative or head agent  
in Paris.

- Ruckwanderersbefragungsdienst,  
1942-July 1943 and Feb. 1944-  
Dec. 1944.

- Appointed to IH 15.2.41; and  
Nest Leiter March 1943 until  
the end of war.

- Leiter Ig 1939-1940.

- ZF: Accountant & Paymaster  
1939-1945.

- Secretary to PHEIFFER; trans-  
ferred to Brest May 1940.

- Secretary to PHEIFFER; trans-  
ferred to Brest May 1940.



GRIMM, Hans Friedrich  
@ GIOVANNI @ Don Harald  
GRASSHOFF  
GRUHN Sdf. & Lt.

HAMENS, Maj.

HARMJANZ, Ogefr.  
HARTMANN, Krim.Ass. & Gefr.

HAYEN, Ogefr.  
+HOEFIG, Angestellter Walter  
@ HOFRAT

HOMANN, Dr. Otto @  
Dr. MEYER  
HOMBERG, R.A.

HUENEKEN

ILLMER, Dr.

+KASSNER, @ RIST @ KATZ @  
KARMANN, Erich  
KAHLE, Uffz.  
KLAMPERMEYER  
KLAPS, K.Lt.  
KREBS, Frau Thea  
KUEHL, Oblt.  
KLUSSMEIER, Hpt.  
LANGER or LANGNER, Ogefr.

LAUSEN, Frl.  
LEMHUIS @ LEHMANN, Ogefr.  
LINDEMANN @ LANGE  
+ LUERS, Erich @ BECKER

MEEMS, Albert @ DICKER  
MUELLER

OBERUEBER  
+ ONNEN, Wilfred @ OTTO

PFLUECHER  
+ PHEIFFER, Fref.Kpt. Dr. Erich-  
@ DOCTOR @ EDERHOF @  
SPIELMANN @ PANNHORST etc.  
PRAMANN, Uffz.  
PRUEN, Frau, nee  
LECHTENERINK

REHDER @ RETTER, Ogefr.  
REICHENBERG, Karl  
REIMANN or REIMANN, Uffz.

- IM head agent in Milan  
1939-1940; head of Peninsula  
networks 1940-1944.  
- IM & Schiffsbefragungsdienst;  
transferred to Aust Antwerp  
1942.  
- Deputy Leiter (?) 1939-1941.  
Also Ia official.  
- Liaison official between Nest  
Bremen & Gestapo c. 1942-  
spring 1945. Previously  
attached to Nest Sept. 1939-  
May 1940.  
- ZF. Assistant to FRICKE.  
- Ig. January 1939-1945. Instructor  
in S/W & microphotography.  
Photographer. Also worked for  
Stelle Roland & Dulag Nord.  
- BENSMMANN's chief agent recruiter,  
1939-45.  
- Contact of BENSMMANN in Milan,  
used as cover-address for agents  
in U.S.A.  
- Chauffeur.  
- Important agent recruiter for  
BENSMMANN.  
- W/T operator and courier.  
- Ii. W/T instructor.  
- Army driver.  
- Leiter IM. 1939-1944.  
- Registry.  
- IM, 1939-1942.  
- Ia (1942).  
- Ii. Head of W/T school, 1943-  
1945.  
- Secretary.  
- Ii. W/T instructor 1943-  
- Ii. W/T instructor 1943-  
- Ii. Instructor in morse and codes.  
1944-45.  
- Courier for BISCHOFF.  
- Chauffeur.  
- Interrogator.  
- Ii. W/T instructor.  
- Leiter Nest Bremen 1935-May 1940.  
- Ii. W/T instructor.  
- Secretary to BENSMMANN. Trans-  
ferred to Ast the Hague.  
- Ii. Assistant to LINDEMANN.  
- In Marseilles 1941.  
- Ii. W/T instructor.

ROEPKE, Werner	- Head of Nest Registry until 1944; trained as W/T instructor and sent to St. Jean de Luz Stolle spring 1944. Sept. 1944 transferred to M.FAK 60.
'ROSSBACH, Uffz. Otto @ ABESSINIER	- Ii. W/T instructor.
SCHIERENDECK, Sdf. Wilhelm @ SCHIRMER	- Ii. Leiter W/T school, & Ipi 1939-March 1943.
SCHLIE, Lt. Dr.	-
SCHNELL, Frl.	- Secretary in IMi.
+ SCHUCHMANN, Sdf. & K.Lt. Heinrich @ SCHROEDER	- IM. Transferred to Nest Brest summer 1940.
SCHWCEIMANN, Frl. Doris	- Secretary.
SICK, Frl.	- Secretary.
SOEDER, Dr.	- Agent recruiter.
STAMBACK, Frl.	- Secretary.
SZELINSKI, Frl.	- Secretary.
+ TECKLEMBORG, Frl. Beatrix	- Secretary to DRIESSEN March 1943-April 1945.
UHRMACHER, K.Lt.	- IM, 1939-1940. Leiter IM 1940-1942. Died 1943.
UTHE, Lt.z.See & Sdf.	- IM until 1942. Transferred to Norway.
VOECK, Frau Inge	- Secretary & Registrar.
+ WENZLAU, Hpt.	- Leiter I Luft 1939-1941, when transferred to Ast Hamburg.
WULFF, Uffz.	- Ii.

(+ = War Room notified of arrest.)

MAIN SOURCES.

K.K. Erich PHEIFFER,	PF.46,969.
Sdf. Johannes BISCHOFF,	PF.601,785
Sdf. Nikolaus BENSCHMANN,	PF.602,110

W.R.C.I/C.  
5.2.46.

Distribution: Standard for Liquidation Reports.

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