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**JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
IN CHINA**

Section I Japanese Naval Intelligence

Section II Japanese Military Intelligence

Section III Civilian Intelligence Organizations

Strategic Services Unit

4 June 1946

Distribution in China:

**G-2
CIC, AFPAC**

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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**Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency**

Date: *2001*

~~SECRET~~**JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA****Introduction:**

The purpose of this investigation has been as follows: *

- a. To collect in greater detail further information concerning the highly complex Japanese Intelligence System, particularly concerning:

**Organizational Structure
Prominent Personalities
Methods of Operation**

- b. To corrolate this information into a comprehensive report on Japanese Intelligence in China for future study and reference.
- c. To understand the war time system in order to be on guard for peace time organizing along similar lines, by the same people, who may use the war time methods of operation.

Source of Intelligence:

The basis of statements in this report stem from information set out in reports of investigation during the period from September 1945 through March 1946 as compiled by investigators of SSU/WD in Canton, Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao, and Shanghai. The findings are presented as briefly as possible to give the report coherence, while in the appendix following each section of the report may be found the detailed explanations, charts, etc.

It must be remembered that at the time of the investigation, certain unavoidable difficulties inherent to the situation in China precluded much of the evidence from Japanese sources. One predominant hindrance which existed, and still exists, is the inevitable liaison which must be conducted with the Chinese authorities in order to interview Japanese military personnel, which in several instances has fruitless attempts to obtain desired interviews. This has been particularly true in Shanghai.

Also the general destruction of evidence by the Japanese following the surrender has completely eliminated the possibility of substantiating investigations with documentary proof, hence a line must be

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drawn between information furnished by Japanese officers who were asked to submit reports, and the informations furnished by agents and contacts; in most cases neither are authentic, and in some cases deliberately false statements were made by responsible Japanese in order to prevent detection of the true facts. Agent reports are generally accurate and true within the limits of error of human memory.

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Section I

**JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
IN CHINA**

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*This was prepared at a later date and therefore is attached to the last section.

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SYNOPSIS

The Japanese China Seas Fleet, under the direction of the Naval General Staff, Tokyo, with Headquarters at Shanghai, was responsible for the Japanese Navy's mission in China, which was to combat enemy assault troops, safe-guard sea communications, patrol channels of Yangtze and Whangpoo Rivers and blockade China Coast. At Shanghai, these duties discharged by Naval Base Command, Special Naval Landing Party and Naval Office assisted by numerous Service Special Units. Naval Base Command was responsible for the defense of Shanghai and its vicinity, Special Naval Landing Party entered Shanghai in 1937 and occupied the Japanese section of the city for the purpose of protecting Japanese nationals and their interests. The Landing Party aided in policing these sections of Shanghai occupied by the Navy, although primary jurisdiction rested in other organizations.

The Naval Office in Shanghai attended to liaison, collecting of information both for the China Seas Fleet and the Naval General Staff, Tokyo, in which matters it communicated directly with the General Staff. Naval Office attended to negotiations and settlements of affairs relative to Naval operations, defense, protection of communications, purchasing of military necessities and transportation. It maintained contact with other Naval and Official organizations. Navigation section, Naval Office obtained economic intelligence from smugglers, Investigation section handled research Press section eulogized the entire Japanese Navy. The Information and Liaison section conducted investigation and kept contact with all foreign nationals, maintained a listening post and controlled enemy property.

The Japanese Navy was helped in its intelligence work by numerous Kikens and Yokos, which organized to collect material and information in China. Towards the Soviets, the Japanese Navy adopted a policy of conciliation and appeasement and received many favors from them in exchange for conveniences, during the war.

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The Imperial Japanese Navy at Shanghai, China was under the control and direction of the Japanese China Seas Fleet which had its origin in and was responsible to the Japanese Ministry of Navy and the Naval General Staff at Tokyo, Japan.

The Japanese China Seas Fleet had its Headquarters at Shanghai, China and was composed of a Commander-in-Chief and numerous staff officers. The mission of the China Seas Fleet was performed by many sub-branches stationed in Shanghai as well as the rest of China.

The mission of the China Seas Fleet was :-

1. To combat enemy assault troops and safe-guard sea communications.
2. Safe-guarding channels of the Yangtze and Whangpoo Rivers.
3. Blockade and patrol of the coast of China.

The following units of the China Seas Fleet were located at Shanghai, China :

1. Shanghai Naval Base Command
Commander: Rear-Admiral TOKUJI MORI
2. The Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party
Commander: Rear-Admiral Minoru KATSUMO
3. The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai
Commander: Rear-Admiral KEIJI MINATO

The majority of the duties of the Japanese Navy at Shanghai were discharged by the Shanghai Naval Base Command, The Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party, The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai. These offices will be discussed later in this report.

4. The Japanese Naval Air Force in Central China
Commander: Captain UNOSUKE UMEZAKI

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5. The Second Meteorological Corps
Commander: Kenji MATORI
6. The Shanghai Naval Navigation Office
Commander: Captain YUKIHIKO IMAMURA
7. The Shanghai Naval Transportation Office
which had a branch office in Tsingtao
Commander: Captain Yasusato TANABE

The Shanghai Naval Transportation Office controlled all shipping firms affiliated with the Japanese Navy.

8. The First Naval Ordnance Office
which had branch offices in Hankow, Tsingtao
Nanking and Peiping
Commander: Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMPEI OMATSUZAWA

The first Naval Ordnance Office at Shanghai stocked and supplied war goods to the entire offices of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, and other organizations designated by directive.

9. The First Naval Office of Accounts and Supplies
which had branch offices in Hankow, Tsingtao
Nanking and Peiping
Commander: Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMPEI OMATSUZAWA

The First Japanese Naval Office of Accounts and Supplies was responsible for the supervision of accounts of the entire offices of the Japanese China Seas Fleet and the purchasing and selling of military goods.

10. The Shanghai Naval Clothing and Provisions Depot
which had a branch office in Tsingtao
Commander: Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMPEI OMATSUZAWA

The Shanghai Naval Clothing and Provisions Depot had the responsibility of stocking and investigation of clothing and provisions of the Japanese China Seas Fleet and other Naval Offices.

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The First Naval Ordnance Office, the First Japanese Naval Office of Accounts and Supplies, and the Shanghai Naval Clothing and Provisions Depot, in discharging their duties as a supply branch of the organization, had contact with and direction of all firms dealing with and furnishing supplies to the Naval Offices. It was to these Offices that the firms of MANWA and KODAMA KIKAN which, on occasions, were used as espionage agencies, were responsible.

11. The First Naval Construction Office
which had a branch office in Tsingtao
Commander: Captain KEIICHI FUJITA

The First Naval Construction Office was responsible for the Construction of defense posts and general construction work of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, with the exception of the Second China Seas Fleet. The First Naval Construction Office had under this control the Naval Construction Corps in North and Central China.

12. The First Naval Engineering Office
which had a branch office in Hankow
Commander: Captain JONOSUKE YUZAWA

The First Naval Engineering Office was responsible for the production and repair of warships, arms and ground communication sets for the Japanese China Seas Fleet or other Naval Offices included in directives. The First Naval Engineering Office directed and supervised the work of the Kiangnan Dockyard at Shanghai, China, and other firms employed by the Japanese Navy in this type of work.

13. The First Naval Hospital
Commander: Surgeon Rear-Admiral SHINTARO KANAZAWA
14. The Court-Marshal Japanese China Seas Fleet
The First Naval Prison
Commander: Provost Captain AIJI NIRA
15. The First Naval Mail Office
Commander: Commissioner YUJIRO HIGOHASHI

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The following units of the China Seas Fleet were not located at Shanghai, China, and had no offices there :

1. The Japanese Naval Office in Peking, Nanking, Hankow, Amoy, Canton and Hong Kong.
2. The Tsingtao Naval Base Command
Headquarters: Tsingtao
Commander: Vice-Admiral SHIGEJI KANEKO

The Tsingtao Naval Base Command had the following mission:

- a. To combat enemy assault troops
 - b. To safe-guard sea communications
 - c. To blockade and patrol the coast of China North of 33° North latitude.
3. The Yangtze River Naval Base Command
Headquarters: Hankow
Commander: Vice-Admiral TORAO SAWADA

The Yangtze River Naval Base Command was charged with the responsibility :

- a. To combat enemy assault troops
 - b. To safe-guard the channels of the Yangtze River between Hankow and Kiangyin
4. The Second China Seas Fleet
Headquarters: Hong Kong
Commander: Vice-Admiral RUITARO FUJITA
Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral YUZURU OKUMA

The Second China Seas Fleet had offices at Hong Kong under the command of Rear-Admiral YUZURU OKUMA and the Amoy branch under the command of Vice-Admiral SEIICHI HARADA. Its duties were :

- a. To combat enemy assault troops
- b. To safe-guard sea communications
- c. Blockade and patrol of the China coastal waters West of 100° East and North-East of the line connecting Copea point (Leighow Peninsula) and the point 20° North of 112° East.

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5. Hainan Garrison
Headquarters: Sana, Hainan Island
Commander: Vice-Admiral KEIJIRO GOGA
Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral KINJI SENDA

The Hainan Garrison had the following responsibility:

- a. To combat enemy assault troops
- b. Blockade and patrol of the China coast west of the line connecting Gopa point and the point 20° North of 112° East.

The following is the staff of the Japanese China Seas Fleet located at Shanghai, China:

Vice-Admiral RYOZO FUKUDA
Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas Fleet
(May 1945 - August 1945)

Vice-Admiral NAOMASA SAKONJU
Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet
(December 1944 - August 1945)

Rear-Admiral KANJI OGAWA
Assistant Chief of Staff, China Seas Fleet
(February 1945 - August 1945)

Captain YASUZATO TANABE
Chief of supplies, engineering,
Commander-in-Chief of Naval Transportation
Section of China Seas Fleet.

The following were staff officers assigned to the China Seas Fleet at Shanghai, China :

Captain MASANOHI OGAGIRO
Captain TAKEO KATO
Captain TOSHIO KONDO
Captain TAKESHI SHIMIZUTANI
Commander HEIJIRO TANIOKA
Commander TADASHI SHIMURA
Commander TAKESHI HUOKI

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Commander GENICHIRO KIONISHI
 Commander TOSHIHIRO AKAGI
 Commander KAZUTOSHI ASADA
 Lt. Comdr. ISAMU KOMIYAMA

In addition to the above officers, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese China Seas Fleet often called for advice upon Commanding officers of the various units under his command and bestowed upon them the title of staff officers of the China Seas Fleet, in addition to their title as Commander of the various units to which they were assigned.

THE SHANGHAI JAPANESE NAVAL BASE COMMAND

The responsibility for the defense of Shanghai and its vicinity was, so far as the Japanese Navy was concerned in the Japanese Naval Base Command under the direction of Rear-Admiral TOKUJI MORI and the Shanghai Naval Special Landing Party, under the command of Rear-Admiral MINORU MATSUNO.

The duties of the Shanghai Japanese Naval Base Command were entirely military. The following chart shows the officers' strength and duties of the Naval Base Command:

THE SHANGHAI JAPANESE NAVAL BASE COMMAND

Commander: Rear-Admiral TOKUJI MORI.

<u>Offices or detachments under command</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Duties</u>
Headquarters of the Shanghai Japanese Naval Base Command (Commander: Rear-Admiral Tokuji Mori)	Staff officers: 3 Officers : 17 Sailors : 180	1. Direction of the entire force. 2. Waters under command: China coast, South of 33° N. and East of 120° E. 3. Safeguarding of sea communications
The Shanghai Naval Port Affairs Office (Chief: Captain YUKIHIKO IMAMURA)	1. Officers : 71 Sailors : 810 2. Motor boats: 49 Converted mine-layers : 7 Ferry boats: 5	1. Control of port affairs in Shanghai, Safeguarding of waters under command, and protection of navigation routes.

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	Tugs : 11	2. Waters under command:
	Dredgers : 5	Shanghai port areas
	Mud-carriers : 8	and Yangtze River
	Cargo boats: 4	below Kiangyin.
	Lighters : 4	
	Pontoons : 4	
Japanese Garrison at Shichiashan or Raffle Island of Pake Liehtao group. (Commander: Captain TAKECHIYO TERANISHI) Captain TERANISHI was concurrently commander of River Gun-boat ATAKA.	1. Officers : 64 Sailors : 1,088 2. River Gun-boat: ATAKA Motor boats: 4 "Suicide" Torpedo boats : 54	1. Defense of Raffle Island and Safeguarding of waters under command 2. Waters under command: Central China coast, South of 33°N. and North of Ta-ohu Shan.
Japanese Garrison in Chowshan Archipelago (Commander: Captain KIYOHIDE FUJINO)	1. Officers : 133 Sailors : 2,379 2. Motor boats: 18 "Suicide" torpedo bts: 98 Gun-boat: KAISEI	1. Defense of Chowshan Archipelago and Safe- guarding of waters under command. 2. Waters under command: Central China coast, South of Ta-Chu Shan and East of 120° E.
Ships under direct command:	Old-type destroyers: 2 River Gun-boats : 4 Transports : 1 Converted sub-chaser 1	Specific order issued whenever necessary.

THE SHANGHAI JAPANESE SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING PARTY

The Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party, entered Shanghai in 1937 at the time of the China Incident. Upon its entrance, the Special Naval Landing Party took over the Northern

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section of Shanghai, that is, that portion of the city north of Soochow Creek known as Hongkew in which Japanese nationals were living. The Special Naval Landing Party also took over the Pootung section of Shanghai which is across the Whangpoo River immediately opposite the International Settlement and likewise was inhabited to a large extent by the Japanese nationals. The purpose expressed by the Japanese in taking these sections of Shanghai was to protect the lives and interests of the Japanese people living there.

Immediately upon the outbreak of the Pacific war, the Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party moved into that part of the International Settlement lying between Soochow Creek on the North, Avenue Edouard VII on the South, Whangpoo River on the East and the Shanghai Race Course, on West.

After the outbreak of the Pacific war the Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party occupied a very secondary position to that of the Army. However, they did retain jurisdiction of these portions of Shanghai which had been occupied by the Navy.

The duties of the Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party were to defend Shanghai in the event of an enemy attack as well as to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals under their control. In its capacity of protecting the lives and property of the Japanese nationals under its control, the Naval Landing Party maintained a small Police Force.

The Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese China Seas Fleet and it continued so to function until April 1945, at which time the command of the entire Shanghai area was assumed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese 13th Army. The Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai came under his direction and took preparatory steps against possible enemy assaults in the former Japanese defense zone and in the defense of the many Naval establishments. The Commander of the Japanese 13th Army at Shanghai in April 1945 also took over the responsibility for air defense measures.

The responsibility of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai as a Police organization, was limited to the safe-guarding of the areas under its command, and took whatever steps found necessary in the maintenance of peace and order in the Naval zone.

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The Police duties in Shanghai were under the direct command of the Japanese Gendarmerie which had powers to take preventative measures, to conduct investigations, apprehensions, and examinations as deemed necessary.

The Japanese Consular Police assumed Police duties over the Japanese civilians in Shanghai while the Shanghai Municipal Police composed mostly of Chinese, had policing authority over the Chinese and neutral nationals.

In maintaining peace and order in the Shanghai area, the Japanese Gendarmerie directed the Japanese Consular Police and Municipal Police whenever necessary.

In the event of the terroristic acts in the Japanese Naval defense zone, the investigations, apprehensions, and examinations of the suspect or suspects and other forms of investigative activity were performed by the Japanese Gendarmerie or by the Shanghai Municipal Police. The Special Naval Landing Party maintained close contact with these two organizations and took whatever steps they requested or recommended in the maintenance of peace and order in the Naval defense zone.

The following chart shows the composition of the Japanese Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party as of August 10, 1945 :

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THE JAPANESE NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE

THE COMPOSITION OF THE SHANGHAI SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING PARTY
AT AUGUST 10, 1945

Name of detachment	Commanding officer	Number of officers	Number of seamen	Total	Arms
Headquarters:	Rear-Admiral MINORU KATSUNO	1		1	
Staff officers:	Captain K. FUKUSHIMA Lt. Com. Y. KAWADA & 4 others	6	18	24	-
Adjutants:	Lt. H. YOKOTA and two others	3	25	28	-
Office duties:	Lt. Com. G. MIYAMOTO and three others	4	-	4	-
Surgeon:	Surgeon Cap. S. KATSUYAMA	1	-	1	
Paymaster:	Lt. Com. S. SUZUKI	1	-	1	
Officers & seamen attached to the Headquarters:		68	1,013	1,081	2 13-mm machine-guns 2 radio detectors 14 heavy machine-guns

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Name of detachment	Commanding officer	Number of officers	Number of seamen	Total	Arms
Headquarters Unit	Com. K. TANAKA	25	618	643	7 12-cm AA gun 2 15-cm trench mortars 1 12-cm field gun 12 18-cm trench mortars 3 25-mm machine guns 4 13-mm machine guns 4 12-mm machine guns 24 heavy machine-guns 14 heavy bomb-thrower
Northern District Unit	Lt.Com.M. MAEKAWA	38	1,282	1,320	11 13-cm machine-guns 16 machine-gun cars, 4 15-cm mortars, 2 anti-tank guns 27 8-cm mortars 48 heavy machine-guns 20 heavy bomb-thrower 2 radio detectors. 12 12-cm AA guns, 3 light tanks 31 25-mm machine-guns, 7 armored cars 2 150-cm search lights 4 110-cm search lights
Eastern District Unit	Lt.Com. T. MATSUDA	23	608	631	4 8-cm AA guns 7 15-cm mortars 4 7.5-cm mobile AA guns, 28 4.8-cm mortars 4 40-mm machine-guns 10 heavy machine-guns 14 heavy bomb-throwers 2 150-cm search lights 19 25-mm machine-guns 4 13-mm machine-guns
Pootung Unit	Lt. Y.HATANO	14	347	361	3 8-cm AA guns 15 heavy machine-guns 22 25-mm machine-guns 8 heavy bomb-thrower 8 13-mm machine-guns 2 15-cm mortars 12 8-cm mortars 1 150-cm search light 1 radio detector

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Inner District Unit	Lt.Com. N. KAWAMURA	27	591	618	1 I-type 8-cm gun, 8 heavy bomb-throwers 2 40-mm machine-guns 2 radio detectors 2 35-mm machine-guns, 2 medium-size gun boats. 2 13-mm machine-guns 2 motor boats 16 8-cm mortars, 3 small boats 26 heavy machine-guns
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Grand total...4,713	{Officers :211	19 12-cm AA guns	74 heavy bomb-throwers
	{Seamen 4,502	7 8-cm AA guns	3 light tanks
		1 I-type 8-cm gun	7 armored cars
		1 12-cm field gun	16 machine-gun cars
		4 7.5-cm mobile AA guns	2 anti-tank guns
		6 40-mm machine-guns	5 150-cm search light
		77 35-mm machine-guns	7 radio detectors
		4 110-cm search lights	2 medium-size gun bo ats
		31 13-mm machine-guns	2 motor boats
		4 12-mm machine-guns	
		15 15-cm mortars	
		95 8-cm mortars	
		3 small boats	
		127 heavy machine-guns	

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A. - DUTIES

The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai was located at 27, the Bund and was under the command of Rear-Admiral KEIJO MINATO.

It was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese China Seas Fleet and attended to liaison work and the gathering of information concerning Naval operations.

This office also handled other Naval affairs specified by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese China Seas Fleet and collected information under the direct command of the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Navy in Tokyo. In this latter connection, the Naval Office in Shanghai received and sent information collected directly to the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. The Naval office also engaged in the gathering of information vital to the operations of the Japanese China Seas Fleet.

The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai maintained close contact not only with other Naval organizations, but also with various Japanese official organizations. This office attended to negotiations and settlement of affairs relative to Naval operations and defense, Protection of communications, purchasing of military necessities and transportations.

B. - ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL:

(1) Officers in Charge.

The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai was composed of one Admiral or Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Office, three to five Captains, Commanders and Lt. Commanders as assistants in addition to several Junior Officers, as well as civilian employees.

The following officers were in charge of the Naval Office in Shanghai:

Vice-Admiral ARATA OKA
December 1941 - September 1943
Vice-Admiral TAIICHIRO KONDO
September 1943 - November 1944
Rear-Admiral KEIJO MINATO
November 1944 - August 1945.

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(2) The General Affairs Section:

The General Affairs Section performed overall execution of general affairs of the office and also matters not handled by other sections of the Naval Office in Shanghai.

Specifically among its duties were the following:

- a) Adjutant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai. In addition to regular duties as an adjutant, he arranged travelling facilities for officers, sailors and civilian employees.
- b) The general affairs room - handled drafting, receiving and sending of official documents, personal affairs and merits of servicemen, pay matters and other miscellaneous affairs.
- c) The internal affairs room - handled the maintenance of the guarding and the maintenance of order in and out of the guard-room.

The commanding officers of the General Affairs Section are as follows:

Captain T. KITaura
December 1941 - May 1942
Captain S. KOBETTO
May 1942 - July 1944
Captain B. KUWABARA
July 1944 - August 1945.

(3) The Navigation Section:

This Section performed the usual customs duties. It also conducted investigation in the Shanghai area concerning economic matters. Information in this regard was obtained by watching the smuggling of goods, arms and other materials into Free China, and the movements in and out of Shanghai of guerrilla bands.

The bulk of the investigative work of the Navigation Section was carried on by Chinese. The agents reported to the officials of the Japanese Navy in their area. These agents were eager to obtain the goodwill of the Japanese, since their services would be rewarded with permits to bring into Shanghai cargoes which otherwise would have to be smuggled. Goods, in order to be brought in and out of Shanghai, first had to have a Navy Certificate and then a customs Certificate. The following men were known to be connected with the Intelligence Section of

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the Navigation Section of the Japanese Navy in and about
Shanghai, China :-

INTELLIGENCE SECTION, MARINE CUSTOMS

Commissioner	MORI TAOKA	
"	TAKEO OMAE	
Chief of the	Political Section)
	TAKECHU FUKUSHIMA)
Assistant	HIKOTARO SATO)
"	SEIJI HIGASHITSU-)
	ZUMI)
"	KATSU KAWASHIMA)
"	TOKUICHIRO NAKA-)
	GAWA)
"	HARUYOSHI WAKANO)
"	KEISAN NITTA)
"	YOSHIO IWADA)
"	SHINRIU TANAKA)
"	HIROSHI HIDAKA)
"	KENSAN IKEDA)
"	KAROKU HIRADA)
"	KITARO YOKOYAMA)
"	SI NAKAMURA)
"	SEI YAMAGUCHI)
"	KOMEI SUGIMOTO)
"	YOSHIGI OGAWA)
"	SABURO FUJII)
"	HANEI KOBAYASHI)
		Shanghai Office
		Woosung Office
		Yangtzepoo Office
		Pootung Office
		Chung Ming Island Office

(4) The Investigative Section:

The name investigative Section is misleading. The duties of this section consisted entirely of research work, by which this section examined the problems confronting the China Seas Fleet in the execution of its duties. Their entire work was done from magazines, books and technical

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periodicals which were collected in and about Shanghai by the Gendamerie. They also received printed material from Japan. This Section performed no active intelligence function in the collection of information and data.

The officers in charge of this Section were as follows:

Captain S. KUWABARA
July 1944 - November 1944
Commander H. TANIOKA
November 1944 - August 1945.

(5) Press Section:

The Press Section, through newspapers, radio Stations, News Agencies, magazines, theaters and movies, handled the press releases and publicity work for the entire China Seas Fleet, as well as for the Naval Office in Shanghai, regarding the war situation both on the China Continent and in the Pacific.

The control of censorship was vested in Tokyo. In Shanghai, the Army, Navy and the Embassy jointly controlled censorship through a committee which was directly under the control of the Embassy. The Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai furnished a representative to that committee.

A few days before the Japanese surrender, the Press Offices were consolidated into one Section known as the KOHO-SHU or the Standard Information Office which was under the direction of Minister TSUCHIDA.

During the war, the Japanese Navy at Shanghai kept in close contact with the Press Sections of the Army and Embassy and eulogized the war results of the Japanese Navy.

Publicity was directed to the Chinese, third Party Nationals and Japanese residents, through the following channels:

- (1) Publicity materials concerning the Japanese Navy were furnished to the Japanese Newspapers TAIRIKU SHIMPO and the Chinese Journals, in particular: SHUN PAO and SHIN WAN PAO.

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- (2) Similar matters in the Japanese language were sent to the Domei News Agency and releases in the Chinese language were sent to the Central Press Service of China.
- (3) Concerns magazines and mosquito papers. The Japanese magazines TAIRIKU GEKKAN and SHIN TAIRIKU and the Chinese magazine SHUN PAO monthly and the SHIN WAN PAO monthly, and others, as well as the Chinese weekly CHUNG KUO and the mosquito paper SHAO PAO were furnished with publicity materials concerning the Japanese Navy.
- (4) Publicity material was also sent to the movies, theaters and cultural organizations in and about Shanghai.

The following personnel was attached to the Press Section:

Captain S. KAMADA
December 1941 - October 1943
Captain K. MATSUSHIMA
October 1943 - May 1945
Captain S. KUWABARA

(6) Information and Liaison Section:

a) - Duties and personnel:

The Information and Liaison Section had for its duties the investigation and supervision of the gathering of information, liaison work and the supervision of property of foreign nationals.

The Chiefs of the Office were as follows:

Chief of Information Room:

Captain T. KITaura (Dec. 1941 - May 1942)
Captain S. KOBETTO (May 1942 - July 1944)
Captain S. KUWABARA (July 1944 - August 1945)

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Commander M. OTANI (Dec. 1941 - Nov. 1943)
 Commander I. TEJIMA (Nov. 1943 - May 1945)

Staff officers:

Lt. Commander O. FUKUYAMA (Dec. 1941 - Nov. 1942)
 Lt. Commander T. HINO (Nov. 1942 - Feb. 1945)
 Lt. Commander M. FUCHIWAKI (Feb. 1945 - Aug. 1945)

Liaison Room:

Paymaster-Lt. G. MIWA (Dec. 1941 - May 1943)
 Paymaster-Lt. H. TORII (Dec. 1941 - Sept. 1942)
 Paymaster-Lt. N. OGUCHI (May 1943 - July 1945)
 Paymaster-Lt. T. IKEDA (July 1945 - Aug. 1945)
 Civil Officer T. NAMBA (Mar. 1943 - Aug. 1945)

Civilian employees:

N. FUKUHARA (Sept. 1942 - Aug. 1945)
 J. TOYODA (April 1943 - Aug. 1945)
 I. UTSUNOMIYA (April 1942 - August 1945)
 Y. IKUSHIMA (Dec. 1941 - Jan. 1945)
 T. HIZEN (Dec. 1944 - Aug. 1945)
 S. IWASAKI (Nov. 1943 - Aug. 1945)

(1) The Information Room:

The information room was employed in the gathering of investigative reports and information and the co-ordination of information gatherers.

Among its duties were:

1. Study and analysis of the general situation. This was accomplished from material sent from Tokyo, Press reports, and local information compiled as reference material for the China Seas Fleet. From this material the information room prepared analysis of the war situation.
2. Peace negotiations with Chungking. - This Section was unable to conduct any activity towards the Conclusion of Peace with the Chinese Government at Chungking because the Central authorities in Tokyo prohibited all branch officers from making independent peace

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approaches. However, a rapprochement with Chungking was attempted on one occasions by the SAKURA KIKAN whose Commanding Officer TOKUJO OKAMURA was sent to Shanghai by Admiral SHUJSHIN NAGANO, Chief of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. Commander OKAMURA co-ordinated his activities with this Section of the Navy.

3. Strengthening of the Nanking Government. The activities for the strengthening of the WANG CHING-WEI Regime was done in Nanking and there was no occasion for any activity in Shanghai except liaison work between the Japanese Naval organization and the Nanking Officers in Shanghai.
4. Operational materials. - This section supplied the Japanese China Seas Fleet with operational and reference material.
5. Analysis of the war situation. - This section performed analysis of the war situation in the areas surrounding Shanghai. This analysis was based on daily Press reports and information supplied by the Shanghai Municipal Government.
6. Naval Information. - The Peace and Reconstruction of the Nanking Government stationed on the islands of the China Coast, as well as Junks operating in the coastal waters, supplied information concerning the situation in the coastal areas. In the final phase of the Pacific war, such information was made difficult to obtain because of the American bombings of the coastal areas of China.

(2) Liaison Room:

The liaison room had for its duties the investigation and supervision of matters which required outside contact and liaison among the Japanese Army and Navy and civil organizations.

The liaison Section handled all matters concerning the Japanese Navy requiring contact with foreign and Japanese organizations as well as other Japanese offices.

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Those matters which concerned the Japanese Navy alone were handled by this section in consultation with the Japanese Army and Embassy office in order to maintain close co-ordination among the three offices. In dealing with affairs which required consultation with the Central authorities of Tokyo, The Japanese Army, Navy and Embassy Offices jointly decided upon them after the reply from Tokyo was received. As its most important duty, this section was commanded to maintain close co-ordination among the three offices.


The following chart shows the organization of the information and liaison section of the Japanese Naval Office at Shanghai:

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IWAO UTSUNOMIYA was a former college professor of Sociology. His duties were merely to act as liaison officer between the churches and the Japanese Navy at Shanghai. According to his superiors, he contented himself with writing long thesis on the social aspects of various religions.

HARUNOSUKE TOYODA, as a liaison's man of the Japanese Navy, represented them in discussions with the Press Bureau and with the representatives of the Embassy and the Army.

TOSHIO MAWA, the civilian affairs officer, was supervisor of this section and controlled the activities of the other six sections.

NOBORU NUKUHARA and TOYOKICHI BIZEN kept in contact and kept the Navy informed on the White Russians situation in Shanghai. To this section also belonged the notorious EUGENE PICK-HOVANS, on whose activities a separate report is being made. It should be noted that Russian Affairs, as used by the Japanese Navy, confined itself to the White Russians. In matters dealing with the U.S.S.R. were always noted as Soviet matters.

Concerning the French, the Japanese Navy at Shanghai exhibited little interest since the French community was divided into Vichy-ites and de Gaullists and were warring between themselves during the entire Pacific war. Both sides, it is rumored, co-operated with the Japanese whenever it tend to advance their cause or to weaken their opponents. Cooperation in the main was received from the Vichy-ites since they were more numerous than the de Gaullists.

There was, however, an underground de Gaullists movement which would recruit men of French extraction and immediately upon recruiting them, would smuggle them to Indo-China or some other place where they could be of more assistance in the de Gaullist movement than at Shanghai.

According to his Commanding officers, TAJIRI, was responsible for keeping the Navy advised of these matters, but was entirely irresponsible and unable to perform his duties. TAJIRI, it is said, is from a noble family in Japan and he maintained his position more on his antecedents than on his work.

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The German Affairs were handled by SHIGEO IWASAKI and SASAKI. Their duties were to maintain liaison with various German officers and officials at Shanghai.

JAPANESE LISTENING POSTS

Jap mentality is completely unsuited to listening-post work. They are slow, cautious thinkers, and can never make a quick decision or take prompt action before thinking up a suitable reason or excuse for such, and each excuse or reason must be sufficiently water-tight to blanket its originator against loss of face.

This phase of Japanese character played a great part in the lives and actions of the officers and men who were directly above us when we worked as operators in Japanese monitor stations. It was also one of the main reasons why, in my belief, these monitor stations played only a minor and passive role in Japan's war effort.

Before September 20, 1944, I did not know whether or not the Japs were monitoring American voice circuits, as operations were still at some distance from the China Coast and the Philippines, and I had very seldom heard any military voice transmissions, although I knew that voice was being used in communications between aircraft and ground stations. Prior to the above date, we took CW traffic only, and only from one station: VHM at Port Darwin, Australia, which was used by the U.S. Navy. All the traffic from this station was in five-letter code groups, and we never got to know what sort of material was being sent. I don't believe that the Japs ever did either, because a Jap officer in Shanghai told me months later that the U.S. Navy's 5-letter code was almost impossible to crack, and that only the men at Tokyo Naval H.Q. could crack it. I do not believe that Tokyo's listening post differed much from all the others, except perhaps in quality of radio equipment.

On Sept. 20, 1944, we heard our first close-range voice signals when planes from a near-by task force raided Manila. We were ordered to find their frequency, and as we did not even have the slightest idea of where to look, I think it was a mere stroke of fate that some pilot was talking as I tuned

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over 4475 kc. As soon as the Japs heard the signals, They ordered us to copy what was being said. It was very difficult for the first few minutes, as we didn't know the types of calls the planes were using, nor did we know the phonetic alphabet. However, after copying the whole day through, we learned more than any Jap officer had learned in Naval Intelligence School. Then came the great task! English-speaking Jap intelligence officers could not understand what we had written down! We, who had listened to these signals for just one day, knew more than the Officer in Charge of the Naval Headquarters Listening Post in Manila! He was stumped on every line of our typed copy. He asked us to explain messages such as this:

"BROWNIE LEADER from 21 BROWNIE. CHICKEN DOWN AT 12 SALLOW FACE 035. PILOT IS GOODYEAR, EVERGREEN. OVER."

We had heard several versions of this message from several planes, and remembered such catches as: "12 miles from SALLOW FACE," "BERRING 035", "GOODYEAR is showing EVERGREEN," "I SEE A-GOODYEAR", and "DYE MARKER," so that we had pretty good ideas as to the meaning of the whole message, but the officer began asking questions:

"What is 12 SALLOW FACE 035?" - We answered that SALLOW FACE was probably a reference point, and that 12 was the distance in miles and 035 the bearing. To which he replied:

"Uh? I do not understand. Then, is GOODYEAR EVERGREEN the Pilot's name? See, the message says "PILOT IS GOODYEAR, EVERGREEN."

It took some time to explain that GOODYEAR was rubber raft, and that EVERGREEN was a dye marker which dyed the water around the raft, probably a substance such as fluorescein. The officer merely blinked and asked us how we could be so sure of ourselves. Of course, we didn't bother to tell him that we had heard patches of conversations that pointed to our theory, but merely answered that what we told him was so. We ourselves were jumping to conclusions and guessing more than we should have, and, strangely, were for the most part correct; however, there were times when we made awful mistakes, and had to do a lot of fast talking to cover ourselves and put the blame on some Jap by saying that he had told us it was so.

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By the time we had explained the day's copy, it was in the wee hours of the morning. The officer then put his seal on the copy, phoned headquarters, giving them some of the more important messages (which should have been given them as soon as they were received, to be of any value), and left. When we saw him putting his seal on our copy, we understood that he would be getting the credit for what we took, so from that very first day we resolved to jumble him up as much as we could.

This turned out to be an easy job. Japanese, even the well educated ones, understand English best when they are spoken to in Japanese English (I don't suppose I have to explain the term); knowing this, we gradually switched to the use of normal English whenever we had something to explain. This drove them to the use of dictionaries, and finally to attempts at reading our copy by themselves, with the help of a dictionary. This led to some very wierd and comical translations of messages, and all joking aside, these translations were handed directly to Headquarters without being checked by us. The few we did check were always completely wrong and off the subject. I add here that most Jap listening posts were run completely by Japs, and very few had Nisei as operators, because the military hated and dis-trusted the Nisei. The Nisei, of course, understand English and make good operators, but they don't like to remain as operators as this is a rather low rank. Most of them climbed from the position of operator to station manager or instructor. In almost every case, the actual copying and much of the translating was done by young ensigns who had learned their English at a Jap high-school or university. I spoke to several of these boys here in Shanghai, and watched them take voice traffic when they came to visit our station. They couldn't copy at the rate the words came out of a loudspeaker, and for the most part got only call-signs, date-time groups, target-area numbers, and "OVER and OUT". Furthermore, none of them could make head or tail out of what they managed to write down. This is no isolated instance I believe that it was the same in every listening post the Japs had.

Later, we made the officers at Manila Headquarters believe that we could copy many times better than their own operators, and they would always take our version of a message for the correct one. Which suited us very well, as we began to "take it easy" when the Japs weren't looking, and often wrote what we thought we heard and at times even

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made up messages when traffic was low. Making up messages was necessary, because the Japs used to get impatient whenever traffic died down and would tell us to search for new frequencies or copy China - India Air Service traffic, which was tiresome as the stations worked day and night.

On October 17, 1944, we noticed that 2716 kc. was jammed with traffic, several stations working at the same time. After some listening, we came to the conclusion that what we heard was a convoy, evidently in motion, as every now and then there were messages such as "reduce speed to 3 knots," "steer 270", "execute 1 Baker," "vessel 030, 1500 yards, showing lights," etc. This was the first time we had heard anything of the sort, but we immediately came to the conclusion that this was a group of vessels not more than 400 miles away (judging by signal strength on that particular frequency) and that it was probably an amphibious force. We told the Japs that they were probably going to make a landing somewhere in the Philippines, but they said it was impossible, and that there was no American fleet strong enough to effect a landing on any island in the Philippines, and they let it go at that. Early in the morning of Oct. 18th, we noticed that many aircraft carriers were coming up on 4475 kc. for radio checks. This led us to believe even more that there would be a landing, as the signals we heard were exceptionally strong. Later that morning, we had a light air-raid, and the Japs ordered us to find the frequency on which the planes were working. We found a lot of plane signals on about 4950 kc, but it seemed that there were not the planes over Manila. On further listening, we heard mention of MACTAN ISLAND, and looking for it in an atlas, formed that it was off CEBU CITY. The raid continued all day, new planes coming over every two hours or so. It was a grand show, and we didn't bother to write as we were too interested in the goings-on. It was like listening to a running commentary on a prize-fight. This raid was nothing like the ones we had over Manila, as many more planes and carriers participated than in any raid we had experienced. The Manila raids were an "every group for itself" affair, but in this raid they used what is known as a "fighter coordinator", who met all incoming aircraft at a rendezvous point, and directed them to definite objectives and tasks. Returning planes would give him the results of their attacks and request permission to return to their bases. On giving them permission to return, he would call their carriers, and if necessary, request a certain number of planes to complete the job. All this was put on the air in plain language, except for such things as target-area

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numbers, and longitude-latitude positions which were put in shackle code. A large number of "bogeys" were shot down, and we heard many squeaky-voiced youngsters commenting on how easy it was. We put this down on paper, and when the Japs read it, they were not at all pleased, because they had to admit that the precise number of Japs reported down couldn't possibly be "enemy propaganda." All reference to the number of Japs shot down was not copied on to the final day's report, and one Jap suggested that we do not emphasize "our" own losses. Our reply to that one was "We thought you wanted us to copy everything we hear". Naturally, we continued this practice, but the Japs always saw to it that nothing of the sort was included in the final report. One can hardly picture a people who will not stand for mention of their own losses even in an official report marked "CONFIDENTIAL".

That same day, we listened to a long and interesting rescue mission on 4475 kc. It seems that early in the morning a small VO had ditched in the channel between Mactay Island and Cebu City, and the cruisers "KINGFISH" and "CLAWBACK" (code names, of course) sent up their scout planes to pick up the pilot, who was reported to have been rescued by a native boat. The two planes covered the whole channel at a very low altitude, buzzing every boat they saw. Many of the boatmen waved at the planes in a friendly manner, but the missing pilot was not seen. The planes were ordered not to attempt a landing on the water as the sea was rather rough, and after all stations had come to the conclusion that the pilot was in good hands, they were ordered to fly home.

