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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

KOREA

SECTION 53

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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Director of Central Intelligence.

Declassified by Dist. State memo dtd. 8/7/80
date 9 January 1981 (in EIR-0379)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

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53. Political Dynamics

A. General

The northern and southern regimes in Korea vary widely in party politics and electoral procedures. North Korean political techniques have evolved from the Communist concept of "people's democracy," the doctrinal rationalization of the Soviet satellite. As explained in this Chapter, Section 52 (under General), the political system developed in the "people's democracy" involves an integrated apparatus consisting of two broad channels for the organization and direction of individual activity: 1) the formal constitutional government encompassing the domain of public activity, or state functions as outlined in the constitution, and 2) the "democratic front" capping the structure of Communist-controlled political parties and social organizations (e.g.: the Korean Labor Party, the Youth League, the Women's League, the trade unions) and responsible in the domain of private activity, including the rallying of youth and dissemination of culture. Although both channels of command are obliged to work closely together, only through one group, the Korea Labor Party (Communist) are the domains of private and public activity linked in such a way as to create a manageable totality of power. According to North Korean spokesmen, the function of the constitutional government is one of administration or management of the raw materials of the public domain in order to assure their productive utilization; the function of social organizations is one of support, for the purpose of mobilizing the human resources of the country behind the government and its activities; and the functions of the powerful Labor Party are to "direct, coordinate, rally, check and control" the operations of these two main chains of state command. Under this system of control, authority is vested in the administrative or executive bodies—in the lower agencies appointed by and responsible to the Labor Party and in the uppermost levels of command responsible to the Soviet Union. Thus, the elective bodies have no actual authority. The election process is closely controlled and manipulated to confirm the existing distribution of political power and to minimize, if not eliminate completely, any criticism of the regime, its activities, or its policies. Control of all political activity is, therefore, clearly vested in the Labor Party, which in turn is controlled by a handful of leaders closely associated with the U.S.S.R.

The political dynamics of South Korea are in striking contrast with those of the northern regime. Overt opposition to the administration has existed in the Republic of Korea since its establishment in 1948. The extremely large number of partisan political organizations that developed during the U.S. occupation period have aligned themselves into two complex, general groupings, each composed of parties, social organizations of broad membership, and political blocs called "negotiating groups" in the National Assembly. The incumbent administration is under the general control of the pro-Rhee grouping which supports President Syngman Rhee and centers in the following organizations: 1) the Liberal Party, since December 1951 successor to the Nationalist Party as President Rhee's main party organization; 2) the still existent Nationalist Party; 3) the National Society, a loosely organized national movement; 4) the Korean Youth Corps; 5) the Korean Federation of Labor Unions; and 6) the Korean Women's Association. Less closely allied with Rhee are: 1) the South Korean Branch of the Korean (*Chosŏn*) Democratic Party, a North Korean refugee group, and 2) the "negotiating group" in the Assembly that has nominally supported Rhee, since the spring of 1951 known as the Republican People's Political Association. Rhee's relations with this latter group have often been strained.

Overt opposition is almost wholly conservative. The opposition is led by the Democratic Nationalist Party, a large and, in comparison to other South Korean organizations, well organized group with strong financial backing and close ties with its own negotiating representatives in the Assembly. Particularly since the beginning of the Korean conflict, other opposition elements have consisted of small factions and negotiating groups in the assembly that align themselves with the Democratic Nationalists against Rhee. Both the pro-Rhee and the opposition organizations either have too few members or are too weakly organized to serve as instruments of control over the society, and they are much too dominated by cliques at the top to reflect popular attitudes in representative democratic fashion. They are instruments of the few individual leaders or cliques that comprise the articulate political leadership in South Korea.

The electoral system of the Republic, on the other hand, formulated with the assistance of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea in 1948, is one

the most democratic in the world. A distinctive feature of the system is the parallel use of phonetic script (*han'gul*) and ideographs along with portrait photographs of candidates, enabling even illiterates to identify the candidates of their choice. No run-off elections are held, however, and the decision is awarded to the candidate with the largest plurality of votes. There is wide participation in both candidacies and popular vote. The government has not hesitated to interfere in elections but does not appear to be able seriously to affect the total outcome of an election. The mechanical excellence of the system is heavily counterbalanced, however, by the dearth of experienced and trustworthy leaders, the political naïveté of the people and the weakness of political parties. The latter do not play a predominant role in the elections but endeavor to expand their ranks after the election by recruiting successful candidates not already associated with the party.

