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1. HATTORI's Background.

- a. Despite the acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation by Japan, HATTORI could personally agree to one of its articles providing for the complete demilitarization of Japan. Even promulgation of the Constitution of Japan which set forth the renunciation of war and the prohibition of armament could not change HATTORI's belief. HATTORI believed it to be a fool's dream that an independent state could find peace by remaining defenseless. During the period from around 1936 to 1945, HATTORI was successively assigned to important staff duties in the Operations Section of General Staff Office, though temporarily chosen a secretary to War Minister FOMO in 1942 and an infantry regimental commander in March, 1945. After he returned from a stay in France and Belgium and from a brief inspection of Russia en route to Japan from Europe, HATTORI gave an advanced warning that he felt World War II would occur around 1940. His prediction came true. This prediction of HATTORI's met with the approval of USHIMARU Kagita, then chief of the Operational Strategy Section of G-1, who since 1936 had been devoting himself to strengthening of armament of Japan. An inspection tour of Russia constituted the most important basis for HATTORI's advanced prediction of the Second World War.
- b. HATTORI was the Chief of the Operational Strategy Section of G-1, General Staff Office at the beginning of the Pacific War. Because of this fact, the people have referred to him as a top leader of the anti-American war-mongers. He is also regarded as a former underling of the TOJO military clique, since he was once secretary of War Minister TOJO. Such criticism however covers only the overt phase of his past acts, but does not see through to his underlying motives. The potential foe of Japan was primarily neither China nor America. HATTORI, who returned from Europe in 1936, was steadily building up armament against Russia in line with the tradition of the Japanese Army and in anticipation of the next global conflict. From the viewpoint of the ultimate goal of the Japanese Army, HATTORI considered the Sino-Japanese War starting in 1937 merely as a minor incident.

When HATTORI took over the position of the Operation Section Chief, its former chief (Colonel YAMASUKI Isotomi) left a document of two or three pages entitled "Strategy in the South Pacific Areas" which outlined strategically basic policies to be followed in the

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(2)(A) Privacy
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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event of war between Japan and America. To tell the truth, HATTORI had almost no concern with this document. He was almost entirely preoccupied with preparations for an anti-Russian war. However, the general opinion of the Japanese political circles and the Army and Navy had been already rapidly shifting towards a war with America. When he concurrently held the position of staff officer for Navy coordination in the Imperial Headquarters (DAIBONKI) and of Operations Section Chief of G-1, Imperial Army Staff, HATTORI was time and again pressed by the Navy for a decision to wage war against America. Considerably influenced by the pressure of the Navy, even HATTORI's subordinates came to grow discontent with the lack of his consideration of a war with America. In order to get out of such a tense atmosphere and to keep himself cool-headed, HATTORI went out for an inspection tour to the Chinese battle front in 1940. During his trip, the Navy and Army Joint Council (RIKWAANGUN REN RAIN KAJI) had already passed a resolution that the Army would decide its attitude toward the pending war upon HATTORI's return. Even during an inspection of the Chinese front, on the other hand, HATTORI was constantly bothered with this problem, but could not arrive at any conclusion. Finally he was able to reach a decision on the plane trip back to Japan from Shanghai. That decision was:

If any one of the following three conditions were realized, a war with America would be practicable:

1. If Russia did not attack Japan
2. If Peace were made with the CHIANG Kai-Shek regime
3. If Germany were to maintain control of the European Continent.

After HATTORI announced this proposition upon returning to Japan, advocacy for the anti-American war lost ground for a while. In January, 1941, signing of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the worsening of negotiations with America brought the advocacy for war again into the fore. War Minister TOJO and his central Army clique were also war advocates. Following the formation of the TOJO Cabinet in October, 1941, he issued an order to the Navy and Army that an entirely new study must be made into the practicability of waging a war with America to the complete disregard of previous strategic studies of it. It was primarily the Navy that played the initial main role in bringing the war into being. The Army was in a position to cooperate with the Navy. If the Navy had not sufficient strength to fight America, it was utterly futile to go into a war however strong the Army may be. What decision did the Navy make to meet Premier TOJO's demand?

"The Navy of Japan has no power to wage a war against America continuously after March of 1942", declared the Navy. It meant that the strength of the American Navy would undoubtedly surpass that of the Japanese Navy after March, 1942, and that there was not the slightest possibility that Japan could win the war.

As for the Army, October was considered as the most appropriate season

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from the viewpoint of weather for its launching operations in the South Pacific areas, and the execution of the operations in January and February were impossible. Inasmuch as the TOJO Cabinet was formed in mid-October, the declaration of war within November was also impossible. The comparison of fighting potentialities between the Japanese and U.S. navies and the atmospheric phenomena in the South Pacific Area led Japan automatically to make a decision upon declaration of war on America in early December of 1941. In reviewing the situation prevailing then, HATTORI stated as follows:

"The general public have placed complete responsibility upon the Army for the conduct of the late war, saying the Army pushed it forward. It is an undeniable fact that I lacked in clear thinking in many respects which ultimately led to the proclamation of war. It is none of my intention to shift the responsibility for it. But is it fair to pass the responsibility entirely to the Army for starting the late war and leading the nation to defeat as the people and the Navy do? Former Navy officers are by and large inclined in their publications to charge the Army brazenly, shift the whole responsibility for war to the Army, and to state that the Army forcibly plunged the Navy into the war, with the two services standing on bad terms. The truth was that the operational brain-trusters of both Army and Navy were mutually coordinated and thoroughly agreed on necessity of the Pacific War. The facts are that I myself witnessed that the Navy was not capable of fighting a war after March, 1942 and then certain Navy experts had to admit this. Whether it was the Navy or the Army which played a major part in starting the war I should like to leave to the judgment of future historians. Concerning the publication of books by former Army officers, I am endeavoring within the range of my power to stop them from reproaching and slandering the Navy. Nothing is more appropriate than to say that the pre-war Navy was clever and the Army was stupidly naive."

Starting with a demand the General Staff Office made in November, 1942 to the War Office for the conscription of civilian ships to be utilized for the Guadalcanal relief operations, GATO Kameyo (Chief of Staff), chief of the Military Affairs Bureau and a loyal "TOJO man", and TANAKA Shinichi, chief of G-1, the Operational Department, had their famous fight, ending in TANAKA's removal by TOJO. Then, War Minister TOJO displaced HATTORI, TANAKA's right-hand man, and made him his secretary. People who did not know the true situation might have assumed that HATTORI was promoted. On the contrary, however, TOJO had already disliked HATTORI. This personnel shift was purposely carried out by TOJO just in order to create the impression upon the people that TOJO was a magnanimous person and that the personnel were fairly treated. Just a glimpse of how HATTORI was treated by TOJO in his capacity as War Minister's secretary would clear away all the prejudices. It is a fact that neither HATTORI nor TANAKA were subsequently promoted.

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c. Perhaps this clarifies HATTORI's stand and attitude on the Japanese-American war. The underlying aim of HATTORI was to conduct a war with Russia to Japanese advantage. HATTORI believed that so long as Russia clings to the principle of world-wide revolution, peace would not come either to Japan or to the world. He still believes that. The only way to defend a nation from ambitious aggression by Russia is a strong Army. HATTORI's assertion for armament has always been sincere, based upon the belief gained through long years' experience and various studies he made in the Operational Section of General Staff Office. He is not "Johnny-come-lately" advocate for rearmament, taking advantage of the recent popularity of such ideas.

d. Many of the high-ranking Japanese military officers have more or less the traits of politicians. Such a tendency is more evident among capable officers. In other words, a soldier following a politician's track is looked upon as efficient. HATTORI has no such political ambitions or skill. In Japan, a man of simple, rough and dogmatic character is commonly referred to as "a real soldier". But, HATTORI is far from being such a man either. HATTORI's character reminds one of a scientist supported by strong moral principles - a scientist of strategy. He tolerates and pays no attention to bitter denunciations like "HATTORI is a Japanese spy even though he once was a militarist boss!" He does not try to utter even a word of excuse or rebuttal to such venomous slander. Constant introspection and bitterly realistic criticism of his own conduct in an effort to choose the course of justice forms his true philosophy of living. TSUJI often comments on HATTORI as extremely lacking in political skill and feels sorry for him. Source, too, occasionally agrees with TSUJI in this regard, though from a different viewpoint. There are a large number of generals and high-ranking officers who have once held important posts in the General Staff Office. But, no one else has served for such a long period at the General Staff Office. In this sense one might say that HATTORI is in a position to represent the past national tradition of the Japanese Army.

e. HATTORI's long-standing convictions on defense against Soviet Russia, since rearmament to him means that against world-wide Communism, naturally include operations against the JCP as an integral factor. This ties in his anti-JCP intelligence activity to the major part of the so-called HATTORI Plan.

2. Measures taken by HATTORI regarding the Police Reserve.

a. It was rather a kind of surprise for HATTORI that Major General Milloughby gave him an order to organize the Police Reserve in July 1950. HATTORI did not even think of receiving such an order. The order required the

completion of preparations within a brief period. What was most important for HATTORI in his plan was how to staff the proposed organization. The problem of whether the Police Reserve should be a mere armed police force

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or should be turned into the nucleus of the coming new Army did not occur to HATTORI. In G-2, GHQ and U.S. Government quarters, the Police Reserve was referred to as "a new Army", and a director-general of its headquarters as the future "defense secretary". Such being the general situation, HATTORI undertook the choice of the main officers in an aim to make it the core of a new Army.

- b. Being on duty at the Demobilisation Board fortunately, HATTORI was in a position which facilitated the investigation of former regular Army officers. A majority of the officers with whom HATTORI came into contact during his tenure in the Army consisted of those officers assigned to Army General Staff HQ Office. Former Staff HQ officers alone were not adequate to form the Police Reserve. More than that, the Police Reserve required the services of almost none of former General Staff Office personnel.