We didn't sleep a wink that night, nor the next five days and nights. The big attack on the Philippines which we had been dreaming of since the first raid on Manila had finally materialized, we thought, And we were not the least bit mistaken, for as soon as all planes had been reported "on the deck" we tuned to 2716 kc, which was buzzing with activity. All night, we listened and tuned over the the medium-wave bands. Many channels were in operation, and on each channel, the control station went under the call sign "HALIFAX". We took it that HALIFAX was the "Big Boss" of all the operations, and were quite correct, because many days later, after the landings had taken place, a station called Tacloban Field, requesting that a jeep be provided at the jetty for "HALIFAX HIMSELF" at a certain time. No doubt HALIFAX

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HIMSELF was old man MacArthur.

That night (were still on Oct. 18th) we found several channels on which communications were along the following lines :

"ACE from PRIVATEER. SALVO FLASH."
 "PRIVATEER from ACE. NO CHANGE, NO CHANGE. REDUCE
 STARHELL RATE TO ONE EVERY THREE MINUTES."
 "ACE from PRIVATEER. ROGER."
 "ACE from PRIVATEER. SALVO . . . FLASH. PRIVATEER
 OUT."

What was this? Never heard the like of it before. We asked the Japs; they siezed our copy, got together for half an hour, and then enlightened us with the statement that they didn't know, and that we had probably missed out many words. In the meantime, we talked it over: SALVO and FLASH - artillery. STAR SHELLS - further proof of artillery. ACE - the scout planes sent on the rescue mission the previous day had the call signs ACE KINGFISH and KIND CLAWBACK, and no doubt the ACE in question was ACE PRIVATEER, a scout plane from the ship PRIVATEER. The only ships we knew to carry scout planes were cruisers and battleships, so the only conclusion we could possibly have come to was that PRIVATEER was a CA or BB, bombarding a target; and that ACE was its air spotter. NO CHARGE, NO CHANGE varied to UP 50, NO CHANGE, or LEFT 50, NO CHANGE, or UP 50, RIGHT 100, so it could only have been what we now know it was - firing instructions. All this we explained to the Japs, adding that it was probably CEBU CITY that was being bombarded. This made them get together for another conference, after which they all went off to sleep. The next day they were all grouchy, and no doubt plamed the whole blitz on us.

October 19th started early. Around 4 a.m., on 4950 kc, a rather sleepy operator drawled "HALIFAX to BINGO BASE. RADIO CHECK" the answer came back "BINGO BASE to HALIFAX. READ YOU 5 BY 5." and so it went with BANJO BASE, TIGER BASE, BRONCO BASE, PEDRO BASE, TEXAN BASE, GALLEY BASE, ARCHER BASE, LOCUST BASE, and all the other aircraft carriers in the task force. Pretty soon, the first fighter controller (ELMHURST 1) had reported on station at "POINT EASY" and HALIFAX was instructing each carrier to send up certain numbers of VF's VT's, and VB's to rendezvous with him at POINT EASY and receive their target assignments, POINT EASY,

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judging from following conversations, appeared to be somewhere over LEYTE GULF, and we noticed that not all the planes were being dispatched to CEBU, but that most of them were assigned to numbered target areas. Later mention of towns such as JARO, CARIGARA, TANAUAN, DULAG, and TACLOBAN, showed us that the main force had been sent to LEYTE, where they commenced shooting up airfields, beaches and trucks along the coastal highway. By noon we had heard mention of "Naval ordnance" "trajectory" and "height of naval ordnance." This led us to believe that a Naval bombardment was also in progress, and a quick check between 2 and 7 megacycles proved this. We found several frequencies on which spotter-planes were working with fleet units. HALIFAX sent frequent orders of this type: "ALL PLANES from HALIFAX. HEIGHT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE IN TACLOBAN AREA AT 1500 FEET." and HEIGHT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE ALONG BEACH IN TARGET AREAS 5254 and 5354 AT 1000 FEET". The height increased shortly after noon, which showed us (not the Japs. They were too slow to follow the whole affair and were still using the dictionary on yesterday's copy) that the gunfire was going inland. That morning we had heard a message that set us thinking; it was addressed to HALIFAX from a plane, and the part we received went like this: "UNDERWATER DEMOLITION CREWS HAVE COMPLETED THEIR WORK." We were still working on it in our subconscious minds when HALIFAX gave the order to all planes returning to base not to fly over Leyte Gulf. Several times after that, planes called HALIFAX and requested "PERMISSION TO INVESTIGATE SHIPPING PROCEEDING WESTWARD IN LEYTE GULF," which made HALIFAX give the order for all planes to "OBSERVE STRICT RADIO DISCIPLINE REGARDING SHIPPING IN LEYTE GULF. BY NO MEANS, I REPEAT, BY NO MEANS WILL ANY AIRCRAFT PROCEEDING TO OR FROM TARGET AREAS FLY OVER LEYTE GULF. OUT." The operator was quite peeved, and I believe that more than one pilot received a strong reprimand on landing. I don't see why pilots were not notified verbally before take-off, that any shipping in the Gulf would be a friendly landing force. As a result of these careless remarks, it is possible that the Japs on Leyte took precautions against a possible landing.

Immediately after this came another order from HALIFAX: "ALL PLANES RESTRICT YOUR ATTACKS TO TARGETS WEST OF COASTAL HIGHWAY. DO NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BOMB OR STRAFE CRAFT APPROACHING BEACHES OR PERSONNEL ON BEACHES."

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Thus, we were some of the first people in Manila to learn that a major landing had taken place on Leyte. That evening, when I went to visit my girl, I told her the news. I cautioned her that there had been no official broadcast from San Francisco, and probably would not be for one or two days, and that we were the only ones in town who knew about it, therefore to be careful to whom she passed it on. The next day, half the town knew - the trustworthy half, and the Japs were completely unaware of the fact, we had made a habit to give her all the news we heard, and she in turn passed it on to her friends and relatives. By this method the Spanish community was always well informed, and I add here that most of the middle-class Spaniards in Manila were hand-in-hand with the guerrillas. We also told our house servants the news: two of these boys were members of the R.O.T.C. guerrillas. The Japs who lived and worked with us often beat them up, and I had received more than one promise from these boys that they would knife these Japs at their first opportunity. They had their opportunity about a month after we left, and I hope they took full advantage of it.

By evening, beach-heads had been secured, radar stations and AA batteries installed. Target spotting was taken over by OBOE Stations (O-5 ϕ was the first one to come on the air), and soon these OBOE stations were giving fire control to CHARLIE stations (C-23, C-24 etc. We understand that these are land artillery companies), as well as to ships. When the beach radar station ("PEPSICOLA") began giving battery-control colors, we gathered that the beaches were under light but persistent air attack. Also, there were many American planes flying around with inoperative I.F.F. This was quite a nuisance, because PEPSICOLA was maintaining "FLASH RED" condition most of the time when danger was non-existent, and this held up a lot of the unloading of supplies at the beaches. (I learned this from a quarrel between the operator of PEPSICOLA and one on board an FS vessel). Of course, such occurrences are unavoidable when there are so many factors involved, and I must say that despite many hitches, supplemented by red tape and last-minute changes, the landing was excellently carried out, and I understand it came as a total surprise to the Japs, resulting in light casualties in man and equipment during the first few days of the operation.

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The next few days are not clear in my mind, as far as the sequence of occurrences goes, because we had almost no sleep from the 17th to the 25th. I remember us working for stretches of 36 and 40 hours, and then just passing out. To further aggravate our plight, the food we were getting was far from our daily requirements. It consisted of one 4-inch dried fish and rice in the morning, two 4-inch dried fish and cooked grass for lunch, and cooked grass with meat scraps and rice in the evening. Black coffee was available any time of the day, but they rationed our sugar so that we could only have a cup after each meal. We almost kissed the Jap who dropped in late one night and, bless his heart, produced, of all things - HOT DOGS - "by order of the Commander, and with his compliments, in appreciation of your diligence." However, a couple of hot dogs didn't pep us up enough to get us out of the stupor that prevented us from telling day from night, to say nothing of the date. All we had in our minds were signals, call-signs, frequencies, task forces, and G.I.'s. I dreamed, in one of my pass-outs, that I had stolen a Jap plane and landed safely on an American carrier, forthwith. I was taken to the mess-room and fed State-side food, all the while chatting with the pilots, whose voices and names I knew so well.

I believe it was on the morning of the 20th that scout planes reported a Jap fleet off SULUAN IS. (at the eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf), and another in SAMAR STRAIT, and still another coming in from the South into Leyte Gulf. I remember clearly the order given by HALIFAX to 99 GALLEY (who was ELMHURST 3, fighter-coordinator) to take some planes and intercept the fleet coming up from the south. He went off with several VT's, VB's, and VF's. The VB's were, luckily, carrying two 500 pound, and several 100 pound bombs each, and the VT's each carried a large torpedo, while the VF's had full-load machine-guns and 8 rockets each. Soon 99 GALLEY reported to HALIFAX:

"HALIFAX - 99 GALLEY. HAVE MADE CONTACT WITH JAP FLEET GROUP. LED BY TWO CA's, ESCORTED BY FIVE DD's AND INCLUDING ONE CV AND ONE CVE."

"THIS IS 99 GALLEY. VICTOR TARES SPLIT UP AND ATTACK THE CA's. VICTOR BAKERS ATTACK CA's AND CV's. THEN TAKE DD's WITH LIGHT CALIBER BOMBS. VICTOR FOXES STRAFE DD's WITH ROCKETS."

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"HALIFAX - 99 GALLEY. AM GOING DOWN TO ATTACK".

Then there was silence. Five minutes later, 99 GALLEY reported that he had sunk one of the cruisers, heavily damaged the other, and dispersed the destroyers. One of the carriers was listing heavily with a destroyer standing by. After his planes had expended their ammo, they returned to base.

Right after this, HALIFAX ordered all stations to observe strict radio silence, and told the planes to switch to VHF, limiting their communications to important messages only. For the rest of the day, there was not so much as a peep on 4950 kc, or any other channel. While looking over the dial in the afternoon, I came over a new frequency where I heard:

"THIS IS NAVY HALIFAX, WE ARE UNDER ATTACK IN LEYTE GULF. CALLING ALL MIKES, ALL NANS. EMERGENCY. EMERGENCY. THIS IS NAVY HALIFAX OUT."

and then, silence. Every now and then an excited voice would come up on 4475 kc, saying something like "GOOD HIT, BIM. I'LL GET THE OTHER ONE," whereupon HALIFAX would say "GET THE HELL OFF THE AIR, YOU - - -" And there we sat, biting our nails all afternoon. Late in the afternoon, HALIFAX notified all planes that they could only land at TAFFY 1, and that TAFFY 2 and 3 have scattered and were under smoke screens. We gathered that the TAFFIES were carrier-groups. The planes were told to land at either Dulag or an airfield that went under the name of "PEPSICOLA BASE". This may have been Tacloban Field, but as I remember, I believe that part of it was still in the hands of the Japs at the time. Some time that evening we found a frequency on which someone was instructing someone else to load all planes with heavy bombs and torpedoes as that was the stuff that did all the good work. He cautioned against letting green pilots up in heavily loaded planes, as some had already messed up the Field in unsuccessful take-offs. He said that he would give the next days instructions on a frequency that he gave in shackle code, and that it was imperative that the Japs were not let in on tomorrow's plans.

We figured this frequency would be in the VHF region, so we didn't bother to look for it, but late that night I accidentally came over a channel on which that same operator was saying "all right," then, "I'll be seeing you in the morning." Well, that was that; we had missed it. The next day there was more silence. The Japs were happy, and many said that the silence

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was due to an American retreat. We let them bask in the sunshine of their thoughts, but not for long, for after the 22nd more and more ground stations came on the air, and even PEPSI-COLA BASE came on the air under the call sign HALIFAX, which to us meant that the Boss himself was ashore. San Francisco said that the Jap fleet had suffered a major defeat, and had been reduced to but a medium-sized task force. The "Manila Tribune" and Tokio Radio said that the Allied fleet had been dispersed and had left the forces on Leyte to the mercy of the Imperial Japanese Army. However, Tokio Radio did not mention how merciful the Imperial Jap Army had proved, by allowing American forces to drive deeper and deeper into the island of Leyte.

Up to now, the Japs had not taken seriously our statement that a landing had been made on Leyte - they believed only what they heard from Tokio Radio. This had a rather confusing effect on the reports they compiled for Headquarters, because whereas we took down traffic which always mentioned troops on shore, American planes on Tacloban airfield, American ships in Tacloban harbor, etc., the Japs had to compile a final report which did not point too much to a landing. Also, when the Japs announced their "victory" over the American and Australian fleets in Leyte Gulf, they mentioned that these fleets were intercepted in an attempted landing by the ever-vigilant Jap fleet, and that the landing had completely failed as a result of the action taken by the Japs, although a "small number of allied personnel had succeeded in reaching the beaches and were being wiped up by local Jap garrison forces." When this report came through, the Japs, believing it, made us understand that we were only operators and that our duty was to copy down traffic - not to voice opinions as if we were senior officers. In other words, we were to hand our copy to the Jap officers and let them do all the thinking. By order of the Commander, "who had been quite upset by our statements which were most untrue and of a careless nature." They further made us understand that if we had been Japanese, it would have been all the worse for us. However, this statement was voiced by a Headquarters representative, and we were later told by KUBO, the Jap who had been put in charge of us by IKUSHIMA because he was useless for anything else, that we had been doing a swell job, and that we knew our stuff, but that the Headquarters gang were a hard-headed lot and had to be given their own way. KUBO was joined in his statement by Ensign Mayeda, a young headquarters officer, who admired and envied us for our ability as operators. Kubo didn't seem to give a damn for his own kind: he had been educated in America and seemed to like foreigners. He also had a soft affection for

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the whisky bottle; going around, with a red face most of the time. Mayeda once told us, "because I am Japanese, I must not discuss it, but to you I can say that I wish the Japanese could fight like Americans. We are too serious in our fighting, while the Americans make a game of it." Nodoubt, he had in mind the many cracks American pilots made while in danger and in the midst of battle. We had made a habit of writing down all the wisecracks we heard, and there were many.

After the 25th, traffic died down to routine messages, and all planes worked on VHF, making it impossible for us to hear them. By this time the Japs had collected an assortment of "operators", who were to work 8-hour shifts parallel with us working on 12-hour shifts. These "operators" were supposed to see that we didn't fall asleep on our beat. One of the fellows the Japs produced was a Portugues-Japanese from Shanghai, by the name of Tommy Silva. We made friends with him quickly, as he proved to be a swell guy. It seems that he used to work as salesman for Yangtze Motors here in Shanghai, and was sent to Manila early in 1944 together with his manager. The manager returned to Shanghai, leaving Silva in Manila - on the lurch -, whereupon the Navy grabbed him and put him to work in our station. He couldn't copy a word to save his life, and it took a couple of weeks before he learned the basic fundamentals of voice communication. He was of very great help to us, because whenever his duty was at night, we used to turn on all the sets in one room and let them blare away, while the three of us moved into another room, shut all the doors and listened to swell music from San Francisco over a bottle of gin or whisky, which the Japs always had in stock. All the Japs slept in an adjoining house, and never got wise to our nightly celebrations. We were, of course, celebrating the Leyte landing, for which we had a special affection, since we knew more about the operation as a whole than any junior officer in the U.S. Army, or Marines at the time. We still think of this landing as if we had actually taken part in it. Our reports on such nights usually read: "2000 to 0400. Little or no traffic of importance on 2716 and 4475 kc. Spent much time looking over dial for channels which might have been operating, but results negative." And really, there was absolutely nothing of important to report on. Even raids on Manila didn't produce much copy, as all communication was on VHF and we had no VHF receiver. The Japs said they would supply us with one soon, but none was forthcoming, probably due to jealousy on the part of the H.Q. staff, who were only too glad to see that our reports were getting smaller and smaller. They, of course, copied down all the unimportant traffic that came through on 2716 kc. This frequency was now being used for harbor-control and messages such as this

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were plentiful:

"JOVIAL 742 from SWEETCORN. PLEASE RELAY TO JOVIAL 748 THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE - THIS IS MY 022125. ACTION JOVIAL 748, INFORMATION JOVIAL 740 and CORDWOOD 340 - REFERENCE YOUR 021630 ITEM ON (HOMFK) KILOCYCLES. AFFIRMATIVE. PLEASE RELAY TO INFO ADDRESSES."

Very informative - what? These messages with reference to previous ones sent on a TARE BAKER SUGAR channel (note five-figure shackles group in the message) were of absolutely no use to anyone but the addressee. However, they were sent and repeated many times, allowing Jap operators opportunity to fill in portions which they missed. The Japs liked this, and as their superiors judged their work by volume, they were happy. We could never get ourselves to copy such trash; thus H.Q. always had the edge on us in bulky reports. It seems that Jap commanders judged their subordinates by efforts expended; not by results achieved.

In the meantime, as I am an ardent "ham", I was greatly intrigued by the possibilities of long-skip VHF signals. I wanted to know just how the sporadic E-layer behaved in tropical regions. With this in mind, I went to our station's repair shop and dug out a 7N7 tube. By the end of the day I had a simple super-regenerative VHF receiver in operation. Our Packard-Bell disc recorder's amplifier section provided plenty of audio gain, and after receiving several grunts of disapproval from our station engineer, who did not like my meddling around with sets before "consulting" with him, I set up a VHF antenna in one of our operating rooms and went to work. I had two coils on the set, one of 5 and the other of two turns. The five turn coil brought in the local airport station and some Jap planes with tremendous volume.

The next time we had a raid, I listened on my set, to the great resentment of my superiors, who gathered that I was merely wasting valuable time. To the delight of my superiors, I was unsuccessful, but I was not discouraged. That evening I made two coils, a one-turn and a half-turn affair. The set would go out of oscillation on the high frequency half of the half-turn coil, but at a point just before that, I noticed a 500-cycle,

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wide-band carrier. Ah! the Manila Radar. I called up Ensign Mayeda and asked him the frequency of the local radar. He was quite reluctant to divulge the "military secret", but after some persuasion intimated that it was in the region of 150 megacycles. After a bit of calculation I discovered that the antenna resonated on that frequency, and a quick check with Lechter wires gave a cross-check, on the antenna length and the truth of Ensign Mayeda's information. The next few days were raid-free, and when finally the sirens blew, I rushed to my receiver, and sure enough, on 141 mc I picked up my pals whom I had not heard for a couple of weeks. In a few minutes, the room was packed with Japs, all jibbering with excitement. The racket they made, supplemented by the loud hiss of the receiver, made it impossible to copy a word. I got sore and chased them all out of the room, including officers. This act they must have planned on our high-strung nerves, for there were no reprisals.

Signals were so thick that it was possible only to get plane calls and scattered portions of target instruction. But when all planes were given orders to return to base, the leader called "1 RELAY BROWNIE" (to keep signals on VHF, relay planes were used to handle traffic between task force and target area) and gave him the results of his attack and suggestions for future sweeps. I noticed that the plane calls were slightly different from previous raids. What would have been 21 BRONCO before, was 21 ABLE BRONCO; and so forth. As soon as their signals died down, we heard a new group in rendezvous over Laguna de Bay using calls with a BAKER prefix. We gathered this was the second wave, and as the "all clear" siren had sounded, we phoned headquarters and told them that a second group was on its way. H.Q. asked us how we knew, and we answered that we had heard planes with BAKER prefixes, and assumed that they were the second wave. H.Q. however, reminded us that we should work more and assume less, and asked what the planes were saying. We answered that they were merely getting rendezvoused, to which H.Q. replied "then why the hell do you think they're coming here?" and hung up. In fifteen minutes we were under a heavy air attack, and the siren had not given warning (the radar did not pick them up, because it was customary of Jap radars to stop as soon as they had picked up enemy planes - to avoid being detected and consequently stop up.) This is how badly Jap tactics stank. Over and over again, after that instance, we could have warned H.Q. of a raid and even of targets, as much as 20 minutes in advance, but after that first experience with their utter stupidity, we did not even try. That day, five waves of planes came over, each wave giving ample warning beforehand.

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Later, however, the Japs merely kept the city under air-raid control all day after the first morning alarm. We often told them that all was clear, but they wouldn't even take our "all clear" information. This was bad for us, because both of us had to stay in the house during emergencies, and both wanted to go over and chat with the gals. In the evening, as we were sitting on the balcony, we saw a car pull up. A couple of colonels had come to visit us. It was customary for us to duck whenever there was brass around the place, so we didn't care to show ourselves much. But when we came into the operating room, we saw something that made us sick. There was our "engineer", showing off my VHF set, and evidently taking credit for it. The army officers were all smiles when we walked in, but as soon as they saw us they gave us a look that hadn't been washed in years, and asked our Japs something that translated probably meant, "who the hell are these tramps?" Our "engineer" answered that we were operators. We stuck around and listened, as we had learned to understand Japanese slightly. It seems that these colonels were asking the "engineer" for a diagram of the set and he was stalling. The army radio technician with them could not make head or tail of my set, and I don't wonder. Wires led from it in all directions - to a communications receiver for power, to the recorder for amplification, and to a throwswitch and a pair of leads with which I could use an indoor or outdoor antenna at will. After the officers left, our engineer asked me to draw him a diagram of the set. Later that evening, as Kazack toyed with the receiver, he noticed that it was being blocked by a strong carrier. Shortly after, a voice began speaking. It was a station on LEYTE, working on 93,000 kc! It was a VHF relay of a radio correspondent broadcasting over the "Voice of Freedom". The signal was so strong that we heard it all over the dial. It blocked our super-regeneration completely. That was the only instance of long distance VHF that I had experienced - a distance of 340 miles!

In November and December there was nothing for us to do but take traffic during raids. The Jap operators had learned how to copy 2716 kc traffic and kept our daily reports long.

I told the Japs that there would probably be a landing somewhere else in the islands on December 8th, to commemorate Pearl Harbor, but they didn't pay much attention. Sure enough, there was an ominous radio silence on the 8th, 9th, and 10th, and then San Francisco announced that Mindoro had been invaded. This got the Japs quite worried, and they told us that in the interests of our safety, they would fly us out in case the fireworks came any closer. We said that we wanted to stay

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"until we saw the whites of their eyes" (and hoped even longer), but orders were orders, and on the night of Dec. 23 we were told that we were to leave the next morning, at five. Shortly before this, when I received a premonition of our departure, I told my girl friend that when the Americans came, she was to get in contact with Intelligence and tell them about us, and also pass on the information that we would try to set up a station in Shanghai (I had salvaged a 4475 kc crystal from some smashed radio equipment off a Grumman, which the Japs gave us) and that our call sign would be DOODLEBUG on 4475 kc. Later, in Shanghai, we almost fainted when we heard DOODLEBUG on 4475 kc. It seems that Clark Field had taken that call, two months after we had reserved it for our own use.

We arrived in Shanghai on Dec. 29th 1944, and after a short rest were put to work in a radio workshop on the 5th floor of the Naval Attache's Office 27, the Bund. After working there a month, and relieving the Japs of a quantity of parts, we were ordered to start the same work we did in Manila. A Dr. Yamamoto was put in charge of us by Ikushima, who had some to Tokyo, and a Mr. Ichijima, Yamamoto's subordinate was given the post of nursemaid to us. We installed the station in 605 Wayfoong House, next door to Ichijima's apartment. Before leaving the workshop, we were told to convert two junk heaps into receivers, and also given a VHF receiver which we rebuilt to suit our needs. Later, I showed Peter how this receiver could be turned into a transmitter by changing one resistor and putting a microphone in the cathode circuit of the detector tube. We reckoned it would come in handy if we had a chance to talk to American planes raiding Shanghai. We never had a chance to use it because we were never alone in our station. However, knowing that it radiated a considerably strong signal even in receiving hoop-up, we played havoc with the local radars by parking our signal on their frequency. We used to play a regular game with them during air raids. Waiting until their beam was directed away from us, we would turn our signal on their frequency. Immediately, the beam would be directed toward us, whereupon we would switch off our carrier. This we used to do for hours on end, and the Japs never succeeded in locating our position.

There was almost nothing to do for some time. Signals from the Philippines on 4475 and 2716 kc. were weak and unreadable, and there were no air raids. The Japs got impatient and in the middle of February, we were visited by Lieutenants Maruyama, Tanaka and Yamawaki of the Secondary H.Q. Listening-Post. The ignorance and great self-assurance of these gentlemen was even worse than anything we had experienced in Manila. All they were interested in was A.T.C. and China Air Bases communication. We

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did not like it when they ordered us to listen to these stations, because they worked ceaselessly and the material sent was either coded operational data or plain language reports on transport-plane movements. However, we did as ordered, and purposely missed the first landings on Iwojima (of course, we followed them on our own). As soon as the Japs noticed these signals, they told us to copy them, not believing that we understood them perfectly. There were the same target designation signals, the same landing craft signals, and the same patrol-plane signals. All this was old stuff to us, but Greek to the Japs.

From then on, we told the Japs that we would concentrate on Naval communication and leave the tiresome China traffic to them. They agreed, as China traffic yielded more bulky reports. We covered the landings on Okinawa, and a few air raids from Okinawa bases on Shanghai. However, there was nothing half as spectacular as what we had seen in the Philippines. We held a transmitter in readiness for any possible invasion in the Shanghai area, but never had a chance to use it. Here is an example of the utter stupidity of the H.Q. boys in Shanghai.

In the first big raid on Shanghai, the call signs of the PBM standbys were PLAYMATE 18, 19, 20 and JUTEBOX 45, 46. Early the next morning, we were waiting for signs of another raid, when we heard JUTEBOX 1 and 2 working with AGATE BASE, which was (in our opinion) IWOJIMA. As soon as the Jap on duty heard these signals, he dashed to the phone and in excited tones notified H.Q. that the raiders had taken off. It took some time to make him understand that these planes were not even from Okinawa. Later we heard PLAYMATES 18, 19, 20 call BOXER (control station of an Okinawa air base), saying that they were orbiting POINT ZEBRA (yesterday's rendezvous point for Shanghai-bound planes) and inquiring as to the whereabouts of JUTEBOX 45 and 46. Now this was the thing we were waiting for, but H.Q. had already sounded the alarm from the report the Jap had put in previously. Our reaction to this was "what's the use," and this reaction prevailed until the end of the war.

Now for a bit of technical data.

Our receiving station in Manila consisted of the following receivers: Two Hammarlund super-Pro's, One Hallicrafter Diversity (out of alignment. Never repaired because engineer said it was in perfect condition), One Hallicrafter Super-petiant, One Hallicrafter Sky Buddy, and two broadcast receivers.

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Two recorders were also on hand, but we never used them. Antennas were put up with no regard for trees or direction.

In Shanghai, we started with one battered RCA 6-tube all wave set, and one GEC 10-tube affair (British made, and calibrated in meters) also a broadcast set. We also had a super-regenerative VHF set with a separate audio amplifier. These sets were later supplemented by another GEC of the same type, and an old Pilot all-wave set, and still later by an AR-77 which we pinched from the German Embassy. When we got the AR-77, we threw away all the junk and used the AR-77 with the two GEC's, which were quitesensitive, as standbys. Still later, in July to be exact, we received a VHF converter (which our engineer had built of parts which had just arrived from Japan. He left Manila for Tokyo in November '44 for the purpose of buying VHF parts. It took 8 months for these parts to finally reach us).

To conclude, I wish to state that the U.S. Navy did a good job in keeping secrets. Anything revealed in voice communication had only momentary value. Only two give-aways are outstanding. One is the shackle code, which I believe can be broken after a few hours of traffic. The other is the ominous radio silence that always precedes a landing, and persistent orders to planes to keep away from groups of shipping, which of course are amphibious forces ready for landing.

I should say that the Japs utterly failed in their radio-snooping. Had the Germans been given as much information, they could have done a lot with it, as they are much more methodical.

I don't believe that as much plain-language voice communication was used in Europe as here in Asia.

MASATO YAMAMOTO was in charge of the Listening Post for the Japanese Navy.

This Post was established in February, 1945, for the purpose of monitoring radio signals only in the Pacific Ocean areas. The first monitoring that was successfully completed was that of the landing at Iwojima. At this time, according to YAMAMOTO, they were able to pick up voice signals from ship to base and from plane to ship but not between ships.

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YAMAMOTO stated that through monitoring voice messages, his office was able to predict the landing at Okinawa approximately two days in advance. However, at Okinawa, the same situation prevailed in that his office was capable only of monitoring messages from base to ship and plane to ship or base, but not from ship to ship. This office was most successful in monitoring bombardment assignments which were given from base to ship every evening.

YAMAMOTO said his section had neither equipment nor operators to monitor CW communications.

TOSHIO NAMBA, the officer in charge of the information and liaison section, stated that approximately March 1945, the Japanese expected a landing by the Allied Forces and picked as the most probable landing point Hangchow Bay, immediately South of Shanghai. It was at this Bay that the Japanese Forced landed in 1937 at the time of the China Incident.

Because of this expected attack on Shanghai by Allied assault forces NAMBA stated that the Army which was the most powerful unit in China took complete charge of communications and defensive positions in and about Shanghai.

NAMBA stated at this time the Navy set up its Listening Post in order to keep itself informed fully of the course of the war. However, the monitoring was very ineffective because of lack of equipment and trained personnel. Radio equipment at Shanghai, according to NAMBA, was depleted and deteriorated to a great extent and no replacements were received from Tokyo. NAMBA stated that the supply of radio tubes was extremely acute and because of this, even Radio Tokyo had on occasion been required to cancel programs. Both the Army and Navy were extremely jealous of communication and refused to allow Japanese civilians to become well acquainted with the work. Although he was a Japanese citizen, NAMBA said he was a civilian and the Navy often was suspicious of him to such an extent that there were numerous communication rooms to which he was forbidden to go although his inferiors who were regular Navy men were not forbidden to enter these rooms. (In addition they did not have sufficient military personnel trained in communications.)

Lt. KATSUHIISA MARUYAMA advised that he entered the Japanese Navy in 1942 and after attending Navy School in Tokyo for six months, he was assigned to Singapore where he was employed as a supply officer. Previous to entering the Navy, MARUYAMA

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stated had completed a business School at Tokyo. In July 1944, MARUYAMA was transferred to Shanghai and shortly thereafter, he was attached to the Listening Post at the China Seas Fleet which was located at Japanese Marine Barracks in Hongkew.

His duty was to monitor the voice section of the American radio. He was also charged with keeping the Navy informed of the status of the Pacific war. This MARUYAMA explained, was necessary, since sufficient information regarding the conflict was not furnished the local office by Tokyo. MARUYAMA stated that his equipment to perform this task was limited to three or four receivers of the RCA and international type manufactured by the United States concerns.

His assistants were three to four Naval Petty officers who did not speak English very well and accordingly were handicapped in their monitoring duties. His office maintained a 24-hour schedule.

MARUYAMA said that the most successful monitoring was done on voice connections from ship to station, from plane to plane, and from plane to ship. His first successful monitoring operation was the landing of the United States Forces at Okinawa. Although this was almost a year after the station had been set up, MARUYAMA, in great embarrassment, explained that while he was monitoring American voice connections, he was not given American speaking personnel with which to do this monitoring and accordingly, it was necessary to train his personnel and while training them, their monitoring activities were extremely unsuccessful and inefficient.

Lt. SHO ADJIMA advised that he was attached to the intelligence communications service of the China Seas Fleet. Prior to his entering the Navy in 1942, ADJIMA had had no previous communications training nor was he given any during his course of study on the Naval Office in Tokyo.

His duties were to detect and monitor the movements of American landing Forces.

ADJIMA stated that he had the following equipment:

Direction Finder 9.3 type, of Japanese make,
10-15 receivers with a range from 300 kc to
15 mc. of the 9.2 type, Japanese make.

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With these equipments ADJIMA stated that he could monitor both voice and CW communications. However, these communications had to be monitored by ear and transcribed as they came through the air, since his office was not equipped with recording machines.

ADJIMA stated that by measuring the velocity, strength, and the call signals of the American Fleet, he was able, he believed with some degree of accuracy, to predict the location of the American ships. However, on one occasion was he able to predict a landing of American Forces.

ADJIMA stated that each day his office sent to Tokyo the location of American ships as shown by his direction finder. Also, American messages in code were sent to Tokyo. No attempt to break the code was made at Shanghai since Tokyo was the clearing house for all coded messages.

b. HISTORIAN

HYOZO HASEGAWA was Naval Historian. He was also connected with the information and liaison section.

(3) The enemy properties control room:

This organization handled the investigation and supervision of enemy properties under the control of the Japanese Navy.

The following are its officers and personnel:

Paymaster-Lt. T. KOBAYASHI	(Oct., 1942 - April 1943)
Paymaster-Lt. T. SUMA	(Feb., 1942 - June 1943)
Paymaster-Lt. N. OGUCHI	(Dec., 1942 - July 1945)
Paymaster-Lt. R. IWAMA	(Dec., 1941 - Oct. 1942)
Paymaster-Lt. KASAHARA	(Dec., 1941 - Oct. 1942)
Paymaster-Lt. T. IKEDA	(July, 1945 - Aug. 1945)

Civilian employee:

K. TERASHIMA (Nov., 1942 - Aug. 1945)

In discussing the operation and duties of his office, Admiral MINATO claimed that at no time was it necessary for his office to set up an intelligence system or intelligence network for the following reasons

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- 1) Tokyo was the center of all intelligence activities and they were directed from Tokyo.
- 2) The Navy had not given his office any funds with which to set up an intelligence network.
- 3) The Navy was not responsible for operations on the China continent, with the exception of Amoy where the Navy had complete jurisdiction and at Hong Kong where the Navy had concurrent jurisdiction with the Army. The Navy was not responsible for the defense of China. Their main activities were limited to blockade the China coast and resisting any assault forces of the Allies.
- 4) During most of the Pacific war, both the Japanese Navy and Army at Shanghai felt itself secure and did not expect an invasion or any activity by the Allies in that area. Then this feeling was dispatched in March 1945, the Army took over the defense of Shanghai and accordingly the Navy had no interest in the espionage activities of Allied nationals, either within or in the vicinity of Shanghai.

KIKANS

Informant advised that the actual intelligence work was carried on for the Japanese Navy by Kikans. In most instances these Kikans were responsible directly to the Japanese Naval Headquarters at Tokyo, Japan, since this was Headquarters for all intelligence information. In many instances, these Kikans did not report intelligence information to the Shanghai Naval Headquarters.

In some instances, Kikans were organized for special and specific purposes, such as the SAKURA Kikan, and when its mission was completed, the Kikans dissolved. In other instances Kikans were organized by the local Naval Headquarters to complete their mission and to follow directives sent to them from Tokyo. The most usual mission of the Kikan was to obtain economic material and data in China.

Among the Kikans which reportedly were organized and directly controlled by the Imperial Japanese Navy were the following :-

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1. MANWA [REDACTED]

The firm of MANWA was established in 1937 soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, by YUI MATAO, an old China hand.

MANWA began operations on a small scale because of its inability to secure substantial financial aid. Prior to the Pacific War, its staff of about ten persons negotiated small purchases for the local Japanese Army and Navy. With the outbreak of the war, however, MANWA became quite active in the Shanghai purchasing market.

At the very outset of the war, MANWA was known to possess no capital to launch into large scale business. With every indication of a huge upward tendency in large business dealings, YUI, the President of MANWA, decided that the only way to obtain sizeable financial assistance from any of the large banks would be to enlist the support of the Japanese Navy. After this decision YUI invited the services of Vice-Admiral TANNAWA TOSHIO, retired from active service. TANNAWA readily agreed to aid MANWA. Because of his rank and connections, as a contact man for MANWA with the Japanese Navy, Vice-Admiral TANNAWA proved invaluable. He opened the road to a sudden briskness in the business dealings of MANWA.

MANWA was registered at the Shanghai Japanese Consulate under the name of TOKUMI KUMIAI, (Amalgamated Organization). Since it was an Amalgamated Organization, MANWA's huge profits immediately were invested in the organization to expand its business into diversified fields. MANWA soon became known as the GO YO SHO NIN, or the specified buyers or merchants of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The operations of MANWA seemed outwardly to be under the complete control of the Japanese Navy. There are, however, reports, unverified at this time, that this situation was not necessarily so.

In its position of controlling MANWA, the Imperial Japanese Navy had no difficulties in placing personnel in the organization, dictating to the organization, and controlling its policy. There are reports that MANWA was the leading espionage organization of the Imperial Japanese Navy in China and South-east Asia. These reports, unverified at present, are being investigated.

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Shanghai is not a large manufacturing center, and cargoes existing here at the time of the war were all imported from foreign countries. These cargoes the Chinese put away in a very clever way and were unaffected by the various proclamations issued by the Japanese Army against such goods. Although such statements were issued by the Japanese, they lacked initiative, system, and organization to round up these goods, for which they were willing to pay fabulous prices.

In its advantageous position of knowing in advance the exact requirements of the Japanese Navy, and what their immediate future requirements would be, MANWA, in a quiet manner, would start buying the required goods in the local market. As the Navy orders came through, MANWA, in a very conspicuous manner, would make reorders to every seller, broker, and commission agent.

The issuance of such orders was immediately known to the business world. The influential cargo owners would then adopt a "Wait and see" policy to observe the price fluctuation. Once buying began prices skyrocketed. For instance, prior to the issuance of orders by the Japanese Navy, an item such as carbon steel of about 70% and 30% manganese content would be quoted at CRB \$30.00 per pound. When buying began, the price would jump to anywhere from CRB \$120.00 to CRB \$150.00 per pound.

By that time, however, MANWA had purchased for the Navy all of its requirements. This would be delivered to the Navy at the prevailing market price. By this method MANWA built up a huge capital.

The position of MANWA as the GO YO SHO NIN for the Imperial Japanese Navy was well known in the Shanghai business world. Funds were issued by banks at the suggestion of the Navy, for banks were glad to render aid to MANWA knowing that their investments would be good. The market continued to show a steady upward trend, and MANWA's profits were enormous.

MANWA's capital and assets cannot be accurately determined because they were invested in the purchase of various commodities in the local market. A good estimate, however, would be about one-half of the SHOWA TSUSHO, information regarding the SHOWA TSUSHO is being collected at the present time. MANWA's cargoes and assets were impounded by the Chinese authorities upon the cessation of hostilities. The source of this information is, therefore, unable to give more exact details.

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Informant stated that the office of MANWA in Shanghai was located at 53 Foochow Road. This building at 53 Foochow Road is occupied by the Strategic Services Unit, United States Army.

Because of the demands made on it by the Imperial Japanese Navy, and with its mountainous funds, MANWA diversified its operations into many fields. MANWA operated its own ships, but this enterprise was shortlived because of wide spread and systematic Allied submarine operations in the Pacific. MANWA started transport of cargo on the KINKON MARU 2000 tons. This vessel was sunk off Singapore. The TENWA MARU, 300 tons, was sunk between Taiwan and Fukushu. IZURE MARU, 1600 tons, an old ship with forty years service, was sunk off Amoy while in transit from Indo-China. Unable to purchase or charter other ships, this project was kept in abeyance. Chartering, however, was actually being done on a very small scale.

