

Information Review & Release (IRR) News for 11-15 October 2004 Executive Summary

Future Planning Calendar

(U//~~ATUO~~) 13 October 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Liaisons' meeting at NARA in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) 26 October 2004: Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP): Next Principals' meeting at EEOB in Washington, DC.

(U//~~ATUO~~) 15, 16 & 17 December 2004: Historical Review Panel: Next meeting at International Point.

(U//~~ATUO~~) 31 December 2006: The Automatic Declassification Date per Executive Order 12958, as amended.

Overview of IRR Activities--Last Week

(U//~~ATUO~~) PRB Reviews Reach Record High

(U//~~ATUO~~) The Publications Review Board (PRB) reviewed over 30,000 pages in more than 400 manuscripts during FY 2004. Both numbers are more than 20% greater than last year's figures and are record highs for the PRB. The PRB currently reviews the nonofficial works of former employees and soon will begin reviewing current employees' work. This added responsibility suggests that PRB's numbers could increase next year. The PRB ensures that former—and, soon, current—employee manuscripts contain no classified information, or other material that might adversely affect the Agency's mission—or the author's job.

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(U//~~ATUO~~) FOIA Requests

(U//~~ATUO~~) Peruvian Businessman Seeks to Clear Family Name

(U//~~ATUO~~) An attorney representing a Peruvian resident born in Huanuco, Peru, is requesting "all documents regarding his client and his company, COPEINCA, S.A., a Peruvian [fishing] corporation, that may be contained in the Central Intelligence Agency." The attorney states that his client is a "well-respected Peruvian businessman who has been falsely accused, by a local Peruvian newspaper of drug trafficking and harboring known drug traffickers in his home, [based on] an alleged Drug Enforcement Administration confidential report."

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(b)(5)

(U//~~ATUO~~) Behind CIA's "A Study of Assassination"

(U//~~ATUO~~) A *New York Times* reporter is requesting any documents that name, or speculate about, the author of "A Study of Assassination"; or that discuss its origins and intended audience; or, otherwise, shed light on the history of this document. This May 1997 release relates to activities in Guatemala.

- The FOIA case manager informed the requester that: (1) More than 5,000 documents pertaining to Guatemala, including Operation PBSuccess, are now declassified and available to the public through The National Archives, and on the Internet; and (2) The FOIA does not require federal agencies to perform research, create records, answer questions, or conduct unreasonable searches through a body of material to see if any of it is related to a particular request.

(b)(3)

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Editor: "A Study of Assassination" was part of the training file for "Operation PBSUCCESS"—which supported the 1954 coup d'etat in Guatemala.

~~(U//AIUO)~~ **Interest in CIA Documents on the "Angel of Death"**

~~(U//AIUO)~~ The Senior Editor of *Freedom* (a publication of the Church of Scientology) is requesting all documents between 1945 and February 1979 relating to Dr. Josef Mengele. The requester enclosed an article located on the Internet (www. word iQ.com) about the subject's life.



Editor: After acquiring the nickname "Angel of Death" at Auschwitz, Mengele fled westward in April 1945. The Allies captured and held him as a POW at Nuremberg, but, unaware of his identity, subsequently released him. In 1949, he fled to Argentina, where he prospered during the 1950s — first, by operating a toy workshop and, then, a small pharmaceutical enterprise. Falling into poorer circumstances, he moved to Paraguay in 1959. The Mossad tracked him for a time. From 1960, until his death in 1979, he lived in Brazil. He drowned after suffering a stroke while swimming.

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~~(U//AIUO)~~ **CIA Declassification Center**

~~(U//AIUO)~~ **From the Archives:**

~~(U//AIUO)~~ **Defining the DCI's Role—a 1970s Perspective**

~~(U//AIUO)~~ From the Carter Library collection comes the following excerpt from a blind NSC memo, circa 1977: "Under the 1947 National Security Act, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has responsibility for 'coordinating the intelligence of the several Government departments and agencies and for directing the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.' However, the Departments of State and Defense have steadfastly opposed centralized management of the intelligence community under the DCI. . . . The DCI has independent management and budgetary authority over only his own agency, the CIA. The Secretary of Defense allocates and manages the remaining intelligence community resources."

~~(U//AIUO)~~ "I. Managing Intelligence Collection and Production. The DCI issues a series of general guidance documents for the collection and production of national intelligence. He tries through a number of different inter-agency committees to reconcile different departmental intelligence requirements. The collection managers (NSA, CIA, DIA, and the National Reconnaissance Office) and the intelligence producers (DIA, CIA, and the State Department) retain substantial latitude in choosing which targets and subjects to cover. The DCI has yet to establish a mechanism to monitor how well these agencies fulfill his general guidance."

~~(U//AIUO)~~ "II. Allocating Intelligence Resources. In 1971, President Nixon directed the DCI to plan and review all intelligence activities, including tactical military intelligence, and to rationalize intelligence priorities within budgetary constraints. The main thrust of this Directive was that major dollar savings could be achieved by making the DCI responsible for preparing for the President a consolidated intelligence program budget. The plan failed, in large part because Directors Helms and Colby were reluctant to intrude in the internal Defense programming and budgeting system. In February 1976, President Ford made another effort to expand the role of the DCI in the allocation of intelligence resources. In his Executive Order [EO 11905] he established a Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) chaired by the DCI with responsibility to 'control budget preparation and resource allocation for a National Foreign Intelligence Program, to establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence, and to provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence.' (Footnote: Executive Order 11905. The CFI reports directly to the NSC and includes as members the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.)"

~~(U//AIUO)~~ ". . . . Instead of trying to establish policy priorities across the various collection and production

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programs, the CFI focused primarily on the largest component of the intelligence budget, the National Reconnaissance Program operations. Efforts by the CFI to develop definitions of tactical military intelligence and national intelligence in terms relevant to the budget process proved fruitless. In summary, the DCI's role in the overall intelligence budget process is that of an adviser to the Secretary of Defense except for those resources under his control as Director of CIA...."

- *Comment: This memorandum precedes a series of recommendations for redefining the DCI's role in the Intelligence Community. It demonstrates the lengthy history of the still unresolved question of how the DCI should relate to other US Government intelligence agencies.* [redacted] (b)(3)

(U//~~ATUO~~) Bundy's Advice on Intelligence Reform

(U//~~ATUO~~) William Bundy—a former member of the Board of National Estimates and, in 1976, an editor for *Foreign Affairs*—proffered his views on reorganizing the intelligence community in a March 1976 letter to DCI George Bush. Bundy said he thought the DCI was "off on the right foot" but that he was inclined in the future to go further and to "divorce the overt activities of the agency. . . from the true clandestine service. My thinking is only partly prudential," he said, "in the sense that any kind of association with clandestine activities may for the time being be a drawback on the necessary recruitment for the overt side. But more basically, I do think that a separation would in itself contribute to better control of clandestine intelligence and of any clandestine activities that continued, and would prevent the director from being in the difficult position of being both judge and prime operator." [redacted] (b)(3)

(U//~~ATUO~~) Mr. Colby—A "Dangerous Man?"

22 June 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President, General Secretary Brezhnev, and W. E. Colby

In the receiving line after the signing of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, the President identified me as with CIA in presenting me to Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev asked the President if I was a dangerous man. The President assured him that I was not. I added to Mr. Brezhnev that the more we know of each other the safer we both can be. The President added that I also fully supported the new agreement, which I confirmed.


W. E. Colby

- *Comment: At the time of the above memo, President Nixon had already selected Mr. Colby to become DCI (in May 1973). His confirmation to that position occurred on 1 August 1973.* [redacted] (b)(3)

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