

MICROFILMED



WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.5(c)



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)




3.5(c)



HISTORY OF THE MONTONEROS IN ARGENTINA

FROM MARCH 1970 TO EARLY APRIL 1977

27 May 1977



3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~ [Redacted]

3.5(c)
3.5(c)

[Redacted]

Page 1 of 24

SCOPE

This paper contains a history of the Montoneros in Argentina from March 1970 to early April 1977. The report has been divided into the following four phases: 1) March 1970 when the Montoneros were formed to the spring of 1973 when the Peronists won the elections; 2) March 1973 when Hector Campora assumed the presidency to 6 September 1974 when the Montoneros declared war on the government and voluntarily went underground; 3) 6 September 1974 to 8 September 1975 when the government outlawed the Montoneros; 4) 8 September 1975 to early April 1977.

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

SECRET

Page 2 of 24

HISTORY OF THE MONTONEROS IN ARGENTINA
FROM MARCH 1970 TO EARLY APRIL 1977

1. The Montoneros were formed in March 1970 as a predominantly peronist-oriented organization which included leftist peronists, radical catholics, leftist nationalists and marxists. The original membership was drawn from all classes, but the majority consisted mainly of students and professionals plus a limited number of workers. The Montoneros took their name from groups of irregulars who fought in the Argentine war of independence and in the civil war and uprisings against dictators during the period from 1820-1853. Philosophically, the Montoneros embraced the traditional peronist beliefs in social justice, economic development free of foreign influence, a just distribution of wealth within a national socialist system, and political independence. The ideology of the Montoneros gradually tilted more to the left, and in 1973 one of their leaders described the Montonero ideology as a combination of marxism, nationalism and peronism which, he said, was adapted to the objective conditions existing in Argentina. He stated that their strategy was the development of a "popular war," led by the Montoneros, and that the ultimate struggle in Argentina would be between the people and the revolutionary vanguard on one side and the forces of repression and imperialism on the other.

2. During the first three years of their existence, the Montoneros functioned as a classic underground urban guerrilla terrorist group, dedicated to overthrowing the military government and to restoring Juan P e r o n to power, if necessary by force of arms. Their first terrorist act was the kidnapping on 29 May 1970 and subsequent assassination of former President Pedro E. A r a m b u r u. Indications are strong that Peron did not disapprove of the action. After the murder of Aramburu, the Montoneros undertook a series of political assassinations, bank robberies, attacks on various military and police installations, and occupation of small towns. Unlike the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Montoneros did not seem to single out foreigners or foreign firms as targets, although they did kidnap the director of Phillips of Argentina in September 1972 and possibly conducted other kidnappings. The Montoneros took the war directly to their main enemy, the military government.

3. The Montoneros also mounted joint operations with other Argentine terrorist groups, the most spectacular being a massive break from Rawson Prison in August 1972. Although Montonero leader, Fernando V a c a N a r v a j a, was among the group that hijacked an airliner to Chile and escaped, most of the others involved were killed by the military in the "Trelew Massacre," which has become a cause celebre for Argentine terrorist groups.

~~**SECRET**~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

Page 3 of 24

4. During their first three years underground, the Montoneros continued to expand their political base as well as conduct terrorist acts. The Montoneros reportedly spent much of 1971 forming support groups in the Catholic youth movement and establishing influence in the parochial schools, universities and Catholic lay organizations. The Montoneros also became involved with "third world priests," a loosely-knit organization of radical priests, a few of whom believed in violent revolution to change the social order in Argentina.

5. During this time, the supreme body of the Montonero movement was the National Command under which a number of provincial commands had been established. A member of the National Command was assigned to each provincial command to give it political guidance. The provincial commands were made up of several basic recruiting units and basic combat units responsible for propaganda activities as well as armed operations. These units were divided into cells.

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

Page 4 of 24

6. The Montoneros began to enter their second phase during the Spring of 1973. In March 1973, the orthodox Peronist Party asked all terrorist groups in Argentina to stop their activities during the presidential elections. While the ERP refused, the Montoneros agreed.

7. After the election of Hector C a m p o r a as President on the Peronist ticket in March 1973, the Montoneros scaled down their terrorist activity and began to emerge and operate quite openly in Argentine politics. They concentrated on becoming the rallying point for ultra-leftist peronists, particularly among the peronist youth. The Montoneros increasingly shied away from political violence, although they may have been responsible for the assassination of Jose Ignacio R u c c i, a well-known labor leader, on 25 September 1973.

8. Following Juan Peron's assumption to the presidency in October 1973, the Montoneros officially announced that they were merging with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) led by Roberto Q u i e t o. The new group would be under the joint leadership of Quieto and Mario F i r m e n i c h, the leader of the radical peronist faction of the Montoneros, and would use the Montonero name. The group pledged to follow Peron and to undertake revolutionary development without violence. A splinter group of the Montoneros, known as the "Savino Navarro Column", rejected the merger and continued to advocate the creation of a socialist state through armed struggle. It is believed, however, that this column later rejoined the Montoneros. The FAR had made its initial appearance in Argentina in mid-July 1970. It was first created to support Ernesto "Che" G u e v a r a in Bolivia, and most of its founders were trained in Cuba. Its membership was largely drawn from the lower and middle classes and students. The FAR's ideology was marxist-leninist, and the leadership supported "Che" Guevara's theory of the guerrilla front. The FAR had engaged in widespread terrorist activities, including the kidnapping of foreign businessmen.

9. During the Fall of 1973, Peron continued to attempt to persuade the Montoneros to give up violence and to keep them as a part of the peronist movement. As of September 1973, Peron reportedly planned to offer Firmenich and Quieto positions in the government, representing the Montoneros, in exchange for their cooperation. The positions would reportedly have been low-level ones and would have had little influence upon the decision-making powers of the government. The kid-glove treatment of the Montoneros continued. When both Quieto and Firmenich were arrested in separate incidents in February 1974 for carrying false documents and illegally possessing weapons, they were quickly released by the courts for lack of evidence.

10. It soon became clear to the Montoneros, however, that President Peron was not going to take Argentina to the left as they desired. In mid-October 1973 a delegation of Montonero leaders met with the Army Chief of Staff and asked the army for weapons to protect themselves from extremist elements in the trade unions and also to improve their power position so that the "fascist" ring around President Peron could be broken. The army refused. In the Winter and Spring of 1974, the

~~SECRET~~

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 5 of 24

Montoneros realized they could not achieve their aims openly. They decided they would have to confront the Peronist government and even President Peron himself. A minority faction in the Montoneros wanted to work toward the creation of a mass movement which would unite groups with similar philosophies and ideologies and to avoid confrontation and separation from the peronist movement at all costs. The majority prevailed.