Under the MANWA LUMBER COMPANY lumber was purchased from the interior of China in great quantities. This lumber Company it is reported, was fully controlled by the Japanese Navy. How the profits were shared, or the basis on which the work was performed, is not known. In name, however, the company was controlled by MANWA.

MANWA was reported to own a Receiving and Transmitting Station, but actually this station did not belong to them. The Japanese Navy (BU KAN FU) had full control of this station, and naval personnel only was hired to do the work. But since the Navy did not have ample funds to operate this station, they had apparently obtained assistance from MANWA to pay the staff and expenditures.

MANWA is reported to have operated an alcohol distillery in Pootung. This distillery is said to have been the largest of its kind in the Shanghai area. No further details are available at this time.

MANWA extended its activities to cover China and Southeast Asia by establishing branch offices.

The following list of places where MANWA had branch offices was furnished by Admiral MINATO:

C H I N A:

AMOY
CANTON
CHANGSHA

NANKING
PENGPU
PEPING

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CHANGTE (HOPEI PROVINCE)	SHANGHAI
FOOCHOW	SHIHMEN
CHEINGKIANG	SINGSIANG (HONAN PROVINCE)
HANKOW	TIENTSIN
HANTAN (HOPEI PROVINCE)	TSINGTAO
HONGKONG	TSINAN
KIUKIANG	WUFU

FRENCH INDO-CHINA:

BANGKOK
HANOI
HAIPHONG
SAIGON

HAINAN ISLAND:

HOIHOW
YULI

MAKASSER:

BALIKPAPAN
BANDYERMASIN
JAKARTA
PONTIANAK
SURABAYA
SINGAPORE

JAPAN:

FUKUOKA
NAGASAKI
OSAKA
TOKYO
WAKAMATSU

PHILIPPINES:

MANILA

The Hankow branch was initiated about two years ago for the same purpose as its mother company, that is, purchasing for the Navy. The same is true of the Peking and Tientsin offices which operated for about a year and a half.

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The Peking and Tientsin branches were operated under many difficulties because this area was under the control of the Japanese Army, with hardly a Navy man around. Financially they also met with obstacles since the head office in Shanghai would not make monetary remittances because of the low exchange rate. These offices were also capitalized as limited companies, which added to their troubles. FUKUOKA who had been the manager of the head office in Shanghai was especially appointed to deal with this situation in the northern offices. Nothing, however, is known of his activities.

Of the many branch offices the one which proved most active and profitable was that of Hongkong. Other outposts such as Saigon, Bangkok, Celebes, and Borneo were very inactive.

2. SAKURA KIKAN

In June 1943, Admiral Shushin NAGANO, Chief of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo, Japan, sent to China Commander Tokuji OKAMURA as an emissary to investigate possibilities of talking Peace with Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-Shek. After arriving in Shanghai, OKAMURA consolidated his mission with Commander OTANI of the Naval Office at Shanghai, Information and Liaison Section.

Commander OTANI called to Chungking agents CHENG Dah Tung and LIN Fu, for a conference with Commander OKAMURA. After numerous meetings, they agreed upon the following points:

1. The Navy should furnish them a wireless installation for contacting Chungking,
2. The Navy should protect their lives and allow them certain activities,
3. The Navy should furnish them with material support.

After the last conference, Commander OKAMURA established his Office on the 13th Floor of the Hamilton House at Shanghai and called it the SAKURA KIKAN. He hired TOMIKAWA, KUROZAWA, KIRA and ZAWAI, and placed them in his Office to collect information from and about Chungking.

CHENG Dah Tung, an agent from General PEH Hsung Hsi, established the Shin Hwa Trading Company on Jinkee Road, to provide himself with cover as a merchant. Thereafter he despatched messages to General PEH Hsung Hsi.

LIN Fu went to Peking to contact his superior TSENG Tsai, Chief of the Chinese Young Men's Party.

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The plan of the Sakura Kikan was to buy off the democratic Parties through the influence of the Chinese Young Men's Party on the one hand, and on the other hand, to get the assistance and collaboration of Generals PEH Hsung Hsi and LEE Chung Jin, and with their influence to press Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-Shek to sign the Peace agreement favorable to Japan.

In order to facilitate their work, the Sakura Kikan planned to bring large amounts of gold bars from Japan to China by submarine.

This plan for Peace with China was reported to WANG Ching-Wei who protested to TOJO and SHIGEMITSU in Tokyo. TOJO immediately ordered Admiral NAGANO to stop this movement. The Kikan, failing to complete its mission, was closed in November 1943.

3. KENTAI YOKO

This organization was founded by Captain KOBETTO, of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai. The purpose was to collect information from Chinese circles through the medium of economic transactions. The manager of KENTAI YOKO was TOKITARO FURUKAWA. He dealt mainly in exchange, cargo, in the port of Wenchow, China, and through his Chinese agents, he collected information regarding Chungking Chinese.

4. THE SHINGISHI KIKAN

Which, it is reported, was operated by Naval officers under direct control of Navy Headquarters, Tokyo. This organization is said to have submitted information and carried on instructions received from Tokyo without consulting Shanghai Naval Headquarters except in minor cases.

5. KODAMA KIKAN

In November 1943, MIZUTA MITSUYOSHI, head of the TOKO YOKO, was found murdered in Broadway Mansions at Shanghai China. No official investigation into this murder was conducted by the Japanese Gendarmerie, which has been pointed out as a fact, which indicates that his murder was ordered from official circles. KODAMA YOSHIO was ordered to take over the management of the TOKO YOKO. KODAMA promptly changed to the Company of the KODAMA KIKAN and hired a large number of ruffians to do intelligence work. He bought up military supplies, and was instrumental in causing inflations. Under KODAMA, the people suffered untold hardships.

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KODAMA was arrested in Japan in 1932 and charged with communistic activities. It is reported he was released in 1936, upon intervention of TATUNO KAWAI, who, at one time was spokesman of the GAIMUSHO, and is now President of the Board of Information. KAWAI gave KODAMA ¥3,000.- and arranged for him to visit China. Upon arrival in China, KODAMA became acquainted with the Japanese Naval Office at Shanghai.

It is reported that Vice-Admiral YAMAGATA, who was Chief of the Navy Air Corps, sent KODAMA to China for the purpose of collecting strategic material for the Japanese Navy. It is believed that KODAMA delivered ¥3,000,000,000.- worth of such material to the Japanese Navy. This material reportedly was collected in China through various means during the last war. KODAMA is reported to have made a personal fortune of \$3,200,000,000.-

KODAMA is reported to have been a member of the Kenkoku Kai (Black Dragon Society), Aikoku Kai (Patriotic Society), Kyo Youth Association, and Kokusai Daishu To (People's National Party).

In addition to the KODAMA Organization, it is reported that in 1941, KODAMA engaged in collecting military material in North and South China and established the Aiko Steel Factory for this purpose. He also reportedly manufactured military equipment. KODAMA is reported to have close connections with Major-General KAIGESA, of the UME KIKAN, who established the temporary Nanking Government.

To aid in the collection of strategic military equipment in China, KODAMA reportedly entrusted considerable work to the IWATA brothers.

6. IWATA KIKAN

The IWATA Kikan was organized and operated by the IWATA brothers, YUKIO and SAGIHO. It was their duty to collect transmitting equipment and machinery for the KODAMA organization.

It has been reported that IWATA YUKIO was the right-hand man of KODAMA and that after the war IWATA represented KODAMA's interests in China.

7. AGMOL

AGMOL was established in Shanghai by Andrew and George MOLOSTVOW, from which it derives its name. George MOLOSTVOW attended WASEDA University in Tokyo, and speaks fluent Japanese.

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AGMOL have offices in Tientsin, at Peking and Saigon. The Saigon office reportedly was closed in 1944.

AGMOL operated in conjunction with MANWA and was organized for the purpose of collecting material in China for the Japanese Navy. Most of the material collected by AGMOL was reported to be jewels, gold, and precious metals of various kinds, as well as gasoline.

AGMOL also, at the request of the Japanese Navy, is reported to have collected information throughout China regarding economical and political affairs. In view of extensive operations and a limited staff, it has been reported that AGMOL was not a very active collector of intelligence.

8. OTHERS

The following organizations were reported to have been formed by and operated under the control of the Japanese Navy at Shanghai and Tokyo:

TAI KONAN
RINTAI YOKO
KOGA KIKAN
TOWA YOKO
MARUNAGA SHODEN
MATSUZAKAYA
KORYU YOKO
FUKUDAI KONSU
MARISHODEN

KENDAI SHOJI
NIPPON YUSHI
EDAI YOKO
SHIATRAKIYA
KONAN KONSU
KOA SHOJI KAISHA
KONKO KONSU
KONAN SHANKYO
TOKA YOKO
HOKAMEI YOKO

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JAPANESE NAVY AND SOVIETS AT SHANGHAI, CHINA.

The primary function, from the Japanese point of view in regard to the Soviets, was to collect information regarding the intellect of the Soviets and to win their friendship and their goodwill, as relationship between the Soviets and the Japanese became of paramount importance. Efforts to complete this mission were intensified.

In order to obtain the goodwill of the Soviets, as well as to collect as much available information as possible from them, the RYUKO YOKO was set-up. This was reportedly a trading firm. Actually, however, it did no business whatsoever. Its main purpose was to promote trading and commercial relations between the Japanese and the U.S.S.R.

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This firm was amply supplied with many Army and Naval purchasing offices. Its personnel was recruited from experienced Soviet experts in the Japanese Army and Navy. Among the personnel were IMAVA, ISODA, TELIRA, KUROKI and EBINA.

RYUKO YOKO attempted to influence local Soviet citizens and business organizations, such as the MOSCOW NORODNY Bank, Soviet Citizen's Club and the TASS Organization so that favorable reports regarding the Japanese would be transmitted to Moscow and the Soviet Embassy at Tokyo.

Information on anything regarding the Soviets was gathered with alacrity and thoroughness, especially on matters relating to the position of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East.

Attempts were made to bribe the members of the local Soviet community who were thought to have "faze" with their countrymen or who had any connections in Japan, some influence in Tokyo or Moscow. Soviet citizens usually were allowed every convenience and facility in their daily life. Japanese firms presented them with valuable presents, especially commodities, which were at a premium during the war. One particular form of bribery was as follows:- the cash shortage in Shanghai was severe and at one time 30-40% premium was necessary to obtain cash. During these months, prior to the capitulation of Japan, Japanese firms supplied Soviet citizens with cash, thus making them huge presents. The Japanese presented the Soviet citizens with CRB\$100,000,000,000 - in cash. This amount could be sold on the open market for \$130,000,000,000 - thus the officials gained to the extent of \$30,000,000,000 -.

In addition, presents were made to official Soviet organizations whenever an opportunity presented. IMAVA was reported to have made many gifts to Soviet charities, including the Soviet Red Cross, contributions to Soviet war damaged areas, etc. It is reported only a small amount of this sum was passed on for official purposes.

Upon the occasion of the surrender of Germany, the Soviets gave a large party at the Paramount Hotel in Shanghai. The expenses for this party were paid by the Japanese through IMAVA.

Commander SHIMURA reportedly had the task of developing friendly relations with the TASS Agency. SHIMURA came to Shanghai in February 1944 as a Staff Officer of the China Seas Fleet. In Tokyo SHIMURA was acquainted with AGREVEEF, Commercial Attache of the Soviet Consulate who arranged an introduction for him with

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M. T. MOLTCHANOFF, Press Attache of the Soviet Consulate at Shanghai and N. I. SHVETZOFF, the Manager of the TASS Agency in China whose office was in Shanghai.

The assistants to Commander SHIMURA, Sub-Lt. TSUBOUCHI and Mr. HIDE, succeeded in becoming acquainted with V.A. VALIN, President of the Soviet Club, and KULESH, the Editor of "NEW LIFE".

After many unofficial invitations, and through bribery, it is reported, the Japanese succeeded in obtaining the cooperation of the Soviets in exchanging information regarding political development in Europe and troop movements.

Through the assistance of the Japanese Navy, the TASS Agency in Shanghai received many conveniences, among which were the installation of telephones, wireless, passes in curfew time and etc. At one time it was reported that the TASS Agency and the Japanese Navy cooperated very closely.

In November 1944, M.F. YAKUSHAMIN arrived in Shanghai and through his interference and that of V.V. CHILIKIN, the Editor of the "RUSSIAN DAILY NEWS", the cooperation between the Japanese Navy and the Soviets declined.

Until the declaration of war by Soviets against Japan, Commander SHIMURA made every effort to hold his connections and offered his assistance to obtain the cooperation of the Soviets in the Shanghai area.

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
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A. The following chart showing the organization of BANWA was furnished by Admiral MINATO :-



SECRET

SECRETB. LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION, MANWA

MANAGING DIRECTOR	AWA, Toshio (FUKUOKA Prefecture) 110 Yueh-Yang Road Telephone 74130
DIRECTOR	YUHI, Matao (TOKYO) 349 Chahar Road Telephone 21275
MANAGER, EXECUTIVE DEPT.	YOKOYAMA, Ichiro (OKAYAMA Prefecture) 233 T'ai-Yuan Road
ASST. DIRECTOR, EXECUTIVE DEPT.	KASUYA, Kenseburo (IBARAGI Prefecture) 110 Yueh-Yang Road Telephone 74130
EXECUTIVE DEPT.	GOTA, Koichi (HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	SHIMAZU, Shizuo (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	TSURUDA, Yukinori (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	KURAMOTO, Masumi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	SASAKI, Kazuo (TOKYO)
" "	SATO, Eiji (YAMANASHI Prefecture)
" "	SAKURAI, Kazuo (SHIZUOKA Prefecture)
" "	YANG, Po-Shou (FORMOSA)
" "	TAMAKI, Ikuo (TOKYO)
" "	TOYODA, Takao (KAGAWA Prefecture)
" "	NAKASHIMA, Kojiro (YAMANASHI Prefecture)
" "	HITAKA, Goichi (FUKUOKA Prefecture)
" "	SAITO, Tadao (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	NISHIMOTO, Jiro (YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)
" "	HAGA, Shozaburo (FUKUSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	MAEDA, Daisuke (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	ARIMURA, Kumazo (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)

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EXECUTIVE DEPT.			
		SHIMODA, Tokudo	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	"	ASAEDA, Munoo	(SHIMANE Prefecture)
"	"	TAGAMI, Taka	(FUKUOKA Prefecture)
"	"	WATANABE, Masafumi	(OITA Prefecture)
"	"	FUKUNAGA, Momoe	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	"	SATO, Tsunao	(OITA Prefecture)
"	"	TANIGUCHI, Michiko	(HYOGO Prefecture)
"	"	SUZUKI, Kenji	(TOKYO)
"	"	ISHII, Hisako	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	SAKAMOTO, Mokuzan	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	YAMAMOTO, Haru	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	KATO, Tanosuke	(IWATE Prefecture)
"	"	KANAYA, Tsuruko	(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
"	"	MATSUZAKI, Noboru	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	ADACHI, Hisako	(ISHIKAWA Prefecture)
"	"	MASUDA, Sadaji	(TOCHIGI Prefecture)
"	"	TANAKA, Mineko	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	TOKUYAMA, Nezae	(KOREA)
"	"	KIBASHI, Hanako	(KANAGAWA Prefecture)
"	"	YASUKAWA, Mariko	(SAGA Prefecture)
"	"	TAKAHASHI, Takako	(CHIBA Prefecture)
"	"	MIYAJI, Yoshie	(SAGA Prefecture)
"	"	OTA, Tsugio	(MIE Prefecture)
"	"	AOKI, Emiko	(HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	TANAKA, Nobumi	(HYOGO Prefecture)
"	"	KAWANO, Etsuko	(GIFU Prefecture)

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EXECUTIVE DEPT.		
" "	NAKAO, Nobu	(SAGA Prefecture)
" "	HANJO, Tokio	(FUKUSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	KAWAKAMI, Hisatatsu	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	HIRANO, Eiko	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	ISO, Tokijiro	(IBARAGI Prefecture)
" "	YATSUYA, Makoto	(HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
	901 Embankment Building	
	North Szechow Road	
	Telephone 44795	
" "	SEKI, Jiro	(IWATE Prefecture)
" "	MATSUBARA, Hidebumi	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	FUJITANI, Tekuo	(TOTTORI Prefecture)
" "	KAKIUCHI, Tokiko	(GIFU Prefecture)
" "	OGURA, Mitsuru	(MIYAGI Prefecture)
" "	TSUCHIYA, Chiyoeko	(HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	SASAKI, Tashiro	(IWATE Prefecture)
	Third Floor - A, Ward Building	
	625 Szechuen Road	
" "	HONJO, Kiyonori	(YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)
" "	SHIRAHAMA, Enso	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	DOHI, Masutaro	(TOTTORI Prefecture)
" "	TAKANO, Chuji	(IBARAGI Prefecture)
" "	AKIMOTO, Shigeru	(YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)
" "	MAEKAWA, Junichi	(HYOGO Prefecture)
" "	TAKESA, Tokuju	(ISHIKAWA Prefecture)
" "	IWAZAKI, Yeshimichi	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	YIZUNO, Juhaku	(TOKYO)
" "	MATSUMOTO, Saburo	(TOKYO)

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EXECUTIVE DEPT.

"	SAKAI, Kenzo	(HOKKAIDO)
"	MITSUDA, Takashi	(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
"	MIYASHITA, Shigeto	(NAGANO Prefecture)
"	TAMADA, Kiyoshi	(KANAGAWA Prefecture)
"	HARA, Takehiko	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	YAMAMOTO, Isaku	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	TAGAWA, Masao	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	MISHIZUMI, Keiji	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	MAGATAKI, Antaro	(TOSHIKI Prefecture)
"	ITANI, Akira	(WAKAYAMA Prefecture)
"	OTSURA, Makitaro	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	MAGANO, Yoneo	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	NAKAI, Masashi	(HYOGO Prefecture)
"	KANAMATA, Saburo	(IWATE Prefecture)
"	OKAZAKI, Shinjiro	(KOCHI Prefecture)
"	SASAKI, Kikujiro	(IWATE Prefecture)
"	MIKAWA, Kikuso	(FUKUSHIMA Prefecture)
"	NAKAYAMA, Kotoku	(IWATE Prefecture)
"	MATSUSHITA, Shigeru	(HYOGO Prefecture)
"	TAKESHITA, Setsuko	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
"	IWANAMI, Seichu	(NAGANO Prefecture)
"	HIRANUMA, Tomino	(KOREA)
"	AMANO, Shigeo	(AICHI Prefecture)
"	TAKENAKA, Yukie	(OITA Prefecture)
"	TAMAGUCHI, Takeyoshi	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	OKATA, Kunio	(SAGA Prefecture)

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" "

ZNAGAKI, Rokusaburo (TOKYO)

" "

ODA, Waichi (KYOTO)

" "

TERADA, Kikuo (OSAKA)

" "

UEHARA, Keido (IWATE Prefecture)

" "

ARAKI, Fumitake (TOKYO)

" "

NISHIMURA, Hideichi (KANAGAWA Prefecture)

" "

IWATSUBO, Ryoichi (FUKUOKA Prefecture)

" "

KAWAI, Kaoru (KAGAWA Prefecture)

" "

ABE, Hisajiro (KANAGAWA Prefecture)

" "

NAMISHIMA, Masamichi (KANAGAWA Prefecture)

" "

MASUNAGA, Akinori (NAGASAKI Prefecture)

" "

ZAKIGA, Haruo (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)

" "

MATSUO, Sadayochi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)

" "

ADACHI, Yoshiaki (AICHI Prefecture)

" "

FUKUDA, Toshishige (KUMAMOTO Prefecture)

" "

SUGIHARA, Daisaburo (HIROSHIMA Prefecture)

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BUSINESS DEPT.		
"	"	SHIMOYAMA, Yoshiharu (GUMMA Prefecture)
"	"	BESSO, Koichi (MIYAGI Prefecture)
"	"	NUMATA, Akira (MIYAGI Prefecture)
"	"	KOSHINAKA, Michizo (YAMAGATA Prefecture)
"	"	KBINUMA, Yoshimi (TOCHIGI Prefecture)
"	"	OSHIRO, Noboru (HYOGO Prefecture)
"	"	HASEJIMO, Kazumasa (MIYAZAKI Prefecture)
"	"	MATSUDA, Nobutada (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	ODA, Morizo (FUKUOKA Prefecture)
"	"	KATO, Masaichi (TOKYO)
"	"	SERITA, Teruo (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	ZSHII, Ryoichi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	MAEDA, Sakae (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	GAISO, Nori (MIYAGI Prefecture)
"	"	SATO, Teisaburo (OITA Prefecture)
"	"	KUHARA, Fusayuki (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	YANO, Hatsue (GUMMA Prefecture)
"	"	HATANO, Kiyoshige (YAMANASHI Prefecture)
"	"	ANDO, Minoru (OITA Prefecture)
"	"	ISOBE, Katsujiro (KYOTO)
"	"	KADAFUKU, Masami (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	TACHIBANA, Takatomio (HIROSHIMA Prefecture)
"	"	NAKAMURA, Yonstoshi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	HIRATA, Kiyoshi (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
"	"	SAKAMOTO, Keiko (KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
"	"	SATO, Masaharu (YAMAGATA Prefecture)

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BUSINESS DEPT.	NAKAI, Fujiko	(OKAYAMA Prefecture)
" "	SAIKI, Kenji	(SAGA Prefecture)
" "	MINE, Sai	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	KAMIYAMA, Takashi	(KANGAWA Prefecture)
" "	TANAKA, Michi	(HYOGO Prefecture)
" "	FUKUDA, Kaichi	(AICHI Prefecture)
" "	SAKITA, Shigeno	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	OTSUKU, Yoshio	(SAITAMA Prefecture)
" "	ARIMATSU, Akiko	(YAMAGUCHI Prefecture)
" "	HIROKAWA, Shuichi	(KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	ADACHI, Teruko	(ISHIKAWA Prefecture)
" "	FUJIMORI, Torao	(MIYAGI Prefecture)
" "	YAMANAKA, Sadako	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	KUNIKAWA, Shigehira	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	TAKI, Kiyoko	(SAGA Prefecture)
" "	KURADA, Kosaku	(KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
MANAGER, FINANCE DEPT.	MIURA, Takeshi	(HYOGO Prefecture)
	13 Green Villa Terrace	
	Shang-To Road	
	Telephone 02-61481	
FINANCE DEPT.	HASEGAWA, Motoaki	(KYOTO)
" "	MABE, Hiroshi	(FUKUSHIMA Prefecture)
" "	WADA, Junichi	(TOCHIGI Prefecture)
" "	NISHIO, Kiyohiko	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)
" "	MURAKAMI, Chojiro	(KYOTO)
" "	MIBASHI, Iohinari	(CHIBA Prefecture)
" "	HIRANO, Yasuichi	(NAGASAKI Prefecture)

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FINANCE DEPT.

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
" "

MIYAHARA, Mitsuo (KUMAMOTO Prefecture)
 ONO, Kenjiro (KAGOSHIMA Prefecture)
 OTSUGU, Hiroaki (SAITAMA Prefecture)
 MAGARIBUCHI, Kikuji (SAGA Prefecture)
 YAMANAKA, Iwao (NAGASAKI Prefecture)
 MOZORO, Kane (FUKUOKA Prefecture)
 ABE, Kiyoko (OITA Prefecture)
 NANAURA, Hiruko (SAGA Prefecture)
 FUJII, Yoriko (OKAYAMA Prefecture)
 WAIZUMI, Yasuo (KOCHI Prefecture)

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C. Chart showing organization of KODAMA KIKAN.



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D.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATAPERSONAL BACKGROUND OF OUTSTANDING OFFICERS
OF JAPANESE CHINA SEAS FLEET

Vice-Admiral RYOZO FUKUDA Born Nov. 1, 1890. Entered Naval Academy, 1907. Midshipman in 1910. Assigned to sea duties for next two years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1912. Entered the Naval Torpedo School, 1913, for six months. Again sea duties for three years.

Entered the Naval Staff College, 1916, as Class B student and stayed there for six months. Entered the Naval Torpedo School again for six months before assigned to sea duties for two years.

Entered the Naval Staff College as Class A student, 1919. Instructor at Naval Submarine School, 1921-22. Sea duties, 1922-25, as staff officer of a combat unit.

Promoted to the rank of Lt. Commander, Dec., 1923. Instructor at the Naval Staff College, 1925-28. Sea duties as a fleet staff officer, 1928-33. Promoted to Commander, Dec., 1928, and to Captain, Nov., 1933. Again instructor at the Naval Staff College, 1933-35. Made one-year official trip abroad visiting America and Europe.

Sea duties, April, 1938 - Nov., 1939. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Nov., 1939. The Hainan Island Garrison, 1939-40. Member of the Naval General Staff, Dec., 1940 - April, 1941. Served at the Amoy liaison office of the East Asia Development Board (Koain), May, 1941 - July, 1942. Promoted to Vice-Admiral, May, 1942. Member of the Naval General Staff, Aug., 1942 - Sept., 1942. The 22nd Naval Base and the Takao Garrison, Oct., 1942 - May, 1945. Commander-in-Chief of the China Seas Fleet, May, 1945.

Vice-Admiral NAOMASA SAKONJU Born June 6, 1890. Entered the Naval Academy, 1909. Midshipman, 1912. Sea duties until 1914. Promoted to First Sub-Lt., 1913, Sub-Lt., 1915, Lieutenant, 1919, after three years' sea duties. Sea duties again before promoted to Lt. Commander, 1925.

After three years' sea duties, promoted to Commander, Dec., 1930. Ground duties, Dec., 1930 - March, 1933. Assigned to the Japanese Naval Office in Manchukuo for two years.

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Promoted to Captain, Feb., 1935. Commander of the Tokyo Naval Communication Corps, 1935-36. Captain of HMS Settsu, 1936-38. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, 1938-40. Chief of Staff of the Maizuru Naval Station, Oct., 1940 - Sept., 1941. Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, Sept., 1941 - Sept., 1943. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Oct., 1941. Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Combat Unit, Sept., 1943 - Nov., 1944. Promoted to Vice-Admiral, Oct., 1944. Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1944.

Rear Admiral KANJI OGAWA

Entered the Naval Academy, 1912. Midshipman, 1915. After three years' sea duties, attended the gunnery and torpedo classes. Attended the advanced gunnery class, 1921-22. After sea duties for two years, served as instructor at the gunnery school, Dec., 1924 - Dec., 1925. Promoted to Lt. Commander, Dec., 1925. Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy in Washington, June, 1928 - June, 1930. After two months' sea duties, placed on the waiting list due to illness. Inactive for one year. Staff officer of the Naval General Staff, 1931; and section chief of the Naval General Staff until Feb., 1939. Promoted to Commander, 1932, and to Captain, 1936.

Again Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy at Washington, 1939 - Nov., 1940. The Chief of the Third Section of the Naval General Staff, 1940-42. Promoted to Rear Admiral, Nov., 1942. Assigned to the Cabinet's War Prosecution Institute, Dec., 1942 - Jan., 1945. Assistant Chief of Staff of the China Seas Fleet, Feb., 1945.

Captain YASUZATO TANABE

Born March 15, 1898. Entered the Naval Engineering School, 1916. Engineering Midshipman, 1919. Again entered the Naval Engineering School after two years' sea duties. Three years' regular duties including one year and a half's service at the Kure Marine Corps. Entered the Naval Staff College as an engineering student, Dec., 1926 - Dec., 1928. Fleet staff officer, 1929-31. The Maizuru Naval Port, Nov., 1931-33. Promoted to Engineer Lt. Commander, 1931. After one year of sea duties, served as staff officer of the Kure Naval Station, 1934-36. Promoted to Engineer Commander in 1936.

Instructor at the Naval Engineering School, 1937-39. Sea duties, Nov., 1939 - July, 1942. Promoted to Engineer Captain, Oct., 1941. Instructor at the Naval Engineering College, 1942-43. Assistant Chief of Staff at the Kure Naval Station, Jan., 1945 - July, 1945. Chief of Supplies, Engineering Commander, Chief of the Naval Transportation Section of the China Seas Fleet.

SECRET

SECRETCaptain MASANORI ODAGIRI

Born Oct. 2, 1904. Entered the Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman, 1924. Sub-Lt. after one year and a half on a training ship and submarine. Lieutenant after three years' service on destroyer and cruiser. After one year at the advanced class of the Naval Academy, assigned to a battleship for one year. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1934. Entered the Naval Staff College, Nov., 1934 - Nov., 1936. Served on a cruiser for one year before assigned to ground duties (the Naval Staff College, the Bureau of Naval Construction, the Naval General Staff).

Promoted to Commander, 1940. Served on an aircraft carrier, May, 1941 - July, 1942. The Naval Academy, July, 1942 - March, 1945. Promoted to Captain, Oct., 1944. Assigned to the Headquarters of the China Seas Fleet, March, 1945.

Captain TAKEO KATO

Born May 24, 1902. Entered the Naval Engineering School, and Engineer Midshipman, 1924. After three years on sea, entered again the Naval Engineering School. Seven years on sea duties. Entered the Naval Engineering College, 1934. Promoted to Engineer Lt. Commander, 1936. After one year on sea, served as instructor at the Naval Engineering School. Again sea duties, Dec., 1939 - May, 1941. Staff officer of the Naval Station June, 1941 - April, 1942. Assigned to the Bureau of Naval Construction, May, 1942 - August, 1943. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, August, 1944. Promoted to Captain, May, 1945.

Captain TOSHIO KONDO

Born Nov. 8, 1904. Entered the Naval Academy, 1921. Midshipman, 1924. After two years of sea duties, studied at the Naval Torpedo School, the Naval Gunnery School, Six years of sea duties, 1927-33. Entered the Naval Communications School, 1933-34. Again five years on sea. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1937. Served as instructor at the Naval Communications School, June, 1939 - April, 1940. Staff officer of a combat unit, May, 1940 - Sept., 1940. Instructor at the Naval Submarine School, Oct., 1940 - March, 1942. Fleet staff officer, April, 1942 - Nov., 1943. Promoted to Commander, 1942. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Nov., 1943. Promoted to Captain, Sept., 1945.

Commander HEIYACHIRO TANIOKA

Born Dec. 29, 1905. Entered the Naval Academy, 1923. Midshipman, 1926. After two years' sea duties, entered the Naval Staff College as junior student, majoring in Chinese language. Served at the Shanghai Naval Base Command, the Shanghai Japanese Special Naval Landing Party, the Naval General

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Staff, Sept., 1934 - Nov., 1938. Promoted to Lt. Commander, 1938. Entered the Naval Staff College, 1938-40. Staff officer of the Amoy Naval Base Command, April 1940 - Oct., 1940.

Adjutant to the Naval Attache, the Japanese Embassy at Nanking and concurrently adjutant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office at Nanking, Nov., 1940 - Oct., 1941. Served as investigation official of the East Asia Affairs Ministry, Nov., 1941 - Oct., 1944. Promoted to Commander 1943. Adjutant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai, and concurrently staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Nov., 1944.

Commander TADASHI SHIMURA

Born Feb. 9, 1906. Entered the Naval Academy 1924. Midshipman 1927. After one year on sea, studied at gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. After six years on sea duties, entered the Naval Torpedo School, Oct., 1934 - July 1935. Again sea duties for three years and entered the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939. Assigned to the Navy Ministry, March 1941 - Jan., 1945. Promoted to Commander 1934. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Jan., 1945.

Commander TAKESHI HIROKI

Born Feb., 16, 1908. Entered the Naval Academy 1926. Midshipman, 1929. After three years on sea, trained as a naval aviator, 1929 - 1932. The Sasebo Flying Corps, 1932 - 33. After one year on sea, served as instructor at the Kasumigaseki Flying Corps, 1935 - 36. Trained as an advanced flying student for one year. The Tateyama and Kisarazu Flying Corps, 1937 - 39. Placed on the waiting list, March 1939 - Sept., 1939. For next five years, served at the Sasebo and Yatabe Flying Corps. Promoted Lt. - Commander, 1941. Staff officer, Sept., 1944 - July 1945. Promoted to Commander Nov., 1944. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, July, 1945.

Commander GENICHIRO KONISHI

Born Nov., 14, 1906. Entered the Naval Academy, 1924. Midshipman 1927. After one year on sea, attended to the gunnery, torpedo and communication classes. Another year on sea duties. Inactive for one year due to illness. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, 1930 - 1934. After two years on sea, served as instructor at the Yokosuga Marine Corps. Sea duties, 1936 - 38. Advanced student at the Gunnery School, 1938. Instructor at the Naval Academy Nov., 1939 - Oct., 1940. Promoted to Lt. - Commander 1939. Sea duties Oct., 1940 - Nov., 1942. Instructor at the Naval Engineering School, Nov., 1942 - Feb., 1945. Promoted to Commander 1944. Adjutant, the China Seas Fleet, March 1945.

SECRET

SECRETCommander TOSHINO AKAGI

Born Jan. 31, 1908. Entered the Naval Academy 1927. Midshipman 1930. After one year on sea, attended to the torpedo, gunnery and communications classes. Sea duties, 1931 - 36. Attended the Naval Staff College, 1936 - 37. Sea and ground duties in China, 1937 - 38. Sea duties, 1938 - 40. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Sea and ground duties in China, March 1940 - May 1945. Promoted to Commander, 1944. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, May 1945.

Commander KAZUTOSHI ASADA

Born July 15, 1911. Entered the Naval Academy 1929. Midshipman, 1932. After one year on sea, attended to the gunnery, torpedo and communications classes. Three years on sea before assigned to the Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai, 1937 - 38. Advanced student at the Naval Gunnery School, 1939. Fleet staff officer 1939 - 44. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1941. Assigned to the Kure Naval Station and Tateyama Gunnery School, Dec., 1944 - Feb., 1945. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Feb., 1945. Promoted to Commander, Sept., 1945.

Captain TAKESHI SHIMIZUTANI

Born Dec. 21, 1901. Entered the Naval Academy, and midshipman, 1922. Sea duties 1925 - 28. Attended the Naval Torpedo School before another five years on sea. Assigned to the wireless station on Chichijima Island, 1934 - 35. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1939. Sea duties and fleet staff officer, Dec., 1935 - Nov., 1939. Naval adjutant to the Imperial family, 1939 - 40. Sea duties for two years. Promoted to Commander, 1940. Assigned to the Maozuru communication corps and staff officer of the Maozuru Naval Station, Aug., 1942 - Dec., 1943. Staff officer of the China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1943. Promoted to Captain, May 1944.

Rear-Admiral TOKUJI MORI

Born Sept. 24, 1891. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman 1912. Seven years of sea duties. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1919. Three years on sea before entered the Naval Staff College. Promoted to Lt.-Commander, 1925. Three years on sea. Instructor of the Naval Torpedo School and concurrently instructor of the Naval Communications School, 1938 - 32. Promoted to Commander, 1931. Staff officer of the Maizuru Naval Port command. 1932 - 34. Fleet staff officer 1934 - 36. Assigned to the Naval General Staff and concurrently to the Navy Ministry, 1936 - 37.

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Promoted to Captain 1936. Four years of sea and ground duties. Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section of the Maizuru Naval Port Command. Promoted to Rear-Admiral 1942. Assigned to the Central Naval Academy of the Chinese Navy, May 1943 - July 1944. Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Party in Shanghai, August 1944.

Captain SADAÉ IKEDA

Born Dec., 2, 1902. Entered the Naval Academy 1920. Midshipman 1923. After two years of sea duties entered the Naval Torpedo School. After three years of sea duties, assigned to the Japanese Naval Landing Party in Hankow, 1928 - Dec., 1928. One year training in navigation 1929 - 30. Sea duties for next eight years. Promoted to Lt. - Commander 1936. Assigned to the Hydrographic Department in Tokyo for one year. Sea duties 1939 - 44. Promoted to Commander 1941. Assigned to the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Party and the Shanghai Naval Base Command as staff officer, May 1944. Promoted to Captain May 1945.

Lt.-Commander ISAMU KOMIYAMA

Born May 29, 1917. Entered the Naval Engineering School 1934. Engineer Midshipman 1938. After two years on sea, attached to the Yokosuga Naval Station and the Yokosuga Marine Corps. Entered the Naval Construction School 1943 - 44. Sea duties 1944 - 1945. Promoted to Lt. - Commander 1944. Staff officer and adjutant of the Ghim Seas Fleet, April 1945.

Rear-Admiral MINORU KATSUNO

Born June 17, 1891. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman in 1912. Assigned to sea duties for next six years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1918. Again sea duties for 12 years. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, November 1926.

Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Station, Nov., 1932 - Oct. 1932, and Adjutant to the Naval Academy Nov., 1932 - Oct. 1935. Promoted to Commander Nov., 1932.

Sea duties Nov., 1935 - Oct., 1938. Assigned to the Kure Marine Corps, Nov., 1938 - Aug., 1944. Promoted to the rank of Captain in Nov., 1939, and to Rear-Admiral Nov., 1943.

Assigned to the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps, (Commander-in-Chief), Aug., 1944.

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Captain KOJIRO FUKUSHIMA Born Mar. 10, 1902. Entered the Naval Academy 1919. Midshipman in 1922. Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, 1927. Again sea duties in 1928. Instructor at the Naval Gunnery School, 1931 - 1934. Again sea duties in 1934. Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in 1934.

Assigned to Adjutant at the Bako Naval Base, Nov., 1933 Nove. 1937. Sea duties, Dec., 1937 - April 1938. Assigned to the Kure Naval Base, April 1938 Oct., 1940. Promoted to Commander in Nov., 1939. Sea duties, Nov., 1940 - July 1943. Assigned to the staff of the Shanghai Naval Base Command, Aug., 1943 - July 1944. Promoted to Captain in May 1944. Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps in Shanghai, Aug., 1944.

Lt.-Commander YOSHIO KAWADA Born Feb. 28, 1899. Entered the Naval Academy, 1917. Midshipman in 1920. Assigned to the sea duties for next two years. Entered to the Naval Gunnery School 1922 and the Naval Torpedo School 1923. Again sea duties Mar., 1923 - July 1927. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base, Aug., 1927.

Placed on the reserve-list, Nov., 1927. Mobilized as replacement in January 1941. Sea duties, Jan, 1941 - June 1943.

Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander, May 1943. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Base, July 1943 - Feb., 1944. Sea duties, Mar., 1944 - Dec., 1944. Assigned to the Headquarters of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Jan., 1945 - March 1945. Assigned to the Staff of the Japanese Naval Special Landing Corps in Shanghai, April 1945.

Captain UNOSUKE UMEZAKI Born Jan. 6, 1890. Entered the Naval Academy 1909. Midshipman in 1913. Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School. 1918. Again sea duties, Dec., 1919 - Mar., 1937. Promoted to Lt. - Commander in December 1925. Assigned to the Personnel Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Navy, March 1927 - Dec., 1931. Promoted to the Commander, Dec., 1931. Assigned to the staff of the Yokosuga Naval Base, Dec., 1931 - Dec., 1937.

Promoted to Captain Dec., 1937. Assigned to the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Section of the Ministry of Navy, Dec., 1937 - Sept., 1942. Placed on the reserve list in Sept., 1942, but mobilized as replacement on the same date. Assigned to Commander of the Japanese Navy Air Force in Shanghai District, Sept., 1942.