HATTORI planned to have the brilliant students of former Army Officers School compose the Police Reserve, particularly those of fine character and ability. Conspicuous figures can not easily be found equally in each class of school year. In his consideration of cooperation in the future, however, HATTORI avoided as much as possible discarding completely the classes which had few capable students. Source does not know all who came under HATTORI's scrutiny nor who besides his own chief Colleagues were chosen for staff posts in the Police Reserve, but approximately 200 officers, a little over double the number of so-called Colleagues, are generally reported to have been tentatively recruited as its leaders. His basis of selection was the same, fundamentally, as for choice of his "Colleagues" organization to study the problem. To put it in another way, HATTORI's original idea was that the bulwark of the Police Reserve officer cadre should be made of the foremost students of each yearly class of the Army Officers School in the first place so that it may be at any time transformed into a new defense army. Practically all of the outstanding officers who were directly in charge of the disposition of troops and operations during wartime and who are now serving at the Demobilisation Board are to be involved in the plan.

- a. The Police Reserve HQ staff under his plan was to be composed principally of the top-notch officials of the Demobilisation Board.
3. The Development of the General Situation resulting from the Creation of the Police Reserve.
 - a. Despite devotion of his efforts to planning of the Police Reserve, HATTORI's plan completely crumbled late in August, 1950 due to a decision of the highest American authorities that former regular Army officers would not be recruited. Nevertheless, because of the establishment of the Police Reserve and the long duration of the Korean hostilities, the public opinion of this nation leaned toward advocacy of rearmament. HATTORI secretly kept his original design in his mind and awaited and still awaits the right time to effect it. In the meantime, the information that Major General Willoughby and HATTORI were connected in organizing the Police Reserve leaked out into the public. HORIBA Kasuo gave information to TANIDA Isamu and others on HATTORI's planning and selections. The result was that some old soldiers and also non-military men began to make malicious

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criticisms of MATYORI out of jealousy. The more intense the rearmament campaign became, the more the slanders against MATYORI increased in the general public. MATYORI kept reticent and showed no concern about it. MATYORI seems to be of the belief that true rearmament is futile as long as his plan, organization, data, and personnel are discredited. Therefore, his only subsequent efforts have been to place his group in readiness for the future.

- b. MATYORI expressed his opinions to Source on 22 September 1951, as follows:

"Even if we had entered the Police Reserve and organized it, or even if we do in the future enter the army and organize it, our first duty should be to step down once it is officially started. As it was officially announced in August last year that we were not allowed to join the Police Reserve, we have made no headway in the active study of rearmament since then. Such an issue as rearmament is for us a mere triviality in the past. It was only recently that our group has been thrown open to scathing charges. I can hardly see the real reason why those people are attacking us. I am readily prepared to work out a fine rearmament plan if called upon, but not in competition and to the exclusion of others. In fact, I am not at present connected with any campaign for rearmament. Now that we have been subjected to such bitter charges, I do not think that the time will come soon for us to effect rearmament. The effectuation of rearmament by the IWAJIRO Group is also impossible in my opinion. Our group has wholeheartedly devoted itself to research on the rearmament issue with a sense of responsibility, while the IWAJIRO Group has taken up the issue just as a part of its operations for the establishment of a new political party. No capable staff needed for rearmament is found in the IWAJIRO Group. The best way to cope with the situation is for us to do nothing and wait for the lapse of time, I think."

- c. Late in August, 1951, the Attorney-General's Office recruited approximately 1200 former regular officers of the Army to become officers of the Police Reserve. Following this, a considerable number of other former officers were depurged. The Attorney-General's Office sent an application card only to those officers which it regarded as suitable to be leaders of the Police Reserve and sought their answer. This was the way the 1200 men were raised. A large number of former Army officers disagreed violently with the Attorney-General's Office's methods and criteria for screening and recruiting of those officers to be depurged and made officers of the Police Reserve. Some interested graduates of the classes of the Army Officers School ranging from the 42nd to 52nd graduating classes held an alumni gathering in which they discussed whether or not they should answer the government's call. They called on MATYORI, HONEDA, and others of the colleagues and asked for their opinions on the matter. Considering the Government's attitude as extremely poor and the established Police Reserve as hopelessly weak, many of the officers wanted to decline the Government invitation.
- d. On about September 8, 1951, MATYORI visited Source and informed him of the outlines of the existing situation:

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If the young able officers should unanimously refuse to enter the Police Reserve, a big gap would likely arise between the Government and former regular officers which would lay the groundwork for serious trouble in the future. If HATTORI were to stand in between them in an attempt to introduce their opinions to the Government and ask for reflection on the Government's methods of selection, it is most highly likely that the Government would think that HATTORI was obstructing or trying to obstruct young officers from entering the Police Reserve with some ambitious design. Yet it was the officers themselves who also violently opposed the Government's selection methods.

Source advised HATTORI:

"You may be dissatisfied in many respects with the attitude of the Government, but the important thing is not to get involved in such a matter. But the way to do it is to advise capable persons to enter the Police Reserve. Otherwise, the establishment of the strong army you hope for will become a matter of the far distant future."