11. The confrontation with Peron came to a head during the 1974 May Day celebration of National Unity when the Montoneros shouted anti-government slogans during Peron's speech, causing Peron to lose his temper and denounce the hecklers as "stupid, immature hirelings of foreign money." The Montoneros left the meeting en masse. A group of moderate Montoneros who were still members of the Catholic Church denounced the walkout and claimed that the Montoneros were being misled by the FAR.

12. The death on 1 July 1974 of Juan Peron and the assumption to the presidency of Peron's vice president and widow, Maria Estela (Isabel) Martinez de Peron, made the Montoneros' confrontation with the government easier. They started a propaganda campaign in order to pressure the government to proscribe their organization. This failed, although the government banned the publication of the Montonero magazine "La Causa Peronista," and the Montoneros were forced to take the final step themselves when on 6 September 1974 they declared war on the government of Mrs. Peron and went underground, announcing they would undertake an anti-government campaign.

13. By early September 1974, the Montoneros had, according to a Montonero leader, 15,000 members throughout the country, 2,500 of whom could be considered armed combatants. In the Buenos Aires area alone, the leader said there were 8,000 members, 1,500 of whom could be considered armed combatants. He estimated that the Montoneros could probably mobilize some 200,000 supporters throughout the country, and between 50 and 60 thousand for demonstrations in the Buenos Aires area. The Argentine [redacted] estimated at that time that there were 11,000 Montoneros, of whom 10 or 15 percent were armed and dangerous. The Argentine [redacted] believed the Montoneros were divided into two factions, a violent-line group which represented 60 percent of the membership, including all of the FAR, and a moderate faction. [redacted] the violent faction controlled all of the weapons and six million dollars in funds. As of 1974 the leaders of the violent-line faction were, for the most part, former leaders of the FAR and were more marxist than peronist. It was considered at that time that a notable exception was Mario Firmenich, who adopted a more moderate public image but who [redacted] was just as much a proponent of violence as the FAR. They actually considered Firmenich more dangerous than the other Montonero leaders because of the sizeable following he enjoyed from both factions and because of his skills as a political manipulator.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~
 Page 6 of 24

14. In what could be considered "phase three" of the Montoneros, that is from their decision on 6 September 1974 to declare war on the government and go underground, to their being outlawed by the government on 8 September 1975, the Montoneros carried out a number of significant terrorist acts, some of which were the following:

19 September 1974 - The Montoneros kidnap two prominent businessmen, Juan and Jorge B o r n of the Bunge and Born Company. Jorge was released in June 1975 after his brother agreed to pay an amount believed to range between 30-60 million dollars and 320,000 new pesos in merchandise distributed to the poor.

1 November 1974 - The Montoneros assassinate by a remote-controlled bomb Federal Police Chief Alberto V i l l a r and his wife while they were aboard a yacht.

26 February 1975 - The Montoneros kidnap John Patrick E g a n, Honorary Consul for the United States in Cordoba. When the Argentine government failed to negotiate and produce four alleged prisoners demanded by the abductors, Egan was killed and his body found 28 February 1975.

25-26 July 1975 - The Montoneros are responsible for numerous bombings and other incidents within the greater Buenos Aires area to commemorate the 26 July death of Eva P e r o n.

28 July 1975 - The Montoneros assault the "Halcon" weapons facility in Banfield taking over 600 guns, including 105 submachine guns.

Period around 22 August 1975, which is the anniversary of the "Trelew Massacre." The Montoneros are responsible for various incidents, including the explosion on a navy ship in the Federal Capital causing serious damage.

15. The objectives of the Montoneros by now were to provoke through terrorist activities a military coup d'etat followed by a polarization of the political forces. The Montoneros reasoned that following a coup d'etat with time the rightist sector would be dominated by the military with the support of some civilians, and the leftist sector would consist of a coalition of most of the leftist groups dominated by the Montoneros. The Montoneros calculated that under such a situation the rightist forces would be in a definite minority with many sectors sympathetic to the rightist side remaining uninvolved out of disinterest or fear. With the advantage of numbers, the Montoneros would then be in a position to press for elections and, through a leftist coalition led by the "Authentic Peronist Party," the Montoneros' political party front, take control of the country via the electoral process.

16. To better organize its military campaign, by mid-1975 the Montoneros decided to devote about a three-month period to intensive militant operations, to be followed by some six months of planning, selecting specific targets and assigning teams against them, training cadre and acquiring weapons and materiel. Militant activities were to continue

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 7 of 24

during this latter phase, but on a lower level. The large-scale terrorist activity during the 25-26 July 1975 period marked the beginning of what the Montoneros called their "First Military Campaign" which was to run through October 1975. The primary targets during this campaign were to be the paramilitary forces of the Argentine government since the Montoneros did not yet consider themselves prepared for direct confrontation with the Argentine army. The Montoneros would retaliate, however, whenever the Armed Forces became involved in repressive measures against the Montoneros.

17. Up until about the time they were outlawed on 8 September 1975 the Montoneros had been able to operate with virtual impunity. As the Montoneros had been an instrumental factor in bringing about the return to power of Juan Peron, and as they considered themselves representative of peronism, there was a political problem for the government in turning against them, despite the Montoneros' militant offensive against the government of Mrs. Peron. Consequently, as a result of their virtual free rein to operate, the Montoneros continued to gain recruits and sympathizers. In September 1975 [redacted] the Montoneros had grown considerably during the previous few months, acquiring a large number of new members from among workers who were disgruntled over the worsening economic situation in Argentina. While [redacted] did not state the precise number of recruits, he indicated the number might be around 2,000.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

18. During this period, in addition to acquiring actual recruits within labor, the Montoneros also managed to achieve influence among the work force of several important industries, such as within automobile plants. While the Montoneros never managed to control unions, they did succeed in dominating the internal labor commissions of many factories and being selected as labor delegates. These Montoneros rarely revealed their true affiliation to their worker colleagues, passing themselves off merely as peronists or, when pressed, as members of the "Authentic Peronist Party." They devoted their efforts in trying to bring about higher wages and greater social benefits for the workers and for the most part did not attempt to organize the workers politically. It was not difficult for the Montoneros to enter a plant's work force as they were usually well qualified. Many companies hired their workers and technicians based on examinations, and consequently, the Montoneros, most of whom had had some university education, were usually able to pass the tests easily and be hired legitimately. For example, the Montoneros would have their members who were engineering students take the tests given by automobile companies.