Despite the great contrast in ideology developed in the areas occupied by Soviet and U.S. forces after World War II, North and South Korean political systems have some common antecedents in the independence movement that developed during the period of Japanese rule. Even during this period, however, the divergence of political orientation that now marks the two regimes was reflected in the existence of a Communist independence movement that existed side by side with the non-Communist movement.

During the period from 1904 to 1910, when Japan was moving by stages toward annexation of the country, the Korean Emperor covertly sent diplomatic emissaries abroad to work against the Japanese. A Korean military force called the "Righteous Army" resisted the Japanese for a time. After Japan annexed Korea in August 1910, Koreans continued unsuccessfully to solicit the assistance of foreign governments in regaining their freedom. Guerrilla resistance was carried on to some extent and numerous Japanese officials were assassinated. The independence movement was neither vigorous nor organized, however, until the Declaration of Independence of March 1919.

Early in 1919 the funeral of the former Emperor gave rise to Korean demonstrations for independence. During the same period, Korean leaders, inspired by President Wilson's Fourteen Points to expect support from the West, sought to present their case at the Paris Peace Conference. On March 1, 1919, 33 Korean leaders assembled in Seoul (Söul), where they signed a declaration of independence and then immediately surrendered themselves to the Japanese police. Most of these leaders were adherents of the Christian and *Ch'ön-*

*dokyo** religions, and a few were Buddhists. Demonstrations were then staged throughout Korea, continuing for several months despite vigorous repression by the Japanese authorities.

Shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Korean patriot groups formed "provisional governments" simultaneously in Seoul, in the border country of Manchuria, and in Shanghai which finally coalesced in the "Korean Provisional Government" at Shanghai with Syngman Rhee as president. Until late 1945 this "Provisional Government" remained in China as the main hub of the independence movement and, while seeking recognition, was represented in Washington by Rhee, who also played a leading role in the activities of Korean residents in Hawaii and the continental United States. Kim Ku, the noted terrorist, became the leading figure in the "Provisional Government" in China. He formed the Korean Independence Party, which enlisted the support of Koreans in China. This party stood alone until the early 1930's when a party oriented farther to the left was formed under the leadership of Kim Kyusik and Kim Wönbong, the latter then known as Kim Yaksan. The "Korean Provisional Government" in China put small forces in the field to help the Chinese resist Japanese aggression, particularly after China proper was attacked in 1937. The Korean Volunteer Corps was established in 1938 under the command of Kim Wönbong (Kim Yaksan) and operated in northeast China behind enemy lines. Later, a Korean Independence Army appeared that was more closely identified with the "Korean Provisional Government" than the Volunteer Corps and which theoretically outranked the latter. The Independence Army was commanded by Yi Ch'öngch'ön (later known as Chi Ch'öngch'ön), with Yi Pömsök as second in command.

The Korean Provisional Government received diplomatic recognition from China and the Free French, and developed a considerable following among Koreans residing in China and other countries, particularly in Hawaii and the United States. It likewise gained some adherents and widespread sympathy within Japanese-occupied Korea.

Meanwhile the leadership of the "Provisional Government" had faced a growing challenge from a communist-sponsored independence movement, launched shortly after the Declaration of Independence in 1919. The communist drive began among

* *Ch'öndokyo* may be translated literally "Heaven Road Cult." The term has been given many other translations, however, and for this reason the prevailing practice of simply romanizing the Korean term has been used here and in reference to the *Ch'öndokyo* Young Friends Party activities in South Korea and North Korea (see below).

Koreans living in the Soviet Union and communist-occupied China; it soon penetrated the Korean peninsula, where the communists established a much stronger underground organization than did the Korean Provisional Government. The first known Korean Communist organization was formed in May 1919 in the Nikolayevsk-Ussuri district north of Vladivostok. After 1920, a number of Korean Communist publications appeared in the Vladivostok area. In late 1922, however, numerous Korean Communist Party members in this area were purged because they refused to halt their partisan activities against Japan. In the 1930's the U.S.S.R. for reasons of security moved the Korean community in maritime Siberia to the Central Asia area.