- f. A few days later, Source met HATTORI and asked him how the recruitment of the Police Reserve officers was going on. HATTORI answered very optimistically that, with their attitude changed, quite a few capable officers were planning to enter the Police Reserve. The development of armament issues would eventually take the course he had once speculated, HATTORI added. HATTORI appears to have individually persuaded the anti-government officers to apply for recruitment.
- g. According to the statements of HATTORI, Major General Willoughby issued a directive to the Japanese Government for a mass depurge of former regular officers a few days before he left Japan. After the departure from Japan of Major General Willoughby, however, the Government gradually limited the number of those to be depurged. HATTORI believes that this is a sign of antipathy on the part of the Japanese Government toward him since he was too intimately associated with Major General Willoughby. Or he feels it may be just a malicious plot of the INAKURO Group.

4. Rearmament Program of HATTORI, SHINOMURA, and TATSUMI.

(Source information based upon eliciting from HATTORI on 22 and 24 Sept. 1951.)

- a. Though it is highly likely that neither HATTORI, SHINOMURA, nor TATSUMI has a separate plan for rearmament at present, TATSUMI may have one of his own. HATTORI's armament program is believed to be largely affected by the opinion and advice of SHINOMURA Sadamu. Consequently, it is almost true that HATTORI's program was fashioned jointly by HATTORI and SHINOMURA. Practically full details of HATTORI's planning are contained in an article entitled "Should A National Defense Army be Established in Japan?" carried in the April, 1951 issue of "The Mainichi Information Report" published from the Mainichi Press. (Cf. Attachment to this report.)

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- b. There is not a single one among former officers whose rank is above Lt. Colonel who is not concerned with rearmament. Almost every one of them recognizes the necessity of rearmament. But, they are ~~not~~ aware of the fact that they are purged. Of course, they anticipate the arrival of the day of depurging, but they do not think that day will come earlier than anticipated. When asked to express their opinions on armament, they are willing to meet the request. However, they do not think they are in a position to organize a rearmament program. It is impossible and prohibited for a purged officer to propagate and spread among the people the importance of armament. Particularly, therefore, former generals are of the opinion that they have been cut off from the world, even though they have many opinions on armament; but they have and feel no responsibility, no desire and no aspiration to take upon themselves positively the formulation of a rearmament plan. It may be well to regard an ambitious exception like HATTORI as a crackpot.
- c. The rearmament program can not be executed in a really responsible manner by one person alone, however capable he may be. The more complex the nature of rearmament is, the greater number of capable staff officers it requires. Since HATTORI was fortunately connected with an organized group of the Demobilization Board, he could quite easily collect the staff operations officers necessary for the task. In fact, he has the largest number of efficient staff officers in his "colleagues" group. Before the present issue came to the fore, HATTORI made a great many efforts to get able officers of the former Army's central agencies to work at the Demobilization Board and JIB, regardless of the rearmament plan. Few have such a close connection with as large a number of young able officers as HATTORI. Therefore, HATTORI does not find it quite as difficult to contemplate formation of a new Army. On the otherhand, young officers have seldom even maintained contact with former generals after the Surrender. Even though some do, their number can not be compared with the number of those working for HATTORI. The number of officers who are on intimate terms with SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI is almost negligible. SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI or even IWAKURA Hideo may be capable of working out an outline of a rearmament program, but they have few subordinates who could map out other practical details of the program. However large the number of excellent staff members recruited may be, the plan can not be made in their head alone. The collection of records and data is indispensable. And these materials are most sufficiently procured by the Demobilization Board in Japan. Judging from these points of view, it was only HATTORI who had a large staff and also sufficient available data. No one can compete with HATTORI in ability, sufficiency of data and number of staff officers. (Source Opinion)
- d. The facts are that ever since Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, there have been assertions for the absolute necessity of maintaining armed forces in the country. But, positive advocates for rearmament really began when the establishment of the Police Reserve was demanded by General MacArthur in his letter. This fact is commonly known to SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI as well as to the general public. If HATTORI had voluntarily commenced formulation of the armament plan, these anti-HATTORI elements might have tried to compete with him in the same enterprise. Inasmuch as the U.S.

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Army has charged HATTORI with the responsibility for the work, there was no opposition from other quarters. Thus, HATTORI's planning was tentatively completed without being bothered by rivalries. Fortunately or unfortunately, however, HATTORI and his staff officers were not permitted to join the Police Reserve. The establishment of the Police Reserve then stimulated the people in general to review the rearmament issue. The deterioration of the Korean War situation led a part of public opinion to the adamant insistence upon the necessity of rearmament. It was in those days that IMAKURO and TANIDA were rumored to be contemplating rearmament. By the time such a rumor went around, HATTORI's plan for the Police Reserve had been already completed.

•. Though their stances differ from one another respectively, SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI and HATTORI are all respectable friends. It is quite unlikely that SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI last year were competitively drawing up their own plans for rearmament while HATTORI was doing it by order of the United States Army.

(1) HATTORI told Source several times that among the former Japanese generals now living, no one was so excellent as SHIMOMURA both in character and mental ability. He added that he often called on SHIMOMURA and looked to him for guidance. Although HATTORI was ordered by the United States Army to form the Police Reserve, he stated that he did not intend at all to become the chief in carrying out rearmament. If it were possible to choose a leader of the new army from among former generals, he would like to put up SHIMOMURA, he maintained, because none than SHIMOMURA is better qualified for the position.

