

VIA: AIR COURIER  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGFA-314

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: 28 October 1952

FROM : Chief, FBI

ATTN: E  
E

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OPERATIONAL/CALL

SPECIFIC— Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and  
Reaction to BDJ "FLAP"

REF: EGFA-32, EGFA-289, EGFA-297 (*being sat. later*)

DATE:	<u>30. OCT. 1952</u>
1- <u>GD</u>	
2-	
3-	
4-	
INFO: <u>E</u>	<u>73</u>
BOARD	CHRONO:

1. The undersigned arrived at the Heidelberg KIBITZ safehouse at 1930 hours, 16 October 1952, for a scheduled meeting with KIBITZ-15. I had not seen KIBITZ-15 since the "BDJ Apparat Flap" made the papers and this meeting would disclose his reaction.

2. Before entering the safehouse, I made a check of the surrounding area to see if the place was under surveillance. To the best of my knowledge it was not. KIBITZ-15 greeted me with an air of self-confidence which he had never before exhibited during the six months which I have been running him. [ ] arrived at 2030 hours and remained until the end of the meeting. He also noticed no indications of surveillance.)

3. The next apparent difference in the "old boy" was his great regard for security, for he immediately shut the windows (the wooden shutters had already been tightly drawn on windows) before we began to talk. This increased security awareness permeated the entire meeting, a great improvement I must say, but I wonder why the sudden development.

4. KIBITZ-15 immediately brought up the "BDJ Flap" and said it certainly was getting a lot of publicity and that in certain ways it would affect our operations, but that we could discuss it later as there were a number of day-to-day problems to discuss first. He then handed me a two-page agenda for the meeting. (I have KIBITZ-15 give me an agenda of main points to be discussed at each meeting so that I have a record of his activities and ideas. I make my own notes for points I want to discuss — a copy of which KIBITZ-15 does not get. I might add, that KIBITZ-15 has no written material or instructions from me or from other staff personnel.)

5. Among a number of routine operational points brought up was a proposal that we furnish, in addition to normal expenses, some 14,000 DM to the operation. This — financially the "biggest idea" that KIBITZ-15 has ever had — would be broken down as follows:

a. 8,000 DM to KIBITZ-177: This W/T Operator, who is nearly

DIST:  
COM-4 ✓  
EE-3

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release  
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- 2 -

finished training, is married, has four children and was formerly a proprietor (Paechter) of a gasthaus in the East Zone, fleeing to the West in 1949. He is now a waiter in a town outside Stuttgart and has only one and a half rooms for his large family. KIBITZ-15 has called these quarters worse than a pig sty. Such conditions, and we agree with KIBITZ-15 on this, do not make it conducive for a clandestine W/T operator to produce. The 8,000 DM requested would be to pay for the purchase of the lease and inventory of a gasthaus near Hof, which KIBITZ-177 could derive his income from, house his family in and use as an operating base for staybehind activities -- the KIBITZ-15 Net has no agents in North Bavaria. (KIBITZ-15 had told me about this "idea" before, but no price was mentioned.)

b. 3,000 DM for KIBITZ-137: This is the amount this team leader, and confidant of KIBITZ-15's, needs to purchase a Schloss near Kaiserslautern which contains 12 apartments of very low standard. KIBITZ-137 can buy and fix the place up for 15,000 DM, but he only has possibilities of getting together 12,000 DM. If we gave him the difference he will purchase the place, and it can be used as an operating base for the KIBITZ-15 Net, KIBITZ-137 and W/T operator, KIBITZ-161.

c. 2,000 to 3,000 DM for KIBITZ-162 (A woman): This would be used for renting and furnishing her an apartment in Wiesbaden (KIBITZ-15 has no W/T agent there) and sending her to business school where she can learn to be a secretary. Then she could get herself a job in Wiesbaden, using her apartment as a W/T operating base.

6. I told KIBITZ-15 that these proposals all had merit, but that I could not say whether or not the money would be made available. We then discussed a number of other operational points before going into the BDJ problem.

7. Throughout the entire discussion of the above points, KIBITZ-15 acted oversure of himself in all matters, nevertheless remaining pleasant to [ ] and myself. I might say that he acted as though he was not an agent at a clandestine meeting in a U.S. safehouse, but again in the Wehrmacht uniform of full Colonel discussing military plans with his staff.

8. KIBITZ-15 then turned the conversation to the "BDJ Flap", saying that the organization itself could not have been run strictly on German initiative; that all in all, he did not object to the idea of having such an apparat or to the people in it. When questioned directly as to what he thought of the leaders of the BDJ Apparatus, he said they were good men -- just the adventurous types gone a little wild. He did not approve of Pask's "hiding behind the Americans" once the organization was made public, however. In regard to the "black list", KIBITZ-15 more or less dismissed it saying that it was all SPD propaganda and that the SPD had certainly taken full advantage of the "flap"

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- 3 -

and the "black list" in their relations with the Bonn Government and the Americans.