There are also evidences of Korean activity among the Chinese Communists dating from the early 1920's. During this period, Pak Honyong, later successively a prominent communist in South Korea and foreign minister of the North Korean regime, was a member of a Chinese Communist group in Shanghai. When the Chinese Communists established themselves in the Yen-an area, their influence upon Korean Communists mounted. Kim Mujong and other Koreans became increasingly active in Chinese Communist military affairs. A group of Korean intellectuals under the leadership of Kim Tubong established the Yen-an Independence Alliance, which became the principal Korean political agency, at Yen-an (Fu-shih), amassing considerable strength, both military and political, before 1945.

In addition to the organizations developed in connection with the Yen-an regime and in the U.S.S.R., various groups in Manchuria engaged in guerrilla activities against the Japanese or in banditry. These guerrilla bands were most active before the Japanese seized Manchuria, but they continued to operate during the 1930's. Kim Ilsong was active in this area in the early period and his guerrilla exploits became legendary; the younger Kim Ilsong, who has been Premier in North Korea since 1947, apparently was active in Manchuria in the late period, but not to the extent he professes.

Communist organizations also developed within Korea during the early 1920's. Marxist thinking was popular in the higher educational institutions of Korea until 1945, despite Japanese suppression. Various organizations were established, principal among them being a "workers-farmers alliance," organized in 1924 and thereafter covertly commanding considerable strength. In April 1925, a group more orthodox by Soviet standards established the Korean Communist Party. Outlawed by the Japanese in 1927, this party also suffered from severe internal factionalism. Accepted into the Comintern in 1928, it was expelled in December of that year because of "ceaseless, unprincipled

group struggle." The party was re-admitted between 1932 and 1935. Until late 1945 the party within Korea continued to be torn by factionalism, but communism nonetheless gained considerable strength within Korea.

The Korean Provisional Government and the communist organizations were the principal centers of the broad and generally unorganized popular movement toward independence. Almost all organizations among the Korean people sympathized with the independence movement and were to some extent involved in its activities. However, the two above-mentioned groups maintained only a tenuous liaison with most of the other organizations and only a general leadership in the movement. Christian organizations, including the Y.M.C.A. and educational institutions, were focal points of the conservatively oriented agitation for independence. The *Ch'ondokyo* religion promoted independence activity of a more leftist, although non-communist, orientation. A major personality in the independence movement until his death in the 1930's was An Changho. In addition to working with the Korean Provisional Government in China, An Changho organized an intellectual association called the Young Korean Academy which functioned in northern Korea and in the Korean community in the United States. Its members still exert an influence out of proportion to their numbers in conservative Korean politics. Other conservative elements, of whom Song Chinu, an editor, was a prominent member, covertly organized the Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party. In addition to these organizations, there were a number of individuals, known even to the Japanese toward the end of World War II, who were important intellectual leaders of the independence movement within Korea. In this group were Cho Mansik, an elderly intellectual active in P'yongyang and Seoul; An Chaehong, an editor; and Yö Unhyöng (Lyu Woon Hyung), leftist leader.

The independence movement itself had never presented a serious threat to Japanese hegemony over Korea. It gained its greatest influence after the surrender of Japan and the liberation of Korea, when it became the fountainhead of political leadership and organization.

The major leaders of the independence movement assumed immediate leadership in post-liberation politics. Syngman Rhee and shortly thereafter Kim Ku, Kim Kyusik, Kim Wönbong, other expatriate "Provisional Government" leaders returned to assume leading roles in South Korea, together with Yö Unhyöng, An Chaehong and Pak Honyong and Song Chino who had been active in Korea. In North Korea leadership was assumed by Cho Mansik, Kim Tubong, who returned with other members of the Independence Alliance, and Kim

Ilsong, who returned with the Soviet forces and used the prestige of the earlier guerrilla of the same name as well as his own. The prestige of the independence movement long played an important role in Korean politics. Conservative military leaders Chi Ch'ongch'on and Yi Pomsok became first youth leaders then party leaders in South Korea. Ho Hon, who had served as defense attorney for the 33 signers of the Declaration of Independence, became head of a pro-Communist front in South Korea. Yi Siyong of the "Provisional Government" became first Vice President, and O Hayong and Yi Rapsong, who signed the Declaration of Independence in 1919, Assembly members. In the north, Kim Mujong assumed a prominent military role that endured until late 1950, and Kim Ch'aek and other guerrilla confederates of Kim Ilsong played primary roles in the communist regime. Both regimes have publicized the independence movement as their ultimate origin. The North Korean regime has stressed the imprisonment of its officials under the Japanese, while the Republic of Korea took the name used by the "Provisional Government" and its other trappings.