(2) (Paras. (2) and (3); Date of Information: 3 Oct 1951; Sub-source: HARUKE Yoshitane; Eval: C-3)

TATSUMI Eiichi's comments were that although HATTORI is a target of various denunciations, TATSUMI felt HATTORI had neither selfish intention nor ambition. It is absolutely not his idea to have his group monopolize formation of the new army. If HATTORI were allowed, he would choose SHIMOMURA a supreme commander of the new Army, TATSUMI believed.

(3) In a gesture to make SHIMOMURA the chief of the new Army, TANIDA Isamu brought a list of the leaders of the new Army of his own choice to SHIMOMURA. Upon taking a look at the list, SHIMOMURA promptly saw through TANIDA's intention to disturb HATTORI's plan. At the same time, SHIMOMURA could note that TANIDA was fairly well acquainted with HATTORI's plan. SHIMOMURA did not care for TANIDA and informed HATTORI of the latter's conducts and gave HATTORI a warning of the TANIDA-HORIBA plot.

Source Comment: A variety of these facts as HATTORI presented them indicate that SHIMOMURA is undoubtedly on HATTORI's side and fully acquainted with his armament plan. In drawing up the armament plan, HATTORI seems to have

conferred with SHIMOMURA at least on its fundamental issues, framework, etc. Consequently, it is close to the truth to draw the conclusion that HATTORI's plan is mapped out jointly by SHIMOMURA.

- f. Judging from the remarks of HATTORI and TATSUMI, it is true that the latter often pays a call on the former. TATSUMI told HARUKE Yoshitane on 3 Oct. 1951, "Since the attention of the world is focused upon us, I evade meetings with HATTORI as much as possible. But when I have to see him on business, I call at his house at night secretly."

These facts are evidence of the solid trust and good-will TATSUMI has toward HATTORI. Source had an opportunity to meet HATTORI on 5 Oct. Source informed HATTORI of the bulk of what HARUKE had told him of TATSUMI's ideas. At that time, HATTORI showed an attitude as if he was greatly surprised with the fact TATSUMI placed such a great trust in him. In spite of the fact that HATTORI had no grudge against TATSUMI, he had never supposed that TATSUMI trusted him so much. It was evident from the conversation that HATTORI does not give much explanation to TATSUMI about his planning studies. In other words, HATTORI does not seek TATSUMI's opinion at all in drafting his own plan. TATSUMI is in the position of closest military adviser to Prime Minister YOSHIDA, who is reported to have consulted the former many times concerning the rearmament issue. If TATSUMI had a thorough knowledge of HATTORI's plan, his advice to YOSHIDA would be based upon HATTORI's planning studies. He apparently does not have such knowledge, however, so he must have his own plan upon which his suggestions to YOSHIDA are based. If so, his plan is probably not worked out as precisely and minutely as HATTORI's, which is based upon Demobilization Board records, materials, files, and planning studies.

- g. TATSUMI Kieichi's other opinions on rearmament and his comments on the persons in question were as follows: (Sub-source: HARUKE; Date of Info: 3 Oct. 1951.)

- (1) Although a war between America and Russia is inevitable in the future, it will not take place soon. Should a war break out in the immediate future, America is not prepared to strike a fatal blow upon Russia promptly. It requires a vast amount of resources to bring Russia to total defeat. However rich a country America may be, it cannot complete mobilization within a short period. At least until 1953, it will be impossible. Judging from the recent decline in America of production of war materials, America herself does not appear to anticipate the outbreak of a war in the near future. Russia is not at present contemplating commencement of a full-fledged war either. A war would proceed on in favor of America, if it occurs now. A war would become one of long duration if it starts now. The Asian communization plan would be much more favorably put into practice by having a minor conflict like the Korean War occur in Far East and a similar one in the Near East rather than one full-scale worldwide catastrophe.
- (2) The rearmament of Japan can not quickly be realized. The Japanese financial condition can not at the present time afford the early implementation of rearmament. The national life is too hard pressed. Furthermore, the expediting of rearmament of Japan would only give rise to unnecessary animosity of the PHILIPPINE Government and of the British Commonwealths, and its consequences would lead Japan into an

unfavorable position. Therefore, the urgent steps Japan has to take are to strengthen and reinforce step by step the present Police Reserve instead of regimenting a new Army rapidly. Thus, it is much wiser to await the arrival of the appropriate time for the development of the existing Police Reserve into the equivalent of a national defense army with due consideration of international situations.

(Source Note: Prime Minister YOSHIDA and Source are both in complete agreement to this opinion of TATSUNI's)3