19. Within the student sector, the Montoneros were also acquiring recruits and influence. The Montonero student front at the secondary level (high school) was the "Union of Secondary Students" (UES), and at the university level the "Peronist University Youth" (JUP). The primary objective of the UES was the continuous formation within secondary schools, and particularly technical schools, of "base groups," which generally consisted of four people, one being the group leader. The UES rarely assembled to agitate en masse for student causes. Efforts

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 8 of 24

to promote the objectives of the UES were normally carried out quietly through individual contact.

20. Within the university sector, the JUP became more vocal than the UES, utilizing its organizational strength and the experience and capability of its members to champion causes or pressure for actions. To help achieve its objectives, the JUP resorted to public rallies, propaganda, and pressure on professors. The JUP's activities were directed both at national political matters, as well as strictly student aspects. For example, with respect to the latter, problems such as inadequate student dining rooms, professor absenteeism, lack of vacancy in a particular course and difficulties with enrollment all became the concern of the JUP in an effort to win student recruits and sympathizers. Individuals represented within the JUP were elected by students from individual university departments. Within each department there were "student centers" which were politically oriented student groups competing with one another to obtain student representation within various university organizations, including the JUP. The Montoneros infiltrated both openly and clandestinely "student centers" in almost all university departments throughout the country. The Montonero-dominated "student centers" obtained adherents both through ideological appeal, as well as through services, such as providing textbooks at low cost, course aids and employment opportunities.

21. The JUP had a national leadership consisting of two representatives from Buenos Aires, one from the Littoral, one from La Plata and one from Cordoba. The JUP leadership would meet alone every fifteen days and with the national leadership of the Montoneros every month. While both the JUP and the UES became influential throughout the country, within the Federal Capital area the JUP was particularly strong within the National University of Buenos Aires, notably in the departments of Medicine, Architecture and Urbanism, Exact Sciences, Pharmacy and Biochemistry, Philosophy and Letters, Economic Science, and Law and Social Sciences. At the secondary level, the UES became strong in the Federal Capital area within the Buenos Aires National College, Carlos Pellegrini National College and Sarmiento National College.

~~SECRET~~

3.5(c)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~

Page 9 of 24

22. What might be considered "phase four" of the Montoneros, that is 8 September 1975 when the Montoneros were outlawed until the present, has been marked by a continuation of terrorist incidents by the Montoneros against the Argentine military, police, and business sector, and, in response, an all-out anti-subversive effort by the military and civilian security forces, particularly after the military took over in a coup d'etat 24 March 1976. By September 1975 the Montoneros were anticipating more serious confrontations with the Armed Forces to begin about the end of 1976-early 1977. In order to attack armored vehicles, the Montoneros were reportedly preparing anti-tank and anti-armored vehicle devices, such as Viet Cong-type mines and anti-tank grenades. They also planned to use a Spanish-type 51 mm mortar. On 5 October 1975 the Montoneros took the initiative in the largest attack to date against a military garrison. In a three-stage simultaneous assault, the Montoneros (1) attacked the 29th Regiment Army Base in Formosa, were met with heavy resistance and consequently suffered a number of casualties; (2) took control of the Pacu Airport in Formosa and (3) skyjacked an Aerolineas Argentinas domestic flight which was diverted to Pacu Airport to pick up survivors of the attack against the 29th Regiment. The crew was forced to fly to an isolated landing area where the Montoneros deboarded and escaped.

3.3(b)(1)

23. Toward the end of 1975 the military and civilian [redacted] were beginning to take a harder position against the Montoneros, and on 28 December 1975 Argentine [redacted] officials picked up Roberto Quieto on a beach in the Buenos Aires suburb of Martinez, and this time he was not released. Quieto told [redacted] that the Montoneros as of December 1975 had between 7,000-10,000 active members and about 300,000 supporters. He said that he and Firmenich were still the top leaders of the Montoneros, and that the third-ranking leader was Alberto Jose Molinas Menuzzi, National Chief of Propaganda. Molinas was subsequently killed 29 September 1976 in a confrontation with security forces. At the time of his death, Molinas was identified [redacted] as being number six in the Montonero hierarchy.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

24. Quieto identified the Montoneros' largest and most important arms cache located in a warehouse in the Buenos Aires suburb of Villa Ballester, and said this was also where the Montoneros had held the Born brothers. Based on Quieto's information, security officials raided the warehouse and confiscated 150 "Halcon" submachine guns made in Argentina, new automatic shotguns of Italian manufacture, five "Colt" heavy machineguns, approximately 100 hand guns, including some U.S. models, "FAL" rifles, hand grenades, three million rounds of small arms ammunition, one thousand barrels for a type of submachine gun under manufacture by the Montoneros, a large quantity of equipment for cleaning and maintaining small arms, Montonero uniforms and a detailed field manual providing instruction for small arms handling, explosives and guerrilla tactics. [redacted] this raid constituted the largest amount of subversive weapons and munitions confiscated by the government thus far.

3.3(b)(1)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~
 Page 10 of 24

3.3(b)(1)

25. Quieto also stated that the Montoneros maintained a Swiss bank account containing 150 million dollars, with another 50 million dollars distributed throughout Argentina. In August 1975 an Argentine revolutionary [redacted] had reported that most of the funds used by the Montoneros to carry out their operations were obtained through kidnappings and robberies. He said that some of the monies thus obtained were invested locally and abroad and used to purchase shares in major Argentine companies to insure continuing income. Other income was provided through the purchase and sale of real estate. Such transactions were handled by legal members of the Montoneros, that is, those members who had not been identified as Montoneros by the authorities. A less significant source of funds came from Montonero members themselves. Those who were legally employed were required to contribute a percentage of their income to the organization with the percentage varying according to the individual's financial circumstances.

26. In addition to Firmenich, himself and Molinas, Quieto identified the following as other leaders of the Montoneros as of December 1975:

Alberto Miguel C a m p s, Chief of Logistics at the National level.

Ricardo Rene H a i d a r, Chief of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for maintaining foreign connections. At the time of Quieto's capture, Haidar was residing in Rome, Italy. In February 1977, however, Haidar was picked up by the authorities in Buenos Aires.

Juan Julio R o q u e, alias "Materó," Chief of the Buenos Aires Region, which included the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province.

Francisco Reynaldo U r o n d o, Chief of Propaganda for the Buenos Aires Region.

Ignacio V e l e z C a r r e r a s, Chief of Cordoba Province.

Hernan Agosto O s o r i o, Chief of the Southern Region.