9. When asked about how he thought the "flap" would affect our (i.e. KIBITZ-15) operations, he said that it certainly indicated that increased security measures would have to be taken by us and everybody in our organization. This led us to a discussion of the LfVs, BfV and German police vis-a-vis "our" operations. When asked the direct question of how Bonn would feel if they learned of our staybehind program, KIBITZ-15 answered, "They will tolerate it".

10. He then pushed [ ] and me on our knowledge of the EDJ. We both denied any knowledge prior to the press reports and assured him we had nothing at all to do with the organization. He did not appear to believe this completely, but made no effort to draw us out further. KIBITZ-15 then practically boasted that he knew the "EDJ Flap" was coming two weeks before Minister President Zinn made his announcement before the Hessian Landtag. I acted quite surprised at this two weeks' "scoop" and asked him his sources. At first he was very indifferent to the question saying he "had many connections". But I repeated the question and he admitted his sources were "friends in the Selbsthilfe in Stuttgart". I asked him what kind of organization this was. KIBITZ-15 told me it was an organization of former German professional soldiers who were taking care of soldiers' pension claims, personal problems, etc., and doing staff work now on how former professional soldiers could aid in the defense of the Fatherland upon a Soviet invasion. With more prodding, he gave me the following details:

The "Selbsthilfe" has plans drawn up for the organization now of former soldiers into dormant groups or military formations. In time of hostilities, i.e. Soviet invasion, these soldiers would join Allied forces for the defense of the Fatherland. The Selbsthilfe plan is in four phases:

- 1) The first will be the defense of the land East of the Donau and then withdrawal over the Donau. All former soldiers living East of the Donau would form groups now; activate in time of invasion and join the Allies in defense of that area and withdraw with them over
- 2) The second line of defense, a line running approximately north and south through Stuttgart. Same action as above, to;
- 3) The third line of defense, the Rhine, with same action by groups as above. Then in the worst military situation;
- 4) The withdrawal of Allied troops, the Selbsthilfe organized German groups included, down the Rhone

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

- 4 -

valley into Spain.

11. KIBITZ-15, when telling of these plans, gave them his whole-hearted approval as a former German officer and tactician. I tried to elicit a little bit more information on the Selbsthilfe, but was unable to do so. As the rapport of our meeting had gone so nicely up until then, I decided to let the matter drop.

✓ [ ] A check on ZIPPER and COM files in Frankfurt, plus a talk with [ ] on 20 October, produced more information on the Selbsthilfe. A summary of the organization and its ideas as reported in our files is as follows:

Its full title is "Soldatenselbsthilfe in Sueddeutschland". It is also known as the South Wurttemberg Officers Group. Leaders of the organization are: former Lt. Col. Albert Paul Schnez of Stuttgart-Gaisburg, Ferher Strasse 12, manager or frontman; former General of Infantry Rudolf von Buenau of Stuttgart, Gaensheide Strasse 62, responsible head of organization.

Schnez has evidently maintained contact with Otto Skorzeny, and with ZIPPER. These contacts were made with the idea of having ZIPPER sponsor the Selbsthilfe's plan (similar to that outlined by KIBITZ-15) for providing the Western military forces with four German divisions four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. The plan also calls for the evacuation (upon hostilities) of 100-200 former German officers who would be given the task of: a) organizing combat-qualified German males from the streams of refugee into military units to soldier with Allied forces; and, b) other logistical responsibilities in regard to the organization of such divisions. This plan of the Selbsthilfe was forwarded to ZIPPER in the fall of 1951. It was considered and turned down by EUCOM and DYCLAMATIS in April 1952. In the original approach to ZIPPER, the Selbsthilfe and Schnez evidently sold ZIPPER with the idea for ZIPPER requested POB to furnish about 9,000 DM a month for the maintenance of a small Selbsthilfe planning staff. (Ref: MGLA-8343, MGLA-11398 and MGLA-8540.) Skorzeny has given a copy of this defense-of-Germany plan, which is very similar to that of the one proposed by the Selbsthilfe to ZIPPER, (and outlined by KIBITZ-15 above) to the Chief of Station, [ ] in November 1951 (WSMA-1756, 21 December 1951). An unconfirmed report in COM files also states that Schnez was involved in staybehind recruiting activities in Austria in 1950/51.

At the 20 October German Panel Meeting, the undersigned discussed the Selbsthilfe-ZIPPER relations with [ ] who said that POB was very interested in the Selbsthilfe and its

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

connection to ZIPPER. I requested [ ] to furnish me additional information on the Selbsthilfe and to have ZIPPER files checked for any reference to KIBITZ-15 himself. (See EGFA-289).

[ ] was also contacted in regard to the Selbsthilfe and from him it was learned the BfV is also interested in this organization. [ ] said that the BfV had been checking into Selbsthilfe activities for some time, probably because of its relationships with Skorzeny whom the BfV plans to arrest the next time he arrives in Germany. [ ] has been requested to elicit further information on the Selbsthilfe from the BfV or from other contacts without giving away the reason for our interest.