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Commander KENKI NATORI Born May 2, 1897. Entered Naval Academy, 1915. Midshipman in 1918. Assigned to sea duties for next two years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School in Dec., 1920. Again assigned to sea duties, Dec., 1921 - Dec., 1924.

Entered the Naval Staff College, 1924. Assigned to sea duties, Dec., 1925 - Dec., 1932. Promoted to Lt. - Commander, 1931. Placed on the reserve list in Dec., 1932.

Mobilized as replacement in May, 1938. Assigned to the Port Affairs Office in Tsingtao, China, May 1938 - May 1939. Assigned to the Yokosuga Naval Base May 1939 - June, 1941. Assigned to the instructor at the Chinese Navy Training Station, June 1941 - Aug., 1944.

Promoted to Commander in June, 1943. Assigned to Commander of the 2nd Meteorological Observation Corps, Aug., 1944.

Captain YUKIHIKO IMAMURA Born Jan. 4, 1925. Entered Naval Academy 1910. Midshipman in 1914. Assigned to sea duties for next three years. Entered the Naval Gunnery School, Dec., 1917. Entered the Naval Torpedo School in May 1918. Again sea duties for two years. Entered the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1920. Sea duties, Dec. 1921 - June 1942. Promoted to Lt. - Commander Dec., 1927 and to Commander, Nov., 1933, and then to Captain Nov., 1939. Assigned to the Chief of the Navigation Office in Shanghai June 1942.

Rear-Admiral KEIJO MINATO Born Aug. 30, 1896. Entered Naval Academy 1913. Midshipman in Dec., 1916. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language, as Chinese Class student, April 1923. Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Nov., 1926. Attached to the Naval General Staff Office, Nov., 1926 - Oct., 1929.

Attended at the London Naval Conference as one of the suites, of the Japanese Representative, Nov., 1929 - June 1930. Assigned sea duties, June 1930 - June 1931. Assigned to one of the adjutants to the Naval General Staff Office, July 1931 - Oct., 1933. Sea duties, Nov., 1933 - Oct., 1934.

Promoted to the rank of Commander, Nov., 1934. Assigned to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, Nov., 1934 - Sept., 1937. Sea duties, Oct., 1937 - May 1938. Again assigned to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, June 1938 - March 1939.

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Promoted to Captain Nov., 1938. Assigned to the Staff member of the Ministry of Navy, April 1939 - Nov., 1941. Sea duties as Captain of carrier, Dec., 1941 - Feb., 1943. Commander of the Naval Air Force Stationing at Iwakuni Mar., 1943 - Oct., 1943. Assigned to the surmaster of the Naval Academy, Nov., 1943 - Oct., 1944.

Promoted to Rear - Admiral in May 1944. Assigned to the Chief of the Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai.

Captain SHIJIRO KUWABARA Born Mar. 31, 1896. Entered Naval Academy, 1915. Midshipman in Nov., 1915. Assigned to sea duties for next five years. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language as Chinese class student in April 1923. Sea duties April, 1925 - Nov., 1929. Assigned to the staff member of the Naval General Staff Office, Dec., 1929 - Nov., 1932.

Promoted to the rank of Lt. - Commander in Dec., 1930. Again assigned to the staff member of the Naval General Staff Office, Dec., 1932 - May 1935. Assigned to the assistant to the Japanese Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in China, June 1935 - Nov., 1937. Promoted to Commander, Nov., 1935. Instructor at the Naval Staff College, Dec., 1937 - May 1939. Staff member of the East Asia Board, June 1939 - Oct., 1940.

Assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai and concurrently staff of the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Oct., 1940 - Nov., 1941. Promoted to the Captain in November 1941. Assigned to the staff member of the Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1941 - July 1944. Again assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai, July 1944 - Aug., 1945.

Lt.-Commander MASEKUMA FUGI IWAKI Born Nov. 29, 1912. Entered the Naval Academy in April 1930. Midshipman in 1933. Assigned to sea duties for next four years. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base Sept., 1937 - Jan., 1938. Again sea duties, Feb., 1938 - Mar., 1938. Entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Language in April 1938 as Chinese Class student. Assigned to the Sasebo Naval Base, April, 1940 - Oct., 1941. Sea duties, Nov., 1941 - Oct., 1942. Assigned to the Ministry of Navy, Nov., 1942 - Dec., 1943.

Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Commander Nov., 1943. Assigned to the staff of the Yangtze River Patrol, Jan., 1944 - Feb., 1945. Assigned to the assistant to the Chief of the Japanese Naval Liaison Office in Shanghai in March, 1945.

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Paymaster Vice-Admiral BUMPEI
OMATSUZAWA

Born Nov. 2, 1893. Assistant-Paymaster in Dec., 1916. Sea duties for next five years.

Instructor at the Naval Paymasters School, Dec., 1921 - Nov., 1929. Promoted to the rank of staff-paymaster, 1926. Sea duties, Dec., 1929 - Mar., 1931. Assigned to the staff of the Accountants Bureau of Navy Ministry, April 1931 - Sept., 1941. Promoted to the fleet-paymaster in December, 1931. Promoted to the rank of paymaster-inspector in December 1936. Sea duties, Sept., 1941 - Oct., 1942.

Promoted to the Paymaster-Rear-Admiral in November, 1942 and to Paymaster Vice-Admiral in November, 1945.

Paymaster Inspector YASUO SHIBUYA Entered Naval Paymasters School 1920. Midshipman in 1923. Sea duties for next

four years. Assigned to the Naval Air Force in Yokosuga Dec., 1927 - March 1928. Again sea duties, April 1928 - 1932. Assigned to the Maizuru Naval Base, Dec., 1932 - Mar., 1935. Sea duties, April 1935 - Nov., 1935. Entered the Paymasters School again as Special Course student, Dec., 1935 - Oct., 1936. Assigned to the 1st Accountant Office of the Navy, Nov., 1936. Promoted to staff-paymaster in December 1936 and Fleet-Paymaster Nov., 1941, and then Paymaster-Inspector, May 1945.

Captain SHIGEYUKI MATSUBARA

Entered Naval Engineering School in 1919. Midshipman in 1922. Sea duties for next

three years. Instructor at the Kure Marine Corps, Dec., 1925 - Dec., 1928. Sea duties, Dec., 1928 - Aug., 1941. Promoted to Engineer Lieut.-Commander in December, 1936. Assigned to the Naval Plant at Hiroshima, Sept., 1941 - Feb., 1943. Sea duties, Feb. 1943 - Jan., 1945. Assigned to the 1st Naval Supplies Office, Jan., 1945. Promoted to Captain in May 1945.

Paymaster Inspector
HIROSHI KUNITSUKA

Entered Navy Paymasters School in 1921. Midshipman in 1924. Sea duties for next one

year. Again entered the Naval Paymasters School as Class B student in December 1925. Again sea duties for next seven years, 1926 - 32. Assigned to instructor to the Kure Marine Corps, Dec. 1932 - Nov., 1933. Sea duties, Dec., 1933 - Mar., 1939. Promoted to the rank of staff paymaster in Dec., 1937. Entered the Naval Paymasters School as Class A student in April, 1939 - Nov., 1939. Assigned to the Japanese China Seas Fleet, Dec., 1939 - Oct., 1942.

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Promoted to Fleet-Paymaster in Nov., 1942. Sea duties Nov., 1942 - Aug., 1943. Assigned to the 1st Naval Supplies Office in August, 1943. Promoted to Paymaster Inspector in September 1945.

Surgeon Rear-Admiral SHINTARO Born May 3, 1894. Graduated from the Medical Section of the Tohoku Imperial University in April 1916. Second assistant surgeon in July 1916. Entered Naval Medical College as Class B. student, July 1916. Assigned to the Naval Hospital at Kure, Dec., 1916 - May 1917. Sea duties, June 1917 - Mar., 1918. Inspection trip to Europe April 1918 - July 1920. Sasebo Naval Hospital, Aug., 1920 - Mar., 1921. Again sea duties, April 1921 - Sept., 1921. Naval Gunnery School, Oct., 1921 - Nov., 1922. Sea duties, Dec., 1922 Mar., 1923. Naval Academy April 1923 - Oct., 1923. Kure Naval Hospital, Nov., 1923 - Jan., 1924. Sea duties, Feb., 1924 - July 1924. Entered Naval Medical College as Class A student Aug., 1924 - Nov., 1925.

Promoted to Surgeon Lieut.-Commander, Dec., 1926. Sea duties, Dec., 1926 - Nov., 1930. Promoted to Surgeon Commander Dec., 1930. Kure Naval Hospital, Dec., 1930 - Nov., 1931. Received doctor's degree in December 1932. Inspection trip for Europe, Dec., 1932 - Oct., 1933. Maizuru Naval Hospital, Dec., 1933 - Nov., 1937.

Promoted to the rank of Surgeon Captain in Dec., 1936. Chief of the Medical Corps at Port Arthur, Dec., 1938 - Oct., 1939. 1st Section Chief at the Kure Naval Hospital, Dec., 1939 Oct., 1941. Sea duties, Nov., 1941 - Nov., 1942.

Promoted to the Surgeon Rear-Admiral in November, 1942. Chief of Medical Section of the 11th Naval Aircraft Plant, Nov., 1942 - Nov., 1944. Assigned to the Japanese China Seas Fleet, and concurrently appointed to the Chief of the 1st Naval Hospital in Shanghai, Nov., 1944.

Technical Captain KEIICHI Born May 2, 1899. Graduated from the Technical Section of the Tokyo Imperial University, Mar., 1924. Graduated from the Construction Section of the Imperial University in March 1927. Appointed the Naval engineer in April, 1927. Assigned to the Construction Board of the Navy Ministry, April 1927 - Feb., 1933.

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Assigned to various offices in Kure, Yokosuga, Sasebo successively, Mar., 1933 - Jan., 1945. Promoted to Technical Commander, Nov., 1942, and to Technical Captain Nov., 1944. Assigned to the chief of the 1st Construction Office in Shanghai, Feb., 1945.

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SUMMARY REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF:

EUGENE HOVANS, with aliases: Pick-Hovans,
Carl E. Clise, Kurjansky, Kojevnikoff

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S E C R E T

SECRETINTRODUCTION:

EUGENE HOVANS, as he is more popularly known, was the only foreigner directly connected with the Japanese Naval Office. HOVANS was in charge of the Russian desk in the Liaison Room. According to information received from Rear Admiral KAIJO MINATO and other top-ranking Japanese Naval officers, and also from associates in other branches of the Liaison Room, HOVANS was a minor figure. However, from outside sources and from newspaper reports appearing in Shanghai papers, it was indicated that HOVANS was one of the most important men in Japanese Naval Intelligence. HOVANS gained further notoriety after heading a mission to Manila, the alleged purpose of which was to penetrate Allied intelligence organizations and expose the Filipino underground. Because of many rumors to the effect that HOVANS and his group were responsible for extortion and killings in Manila, extensive investigation was conducted by this office at the request of War Crimes Commission of the China Judge Advocate General's Office. Results of the investigation failed to show sufficient evidence of a war crimes violation.

BACKGROUND:

HOVANS' police record disclosed that he was born in Riga, Latvia, on 19 February, 1900. According to a French source, HOVANS first made his appearance in China in 1927 in the company of General BORODIN, who was the Red Russian Advisor to the Chinese. It is rumored that subject sold out BORODIN to the British, and when this was discovered by the Soviets, subject was arrested and tortured by pouring hot oil on his head. As a result, subject's head was severely scarred and to cover these scars, he usually wears a black Chinese-style skull cap.

Subject later escaped to Shanghai and was contacted by British Intelligence. He is reported to have bled them for large sums of money for long and devious reports on Communist activities in China. After exhausting the British, subject became an informer for the United States Treasury Department, where he sold a tip-off to subjects of a treasury investigation for a reported \$2,000. After a short period with the Treasury Department, he became associated with the Chinese. A few years later, he became an informant for Major WILLIAMS, USMC, of the Naval Intelligence Office. Reportedly, it was well-known in Shanghai that HOVANS was double-crossing WILLIAMS by also

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working for the Japanese. At the same time he was hawking pamphlets and books, purported to have been stolen from the Soviet Consulate.

As war with Japan became more evident, Japanese money came easier for HOVANS. He had made connections with the Shanghai WANG CHING-WEI Government through the Japanese. Then he succeeded in convincing the Nanking Reform Government that one MAMANTOFF was a Soviet agent working against them, and should be liquidated (MAMANTOFF had previously written an article about HOVANS in the nature of an expose). HOVANS received permission to arrange for the liquidation and accordingly hired some Chinese to do the job. Largely through the efforts of the French Police, the Chinese were arrested and implicated HOVANS. HOVANS was tried and convicted for inciting the murder and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. This was on 24 November, 1941. On 8 December, 1941, the Japanese Naval Landing Party released HOVANS from prison, and he was installed in a suite at the Cathay Hotel and given an office at Japanese Navy Headquarters, 27 The Bund. According to a chart furnished by Admiral KEIJO MINATO of the Japanese Naval Resident's office, HOVANS was employed in the Liaison Room of the Japanese Naval Office on the Russian Desk. His immediate superior was a Russian-speaking Japanese named FUKUHARA. The Liaison Room, at that time, was under the command of Commander OTANI and a civilian officer named KICHIZO IKUSHIMA. Both were transferred to Japan in early summer of 1945. (See Outline of Japanese Naval Resident's Office in Summary of Imperial Japanese Navy at Shanghai).

When Admiral MINATO was questioned concerning HOVANS' connection with the Japanese Navy, MINATO replied that subject was known to him by the name of CLIGE.

The following is a report on HOVANS submitted by Admiral MINATO:

"JAPANESE NAVAL LIAISON OFFICE IN SHANGHAI
December 12, 1945

"The man known as HOVANS was connected with the Liaison Section of the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai since the time when Commander M. OTANI was Chief of the Section, (Dec. 1941 - Nov. 1943) and YOSHIKO IKUSHIMA (civilian employee) was member of the Section.

"HOVANS mainly reported on:

- "1. The activities and tendency of neutral nationals in Shanghai; and

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"2. The opinion and reaction of Shanghai citizens in general with regard to the progress of the war and its accompanying effects.

"He also made comments on the international situation through his personal observation.

"HOVANS was sent to the Philippines upon a request from the Japanese Naval Office in Manila. Therefore, the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai has no knowledge of his activities or work in the Philippines.

"His connections with other offices than the Japanese Naval Office in Shanghai are not clear to us. In view of the fact that he organized and led a theatrical group in Shanghai, we believe that he had wide contact. However, we do not believe that he had an intelligence net-work. We considered him as an 'information broker' common in Shanghai.

"As to his whereabouts, we knew that he was in Shanghai up to the time of the Japanese surrender.

"We then noticed a press report saying that immediately after the Japanese surrender, HOVANS went to Tsingtao where he was arrested a month ago."

With reference to MINATO'S statement concerning HOVANS' main duties, the following information is submitted:

Shortly after the capitulation of Japan in August, 1945, the U.S. Naval Landing Party discovered three letters purportedly written to Commander OTANI and signed "C. E. CLIGE". Only one letter is dated, that date being 14 January, 1942. The other two letters are undated and signed with the initials "C.E.C." The substance of these letters is as follows:

1st letter, dated 14 January, 1942:

A request to organize a Special Judicial Investigation Section under IKUSHIMA, because the M.P. or Gendarmerie of the Japanese Army did not have the qualifications to carry out foreign espionage. The M.P.'s business is the handling or exposing of Chinese agents from Chungking and the Wang Ching-Wei Government. The Judicial Investigation Section would have two sub-sections consisting of an Espionage Section and a Sabotage Section. Most of the letter is a diatribe against the Gendarmerie and their incompetency in handling espionage cases.

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SECRET2nd letter, undated:

Wherein he discusses a method to prevent Allied air-raids upon Japan, stating that "Public opinion of Britain and the United States demands from Roosevelt and Churchill some victory....." "No doubt, American and British circles will try to effect an air-raid on Japan, no matter how costly it may prove, just for the prestige and for the pacification of the population....."

"If you gather all the citizens of the Allies and transport them to Japan, placing them there under the protection of various patriotic organizations, you will have a good insurance against air-raids. For the prisoners, could be chosen the most important cities with factories and other industrial enterprises. All should be settled in various parts of the cities, in barracks, and diplomats in hotels and former schools. Certain missionaries with their families should also be deported from China to Japan, as well as all men of military age, also with families. You may rest assured that there will be no air-raids on those cities where they will be settled under adequate and strict protection because your spokesman will broadcast that, on account of the unhealthy climate in the Philippines and awful sanitary conditions in China, as well as in view of great excitement and anti-foreign feelings of the Asiatics, the Japanese Government had transported the prisoners of war to Japan where the climate is excellent and where they are well protected. Thus, the air-raids on the cities, having no military importance, but possessing factories and works, would be prevented, for neither Americans nor Britains would attack such cities from the air."

3rd letter, undated:

Contains a discussion of present conditions in Shanghai under Japanese occupation and proposals to restore Shanghai to normalcy. He advocated formation of a Russian Auxiliary Detachment under Japanese command, so that food and shelter would be provided to the large number of watchmen and body-guards now unemployed.

He suggested ".....there is no need to stand on ceremonies with the Jews. Control over the Jews should be strengthened. They should be compelled to revive the life of Shanghai. They need a good whip and a clenched fist. Your union with Germany - however you may pamper them - is an order for them for underground

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hostilities, sabotage and discrediting of you."

Concerning Soviet activities in the International Settlement, HOVANS noted that the Soviet Radio Station in the Settlement was broadcasting in Russian, English, German and Chinese, all Allied news and propaganda in the guise of Tass reports. He suggested that the Soviet radio be limited to broadcasts in Russian and also be bound to broadcast all Domei reports.

In an effort to establish the validity of the above letters, Mr. TOSHIO NAMBA, 146 Quinsan Road, B-18, Shanghai, who headed the General Affairs Desk of the Liaison Room was questioned. NAMBA, a graduate of University of Southern California, tentatively identified the signature of "C. E. CLIGE" as that of subject's, but stated he would not be able to swear to it because he had only seen subject's signature on a few occasions. Certain excerpts of the letters were read to NAMBA and he expressed doubt as to subject's ability to write such a well composed letter. NAMBA said subject's English was very poor, and suggested the letters had probably been ghost-written. NAMBA further said it was not usual for HOVANS to send communications to Commander OTANI in English, but that subject usually gave them to FUKUHARA in Russian and FUKUHARA would translate them into Japanese for OTANI.

With regard to subject's main duties, NAMBA said that HOVANS' chief value lay in the fact that he had many contacts in the Russian community. He said that he had read some of subject's reports and thought that they were childish. He also added that the Japanese Naval Office did not trust HOVANS completely.

Also, with regard to subject's ability in the Japanese Naval Office, Admiral MINATO stated that he doubted if subject ever contributed any worthwhile intelligence information, because he (MINATO) could not recall any of subject's reports although they undoubtedly passed through his hands. MINATO said he could only speak for the period from November, 1944, at which time he took over command of the Naval Office.

FUKUHARA was questioned concerning his knowledge of HOVANS' activities and he furnished two statements which are contained in Appendix D. The substance of these statements is as follows: In his first statement given on 7 December, 1945, FUKUHARA hedged and submitted only general information concerning HOVANS. He was interrogated again and the translation of his statement given December 24, 1945, states that

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HOVANS gathered intelligence chiefly on world conditions from the radio, newspapers, magazines and conversations with people familiar with foreign affairs. A schedule of HOVANS daily activities as given by FUKUHARA reveals that HOVANS listened to world wide news broadcasts from Moscow, Honolulu, San Francisco, and London between 0400 and 0500. Between 0600 and 0700 he made and received phone calls acquiring the local intelligence on Shanghai. From 0800 to 0900 he read three or four different Russian newspapers. About 1000 he went to the office of the Resident Naval Officer where his duties consisted of writing a report, interviewing visitors, etc. He had lunch at 1300, always with a guest. After lunch he usually took a nap and at 1500 he had another appointment. Later in the afternoon he made arrangements for his theatrical group, visited sick people, obtained free hospitalization for needy actors, etc. In the evening he dined with friends and admirers and usually went to a night club until late at night. However late he returned home, he usually began his day at 0400.

Regarding HOVAN's character, FUKUHARA states that he was a highly emotional individual and gave vent to his emotions easily. He wasn't anxious for material wealth but desired position and honor in life. He met many people but quickly tired of them. Therefore, he had many enemies and no intimate friends.

FUKUHARA said that HOVANS had confidence in the opinions of Mr. AWALD (FREDERICK WIEHL - German agent in Shanghai) on problems concerning Germany, England and America, and used them in his report.

In the course of the investigation concerning FREDERICK ANTON WIEHL, WIEHL made the following statement concerning HOVANS:

"HOVANS worked from Room 741 of the Cathay Hotel, and from the fourth floor of the Jardine Matheson Building which had been the Navy Building under the Japanese.

"He, himself, did little or no personal outside work, relying as he did upon informers and employed workers. Among these were Captain CARNEIRA, PAUL LOJNIKOFF, KASHIN, ARNHEIM, GERSHOWITZ and a few others, such as TERNI, etc.

"These people were known in the Russian and foreign community as seeking information for the Japanese. Those who wanted to make money in this way sold their information to either one of HOVANS'

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workers, total about 12.

"HOVANS mostly used a system of stealing information from the various Japanese Gendarmerie Offices, from the Army and from the Police Headquarters. Thus, while GERSHOWITZ was working as a sergeant in the Detective Bureau of the Police Headquarters, he would sell his information, gathered around the police files, to HOVANS. The result of tactic brought a general hatred of HOVANS from the Gendarmerie and the police. HOVANS was branded as a scoundrel by the police, and, as a result of this, the police and Gendarmerie spread negative stories about HOVANS in Shanghai which resulted in HOVANS being hated by most Shanghailanders. In this way, HOVANS mishandled his intelligence work.

"In addition to information gathered about anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai, and about gangs who were cutting in on Japanese rackets and which HOVANS 'smashed' for 'political reasons', HOVANS was responsible for many deaths of foreigners and Chinese in Shanghai who were arrested on framed up information gathered by CARNEIRA and LOJNIKOV, etc. and allegedly executed or imprisoned at the Japanese Bridge House. HOVANS once boasted of '18 pieces finished', which was the way he described the liquidation of 'gangsters' by the Japanese as the result of his work.

"Incidentally, it must be stated that every two weeks, HOVANS performed as an actor at the White Russian Club House on Avenue Foch in a Russian play. While this has nothing directly to do with his intelligence work, it was basically an effort on his part to suppress the antagonism of the public to his racketeering by donating the proceeds of the performances to Russian charity.

"Outside of Shanghai, he once took a group of his workers to Singapore and Manila for the purpose of counter-intelligence against the Americans and the British there. The plan was to infiltrate his men into the British-American intelligence workers there, and to pose as British-American intelligence workers, and to thus ensnare the foreign intelligence and turn them over to the Japanese authorities.

"HOVANS used the name of EUGENE HOVANS, but this is not his correct name, but he has been known by this name since his conviction and imprisonment in 1941 in connection with the murder of MAMANTOFF, who

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was head of the White Russian Emigrant Committee. HOVANS, on behalf of the Japanese, hired a Chinese to kill MAMANTOFT. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, but has not served this and is still under sentence. During his trial he claimed that he was working for the Germans, which turned the German Intelligence against him. When he came out of jail, (released by the Japanese), he used the name C. E. KLIEGE, or at least his car was registered in this name, and was hired as 'advisor to the Japanese Navy.'

"After his trial, during which as above-mentioned, HOVANS incurred the enmity of the German intelligence, I was given the assignment of trying to pin something on him so that rival Japanese factions would rid us of him - HOVANS was at outs with all Japanese except the Navy. As a result, I learned the following about him:

"HOVANS came from the Ukraine to the Far East in 1917, first to Harbin where he made connections with the Communists. In about 1927, he became associated with the Hankow Government which was at that time communistic and was headed by CHEN KUNG-FO, later Mayor of Shanghai and acting President of the Nanking Government. HOVANS was a Captain in the Chinese Communistic Army, as 'Captain PICK'. He helped the organizers on the political side, who were constantly harassed by other Chinese.

"BORODIN, the Russian organizer of the Hankow Communist Government eventually returned to Moscow, after which they ran out of funds and the whole set-up blew up. HOVANS came to Shanghai in about 1932 to 1935. He got in touch with LUCHICH, a White Russian writer who received a contract from the British Government to write a book called the 'Red Menace Over China'. The author was allegedly Captain EUGENE PICK, or HOVANS, but the photograph which purports to be that of Captain PICK is actually a photograph of LUCHICH. Very few people know that the photograph was not of HOVANS, but HOVANS let this information out to me when I detected this. HOVANS claimed that he used the name Captain PICK in Hankow. HOVANS managed to sell the Japanese the idea that he was the author of the book, although the language of the book is not that of HOVANS. It was written in English for the North China Daily News, Shanghai, a British daily newspaper. There were quotations in the book from British papers and from the New York

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Times. LUCHICH and HOVANS apparently had previously furnished the material to these publications. The book was published in Shanghai about 1932 to 1935.

"HOVANS was, during the years immediately following this, mixed up in all sorts of rackets, prostitution, gambling, etc., and was in and out of jail constantly. In about 1937, he became friendly with NATHAN ('NAT') RABIN (or RABINOVITCH), a Latvian who was a gangster mixed up in 'protection' rackets, etc., and who is now under arrest by the Chinese Gendarmerie since September for some offense. He is very tough - a real strong-arm man. RABIN and HOVANS were closely associated in the various rackets, though each worked on his own.

"RABIN, in addition to his racket activities, trapped some of the Chinese guerilla generals, many of whom had to switch to the Japanese to save their lives. The Japanese paid him well and he had a lot of money. He was the owner of the 'Little Club'. These incidents took place during 1937. HOVANS was not involved in them, but only in commercial rackets, but he was linked up with the Japanese.

"HOVANS told me that he had an assignment from Admiral OTANI to infiltrate into the American Intelligence work at the time the war broke out. He also told me how he had (for the Japanese) put small time bombs in egg crates on British ships plying along the coast in order to spoil the refrigeration systems. He said that the British knew he had been responsible for this and had quite a grudge against him for it.

"HOVANS often voiced to me his wonder at the Japanese hiring him. He thought it was only to keep him out of guerilla work. He was not a Communist, but was selfishly interested in making money and could do very well as a guerilla. HOVANS' activities consisted of terrorist activities to keep the foreigners in line. People knew he worked for the Japanese and were afraid to cross him. HOVANS received from the Japanese free food and Room 741 at Cathay Hotel, gasoline for his Austin car, presents, expenses and a small salary. He was

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very foolish and didn't save much so now has nothing in Shanghai.

"I started working against him about end of 1942 on orders of Dr. KLARE, trying to pin something on him to get him into disfavor with the Japanese, so that either the Japanese or the Germans could take care of him. I wanted to pin a German killing or something of that sort on him which would have enabled the Germans to have him arrested. HOVANS didn't like the Germans as he had previously (a long time before) worked for the German Intelligence, and they didn't treat him well financially. HOVANS often sent people around to try and catch me out at the beginning. When he got no results from his informers, he came once to 304 Kiangse Road to investigate personally and bragged on my set-up (which bragging was only 'sour grapes').

"HOVANS description is: Height 5'7", weight 175 to 180 lbs, age 54, Russian appearance - Mongolian cast of countenance, round face, pointed nose, good teeth with gold fillings, no hair at all, wears black skull cap, has burn scars on his head on top to the rear from the time when he was tortured by the Communists. He looks husky. He sings in Russian opera. He is a heavy vodka drinker, especially when in any trouble. He is a flashy dresser; wears a large gold ring with Chinese characters on his left little finger; gold pocket watch with gold chain across vest; has a sport coat with pleats; black shoes; flashy, loud silk socks; brown suit with interwoven stripes; blue rain coat, very faded; usually wears a light grey hat. Most of his suits are sportsstyles. He walks with his shoulders straight, very erectly, with a military manner. He had a cheap chromium plated cigarette lighter of the Ronson type, with release on the right. He usually went armed with a pearl handled revolver, 38, chrome or nickel plated. He speaks very broken or pidgin English and has a very deep voice, coarse and loud. He also speaks Chinese, Japanese, Russian and German. He used to have a picture of his wife, 6 x 8 inches, also a picture of himself as an actor, in a part from the Renaissance Period, with long hair, etc."

MANILA MISSION:

According to information furnished by Admiral MINATO,

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the Manila Mission was requested by the Japanese Naval Office at Manila. They requested that a number of neutrals be sent to Manila for intelligence purposes. Since HOVANS was the only neutral in the Shanghai Office, he was given that assignment. However, other sources who were closely connected with the Manila trip claim that the trip was conceived by IKUSHIMA, the Civilian officer in the Liaison Room. IKUSHIMA submitted plans to Commander OTANI who drafted final plans and sent them to Tokyo for approval. After they were approved, IKUSHIMA was placed in charge of the Mission. According to members of the Mission, the following personnel made the trip: HOVANS, FRANCISCO CARNEIRO, PAUL LOJNIKOFF, PIETRO TERMI, FRITZ ARNHEIM, MORRIS GERSHOVITZ, (a.k.a. MORIS MEJOFF), SLAVA TOROPOVSKY, PETER KAZAK, TRIA, a Filipino, and Japanese named - IKUSHIMA, MORI TAKAMI, TADASHI HAYASHI, PETER UTSUNOMIYA, KUBO, S. ICHIJIMA and YOSHIDA.

The Mission left Shanghai early in June, 1944, and last remnants of it returned late in December, 1944. HOVANS is reported to have returned from Manila on August 9, 1944.

Concerning the activities of the group while in Manila, SLAVA TOROPOVSKY submitted a statement, the full text of which is quoted in Appendix E. The substance of that statement is as follows:

He arrived in Manila with KAZAK, LOJNIKOFF and ICHIJIMA June 12, 1944, and was taken to the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank Compound (409 Aviles Street) where IKUSHIMA had his headquarters. This was the residence of Admiral HIRATDE, Japanese Naval Attache in Manila. They had a few words with HIRATDE and were then introduced to Commander AOYAMA, IKUSHIMA's superior.

TOROPOVSKY and KAZAK were billeted in a small bungalow away from the other members of the group. A listening post was set up there under YOSHIDA and they were told to copy CW traffic from VHM, a station in Port Darwin, Australia, which was used by the U.S. Navy for sending orders to all ships in five letter code.

PAUL LOJNIKOFF soon after arrival met a girl named ESPANITA DE VIDAL, who seemed to be well acquainted in Filipino society. She furnished LOJNIKOFF with typewritten sheets of information in English which he passed on to IKUSHIMA.

CARNEIRO was usually with LOJNIKOFF.

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TERNI became acquainted with a Dr. MATSONI who once told TOROPOVSKY he had travelled through guerilla territory in Batangas and Camarines Nortes Provinces of Luzon.

ARNHEIM and GERSHOVITZ worked together mingling in the lower strata of Manila and acted as "stool-pigeons" for HOVANS.

TOROPOVSKY did not know much of HOVANS' activities, other than the fact that he was blackmailing a Polish merchant in Manila named ZALEVSKY because ZALEVSKY'S wife, an American, had not been interned.

TAKAMI, an American-born and educated Japanese, was answerable only to IKUSHIMA and Commander AOYAMA. TOROPOVSKY knew nothing of his activities.

TOROPOVSKY said that his contact with the group was very limited and that he had not heard of any terroristic acts or killings on the part of the group. He said the only information he had was from a story which appeared in the Shanghai Russian Daily News sometime in November, 1945, which told of the killing of six clergymen, believed to have been Spanish Catholic Missionaries, by HOVANS and LOJNIKOFF during their stay in Manila. (Mr. CHILIKIN, Editor of the Daily News was later contacted and said the story had no foundation in fact, and was written by a number of his reporters, based on various rumors that they had heard).

PAUL LOJNIKOFF and PIETRO TERNI were both arrested on authority of the War Crimes Commission in November, 1945. When questioned by this office, both repeatedly denied being sent to Manila for intelligence or terroristic purposes. Both claimed that they went to Manila to "buy cargo" for the Japanese Navy Purchasing Office. They claimed that IKUSHIMA and HOVANS saw a chance to make money in Manila and as friends of HOVANS they were invited along to share in the profit.

Further information concerning the activities of the group in Manila is contained in the Counter-Intelligence Corps investigation of BORIS GREGOROVICH MEJOFF alias MORRIS GERSHKOVITCH. MEJOFF accompanied the group to Manila and when the group was evacuated he was left behind as was FRITZ ARNHEIM and MORIHIKI TAKAMI. MEJOFF later was reported to the Counter-Intelligence Corps by ESPANITA DE VIDAL. During the course of that investigation MAX ZALEVSKY, Elizalde Paint Co., Tanduay St., Manila, was interviewed and stated, in substance, as follows:

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He first met MEJOFF in Escolta Cafe some time in July, 1944. ZALEVSKY had formerly lived in Shanghai and remembered MEJOFF as a uniformed policeman in that city. MEJOFF told ZALEVSKY that HOVANS had a letter from ZALEVSKY'S parents. MEJOFF also told him that he, with the others who had come to Manila with him, were refugees from Singapore.

Although HOVANS was the leader of the group, he stayed in the background. ZALEVSKY met the others, including MEJOFF, frequently. When they became better acquainted with ZALEVSKY, they told him that they were purchasing agents for the Japanese Navy.

On one occasion, HOVANS phoned ZALEVSKY and asked him to call at his office. Arriving there, ZALEVSKY was told that the Japanese Navy had a great deal against ZALEVSKY and that ZALEVSKY could clear himself by furnishing information. HOVANS was particularly interested in locating a guerilla radio station said to be operated by a man named JOHNSON. ZALEVSKY disclaimed any knowledge of it and was later picked up by the Japanese for questioning. He was allowed to go after interrogation.

On another occasion, HOVANS told ZALEVSKY that in order to stay out of trouble, he would have to pay him (HOVANS) 50,000.00 Pesos. ZALEVSKY paid 20,000.00 and made a date to pay off the balance. HOVANS failed to keep the appointment but instead sent MEJOFF to pick up the money. This money was given to MEJOFF.

After HOVANS left Manila in August, 1944, LOJNIKOFF set himself up as head of the group. Never very popular with the rest of the group, MEJOFF fared even worse after HOVANS left. LOJNIKOFF and CARNEIRO spoke deprecatingly of MEJOFF, and whereas the others appeared prosperous, MEJOFF looked ragged and poor.

At one time, LOJNIKOFF and CARNEIRO offered to set ZALEVSKY up as a purchasing agent for the Japanese Navy. ZALEVSKY refused.

From time to time, LOJNIKOFF asked ZALEVSKY for information about Americans and American property. When ZALEVSKY refused to give him the information, LOJNIKOFF threatened to turn him in to the Japanese. In this way LOJNIKOFF collected about 100,000.00 Pesos in bribes from ZALEVSKY.

The questioning of MORIMIKO (or MOROSI KAI) UKAMI by Counter-Intelligence Corps in Manila disclosed the following:

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In May, 1944, TAKAMI had a proposition with MANWA, a Japanese firm in Shanghai which possessed a powerful connection with the Japanese Navy. Whereas, other companies were unable to obtain shipping space for exports, MANWA was able to get this shipping space. TAKAMI was exporting lamps to the Southern territories to sell on the black market.

During May, 1944, Mr. IKUSHIMA, a first-class member of the Shisei-Kan, the highest branch of the Gunzoku (civilians attached to the military), called TAKAMI into his office. He let TAKAMI know that he was acquainted with his activities in the black market through the Manwa Company and threatened him with conscription.

As TAKAMI is an American citizen and also since he had no stomach for active military duty, he listened to IKUSHIMA's proposition that he join IKUSHIMA. IKUSHIMA promised to get TAKAMI a good position in the Navy counterpart of the Gunzoku. TAKAMI did not want to identify himself with the military in any way, so he countered with the proposal that he would give his services to IKUSHIMA gratis in exchange for IKUSHIMA'S protection against conscription. IKUSHIMA agreed to this proposal.

On or about 26 May, 1944, IKUSHIMA told TAKAMI something of the mission that they were to perform. IKUSHIMA told him that there was to be a group composed of Japanese, Koreans and Europeans which was to be sent to Manila. TAKAMI was to be included in this group. He did not elaborate on the work that was to be done but told TAKAMI that he would divulge its mission in due course. On 28 May, 1944, TAKAMI was sent by plane to Taihoku, Formosa, where he was to act as an interpreter for these Europeans when they stopped there on their journey to Manila.

He recalled that MEJOFF came to Taihoku with CARNETIRO and LOJNIKOFF. HOVANS and IKUSHIMA, with two or three others, came later, but took off for Manila first. TAKAMI came to Manila from Taihoku with MEJOFF, TERNI, LOJNIKOFF and CARNETIRO. This group arrived in Manila on 11 June, 1944.

TAKAMI said that he was shocked at the group of Europeans that IKUSHIMA had picked for this mission, whatever it was. HOVANS, the leader, had been a notorious crook in Shanghai, and, at one time, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years. (When questioned by TAKAMI about this, IKUSHIMA had stated that HOVANS had done important espionage work for the Japanese Government, and, therefore, was highly

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respected and trusted by high Japanese officials.) LOJNIKOFF, another member of the group, was lightweight boxing champion of the Orient and had been mixed up in the "buy and sell racket" in Shanghai. LOJNIKOFF had also been involved in the theft of diamonds in Shanghai. TAKAMI stated that the other men, including MEJOFF, had been unknown to him before coming here.

On or about 15 June, 1944, IKUSHIMA called a meeting of the group which was held at the residence of the president of the Hongkong Shanghai Bank in Aviles Street near Malacanan Palace. At this meeting, IKUSHIMA stated, meagrely, the mission of this group in Manila. He told the group, including MEJOFF, that of all the territories conquered by the Japanese, the Philippines had taken the least kindly to the Co-Prosperity Sphere and was the most recalcitrant. He stated that the Army and Navy were doing what they thought best to relieve this situation, but it still persisted and was going from bad to worse. Therefore, it was the mission of this group of Europeans and Orientals to investigate and study this condition from every angle to attempt to find the answer to this situation and to bring the Philippines into the line. This group was to analyze the Filipino way of life, to study the Filipinos' ideology, and to find the answer to this most pressing problem.

In addition, they were to study the other nationals in the Philippines to learn what their sympathies were, to find out how the Japanese had failed to win them over to their side. Further, they were to investigate the Japanese Army and Navy, and observe the methods that they were using to alleviate this situation, and to make recommendations as to the improvement of these methods. Japanese controlled utilities, such as Meralco, were to be investigated to learn if corruption existed and to root out the causes if such a condition existed. IKUSHIMA stressed the point that each man had been carefully chosen because of his past experience and each man was to do a specific job.

TAKAMI stated that it was a grandiose scheme and a very noble one in purpose, but it was evident to him that IKUSHIMA had been deceived by HOVANS, and certainly the men that HOVANS had selected for IKUSHIMA were in no way qualified to carry out such a mission. In TAKAMI's opinion, they were as fine a group of opportunists, blackmailers and swindlers as could be found in the Far East.