Maria Antonia B e r g e r, Chief of the combat unit for the Southern Zone.

Fernando Vaca Narvaja, Chief of the "Cuyo" Region, which included the Provinces of San Juan, Mendoza and San Luis.

Esther Norma A r r o s t i t o, Chief of the combat unit for the Northern Region who had participated in the operation against former President Aramburu. Arrostito was picked up by the security forces 2 December 1976 and reportedly later killed.

Jorge Omar L e w i n g e r, Chief of the Western Region. Lewinger has since been reportedly captured.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

SECRET

Page 11 of 24

27. In the action 29 September 1976, which led to the death of Molinas, Army G-2 also reported the death of the following, all of whom, according to G-2, were members of the Montoneros' National Political Secretariat as of September 1976:

Jose Carlos C o r o n e l, alias "Julian," head of the Montonero front of factory workers

Ismael S a l a m e, alias "El Turco," Montonero head of agitation and activities at the student level.

Maria Victoria W a l s h, alias "Hilda," head of the press section of the labor front.

Ignacio B e r t r a n.

Montoneros who, in addition to Arrostito and Firmenich, had participated in the operation against former President Aramburu were Carlos Raul C a p u a n o Martinez, who was killed 18 August 1972; Carlos Gustavo R a m u s, who was killed 7 September 1970; and Fernando Luis A b a l Medina, who was killed 7 September 1970.

28. In a captured document entitled "Annual Plan of the Montoneros from February 1976 through February 1977" the Montoneros express their intent to engage in the "First Military Campaign" of this period during March and April 1976 with the objective of trying to "annihilate" the police forces and carry out actions against business executives. According to the document, subsequent military campaigns were to depend on the outcome of the March-April offensive. Other [redacted] documents refer to the Montoneros "Fourth Military Campaign" which took place between early August 1976 to mid-October 1976 with the principal assassination targets continuing to be the "repressive forces" and business executives. In addition to killing, the Montoneros also engaged in harassment operations against their targets, which involved such actions as threatening phone calls and letters; threatening packages, some actually with bombs, some without; explosive devices in gifts of flowers, etc. The overall objective of the harassment campaign was to provoke fear and confusion among the targetted sectors with little cost to the Montoneros.

3.3(b)(1)

29. Following are some of the significant actions during 1976 against the military and police which are attributed to the Montoneros:

15 March 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the detonation of a powerful bomb which had been placed in a car parked next to Army Headquarters in an assassination attempt against General Jorge V i d e l a, Commander of the Army.

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS~~

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 12 of 24

18 June 1976 - Federal Police Chief Brigadier General Cesareo Angel C a r d o s a was killed by a bomb placed under the mattress of his bed by Ana Maria G o n z a l e z, a member of the Montoneros.

2 July 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the powerful bomb explosion in the dining room of Federal Police Security (Intelligence) headquarters which caused the death and injury of numerous people.

2 October 1976 - The Montoneros are believed to be responsible for a bomb which exploded under the reviewing stand at Campo de Mayo, resulting in several wounded. President Videla had been seated in the stands a few minutes beforehand but was not hurt.

17 October 1976 - The Montoneros are believed to be responsible for the powerful bomb explosion in the Military Club in the Federal Capital in which numerous people were injured.

15 December 1976 - The Montoneros are responsible for the explosion of a powerful bomb at the cinema of the Defense Ministry's Planning Department in downtown Buenos Aires which killed at least fourteen people and injured another thirty.

30. With respect specifically to the business sector, in a document dated August 1976 the Montoneros claim that they sent 2,000 threatening letters to business executives warning that they would be judged by the "revolutionary tribunal" if they collaborated with the government. In their campaign of intimidating and killing business executives, which was directed particularly against multinational companies, the Montoneros hoped to discourage international investment and promote the continuation of economic chaos, a situation which the Montoneros consider to be advantageous to their ultimate objective of taking control of the country.

31. The "Fourth Military Campaign" was also to focus on acts of sabotage against large industries, primarily those which had allegedly been dismissing or suspending workers without paying wages. The automobile and textile industries were singled out as particular targets. The Montoneros reasoned that sabotage operations presented an especially effective way to strike blows at the enemy and could be carried out by an insider in a clandestine manner with a minimum of risk; politically, sabotage operations helped provide public proof that there still existed a viable and potent opposition movement; and militarily, sabotage operations forced the enemy to disperse their troops and thus weaken their position. The Montoneros directed that sabotage acts were to be carried out with primarily three objectives in mind: (1) Destroying goods produced, such as stock on hand; (2) slowing down overall production; and (3) causing serious damage to the final stages of production, including retail aspects. Sabotage operations at beginning stages were to be avoided as they caused too many people at later stages of production to be put out of work.

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

Page 13 of 24

~~SECRET~~

32. On 17 August 1976 the Montoneros held a press conference of foreign correspondents in which the Montonero representatives present informed the correspondents that in the foreseeable future the Montoneros would be concentrating on propaganda/psychological action operations with less attention directed at military activities. The Montoneros assured that the organization was in no hurry to achieve power and would work behind the scenes to gradually strengthen its support. They stated that as a result of the "plan of hunger" of Jose M a r t i n e z de H o z, Minister of Economy, conditions were such that propaganda/psychological action operations were tactically the appropriate course for the Montoneros to pursue and not great military operations.

33. As defined by numerous confiscated documents, "propaganda/psychological action operations" were in fact the type of operations which the Montoneros had already been carrying out through most of 1976, i.e., isolated assassinations, bombings, sabotage and harassment, with a concurrent effort, particularly in the propaganda area, to strengthen opposition to the government both in Argentina and abroad. With respect to the Armed Forces specifically, in addition to trying to kill various officers and provoke fear within the ranks, the Montoneros sought to denigrate the Armed Forces command in an attempt to exacerbate disunity within the services and to bring about the isolation of the military government from the rest of the population. The Montoneros recognized that their ultimate victory would depend less on their carrying out military offensive operations than on their promoting disruptive actions designed to thwart the success of the government. The Montoneros calculated that through growing opposition to the government and disunity within the ranks the Armed Forces governing process would eventually collapse on its own, at which time the military would be compelled to permit elections, thus allowing the Montoneros to gain power legally as the vanguard of a leftist front and the main element in the formation of a socialist state. Mario Firmenich stated in a press conference 30 June 1974 that as of that time he envisioned that a ten-year program would be necessary before Argentina could achieve a socialist government.