However, these leaders from the independence movement, predominantly expatriates, had little experience save in intrigue and subversive activity. Like the independence movement, the groups active immediately after World War II were organizationally weak, faction ridden, and divided along left-right lines. During the period of U.S. and Soviet occupation, however, new elements of leadership arose; communist and anti-communist polarization, further stimulated by the divided U.S.-Soviet occupation, was magnified; new political issues came to the fore; and the opposing political systems developed in the two areas strongly reflected the conflicting influences of the occupying powers.

B. Republic of Korea (South Korea)

1. Political parties

a. CHARACTERISTICS -- The system of parties and other political organizations in the Republic of Korea is complex and has many apparent weaknesses. Individual organizations are, in general, both structurally weak and narrow in base while the total picture of political party activity is one of complex and constantly altering interrelationships. These characteristics are attributable in large part to the extreme importance attaching to a few individual political leaders and their cliques in the functioning of the system as a whole. A Korean political observer, using the pseudonym "Heaven Cave," wrote a series of historical articles for the *Seoul Daily News* in early 1950. The arti-

cles characterized these aspects of South Korean politics and their implications exceptionally well:

It may be safely concluded in the light of the ups and downs of these various parties and organizations—with a very few exceptions—that they did not rally for reasons of any particular principles, beliefs or causes on the basis of popular support, whatever its degree, but came into being on the basis of . . . unity of a handful of minor politicians with certain prominent persons as their leaders, falling, however, to find popular backing. Naturally they were, or have been destined to be, subject to constant fluctuation, reacting to each change in the political situation . . .

Structural weaknesses give the party system an aura of intrigue and obscure its other important elements, such as the character of alignments and the bases therefor, political issues, decisive factors in political conflict, and effects of the system upon progress and stability in government. Although Korean politics are, to a high degree, simply a struggle for personal power, issues have appeared as tactical propaganda in a particular political conflict and, to some extent, because of variation in philosophies and interests among the principal contestants. Although the factors of dynamic personal leadership and intrigue are of great importance in political conflict, factors of more recent origin, such as party organization, modern campaigning, and the spoils system, have come to play important roles as well. With the advent of representative government, new forms of intrigue have developed, but at the same time political alignments have become more stable.

Despite partisanship, there is fundamental agreement on nationalist issues. Unification of Korea has replaced independence as the most important political issue. There has never been any disagreement on the objectives of unification and independence. The disagreement that existed over policies designed to achieve these objectives has narrowed until the positions of the various partisan groups in South Korea vary only slightly. Policies favoring the establishment of a Communist Korean state or a negotiated unification through compromise with the Communist regime in the north once had broad support in South Korea, but now have been rejected by virtually all South Korean groups.

b. DEVELOPMENTS 1945-49 -- Because of the organic weakness and the fluidity of partisan politics in South Korea, an understanding of the party system, particularly its subtle aspects, must be derived primarily from an examination of its origins in the independence movement (see Subsection A, above) and its development in the postliberation period until a relatively static political alignment emerged in the summer of 1949. This period may be divided into two parts: 1) occupation and trusteeship—August 1945 to September 1947;

and 2) the establishment of the Republic of Korea—September 1947 to the summer of 1949.

Koreans consider that their liberation from Japanese rule took place on August 15, 1945; however, the U.S. occupation forces did not arrive until early September, and Korea's status of trusteeship was not announced until late December 1945. The interval between liberation and announcement of trusteeship was a formative period for political parties. Underground organizations began overt operations; expatriate organizations returned to Korea; and new parties were formed. The Korean people promptly began to organize along political lines, anticipating the early establishment of an independent government.

