

~~SECRET~~**(U) In the Military Style: Dwight Eisenhower**

(S) Having served on active duty in the US Army from 1915 to 1948, Dwight Eisenhower as president not surprisingly organized his national security apparatus along the lines of a military staff, with large meetings and formal briefings. He made it clear early on that he did not read the *Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB)* and did not want to receive written materials or have regular meetings with CIA officers. Instead, Eisenhower preferred to get his intelligence information mostly from DCI Allen Dulles's briefing that led off what Eisenhower later called "the most important weekly meeting of the government"—the NSC session held on Thursdays at 0900. "I would much rather have it [an intelligence briefing] at the NSC level so all my staff and all of us can hear the same thing each time rather than to have a personal briefing," an Agency officer quoted him as saying. OCI and the Office of National Estimates (ONE) put together Dulles's material; sometimes the Deputy Director for Intelligence or a subject matter expert also contributed.<sup>1</sup>

(S) The *CIB* did not figure prominently in the weekly briefing or in Eisenhower's overall use of intelligence.<sup>2</sup> Every day, OCI's chief editors checked key items in the *CIB* for the president's chief military aide to bring to his attention; such notifications occurred usually twice a week. If requests for follow-up resulted from those interactions or the NSC meetings, OCI responded with memoranda sent to the NSC, not with articles in the *CIB*. Early in 1953, OCI director Huntington Sheldon and DDI Loftus Becker discussed producing a very brief, all-source publication just for the president, but the idea never materialized until the Kennedy Administration. Sheldon believed Eisenhower was hesitant to have a product tailored for his eyes only and may have felt that the authors would be less objective than if writing for a publication with wider circulation.<sup>3</sup>

(S) Eisenhower's lack of engagement with the daily Agency product also reflected his more strategic appreciation of intelligence and his suspicion of departmental intelligence. According to Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, the White House chief of staff, at the NSC meetings the president wanted the DCI to concentrate on giving the intelligence context for larger or longer-term foreign policy and military issues. In addition, throughout his presidency, Eisenhower made a practice of not reading daily intelligence reports from a single agency. Instead, with the help of the president's son, Lt. Col. John Eisenhower, Goodpaster reviewed the separate reports from CIA, State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs and then melded that material into a morning briefing. Over time, OCI's main function became seeing that the members of the president's national security coterie were kept informed and in a position to advise him as required.

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<sup>1</sup> (U) Helgerson, 20-21; [redacted]; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 712; Fred Albrecht interview with Meredith P. Davidson, 24 September 1973 [redacted] [not classified]. [redacted]

3.5(c)

<sup>2</sup> (U) Sources for this paragraph and the next are: Helgerson, 21-23; Albrecht, "Keeping the President Informed," 48, 54, 56-57 [S]; Albrecht, "History of the CIB," 24.

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(U) Perhaps because of this lack of presidential attention to the *CIB*, it became more of a vehicle for informing a broader audience of national security decision makers, and its dissemination grew steadily. By mid-1954, 33 copies went outside the Agency, and that number rose to 48 by 1957 (compared to 14 during the last year of Truman's tenure). The Defense Department took the largest share of the increase. Also in the mid-1950s, the *CIB* began getting cabled to a number of domestic and overseas locations, such as CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii, the Continental Air Defense Command in Colorado, <sup>4</sup>

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(S) By its sixth year of publication in 1957, observers inside and outside the Agency recognized flaws in the current intelligence process that were degrading the importance of the *CIB*. Noting its broad distribution, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Affairs (PBCFIA) and the CIA Inspector General (IG) recommended, respectively, that a community-wide coordinated publication be produced and that an interagency current intelligence unit be created to replace OCI. OCI focused on the shortcomings of the *CIB* itself, some of which sounded like those the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report had identified almost ten years earlier:

- Articles were based only on material received each day, opening up the possibility that important situations might be ignored because they lacked a current "peg."
- The *CIB* did not provide enough day-to-day continuity on important situations.
- Not enough top officials read the *CIB* because they got the same information through departmental channels; topics not important to them were often covered; and the articles were too detailed or complex, or did not provide warning and prediction.<sup>5</sup>

(U) Notwithstanding the recommendations of the PBCFIA and the IG, CIA kept its authority over current intelligence,<sup>6</sup> and the burden of changing the daily publication and its production process fell on OCI. In response to those criticisms, OCI instituted an interagency prepublishing procedure and premiered the *Central Intelligence Bulletin (CEIB)* on 14 January 1958. Sheldon ambitiously declared that the *CEIB* would be a publication that "a responsible policymaker will be able to ignore only at his own peril." The name change, displayed on a bold new cover, was intended to underscore that the *CEIB* was the locus of all important current intelligence and conveyed a coordinated interagency viewpoint. The *CEIB* routinely was longer than its predecessor—from under 10 to nearly 20 pages long—and covered a dozen topics in six to eight lines with longer backup articles on over half of them. For the first time, source

<sup>4</sup> (U) Albrecht, "History of the CIB," 29-31.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 35-41.

<sup>6</sup> (U) NSCID-3 stated that "Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and National Security Council; in addition it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce. The departments and agencies will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency current intelligence publications as practicable."

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document numbers were provided. Taking into account Eisenhower's fondness for graphics, the *CEIB* soon included a map of the two hemispheres with red arrows locating the areas covered in each issue. Given the increased participation of other agencies, the distribution jumped to 90, with the Defense and State Departments accounting for most of the increase.<sup>7</sup>

(S) Meanwhile, the NSC-centric communication process between the White House and CIA continued for the balance of Eisenhower's term. The president received formal intelligence briefings from Dulles at the weekly NSC meetings and informal updates from staffers as the situation required. No comments about the *CEIB* from Eisenhower or White House principals have been recorded. Yet even though its principal customer was not reading it every day, the *CEIB*'s stature did not suffer. By the time the next administration was in office, its "special status as a report designed particularly for the White House and NSC had been generally recognized. There was no other daily intelligence product possessing the character of national intelligence, carrying COMINT as well as collateral, and having the blessing of the chief components of the Intelligence Community."<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> (U) Albrecht, "History of the CIB," 42-47.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 57.

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