34. In accord with the Montoneros' political objectives, under the military government, the Montoneros have been trying to form a broad-based opposition "national resistance movement" which eventually would be expanded into a more politically organized "national liberation front". The Montoneros also founded the clandestine "Montonero Party" on 17 October 1976, the anniversary of peronist "Loyalty Day," with the Secretary General of the party being Mario Firmenich, who was to continue to function as head of the Montoneros. The party was to be the channel for the political expression of the Montoneros' concept of peronism, as well as the focal point for the creation of the "national liberation front." While the "Montonero Party" and eventually the "national liberation front" were to represent the political elements of the Montoneros, the "Montonero Army" and the militias were to serve as the Montoneros' militant element. What previously had been known as "peronist resistance" came to be known

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 14 of 24

as "Montonero resistance." The Montonero document announcing the creation of the "Montonero Party" was signed by Firmenich, "Mendizabal," who is probably Horacio Mendizabal, and "Vaca Narvaja", who is probably Fernando Vaca Narvaja. By August 1976, the Montoneros had begun to distribute regularly a pamphlet entitled "Resistencia Montonera", and were also continuing to put out regularly their official publication "El Montonero."

3.3(b)(1)

35. The effort of the Montoneros to extend their influence also embraced the religious sector, as revealed by a [redacted] Montonero document believed to have been written August or September 1976. As of the writing of the document, the Montoneros had already begun efforts to organize the following three groups directed at expanding Montonero influence within the religious sector: (1) Social Christian Movement (SCM). The SCM was to be primarily a political entity to integrate sectors of the Popular Christian Party and the Revolutionary Christian Party. At the time the document was written, the SCM had about 42 affiliates, some of whom, according to the document, were first- and second-echelon members of the latter two parties. (2) Movement for the Unity of Christians. This Movement was to be comprised primarily of clergymen and was to be directed at attempting to sever the relatively close relationship then existent between the government and the Church hierarchy. (3) Christians for Liberation (CPL). The CPL, contrary to the other two groups, consisted mainly of Montoneros. The CPL had been established within the Greater Buenos Aires area, and it was the intent of the Montoneros to promote the CPL nationally as part of the broad-based opposition "national resistance movement."

3.3(b)(1)

36. Another [redacted] document revealed the effort of the Montoneros as of July 1976 to promote the formation of "Neighborhood Resistance Centers." The purpose of the Centers was to help organize, coordinate and lead the resistance movement within poorer residential areas, including encouraging the poor to become participants in acts of terrorism. In the past, Montonero subversive operations had been conceived and carried out by highly trained specialized groups acting independently of the people. However, by mid-1976 the Montoneros were encouraging the people to plan and implement their own operations, such as killings, with whatever weapons might be available to them; setting fires, bombings, causing streets to be blocked, and isolating wealthy neighborhoods through acts of sabotage, leaving them without water, electricity, gas, etc.

37. Within labor, following the coup d'etat and the suspension by the government of traditional labor activity, the Montoneros attempted to organize the General Labor Confederation/Resistance (CGT/R) as a clandestine labor organization parallel to the legal, but suspended, General Labor Confederation (CGT). According to a press release of the CGT/R sent to foreign news correspondents in Argentina, the CGT/R held its first plenum 14 August 1976 at a secret site in Buenos Aires Province in which representatives of unions throughout the country were in attendance. During the session, officers of the CGT/R were elected with metal worker Arturo G a r i n, which might be an alias, being named as the CGT/R chief.

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 15 of 24

38. Throughout 1976 the Montoneros continued to hold discussions with the ERP regarding the possibility of unification of the two organizations in an attempt to strengthen opposition against the government. Such talks had been going on since at least 13 February 1974 when Mario Firmenich, Mario Roberto S a n t u c h o, Commander of the ERP, and others met in Mendoza Province to discuss the unification issue at that time. In a subsequent press conference, Firmenich acknowledged that the two organizations had been holding talks but said that no profound agreement yet existed. Firmenich stated that in the opinion of the Montoneros the ERP's basic error was in trying to copy the model of the Vietnam situation, particularly in believing that the enemy could be clearly defined, that weapons represented the principal strength, and that the focus should be in the rural areas. In addition, the Montoneros believed that the ERP's blind adherence to marxist theories had caused the ERP to become strapped by dogma and to commit political errors which resulted in the ERP becoming separated from the Argentine people. The Montoneros also considered the ERP to be overly concerned with military aspects to the exclusion of political developments.

39. Firmenich admitted that the Montoneros had also made mistakes, noting that originally the Montoneros believed that the armed struggle in Argentina should be modelled after the "Che" Guevara experience and that the Montonero effort should therefore be concentrated in the rural areas. Firmenich said that the Montoneros later realized that this was unrealistic, that while the rural sector should not be abandoned, the emphasis should be on urban guerrilla warfare because the masses of workers were in the cities, not in the mountains.

40. The ERP, in turn, accused the Montoneros of being opportunists without a definable ideology. The ERP claimed that the Montoneros were not true revolutionaries because they did not follow any approved revolutionary doctrine and because, at least under President Campora and President Juan Peron, they were willing to operate within the Argentine political system.

41. Despite their failure to achieve unification, some contact and cooperation continued between the two groups. During a raid by the security forces in early 1975 a Montonero document [redacted] stating that meetings would be held throughout 1975 by the Montonero national leadership with the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), the political element of the ERP. With respect to joint operations, on 18 August 1975, the Montoneros and the ERP together stole an Army truck loaded with submachine guns and other weapons. A communique [redacted] claimed that the two organizations joined forces in this operation to retaliate against the recent killing, presumably by rightist forces, of the Mariano P u j a d a s family in Cordoba. The communique also stated that the Montoneros and the ERP would continue with assassinations, particularly directed at Argentine military and security personnel.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

3.5(c)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

~~SECRET~~

Page 16 of 24

3.3(b)(1)

42. In September 1975 a Montonero leader commented that coordination between the Montoneros and the ERP had improved and that a permanent coordinating council had been established, although there was still no central leadership over both groups. He stated that an example of Montonero/ERP cooperation was the coordinated assault in Cordoba on 21 August 1975 in which the ERP attacked a police station while the Montoneros attacked an Army communications center. In September 1975 the Army [] received information that the Montoneros would be sending about eighty men to Tucuman Province to assist the ERP in urban terrorist activities.

43. Upon questioning after his detention 28 December 1975, Roberto Quieto told the authorities that ties between the Montoneros and the ERP were minor. Quieto claimed that the ERP had distributed propaganda portraying a stronger relationship between the two organizations than was actually the case in order to build the ERP's image, lure recruits from the Montoneros and confuse the authorities.