The first movement to be organized after liberation was the left-wing-led Preparatory Committee for the Rehabilitation of Korea under the auspices of which local "People's Committees" assumed governmental functions, and a central "People's Republic" was proclaimed in Seoul. Prominent right-wing leaders refused to associate themselves with this committee; conservatives who had joined initially seceded as the extent of Communist control became apparent; and the movement finally disintegrated after the U.S. authorities deprived it of the governmental powers that it had taken upon itself. Left-wing activities continued, however, primarily in the form of the People's Party (led by Yō Unhyōng [Lyuh Woon Hyung], organizer of the Preparatory Committee for the Liberation of Korea) and the Communist Party. The latter, although torn by factionalism and smaller than the People's Party, succeeded in establishing a number of pro-Communist mass organizations.

The conservatives also established political organizations and associated themselves with the U.S. occupation forces. The Korean (*Hon'guk*) Democratic Party, a covert organization of the 1930's, was reformed overtly in September, and committed itself to support the "Korean Provisional Government." Syngman Rhee subsequently returned to Korea and provided a strong conservative leadership. His strength was derived in part from the prevailing belief in Korea that he enjoyed the support of the U.S. Kim Ku and other members of the "Korean Provisional Government" returned from China in late November, further enlarging the conservative leadership. Believing themselves to monopolize U.S. favor, however, the conservatives generally neglected organizational activity.

The unexpected announcement in late December 1945 of the terms of the Moscow Agreement providing a trusteeship status for Korea initially evoked intense antagonism on the part of all Koreans. Although the communists, upon receipt of orders from the north, quickly shifted to endorsement of trusteeship, their position remained

unique; until 1947, opposition to trusteeship was the cornerstone of political activity in the south.

The negotiations on implementation of the Moscow Agreement accentuated the influence of the trusteeship arrangement on Korean politics, particularly in the south. The agreement called for the creation of a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission, charged with formulating plans for the establishment of a provisional Korean government upon the basis of consultation with democratic Korean parties and social organizations. As a result of this provision, party organizations multiplied rapidly; nonparty organizations entered into the political arena; and "front" structures, combining parties and social organizations, were formed. Before the Joint Commission convened in March 1946 the Communist organizations formed the Democratic People's Front, and Rhee and Kim Ku established the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence.

Early in the negotiations the Soviet delegation proposed a formula for consultation with parties and social organizations that revealed why the Korean Communists had suddenly shifted from their initial position of opposition to trusteeship. This formula provided that only those groups which had completely endorsed the Moscow Agreement should be permitted to consult with the Commission. The U.S. delegation strongly opposed this proposal on the grounds that it would exclude the non-Communist majority in the south. Despite repeated efforts to agree on a formula for consultation and some illusory progress, the Joint Commission's brief session in 1946 and its longer session in 1947 failed to reach any significant agreement.

Conservative groups were generally completely opposed to the Joint Commission and began to develop strong rightist organizations in South Korean politics. In this period Rhee was vigorously supported by the Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party, and in a bid for pre-eminence among rightist leaders he assumed control of various rightist front organizations. Through these fronts and their interlocking leadership the various conservative organizations, including the youth and labor groups, were bound together in general unity of policy. Rhee launched a campaign for a separate and independent government in South Korea as early as June 1946, shortly after the brief session of the Joint Commission, and organized the Conference of Representatives of the Korean People to support this campaign. Rhee's policy was generally supported by all conservatives except members of Kim Ku's Korean Independence Party, which by early 1946 had been considerably strengthened and had formed youth and labor sections.

While the communists were improving their organization in South Korea on the one hand and meeting with greater suppression on the other, following the merger of the pro-communist parties of North Korea into the North Korean Labor Party under Communist leadership, a similar merger of the pro-communist parties was begun in South Korea in September 1946 and completed in December. The front was controlled by the Labor Party, with Kim Wŏnbong's People's Republican Party (originally the leftist National Revolutionary Party which was active in the Provisional Government) included only to give the front the appearance of a multiparty structure.