It was TAKAMI's job to get the overall picture. He was to observe and in that way acquaint himself with the work to

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be done, so that, if necessary, he could take over the leadership of the group. He also acted as interpreter and contact man between HOVANS and IKUSHIMA for about two months, at which time HOVANS returned to Shanghai. In August, 1944, TAKAMI took over the leadership of the group working directly under Ikushima.

Takami went on to say that almost from the beginning the thing was a farce. IKUSHIMA was jealous of his position and appeared to be reluctant about giving out any information lest someone of the group learned too much. He would issue silly orders. For instance, he would detail a man to find out the names of the members of a certain foreign chamber of commerce when the information was open to everybody. He would detail another man to find out which puppet government officials had what friends among the foreign colony. He would ask for voluminous reports and a great deal of effort would be spent gathering information that could have been gotten out of a business directory or telephone book. It appeared to TAKAMI that IKUSHIMA was more interested in getting a lot of nonsensical reports that might impress his superiors than he was in solving any problems or promoting any better relations between the Filipinos and Japanese which he had announced as his intention originally.

IKUSHIMA set up CARNEIRO and LOJNIKOFF in the "buy and sell" business so that they could observe this racket from the "inside". This did not work out because the Filipino "buy and sell" men distrusted these foreigners and would have nothing to do with them. As CARNEIRO and LOJNIKOFF were interested only in the money that they could make out of this business, they were not interested in observing the Filipino members of the "profession" and made no effort to promote any better understanding. In fact, they did more harm than good because they swindled the Filipinos.

About the end of September, 1944, TAKAMI had a long talk with IKUSHIMA in which he tried to point out the fallacy of attempting to rectify the Philippine situation by using these men. IKUSHIMA, who had by now become quite disillusioned, agreed with TAKAMI and the group just fell apart. Little or no attempt was made after September to accomplish anything. The members of the group were left on their own to work out their own salvation.

Originally, the men had been paid 3,000 Pesos per month which was ample. After a couple of months, this became too little on which to live and the true character of these men came to the front. They became involved in all sorts of schemes to make money and they all had pretty bad reputations around town. IKUSHIMA, in order to save face, called for an accounting of their activities from time to time, but he had lost control over them.

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SECRETCONCLUSION:

Although allegations had been made that HOVANS and his group were responsible for the deaths and torturing of American and Filipino nationals, investigation has not shown that to be the case. Undoubtedly, they participated in some intelligence and espionage investigations of a minor nature in an attempt to ferret out allied collaborators. It appears that the real mission of the trip to Manila was a combination of two things: (1) An investigation of the sympathies of the Filipinos and reasons for the Japanese failure to win them over to the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (2) A trip to Manila offered the HOVANS group a good opportunity to extend their black market and swindling operations. HOVANS and his group would never have consented to make the trip on reason number one alone and the Japanese Navy would never have permitted the trip based only on reason number two.

It seems apparent that the group accomplished little of an intelligence value for the Japanese, and when it became obvious that the Philippines would be invaded by American forces the group disintegrated into selfish individuals each attempting to make as much money as possible.

Inasmuch as the China Theater Judge Advocate General's office has indicated that there is not sufficient evidence of a War Crimes violation against American citizens by HOVANS or any member of his group, intensive investigation of the case has ceased. However, informants of this office are still attempting to locate HOVANS in order that he may be questioned concerning intelligence activities of the Japanese Navy.

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Section II

**JAPANESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
IN CHINA**

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- EXHIBIT IV** - Hidaka Organ
- EXHIBIT V** - Hidaka Organ
- EXHIBIT VI** - Excerpts of a Report on Japanese Intelligence, Tsingtao
- EXHIBIT VII** - Japanese Espionage Section, South China
- EXHIBIT VIII** - Japanese - South China Intelligence Group Five Provinces Information Department
- EXHIBIT IX** - Kempai Tai at Tsingtao, North China

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INTRODUCTION

A. The Military Intelligence Service was the most important branch of the Japanese China Expeditionary Forces. Its leaders, most of whom were rabid radicals, influenced and in most cases controlled the tactical planning staffs of Headquarters and the Armies under its command.

The conquest of China, the control of its people and exploitation of its wealth was both directly and indirectly supervised by intelligence.

The functions of this vast organization were as extensive and elaborate as any in the world, the main sections included the following: field or combat intelligence within Armies, counter-espionage, espionage, sabotage and fifth column, policing and peace preservation, propaganda and economic control through government monopolies. The responsibility for the performance of most of these functions did not lie strictly with the Chief of Intelligence at Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, but was for the most part the responsibility of the army commanders and his intelligence staff; the commanders, in turn, were not obligated to report every detail concerning intelligence activity to Headquarters. It was in the interest of the Army of a certain area to operate its own organizations to successfully execute its duties of either combat or occupation.

Besides organizations of the Armies, other intelligence units, better known as Kikans or Special Service Organizations, were created by higher Headquarters for the performance of special missions. These independent Kikans operated for and reported only to Headquarters.

The Military Police (Kempei), in many respects independent of Headquarters, had many intelligence duties to perform, the most important of which was counter-espionage.

Within the Army alone there did not exist a properly coordinated intelligence system, one with a proper flow of intelligence to the supreme authorities, the Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo. The system was for the most part conducted as a service to the area in which it operated and in this respect it was extremely thorough. Such thoroughness was exemplified by the constant repetition and over-lapping of duties by different organizations with the same Army.

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The Imperial General Headquarters was the body responsible for strategy and the prosecution of the war, and controlled both branches of the armed forces. It was made up of senior Army and Navy officers, with representatives of the Foreign Office for purposes of liaison and advice.

The relation of Imperial General Headquarters to intelligence work paralleled its relation to the prosecution of the war in general. Through its Third Bureau, it directed and coordinated the intelligence activities of all subsidiary organizations. The function of coordination was performed by an Inter-service Supervisory Control Board within the Third Bureau.

The General Staff was responsible for the conducting of military operations and the collection of intelligence. The latter function came under the direction of the Second Department (DAI NIKA, JOHO) of the General Staff. This department was in turn divided into a series of numbered sections, each with particular functions or with direction toward a particular area. Subdivision of which are not known in detail, however it has been reported that the divisions are as follows: Europe and US Division, German and Soviet Division and Propaganda Division. All intelligence received from army units in the field was routed to the Second Department, which was principally the main coordinator of Army intelligence.

The Ministry of War, although a body on the same level of authority as the General Staff, was responsible for military administration and played no part in command functions or intelligence. In actuality the Kempei Tai, (Gendarmerie or Military Police) was responsible to the War Ministry, but intelligence affairs of the Kempei were channeled the Commanding General of the area in which it operated, for transmittal to the General Staff.

C. China Expeditionary Forces (CEF)

The China Expeditionary Forces functioned under the Imperial Headquarters on the same rank as the Southern Forces (Nambosogun) and the Manchurian forces (Kwangtung Army - Kantogun). The intelligence section (Dai Nika) of Hq. CEF was charged with the strategic collection and coordination of intelligence as received from the North, Central and South China Commanders to be used by the commanding general for war plans and dissemination to the General Staff and Imperial Headquarters.

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1. Headquarters and Staff Officers

The Officer in charge of the Dai Ni Ka was the most important man in the CEF and although according to the headquarters organization the Dai Ichi Ka (First Section) was the section responsible for planning and execution of the war, the Intelligence Section in China controlled this function. This circumstance existed since most of the Staff Officers of the CEF were the radical element who had been expelled from Japan to the fighting front by Premier Tojo because of their political intrigue and military purges. These radicals controlled with tremendous power the direction and execution of warfare in China, regardless of the policies or directives of the Commanding General, who was most frequently a Tojo appointed officer. This power went to the extent of defiance toward orders issued by the General Staff and often deliberate independent action on the part of the Headquarters CEF.

Prominent radicals who held intelligence posts in the CEF were Lt. General WACHI, Lt. General TSUJI, Major General KAWAMOTO, Colonel OKATA and Colonel OGAWA, all of whom were opponents to Hideaki Tojo's government and policies.

WACHI served as right-hand man to General MAZAKI and with the rank of Colonel was Chief of the Dai Ni Ka in 1938 - 1939 and had as his assistant Colonel TSUJI. In 1939 WACHI, after promotion to Major General, and TSUJI were removed to the front at Hankow. At the end of the war Lt. General WACHI was Assistant Chief of Staff of Nanshogun (Southern Forces)

TSUJI, after serving in Hankow, returned in 1943 to Nanking as Officer in Charge of the Dai Ni Ka, however, later in the same year was dispatched to the South Pacific. Successors, such as KAWAMOTO, OKATA and OGAWA carried on the influence of the Second Department.

The policy which WACHI and TSUJI were endeavoring to enforce was complete military domination of China and the dividing of China into two states, the North China Provisional Government and Taide Puppet Regime. They strongly opposed the formation of the Wong Ching Wei Puppet Government.

As a result of the insubordinate activity by these individuals, Tojo sent HARUKE and SAKATA in 1939 as supervisors to the Headquarters, CEF, but they were gradually influenced by the radicals and became involved in exploitation and fortune seeking rackets.

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2. INTEL. DATA

a. Generalization

The 2nd Section of the Headquarters, North China Expeditionary Force was merely an office through which intelligence flowed, in irregular spurts, toward Haining Headquarters. It played only a small role in supervising, directing or instructing its rather loosely connected subordinate organizations. The scope of investigation conducted by the 2nd Section included collection of information on Chungking, American, Soviet and Chinese Communist forces; the first two only by means of radio "listening posts"; the third by the same means, through liaison with German, Italian and French agencies, and by supervision of White Russian communities; and the fourth, Communist forces, by means of agents and through the flow of combat intelligence from fighting units. As would be natural in the North China Area, the Chinese Communist forces were the greatest menace to the Japanese, and as a result most of the agencies directed their efforts toward collecting information about them.

b. The subordinate agencies were as follows:

Third Independent Guard Unit

The Third Independent Guard Unit was a part of a Group Army garrisoned in the Peiping Area whose intelligence section reported to 2nd Section, North China Army Headquarters, upon information concerning Communist elements as obtained from the Main Kih Hui, Cooperatives, and other native organs cooperating with the Japanese. It proved difficult to obtain accurate information due to guerrilla type warfare conducted by the Communists. (For further details re origin, organizational structure, training, cases of success and failure, see Appendix, Exhibit I.)

Peiping Information Group (Chinghsun Hikan)

The Peiping Information Group (Chinghsun Hikan), receiving its name from its commanding officer, was charged with collecting information on both Chungking and Communist forces, utilizing both soldiers and civilians in its offices and Chinese agents. (For details re make-up, training, dispatching of agents, expenses, activities, etc., see Appendix, Exhibit II.)

Peiping Special Intelligence Corps

Peiping Special Intelligence Corps was a "listening post" collecting information from foreign broadcasts along political lines. (Appendix pg. III)

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By 1943 Tojo had managed to eliminate most of the radical Staff Officers from CEF Headquarters, usually by sending them off to the front, and there was a rapid decline of influence on the part of the Second Department. Inferior and inexperienced graduates of the Nakano Special Military Officers School were placed in staff positions.

The Dai Ni Ka devoted its attention equally toward Chungking and Communist affairs until the outbreak of the war against the United States and England, at which time attempts were made to compromise with the Communist forces, especially the New Fourth Army, and some success resulted, since active warfare subsided, trade developed between the two areas and prominent Communist personalities were permitted to travel within occupied areas. As a result the Second Department could devote its entire attention to the war against the Allies. During the closing months of the war and shortly after the surrender, the Staff of Headquarters CEF supported the Communist Armies with supplies and equipment in deliberate violation of the surrender terms.

The Dai Ni Ka was responsible for the forming and supervising of Special Service Organizations, developed for special missions in combat areas for penetration purposes or for economic or counter espionage activities in occupied cities. These missions were most frequently the inspiration of the radical militaristic Staff Officers at Headquarters.

SECRETHidaka Organ

Hidaka Organ was in complete charge of collecting information on and from the foreign national groups and organizations in Peiping and Tientsin, mainly by liaison activity. This organization overlaps the functions of both the above-mentioned organs since activities in Chungking and Yenan were also in its scope, and this kind of information was also collected by radio interception. (Appendix, Exhibits IV & V).

Other agencies devoting their efforts to intelligence in the Peiping-Tientsin area are the Kempei-tai, the Intelligence and Investigation Corps of the Ambassadorial Office, North China Telephone & Telegraph Co., North China Communications Co., North China Development Co. However, these are covered in other parts of this summary.

It is apparent from reports received concerning the North China area that this part of the country, furthest removed from strategic fighting fronts, was simply in a state of occupation and there was little need to stress intelligence activities other than to prevent subversive uprisings and to suppress the guerrilla menace on the part of Communist bands. Therefore, the various Japanese Armies in this area dealt with intelligence affairs in the manner that the commanding officer wished to conduct them. The evolution of intelligence activity in the port of Tsingtao, Shantung Peninsula, is a good example of how the highly organized system, on the part of both the Navy and Army, since 1938, changed to meet the prevailing situation.

In 1938, the 5th Brigade of 43rd Japanese Army Intelligence Department, known as Tokumu Kikan, swept into the city and "occupied", but in time most activity was conducted against Communists through combat intelligence teams who collected information concerning enemy disposition, peace and order in occupied areas, climatic conditions, and topography and terrain; their sources were through agents, voluntary informers among inhabitants, Imperial Collaboration Army, Peace Preservation Units, and the Puppet Armies.

Economic, political and counter-intelligence functions, although conducted by the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie agencies, were mainly the duty of civilian organizations as the Koain, under the Great East Asia Ministry.

The general method of collecting intelligence from agents, both Chinese and Japanese, was by extortion or subjection means, such as granting privileges, contracts, etc. in return for information. There was little security or concealing of identity of agents; training was at a minimum; and pay was

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negligible. All of these factors existed because North China, particularly on the Shantung Peninsula, was actually too far from the war in China and the Pacific to be of tactical importance. This area was simply held and had only a need for occupation forces to maintain public peace and suppress skirmishes on the part of guerrilla "bandits" and small Communist forces. (For details, see Appendix VI.)

In order to explain in further detail the methods of operation, the training of personnel, and to give an estimation of the value of information obtained, a general statement of The Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese Officers and Soldiers, entitled "Outline of Intelligence Collecting Machinery of Japanese Forces", 2 December, 1945, follows:

OUTLINE OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING MACHINERY OF JAPANESE FORCES

Since the Manchurian Incident, a bad habit of neglecting the intelligence service was created among the Japanese forces in North China as they had always fought against weaker enemy forces. The Japanese forces always were confident of winning over the enemy. The Chinese forces were weaker in quality and equipment. Information obtained regarding the Chinese forces was not the deciding factor for the victory of the Japanese forces. It was useful only for the Japanese forces to keep the Japanese casualties to a minimum. Under such circumstances, an evil habit of neglecting the value of the intelligence service gradually grew.

It has to be admitted under the circumstances that almost all of those members who were engaged in the intelligence service were not of first ranking men in their line; that enthusiasm of the commander in leading the service was not sufficient; and that machinery for collecting intelligence was also not sufficient.

Recently, however, importance of intelligence service was strongly urged in some quarters in favorably leading campaigns against Chinese Communist forces. But this advocacy, after all, failed to attract general attention. Here may be traced one of the causes which lead Japanese forces gradually to an unfavorable war situation.

Along with such general situation, the information collecting machinery of the Japanese forces in North China was also very poor, it has to be admitted.

In North China information was collected chiefly through interception of enemy radio communications and from secret agents of Chinese nationality. But those who had facilities for intercepting enemy radio communications were confined to Army Headquarters or much higher army unit headquarters. Furthermore, the capacity of the facilities was extremely limited.

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Of the Chinese secret agents employed, those who apparently seemed excellent did not really cooperate with the Japanese forces and the rest were generally of low mentality and most were so-called double agents far from sharing the same fate with the Japanese.

Most of them, taking advantage of their positions with the Japanese forces, indulged in lootings or other unlawful conduct among the Chinese populace with the result that the Chinese public gradually came to entertain bad feeling against the Japanese forces and efforts were made to collect information voluntarily brought from the local inhabitants by rendering aid to them and winning their popularity and success was obtained to some extent.

Those which supplemented the insufficiency caused by the afore-mentioned poor radio interception facilities and inferior Chinese secret agents were the enemy documents obtained by our garrison units during their small engagements, examination of war prisoners when captured and also cooperation offered by local Chinese. In view of special circumstances taken into consideration in operations against the Chinese Communist forces, one division of Japanese troops usually had to defend about 140-160 separate localities. In those areas where Japanese troops kept friendly relations with local Chinese inhabitants and checked the infiltration of the Chinese Communist troops, the local Chinese inhabitants always volunteered valuable information although there were exceptions. Furthermore, after each small battle, all enemy documents captured as well as information obtained from prisoners of war were sent to their upper units and they were of great value.

Since Japanese forces held their commanding system in high respect, thousands of small garrisons scattered in North China might have well been regarded as advance units of information collecting machinery. Under such circumstances, it was very seldom that a special intelligence unit was dispatched to a certain specified locality directly by Headquarters respectively of each Brigade, Division, Army and the Japanese North China Army. The Chinese military authorities entertain some doubt on this point, but this is groundless suspicion on their part.

In addition to negligence of intelligence service as afore-mentioned, the following two factors may be accounted additionally for the failure to obtain successful results in the intelligence service:

1. Small advanced Japanese garrisons were stationed at isolated places where communication was difficult, and no adequate education regarding the collection of information given to them.

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- ii. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, there were frequent shifts of troops, and no thorough-going training had to be given up.

General speaking, it took at least six months for the troops to acquaint themselves with special tactics to be employed for engaging the Chinese Communist troops. Most of the Japanese troops, however, had to be shifted to other theaters of war when they somehow learned it, and the fresh troops had to repeat the same thing.

In short, the information collecting machinery of the Japanese forces in North China was insufficient either in its structure or in its capacity. It was rather annoyed by unreliable information offered by professional Chinese secret agents. When the war situation was generally good for Japan effects caused by such bad information were apparently negligible, but with the progress of the war gradually unfavorable, various weak points were disclosed in every direction and the Japanese forces had difficulty in grasping the true nature of the Chinese Communist forces.

With the above description in mind, it will be interesting to look into the following table:

TRAINING OF MEMBERS ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND VALUE OF INFORMATION OBTAINED

i. Training:

Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army, with a view to enhancing the ability of those in complete charge of intelligence service of each Brigade, Division and Army under its command and control as well as giving instructions in carrying out the service, assembled those members twice a year, spring and autumn at Peiping, or, if necessary, special officers were dispatched to each Brigade's, Division's or Army's intelligence section for training of personnel.

In 1944 when general inspection of all Divisions in North China was conducted for the first time, the intelligence sections at each Army, Division and Brigade Headquarters were also inspected and necessary instructions were given.

In addition, general instructions were given to each intelligence section by means of telegrams, reference booklets published from time to time and official circular letters.

In training and giving instructions, emphasis was especially laid on the characteristic feature of the Chinese Communist forces and the special fighting tactics to be

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employed against the Chinese Communist forces. For that purpose, the following booklets were published:

A series of the "Extermination of Communists" published once in two or three months.

"A Guide for Extermination of Communists" Vol. 1 & Vol. 2.

"Suggestions on Punitive Operations against Chinese Communist Forces".

"A Desk-Book on Intelligence Service", etc.

The authorities of each Division and Army, besides making use of the above material, distributed among the members of the intelligence section some reference booklets necessary for giving special knowledge peculiar to each locality concerned.

On the other hand, an exchange of information was conducted with similar information organs other than the military once a month as a rule and they were asked to submit a report from time to time on the information they obtained.

Originally, special training was not given Japanese troops before being put on intelligence service. They were given necessary training while they were on routine duties. Here we find another trend of neglecting the value of intelligence service.

At the end of 1944, it was felt necessary to have specially trained members in intelligence service and plans were made to train those officers graduated from the cadets' training corps at Paoting and Shihmen for two or three months so they might be appointed as chiefs of the intelligence sections of the respective Divisions and Armies. Before these plans bore fruit, the war was brought to an end.

ii. Value of Information Obtained:

Headquarters of the Japanese North China Army achieved quite satisfactory results intercepting radio communications transmitted by Chungking forces as the latter's supervision and control of radio communication was poor. During actual operations the Japanese forces could relatively accurately perceive in advance attempts and movements to be carried out by Chungking forces.

On the contrary, it was very difficult or in some cases almost impossible for Japanese forces to know in advance the

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secrets relative to military operations of Chinese Communist forces, despite considerable efforts made for the interception on the part of the Japanese forces. Such being the case, the Japanese forces had to depend on a rough estimation based on incomplete information to infer the enemy attempts and movements. But it was, after all, inaccurate. Probably this might be attributed to the following facts:

- a) The elusive character of the Chinese Communist forces.
- b) Inferiority of secret agents employed by the Japanese forces.
- c) Strict supervision and control of the Chinese Communist forces over their radio communication as well as the poor facilities of the Japanese forces for intercepting the enemy radio communication.

Consequently, with the progress of the general war situation unfavorable to Japan and with the gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops scattered in various areas, it became all the more difficult to grasp an accurate conception on the strength and equipment of Chinese Communist forces.

On the other hand, Japanese forces had no facilities for intercepting radio communications transmitted by the Soviet-Mongolian forces in the Outer Mongolian area, and also it was almost impossible for the Japanese forces to dispatch their secret agents to that area. It is not too much to say, therefore, that no information was obtained regarding the Soviet-Mongolian forces.

Circumstances being as such, the Soviet attacks on the Japanese forces launched on August 9 were, frankly speaking, unexpected ones, and it was not until hostilities began between Japanese and Soviet troops north of Kalgan that the Japanese forces could get the general idea on the strength and equipment of enemy troops.

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3. Central China

a. Organization

The Second Section of the Headquarters, Central China Expeditionary Forces was located at Nanking and acted as the supervising and directing office of the intelligence departments in the armies under its command. The scope of its activity was greatly limited since the Area Armies Intelligence Departments furnished only matters of extreme importance to be relayed to higher headquarters. Most frequently, the Commanding General of the respective armies utilized information obtained without relaying it to Headquarters, CEF.

Under the command of Central China was the Sixth Area Army, and under it came the 34th, 20th, 13th and 11th Armies. The Staff Departments, containing the Intelligence Officer, as well as other sections, placed officers responsible for the collection of intelligence in the subordinate divisions, brigades, and regiments. It was the privilege of these officers to select the men under them to carry on their investigative functions. Many of these investigators were civilians who had a knowledge of the locality or language qualifications.

b. Methods of Operation

1. The Army, by means of combat patrols, collected information concerning both Communist and Nationalist forces at the fronts, and also utilized agents in penetration operations in the guise of merchants, smugglers, etc. The small towns near the fronts were covered by native informants at local shops, eating places, and rest houses as well as by the local Peace Preservation Corps.

2. In the large cities, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Soochow, etc., a much vaster network of informants and agents existed, however, their duties were more of a counter espionage and economic nature. The Army played only a small role in these areas since this activity was mostly of gendarmerie function.

Shanghai, at which city the 13th Army (NOBORI BUTAI), had its headquarters, is an example of the tremendous overlap of activity on the part of the numerous Japanese intelligence agencies, and showed the wast of effort and the interservices' jealousy which existed, and yet the extreme thoroughness to which the services conducted espionage and counter-espionage, propaganda, and subversive activities. The Army, with its allied Army Bureau

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(RIKUGUNBU) and Peace Preservation Corps and Puppet Armies, the Gendarmerie and its subordinate Police Force, the Navy and its Landing Party and Resident Office, the Foreign Office and its Consular Police and various development companies, railroad police, etc., delved into every phase of intelligence and exploitation, and formed a tremendous and impenetrable wall around the city. Each service, jealous and competing, had its own channel of reporting, and instead of depending on extensive exchange of information to coordinate their activities, chose to have its own network of agents and informants.

C. Training

The training of intelligence officers for higher positions did not exist, their positions were granted only after long periods of service with the Army. Therefore the activities conducted by the officer were not always according to a formed plan but more according to his personal interests and desired field of endeavor. This was predominately the policy which resulted in the forming of special service units (KIKANS) which were created to serve a special mission and were then disbanded upon completion or failure of the mission.

Less important officers and civilian employees were selected to work in intelligence departments by the following qualifications:

Previous military services, particularly in intelligence.
Language abilities.
Residence in the area of service.

No training was given to these people; they were expected to learn by experience.

The only persons in the intelligence service who received specialized training were technicians who had studied radio operation and maintenance, cryptography, and photography, and usually these were enlisted men.

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S E C R E T4. SOUTH CHINAa. Organization and Systematic Arrangements of Intelligence in South China: (See Chart; Exhibit VII)

Prior to the Japanese surrender, their South China intelligence work was under the direction of the Staff Department of the 23rd Japanese Army of Occupation with Kwangtung as their designated territory. The backbone of this organization was the Staff Department of the Army which utilized the Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and other intelligence units under its control to form its intelligence net. The Liaison Department and the Gendarmerie also assisted in such activities. The listed details are:

1) Service Units:

- a) 104th Division
- b) 129th Division
- c) 130th Division
- d) 23rd Brigade
- e) The 8th Independent Infantry Regiment
- f) The 13th Independent Infantry Regiment

2) Other assisting units:

- a) Liaison Department (Renrakubu)
- b) Gendarmerie

3) Other Special Intelligence Units (Kikans):

The above organizations were all under the control of the Staff Department of the Japanese Army. The Army designated an Intelligence Staff Officer to each Division, an officer to each Brigade and Regiment to assume charge of Intelligence. Under these officers-in-charge, a subordinate staff was formed from the rank and file. For other organizations and units, the same arrangement prevailed, an officer-in-charge, subordinate staff and interpreters. Details are shown on the accompanying chart.

b. Methods of Operation:1) Army Organizations: (Service Units)

In this respect, the Army collected information directly concerning the disposition of the Chinese Army and other relevant information concerning Free China. Captured documents and/or prisoners of war were sources of information.

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S E C R E T2) Intelligence Organizations:

These units were scattered throughout the country headed by an Intelligence Officer who purchased documents, newspapers and other printed matter circulating in Free China. From this source a general survey was made concerning the economic and political conditions in Free China, the excesses or scarcity of materials, current commodity prices, national morale, etc. which all contributed to his deductions concerning current conditions in China. Furthermore, it was the job of the organizations to hire Chinese and Formosans as agents for infiltration into Free China for espionage purposes. Radio intelligence interception, code-breaking for military information and movements, information concerning the China-India Air Transport, and the disposition of the American Air Force and Navy Units - all these activities were the tasks of these Intelligence Units.

c. Reporting:

- 1) Documentary: (1) Monthly Reports
(2) Special Reports as occasion demands
- 2) Radio: This method was limited to urgent and/or important matters
- 3) Telephones: For use close to Army Units, or for urgent information
- 4) Close Liaison between Unit Heads: This was accomplished through conferences of Unit Officers. Important or complicated matters were decided by such conferences.

d. Sectional Intelligence Operational Activities:

- 1) The 23rd Army under orders from Headquarters of the Japanese China Expeditionary Force, collected all information pertaining to the equipment of the Chinese forces, their organization and movements, tactics, the condition and strength of the Chinese-American Air Force, coastal landing possibilities, naval unit movements, the study of American strength and the international aspect of Chinese-American picture, and report such information to the Imperial Headquarters through the Second Area Command at Hankow.
- 2) Important information obtained by the 23rd Army, the 13th Army, the Taiwan Army, the 5th Air Force (principally

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serial information), the 2nd Expeditionary Naval Squadron, the Southern Army and the Indo-China Army was circulated and exchanged among each other.

3) All intelligence departments under their respective divisions were responsible for the collection of intelligence and the information obtained by their subordinate units as well. Such information other than that relevant to immediate tactical purposes, and all necessary information, was reported to the 23rd Army. Units, besides serving as clearing houses for their sub-units, carried out intelligence operations of their own and reported to their respective superior Departments attached to the Army Divisions. There were no designated intelligence organizations attached to Brigades and Regiments. This work was handled by the service units themselves, who were primarily interested in combat information which might be of immediate concern to themselves; such information was reported to their immediate superior Units. In their ordinary operations, the intelligence units included pacification propaganda for which a special office was set up. In regard to the Units attached to the Army Division, their main objective chiefly concerned the territory or area under the Division's occupation, with main emphasis on information relating to the Chinese forces immediate to them and with secondary emphasis on the subjects of Communists and bandits.

4) All intelligence agencies were to collect and assimilate all information of economic and political value for reports to the 23rd Army. They also established close liaison with the German "Heise" intelligence agency collaborating in the study and breaking of the Allied (Chinese and American) code. Results were reported to the 23rd Army.

5) Assisting Intelligence Agencies:

a) Gendarmerie:

1. Responsible for information and the preservation of peace and order.
2. Investigation of Chinese intelligence agents and their activities.

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3. Collection of information from the South China Five Provinces Intelligence Group. (Exhibit VIII)

All reports were sent to the 23rd Army.

Personnel of the Liaison Department, 23rd Army:

<u>Department</u>	<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Duties</u>
Liaison Dept.	Maj. Gen. Matsui	In charge of entire Dept.
General Affairs	Capt. Harushima	In charge of personnel and general affairs.
Unit #1	Lt. Ikida	Administration, and director of strategy, collection of intelligence regarding China.
Unit #2	Col. Kawai	Director of affairs concerning Puppet Government, Army and the Police.
Unit #3	Lt. Togashi	Director of economic sabotage and the purchase of raw materials
Unit #4	Capt. Okagami (Okanoue)	In charge of the exchange of reports with other members of the Axis.
Liuchow Branch	Maj. Ueuta	Similar to Liaison Department
Swatow Branch	Lt. Col. Yamaoka	-do-

e. General:

- 1) Before the assumption in charge by Lt. Col. KOBAYASHI, the "South China Espionage Agency" was headed by a person whose name was well known throughout China, Lt. Col. OKADA, an intimate friend of the German Espionage Agent, HEISE. When OKADA went to Shanghai in December, 1944, for the peace proposals, his duties were taken over by Lt. Col. SAIGO. When SAIGO went to Hengyang in March, 1945, KOBAYASHI took over until the end of the war.
- 2) During hostilities, various Japanese staff officers frequently had to leave for duty to the front and due to their lack or incomplete knowledge of the Chinese language it was difficult for them to hire and dispatch

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good agents. Because of these difficulties, Japanese ranking officers acknowledged the poor quality of their espionage reports.

- 3) At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had already established many intelligence and espionage posts throughout China. Because of the friction that arose between the men in charge and the agents, the task was transferred to the Army in the field.
- 4) It can be said that the main source of enemy intelligence was obtained through the radio, because such reports were mostly military and political of comprehensive nature which Tokyo and Nanking considered to be of great value. The Japanese paid special attention to the German "Heise" Agency and their collaboration was very close, such as the relationship of ranking officers with HEISE, and the designation of specific personnel, technical and otherwise, for cooperation with HEISE. The list of Japanese personnel assisting HEISE is given below:

<u>Unit Organization</u>	<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Collaboration Duties</u>
23rd Army Hq.	Col. Hasegawa	Social relationship with Heise
23rd Army Staff Hq.	Col. Okada	Heise's intimate friend
" " " "	Capt. Aoyama	Liaison with Heise
" " " "	Sgt. Sasaki	Interpreter
" " " "	Cpl. Wada	"
Ume Organization	Major Ume	Message interception
Kagami Organization	Major Kagami	" "
" " " "	Pfc. Nitta	Interception of China-India air transport information
23rd Army Staff Hq.	Pvt. Nunome	"
" " " "	Pvt. Masuda	"

f. Special Intelligence Units (Kikans):

The material referring to the Special Intelligence Units of South China is located under a separate section entitled "Special Service Organizations (See Table of Contents.)"

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G. Foci of Intelligence Activities

Since the tide of the Pacific war turned in favor of the Allies, especially since the American reoccupation of Leyte and Manila, the Japanese were contemplating the eventual landing along the South China coast. And from the reorganization and new equipment of the Chinese Army, they knew the time for the new Chinese offensive was near. Because of these facts, the primary concern of Japanese intelligence was directed toward the possible place and date of American coastal landings, the progress in tactics and offensive power of the rejuvenated Chinese Army, the new types of equipment and the probable time of the new Chinese offensive. Herewith is listed their primary objectives and territory covered:

Objectives:


- (1) Possible American landings along the South China coast:
 - (a) points of landing
 - (b) time
 - (c) strength and strategy
- (2) Time and strategy of Chinese offensive
- (3) Information relating to air transportation over the Bump
- (4) Degree of success pertaining to the sabotage of political division of China
- (5) Actual condition of peace and order of occupied South China
- (6) Information pertaining to concentration of forces.

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Territory Covered:

THE FOCI, AREA AND DIRECTION OF THE
SOUTH CHINA JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS



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SECRET5. SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONSa. Nomenclature:

Frequent changes in Japanese Special Service organizations, both in their names and in the functions which they imply, are apt to cause confusion. A glossary is therefore given in this paragraph, which sets out the names, meaning, and period of the organization of the Special Service Department (SSD).

CHUZAI BUKAN	Resident officer1929-37
(RIKUGUN: Army)		
TOKUMU KIKAN	SSD Army only	
1. Army SSD for less important areas		
excluding cities Peiping, Tientsin,		
Nanking, Shanghai, Canton	1929-37
2. SSD whole of China	1937-38
3. Solely for Puppet Government	1938-43
TOKUMU BU	Special duties dept.,	
Army whole of China excluding		
Shanghai and Nanking	1938-43
RENRAKU BU	Army Liaison Department1943-45
Used only for work with Puppet Gov.		
RIKUGUNBU	Army Department or Bureau1943-45

b. Origins:

Although the first organized effort to develop special services was made by the Navy in 1929, it is believed that the Army had them some years earlier. They existed in the form of Military Attaches at Peiping. However, when the Chinese Government transferred to Nanking, the Japanese, with their increasing interest in China, desired to retain a representative in North China and in order to avoid diplomatic protest created the CHUZAI BUKAN (Resident Officer) in addition to the Attaches' office. Resident officers were installed in every city of importance, subsequently extending to Canton.

c. Functions:

From 1929 to 1937, the Army Special Service Department was virtually under the control of the Imperial General Staff (SAMBO), Tokyo. This was because the main functions of the Special Service Department during this period were espionage and counter-espionage (general heading GUNREI), for which the General Staff has always been responsible as against the

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function of cooperation with governments, propaganda, economic and industrial affairs (general heading GUNSEI), for which the War Office (RIKUGUNSHO) and Admiralty (KAIGUNSHO) were responsible. Later, during the occupation, the SSD's were concerned primarily with the control of the native population, the establishment of Puppet regimes, and organization of labor and supplies for the occupation forces, in addition to intelligence activities.

d. Changes:

Changes took place as a result of prevailing circumstances, and took effect over a period of months. The first took place in 1930 when the RIKUGUN CHUZAI BUKAN activated the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization) to conduct similar functions in less important areas where sections of the organizations were formed and disbanded as the situation in that area demanded.

At that time, sections of TOKUMU KIKAN were not given special code-names; e.g., UME, MATSU, etc., which applied to later Army organizations. Thus, during the period 1929 - 1937, there were the following SSD's:

CHUZAI BUKAN, answering directly to Tokyo, mainly to the General Staff.

TOKUMU KIKAN (AIKUGUN), from 1930, in less important areas, answering to Tokyo, mainly to the General Staff.

Following the opening of hostilities in China in the summer of 1937, and the subsequent occupation of Nanking by Japanese forces, the SSD was remodelled, and the office of CHUZAI BUKAN terminated, with the exception of Army Departments in Canton and Hankow, when the CHUZAI BUKAN remained in addition to the new organ.

Although the Navy retained their Attaches, the Army temporarily withdrew theirs until the Wang Ching Wei Puppet Government came into being.

The Army SSD throughout China adopted the name of RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, and was for the first time under direct control of Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, Nanking, which in turn was responsible to the Imperial Headquarters and/or War Office, Tokyo, according to the nature of the work. This change in name and of responsibility was ordered by Lt. Gen. KITA, Seiichi, who was later succeeded by Lt. Gen. HARADA, Kumakichi. HOKUSHI RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN (North Army Special Service Department) had its headquarters in Peiping

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and was in control of Army SSD's in Tientsin, Tsingtao, and a few northern cities. Its jurisdiction did not extend to SSD's in Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow, who answered independently to Hq., C.E.F., Nanking. NANSHI RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN (South Army Special Service Department) had its headquarters in Canton.

Some time in 1938 the Army SSD began to adopt the same title as used by the Navy; viz., TOKUMU BU. The name RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN, especially as regards its espionage and counter-espionage functions, had become too well advertised in certain areas. This change in name did not apply to the Army SSD in Nanking and Shanghai, where their functions mainly were concerned with the engineering of and subsequent collaboration with Puppet Governments.

Thus, during the period 1937-1943, there were the following SSD's.:

RIKUGUN TOKUMU KIKAN - 1937-1938
 " " BU - 1938-1943
 " " KIKAN -

at Nanking - Shanghai - 1938-1943
 CHUZAI BUKAN - retained at Hankow and Canton.

The third general change of names and functions of the SSD's began in the spring of 1943. RIKUGUN TOKUMU BU, TOKUMU KIKAN and CHUZAI BUKAN were disbanded. In so far as their functions vis-a-vis the Puppet Government were concerned, the three were amalgamated into the RENRAKU BU. (Liaison Department), with the exception of Shanghai, where the SSD continued to operate as the RIKUGUN BU.

The other branch of the Army SSD, that which dealt with espionage and counter-espionage, was centralized under an Intelligence Branch, known as BORYAKU JISSHI KIKAN at Headquarters, CEF, Nanking. This branch was commonly referred to as TOKUSHU KIKAN (literally Special Duties Organization), but was not known officially by this title. MATSU KIKAN and KIKU KIKAN came under the category of TOKUSHU KIKAN (literally Special Duties Organization), but was not known officially by this title. MATSU KIKAN and KIKU KIKAN came under the category of TOKUSHU KIKAN.

The RENRAKU BU had departments in all the important centers of the Chinese Puppet Government, viz., in Peiping, Nanking, Hankow and Canton, as well as in Shanghai, where it was named RIKUGUN BU, but differed from its predecessors in that it comes under the direct control of Army Headquarters in Nanking.

This latest organization was born out of several trial

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and error methods used by the Army and Navy in China. It proved itself more efficient and lasted until the end of the war. The final change in name to that of a Liaison Organization and the assuming of duties along peace preservation lines came about when the Puppet Government was given the privilege of establishing its own government and city administrations. The old and much dreaded TOKUMU died and left the Chinese people not free of the special service as the Japanese wished to point out, but faced by an organization which was much closer to the people in its prying and watchfulness.

The RENRAKU BU was usually commanded by an officer of General's rank, or the rank of Colonel, according to its size and importance. It became an organization much like a police force with representations even covering most of the villages in outlying districts.

Its principal function was collaboration and liaison with the Puppet Government, for which a sub-department was maintained (SEIMU - Political Administration) and also departments dealing with economics, industry, propaganda, etc.