44. The prospect of unification also suffered a setback after the unsuccessful attempt by the ERP on 23 December 1975 to seize the "Domingo Viejobueno Arsenal Battalion" at Monte Chingolo in Buenos Aires Province in which over fifty ERP participants were killed. While the Montoneros reportedly provided assistance to the operation in a support capacity, they were highly critical of the ERP for the failure of the operation and consequently reassessed the desirability of unifying with a group which, in the opinion of the Montoneros, had bungled so disastrously. In addition, the Montoneros were reluctant to become too closely associated with an organization which had a purely marxist orientation, considering that they could function more effectively under the peronist banner. Unification talks also suffered a setback with the death on 19 July 1976 of Mario Roberto Santucho and numerous other actions against the ERP by the security forces.

45. The Montoneros and the ERP nonetheless continued with their loose cooperative arrangement, and as of July 1976, being in financial straits, the ERP had borrowed at least U.S.\$600,000 from the Montoneros.

46. By mid-1976 both the Montoneros and the ERP were promoting an international propaganda campaign against the Argentine government, and in this regard each organization was represented within the "Argentine Center of Information and Solidarity" (CAIS), headquartered in Paris, France. As of August 1976, however, CAIS was having internal problems which was affecting its propaganda output. These problems largely concerned infighting between Rodolfo M a t t a r o l l o, alias "Raul N a v a s," a militant of the ERP; and Luis C e r r u t i C o s t a, a Montonero who was head of the CAIS foreign relations section. Part of the difficulty was allegedly due to an effort by the Montoneros to assume authority over subversive matters in Argentina. As of mid-1976 the CAIS reportedly had a direct relationship with the "Latin American Students Section" (AELA) in Germany; the "Antifascist Committee Against Repression in Argentina" (CAFRA) in Rome, which has the support of the Italian Communist Party; the "Argentine Anti-

~~SECRET~~

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 17 of 24

Imperialist Socialist Movement" (MASA) in the United States; "C.O.S.A." (sic) in London; "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" in Mexico; "Amnesty International;" the "Russell Tribunal II;" the "Peace Association" in the U.S.; and the "International Commission of Jurists," a subsidiary of the communist-front "World Peace Council."

3.3(b)(1)

47. In November 1975 [redacted] left-wing Montoneros were a dominant element within the "Casa del Pueblo Argentino" in Mexico City and that Mexico City was being used as a type of support base for the ERP and the Montoneros. In this regard, the "Casa del Pueblo Argentina" was providing documents, housing, travel funds and other assistance.

48. In June 1976 Envar E l K a d r e, representing the Montoneros, attended a meeting in Lisbon, Portugal of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Junta" (JCR), a coordinating body consisting of the ERP, the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement/Tupamaros, the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left and the Bolivian Army of National Liberation. The purpose of the meeting was to advise the group that the Montoneros, while not actually joining the JCR, would participate in an observer/advisor status, as well as provide the JCR with financial assistance on a monthly basis.

49. Despite their efforts to expand their influence and impede the efforts of the government, by late March 1976 the Montoneros privately conceded that despite the recent assumption of the military government they had already been dealt significant blows by actions of the security forces, particularly in the interior and most notably in Cordoba, Mendoza, the Northeast and the Littoral. The Montoneros considered it inevitable that as the interior continued to come under the control of security elements, the government would channel more of its resources into offensive actions against the Montoneros in the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires Province. As the rear guard of the Montoneros in the Buenos Aires area was regarded as weak and in no condition to successfully combat the Armed Forces offensive, the "tactical command" of the Montoneros ordered the implementation of "operation chameleon" calling for a large number of Montoneros to go into hiding. To help allow these Montoneros to live clandestinely, the "tactical command" directed that beginning 30 April 1976 an intensive effort was to be initiated to obtain legitimate documentation and identifying data of citizens who were not Montoneros. The Montoneros would then alter the documentation as necessary for use by the clandestine Montoneros or make false documents from the personal data acquired. Parallel with the defensive "chameleon operation," the Montoneros would continue to engage in offensive militant operations, both for the purpose of trying to stop the advance of the military, as well as to re-enforce the image of the Montoneros.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 18 of 24

3.3(b)(1)

50. As a result of the capture of Roberto Quieto, whom the Montoneros condemned as a traitor for allowing himself to be picked up and for revealing information [redacted], and because of other actions against the Montoneros by the security forces, the Montoneros re-appraised their situation and consequently instituted organizational changes beginning about May 1976.

51. When the Montoneros were first formed, they were a relatively small group consisting of cadre units which operated for the most part independently. As the membership expanded, it became apparent that a more centralized and structured organization was necessary to respond to reality. In May 1973 steps were taken to gradually consolidate the cadre units into a more cohesive body. The cadre chiefs became the overall national leaders, a number which eventually was reduced to three men, Firmenich, Quieto and possibly, at least at some point, Molinas. With time, a superstructure evolved which resulted in both a large bureaucracy with a period of demilitarization. The demilitarization brought about an absence of military training and led to low-level operations. The bureaucracy became unwieldy and Montonero members began acting on their own, carrying out activities at will without authorization or supervision. A further problem was that the national leaders became inaccessible. The decisions of the national leaders were not to be questioned, nor were they interested in suggestions. The primary focus of attention of the national leadership was in the Federal Capital area, and as a consequence the national leaders lacked knowledge of the different Montonero regions. The national leadership failed to produce a consistent and broad policy which encompassed the entire organization, resulting in contradictions between the Federal Capital area and the regional districts. In sum, the organizational structure which evolved lacked an effective channel to discuss and resolve problems.

52. In early 1976 the Montonero "national council" recommended the following to help correct the situation which had developed: (1) Greater democratization of the organization to allow for more effective communication between elements and the opportunity for members at all levels to express views and criticisms; (2) Better military training with at least one operation a year involving a large Montonero troop contingent; (3) Greater knowledge about and interest in members of the organization at all levels to help avert possible security problems. This latter point referred to the Quieto situation in which Quieto had apparently been denounced to the authorities by his wife who was angered over Quieto's affair with the Montonero "Ana;" (4) The assignment of a security officer to each regional district to be alert to potential problems from the membership which could affect the security of the organization; (5) Insistence that all members continually carry a weapon to be used either to try to resist capture or to kill oneself if capture appeared certain; a cyanide capsule was also to be carried to commit suicide.