At the same time, however, the communists began to suffer greater suppression. In the late summer of 1946, the military government police accused three high communist officials of counterfeiting money but took care not to identify the project with the party. In late September after a number of communists were arrested for violating military government law and communist newspapers suppressed, the communists instigated a series of riots and attempted strikes, culminating in a bloody massacre of police at Taegu and followed up by scattered local disturbances. Thereafter the communists faced strong opposition from the police, and their activities were restricted to local areas and challenged by militant rightist groups. Before the Joint Commission reconvened in 1947, the communists assumed a less militant attitude in an attempted rapprochement with U.S. authorities. In August 1947, however, evidences of a communist-planned uprising led to general arrests by the police, and although central communist offices subsequently re-opened, almost all the leaders fled north, and communist activity in the south thereafter was primarily on a subversive basis (see this Chapter, SECTION 57, under South Korea).

After mid-1946, the primary political efforts of U.S. authorities were directed toward the formation of a broadly supported centrist political bloc which would be willing to consult with the Joint Commission. Support for the right was not altogether abandoned. The U.S. authorities continued for a time to consult with the Representative Democratic Council established in early 1946, on which rightists had been given the majority of seats. They also continued to demand that the rightists be permitted to consult with the Joint Commission. The Coalition Committee, the focal point for a centrist bloc was formed in the summer of 1946, however, as a result of U.S. efforts. Kim Kyusik became chairman of the Committee and Yŏ Unhyŏng its vice-chairman. With U.S. support the centrist bloc gained the adherence of various previously established political groups, such

as the (*Ch'ŏndokyo*) Young Friends Party, as well as that of independents and of groups newly organized by defectors from the left and right who had been antagonized by extremist policies.

The Coalition Committee continued to function through 1947. The U.S. authorities gave members of this committee a prominent role in the discussions of the Joint Korean-American Conference in the fall of 1946. The Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was formed in consultation with the committee and committee members were appointed to fill a large minority of the seats, while the rightist-dominated Representative Democratic Council was deprived of its official advisory role. Kim Kyusik became chairman of the Legislative Assembly, and An Chaehong, another member of the Coalition Committee, was appointed Civil Administrator of the South Korean Interim Government, the name given to the Korean personnel of the U.S. Military Government in May 1947. However, despite these showings of favor by the U.S., the centrist bloc failed to develop great strength. It was attempting to move counter to the strong earlier force of polarization into communist and rightist groupings. The assassination of Yŏ Unhyŏng in July 1947 deprived it of its most astute politician. Moreover, the centrist elements had from the beginning been impeded by inherent weaknesses. In the words of an experienced observer of Korean politics:

The Moderates [centrists] could not have built up appreciable power unless they had been backed, literally, by American arms—as the Communists were backed by Russia in North Korea. . . . The Moderates lacked popular and astute leadership. They were continually beset by factionalism. They lacked funds. They were unable and, to their credit, unwilling to organize strong-arm youth groups on which effective Korean politics are based.

In late 1947, shifts in U.S. policy terminated the support of the centrist bloc.

U.S. action on the Korean problem in September 1947 precipitated sharp changes in political alignments. Recognizing that the Joint Commission proceedings were making no progress, the United States attempted first to negotiate at the level of the four powers involved in the Moscow Agreement and, when this failed, presented the Korean problem to the U.N. General Assembly Session of 1947. As a result it was decided to hold elections throughout Korea and to establish an independent government. The dissolution of the Joint Commission, the anticipation of elections and of an independent government, and the increasingly evident fact that elections would be held only in South Korea produced new and more enduring alignments.

This shift in U. S. policy struck a blow at the center bloc, which had espoused the concept of

unification on the basis of negotiation by the Joint Commission, and in the end virtually eliminated it as an effective movement. The Coalition Committee was dissolved, and an initial attempt to unite centrist forces in a Democratic Independence Party failed. In November 1947, a National Independence Federation was created under the aegis of Kim Kyusik. Some 15 tiny parties of the center that adhered to this federation took the position of opposing separate elections, not only because such elections would make more difficult the unification of the country but also because the center, lacking broad popular support, and strong-arm groups, could not compete on an equal basis with the rightists. The adherents of the federation argued their opposition to elections before the U.N. Temporary Commission and in the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. When in early 1948 the latter body endorsed separate elections, the minority group composed of former Coalition Committee members walked out.

Kim Ku, from the rightist camp, joined the center in opposing separate elections. Kim's decision may be attributed partly to his long-standing reluctance to support separate elections advocated by Rhee and other rightists. Moreover, he had long been envious of Rhee's emergence as the principal rightist leader. In November 1947, associates of Kim assassinated Chang Toksu, member of the Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party, precipitating sharp friction between the Democratic Party and Kim Ku. Kim carried his own relatively large Korean Independence Party into the Coalition with the center parties but drew with him only minority elements of the rightist front organizations.

