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Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 2-6 August 2004 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **11 August 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **TBD: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP):** Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **31 December 2006:** The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ FOIA Requests

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **Information Sought on America's First Jet-Propelled Spyplane**

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ The requester claims to be "writing the first book on the North American B-24 Tornado, America's first jet bomber (1948)." He adds...because it was also the world's first jet/spyplane, I need to know if there is any CIA connection and documentation about its operations in Yokota, Japan, from 1950-1958.

- *The FOIA case manager notified the requester that his request was received, and that an analyst would review it and be in touch should any problems arise, or if additional information is required.*

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~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **Seeking a Regional Map of an Afghan Site**

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ On behalf of 501(c)3 [charitable tax-exempt] organization 'Green Village Schools,' the requester is seeking satellite and/or aerial imagery of Shin Kallay, Helmand, Afghanistan. He states that his organization has built, and is maintaining, two very successful schools there and, consequently, desires a map of the region. "In the unlikely case that such imagery does not exist, please instruct me as to how I could obtain it."

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **Interest in Media Influence by the CIA**

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ The requester seeks information relating to the CIA's "Project Mockingbird," and/or files relating to the subject of media influence by the CIA between 1950 and 1980.

- *The FOIA case manager searched the MORI database of previously released records, located two responsive documents, and sent them to the requester.*

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~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ CIA Declassification Center

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ **CDC's Latest Visits to the Presidential Libraries**

~~(U//**ATUO**)~~ Following a 26-27 July visit to the Ford Presidential Library, CDC's External Referral and Liaison Team visited the Kennedy and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries during 2-5 August to install CDC's upgraded classified Laserfiche system. The new system is similar to the CIA Records Search Tool-CREST system deployed at National Archives at College Park, Maryland—but it is only to be used by cleared library archivists. In toto, CDC has

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provided 115,593 pages of reviewed presidential material from the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) program to the Kennedy Library. Also, it has delivered 47,749 pages to the Eisenhower Library. In addition, the CDC team provided tutorials on the new system to the library archivists, along with 'canned' queries to assist them in searching the system. This trip completes the installation of the new Laserfiche system, and the delivery of additional reviewed presidential material, to the initial four libraries in the RAC program: Johnson, Ford, Kennedy and Eisenhower.

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(b)(3)~~(U//ATUO)~~ From the Archives:~~(U//ATUO)~~ Carver's Advice to FSOs

~~(U//ATUO)~~ In early March 1970, DCI Helms was due to address State Department officers at the Foreign Service Association. George Carver, then Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, sent a memo to the DCI, in which he outlined four themes that he felt might be profitably covered in the DCI's remarks:

"The first is the obvious one of demonstrating that the Agency—along with the Foreign Service Officer corps—works for the US Government and that none of our officers have horns, a tail or cloven hoofs."

The second theme was to make the officers aware that "our activities and operations in any given country are always known to the Ambassador and either approved by him, or commented on to Washington by him, before the fact."

"The third point is a little trickier." Mr Carver wrote that while he had "a lot of admiration for many FSOs...almost all of them...seem inherently inclined to think of themselves as advocates of the government to which they are accredited, rather than USG's dispassionate, objective representatives to it or interpreters of its actions."

"Finally there is a related point of considerable importance. Many of our Foreign Service colleagues—particularly at the DCM [deputy chief of mission] and ambassadorial level—seem incorrigibly prone to confuse the concept properly labeled 'influence' with another concept properly labelled 'cordiality' or 'good fellowship,' but for which 'influence' is a misnomer. If an Ambassador has, or thinks he has, warm personal rapport with the local Numero Uno...that is fine but such rapport—even if it actually exists outside the mind of the reporting officer—is not necessarily influence."

Mr. Carver then explained that he felt true influence was "the ability to get someone to do (not just promise) something he had not thought of doing or is himself disinclined to do." He added: "From an epistemological point of view, such statements as 'I cannot ask the President of Thailand to do such-and-such because levying such a request would jeopardize/damage/diminish/reduce our influence over him' are logically meaningless nonsense. (What such a statement often really means is 'I don't want to put this pitch to the President because he might be offended and not greet me/my wife so warmly at the next diplomatic reception.) This is a rather delicate notion, but if you could weave it into your remarks it would be useful to do so."

- *Mr. Carver's remarks are particularly interesting, given his extensive contacts with high-level State Department personnel, which allowed him to be viewed as a knowledgeable observer. Under similar circumstances, what might high-level State Department personnel have said?*

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~~(U//ATUO)~~ Defining the DCI's Role and Title

~~(U//ATUO)~~ From the Kennedy National Library comes a 19 July 1975 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to the President (Nixon), commenting on "Recommendations Regarding Intelligence in the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy." Schlesinger states that the "recommendations for the most part are reasonable and sound," but cautions that "their success depends on a number of factors not addressed in the Commission report....Comments on specific recommendations are as follows:"

"Recommendation #46: The DCI should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.

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Of more importance than the physical location of the DCI's office is the question of whether or not the DCI should retain his role as head of the CIA. It is my view that as long as the DCI is responsible for day-to-day operations of the clandestine services, he will be unable to perform his larger role as the President's premier intelligence advisor and as leader and coordinator of the entire intelligence community....

Recommendation #47: The CIA should be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA), and its Director the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI).

Concur."

- *Comment: This commission is generally referred to as the Murphy Commission, as it was chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy. Although at the time Schlesinger was Secretary of Defense, he served as DCI from February 1973 until his resignation on 2 July 1973 to assume the duties of SecDef. The DCI Team recently released a memorandum from then-DCI Colby expressing "little value in establishing an additional [DCI] office nearer, as access is easy anytime the President desires it" and "no particular advantage to be gained by retitling the CIA..." The numbered recommendations above were apparently 'shelved' —probably by the Ford Administration, given that President Nixon resigned less than three weeks later. We are unclear as to why a 1975 Nixon Collection document is included in the Kennedy Library collection.*

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