- (3) Nobody is more qualified than HATTORI to assume the leadership of the new Army in the future. He is wonderful both in character and ability. Anyone who has once met him is completely charmed with him. A variety of malicious criticisms are pelted against him in the public, but he is an entirely unselfish person. Even after the departure from Japan of Major General Willoughby, Source believes the trust of the U.S. Army in HATTORI has never changed.
- (4) The Japanese Government is planning the breakup of the Demobilization Board on the grounds of administrative retrenchment and so on. But, so long as HATTORI enjoys a high popularity of the U.S. army, the plan would be futile.4
- (5) But, the only trouble lies in the subordinates of HATTORI. They sometimes make rash statements unnecessarily: "We colleagues are strongly united" or "We maintain extensive intelligence organizations throughout the country". HORIBA, too, is a fine man, but he lacks a discreet attitude. For such a reason, the Japanese Government entertains an antipathy for the HATTORI Group. It fears the HATTORI Group and is trying to stamp HATTORI out. The insistence upon the dissolution of the Demobilization Bureau is a sign of antipathy which the Japanese Government has for HATTORI.
- (6) The general public hold TANAKA Shinichi, chief of G-1, the Operational Section General Staff Office in the early part of the Pacific War, former Lt. General of the Army, HATTORI and TSUJI Masanobu the most responsible among living persons for having waged the last war. In other words, these three are looked upon as truly responsible for having brought about the Surrender. Such a criticism is equivalent to a death blow for HATTORI. However, fair consideration of the most eligible person to be made a leader of the new Army in the future can result in the appointment of no one but HATTORI. The members of HATTORI's Group should take these points into special consideration, refrain from making irresponsible statements which are quite likely to incur the antipathy of the Government as well as the people, and act as considerately as possible until the right time has come.

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- b. Source had never asked HATTORI what his plan was like. Source had assumed an attitude of being not concerned with the armament program. On around September 24, Source and HARUKE were invited by HATTORI. HARUKE then asked a question to HATTORI, "To what an extent Japan must be rearmed?" After making general explanations of answer to this question, HATTORI said, "Practically all of my views on this issue are carried in the March issue of the Yomiuri Monthly". On the night of October 8, Source phoned HATTORI and said, "If you have the March issue of the Yomiuri Monthly, please lend it to me." HATTORI apparently did not have it and answered, "It wasn't the Yomiuri Monthly, but the March or April issue of the monthly of the Mainichi Press." The monthlies published from the Mainichi Press are "The Mainichi Information Report" and "The Economist". Source quickly started looking for it and found it in the April issue of the first one.

9. HATTORI's Opinions on the Armament Program.

- a. Source heard in silence the questions and answers exchanged between HATTORI and HARUKE on the armament program on 24 September, 1951. Writing it up several days later, Source was unable to state accurately all the contents of the discussion between HATTORI and HARUKE. At the general contents of HATTORI's ideas are as a whole in accord with the article (cf. Attachment) carried in the "Mainichi Information". The following are the additional or correctional items of that discussion not included in the March article:
- (1) Former Admiral NOMURA Kichisaburo seems to be planning and working for the revival of the Navy.
 - (2) The U.S. Army to be detailed to the defense of Japan in an emergency would number somewhere between five and ten divisions according to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. But it is very difficult for America to dispatch ten divisions to Japan.
 - (3) The defense of Japan by the U.S. Garrisoning Army alone is infeasible. Japan must be armed as quickly as possible. For that purpose, the prompt and substantial reinforcement of the Police Reserve is necessary.
 - (4) Five divisions can be formed by 75,000 men of the Police Reserve. But, Japan must have at least fifteen additional divisions. Supposing five divisions are to be recruited and established in each year, another three years are needed even to get training coordinated.
 - (5) In order to effectuate armament within such a period the time limitation means that almost all former regular officers will have to be depurged.
 - (6) It is far from being the truth that HATTORI is at the present time desirous of entering the Police Reserve by any means or becoming a leader of the New Army, he says. At the same time, he has no intention whatsoever of standing in the way of the armament program campaign of others. The presence of sectionalism in the army to be formed anew should be avoided by all means. Therefore, he does not retaliate in any way against those people who want to exclude him. At present, however, he can do nothing but let things take their course.

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6. Later Comments on Armament Planning, Security Information

On 12 October 1951, Source and HARRIS were invited to HATTORI's home. In the presence of former Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO Masakatsu (橋本正勝), HATTORI's subordinate, HATTORI gave an approximately four-hour explanation concerning the so-called HATTORI Kikan to them. Among various items of HATTORI's explanation, those concerned with armament are as follows:

- a. The manner in which the article entitled "If Japan has a national defense army?" (carried in the April issue of the "Mainichi" Information") was obtained was as follows:

A reporter from the "Mainichi" Press paid a surprise visit to HATTORI at the Demobilization Board on one March day, this year. He asked for HATTORI's opinions on rearmament. HATTORI, in refusal, had his subordinates, former Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO Masakatsu and HARA Shiro (原四郎), meet with the "Mainichi" reporter. As HASHIMOTO and HARA were not prepared for the occasion, they just aired opinions on rearmament which had been in agreement between HATTORI and them. The "Mainichi" pressman further called on former Navy officers and sought their opinions on rearmament in the same manner. The article was published in the "Mainichi Intelligence" under the form of a three-man talk between A, B and the newspaper reporter was thus actually compiled on the basis of the information procured from a certain former Navy officer as well as from HATTORI's subordinates. Consequently, the article does not represent directly the opinion of HATTORI himself, although his opinions are not at great odds with its contents.

- b. Concerning the article entitled "A Seventeen Division Standing Army - A Question-Answer Form Interview with Former Colonel ~~HATTORI~~" in the October 21 issue of the "Weekly Asahi" HATTORI had even more bitter comments.