Opposition to the elections was expressed in two courses of action: 1) violence directed against the election procedures, and 2) participation in a North-South Conference. The first course of action was adopted only by pro-communist elements. Violence reached dangerous proportions, but its force was for the most part spent before the elections took place. However Kim Ku's following and most of the National Independence Federation parties joined, with South Korean and North Korean Communists in the First North-South Conference held in April 1948. These groups issued a joint denunciation of the separate elections but the conference had no broader results. No communists and only a few dissident members of the center parties participated in the South Korea elections of May 1948.

Having set themselves unequivocally against the elections, the center groups as well as the communists were virtually deprived of a role in the government. As a result the right-wing supporters of the election—the Korean (*Han'guk*) Demo-

cratic Party and the coalition of elements behind Rhee—were its principal beneficiaries and emerged in control of the new government. Rhee himself became president; the old centrist groups, isolated by their failure to participate in the election, disintegrated; new centrist combinations were disrupted by government action; and the communists were completely suppressed. The next phase of Korean political development, although marked by right-wing control of all the major instruments of power, was marked also by the emergence of overt conflict within the conservative groupings between the pro-Rhee and the anti-Rhee forces. As of April 1952 the elements that compose the two rival groupings have gone through countless alterations and combinations. Although they have now achieved a higher degree of stability than ever before, by Western standards these groups are still extremely fluid. Each of the two major blocs is composed of political parties, patriotic and social organizations, and Assembly groupings, called "negotiating groups," which have resulted from the necessity of apportioning committee seats among a multitude of small factions and which have become instruments of considerable power in the political system. Both blocs are dominated by individuals and small cliques, and political alignments and shifts are based in large part upon personal relationships among individual leaders.

C. THE PRO-RHEE POLITICAL COMPLEX

(1) *General*—The political support for the Rhee administration, which began simultaneously with the establishment of the Republic in 1948, has been developing into a complex of organizations of various kinds dominated by Rhee personally (see FIGURE 53-1). Much of the undoubted strength of this complex stems from the forceful personality and the prestige of Rhee himself. On the other hand it has suffered from organizational weaknesses attributable to Rhee, who even in the presidency has continued to be distrustful of lieutenants and to act in autocratic, theoretically non-partisan, fashion as though still leader of a revolutionary movement. The main strength of the complex rests in its mass or patriotic organizations—such as the National Society and Youth Corps. The parties—successively, the Nationalist Party and the Liberal Party—are of secondary importance. They are recent experiments developed to cope with mounting opposition, and they have derived their support from the mass organizations. The pro-Rhee complex has been particularly weak in the third category of political organizations characteristic of the Republic, the "negotiating groups" in the Assembly.

The extensive powers of the presidency have been used by Rhee to support the pro-Rhee political complex. The advantages to the complex from




FIGURE 53-1. PRINCIPAL PARTISAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, APRIL 1952

this exercise of the power of office has generally outweighed Rhee's neglect of partisan organization. In addition to broad appointive powers, the presidency has afforded Rhee control over former Japanese owned industrial and other installations in the Republic (see SECTION 65 under Business organization), and over the police, who exercise great influence in all activities at the local level. Rhee has used his office to force the merger of existing youth groups into the single Youth Corps and to place them under his control. In addition Rhee has used heavily the prerogatives of his office to support the pro-Rhee complex in other ways such as the timing of elections; removal, appointment, and transfer of executive officials at all levels; and issuance of his own propaganda through the Office of Information and related agencies, such as the semi-official publication *Korea Times*.

The "One People Principle" (*ilmin jui*), an ideological rallying cry, was expounded by Rhee in 1949 in a generally unsuccessful effort to link government agencies with the mass organizations of the pro-Rhee political complex, in a manner similar to totalitarian states. Even after Rhee took up

overt party activity in 1951, this rallying cry continued as a prominent feature within his political following, and continued to contribute to his strength.

(2) *Mass organizations* — The National Society, Rhee's main supporting group in the 1948 campaign, was still one of his principal sources of strength in 1952. It was established as the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence in February 1946, but the last part of its name was dropped after the creation of the Republic of Korea in 1948. As early as October 1946, the organization claimed 7,000,000 members, and as of 1952 it was still probably the largest organization in South Korea.