Mention has already been made of the existence of an independent organization, the RIKUGUN BU, in Shanghai which reported directly to Nanking Headquarters and carried on the duties of the TOKUMU BU and RENRAKU BU. However, this organization was also a complex intelligence organ. Details concerning the RIKUGUN BU follow under the ~~Central China~~ subsection. At Shanghai there also existed the RENRAKU BU as a separate organization of the above.

e. Employees of the SSD:

1) Civilian Employees:

Japanese civil servants who served in the SSD were generally of two kinds - young, inexperienced university graduates and old residents of localities in which they worked. The younger group were generally qualified in economics, propaganda, political administration, etc., especially as relating to China. The latter were recruited on the spot and held such qualifications as language, business knowledge of the areas they lived in, valuable contacts, etc. None of the civilians received intelligence training, but learned their duties through experience.

2) Agents:

Agents of the SSD were of various nationalities - the greatest number being Chinese; whereas Koreans, Formosans and White Russians comprised the remainder. As a whole there was little specialized training, and most of the knowledge attained was through actual job participation.

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SECRETf. Relations between SSD and Axis Representatives:

Relations between the Japanese SSD in China and the German and Italian diplomatic representatives were maintained on the surface in the most cordial manner, but behind the scenes there was a strong undercurrent of resentment which the SSD centres had towards their Axis partners. Particularly was this the case in connection with the Germans, who were unwontedly meddlesome in the workings of the SSD.

The Japanese considered China, or at least occupied China, under the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and, as such, was, without reservation whatever, Japan's affair; just as the Germans and Italians would have their share of occupied territory in Europe and Africa, should the war end in the Axis' favor.

After the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the concessions given to the Germans and Italians as regards information collected by the SSD were increased. However, it was difficult to satisfy the insatiable demands of the German representatives and even of the Italians who were prone to mimic their senior partner.

German interference in Japanese SSD operations reached its peak after Dunkirk. On not a few occasions, the Germans were caught redhanded in buying off Japanese agents, thus intercepting the information which should have reached the Japanese. The natural outcome of such occurrences was the tendency on the part of the Japanese SSD to become even more parsimonious in parting with information. With the deterioration of their position in Africa and Europe, and after Italy's elimination from the war, the Germans became less bold in their methods. Also they learned to their cost that Chinese did not make very trustworthy agents.

Italian representation became almost non-existent when Italy surrendered. Those pro-Fascist officials who were left, after the anti-fascists were interned, retained little of their diplomatic powers and as far as the Japanese SSD was concerned, there was little liaison to be conducted.

g. SSD Organizations:

Set out below are reports concerning all SSD organizations known to this office. This information concerning each organization explains briefly the objectives, key personnel, locations and time of activity.

1) UMF KIKAN:

UMF was organized in 1938 by Lt. General KAGEZA in Nanking for the purpose of supporting and promoting the

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Puppet Regime. In Chinese it was called MEI-HWA-TANG (Plum Flower Society) and was attached to the Military Adviser's Council. In the beginning it was active in the protection of Puppets from attacks by the C.C. Society and Blue Shirt Society (TAI LI) and assumed leadership in the Country Cleaning Movement.

In 1943, Lt. General MATSUI, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters, CEF, took charge of the organization and changed its function to one of strategic information gathering concerning the Chungking Government.

It has been highly difficult to obtain information concerning UME KIKAN as the Chinese authorities have shrouded it in secrecy, completely ignoring requests for information about it or permission to interrogate members of its staff.

Concerning the Shanghai office, it has been learned that Captain NAKAJIMA, Seichi, was in charge and had Lt. HIZAMATSU and Lt. KUROKI on his staff. The office had two departments: Political, devoted to espionage; economic, devoted to purchasing and exchange of war materials with the forward Chinese Armies. These transactions were made by the TONAN KIGYO KOSU (East Southern Development Co.) located in Shanghai, but with branch offices in Chekiang Province at Hangchow, Chinhwa, Fuyang, Lanchi and Niwoo.

According to a statement by Major General TOMI, Chief of Staff of the 23rd Army, it was this organization that engineered the desertion and flight of WANG CHING-WEI and TSENG CHUNG-MING from Chungking to Hanoi and thence to Nanking.

In 1938, the IWAI Mission, (sometimes called the Special Investigation Group), an independent office of the Foreign Office, cooperated very closely with UME KIKAN. IWAI, Aeiichi, who had served as Consul in Canton, organized the mission upon his arrival in Shanghai, and received full cooperation and financial support from Lt. General KAGEZA, Director of UME.

2) OBA KIKAN:

OBA, Masatoshi, once a loafer in Shanghai ingratiated himself with the military clique following the battle for Shanghai, 1937, and formed the OBA Organization. In the pretense of doing intelligence work, he caused many anti-Japanese to be jailed and destroyed many British and American industrial plants. He also assisted the UME KIKAN

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in the formation of the Puppet Army. During the search for Kuomintang personnel in outlying villages by the Puppet Government, OBA managed to appropriate a huge amount of grain for himself.

3) MATSU KIKAN (Pine Society):

MATSU KIKAN, organized in 1940, was directed by Lt. Col. OKADA, Yoshimasa, former Chief of Staff of the 23rd Army with offices in Shanghai, Hongkong, Canton and Hankow, and was responsible directly to Headquarters, Nanking. The objection of the organization was to collect information concerning political personalities and activities in Chungking, and utilized this information to persuade officials to collaborate with the Puppet Regime. Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war, MATSU KIKAN was devoting its efforts to obtaining foreign capital (gold) by exporting Chinese native goods, bristles, wood-oil, etc. to the United States. This trade was financed by SHOWA TSUSHO. The organization was reported to have been disbanded in 1943 and that the information section joined UME KIKAN. However, a source in Canton reports that up to the surrender, the activities of MATSU were entrusted to a branch of the ITAGAKI HOUSE, with the aim of destroying the Chinese economic structure by the purchase of metals and ores.

4) FUJI KIKAN (Shanghai Kikan):

Shanghai Kikan was organized and operated during 1940-1941 by Captain URANO (now Lt. Colonel), who assigned directly from Headquarters, CEF. Its duties, as were the duties of most Kikans early in the war, were both the elimination of Chungking agents and persuasion of Chinese officials to join the Nanking Regime. FUJI KIKAN was more of a terrorist gang than intelligence organ, and carried out its acts by holding as hostages members of Chungking officials' families, and in the case of enemy agents, simply shooting them. Assistants of URANO were two Koreans, KANEZAWA (Kim Kyung Chai) and YAMASHIRO (Choi Kyung Su).

5) SAKURA KIKAN:

This organization, directed by Major-General OKADA, operated at Shanghai in 1940 until 1942. Its main activity was counter-espionage directed against Chungking agents.

6) SAKADA KIKAN:

This organization, originally started by SAKAKA, operated as an espionage organization for the 13th Army under the direction of Lt. Col. ICHIGAWA, _____, Intelligence Staff Officer. It was known as the New Trading Co., (Shin Wha Moi Kungsu), and had its offices in the Development Building, Shanghai. KOJIMA Takeo was the manager as his assistants, Capt. HASHIMOTO and Mrs. NOGAMI.

7) MISUMI ORGANIZATION:

This organization was originally directly under the Headquarters, Japanese China Expeditionary Force, but was

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transferred to the 23rd Army. The main duty was the interception of military radio messages sent by the Chinese and the American headquarters. It was divided into two sections: the China Section and the American Section.

The attention of the China Section was the Chinese 2nd Area Command, especially the 7th War Area, the 65th Army, the 63rd Army and the Border Region Headquarters. Messages from these headquarters concerning troop movements and supplies were the main objectives of interest. The main objectives of interception for the American Section were the messages and broadcasts from the Philippines, which was the center of the American Naval information, Honolulu and Oahu, and the messages that travelled between these points and the United States. When the tide of the Pacific War became evident, this organization devoted its entire energy towards the collection of information concerning the points of coastal landings which the Americans and the British forces were contemplating. But due to lack of equipment and shortage of personnel, their achievements in this respect up to the time of the surrender were poor.

In their study of intercepted messages, the important points of each message were made into copies and compared with other messages sent out. Their time of interception ranged from 0800 hours to 2400 hours.

China Section:

C-I-C :	Captain Yano	
Staff :	40 (including four officers)	40
Duty :	Radio interception of Chinese messages	

American Section:

C-I-C :	Capt. Arakawa	22
Staff :	22 (including 1 officer)	
Duty :	Interception of American radio messages	

Apparatus (Technical) Section:

C-I-C :	Lt. Sako	6
Staff :	6 (including 1 officer)	
Duty :	Repair and maintenance of equipment	

General Affairs Department:

C-I-C :	Capt. Yano (assumes this post also)	8
Staff :	8 (including 1 officer)	
Total number of personnel		<u>76</u>

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Equipment used in the China Section:

10 radio transmitter sets with 28 operators
 9 sets require 3 men per set
 1 set requires 1 man per set. 10 sets
 one to two translators.

Equipment used in the American Section:

7 sets with 20 operators
 6 sets require 3 operators
 1 set requires 2 operators 7 "
 readers and translators together 2 men
 Total 17 sets

Types of Radio Transmitters:

R C A 4 sets
 National 3 "
 Others 10 "
 Total 17 sets

This equipment was handed over to our 38th Division and the 50th Division by the Japanese.

8) The Asiatic Prosperity Organization:

This organization was directly under the headquarters, Japanese China Expeditionary Force whose headquarters was at Nanking. It was originally established in Hongkong, but in April, 1945, it was transferred to Canton under the 23rd Army. Its main activities were the collection of intelligence information from documents and newspapers and the dispatching of agents into Free China to carry out its activities, especially information concerning military movements in South China. From their own reports it was difficult to find good agents for this purpose, and due to the tight anti-espionage net set up by Chungking, these agents often were arrested or simply disappeared. Col. NINOUE, Capt. AOYAMA and Lt. Col. KOBAYASHI all expressed the same doubt whether these agents ever reached their objectives, and knew that results expected from these people could not be reliable and therefore confined themselves chiefly to documentary information. Whatever information they had been able to obtain was concerning the East River Communist and bandit activities.


Personnel:

<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Duty</u>	<u>Present Address</u>
Major Ninoue	Head of Organization	Deceased
Capt. Aoyama	Successor to Maj. Ninoue	Honam Concentration (POW) Camp
Sgt. Yatomi	Member of the Staff	Liaison Department 2nd Area Command
Mr. Masuda	Employee	Lingnan Concentration Camp
Kwing Chuen	Chauffeur (Chinese)	Unknown
Chang Yiu	Cook "	"

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SECRETSphere of Operation of the Asiatic Prosperity Organization

CHART # 2



NOTE: The chief agent for this organization was a Chinese, LI SHING WING, a native of Toishan, aged 38. Before the war he was said to have been connected with the Chinese "Blueshirts", and supplied information to the Japanese at Hongkong after the beginning of hostilities. He came to Canton in March, 1945, to continue his work by establishing a shop as his blind under the name of CHEUNG LEE HONG situated on Tai Ping Road, S. This was his headquarters where he dispatched agents to Chungking, Kunming, Kweiyang, San-nan district, the East River and Loting area. Once a month his men went out utilizing the river boats and trade-travelers as means of contact.

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SECRET9) Kagami Organization:

This organization was part of the Japanese 5th Air Force at Nanking. Its main objective was the interception of messages relating to the movements of the American Air Force in China. Due to the expediency of the work, it maintained close collaboration with the German "Heise" Agency at Canton. From March, 1944, it began to undertake the main task of intercepting messages of the A.T.C. and Sergeant NITTA was designated to collaborate with the Germans. Before collaboration with the Germans, the only duty of the Kagami Organization was the interception of A.T.C. messages. In June, 1945, this unit moved to Central China, together with the 5th Air Force.

Personnel:

Major KAGAMI	Head of Organization
Capt. KIGENOI	Staff Member
Capt. OAITO (Ofuji)	" "
Capt. TAKAYA	" "
Lt. (Uncertain romanization)	" "
Sergeant NITTA	

10) YOSHINO Organization:

This organization was attached to the Headquarters of the Japanese China Expeditionary Force. It was set up in Canton on June, 1944, with Maj. Gen. YOSHINO as the head. Its objectives were sabotage directed against ranking Chinese military officers, sowing seeds of discord between local Governments and the Central Government, and the instigation of peace overtures through false propaganda of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Upon the recall of Maj. Gen. YOSHINO to Nanking Headquarters in February, 1945, Maj. Gen. TOMITA (TOMIDA) took over the organization which he wound up and reorganized into what was known as "The South China Espionage Agency" whose main objective was the instigation of peace between the Chinese forces stationed in Kwangai and the Japanese. The results of this effort were nil.

Personnel:

<u>Name and Rank</u>	<u>Duty</u>	<u>Present Address</u>
Maj. Gen. YOSHINO	Head of Organization	In Japan, address unknown
Lt. Col. FUKUYAMA	Assistant Head	Staff Officer, 23rd Army, at present in Shanghai.
Lt. (Uncertain romanization)	Secretary	Address unknown
Sgt. KITAGAWA	Secretary	Liaison Department 2nd Area Command

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SECRET11) Take Organization:

The duty of this organization was the study of the military, political, cultural and other subjects of the Chinese.

12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization:

The principal duties of the HUNAN FUKKOBU Organization was to avoid coercive action against the people of the occupied area in order to gain the good will of the people, to maintain a popular support of the people, to gain the support of discouraged war-lords and politicians, to collect resources and food in order to maintain the Japanese occupation forces.

The FUKKOBU was organized under the guidance of the Sakurabutai and the Ministry of War. The Commanding Officer of the Changsha Organization was Major General SAKATO TOYOKI.

The following is a diagrammatic outline of the organization:

a) General Office:

1. Commanding Officer - Colonel HORIE
2. Principle - Same as Chinese Organization
3. Direct Section:

- A. Service Section: Receiving and dispatching documents and wireless messages.
- B. Accounting Section: Receiving, paying, and auditing.

b) Economical Affairs:

1. Commanding Officer - Colonel NAKASHIMA
2. Principle - Cultivate resources, "oppress" economics, steal material in order to fulfil the military needs.
3. Direct Section:

- A. Mining Dept.: Investigation, research and cultivation.
- B. Munition Dept.: Metal ware and all materials concerning munitions and to establish cigarette, wine and soy, leather, clothing and dyeing, soap, alcohol and bags factories.
- C. Collecting Dept.: Collecting material, drafting and buying or exchange.
- D. Finance Dept.: Currency, banks, increase production, loan and exchange (cooperate with merchants to transport important materials from interior).
- E. Technical Dept.: Economical planning, control planning, mining research, etc., and concentrate the technical experts.
- F. Cooperation Assn.: To cooperate with the merchants in occupied area on economical affairs.

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12) The Hunan Fukkoku Organization (Continued)

b) Economical Affairs: (Continued)

3. Direct Section: (Continued)

G. Representative Organization:

- 1) Kodama Org.: Established by Naval Dept. and under FUKKOKU's direction. Collecting material to supply to Naval Dept. Pretended to be commercial organization, but in fact an organization to steal materials.
- 2) Showa Yoko: Established by Army Dept. and under FUKKOKU's direction. Same as Kodama to supply to Army Dept. service-metal ware, medicine and coin.
- 3) Manwa: Established by Army Dept. and under FUKKOKU's direction. Same as Showa Yoko. Service-collecting various food and grease.

H. Direct Companies:

- 1) Hsien Kiang Tdg. Co.: Supervised by Capt. TAKATORI. Service-exchange with daily use, commodities to military needs such as food and grease.
- 2) Hunan Dept. Store: Supervised by MATSUI. Service-supply to Changsha citizens commodities and salt. Principle - to hold people's goodwill by maintaining C.R.B. notes.
- 3) Kung Ping Shan Han: Supervised by Capt. TAKATORI. Service and principle - same as Hunan Dept.
- 4) Koan Printing Co.: Supervised by Changsha FUKKOKU. Service-announcements and declarations and military lists.

c) Political Affairs:

1. Commanding Officer - Lt. Colonel TERAHIRA.
2. Principle - to hold people's goodwill by organizing Puppet Government in occupied area and to maintain social security in order to aid Japanese to carry on the war.

3. Direct Section:

A. Propaganda Dept.:

- 1) Consolation Unit: To hold consolation affairs in certain areas.
- 2) Cultural Unit: Cultural Society, to control the publishing of puppet papers.
- 3) Road Unit: Organized roads maintaining units (Maintenance) along highways and railways in order to keep peace and increase transportation.

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12) The Hunan Fukkobu Organization (Continued)

c) Political Affairs (Continued)

3. Direct Section (Continued)

B. Strategy Dept.:

1) Information Unit: Supervised by YANAGITA

(Civilian)

(). Duty-Commercial situation at Changsha. Securing information and surveilling guerrilla activities. Org. More than 10 at Takung Pao Association 2/3 were Hupei.

2) Special Service Unit: Supervised by Capt.

SOMIYA (),

relative of Japanese Emperor.

Duty - to investigate Japanese thoughts and actions. Surveilling working comrades.

3) Economical Special: Supervised by HARAGUCHI

Service Unit:

(). Organizing economical police and FUKKOBU's plainclothes men. Duty to maintain C.R.B. notes and prevent inflation (high cost of living).

4) Puppet Org. Unit:

Supervised by CHANG I FUNG (). Duty -

Organizing Puppet, Provincial City and District Government and serial organizations.

Organizing special service group in Interior and working group in occupied area.

Communication Section: To collect information from newspapers and articles published in Interior.

BRANCH OFFICE: Established in every county, district and big cities of the occupied areas. The organization is same, but smaller.

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SECRET INTELLIGENCE GROUP: Source advised that there was a Secret Intelligence Group with the General Staff of the Japanese 20th Army. Source did not know if this Group had any special name, but said that it was always referred to by members of the Kempeitai as the "Secret Intelligence Group". This Group was headed by Capt. SOMIYA () who is a relative of the Japanese Imperial family, and who also headed the Special Service Unit in the Political Affairs Section of the FUKKOKU. This Group consisted of only two Japanese, Capt. SOMIYA and a Sergeant, but they employed about 30 Chinese, most of whom came from Hupei Province. The main duty of this Group was to find out the number, plan, activity and equipment of Chinese forces.

Source also advised that Capt. SOMIYA had planned for a Group whose main purpose was to assassinate American and British officers. This plan was suggested a few weeks before the surrender and was never put into effect.

COOPERATION BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: Source advised that all three organizations kept their own records and files, but exchanged copies of their records freely. Important cases were forwarded to Tokyo via Japanese Headquarters in Nanking.

Such free liaison and cooperation existed in advanced areas, but not at higher headquarters.

13) Shanghai Rikugunbu (Army Bureau):

The Japanese Army Bureau (Rikugunbu) was an independent intelligence collecting organization, located in Shanghai, under the direction of Major General KAWAKOTO YOSHITARO, AC of S, Nanking, and was under the direct supervision of Headquarters, China Expeditionary Forces, Nanking, from 1 October, 1942, to the end of the war.

a) Purpose:

The general purpose of the Army Bureau was to represent the Headquarters in Shanghai in a variety of intelligence affairs necessary in this large city which were not included in the functions of the 13th Army. It acted not only as a liaison body with the Army, Navy and Embassy offices, but also as an intelligence collecting, counter-espionage and propaganda agency.

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13) Shanghai Rikugunbu (Army Bureau) (Continued)

b) Functions:

1. Collection of political and economic intelligence concerning Chinese and Foreigners by means of agents and radio reception.
2. Liaison affairs concerning Chinese peace construction.
3. Liaison with Japanese agencies.
4. Liaison with agencies and officials of Axis and neutral countries.
5. Propaganda preparation and distribution.

c) Structure:

Director of the Army Bureau

Senior Staff Officers

1. First Department (Intelligence)

A. Political and Economic Section:

- i. Political Information Sub-Section
- ii. Economic Sub-Section
- iii. Materials Sub-Section (Preparation and translation of publications)

B. Foreign Affairs Section

C. Foreign Information Section

- i. Reception and translation of radio broadcasts
- ii. Preparation and consolidation

2. Second Department (Liaison Office for Chinese Affairs)

3. Information Department (Press Bureau)

4. General Affairs Department (Administrative)

d) Methods of Operation:

Through interrogation with staff officers, only denials concerning the use of agents were received, and emphasis was placed upon the liaison duties of the organization. However, informants have volunteered that the Rikugunbu was the leading intelligence agency in Shanghai throughout the war, which employed numerous Japanese, Chinese and foreign plainclothes agents.

A special effort was made by the Rikugunbu to penetrate and play a role in White Russian affairs to the extent of operating a Russian language daily, the "Far Eastern Daily News" owned by K. KUROKI, who was also Assistant Chairman of the Russian Emigrant's Committee. Not only was this intended as a means of controlling and prejudicing Russian thought to favor Japan's war in China, but also a means of cultivating Russian informants.

In one sense, the Bureau was a special service organization (Kikan) on a very elaborate scale, working directly and independently as a strategic office of the Nanking Headquarters. However, unlike most of the Kikans, this organization had many more departments and sections and phases of intelligence activity to conduct than most Kikans operating usually on one particular assignment. It was the one organization in Shanghai which did most to coordinate the efforts of all intelligence gathering agencies.

(Source: Lt. Col. MORI, AKIRA, Senior Staff Officer, Rikugunbu, 15 November, 1945. Evaluation C-3).

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6. Gendarmerie (Kempei Tai)

a. Organization and Command

The Gendarmerie, a special branch of the armed forces, which conducted Military Police functions, served both the Army and Navy, although it was under the direction of the War Ministry and of the Provost Marshal General, and therefore more closely connected with the Army.

The Kempei Tai in China was not controlled from Japan but was directly responsible to General OKAMURA, Neiji, Commanding General, China Expeditionary Forces; no orders or directives were received from any higher Kempei Tai, Headquarters in Tokyo. If any Kempei matter was of sufficient importance to report to the Imperial General Staff, it was reported through command channels by General Okamura. The Kempei, like the Army, was divided into the areas, North, Central and South China, the commanders of which were responsible both to their area commanders and the Commanding General; in the Armies, the Army commander did not decide policy matters of the Kempei but merely laid down rules and regulations which were to be enforced by the Kempei Tai.

In Japan, the Kempei Tai Commander had no control over activities in China but was solely responsible for operations in Japan proper under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry.

b. Duties - Generally, the Kempei is divided into two general sections:

General Affairs Section: Concerned with matters of policy, personnel, records, and thought control.

Services Section: Concerned with training of personnel, security, espionage, counter espionage, supervising civilian employees of the Army, policing occupied areas, guarding military installations, surveillance of Japanese in occupied areas and controlling black market.

The Army was responsible for handling of prisoners of war, and the only connection that the Kempei had with prisoners was when they were requested by the Army to provide guards for the transportation or detention of prisoners.

Reports from various parts of China, do not offer any consistent departmental structure of Kempei units, although all present as duties, the above mentioned.

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Two reports indicate that Kempei units, located at cities in Central China, had internal departments as follows:

TOKKO-KA (counter-espionage) - Employing mainly Orientals, and some foreigners, to expose Chungking and Communist agents.

KEIZAI-KA (economic affairs) - Devoting its efforts toward control of black market activities, such as exchange and dealing in gold bars, foreign currencies, forgery, sale of prohibited war materials.

GAIJI-KA (foreign affairs) - Investigation and control of activities of foreign nationals, arrest and detention of enemy nationals, confiscation of property, control of neutrals.

TEISATUSU-KA (investigation section) - The personnel of which was used by other sections for detective, investigation and surveillance activities who had this power of arrest according to warrants issued by their office.

KEIBI-KA (garrison units) - The duties of which were patrolling the streets in the interest of public safety, guarding of military installations, jails, and puppet personalities.

SHIHO-KA (justice section) The duties of which were the processing of preliminary investigative reports to determine need for further investigation, check the facts of the case through own sources, preparation of material for court case at the Military Court (Gumpo Keigi).

c. Strength

The units of the Kempei generally were classified into three categories: province, zone and sub-zones levels under occupying Armies.

Provinces: 80-100 officers and men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel and included 25 civilians (SUNSOKU)

Zone: 70-80 officers and men, commanded by a captain, and included about 15-20 civilians, and 12 Chinese auxiliary policemen.

Sub-zone: 20 officers and men, 10 Chinese and Japanese civilians.

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This does not include vast numbers of informants. Exceptions to these strengths existed in most large cities where there were numerous sub-stations; as for example, Shanghai where there were five important stations excluding Headquarters, each of which controlled sub-stations, and patrols.

d. Recruiting and Training

All gendarmerie personnel were obtained from other units of the army such as the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. No one was assigned to the Kempei Tai upon induction. The Kempei Tai always had a standing list of volunteers from other branches and when replacements were needed examinations were given to the volunteers and their background was investigated. The best qualified men were selected for the Kempei Tai, and sent to a school. Formerly the only school was in Japan, but in the last two years schools were set up in Peking, Manchuria, and Nanking. The school in Nanking was run by the Central China Gendarmerie Unit and furnished replacements for that command. The course in the school consisted of about four months training in police methods, gendarm policy, military discipline, etc.

There were only two KEMPEI schools in North China and Manchuria. One was located at Peiping, and the other was located at Chang Chun (SHING KING), Manchuria.

The curriculum at the Peiping school consisted of physical training: rough and tumble, judo, mob control, etc.; mental training (Shinto); superiority of the Japanese race, unconquerability; undercover training, espionage, agent nets, penetration, and interrogation methods. The courses varied in length from three months and six months to one year, depending on the type of work; police, espionage, etc. The school graduated from 200 to 300 students per year; all of these were Japanese personnel, both military and civilian.

The school at Chang Chun was very similar to the Peking school but it was considerably larger and graduated Japanese, Koreans, and White Russians.

Refresher training was given at most units every six months to officers and men alike in the form of trial cases, which were to be solved in theory by written paper.

e. Methods of Operation:

(1) Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction over persons of the Kempei Tai in law and order matters is restricted to military personnel and persons travelling with the Army.

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Japanese civilians come under the jurisdiction of the Consular Police and Chinese civilians were under the jurisdiction of the puppet police. One exception to this might be that in case of a riot the Kempei Tai would be ordered by the army commander to assist the civilian and consular police to restore order. Also, the consulate police might request the Kempei Tai to assist them if they were unable to cope with a situation. The Kempei Tai did not have a liaison officer with the consular and puppet police. However, the army maintained a liaison office which dealt with the consulate and the puppet government and this army liaison office would handle the liaison between Kempei Tai and the puppet and consular police. Another exception concerning jurisdiction over Japanese and Chinese civilians was in the case of suspected espionage, in which matter the Kempei Tai had the right of arrest and prosecution over any person, may they be enemy nationals, Japanese civilians, or Japanese military or naval officers and men of any rank. In the case of neutrals, an arrest may be carried out but the neutral is usually turned over to his consular representative for punishment.

2. Trial of Offenders

The trial of a civilian either enemy or Japanese national was conducted in either a civil or military court depending upon the charge and the arresting organization. If the civilian in question was booked with a political charge, which most frequently was the case, since most offenses during time of war were considered political affronts at Japan, he was subject to a courts martial in the Japanese Military Court (Gumpo Keigi), and if found guilty and sentenced to jail, would be placed in a military jail. Criminal trials against Japanese citizens (non-military) took place in the Consular Court; against Chinese in Puppet Courts; against neutrals at their respective consulates, unless these neutrals were not nationals of countries that had extra territoriality rights in China, in such a case the trial took place in a Puppet Court.

The Navy does not have an organization similar to the Kempei Tai, and Kempei Tai is responsible for order on the part of Navy personnel. In the event Navy personnel get into trouble, the Kempei Tai turned them over to the Navy for disciplinary action. The only time that the Navy might have any control over the Kempei Tai would be in a case where an island garrison is commanded by a Navy Commander, in which case the Navy Commander would also be the over all commander of the Kempei Tai in that area.

Exceptions to this rule existed in the cities of Shanghai and Tsingtao where the Navy, as the arrogantly superior branch of service, was undisputed in certain areas of the city; they were the sole economic exploiters and first-law enforcement agency in the area, followed by the gendarmerie, and finally the police. It wasn't until early 1945 that the Kempei Tai, because of the

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Navy's loss of prestige and strength in the Pacific, was able to challenge and counter Navy orders in these areas.

3. Agents

In outlying forward areas, the agents of the Kempei Tai were under the same covers as Special Service men, such as storekeepers, traders and merchants, inn keepers, etc., most of whom were unpaid and received only small privileges in return for services, in the form of permits for trade, or permission to deal in illicit goods, or the privilege of purchasing rice, clothing, and foods at lower cost than the market price.

In the larger cities, agents were of a variety of nationalities, predominantly Chinese however, although foreign agents and informants were most valuable in their understanding of black market, swindling, extortion methods, blackmail, etc. Again, these agents received only slight monetary remuneration, and the only benefit they received for their services was to be able to carry on these criminal activities at the expense of the population and to the benefit of themselves and the officials for whom they worked.

Many gendarms worked in plainclothes and operated much like agents themselves, however, they were, toward the end of the war, very disconcerted about their personal security, since very little enemy espionage threatened their positions. Through the medium of terrorism and torture of arrested persons, a vivid and realistic threat existed in the minds of allied sympathizers and operators, who cautiously observed all rules and regulations laid down by the occupation forces and enforced by the Kempei Tai, in every effort to retain their own security and safety.

Because of such a situation there were few strictly loyal Chinese agents working for the National Government, the Communists, or the American Forces; the only way they could exist and still carry on their intelligence role was to act as double-agents, and for their own benefit serve both sides. The Kempei Tai did not have the exclusive right to handle double agents, and if the Army caught an agent they might use him without notifying the Kempei Tai.

Exhibit IX - Kempei Tai at Tsingtao, N. China

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This army was considered to be the best of the Japanese Army Ground Forces until 1943, at which time it totalled 1,000,000 in strength. However, afterwards approximately 500,000 troops were withdrawn to fight on other fronts. Until 1943, this army was prepared and had plans to launch an attack on Russia.

The intelligence services of the Kwantung Army was likewise considered to be the best not only in China, but of the whole Japanese Army.

1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:

The 2nd Section, Headquarters, Kwantung Army, was charged with the collection of information, examination and appraisal of information collected, investigation into the prevailing military situation, and the planning for and supervision of land services. It was organized as follows: Chief of the 2nd Section, a Colonel in rank, was responsible to the Commander and the Chief of Staff, and reported directly to Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, and had under his jurisdiction four sub-sections which are as follows:

- a. General Affairs Section - in charge of personnel, records, etc.
- b. Intelligence Section - Affairs connected with information collecting.
- c. Military Investigations Section - in charge of investigations for military requirements.
- d. Meteorological Section.

Besides the above duties, contact was maintained with and supervision was given to the Public Security Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Manchukuo and the Investigation Section of the South Manchurian Railway Company.

2. METHODS OF OPERATION:

Generally speaking, the intelligence services of the Kwantung Army were of first rate although even they had much to improve. The results gained through the activity of its intelligence services were sufficiently fruitless in preparing any military operation. This was exemplified at the time of the Russian advance into Manchuria, their endeavor to reinforce their Army last summer, and also in a series of incidents occurring on the Russo-Manchurian Border. The means by which the intelligence service gathered its information falls into the following categories:

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- a. Special information was secured from the decoding of Soviet Army radio messages of which only the simpler three letter codes were deciphered. By this means, information about the disposition of Army groups and their movements and maneuvers were obtained. However, no information was gained concerning the organization of the armies, their equipment and their potential fighting strength.
- b. Aerial photography contributed much to the formulation of invasion plans by the Kwantung Army through preparation of topographical over-lay maps. Aerial photography was exclusively conducted by the 2nd Air Force and much information was gained concerning Soviet airfields and the stationing of their aircraft, military installations, warehouses, fleet disposition, etc., at such places as CHITA, KHAVALOVSK, VOLOSILOV and VLADIVOSTOK.
- c. Land observations were conducted by reconnaissance patrols that sought information concerning the general enemy situation and their fortresses along the frontier.
- d. Information from documents which were sent to Japanese Special Service organs in Harbin from such places as Moscow and Chita by Japanese diplomatic representatives were, after translation, distributed to all Army Division Headquarters in Manchuria. Such information as the transfer of army units and war materials in eastern Soviet territory, as well as books and documentary material were carried by diplomatic agents who traveled between Manchuria and Soviet Russia via the Siberian Railway.
- e. Information gained through interrogating Soviet military deserters and civilian refugees gave little information other than that of organizations and equipment of small units, internal situation, and military discipline of the Red Army. In many cases, the Russian Army sent "fake" army deserters to willingly offer false information.
- f. Sending of agents across the frontier never proved effective and the Kwantung Army never expected much from such missions. It was difficult to acquire qualified persons; the Soviets had an excellent anti-espionage network; and the racial differences too frequently led to the discovery of agents. Double agents were used, but proved unreliable and ineffective in the opinion of the

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Japanese intelligence.

There was no use of Special Service organizations or Kikans in this area in espionage activities and the Military Intelligence Section conducted all of this work themselves. However, in counter-espionage and peace preservation activities in Manchuria, the Military Intelligence played only a small role since these matters were handled by the Military Police (Kempei) and the Peace Preservation Corps respectively. However, the latter was supervised by and responsible to the 2nd Section. These two organizations shall be described under their respective headings.

Ever since the Manchurian incident, Japan, from the standpoint of possible hostilities with Russia and also the necessity of rendering assistance to Manchukuo, did everything in her power to foster the Kwantung Army and send the best men and equipment to that army.

(Source: Report on "Kwantung Army Intelligence Service", March, 1946, Evaluated C-3.)

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SECRETEXHIBIT ITHE THIRD INDEPENDENT GUARD UNIT, PEIPING(1) Duties:

The Intelligence Room of the Headquarters tried to gather information concerning the activities of the Communist elements and its armed forces, which were the most important factors obstructing construction and Japanese endeavors to establish stability in provincial districts. The information gathered was utilized whenever the Japanese forces started new operations against Red forces. The information, as soon as obtained, was immediately transmitted to higher command and various units below.

For this purpose, a special section was organized in the Headquarters under the direction of an officer especially assigned to the task.

(2) Organization, Personnel and Duties:

Office in charge: Captain MAORU IIZUKA

<u>Sections</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Telephone & Telegrams	} Collection of information, their study and examination
General Affairs	
Reporting & Information	
<u>Special Investigation Corps</u>	} Study of Communist forces, party and population in Red area
Information by Documents	
Translation & Interpreting	

(3) Training & Training Equipments

A plan existed for giving education connected with the collection of information to intelligence officers attached to each battalion four times a year. However, this plan was never realized as the war came to an end only four months after the plan was considered.

No plan ever existed for special education to be given to non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

Some documents and books were given from higher commands for the purpose of educating. Otherwise, no special equipment was employed for training.

(4) Cases of Success and Failure

While in most cases, information was gained through Chinese organs cooperating with the Japanese or from villagers, action promptly taken by Japanese forces on the basis of these informations rarely met with success as Communist forces had a very excellent system of preventing

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against any leakage of military secrets. In this, the racial traits of Chinese population, too, counted much.

Notable among the cases of success was the case in which the Japanese forces, after encircling the main body of Red forces in Hsincheng-hsien in June, 1945, successfully dealt a serious blow to a large body of Communist forces which tried to rescue their comrade units in Japanese encirclement. This was due to information the Japanese obtained in time.

In guerrilla warfare, on the whole, it has always been extremely difficult to get ahead of enemy movements. It was found that for an efficient working of our intelligence network, quite a number of personnel would be needed to work exclusively for that, while actually it was not the case.

Each battalion relied on necessary information on the agents of the Hsin Min Hui, Cooperatives and other native organs in close contact with local villagers for the same purpose. Enemy prisoners, too, sometimes, offered valuable information. Chinese spies, however, were seldom employed, because their efficacy was very doubtful.

(Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945. BH/80. Evaluation: C-3)

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EXHIBIT II

PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SHIGEKAWA ORGAN)i. Make-up:

This organ was mainly in charge of collecting information on the Chungking forces and in the north-western part of China, and was organized as follows:

<u>Chief of the organ:</u>	Colonel K. Shigekawa
<u>Assistant officer:</u>	Sub-lieutenant Senda
<u>Information Squad:</u>	7 men
<u>General Affairs Squad:</u>	5 men

Note: No regular intelligence officers and men existed. As the Chief of the organ had long been in China, he himself called on many seniors and friends for the collection of necessary information.

ii. Training and Education:

As there were no regular intelligence officers or men, there was no necessity of considering this question.

Except giving necessary suggestions and guidance from the Chief of the Organ during his personal contact, no regular training was conducted for the members of the Organ.

iii. Dispatch of Intelligence Agents:a) In the Muhammedan Circles:

Keeping close contact with the Muhammedans of the Chingcheng Temple (belonging to the North China Association of All-China Muhammedan Federation) the branch temples of which are scattered in various places in North China, the Peiping Organ gathered various information obtained from Muhammedan circles in North China.

The Peiping Organ gave no specified command or order to the Muhammedans concerned and only sought for useful information during the course of ordinary conversation with them. They were under no obligation. Those Muhammedans who were used to bring information were:

HAN _____, trader, at Hochou, south-eastern part of Kansu province.

HAN SHOU-TANG, formerly soldier, at Hsining, east of Chinghai Lake, eastern part of Chinghai Province.

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MA SHI-I, local Muhammedan, at Changkiachwan, south-eastern part of Kansu Province.

On the other hand, efforts were made to keep close contact with the Muhammedan traders coming to Peiping from the south-eastern part of Kansu Province. As they were large in number, their names in detail are not available here.

b) At the Time of the Honan Operation:

At the time of this operation, Chinese traders, farmers and Muhammedans of Honan Province were locally employed as secret agents and were dispatched to Loyang and Sian, but no success was obtained as almost all of them did not return.

c) Intelligence Agents in the Peiping-Tientsin Area:

As afore-mentioned under the heading of "Make-up", there were no regular intelligence agents at this Peiping Organ. However a number of the Chinese with whom the Chief of the Organ became acquainted during his long stay in China were utilized as medium of information required.

iv. Expense Required:

- a) Current Expenditure: — Y20,500 FRB monthly.
- b) Extra disbursements were made in case of military operations. For instance a sum of Y80,000 was appropriated at the time of the Honan Operation in the spring of 1944.

v. Activities outside Peiping Area outlined:

- a) With the outbreak of the Honan Operation in the spring of 1944, the Peiping Organ was ordered to transfer in Honan Province and was engaged in the main in the survey of military geography and was also in charge of the collection of information necessary for the maintenance of local public peace.

The members of the Organ returned to Peiping in the latter part of April, 1945. Later they went to the Japanese homeland on a furlough and came back to Peiping in the latter part of July. Before they were given a new duty the war was brought to an end.

- b) The principal activities undertaken by the Peiping Organ in the past are as follows:

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PEIPING INFORMATION ORGAN (OR SHIGEKAWA ORGAN)

Just after the outbreak of the China Affair:

Participated in the formation of the Public Peace Maintenance Association of the special municipality of Tientsin.

Keeping close contact with the members of the Chinese Youth Corps who were residing in North China supported the development of the same Corps.

Created the Hsinmin College in Peiping and took care of the institute until the first students elapsed four months of study.

