

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: RID / ANP - GE - 66

EXTENSION

NO.

XARZ - 17680

DATE

13 June 1945

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. RID / EDI - CB-34			AA
2.			
3. RID / FI GC-52			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15. (6)			

HUEGEL, KLAUS (DP)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

MICROFICHE

WCS
WASH-X-2
PTS-113
DOC-324
Box-1

AN/WR/BI	
PS	DESP
ABSTRACT X	INDEX

13 JUN 45

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~~SECRET~~ 23 March 62

XARZ-17680

L3-3626

13 June 1945

MICROFILMED

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Alfred McCormack

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Sturmbannfuhrer (Dr) Klaus Huegel.

DEF
C.I.F. - Germany
DOCUMENTARY MICROFILM SERVICE

~~SUBJECT~~

We are advised by our representative in Italy that in a preliminary interrogation of Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. Klaus Huegel, AMT VI, Italy, he alleged the following successes by the German Intelligence Service against Allied security: 1515

1. Transatlantic cable tapped in 1943. At the end of July 1944 a three-page Roosevelt-Churchill conversation was recorded. Presume the operation was initiated by Ohnesorge, the Reichpostminister.
2. From April 1943 until March 1944, while in AMT VI, Huegel read a bulletin sent daily to Schellenberg by the German High Command Cryptographic Service. Huegel remembers three or four signals daily from United States Minister, Harrison in Berne to Washington. Huegel states that Harrison's information on Nazi personalities was highly regarded by AMT VI and was usually found to be accurate on investigation.
3. The traffic between the British minister in Berne and London was read regularly, but his information on Nazi personalities was not as accurate as Harrison's.
4. The traffic of the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Knatchbull-Hughessen to London, Madrid, Lisbon and other places was a regular feature of the Special Bulletin.
5. The traffic of the De Gaulle Government in Algiers to Washington was read.

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WASH X-2
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XARZ-17680

13 June 45

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XARZ-17680

13 June 1945

6. Each week the Special Bulletin referred to included messages sent to Ankara by the Turkish Envoy in Moscow, and the Daily Bulletin included traffic between Vatican City and the Papal representative in Lisbon.
7. Beginning in November 1943 an SD penetration agent had access to private papers of Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hughessen, British Ambassador to Turkey and microfilms of many important documents were furnished Berlin. (X-2 has detailed facts on this penetration, having first discovered the penetration and through recent interrogation of a captured German official discovered the complete details.)

CIT: Italy

Our representative further reports that his conversation with an Italian crypt-expert (Donnini) indicates that the Germans passed Navy intercepts to the Japanese Intelligence Service to assist the Japanese in their development work.

~~BRIEFLY NOTED AS INDICATING
GERMAN NAVY INTERCEPTS WERE
PASSED TO JAP. I. S.~~

Thomas W. Dunn
Lieutenant (jg) USNR
Chief, Liaison Section
X-2 Branch

TWD/mfm

Source: Mr. Murphy 6-13-45

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DRAFT

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Colonel Alfred J. ...
MEMORANDUM FOR G-2, ONI, State

13 June 1945

MICROFILMED

SEP 7 1962

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

FROM: ~~James R. Murphy~~

We are advised by our representative in Italy that in a preliminary interrogation of Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. Klaus Huegel, AMT VI, Italy, he alleged the following successes by the German Intelligence Service against Allied security:

1) Transatlantic cable tapped in 1943. At the end of July 1944 a three page Roosevelt-Churchill conversation was recorded. (in the ONI and G-2 memo add this) Presume the operation was initiated by Ohnesorge, the Reichsoostminister.

2) From April 1943 until March 1944, while in AMT VI, Huegel read a bulletin sent daily to Schellenberg by the German High Command Cryptographic Service. Huegel remembers three or four signals daily from United States Minister, Harrison in Berne to Washington. Huegel states that Harrison's information on Nazi personalities was highly regarded by AMT VI and was usually found to be accurate on investigation.

3) The traffic between the British minister in Berne and London was read regularly but his information on Nazi personalities was not as accurate as Harrison's.

4) The traffic of the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Knatchbull-Hughessen to London, Madrid, Lisbon and other places was a regular feature of the Special Bulletin.

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Our representative further reports that his conversations with an Italian crypt-expert (Donnini) indicates that the Germans passed Navy intercepts to the Japanese Intelligence Service to assist the Japanese in their development work.

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7/9 material punched to properly and not as yet addressed.

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