

~~SECRET~~

DD/P2-5219

Executive Registry
9-3575

*Paul
Ch*

JUN 8 1956T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Interest of the President's Consultants
in Staybehind Activities

1. As a result of the interest shown by the President's Consultants in our staybehind activities, you asked that you be furnished two memoranda prior to the next meeting with the Consultants, one explaining our activities in the staybehind field in general and the other dealing with our staybehind arrangements

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2. Attachment A summarizes our general activities in the staybehind field, and Attachment B describes our specific staybehind activities

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Richard W. Wisner
FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

2 Attachments

Copy to Sec 6/11

~~SECRET~~

SENT TO PBLFIA
24 OCT 56

~~SECRET~~

A

STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STAYBEHIND ACTIVITIES

DESCRIPTION

The purpose of staybehind planning and implementation is to insure a continuing operational capability in intelligence collection and covert operations in an area which is now accessible but which may be denied by enemy action, either of a political or military nature. A staybehind feature may be built into a clandestine operation or, in some cases, an operation is mounted for the purpose of providing a staybehind mechanism. Such a mechanism may be composed of:

- a. Agents who have been trained or who are currently engaged in training for staybehind operations;
- b. Agents who are now in place and conducting intelligence or other cold war activities, but for whom there exists a definite survival potential under denial conditions and for whom definite responsibilities are planned under such conditions;
- c. Indigenous groups developed and trained in unconventional warfare tactics for activation and expansion in the area after its denial.

Staybehind operations are designed to meet the following situations: a long-term general war; short-term local war situations; and a denial situation created by enemy political action. They may be developed unilaterally by CIA or by agreement with and participation of friendly governments. By and large, our effort has been directed through the friendly government agreement approach, which affords the added advantage of increased liaison activity with the intelligence and security services of the host country during the cold war period.

AUTHORITY

Preparation for staybehind activity is an integral part of the permanent over-all responsibility of CIA to provide for clandestine intelligence and operations coverage abroad regardless of prevailing political or military conditions and of operational contingencies existing at any given time. The

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

basic authority for such preparation is found in the National Security Act of 1947 and in subsequent implementing actions contained in NSC 5412/2 for covert operations and NSCID 5 for clandestine intelligence operations. In addition to this basic obligation, NSC 5412/2 assigns to CIA the further responsibility for developing covert assets for unconventional warfare which may provide a base for military expansion in time of war, and specifies that plans for these covert operations will be in consonance with and complementary to approved plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As wartime requirements are received from the Joint Chiefs, the covert assets developed thus far by CIA will be assigned to wartime tasks and further assets will be initiated where needed.

IMPORT

The critical importance of developing emergency assets as a form of insurance for survival to continue the CIA mission is particularly apparent from Soviet annexations of the past few years. The lack of adequate stay-behind elements in Czechoslovakia, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam underlines the need for timely preparation for emergency contingencies in the critical areas of the Free World which could become denied to us in the future. Global war is not the only contingency for which we have to make adequate preparation. In local military aggression such as occurred in Indochina or in political aggression as occurred in Czechoslovakia, clandestine capability is relatively more significant than in the case of global war.

EXTENT

CIA's total available assets at the outbreak of war will consist of all assets which we are able to develop prior to such an outbreak. A few CIA projects are developed in the cold war period which are specifically designed to generate assets for use in a general or local war situation. Most projects, however, are developed to carry out cold war objectives, with an accompanying plan for converting the project's assets to use in a general or local war. In planning for staybehind, consideration must be given to those contingencies which may deny critical areas of the Middle East, Far East, and Europe.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

During the past seven years CIA has placed its main effort in this field toward a gradual build-up of staybehind mechanisms in the most critical

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

areas. Our potential for stayability still requires substantial expansion. The need for additional assets independently managed by CIA is urgent in certain areas. [redacted]

[redacted] Many of the existing staybehind mechanisms have been inexpensive in that they are developed and partially supported by the host country, [redacted]

(b)(1)

The percentage of the CIA budget used for purposes of staybehind is very small. [redacted]

(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

B

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(1)

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)



(2)
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(3)

~~SECRET~~