Participated in the campaign to support General Wu Pei-fu in 1939.

Participated in the conference between General Yen Hsi-shan and the Japanese forces in North China regarding the peace problem about 1941 or 1942.

After the Outbreak of the Greater East Asiatic War:

Attempted to make some connection with the Chungking authorities regarding peace negotiations, and launched various political activities. Despite much exertions it ended in failure.

Attempted to persuade General KO CHU-KUO to have his forces jointly carry out with the Japanese forces punitive operations against the Chinese communist forces, but it failed.

Engaged in launching peace negotiations with Chungking through Chang Hsueh-ming, Li Yu-liu and other generals, but it was in vain.

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SECRETEXHIBIT IIIPEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS(1) Duty:

The main duty of this corps was to gather various information needed by the North China Army both from the political and strategical necessities. For this purpose, this corps at Normal times tried to gather information concerning the situation in the Northwest Region of China and the regions in the vicinity of Peiping, while at the time of the prosecution of specific operations, information concerning the movements of enemy forces in the specific areas.

(2) The Organization, and the equipment utilized:I. Chinese Section

General Affairs Room:	5 Sub.-Lieutenants and 3 civilians
Sagyo (Work) Corps:	Captain and 5 officers
Accounts Room:	2nd Lieutenant and 2 civilians
No. 1 Room:	5 civilians, 3 engineers and 2 interpreters
Ordnance Room:	3 engineers
No. 2 Room:	10 engineers and 7 civilians

II. Direction of Detector Section

Chief: 2nd Lieutenant SHINGO YAMANAKA

1. Peiping Corps: 3 engineers and 3 enlisted men
2. Tsinan Corps: 5 enlisted men
3. Chinchow Corps: 5 enlisted men

TABLE OF THE EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED BY THE PEIPING
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS

<u>Names</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
National Receivers	3	} Peiping
R.C.A. Receivers	4	
Zenith Receiver	1	
Philco Receiver	1	
Radio Locators (Special receiving sets, type 94, model 5)	2	} 1 at Tsinan 1 at Chinchow
Total	<u>11</u>	

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ACHIEVEMENTS GAINED BY THE PEIPING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
CORPS IN DECIPHERING ENEMY'S CODED MESSAGES

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Extents of Success in Deciphering</u>	<u>Categories of Codes Used</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Northwest District Radio Station	Unable to decipher	None	Most information was gained in plain language messages
Radio Station with Lanchow as center, mostly re traffic	Able to decipher most of them	Unknown	Information was gained re traffic situation in Northwest area
Kansu Provincial Gov't.	Successful after one month	Unknown	Information gained here was useless and discarded
Headquarters, N.W. Supply District	Successful to a certain extent		Same code used for long period; most of informational messages deciphered
Yenan & its environs	Unsuccessful, es- pecially those for military operations	Category No. 1 & No. 21, for political propaganda	Employed 25-word unit <u>Ransu</u>
Central-Chitung War Zone	Successful after one month	category No. 52, intended for political propaganda	Length of <u>Ransu</u> 1,000 words
Shansi-Chahar- Chitung War Zone	Successful after one month		Same as above
18th Group Army	Successful after one month		Same as above

NOTE: The Japanese were successful in deciphering some others, but the category of the codes used in these was similar to those mentioned above.

(3) Education & Training:

- a. For the purpose of interception of wireless messages and deciphering of coded messages, no special systematic education has ever been given. Some general training was given the men in Nanking and was sent over to Peiping. All the education and training needed was intended to be given the men while

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actually on duty.

- b. **Direction Detector.** Thirteen non-commissioned officers and soldiers were assigned about February this year for about three months since then to receive special education in this connection. The education, however, was confined to the treatment of the apparatus and measurement of the distance as the men assigned to this task had already been educated on communications. These thirteen men came from various communications units stationed in North China.
- c. **Equipment for training.** There existed no special equipment, documents or books for the training.
- d. **Cases of success and failure:**

- 1. **Cases of Success:**

Sometimes while military operations were in progress, the Chinese forces used easily-decipherable codes for the transmission of important messages, with the result that we gained access to important information. Sometimes, again, the Chinese failed to codify the names of the transmitting and receiving agents and naturally we could easily find hints to their identity.

During the Honan campaign, 1944, following cases occurred: The Chinese forces used codes, which had been in use for a long time and which the Japanese had already succeeded in deciphering. It was customary for General CHIANG TING-WEI, Commander-in-Chief of the 1st War Zone, to add his own signature and address in plain language, with the result that this afforded the Japanese an easy hint as to the whereabouts of the headquarters of the 1st War Zone.

The wireless stations used by local militiamen in Honan Province used to exchange messages among themselves asking about their respective location and their intention of future movements and so forth, supplying us with valuable information.

- 2. **Cases of Failure:**

The Japanese were unaware that the Communist forces were using the Ransu-type codes and that their coded messages were interspersed with those in conversation type, and were trying to decipher them in the same manner as applied to those sent by the Central Army forces. This resulted in our failure to find out any hints at all to decipher them.

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e. Actual Results Gained:

1. While important coded messages could never be deciphered by the Japanese, easier ones were successfully deciphered. However, the lack of strict discipline on the part of the men working for respective radio stations resulted in affording us many times with hints and valuable information.
2. Apparently the Communist forces were using three categories of codes; (1) for military operation, (2) for political propaganda, and (3) for transmitting messages and instructions. As for their deciphering, the Japanese side was never successful in deciphering that for military operations, while they were in a better position as regards the other two categories. The respective radio stations apparently used different kinds of call signs for transmitting and receiving messages connected with military operations.
3. As regards the actual results gained by the employment of direction detectors, it can be said that the results on the whole were entirely unsatisfactory, due, mainly, to the fact that we had little past experience and very scarce material to rely upon and also because we had to change the call signs so repeatedly and at such short intervals.
4. The actual results gained as regards our endeavors in deciphering the enemy's coded messages are shown in the table No. 4 attached hereto.

(Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945, BH/80. Evaluation: C-3).

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This organ was in complete charge of the collection of various information on and from the third states as well as the connection with the military and other intelligence organizations.

It was organized as follows:

Chief of the Hidaka Organ: Colonel Takaaki Hidaka.

The Hidaka Organ ----- (Peiping Office
Tientsin Office

Peiping Office

Chief: Colonel T. Hidaka
Assistant: 2nd Lieutenant Shimura
Classification of Works:

1) General Affairs & Accounts:

Personnel
Miscellaneous Works
Guarding
Connection
Rations
Transportation

2) Guidance of White Russians
&
Problems dealing with

Great Britain
U.S.A.
Germany
Italy
France
Soviet Russia

Warrant Officer:
Interpreter:
ditto
ditto
Lance Corporal:

Yamashita
Watanaba
Nagahara
Nakanishi
Urano

3) Dealing with the Japanese
Side:

Sergeant-Major:
Junior Emp.:
ditto
ditto

Sasaki
Idani
Sachimori
Ueda

ii. Outline of Activities:

As the main purpose of this organ was in the collection of information on and from the third states, there were no special intelligence agents. Information was chiefly gathered by the contact of the members of the Organ

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with the nationals of the third states residing in China.

Information on the Soviet Union was mainly obtained through the connection with the Soviet people in China while efforts were also made to smell out some information while assisting the white Russians without nationality or during the course of issuing travelling certificates for them.

Information on Great Britain, the United States, Germany, France and Italy was gathered through the contact with the members of the German, French and Italian Ambassadorial officers in China as well as by the translation of foreign books and journals, thus grasping the outline situation in foreign countries.

As auxiliary means for supplementing the above information interception of wireless message transmitted by Britain and the United States was carried out.

For carrying out the above duties, approximately ¥50,000 FRB expense was disbursed monthly.

iii. Training and Education:

No special training or education was given to the member of the Organ. Accordingly there were no facilities and materials for the education although general cultural books and journals published in foreign countries were provided as many as possible for their general information.

iv. Success and Failure Experienced:

Since the Hidaka Organ was in North China, its object of activities was chiefly concentrated on the Soviet Union, and as its Tientsin Office had much opportunity to contact with the Soviet people, information on their movements were collected to some satisfactory extent. But as such information was only concerned with the Soviet people residing in North China, almost no information on the situation in the Soviet territory was obtained.

As to the United States and Britain, various information was gathered through then allied Germany and Italy and also France.

Information on the political and cultural fields of the foreign countries was generally obtained through the translation of the latest books and journals published in the respective countries. But the process to obtain these materials was not systematic, the information thus obtained was rather obsolete and not so much valuable as to be useful for the confronting operation or for taking suitable measures politically and financially.

In short, the activities of this Organ was not so effective considering the relatively large number of personnel it held. (Source: The Rehabilitation and Liaison Department of the Japanese Officers and Soldiers Report entitled "Outline of Intelligence Collecting Machinery of Japanese

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HIDAKA ORGAN

Forces" 2 December, 1945.) Evaluation: C - 3.)

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Organization, functions and personnel as per attached chart.

Explanation:

1. The Organization is located in Peiping under the Chief of Second Section of North China Headquarters of Japanese Army Forces.

2. The organization has been receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief of North China Forces up to end of war in order to collect various information as follows: (Besides this the organization has been instructed to supervise Non-nationals, the Chinese and Japanese residents.) Necessary information and data to observe the activities of Britain and America, and to observe the anti-Japanese movements (both military and political) of Soviet Russia; general activities of Yen-an, especially the propaganda system and necessary information to observe their anti-Chungking policy; military, political and economic activities of Chungking and its relations with Britain and America; movements of Outer-Mongolia; supervision of Chinese politicians and other personnel cooperating with the Japanese; supervision of important Japanese elements; and observance of popular feelings among other foreigners.

3. Sixty men worked under Colonel HIDAHA and about three hundred indirectly in order to accomplish the above mentioned duties.

4. The most important system used in collecting information was interception of wireless messages and this system was organized as follows: Yen-an Interception Unit; Fukuyama Reception Unit; Tominaga Reception Unit; Italian Reception Unit; D.N.B. (German) Reception Unit; Broadcasting Stations Reception Unit; and Chungwa Aviation Company Reception Unit.

(2) Outline of Activities in Various Sections

1. The Commanding Officer of the organization gives instructions to each section and collects the necessary information. The examination of and report on the information obtained is done by the Commanding Officer himself. When reporting the information to the Army General Staff in Japan, War Ministry, General Headquarters in North China, Kwantung Army, Korean Army (Japanese Forces in Korea) and various armies under the North China Headquarters by telegram or in written report, he must get authorization from the Chief of Staff of North China Headquarters.

2. The Urano Organization in Tientsin is directly under the command of Colonel HIDAHA and collects information in compliance with the duties of above-mentioned Organization.

All the information collected in the Urano Organization is forwarded directly to Colonel HIDAHA in Peiping without being examined.

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Therefore, Colonel Urano has no responsibility whatsoever regarding the value of this information. The whole responsibility lies in Colonel HIDAOKA alone, in the judgment of value of information collected by the whole organizations.

3. Outline of information collected through interception of wireless messages:

Collection of information from various countries is done by interception of broadcasting and news services. The Commanding Officer of the organization gives the instructions to each of the Reception Sections regarding the respective stations to intercept and have them report daily. All the information thus collected is classified as below and filed so as to be used as data in the judgment of the situation

a) American Affairs:

War situation in Asia
 War situation in Europe
 U.S. Army (Strength, Name of units, Names of Staff Members, armaments, morale, training, etc.)
 U.S. Air Corps (Strength, names of units, names of Staff Members, types of planes)
 U.S. Navy (Organization, names of Staff Members, Names of Warships, movements)
 War Industries
 Political movement
 Economic situation
 Diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia
 Diplomatic relations with Great Britain
 Diplomatic relations with Chungking
 Diplomatic relations with Central Asia
 Anti-Japanese propaganda.

b) British Affairs:

Classification as above.

c) Soviet Russian Affairs:

Soviet-German War situation
 Anglo-Soviet relations
 Activities of Comintern
 Strength, movements and kind of troops in Eastern Siberia
 (movements of troops to or from European Theater)
 Political situation in Soviet Russia
 Economic situation in Soviet Russia
 Transportation situation in Soviet Russia
 Transportation of supplies from U.S. to Soviet Russia
 Transportation of arms and planes from U.S. to Soviet Russia
 Anti-Japanese propaganda
 Diplomatic movements against Chungking
 Movements regarding Soviet aid to Yenan

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- d) German Affairs:
 - Military situation
 - Political situation
 - Economic situation
 - Propaganda situation
 - e) Balkan Affairs:
 - f) Middle East, Near East and Central Asiatic countries
 - g) Chungking Affairs:
 - Operation
 - Organization
 - Air Forces
 - U.S. Air Forces and Army in China
 - Political activities of Chungking
 - Anti-Yenan movement
 - Economy and Production
 - Supplies through the India-Burma route
 - Commerce and airway networks
 - Anti-Japanese peace movements
 - Political and Economic activities against the Northwestern Provinces
 - h) Yenan Affairs:
 - Propaganda within themselves
 - Propaganda against outside
 - Activities of Yenan Army
 - Economic situation
 - Political situation
 - Army forces, strength, organization and armaments
4. Yenan Reception Section (In Peiping and Tientsin)

The Yenan Reception Section in Peiping consisted of six men including its Chief, using four wireless sets of eight or ten tubes. All the operators excepting the section Chief were Chinese. The object of the reception were Yenan Hsin Hua News Service, Propaganda broadcast of the Japanese Liberation League in Japanese and messages in English sent from Yenan to Chungking.

The Reception Section in Tientsin under Urano Organization used the same system as in Peiping with one receiver and two operators.

5. Fukuyama Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section comprised twenty operators (all Japanese), two receivers in Turkish language, and thirty other employees. They used one set of high speed receiving sets and about eight sets of ten-tube receivers. The object of reception were U.P., A.P., and Reuter News Services sent from Chungking to America, telegrams sent from Chungking to New Delhi and Ankara Broadcast.

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6. Tominaga Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section was operating on messages (excluding code messages) sent within Soviet Russia, especially messages sent among the principal cities, world-wide broadcast from Moscow, Habarovsk broadcast, Ulan-Bator broadcast and messages sent among the principal cities along the North-western China Route.

The Section comprised six Japanese operators, eight Chinese operators, ten Russians, four Mongolians and fifty other Japanese employees. They used one set of high speed receiving sets and ten ordinary receivers.

7. Italian Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section comprised fifteen ex-Italian Marine operators using four sets of their own receiving apparatus, working mostly on Soviet news services sent out from Siberia. With one set they were taking air-transportation information of the Indo-China air route, and information concerning the passenger and cargo transportation by air in China.

8. D.N.B. (German News Agency) Reception Section (Peiping)

This Section operated with four Chinese operators, three Chinese employees and three German correspondents. The object of reception was concentrated on the Anglo-American information and in order to get the information concerning the European situation, they mostly listened in to the London Reuter news and partly to the U.P., A.P., and Reuter News Services sent out from New York and Washington.

9. Broadcasting Station Reception Section (Peiping)

They operated with six Chinese and four Japanese listeners, mostly catching the Chungking broadcast and partly listening in to the broadcasts from Los Angeles, San Francisco and Hawaii, etc.

10. Chungwa Aviation Company Reception Section (Peiping)

They worked on the information concerning the air transportation on the Indo-China route and the passenger and cargo transportation in China, with fourteen Japanese operators and six Japanese employees.

11. Information Services by Agents and Informers:

Information was available through the Agents and Informers in Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Kalgan and other principal cities. The object was principally placed on Chungking and necessary information to watch the activities of Soviet Russians in North China. The organization and functions of this system is as follows:

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a) There are very few agents with a fixed salary, working exclusively in collecting information; but in general the information was made available through the organizations of the Russian Imigrant Bureau, German correspondents and the Axis organizations such as German and Italian officials etc. In these operations the instructions were directly given by Colonel HIDAKA or Lt. Colonel URANO and there were very few occasions when they used their men indirectly.

b) There were no instances whatsoever when the agents were sent to distant places outside North China, as, e.g. Chungking, Yenan, etc.

c) Through the Imigrant Bureau. This Bureau consisted of the White Russian Imigrant Bureau, Hebrew Association, Latvian Association, Lithuanian Association and Polish Association. The Central Organization to deal with these groups was situated in Tientsin and local organizations in Peiping, Kalgan, Tsingtao and Chefoo respectively. The Chairmen of the respective national associations were charged with taking control and directing various nationals under the order of Japanese Military Authorities. During this period, various meetings and conferences took place and this naturally enabled us to listen in to the information from various districts.

As the White Russians were mostly interested in the developments of Soviet Russia, their observations of Soviet Russia's secret propaganda activities were comparatively correct, but, other information was not so reliable. The Russian Imigrant Bureau in Tientsin was operating a newspaper called "Vozrojdenie Azii" in Russian language for propaganda purposes. The Chief Editor of this organ, PASTOCHIN, is an extreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist element and had a fairly correct judgment concerning the Soviet information.

d) White Russian Agents.

Among two thousand White Russians in Tientsin, there were two hundred who were confirmed extreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist elements. From these elements twenty persons were available as agents and they were very willing to cooperate with the Japanese Authorities.

e) Utilization of the German News Agency and German Correspondents.

The opinion and observations of the German news correspondents were fully utilized.

Dr. Herbert Mueller, Director of the Peking office of the D.N.B., had a personal taste in gathering news and information.

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Commanding English perfectly, he personally listened into the Reuter newscasts and was extremely clever in judging the developments in the situation.

In the same office were two other German correspondents, Herr Lueckenhaus and Dr. Abshagen. Working as the Director of the New York office of the D.M.B. up till America's participation in the war, Lueckenhaus was well versed in American affairs and his observations on American situation were worth listening to. Dr. Abshagen remained in England more than ten years as a correspondent and was well acquainted with the higher political classes of England and naturally thought much of as an expert on English and European affairs.

Dr. van Briessen, another German correspondent in Peking was more or less of liberal tendencies. While having a good brain, he was considered of anti-German inclinations.

Mr. Cordes, still another German correspondent, was a "Chinese Nisei", had a perfect command of Chinese, enjoyed a wide and extensive friendship among Chinese colleagues and had a taste for Mongolian affairs.

Dr. Herbert Tichy, considered of a more or less anti-German idea, travelled extensively in various countries as a newspaper correspondent. His specialty was Indian and China's Northwestern affairs.

f) Special Correspondent in Peking of the German Fuehrer's Headquarters.

Siegfried Fulkrug, special correspondent in Peking of the Fuehrer's Headquarters, was working under the orders of Lt. Colonel Elhardt in Shanghai, and was entrusted, among other things, with the sounding out of developments in Soviet Russia. Besides this he was also spying on the situation in Japan and Chungking.

While Fulkrug was not considered as a big hand, he had a very able subordinate in the person of Dr. Heissig, an anthropologist and archaeologist, well versed in Mongolian tongue, who was capable to a high degree of judging developments in Siberia and Mongolia.

Fulkrug had his agents in Harbin, who gathered information on Russia. This information was offered to Colonel HIDAKA in exchange for some concerning Japan and so forth. Following Germany's capitulation, he was considering dispatching his own agents from Peking for the same purpose. However, this plan never materialized on account of Japan's surrender.

g) Communications & Equipment

The HIDAKA Organization primarily did not intend to employ to any large extent spying agents, nor did it send them over any long distances, with the result, naturally, that the Organization was not in possession or employment of any special means of communication. The only method they employed was to meet Agents

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at a secret place or else to obtain the necessary information by means of telephone, mail or by courier.

(3) Training Plans

The HIDAKA Organization never gave any special training to its staff members and its agents. However, it endeavoured to increase their efficiency along the following lines:

1. Whenever they committed any mistakes or blunders while executing their appointed duties, they were called to pay due attention to them. When they finished their appointed tasks, judgment on their results was given by responsible parties with a view to letting them become aware of their merit or the contrary.

2. The staff members and agents were afforded with opportunities to witness for themselves how the other organizations on similar lines, of the army or of the newspaper offices, were functioning.

3. Impetus was given to bring to a higher level their personal knowledge, common sense and so forth. For this they had a special fixed program for their education, subjects which comprised mathematics, foreign languages, physics, history, economics, history of ideology, military science and so forth. Lessons on these subjects were given by officers and able men among the staff members. And, for the education of these officers, the Director of the Organization, Colonel HIDAKA, took charge.

Emphasis was given on the education in Chinese language. They were asked to take lessons at night schools or else at the residences of teachers. For textbooks for these lessons, quite a number of documentary records, novels and other literature was employed up until the end of the war. Following the termination of hostilities, all of these were destroyed by fire.

According to the memory, principal among these books were those concerning the education of American G-men, secret agents of Japan, German spying system education given at the Chinese Military Academy for gathering information. A book specially recorded the activities of international spies on Siberia-Manchuria border area.

(4) Expenditures

1. Officers and civilians working for this Organization received salaries fixed by army regulations and did not get any special allowances.

2. Regular agents got salaries, according to their respective abilities, which were supposed to be barely enough for a minimum standard living. The lowest was 500 Yen FRB. They, however, were allowed to make purchases at certain designated Japanese agencies at lower prices. The highest pay they got was around 1,000 Yen FRB.

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3. Irregular agents got payment in kind, e.g. flour, sugar, tobacco, coal, etc.

4. Whenever these irregular agents brought any valuable information, they got additional payment in cash, ranging from 100 to 1,000 Yen FMB.

5. Just prior to the termination of the war, the average monthly expenditure was around 200,000 Yen FMB, mostly for the purpose of employment of some liaison personnel, for maintaining special connections with the Chinese and also for keeping in contact with German and Italian organs.

(5) Evaluation of Information.

The evaluation of respective information brought in was undertaken by Colonel MIDKA personally, under his own responsibility.

This was done on the following program:

1. Comparison of various information gathered from different sources.

2. Getting in contact with similar organs within the army. Inquiry is made whether these have also got the same information or not, and, if so, compare the accuracy or dependency of either of them.

3. In case particular information is considered of extreme importance, order is given to a responsible person to enquire into all circumstances, in an endeavour to ascertain the reliability of the same information.

4. In deciding on the reliability of a particular piece of information, the ability of the particular agent who brought it in was taken into consideration. Information was reported to responsible parties classified A, B and C, according to their degree of reliability. Any "rumour" or "propagandistic report" was reported as such.

(6) Cases of Success and their Causes

It often occurred that valuable information which came into its hand lost its intrinsic value through its failure to accurately evaluate or through the delay in reporting.

As the cause for all this, the following may be considered:

1. Prejudices of the man who receives the information stood in the way.

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2. Failure to correctly judge the ideological tendency of the particular agent who brings in such information.
3. Failure to afford ample assurances for livelihood to the agent.
4. Lack of patience in the employment and use of the agents.

Among the causes as enumerated above, Item 1 is considered the most important. This was especially true as regards the situation just prior to the outbreak of the hostilities between Russia and Germany and between Japan and Russia. The Organization failed to compare all information in hand in time or to report this information without delay to responsible quarters.

The Organization had no "scoop" to speak of.

Source: "Hidaka Organ", 27 Dec 45, Eval: C-3

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SECRETEXHIBIT VIEXCERPTS OF A REPORT ON JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE, TSINGTAOINTRODUCTION

Japanese intelligence agencies have been active in Tsingtao since the initial landings by the Navy and Army Troops in 1938. The Navy landed three days before the Army and has since the landing exercised more control over the administration of the city than the Army. The Navy and Army have been jealous of each others' rights and have not cooperated too well. The lack of cooperation has extended to the exchange of intelligence information, and each has withheld valuable "Hot" information from the other. Methods used by the various agencies which have collected intelligence, varied somewhat, but in general followed a pattern of employing civilians directly to supervise the intelligence work, and having civilian agents to work under the civilians that were employed. The civilian employee would be under a staff officer if the agency was a part of the armed forces. Supposedly the Staff officer would be in charge, but actually the person in charge would be the civilian. This is especially true of the Naval Intelligence Section.

A distinction must be made between Combat Intelligence, General Intelligence, and Counter Intelligence. These will be discussed separately according to their separate functions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Shortly after the Army and Navy landed in January, 1938, Intelligence Agencies were set up by each branch of the Service, and by the Kempei Tai as well. The Naval Unit was known as the Special Service Bureau (Tokumubu), and the Army Unit as the Special Service Agency (Tokumu Kikan).

The Tokumubu was established for the purpose of accelerating the restoration of peace and order in the area. The Bureau had the following Departments: Political Affairs, Harbor Office, Peace and order (including Propaganda Section), Management of Enemy Property, and Information. The Information Section was further divided into two Sections; Chinese Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The Information Section collected General Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. Also the Section censored the mail and telegraph communications of Japanese, Chinese and foreign persons for the purpose of gathering information, particularly relating to Anti-Japanese movements, or espionage activities.

In March, 1939, the Bureau was dissolved and its functions were transferred to the KOAIN so far as Political Affairs were concerned, and to the Naval Resident Office so far as Naval Affairs were concerned. The Naval Resident Office set up the censorship duties as a separate Section. The Information Section performed the same duties as it had

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under the Bureau. In March, 1940, the Naval Resident Office was abolished and all functions were transferred to the Special Naval Base Force, Tsingtao. In 1938, the Special Naval Base Force (then named the 1st Combined Landing Force) had an intelligence Section (Special Service Department) principally gathering intelligence of an operational nature, and Counter-intelligence for the purpose of security within the City. Between 1940 and 1942, no information has yet been obtained as to what the complete intelligence activities of the Section were. However it is known that in 1942 it was divided into the following Sections:

Chinese—Mission to seek out agents within the City that were operating for the Chinese Central Government, or the Chinese Communists (Related to the security of the City). Since the Navy at times sent expeditions to fight in the outlying land areas, the section also gathered intelligence to assist these expeditions.

Economic—Gathered information relating to price fluctuations and the movement of commodities. Black market activities were investigated by the Consular or the Chinese Municipal Police.

Foreign Affairs Section—To ascertain the attitude of the foreign population toward the war.

The Intelligence Section also controlled censorship and the issuance of passports. In 1943 it was decided that the Intelligence Section should concentrate on operational intelligence, so the Economic and Foreign Affairs Sections were abolished. The passport function was transferred to the Sea Defense Department, and the Censorship function was set up separately. The mission of the Section now related to detection of any Chinese Central Government or 8th Route Army Agents within the City, investigation of the theft of Naval Supplies, and operational intelligence of one outlying area (Lao Shan). If the Section had spare time it did work relating to the activities of foreigners within the City. The Section continued in this manner until November 1944 at which time the Section was abolished and Naval Intelligence activities were reduced to a small scale. The Civilians connected with the Section were dismissed and any functions were carried on by the Staff Officer in charge. The Navy relied on other agencies for any information needed. About two months before the end of the war Lt. (j.g.) KAWASHIMA, KOHEI was placed under the Staff Officer and he began to collect information relating to foreigners. (The officer was concentrating on information relating to Soviet Russian citizens.)

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At the time of the establishment of the KOAIN, the Army was expected to transfer the activities of its "Special Service" Agency to the KOAIN. The Army, however, continued to carry on with the Agency for a period of time. Finally, most of the functions of the Army Special Service Agency were transferred to the successor of the KOAIN, The Greater East Asia Ministry. At the time of the transfer, the Army set up an investigation section. The section was small and did not achieve any notable success. It was almost exclusively concerned with information relating to the Anti-Communist Bureau and other White Russian activities.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Combat information was needed by all units in contact with the enemy. (Enemy refers generally to what the Japanese called "Bandits", a name which covered both the Chinese Communists and the guerrilla forces. It should be stated that most of the fighting in the area and most of the intelligence collected involved the Chinese Communist forces.) The Navy had detachments up and down the coast and these detachments gathered combat information.

Most of the Combat Intelligence for the Army was gathered by the Intelligence Department of the 5th Independent Mixed Brigade. The Brigade had its Headquarters at Tsingtao and operated under the 43rd Army Headquarters at Tainan, Shantung.

1. Supplying the Brigade Headquarters with all types of information concerning the enemy, but particularly combat information.
2. Information as to peace and order in the area.
3. Information as to climatic conditions.
4. Information as to topography and terrain.

The sources of information were as follows:

1. Various Chinese forces under Puppet Governments.
2. For giving people certain advantages such as additional rationing privileges, information was obtained.
3. Inhabitants of various areas voluntarily brought information.
4. The Imperial Collaboration Army was used as a network.
5. The Peace Preservation Unit, part of the Puppet Armies, was used.

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SECRETGENERAL INTELLIGENCE

General intelligence included economic and political intelligence as well as such intelligence as was necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within the City of Tsingtao. This type of intelligence was of primary importance to civilian activities, and although the Army, Navy and Gendarmerie gathered this type of information, it was generally turned over to civilian agencies. The KOAIN was founded partly to take care of such information, acting as it did as an advisory board to the Chinese Puppet Government. There were Japanese officials in all parts of the Puppet Government system. These were kept informed by the intelligence Section of the KOAIN and later by the Greater East Asia Ministry. Fluctuations in the value of gold and prices were investigated. An attempt was made to keep the authorities aware of anything that might affect the peace and order of the city.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

All intelligence organizations in Tsingtao did Counter-Intelligence work. At the simplest, such work would merely involve the censorship of postal matter, telegrams and newspapers. A division of the censorship duties was effected between the Navy and the Gendarmerie. The former assumed responsibility for all correspondence in western languages; the Gendarmerie was responsible for Eastern languages. In censoring mail, two factors especially were noted; obscurity of language and frequency of correspondence. A list was drawn up of persons who were suspected on either count and their mail was subject to the closest censorship. One Naval censor stated that there were insufficient persons available to do a competent censorship job and that only the mail of suspicious persons could be examined. He further stated that no person had ever been arrested as a result of censorship. Newspapers were also censored but the fact that the local press was Japanese controlled usually guaranteed harmlessness of content. Newspapers coming from other parts of China, such as Shanghai, were also censored.

During the war, a careful check was maintained on all occidentals living in Tsingtao. Those of the Germans who were reputed to be Anti-Nazi were placed on a "Black List", as were Russians, Jews and other nationals who were felt to be politically opposed to the Japanese system. After the surrender of Germany it was felt necessary to begin another investigation of German residents, with some emphasis placed on discovering possible agents of the German Government. Information was supplied by informants. Some of these volunteered information to persons whom they knew worked for Japanese Intelligence, while others received money either directly or indirectly from one or another of the intelligence organizations.

The main effort of Japanese Counter-intelligence activities was directed at the nationals of countries not at war with Japan, or, as in

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the case of France, only passively engaged. Close scrutiny was kept of their movements and correspondence. When one of them was due in Tsingtao from Shanghai, for example, notice was given by telegram or airmail to be on the watch for him. Such notice would be given if smuggling or manipulation of the foreign exchange were suspected, as well as if espionage activities were indicated.

Although it was known that there were many agents, both of the Communists, and of LI, HSIEN-LIANG (Mayor of Tsingtao) in Tsingtao, only a relatively small number were ever caught. There were almost invariably sentenced to death.

METHODS

With the Japanese Navy and Army in control of Tsingtao it was a simple matter for them to obtain free intelligence. For example all Naval contractors who supplied food to the American Fleet prior to the outbreak of the war were agents of the Japanese Navy. Naval contractors were told that they would be refused permission to go out on the docks if they refused to cooperate. The intelligence brought in by such persons had a very limited value. Generally they managed to get copies of the ship's news, plans of the day, and such information as could be obtained by emptying waste paper baskets on the ship. In that way the movements of ships could often be learned as well as such information as could be found by chance on scrap paper.

This extortion method of gaining intelligence was also practiced on all Japanese merchants. While there were certain Japanese civilians who supplied information systematically and went to great pains to obtain it, most of them attempted to furnish as much as came their way in return for the privilege of obtaining a license, etc. One Japanese broker was notorious for his activities, employing several persons who acted in turn as agents. One of these was a White Russian who reported on matters concerning his community.

The information supplied by such agencies was generally inferior because the persons engaged in obtaining it were untrained. A somewhat more satisfactory method was that of hiring Chinese agents. For example, several Japanese employed by Japanese Naval Intelligence each led a group of Chinese agents who gathered information. The Gendarmerie and the Consular Police had a similar arrangement. The agents were underpaid almost without exception, usually receiving their wages in other forms than money. As a result they would boast of their powers as agents, threatening to turn in various people if they did not furnish money for protection. All Chinese agents in the employ of the Japanese knew each other and competed with each other. This system of using agents proved so unsatisfactory to the Navy, that in June, 1943, (and in November, 1944),

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they published a list of all their agents in a daily newspaper in the hope of utterly discrediting them.

Japanese methods were usually extremely crude. For example, no security was observed as far as agents were concerned, partially because of their large numbers. Chinese agents would have the name of the Japanese "Advisor" for whom they were working printed on their cards. This was sufficient to obtain for them free food and women and usually money. When investigating suspicious characters, little common sense was used as a whole, superficial evidence being taken for fact. (Source: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-Enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945, BH/80. Evaluation: B-3.)

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SECRETEXHIBIT VIII

**JAPANESE-SOUTH CHINA INTELLIGENCE GROUP FIVE PROVINCES
INFORMATION DEPARTMENT. (SOUTH CHINA POLITICAL PEACE
PRESERVATION PARTY)**

SYNOPSIS:

The Group was developed in 1940 by General DOIHARA KENJIRO, Japanese Espionage leader who founded Japanese plainclothes espionage system. South China Head Office established in Canton for espionage system was designed to service the Five Provinces of Southern China. The organization was under the control of Nanking WANG Regime and Canton Main Office under direct orders of Japanese Puppet Secret Service Headquarters in Nanking. The Canton Office Organization was divided into Intelligence, Counter-Espionage, Political Intelligence, Training, Finance and Administration Sections. The Group was interested in ascertaining information concerning military targets of the Allied Air Force in China, political agents, economic agents, diplomatic relations and Allied indications possibly affecting China. Group operated independent of other Japanese Intelligence Groups.

HISTORY:

In 1940, General DOIHARA sent an agent, Major General OKUBO, to Canton to establish an espionage system for the five provinces of Southern China. OKUBO established his headquarters in Canton, but received his orders from the Japanese Puppet Secret Service Headquarters in Nanking. At first this new agency was to be a section of the Nanking Puppet Central Government Propaganda Department. However, a few months after its establishment, it became known as the SOUTH CHINA INTELLIGENCE GROUP FIVE PROVINCES INFORMATION DEPARTMENT, under Japanese supervision. Branch offices were established in Shanghai, Sha Ping, Hongkong, Macau (2), and Kwangchowwan (2). Major General OKUBO, FOK WING KAI, FOK WING KAN, were known to be the main leaders.

ESPIONAGE SECTION:

CHAN CHI KONG - Supervisor
Nine known agents and two suspected agents

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:

TSUN CHI KONG - Director, ex-member of the Central Government Communications Ministry.
Nine known agents and one suspected agent.

PROPAGANDA SECTION:

"Fatty" LAU - Director
Three known agents and three suspected agents.

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SECRETOPERATIONAL DATA:1. Mission:

The mission of the South China Intelligence Group is one primarily of espionage and morale operations. There has been no indication of sabotage or assassination activities on the part of known agents, although the training schools included demolition instruction in their schedules.

From available information on the Group, their mission was as follows:

- Report on military movements in the South China War Zones.
- " " American Air Force and the locations and strength of fighter and bomber bases.
- " " intelligence organization of the Allied Forces.
- " " Quartermaster depots, storage go-downs and supply dumps.
- " " Allied camouflage systems.
- " " conditions and morale of Allied Forces.

In addition, agents of the Group were instructed to carry the doctrines of the Puppet Government and to further the meaning of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

2. Personnel:

The headquarters staff of the SOUTH CHINA INTELLIGENCE GROUP was composed primarily of educated Chinese puppets who had at one time or another studied in Japan. Available information indicates that the staff may have at one time been indoctrinated in the Japanese nationalistic ideals while they were in Japan. Each year a Japanese officer of the South China Gendarmerie served as advisor to the Intelligence Bureau. Successively, they were: NAKASHIMA, OKABAYASHI, TAMURA, DOI and ABE.

The group leaders or agents appear to have been recruited from the tough class of gangsters and gang leaders in Canton and Hongkong. Cantonese Chinese predominate and most of the leaders speak English.

The informants and lesser agents were recruited from the lower class gangsters, doctors, backward military officers, dissatisfied politicians, fortune tellers, loafers and prostitutes.

3. Recruiting:

Available information indicates that SOUTH CHINA GROUP agents were recruited only through personal contact with members. A prospective agent was reported to the group and

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he was watched. Propaganda was fed to him by a trusted friend who was a member of the group in order that his reactions and sympathies may be observed. If the prospect was found to be favorable, he was first placed on duty with the Puppet Police Force so that his abilities could be watched and he could be more completely indoctrinated. He was then asked to work for the Group and was sent to the training school.

4. Training Schools:

The training schools for the SOUTH CHINA INTELLIGENCE GROUP changed their locations quite often. The most recent school was located at the Police Club on Tung Ming Road in Canton. Previously this school was held at both the Whampoa Military Academy and the old Chinese Air Force Club, and was known as the Special Service Training Academy.

President of the training branch was Lt. Col. KUO WEI-MING who was the Chief Commander of the Police Department of Kwangtung.

5. Training Procedure:

Special Training was given from three to six months. If the student was capable he would graduate in the minimum time of three months. Subjects taught include dialects, customs and habits of localities, procedure of interrogation and cross examination, methods of communications, ideals of cover and puppet indoctrination. Instruction was also given in the identification and use of allied weapons and radio operation and repair. Instructors were mostly puppet officials who were Japanese returned students. Some Japanese intelligence officers were used as instructors for special courses.

6. Priority:

Agents were appointed to an area just in advance of Japanese attacks or right after. Long term agents were sent to areas of military importance of deep penetration. Agents in occupied areas had the right to control opium, gambling, prostitution and to smuggle within certain areas.

7. Pay:

Agent's pay was from 200 to 800 dollars, Japanese Military Yen. Agents were allowed to smuggle and squeeze. For certain operations, large sums were given in either gold or silver. Informants were paid from 40 to 150 Military Yen.

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EXHIBIT IX - Kempei Tai at Tsingtao, North China

The Gendarmerie was established in Tsingtao in 1938 and was initially given a sphere of activity which extended to all of the Shantung Peninsula, East of PU SHAN. Its objectives were stated to be maintenance of peace and order as Military Police. Prior to September, 1943, it had five sections interested in gathering information. These were: The Chungking Section, which investigated the possibility of Chungking agents being in Tsingtao; Communist Section, which investigated possibility of Communist Agents in the city; Economic Section, which investigated hoarding on part of the Chinese and gathered information about materials needed by the agency; Foreign Affairs, which gathered information relating to foreigners in the city; General Intelligence, believed to be a section which gathered information relating to Japanese Secret Societies and rumors that might be spread. In September, 1943, a "Special Guard Force" of eight battalions was set up. One of these battalions was the MATSUDA Battalion and it operated in the Tsingtao area. At that time the Gendarmerie was directed to concentrate on Military Police work. The Communist, Chungking and Foreign Affairs Sections were abolished and their duties were taken over by the MATSUDA Battalion. The General Intelligence Section did from that time henceforth gather some information relating to foreigners, but it was for the purposes of security and "Thought Control" and not for counter-intelligence purposes. The Economic Section remained the same. In March, 1945, the Gendarmerie was reconstituted with a more limited sphere of activity.