A reporter from the "Asahi Press" unexpectedly paid a call on HATTORI at the Demobilization Board the other day. HATTORI wished to evade a talk with the reporter, but could find no legitimate excuse to escape it. So HATTORI gave an outline of his planning work in reply to the reporter's questions. This question-answer conversation was reported in the "Asahi Weekly". Therefore, "former Colonel H" in this article is HATTORI himself.

- c. Re the article entitled "Chapter I The Rise of the Rearmament Movement" in the October 21 issue of the "Asahi Weekly".

Some parts of the article reporting on the activities of HATTORI are fairly close to the truth, but some others are far from it. The article itself is written with malicious intention. The source of this article still remains unknown to HATTORI, but probably the same reporter wrote it.

- d. The explanation on armament HATTORI gave to Source and HARRIS on 12 October

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was as follows:

- (1) An estimate of the armament of America and Russia.

The existing military strength of both countries is roughly estimated as follows:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
U.S.A.	250 divisions	40,000 planes
U.S.S.R.	300 or 450 divisions	20,000 planes

HATTORI also estimates the military strength to be mobilized by Russia, Communist China and North Korea in an invasion of Japan at 50 divisions and 9,500 air planes in total.

The U.S.-Japanese Security Pact envisages the stationing of approximately five or six divisions of the American Army in Japan, HATTORI speculates, with ten as an absolute maximum in event of emergency. Airplanes to be shipped to Japan after the effective date of the above Pact will be approximately 3,000. There is the possible likelihood that America would draw its entire military power out of Japan if the situation turns out worse in event of World War III. We can not expect a constant flow of military aid from America for the defense of Japan.

- (2) To what an extent must Japan be armed?

The peace-time military power necessary for Japan if U.S. Army garrison is retained in addition is 15 divisions, 2000 airplanes and 100,000 tons of Naval forces mainly consisting of cruisers. The forces needed in event of war, under similar conditions, are 45 divisions, 3000 airplanes and 150,000 tons of the Naval force. The peace-time military power necessities of Japan, if there is no dependence upon America for aid would be a minimum 20 divisions, 3500 airplanes and 200,000 tons of Naval forces. In event of attack, under similar conditions, 60 divisions and 5000 planes would be needed. Special attention should be paid to the fact that America looks forward to the quicker rebuilding of the Japanese Army than most Japanese are hoping.

- (3) Concerning the time for outbreak of World War III.

In HATTORI's study and experience, the accurate prediction of the time for outbreak of the next war is absolutely impossible. Many people specify the time for the occurrence of a war. Such speculation deserves little trust. It is wholly groundless. The time for the outbreak of war is decided by factors which can not be predicted. If a mere speculation is allowed, however, it seems most likely that World War III would commence in late 1953.

- (4) Re anti-armament advocacy.

About ten years are wanted until Japan achieves a proper force of the

military strength above-stated as necessary. Even if armament is speeded up, five years are necessary. Therefore, assertions have been made that Japan might as well not rearm in view of the above-mentioned speculation that World War III would occur in late 1963. Such assertions are a gross mistake, however. When the strength of an organized army even of incomplete proportions and that of a group of individuals are compared with each other, the strength of the latter can not even be considered. Even if men are recruited into the Army and given only a ten-day training, there will surely result some of the strength of an organized body. The strength of an organized body is so formidable that it can not be compared with that of the individual. That we cannot complete armament before the outbreak of another war is nothing but a speculation at the present time. It is a prediction and no more. The Third World War may not happen even in 1955, at which time we may come to repent over why we did not ever undertake full-scale armament despite the lapse of such a long time. It is primarily sheer nonsense that Japan is entirely unarmed in the present world situation. In order to eliminate such nonsense, rearmament should be promptly undertaken regardless of varying speculations as to when another world war will take place.

Some people are opposed to rearmament on the grounds that it will only help to cause another world-wide conflict and that Japan will be entangled in it. They believe that so long as Japan remains unarmed, World War III will not ever break out, and even if it happens, Japan will not become involved in it. Before we refute these ideas, it is necessary for us to compare the views on war of the Communist bloc with those of the Democratic bloc.

The democratic nations are armed to preserve peace, at the same time doing everything possible to avoid war. It is only when the situation turns out so perilous that peace cannot be preserved without resorting to arms that the democratic nations are determined to fight a war. That is to say, the Democratic bloc is armed and determined to fight a war if necessary in the hope of keeping peace. The Communist bloc, on the other hand, is bent upon materializing its plans and ideas by appealing to force of arms whenever convenient. Armed intervention is an indispensable means of aggression of the Communist bloc. Communist nations are endeavoring to put their plans into practice by use of armed force as soon as their preparations are completed. That is to say, the Communist bloc is armed in the hope and intent of waging a war.

If the Communist bloc wishes to communize Japan, whether this country is armed or not has no bearing upon Communist plans for use of force or of its military invasion. If the Communist nations believe that their armed invasion of Japan will most likely succeed, they would not hesitate to start it. The reason why they do not start it now is that they are not sure of success in it as yet. To rearm Japan therefore is not to cause a war, but to force the Communists to realize that they have no chance for victory. The result will be to further postpone the time of their armed attack on Japan.