13. Another item on the agenda given to me by KIBITZ-15 at our 16 October meeting was the security practices of individual agents and himself. He started off this discussion by comparing our operation with the "EDJ Flap", saying that he did not want to have any "papers" about our operation discovered by the German police. KIBITZ-15 then stated that he had gone through his own personal papers at home and brought to the Heidelberg safehouse or destroyed everything he had concerning the operation. He had also made a point of meeting KIBITZ-150 and seeing that he had destroyed all papers relating to KIBITZ and that he, KIBITZ-150, now kept nothing but what was "in his head". KIBITZ-15 also said that he again contacted KIBITZ-171 to make sure he had destroyed all evidence of our stay-behind activities in his possession. A number of papers and notes were picked up from KIBITZ-171. I commended KIBITZ-15 for these acts and said that it had been my contention all along that our security had been lax. He agreed and said that from now on he would personally search all W/T agents, especially after they left a training session to see that they had no incriminating papers in their possession, and furthermore, he would make periodic checks of all agents for the same security reason.

14. We then got down to the point on the agenda entitled "Camouflage or Cover for KIBITZ-15 and Sub-Agents". KIBITZ-15 drew up a paper, which he gave me with the agenda, on his own personal cover and said that it was very difficult in some instances, although he considered that he himself was in no danger. Briefly, he uses the following cover:

- a. His own business connections which call for a great deal of travelling in Germany;
- b. He passes around the word he is a part-time special advisor to the "Blank" Office on military matters which are more or less classified;
- c. He also says that he has press connections. He laughed when he was reading this to me and explained that his "proof" was the occasional small article he contributed to various veteran newspapers currently being published in Germany.

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

He followed up this explanation with the proposal that he be given a press pass and cover story that would hold up. He suggested that we obtain a copy of the contract and papers that one of the major wire services gives their indigenous "stringers", and then forge copies with his alias thereon. This, he believed, would be a great advantage to him operationally. I knocked this idea out with a statement that the press as a cover for operations was one of the oldest tricks of the trade and that I certainly was not in favor of it.

He then proposed that he be given a forged paper as a member of the German or International Red Cross; this, I countered, was entirely too dangerous a cover for it was too easy to break. He then proposed that we give him some kind of forged papers showing he had a connection with the German Intelligence Service (Nachrichtendienst) without mentioning any specific one. I immediately said that this type of cover was out of the question first, because there was no such legal agency now and that even if there were, we could ~~not~~ not and would not do such a thing.

15. The next point was one that almost floored me for KIBITZ-15 suggested that all the sub-agents in the KIBITZ-15 Net should now be made to sign a contract. This contract would be in the form of a statement as to exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it. Such contracts would be worded to look as if the agents were recruited and trained by a press service as TWX or telegraph operators, or as reporters for non W/Ters. KIBITZ-15's idea behind this contract was that if any agent was discovered by German authorities, they would be able to say they were "just being trained for employment by such-and-such news service". Thus, there would be no intelligence connotation to their activities. KIBITZ-15 said that he hoped to have such a model contract drawn up in the next couple of weeks and that we could discuss the problem further then. I lost no time in telling him that I approved of the contract idea, but did not approve of the press bureau or training cover story. After this long disertation on cover ideas by KIBITZ-15, I re-emphasized that the main cover for a staybehind program is the natural cover of each individual agent, explaining to him that in order for a W/T man or any staybehind team member to be stayable, he must live a natural life or cover with his observing and reporting activities being strictly clandestine. This discussion of cover was closed when I genuinely complimented KIBITZ-15 for his consideration of the cover and security problems. He will draft up these "contracts".

16. We then got into a discussion of a number of individual operators and when they would be furnished training and the old sore point of FRQs. With the idea of giving KIBITZ-15 "busy work" for the next couple of weeks, and as a preliminary step in limiting him to a given number of operators and staybehind teams, I requested him to give me a list of: 1) all active agents, W/T operators and others; 2) all agents who could be dropped and the reason

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

therefore; 3) all agents who were semi-active, when they could become active or whether they should be dropped. In making this request, I indicated that detailed information was required.

17. It was now close to 2330 hours and our meeting was still very Gemuetlich with KIBITZ-15 really playing the part of the self-confident Colonel. The meeting closed with a number of "Witzen" by KIBITZ-15, who had prepared notes on several new ones he had heard recently.

18. KIBITZ-15's self-confident attitude; his overnight "awakening" to security; his admission that he had connections with the Selbsthilfe who told him of the "BDJ Flap" and his propositioning me for the 14,000 DM, tend to point to the fact that KIBITZ-15 has possibly confessed (to the Selbsthilfe or through them to ZIPPER ??) his sins -- his part in KIBITZ -- in an effort to get some German approval and/or as "Rueckversicherung" in the event some German authorities start an investigation and an ensuing BDJ-type flap. Such a flap (see EGFA-297) would be very detrimental to the pursuit of his military career which is his main ambition. Considering the above, purely in the realm of conjecture, we might ask the following questions:

- a. Was KIBITZ-15 told by "someone" that he should continue to cooperate with us as long as he was not exposed; i.e. tighten up his security?
- b. Could he also have been told to see whether or not we would furnish large sums of money, (i.e. 14,000 DM) with an eye to having KIBITZ finance, in whole or in part, the Selbsthilfe "planning staff" (see paragraph 12 above)?

HGS/cfp

APPROVED: [ ]

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**