

***Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 5-9 July 2004  
Executive Summary***

***Future Planning Calendar***

(U//~~ATUO~~) **14 July 2004:** Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **TBD:** Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

***Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week***

(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~ATUO~~) **Writers Researching Past Terrorism Incidents**

(U//~~ATUO~~) Two well-known published authors on terrorism, John Prados (*Presidents' Secret Wars*) and David Wills (*The Final War on Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism Policy During the Reagan Administration*), submitted overlapping FOIA and EO requests for information on Libyan terrorist incidents, and US responses to them during 1985-86.

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

(U//~~ATUO~~) **Citing FRUS--Request for Documents on Indonesia**

(U//~~ATUO~~) The National Security Archive is requesting all documents generated by the Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files: Job 78-00061R, between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1966 relating in whole or part to Indonesia.

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

(U//~~ATUO~~) **Researching the Chin Espionage Case**

(U//~~ATUO~~) A retired FBI employee who states that he worked with CIA personnel during the investigation of CIA employee Larry Wu Tai Chin states that he intends to write "the definitive account of the Chin espionage investigation," and is asking for detailed records.

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)

*Editor: Larry Wu-Tai Chin joined the CIA in 1952. He retired from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in 1981, at age 63. At his trial in 1986, he admitted to passing information to the People's Republic of China (PRC) over a period of more than 11 years. He claimed that his intent was to promote PRC-US reconciliation. Convicted on 17 counts of espionage-related and income tax violations, Chin*

*committed suicide while awaiting sentencing.*

~~(U//ATUO)~~ CIA Declassification Center

~~(U//ATUO)~~ From The Archives:

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **McLaughlin Shoots Down DNI Concept**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ On 1 July 2004, *The Washington Post* reported on (then) Deputy CIA Director John E. McLaughlin's address to the Business Executives for National Security. As reported, the DDCI noted that he has lived through several national debates about the future of intelligence, and "there appears to be an appetite for it again, in both parties and among key segments of the public." By the *Post* account, Mr. McLaughlin "quickly shot down a popular reform idea of an 'intelligence czar who would stand apart from CIA and oversee all aspects of American intelligence.' Noting that the idea was 'first floated in 1955,' he said central control could be asserted 'without the additional layers of command or bureaucracy such a change would inevitably bring.'"

~~(U//ATUO)~~ CIA's 25-Year Program has reviewed and declassified much material pertaining to the underlying issues of this larger debate over the organization of US intelligence. For example, a 10 March 1978 memo—from the chief of the Budget Management Group in the Comptroller's Office to the Legislative Counsel—notes: In the 1947 intelligence charter legislation ... "the DCI was to fulfill the duties and responsibilities now ascribed to the DNI (Director of National Intelligence concept), and the CIA was to support him in so doing. The failure of the original Act was that the DCI was not given the clout necessary to permit him to do the job assigned to him. 'Clout' is now being defined as DNI [referring to the concept]. The issue seems to be whether the DCI and CIA are going to be given the clout to do the job originally intended, or failure of that concept is going to be acknowledged and a new hierarchical element superimposed over the old, with allocation of the clout going to the new superstructure. Creating a DNI and assigning him dual responsibility of the DCI will not accomplish the purpose; it merely raises the level of ambiguity and compounds it. We continue to believe that the concept of a DNI, creating as it does merely another bureaucratic layer, should be resisted and we should push for strengthening the existing structure, with title changes if they improve the aesthetics."

- *Comment: The immediate impetus behind this 1978 discussion of an intelligence reorganization was a pending Senate bill on that topic*

(b)(3)

*Editor: As reported by The Washington Post: "His [DDCI McLaughlin's] solution would be to recognize that CIA is already 'central,' describing it as the only U.S. intelligence agency that 'integrates all intelligence sources' and is not part of a larger department, such as Defense or State or Justice, and therefore 'does not create or advocate policy.' To provide the CIA director the power he needs over all intelligence, McLaughlin would invest the job with overall decision authority to allocate intelligence spending, almost 90 percent of which now is in the Pentagon and 10 percent with CIA. With that authority, the director 'would also have to accept accountability for meeting military intelligence requirements.'"*

~~(U//ATUO)~~ **NSC's Preference for Raw Intelligence**

~~(U//ATUO)~~ Ford Library: A 10 April 1975 National Security Council (NSC) memorandum from Latin America Area Director Stephen Low leads off with..."Following are answers to the three questions you posed in connection with the Secretary's appearance before the Rockefeller Commission."


In answer to... 1. "The extent we [NSC] depend on CIA for intelligence collection and analysis" – Low responds: "CIA raw traffic provides a substantial portion of the intelligence used by this office. I would estimate that in terms of raw traffic, the preponderant intelligence material which is of significant value to us is of CIA source. Analyses are of less importance. Studies and judgments which are of greatest value are primarily from other sources, i.e., embassy or State. NIEs, however, can be useful."

In answer to... 2. "The benefits from listed CIA activities"— Low responds: "It is very difficult to make a judgment on the value of the CIA activities listed, since we usually receive the intelligence without an explanation of how it was acquired."

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In answer to... 3. "Most important types of intelligence"- Low responds: "We have come to rely almost totally on raw intelligence. Our need for evaluation is often so immediate that we find it quicker to produce it ourselves than ask CIA for it. Estimates, however, are of some value....One qualification of the above should be noted. We are speaking here of intelligence in our own area of responsibility. For information outside of our area, we depend almost entirely on analyses rather than raw traffic..."

- *Comment: A central theme in Low's responses is the importance of getting DI analysis to the policymaker in time for it to be useful. That he found US Embassy and State Department studies and judgments of greater utility than CIA analytic product would have been of concern -had the CIA been aware. Through the White House Situation Room , the NSC received substantial "raw" reporting.*



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