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 19 of 24

53. Around May 1976 it was decided to refer to the "Commander" of the Montoneros as the "Secretary General" and to divide responsibility of the "tactical" (military) and "strategic" (political) functions, which hitherto had been combined. The "tactical" aspects would be controlled by a "national secretariat" operating from the Federal Capital. "Strategic" aspects would be more regionally oriented. "Regional elements," as such, were to be replaced by "columns" or "zones" led by a secretary general. The "columns" or "zones" would have more of a vertical command structure than did the "regional elements".

54. In sum, during this period the new Montonero organizational structure included the following: "National leadership (conduccion nacional), consisting of a secretary general plus three "area chiefs"; (2) secretariat, consisting of the secretary general and the national secretaries responsible for military, political, organizational, propaganda and indoctrination matter and international aspects; (3) "columns" or "zones," each led by a secretary general, plus four sub-secretaries in charge of military, political, organizational, and propaganda and indoctrination matters.

55. The military sub-secretary for the Federal Capital would have responsibility for three departments: The department of production involving the manufacture of armaments; the department of services which was to be responsible for logistical supports, medical facilities, caches and documentation; and the department of information responsible for maintaining intelligence files on personalities of interest and other potential targets, such as aspects of the country's infrastructure, etc.

56. Within the Federal Capital the political sub-secretary would be in charge of four departments: Student, labor, press and propaganda, and the "national liberation front."

57. Within the Federal Capital the organizational sub-secretary would be in charge of five departments: Personnel, prisoners, finances, communications and technical assistance.

58. The propaganda and indoctrination sub-secretary within the Federal Capital would be in charge of preparing, publishing, and distributing propaganda.

59. The national secretary in charge of international aspects headed four departments: Latin America, Investigation and Information, Special Logistics, and Relations with Europe, Africa and the Soviet Bloc. A document dated 1975 outlining the "work plan" of the Montoneros for 1975 stated that the International Section of the Montoneros would maintain periodic contact with the embassies of Cuba, friendly Arab states, such as Syria, Iraq and Algeria; and other communist states, the selection, according to the document, to be made at a later date. The "work plan" also noted that preparations would be made to send a mission to Western Europe

~~SECRET~~

~~WARNING NOTICE~~
~~SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 20 of 24

to disseminate propaganda relating to repression in Argentina and to obtain the support of "social democratic groups" in that area.

60. The Montoneros new organizational structure also called for armed operations to be carried out by "combat groups," consisting of some twenty people divided into units of four directed by a unified command. In addition, the Montoneros began to institute an operational system of roving patrols for the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts on the basis of targets of opportunity. The main feature of the members of a given patrol would be that they all knew the area in which they were operating extremely well. The patrol system differed from past operating techniques, in which the Montoneros carefully planned an operation well in advance and then selected individuals who would comprise a "commando unit" to implement the operation, basing the selection on various factors which did not necessarily include knowledge of the operating locale.

61. By late 1976 and early 1977, as a result of countersubversive actions, the Montoneros had lost numerous members and supporters and had been dealt severe blows to their logistical and organizational structure.

62. Within the labor area, the Montoneros suffered a setback as a result of actions by the security forces which began as early as January 1976. At that time, the security forces, having information that the subversives had infiltrated labor commissions at the factory floor level, picked up several Montonero labor penetrations. The Montoneros then pulled out many of their labor penetrations still remaining and helped them go into hiding. The result was a decline in the influence which the Montoneros had hitherto been able to acquire within the labor sector. To further hinder the developments of subversive infiltration within labor, after the military took over the government in March 1976, the Army 601st Intelligence Battalion gradually became involved in an effort to infiltrate the work force of as many companies as possible to acquire information firsthand on the labor situation and to identify subversives among workers. As of January 1977, the Army 601st had infiltrated about one hundred companies.

63. The Montoneros, however, still attempted to extend their influence within the labor area to try to utilize the workers as a base of support. By early 1977 the Montoneros were anticipating, because of the deteriorating economic situation, a massive confrontation between government forces and labor before the end of July 1977, a situation which the Montoneros hoped to exploit. In preparation for this possibility, the Montoneros planned to begin as of 1 January 1977 an intense effort to infiltrate as many factories as possible, engage in a widespread recruitment effort, create small combat units among factory workers and bring about Montonero control of internal labor commissions. The goal of the Montoneros was to have the support of at least thirty percent of workers in each factory. The Montoneros intended to give priority attention in their infiltration/recruitment

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

SECRET

Page 21 of 24

effort to the textile and metallurgical unions. The Montoneros also hoped to reorganize the CGT/R to make it more effective.

3.3(b)(1)

64. [redacted] despite their ambitious goals within labor, the Montoneros are faced with trying to gain the support of workers who in general continue to be responsive to traditional peronist labor leaders, and these leaders, in turn, are not disposed towards sharing their power positions with the Montoneros. While the Montoneros, through the CGT/R or some other vehicle, might eventually be able to utilize labor discontent as a power base, this would probably be a gradual occurrence over a long period and not a situation which could evolve immediately.

65. With respect to the Montoneros' logistical apparatus, various actions carried out by the countersubversive forces against the Montoneros in November 1976 represented, according to the Army [redacted], the greatest blow ever dealt to the logistical infrastructure of a subversive organization in Argentina. As a result of raids against Montonero weapons factories and supply centers, the authorities confiscated almost all of the G-70 "Energa" grenades made by the Montoneros and almost all of the 16-33-MP grenade launchers. In addition, about one-fourth of the hand grenades under production were seized, as were the prototypes for 60 mm mortars. These actions were carried out in Chaco, Corrientes, Santa Fe and Villa Dominico in Buenos Aires Province.

3.3(b)(1)

66. By early 1977 a Montonero document revealed that the Montoneros were no longer in a position to provide small arms to their militias who must acquire their own. However, fabrication of grenades was continuing with priority being given to the manufacture of SFM-5 grenades and launchers. The Montoneros hoped to have the SFM-5 grenades ready for use by April 1977. The Montoneros also expected to have 1,000-2,000 G-40 grenades by the end of April 1977.

67. With respect to the Montoneros' finances, the Montonero national military secretary listed in a document the financial expenditures in the Federal Capital for August, September and October 1976 as being, respectively, the peso equivalent of US\$127,500.00, US\$233,250 and US\$70,450. Roughly 42 percent of these totals was for the purchase of vehicles, safehouses and other property, 38 percent for logistical and miscellaneous items and 20 percent was invested. The Army [redacted] assessed that while the Montoneros had suffered losses in membership and in their logistical apparatus, at least as of August, September and October 1976 there did not seem to be a problem of funds.