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- e. The concern of the Japanese Government and its Prominent Statesmen with Rearmament.

Either because they are not concerned with the activities of the JCP and Russia, or because they have no accurate information on them, the Japanese Government has no real comprehension of the fact that Japan is exposed to global danger. HATTORI said he had many chances for personal talks with various people ever since the National Police issue of last year was brought to light. He had explained about the necessity of armament to them. However, about 50% of them remained unconcerned. Although the rest of them showed a considerable interest, they did not bring themselves to take any positive step. Such being the case, he could not help but feel a great anxiety as to when they would seriously take up the rearmament issue.

(Same information, Sub-source, and date acquired same as for para. 6)

The Activity of HATTORI's Group for Rearmament.

- a. It is entirely unknown at the present moment who will actually be in charge of planning major rearmament of Japan nor when it is to be undertaken. HATTORI himself is not anxious to take the initiative in rearming Japan. He does not have a bit of ambition to make himself the chief figure in rearming Japan. It is indeed deplorable and sorry for HATTORI to be looked upon as an ambitious man only because he has studied the armament issue copiously and has insisted upon the necessity of armament. However, no one is at present seriously making such a comprehensive study of armament. Some one would have to undertake the study sometime or other. HATTORI felt he might be of some service to the nation in the future by squarely facing the issue of armament now. From this point of view, HATTORI has pursued his research of armament privately in the Colleagues organization even up to the present. Japan has regained its independence and sovereignty after the signing of the peace treaty; but, HATTORI feels that if Japan remains unarmed, this independence and sovereignty would merely be empty words. As a matter of fact, Japan would be permanently placed in a subordinate position in the family of nations. In order that Japan may preserve its sovereignty and independence both in name and practice, rearmament is of absolute necessity from the theoretical viewpoint. It is all the more absurd that Japan should be in a military vacuum under the existing international situation.
- b. In order to form a vigorous new Army, it is absolutely essential to change its leaders from fine men. Fine men are found not only among those who are acquainted with HATTORI. They are scattered all over the country. The thing is to find them and make as many connections as possible with them. Such work can not be done by HATTORI alone. He depends upon his reliable friends. At present, HATTORI has about 80 to 90 colleagues under his direction throughout Japan. The rumor has it that the HATTORI Kikan or HATTORI's Group comprises these colleagues. HATTORI does not intend to set up a clique or a faction. HATTORI is of the firm belief that sectionalism in the Army should be done away with at any cost.
- c. The establishment of mutual contact among these 80-odd colleagues of HATTORI's is very difficult. Though they can hold local meetings they can hardly have a central assembly often times because of the difficulties of their personal living. Those colleagues residing in Tokyo can meet frequently and

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easily make a contact to one another, since their residences are close at hand. Therefore, their activities are very lively. They are not in a position to participate in political activity, so they are just making abstract researches such as:

- (1) What policy is necessary for the formation of the New Army?
- (2) What ideals should the New Army adopt?
- (3) What moral principles should be upheld by the personnel of the New Army?
- (4) What operational approach will Russia adopt in attacking Hokkaido?
- (5) What policy and strategy should be taken for the defense of the Japanese homeland?

In other words, what they are doing is merely strategic research necessary for the formation of a new army. The results of their researches are either kept to the individual persons themselves or handed to other colleagues. They are not in a position to announce them publicly to the world. In due recognition of the necessity of the rearmament of Japan, their group is devoted to strategic research and the acquiring of the knowledge of new techniques necessary for the creation of the New Army. So, if this group be utilized by the authorities concerned in the formation of the new army, it would be of more help than can be imagined.

** NOTES **

1. In a recent background report on leading officials from 1937 to 1945 in the General Staff Office, [] indicated that DOI Akio was HATTORI's predecessor as Chief of OpSec, G-1. That does not match with either this information nor that in ZJL-745, which put DOI as head of all G-1 much later. We shall check further on this; the background report came from HATTORI's records.
2. **Source Note:** The persons tentatively chosen as staff planning officers were those enumerated in earlier reports (ZJL-746) as heading the "Colleagues."
Field Note: By a mere comparison of numbers, it is obvious that HATTORI probably planned to fill about half the top posts with men of his own choice; his air of injured innocence at being called on this point by other military men, however objective his selections might be, seems a bit ridiculous.
3. **Field Comment:** Despite his impassioned defense, even "white-washing" of HATTORI, Source has, whenever pressed for his own ideas, opposed full-scale rearmament.
4. **Field Comment:** This, added to the statement on page 10 concerning secret meetings between HATTORI and TATSUMI, gives us the impression that much more can be gained from "reading this report backwards", so to speak. How does TATSUMI know the American attitude is unchanged? If TATSUMI knows YOSHIDA's government thinks ill of HATTORI and plans to break up the Demobilization Board and yet feels both are needed for the future, WHY does he not use pressure pre HATTORI?
5. **Field Comment:** For additional activities, cf. ZJL-746. It is apparently a complete mystery to HATTORI why certain Japanese political and journalistic circles should be at all apprehensive about an organized group and coordinated effort at this time, and furthermore, until its recent publicising, a secret group, laying the organizational and ideological groundwork for a future Army.