The MATSUDA Battalion was one of the eight component battalions of the Special Guard Force, which was also known as the KO BUTAI. The avowed purpose of this force was to fight the Communists and it was specially organized to fulfill this mission. Half of the force was from the infantry and the other half the gendarmerie. The theory was that the gendarmerie would investigate Communist activity and the infantry crush it. Members of the battalion usually spoke fluent Chinese (in some cases were actually Chinese) and would disguise themselves as coolies and peasants. They had two primary missions: (1) To enter areas held by the Communists in order to determine the situation; (2) To mix in crowds in areas already held by the Japanese in order to discover Communists or Communist sympathizers. Combat intelligence was obtained by interrogating Chinese, both military and civilian, who were fleeing from the Communist held areas to the Japanese held areas. One detachment of the MATSUDA Battalion is reported to have operated in Tsingtao under the command of Lt. MAEDA.

SOURCE: "Summary Report on Enemy and Non-enemy Intelligence Organizations in Tsingtao", 10 December, 1945, BH/80.

EVALUATION: B-3

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Section III

**JAPANESE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA**

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S E C R E T**JAPANESE CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN INTELLIGENCE****INTRODUCTION**

This Report, which emphasizes mainly the Foreign Service among the Japanese non-Military Intelligence agencies operating in China, not only relates the historical developments and changes of these agencies from the time of the Pacific War until the surrender, but also lists intelligence personnel, departments and functions. The organizations, which were subordinate to the Foreign Service and played a part in the intelligence gathering network of the Greater East Asia Ministry, Embassies, or Consulates, are described in sequence after the above-mentioned topics.

The Foreign Service Intelligence Section was the most important pre-war information gathering agency of Japan and it may easily be said that in two fields it was far superior to military or naval organizations; these were long range espionage and propaganda in areas intended for occupation.

The Foreign Service initiated and directed such companies as the Asia Development Board, Development Companies and the Anti-Opium League and many other organizations which were created for one simple objective - the exploitation of China's people, wealth and natural resources. With its powerful control of the Puppet Government and its ever prying Consular Police and Intelligence Sections, the Foreign Service was almost as independent a force as the armies of occupation. This independence was one factor causing the jealousy and frigid cooperation which existed between the Army and the Foreign Service.

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Shanghai, China.

14 June, 1946.

THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND THE GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTRY

1. THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE:

The Japanese Foreign Office, also known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the head department within the Japanese Government from which the Embassies originate. It is through these Embassies or Intelligence outposts, located throughout the world, that the Foreign Office derives its importance as the non-military collectors of intelligence. It is very important to realize that the collection of intelligence is not limited to only one department or section of the Foreign Office. A study of information available tends to confirm that whether military or non-military the Japanese system for the collection of information is one of "mass collecting" rather than "specialized" collecting so the various departments or sections within the Foreign Office and their Embassies are merely the breakdown for centralized evaluation, recording and dissemination of information received. For this reason the overall breakdown of the Foreign Office is given in this report and with such a better picture of intelligence operation within this organization is realized.

In the past, and also during wartime, the Foreign Office acquired personnel only by the individual's desire to join the organization. In addition to obvious requirements (family, social position, etc.) usually demanded, all prospective members had to pass an examination for one of three classifications: Administrative, Diplomatic or Judicial. At this stage there is no Foreign Office school where personnel are placed for further training. Although all people are given a course in cryptography upon starting to work, all personnel interrogated stated that they received their training by starting in a clerical position and working up through the various departments, letting practical experience take the place of any schooling. However, prior to Japanese-American hostilities, it was customary to send many people to foreign countries for periods of two to four years. Representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office include diplomats and consular officials of all grades.

2. FUNCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SINCE 1937:

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(a) ORGANIZATION:

In 1937 the organization of the Foreign Office consisted of the Secretariate of the Foreign Minister, the East Asia Bureau, the Europe and Asia Bureau, the American Bureau, the South Seas Bureau, the Trade Bureau, the Treaty Bureau, the Investigation Department. Each of these eight divisions were sub-divided into various numbers of sections as will be listed below:

1. Minister's Secretariate: (Five Sections)
 - A. Personnel
 - B. Accounting Section
 - C. Archives
 - D. Telegraphic Codes
 - E. Treaties Section

2. The East Asia Bureau (Three Sections)
 - A. 1st Section: Handles affairs concerning politics, economy and culture related to China
 - B. 2nd Section: Handles affairs concerning Japanese residents in Manchoukuo and China.
 - C. 3rd Section: Handles affaires related to Manchoukuo.

3. The Europe and Asia Bureau: (Three Sections)
 - A. 1st Section: Handles affair's related to the Soviet Union and the Near East.
 - B. 2nd Section: Handles affairs related to the Continental countries in Europe
 - C. 3rd Section: Handles affairs related to Great Britain, its dominions and over-seas possessions.

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4. The American Bureau: (Two Sections)
 - A. 1st Section: Handles affaires related to the United States of America.
 - B. 2nd Section: Handles affairs related to the South American countries.
5. The South Seas Bureau: (Two Sections)
 - A. 1st Section: Handles affairs concerning politics related to the Southern region.
 - B. 2nd Section: Handles affairs concerning economy and culture related to the Southern region
6. The Trade Bureau: (Six Sections)

A. Each of these six sections work on affairs related to trade with countries in different areas. This bureau was rather inactive during wartime.
7. The Treaty Bureau: (Three Sections)
 - A. The three sections in the Treaty Bureau divided the work covering affairs concerning treaties, legal problems involving foreign countries, international conferences and international administration.
8. The Investigation Department (Six Sections)
 - A. These six departments were concerned with the collection of informative material in various fields, other special investigative work and press and propaganda work.

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Later some changes occurred concerning the division of duties among the various sections of the Foreign Office, but the division of duties among the various bureaus of the ministry remained practically unaffected by such changes. In this connection it was stated that a new organ called "HOHOBU" (Information Department) was created in the Cabinet around 1939 charged with the duties concerning foreign and domestic information, enlightenment and propaganda, but inasmuch as this organ happened to have neither subordinate offices abroad nor means to keep directly in touch with Japanese officials abroad, the Investigation Department of the Foreign Office remained in charge of the press and propaganda work and the information work for foreign countries.

Neither did the establishment of the Asia Development Board, which was created in 1939, affect the organization of the Foreign Office to any appreciable extent except that the duties of the First Section of the East Asia Bureau decreased somewhat in scope, in spite of the fact that official duties concerning China were mostly taken over by the Asia Development Board.

The creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry in November, 1942, however, brought about a great change in the organization of the Foreign Office as the result of the new ministry having taken over practically all duties related to the countries in the Greater East Asia region. To be more exact, all affairs under the jurisdiction of the East Asia Bureau and the South Seas Bureau, as well as part of the affairs under the jurisdiction of the Treaty Bureau (i. e. those concerning consular courts in China) of the Foreign Office, were transferred to the Greater East Asia Ministry with the result that the organization of the Foreign Office was revised to consist of the MINISTER'S SECRETARIATE, THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, THE WARTIME ECONOMY BUREAU, THE TREATY BUREAU and the INVESTIGATION BUREAU.

Of these different bureaus, the POLITICAL AFFAIRS BUREAU was charged with such duties as had previously been attended to by the East Asia Bureau, the Europe and Asia Bureau, the America Bureau and the South Seas Bureau, but were not taken over by the Greater East Asia Ministry. Consisting of seven sections, the Political Affairs Bureau divided its duties among these sub-divisions as follows:

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1st Section: General control of bureau affairs.

2nd Section: Affairs concerning the Greater East
Asia Ministry.

3rd Section: Affairs concerning the Soviet Union.

4th Section: Affairs concerning European Continental
countries

5th Section: Affairs concerning Great Britain and
its dominions and overseas
possessions.

6th Section: Affairs concerning North America.

7th Section: Affairs concerning South America.

Of the other bureaus, the WARTIME ECONOMY BUREAU was in effect what had previously been known as the TRADE BUREAU, the new name deriving from the fact that following the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, affairs concerning trade with foreign countries decreased while the same bureau became more and more busy keeping in touch with various government offices in Japan in connection with affairs concerning wartime economy. Thus, the First Section of the Wartime Economy Bureau was charged with general affairs concerning wartime economy, while the Second Section of the same bureau attended to affairs concerning economic negotiations with foreign countries (the only one mentioned was the liquidation agreement with Switzerland).

In the TREATY BUREAU, the three sections previously in existence were reorganized into two sections, the First Section attending to affairs concerning conclusion of treaties and the Second Section to affairs concerning legal questions involving foreign countries and affairs concerning international conferences.

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The INVESTIGATION BUREAU consisted of three sections, the FIRST Section being charged with investigation work related to all foreign countries other than the Soviet Union, the Second Section undertaking investigation concerning the Soviet Union and the Third Section primarily attending to affairs concerning the press for foreign consumption.

Since 1942 the Foreign Office continued to function with its organization divided into various bureaus and sections as described above until August, 1945, when the war came to an end and the Greater East Asia Ministry ceased to exist with the result that the Foreign Office resumed duties concerning the Greater East Asia region as it had done before the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that the organization of the Foreign Office has been revised to some extent. In this respect, however, no official report has been received by the Foreign Office personnel in Shanghai. Nor are the press reports sufficiently descriptive to clarify the present organizations of the Foreign Office, but all reports combine to give an impression that the Foreign Office now consists of the Minister's Secretariate, the Political Affairs Bureau, the Trade Bureau, the Investigation Bureau and the Control Bureau. The Liaison Affairs Bureau for Ending the war, which was once reported to be in course of organization as an extra-ministerial bureau of the Foreign Office, seems to have been made directly responsible to the Cabinet in accordance with a later decision. Under present circumstances it appears impossible to get further information regarding the present organization of the Foreign Office or regarding the division of personnel and duties among various divisions and sub-divisions of the same ministry.

Regarding the functions of the Foreign Office, the foregoing paragraphs concerning its organization contain several passing references. Upon further interrogation with the Minister of the Shanghai Embassy, Mr. YUTAKA TSUCHIDA, a separate and more detailed account, as was obtained, will be given below:

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(1) Previously the functions of the Foreign Minister were clearly defined in Article One of their Foreign Office Official Regulations, making it clear that "The Foreign Minister shall control execution of political administration related to foreign countries, protection of Japanese commerce in foreign countries and affairs concerning Japanese residents abroad and direct and supervise diplomatic and consular officials". The same Article, it was stated, also provided that "The Foreign Minister shall direct and supervise the Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in Manchoukuo with regard to such duties of the Kwantung Bureau as are related to foreign affairs."

(2) In 1942, however, the above provisions concerning the functions of the Foreign Minister were revised as the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry caused the greater portion of the Foreign Minister's previous functions related to the Greater East Asia region to be taken over by the Greater East Asia Minister, thereby automatically narrowing the scope of the Foreign Minister's functions. On this occasion the phrase "execution of political administration related to foreign countries" (in Article One of the regulations quoted above was revised to read "execution of political administration related to foreign countries (excepting the Greater East Asia region)". The phrase "protection of Japanese commerce in foreign countries and affairs concerning Japanese residents abroad" in the said Article was revised to read "protection of Japanese commerce in foreign countries (excepting the Greater East Asia region) and affairs concerning Japanese residents abroad (outside the Greater East Asia region)" and the paragraph reading "The Foreign Minister shall direct and supervise the Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in Manchoukuo with regard to such duties of the Kwantung Bureau as are related to foreign affairs" was rescinded.

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With a view to unifying foreign policy, the Foreign Minister was placed in charge of all purely diplomatic affairs even if such were related to countries in the Greater East Asia region. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister was empowered to direct and supervise diplomatic and consular officials within the Greater East Asia region with regard to purely diplomatic affairs (such as affairs concerning conclusion of treaties or ceremonial affairs) despite the provision "execution of political administration related to foreign countries (excepting the Greater East Asia region)" as in Article one of the revised Foreign Office Official Regulations.

Therefore, the functions of the Foreign Minister as revised following the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry may be defined as follows: (Note: Source states that no exact quotation is possible as the revised regulations are not available here at present).

The Foreign Minister controls execution of political administration related to foreign countries (excepting the Greater East Asia region), protection of Japanese commerce in foreign countries (excepting the Greater East Asia region) and affairs concerning Japanese residents abroad (outside the Greater East Asia region). The Foreign Minister directs and supervises diplomatic and consular officials resident in the Greater East Asia region with regard to purely diplomatic affairs.

(3) However, as the war ended in August, 1945, and the Greater East Asia Ministry was supposed to disorganize, all duties that had been taken over by the said Ministry from the Foreign Office were transferred back to the latter office. Accordingly, Article one of the Foreign Office Official Regulations must have been revised for a second time. There has, however, been no confirmation of such, but source believes that the original text of Article one of the Foreign Office Official Regulations has been made to stand again.

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existed with the Naval Attache, Rear-Admiral OGAWA, who was also Vice-Chief of Naval Operations. Therefore, the Military and Naval Attaches in China possessed the equivalent rank of Minister and the Minister or Ambassador did not exercise any real authority over them. In other foreign countries the Minister ranked above the Military and Naval Attaches. The Military Attache's office appeared to take a broad interpretation of their scope of duties, which was defined mainly as the collection of military intelligence. This office was known to be responsible for the collection of secret intelligence, interviewing agents, directing secret activities, collecting political and economical intelligence, plus other military types of information such as targets and battle orders. Further details as to operations by the Attache's office were not admitted by any persons interrogated.

Other Pertinent Statements Abstracted during Interrogations:

The Third Bureau of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters was the highest organization among all intelligence and information offices. All other offices such as the Military Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Military Special Service Section, Military Attaches, Naval Attaches, Foreign Offices and the Greater East Asia Ministry were responsible to the Third Bureau. It is stated that this Bureau had a great number of members, but sources can make no approximate guess. It was admitted though that every intelligence organization had at least one member appointed to it by the Third Bureau. In the case of the Foreign Office, or Japanese Embassy to China, the Ambassador was appointed to be responsible to the Third Bureau. Therefore, it is fairly safe to assume that all important figures in the Japanese Secret Service or Intelligence work belonged directly or indirectly to the Third Bureau.

The Third Bureau was always very powerful in any area because they issued orders in the name of the Commander-in-Chief.

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The Third Bureau also maintained a school in Nanking, training men for General DOIHARA'S Special Service Units. The course lasted ten months with classes averaging between 150 - 200 men. Source states, one of the main subjects taught was the Chinese language. All students were enlisted men in the Japanese Army, but upon graduation these men always worked in civilian clothes. The school was "set-up" and operated as an Army detachment and gave no appearance as being a school.

3. IMPORTANT POINTS IN CONNECTION WITH VARIOUS SECTIONS IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE

The Financial Section of the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai: The Chief Secretary of the Financial Section was Mr. S. HASHIMOTO, who had a staff of approximately 20 people working under him in the Embassy. This man, during interrogation, finally admitted that his chief duties consisted mainly of advising Japanese banks on financial matters. These matters were as follows:

Approval for loans to be made to Japanese people;

Approvals and suggestions of loans pertaining to business firms, (these firms were the majority of the Japanese cover organizations) and funds for their operations were allocated through the above procedure.

The Foreign Office Intelligence Director of the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai was Mr. K. OKAZAKI. This man states his work consisted of intelligence pertaining to international politics. His chief subordinates were S. OGATA, for Russian matters, and S. OTA, on all else; each of these men had a working staff of approximately 25 people. Reports from this office were dispatched directly to the Foreign Office Headquarters in Tokyo, known as the "KASUMIGASEKI", (this name has the equivalent meaning as No. 10 Downing Street, etc)

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To illustrate the close connection of the Minister with all the various working departments of the Japanese Embassies in their respective localities, each Minister was given the privilege of selecting and making his own appointments among his personnel, placing them where he thought they were best qualified. All work submitted from the various sections went out under his name. Key people interrogated, stated that no dissemination by one embassy office was made to any of the other embassies, i. e., all reports flowed in to Tokyo and received further dissemination there. These people further stated that to their knowledge little information was ever received from German offices in this area, but the German offices tried to cultivate them for the latest information.

The Russian Affairs Section in the Japanese Consulate-General was composed of Vice-Consul MURAKAWA and a student-interpreter, AIZAWA. (who was transferred to the Japanese Consulate in Manchuria in July, 1945, and no successor was appointed). Soon after MURAKAWA reached Shanghai, the Greater East Asia Ministry was established and he was transferred from the Foreign Office to the new Ministry. The Greater East Asia Ministry was not directly interested in the intelligence activities of the Russians and MURAKAWA was ordered to carry out the collection of purely local information, with an annual budget of ¥ 10,000. Thereupon, considering the allotted allowance, the work was divided into the following three categories:

- (1) Collecting Russian publications both in Shanghai and from Moscow such as newspapers, magazines and books and getting materials relating to political and economic questions.
- (2) Investigating movements of Soviet citizens as well as White Russians in Shanghai.
- (3) Collecting rumors relating to Russian affairs.

The above work was entrusted to the following persons:

- (a) Mr. A. A. POURIN No. 7, Macgregor Road, Shanghai.
- (b) Mr. K. KAZAKOFF No. 76, Route Paul Henri, Shanghai.

However, source claims it became almost impossible to prosecute the work due to the abnormal high cost of living early this year. Thereupon, the Greater East Asia Ministry granted and forwarded upon request of the Section the sum of ¥ 100,000 in March, 1945, which enabled the section, for a few months before the surrender, to pay POURIN a salary ranging from CRB \$200,000 to CRB \$300,000 monthly, while KAZAKOFF was given the limited amount of CRB \$50,000 monthly.

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MURAKAWA was transferred to the Information Section of the Japanese Embassy Office, Shanghai, in July, 1945, and there continued the work he had been following until the formal surrender of Japan in August, 1945.

From a separate Chinese source the following information was obtained and is given in chart form below. Source states that one or two members from each section listed formed an Intelligence Section in the Japanese Embassy. The Japanese who were interrogated would not admit that such a section existed, but considering the deliberate vagueness and circular answers given to such questions there is a tendency to raise the evaluation of this separate report.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION
OF JAPANESE EMBASSY

1945

ARMY LIAISON SECTION	NAVY LIAISON SECTION	ANTI-ESPIONAGE SECTION	GERMAN SECTION	CHINESE SECTION
S. KUROKI	Sec: FUKUDA	Sec: SHIMIZU	Sec: NAKABAYASHI	Vice-Consul: MAEDA
Sec: FUKUI	Sec: FUJIHARA	Sec: SATO	Insp: YUASHA	FURUKI, HAYASHI, HOZAKI

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U. S. S. R. SECTION	ANGLO-U. S. A. SECTION	INTERNATIONAL SECTION	ECONOMICAL SECTION	POLITICAL SECTION
Sec: MAEDA	Sec: TAJIRI	Sec: NISHIMURA	Vice-Consul: UMEKAWA	Vice Consul: HATTORI
SEC: MURAKAWA	SEC: HASHIZUME	Insp: YASUDA		
UEDA, IKEDA MATSUSHITA	Sec: IKEDA		Sec: TACHIBANA	Interpreter: KOTO

EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES IN CHINA.EMBASSY IN CHINA: Nanking

Ambassador: TANI

EMBASSY OFFICE

A. SHANGHAI

Minister: TSUCHIDA

Consulate-General:Shanghai
Hangchow
Hankow
Pangpu
HaichowSuchow
Nanking
Kiukiang
Wuhu

B. PEKING

Minister: KUSUMOTO

Tai Yuan
Peking
Tientsin
Tsingtao
Chinan
Kaifeng
ChihfuShanghaiwan
Tanshan
Tanku
Taitung
Chantien
Shantau

C. KWANTUNG

Minister: TASHIRO

Kalgan
SuiyuanShihchiachuan
Paotan

D. KALGAN

Minister: HACHIRI

Kwantung
HsiamenAomen
Haikow


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Minister
TSUCHIDA
Yutaka

Cabinet of Minister
SATO Shintaro

Counsellor
OKAZAKI
Kaheita




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5. ECONOMIC CONTROL OF CHINA BY JAPANESE EMBASSY.

The following charge was submitted on 15 February, 1946, by a reliable source:



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10. Central China Cigarette Company
11. Yangtze Egg-Products Company
12. Central China Transportation Co.
13. Central China Junk Association
14. Central China Animal Hides Co.
15. Nippon Fat Products Company
16. Central China Silk Company
17. Inter-Creek Steamship Company
18. China Hemp Products Company
19. Central China Salt Products Co.

Numerous informants have advised that the Japanese Embassies relied to a great extent on their economic arms, the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company, for intelligence in China.

A. ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD

According to source the Lukouchiao Incident, which took place on 7 July, 1937, rapidly spread hostilities over an increasingly wide area, despite the "non-Aggravation" policy followed by the Japanese Government and the Japanese Army had to occupy not only North China, but also many points in Central and South China. In the meantime, efforts were made by several Chinese leaders in the occupied areas to form local governments to tide over the transitory period. Seeing this, the Japanese authorities considered it imperative to render positive support to such efforts with a view to protecting and furthering the welfare of the Chinese people. It is for this purpose that in September, 1938, a plan was mooted in favour of inaugurating a powerful organ co-ordinating military and government organizations, whereas, in China there had been no official organ directly responsible to Tokyo except those belonging to the Foreign Office, i. e., the embassy, consulates-general and consulates.

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This plan was supported strongly both by military and government circles, but there also was a small group vehemently opposing it. The latter argued that, instead of mixing up military and government affairs, various departments of the Government should detail large civilian personnel to attend to affairs relating to China, thereby enlarging and strengthening the structure of the Foreign Office. The resignation of General KAZUSHIGE UGAKI as Foreign Minister took place at this juncture on account of this question.

The original plan, however, continued to be supported among influential circles centering around military personalities and finally the Asia Development Board was inaugurated in the Cabinet in April, 1939.

The Asia Development Board was, as may be clear from what has been said above, an organ in which the military and the Government joined forces with military personnel forming its nucleus and with various civil service offices supporting it for the purpose of effectively dealing with the China problem. Naturally, the Foreign Office and the Asia Development Board had different duties to attend to in China, the former taking care of what little diplomatic affairs there were, besides affairs concerning Japanese residents in this country. All other important affairs, such as support to be given to Chinese domestic politics, solution of economic problems in China and cultural cooperation to be effected between Japan and China came under the jurisdiction of the Asia Development Board and not to be overlooked, also the collection of information.

The personnel of the Asia Development Board in Tokyo consisted of the Premier as President and the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Ministers as Vice-Presidents. (At the time of the organization of this Board, Prince FUMIMARO KONOYE, HACHIRO ARITA, General GEN SUGIYAMA, Admiral MITSUMASA YONAI, and OKINORI KAYA were in office respectively as Premier, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister and Finance Minister). Under the President and four Vice Presidents of the Board, Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA was appointed Secretary-General, Major-General SUZUKI as Chief of the Political Department, SHINROKURO HIDAKA (of the Foreign Office) as Chief of the Economic Department and Dr. MATSUMURA (medical professor) as Chief of the Cultural Department. Of these three departments,

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the Political Department was considered the center of the whole system, its three section chiefs were sent from the Army, the Navy and the Foreign Office respectively. The personnel of the Asia Development Board, including the Secretary-General, had to be reshuffled several times, but the distribution of offices among various government departments remained unchanged.

In China the Asia Development Board established the North China Liaison Department at Peking, the Central China Liaison Department at Shanghai, the Mengchiang Liaison Department at Kalgan and the Amoy Liaison Department at Amoy. Of these four offices, the office at Peking had a branch at Tsingtao. These offices were headed by Army and Navy officers in active service as follows: The North China Liaison Department was headed first by Lieutenant-General KITA, next by Lieutenant-General MORIOKA and then by Major-General SHIOZAWA, Vice-Chiefs being first Major-General NEMOTO, next Major-General MORIOKA (before promotion) and then Major-General SHIOZAWA.

The Central China Liaison Department was headed by Vice-Admiral TSUDA and next by Vice-Admiral OTA, with an Army officer serving as Vice-Chief, which post was first occupied by Major-General KUSUMOTO, succeeded by Major-General OIKAWA, Major-General INOUE and Major-General ICHIAI in the order named.

The Mengchiang Liaison Department was headed first by Lieutenant-General SAKAI, next by Lieutenant-General TAKASHITA and then by Major-General IWADAKI; no Vice-Chief was appointed for this office.

The Amoy Liaison Department was first headed by Vice-Admiral OTA and later by Vice-Admiral FUKUDA, with no Vice-Chief appointed as in the case of the Kalgan office.

The branch office at Tsingtao was headed first by Rear-Admiral SHIBATA, next by Rear-Admiral TADA and later by another Naval officer.

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During the last year of operation and until August, 1945, the Greater East Asia Ministry was composed of five main departments. These departments were sub-divided into sections as follows:

BUREAU OF GENERAL AFFAIRS (General matters concerning economic, political and cultural affairs).

General Section	Section of Economic Affairs
Section of Research	
Section of Inspection	Section of Traffic Affairs

BUREAU OF CHINESE AFFAIRS (Economic, political and cultural affairs relative to China)

General section	Section of financial Affairs
Section of Commercial Affairs	Section of Traffic Affairs
Section of Agricultural Affairs	Section of Administrative Affairs

BUREAU OF MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS (Economic, Political and Cultural Affairs relative to Manchoukuo)

General Section	Section of Emigration
Section of Economic Development	Section of Education

BUREAU OF SOUTH SEAS AFFAIRS (Economic, Political and Cultural Affairs relative to South Seas Area).

Section of Political Affairs	Section of Administrative Affairs
Section of Economic Affairs	Section of Economic Development

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The main cover used by leaders and agents in Free China was that of a business man or doctor. Lesser agents and informants took the cover of fortune tellers or refugees. All agents entered Free China as smugglers. Couriers back to occupied areas used the smuggling cover.

9. Communications:

Communications were usually carried out by courier or runner carrying coded messages in the form of letters. An agent very seldom left Free China, but went near the border and used a smuggling or running merchant to carry the information across the border.

10. Finances:

The finances for the Group were derived primarily from Puppet levies (70%), received from the Minister of Propaganda. Additional finance was received from goods smuggled and from Japanese military sources (30%).

11. Codes:

Little information is available regarding codes used by the Group. However, it has been learned that names of commercial products held significant coded meanings. The known codes are as follows:

Large size tubes of toothpaste	indicate	B-29's
Small " " " " "	"	B-24's
" Twin Sisters' brand hair oil	"	P-40's
Another brand " " "	"	P-38's

Troops were referred to by names of metals. Numbers of troops were referred to by the numbers 1 to 9, indicating thousands.

12. Liaison:

The Group had little or nothing to do, as far as exchange of information is concerned, with any of the other Japanese intelligence groups. It has liaison with the Navy and the Army mainly for the purpose of getting priority in communications and transportation. Work with the Japanese Consulate was also limited. However, the Group did report any Japanese or Formosans who had revolutionary intentions.

(Source: From a Summary Report on Japanese-South China Intelligence Group Five Provinces Information Department (South China Political Peace Preservation Party), dated September 29, 1945, evaluated B-2.)

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Each of these liaison departments was divided into various bureaus, which were headed by officials representing the Foreign Office, the Finance Ministry, the Commerce and Industry Ministry, Agriculture and Forestry Ministry and the Communications Ministry of the Tokyo Government, each attending to duties in which he had been well versed at the Government office he had originally occupied.

From the above description of the organization of the Asia Development Board, it may be clear that in this organ the Army and the Navy formed its nucleus with various civil service departments of the Government rendering necessary cooperation.

Thus organized, the Asia Development Board continued to function in parallel with the Foreign Office in connection with the China problem until November, 1942, when the Greater East Asia Ministry was inaugurated to supersede it.

B. GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTRY

According to source, during the first several months of the Greater East Asia War, which started on 8 December, 1941, the areas occupied by the Japanese forces rapidly grew larger. The situation thus created made it imperative not only for Manchoukuo and occupied China but also for the southern countries to strengthen defenses in a spirit of mutual assistance as member nations of what was known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In view of this situation, the opinion was mooted in the Tojo Cabinet between August and September, 1942, that a new Ministry should be inaugurated with the object of rendering effective assistance to the "co-prosperity" nations, instead of leaving the Asia Development Board and the Foreign Office in charge of such matters. This opinion was opposed by a group of men, who, as in the case of the previous plan calling for the creation of the Asia Development Board, held that it was more advisable for diplomatic reasons to enlarge the scope of the Foreign Office service so as to cope with the situation. It was in this connection that the then Foreign Minister TOGO had to resign his portfolio under the pressure brought to bear upon him by the majority of Cabinet Ministers who favored the creation of a new Ministry. The new Ministry project made rapid progress and in November, 1942, the Greater East Asia Ministry was inaugurated accordingly.

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BUREAU OF TRADE (Affairs concerning foreign trade).

Section of Planning Section of Importation
Section of Exportation

It should be pointed out again that of the five main branches composing the Greater East Asia Ministry, each of these branches had its own research section (investigation or intelligence), and there were times when these sections handled political, economical, military and social intelligence. (Making dissemination of same.) This is an example of work overlapping duties among various sections.

The Greater East Asia Ministry did have its own schools. Only vague information was obtained concerning them, however, it is known that one, or the main school, was in Nanking. People questioned claim these schools were only to train people on intellectual subjects, but included physical training for disciplinary reasons.

6. THE JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SHANGHAI, CHINA.

A. Organization:

The following chart shows the organization of the Japanese Consulate-General in Shanghai. This organization is very similar to that of the Embassy and duties performed were the same.

(OVER)

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e. Department of Police

1. Dai Ichi Ka
Police Station

- a. Keimkakari (Section for
general business)
- b. Gyoseikakari (Section for
administration)
Permits for trade,
enlistment,
sanitary works.
- c. Shomukakari (Section for
census registration)
Registration of birth
and death,
residents.
Issue of certificate.
Concerning Chinese
employment.
Real estate and
properties
of Japanese
subjects.
- d. Shihokakari (Section for
justics)

2. Dai Ni Ka (Tokko Kaisatsu)
Counter-espionage, control
of Japanese communists
and Korean Independence
parties.f. Department for Justice
Court of Justice

g. Extra-Department works

- 1. Denshinka (Section for
telegrams)
- 2. Ryokenka (Section for
passports)
- 3. Bunshoka (Section for
documents)
- 4. Kirokuka (Section for
data)

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7. ACTIVITIES OF THE SHANGHAI CONSULATE-GENERAL, 1932 - 1937.

With the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese military forces in 1932, anti-Japanese movements in China became brisk and Chinese public sentiment appealed for a unified front against Japan. As a result, the first Sino-Japanese war broke out on 28 January, 1933.

During the war the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai was kept busy supporting military movements, calling out all Japanese residents for voluntary work. As peace was restored in May and with the retreat of the 19th Route Army from the Shanghai area, the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai received orders to conduct the political counter measures against anti-Japanese movements.

The department for information was expanded and one special official was appointed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assume the important business of dealing with political intelligence activities.

Because of the cosmopolitan nature of the international settlement in Shanghai and the complicated conditions of the international control of the city, the Consulate could not get satisfactory results. They utilized the *Doa Dobun Shoyin*, *Shizenkagakugenkuho* (the Japanese Institute for Natural Science) and the Japanese Commercial Association for collecting information, gave instructions to the Japanese members of the City-Council of the International Settlement to make official protests against anti-Japanese movements inside the Settlement.

By means of propaganda and the use of Chinese terrorists the Japanese attempted to change the Chinese public's sentiment to one of anti-British feeling.

They attempted to gather Chinese veteran militarists and politicians for anti-Kuomintang movements, but without much success.

With the attack of Japanese Army in Lou Chia Chiao on 7 July, 1937, on the Chinese Army and the occupation of Peking on 30 July by the Japanese, war soon followed on 13 August in Shanghai.

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In January, 1942, they organized the Shanghai Koa Kai (East Asia Development Association in Shanghai) and Jikyoku Fujin Kai (Women's Association to meet the political situation) for the purpose of unifying the Japanese population to cope with the political situation.

They organized Hinbohan (neighbor's joint) numbering 1,000 and war-joing (Chonai Kai) numbering 180 as the sub-organization of Koa Kai.

These organizations were active in -

1. Planting the castor-oil plant.
2. Collecting metallic ware.
3. Selling government bonds.
4. Training Japanese according to fascist ideas.
5. Collecting necessary funds for the building of aircraft.

In June, 1943, they dissolved the Koa Kai and organized the Koa Hokoku Kai (Patriotic Association for the East Asia Development).

The staffs of Koa Hokoku Kai were as follows:

President: General Consul Seiki Yano
 Vice-President: Mr. Nobuo Watanabe
 Chief of Business Board: Yasutaro Koemura
 Chief of Department for General Affairs: Katohira Hattori
 Vice-Chief of Department for General Affairs: Matsutsugu Matsui
 Vice-Chief of Department for General Affairs: Yubun Shimoda
 Chief of Department for Training: Hajimu Hirayama
 Vice-Chief of Department for Training: Sai Gakuto
 Chief of Budo: Yeimatsu Shirakami
 Chief of Physical Training: Kwanji Kawai
 Chief of Department for East Asia: Hiroshi Hata
 Chief of Cultural Department: Kiyoshi Iwamoto
 Vice Chief of Cultural Department: Shunnosuke Ashizawa
 Vice Chief of Cultural Department: Chokudo Omori
 President: Setsu Aoki (Central China Water & Electric Company)
 Vice-President: Nishiro Kawamura (Yokohama Bank)
 Advisers: Keitaro Kuroda (Shanghai Cotton Mills)
 Kenji Kodama (Tokyo)
 Kikujiro Takajima (C. C. Development Company)
 Danso Tachikawa (Tung Hsing Cotton Mills)
 Akitsugu Nishikawa (Toyoda Cotton Mills)

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The System:

The Faculty: A. Political science and law

The Faculty: B. Commercial and Economic Lectures

The College: Economical Lectures

Lectures: Languages, (Chinese, English, Russian and German); Science; Philosophy, Economics, History; Geography, Asiatic Peoples' Theory; Japanese and Chinese Law.

Besides the above lectures they have special lectures concerning Chinese affairs for studying Chinese political, Economical, Cultural, Anthropological, Geographical conditions.

Trip for Special Investigation: Every year they send students for about 2½ months on round trips in interior China for investigating the important strategic points in China.

Finance: They organized a foundation called TOA TOBUN KAI in which prominent Japanese politicians and capitalists were involved. The Headquarters of TOA TOBUN KAI was in Tokyo, the branches were established in Shanghai, Tsingtao, Peking and Canton.

The President of TOA TOBUN KAI was Prince Fuminero KONOYE and Vice President was General Nobuyuki ABE.

The President of the Shanghai branch was Mr. Tatsuichiro FUNATSU and prominent Japanese business men and officials were involved.

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The main object of education in this University was for educating and training students specially to assume duties in the intelligence service in China for the Japanese Government. Only Japanese students, not Chinese, were trained in espionage. Before the Sino-Japanese war they had a special class for Chinese students for the purpose of utilizing them in pro-Japanese activities, but all the Chinese graduates went over to the Chungking Government after the outbreak of Sino-Japanese war.

The Professors:

The first Director of this School was the well-known advocator of Military invasion into China, Mr. Sei ARAO, who was active in Military espionage during the Sino-Japanese war 1882-1883 and Russo-Japanese War 1892-1893.

Mr. Hajimu NEZU, the successor of Mr. ARAO persuaded the Japanese Government, prominent Japanese politicians and capitalists to form the financial foundation for this school.

The recent Director: Kichichi HONMA

The Professors: Okichi KITANO.

Takuro SUZUKI,

Fumio OTAKE

Fukusaburo HIZAE

Shunpei MOZAKI

Yasumobu KUCHIDA

Ichiro SAKAMOTO

Yoshiro TODA

Yeiichi OTA

Atsumi YAMADA

Mamoru SAIHEKI,

Stasuke HIROYE

Yoshihiro HORIYE

Masaichi ISHIKAWA

Hatsutsugu TOBIISHI

Kageo SAKUKAKAWA

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JAPANESE CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN INTELLIGENCE

Tokuyuki Makaye
Miyazo UCHIYAMA
Ryuso ORI
Hajimi COMI
So UYEHARA
Kahei KOHASHI
Heku MICHIGAMI
Sakuma YAMACUCHI
Maseo UCHIYAMA
Itero YAMAZAKI
Toyokichi HINNAI
Kiyoshi KUNAI
Isaburo KIDA
Hircharu CHIKAZAWA
Yasuchige KIMURA
Yoshio TSUJIYA
Ryusei MATSUMOTO
Kinichi HIRASHITA
Ichichu ICHIYEN
Kazuo KANEHARU
Tokuji OSAKA
Shiro MIYOSHI
Yasuyoshi ISHII

The members of East Asia Investigating Department:

Chief: Fukuseburo HITAYE
Members: Yasuhira TKAGI
Masanane OKO
Yasuye IKE
Genkichi OTA

The professors of college:

Chief: Seizo KUBOTA
Members: Ichiro SAKAMOTO
Fumio OTAKE
Gaso WAKIYA
Satasuke HIRUYE
Hiroharu CHIKAZAWA
Yasushige KIMURA

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JAPANESE CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN INTELLIGENCE

Sakuma YAMAGUCHI
 Masayoshi KOGA
 Naoichi ZUNOCHI
 Miyazo UCHIYAMA
 Atsumi YAMADA
 Gehei KOHASHI
 Hyusei MATSUMOTO
 Juntaro YONEKURA
 Seiichi AOYAGI
 Minetaro FUKUZAKI
 Senri OKA
 Kuzuo KANEMARU

The professors lecturing on Chinese affairs:

Fumio OTAKE
 Fukunaburo HIZAYE
 Atsumi YAMADA
 Mamoru SAIHEKI
 Toyokichi JINNAI
 Kiyoshi KOIWA
 Sakuma YAMAGUCHI

The graduates from this College were mostly employed by the Japanese Government service, the Ambassadors for Burma and Siam during the war were graduates of this College and General Consuls in important towns of China were occupied by the graduates of this College.

The Chiefs of Intelligence Sections of Government concerns in China were almost all graduates from this College. The greater part of the graduates were sympathizers of the East Alliance which was lead by General Ganji ISHIMARA and Mr. Shumei OKAWA.

Some of them entered Military service and have assumed duties in intelligence departments. Lieutenant YONEYAMA and OMI, who were graduates from this College, were in the information section of Nobori-butai (13th Army).

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The current activities of the professors and graduates:

The greater part of the professors have left already for Japan. The Director, Mr. Kiichi HONMA, is still in Shanghai. Messrs. TOSIKICHI JINSAI, KIYOSHI KOIWA and SAKUMA YAMAGUCHI are still in Shanghai and are involved in democratic movement. They have gathered many graduates together and become the important members of Japanese cultural Association.

The others, who were the sympathizers for East Asia Alliance, were active in trying to be employed by Chinese Army. Because the graduates from this College can speak Chinese fluently and know how to behave like Chinese, they can easily camouflage themselves as natives.

The graduates from this College number about 4,000.

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