3.3(b)(1)

68. This situation changed, however, in February 1977 when Argentine naval officers captured in Buenos Aires Ricardo Rene Haidar, the Montonero National Secretary for Finances. Haidar provided detailed information on the Montoneros' financial structure, including the location of the Montoneros' principal financial reserves in bank accounts in Spain and Switzerland, to which Haidar had direct access

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)



~~SECRET~~

3.3(b)(1)

using his alias "Pablo Ventura." Based on Haidar's information and assistance, the [redacted] forces were able to withdraw 14 million U.S. dollars from a bank account in Madrid, Spain and 50 million U.S. dollars, plus stock certificates, from a bank in Geneva, Switzerland. Haidar told the authorities that most of the Montonero operations had been financed primarily by interest earned on these two European accounts. Within Argentina, Haidar led the authorities to 17 million dollars hidden in a safesite in Cordoba and to four million dollars hidden in Mendoza. As a result of these operations involving Haidar, as of February 1977 the financial reserves of the Montoneros had been virtually eliminated.

69. Within the student sector, soon after the coup d'etat the countersubversive campaign moved against both secondary and university levels. In early May 1976, President Videla remarked [redacted] that the government had made significant progress in identifying subversive indoctrination activities at the secondary school level. Videla noted that the previous government had done a good job of keeping down such activity in the universities but had not focused on this problem at the secondary school level. He said that what the present military government was discovering was the extent of infiltration by subversives in secondary schools, which in some cases involved professors and directors of schools.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

70. With respect to membership losses, in September 1976 [redacted]

[redacted] the number of Montonero militants at that time may have been about 7,000. [redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

as of February 1977 the number of militants may not have been more than 1,000, and [redacted] that the Montonero leadership had been reduced by perhaps as much as eighty percent.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] the figure of militants as of January 1977 at about 2,000. Both the leadership and rank and file had dispersed, and as of March 1977 Mario Firmenich was said to be in France.

71. Despite setbacks, per a Montonero document entitled "National Plan from January through April 1977" signed by Rodolfo Galimberti, National Military Secretary, the Montoneros intended to continue with terrorist operations in 1977, the principal terrorist targets in order of priority being as follows:

(1) Executives of monopolistic companies and members of the oligarchy who have taken actions detrimental to the workers. The primary objective of the terrorist campaign against these individuals is to force them out of fear to leave Argentina. If they wish to remain in the country and stay alive they must agree to provide the wages and benefits to workers stipulated by the CGT/R. For the most part, the targets are to be executives who do not have bodyguards or who are otherwise easy to get at.

(2) Members of the Armed Forces and other security services. In general, emphasis is to be placed on actions against the Armed Forces rather than the police. Killing of individual police officers

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

Page 23 of 24

is to be primarily for the purpose of acquiring a weapon. The Montoneros also consider it important to continue with their propaganda/psychological action campaign aimed at intensifying disunity within the military by working to exacerbate the differences within the Armed Forces over the policies the government should pursue. Propaganda in this regard is to continue to stress that the military hierarchy favors the imperialists and the oligarchy at the expense of the workers and the national interests. The Montoneros also hope to develop a greater social consciousness among the lower ranks of the military and incite them to challenge the decisions taken by their superiors.

(3) Argentine government officials, both military and civilian. Selected high-level officials will be threatened with death unless they resign. Lesser officials will be urged to promote policies which benefit the lower and middle classes.

72. While the Montoneros continued to collect and maintain information on the U.S. Mission in Argentina, the fact that U.S. officials were not listed by the Montoneros as priority targets may relate to a meeting held in Rosario in early September 1976 attended by Mario Firmenich, Molinas and "Pablo Ventura," the alias, as later revealed, of Ricardo Rene Haidar. During this meeting the leaders said they considered that the human rights issue, particularly within the U.S., was working to the advantage of the Montoneros. Consequently, in the interest of maintaining this advantage the Montonero leaders decided that for the present they would not direct terrorist actions against foreign diplomatic missions or their personnel in Argentina, as such actions would tend to weaken the Montoneros' position in the human rights context. The Montonero leaders noted that the human rights issue was generating sympathy and support for the Montoneros and other leftist groups in Argentina, and the attacks being made against the Argentine government were ultimately to the benefit of the Argentine leftist radical sector.

73. In the face of increased countersubversive actions, by early 1977 the Montoneros had brought about further organizational changes. The position of Montonero secretary of organization had been abolished, and the Montonero structure was becoming increasingly decentralized with action concentrated at the zone level. The policy of the Montoneros was no longer to exist as an elite and tight entity, in effect separate from society, but to become diffused and its members absorbed among the masses where they could exert influence at the grass-roots level, particularly among the workers. In this way, the Montoneros hoped to take advantage of the growing conflict between labor and the government to try and become the vanguard of the opposition force. The Montoneros intended to spread their people throughout the country, both to promote the resistance of the government nationwide, as well as to avoid a concentration of Montoneros at any one place, a situation which would make them particularly vulnerable to the security forces. Specific political and military actions within a zone were to be decided by the zone leader without

~~SECRET~~

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3.5(c)

Page 24 of 24

~~SECRET~~

the need for higher approval. Such actions, however, were to include targets and be implemented in accord with the general guidelines set forth in the Montonero "Military Instruction Manual." This manual was to have been completed by January 1977 and beginning February 1977 four-day courses were to be given by platoon leaders to militants based on the contents of the manual. Every month a two-day meeting was to be held of various zone chiefs with appropriate national representatives to evaluate problems and successes of the previous month, make plans for the upcoming month and discuss political matters. Operations against any target were to entail a low risk for the Montoneros involved and were to be implemented with as few militants as possible. Those Montoneros carrying out an action were to be familiar with the operating locale and plans were to be made for an easy and rapid getaway, possibly by using bicycles or motorcycles in congested areas rather than cars. The Montoneros acknowledged that their communications procedures were extremely vulnerable as the security forces were aware of most of them, and consequently from January through April 1977 a special effort was to be made to improve communications.

3.3(b)(1)

74. Despite the plans and efforts of the Montoneros to maintain their viability and fulfill their objectives, as of early 1977 President Videla was making public statements stressing the determination of the government to continue its fight against subversion until it was destroyed. Some [redacted] officials [redacted] calculated that the subversives would be defeated by the end of 1977, while others estimated that the struggle would be prolonged until the end of 1978. The Montoneros, however, are optimistic, believing that despite this period of confrontation time is on their side, and that ultimately the leftist forces will prevail and a socialist state in Argentina, dominated by the Montoneros, will be established.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)