Rhee has dominated the National Society since its inception, his control becoming even more complete after Kim Ku's defection from the rightist camp in late 1947. Since the 1948 campaign, however, the society has lost much of its strength of leadership, inasmuch as the participating youth groups of Yi Pomsok, Chi Ch'ongch'on, and others have been absorbed by the pro-Rhee Korean Youth Corps, and Sin Ikhi and Chi Ch'ongch'on have

joined the opposition. Since 1948 the society's leadership has been comprised of ineffectual elderly men, whom Rhee has placed in several of the high offices of the government. Two of these men, Myōng Chaesae and O Sech'ang, fell into communist hands during the Korean conflict. Yi Hwal, the secretary general, and Pae Unhūi, important principally as a member of the Nationalist Party, are now its chief remaining leaders. The society is supported by the *Chayu Minbo* (*Free People's News*), a minor Pusan newspaper.

The National Society has been valuable in Rhee's political campaigns. However, partly because of the looseness of its sprawling organization and partly because it poses as a national movement rather than a party, it has been unable to enlist the total support of its membership behind Rhee on partisan issues and it is even reported that the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party has general control over branches of the society located in the Chōlla provinces (Chōlla-pukto, Chōlla-namdo). Nevertheless, the society provides Rhee with an enormous reservoir of citizens generally identified with him. He can utilize its members to organize general demonstrations and campaigns extending into most of the local communities of South Korea, and his parties can draw a large following from the society.

The Korean (*Taehan*) Youth Corps supports Rhee in very much the same way as the National Society. It was created in December 1948 under pressure from President Rhee as a merger of all existing conservative youth groups. As to size of membership and geographic extent of organization, the Youth Corps closely parallels the National Society, with which it has been linked through their common acceptance of the "One-People" Principle. Differing from the National Society in composition of membership and in time and form of origin the Youth Corps also differs in the reasons for its factionalism and in character and number of activities.

Rhee is president of the Youth Corps, and its chairman is An Hosang, the German-educated former Minister of Education, who formulated the "One-People" Principle. The vice-chairman of the Youth Corps is Mun Pongje, former head of the Militant Northwest Young Men's Association, an organization composed of North Korean refugees and associated with the South Korean Branch of the Korean (*Chosōn*) Democratic Party, also a refugee group. This hierarchy of the Youth Corps exercises firm control over its headquarters, but the rank and file appear to be torn by factionalism arising from the origin of the corps as a merger of formerly competing groups. Many members are still believed to be in sympathy with Chi Ch'ōngch'ōn, leader of the former *Taedong* Youth

Corps, who is now an officer of the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party. Yi Pōmsōk, on the other hand, by creating a Purple Eagle Alumni Association, retained an organic base for continued activity by members of his former Korean National Youth, which joined the corps in early 1949. As of 1951-52 because of Yi's prominence in Rhee's Liberal Party at that time, Yi's faction was generally pro-Rhee. In addition to internal factionalism, the Youth Corps also suffers to some extent from the looseness of control over local branches. Before the 1950 Assembly elections, Youth Corps personnel were actively campaigning for Democratic Nationalist Party candidates in the Chōlla provinces. The value of the corps to the President is enhanced by its quasi-public character. Although the corps has not been transformed into a truly civic organization in accordance with the recommendations in 1949 of its U.S. adviser and its efforts to secure government subsidy at that time were unsuccessful, it held a general monopoly of available reserve force capable of maintaining order even before the outbreak of the Korean conflict. Since the beginning of hostilities the corps has been closely associated with the military in recruiting and training reservists and home guards.

Elements of the Northwest Young Men's Association in the corps have consistently received special attention and have been useful to the government activities directed at North Korea.

In the field of partisan political activity, the corps has been extremely useful to Rhee, despite the fact that it suffers from the same weaknesses of disunity and theoretical nonpartisanship as in the National Society. The Youth Corps members elected to the Assembly, like those of the National Society, have generally acceded to the pro-Rhee negotiating group therein and Youth Corps members have to some extent supported candidates of the pro-Rhee parties. Because of its militant character the Youth Corps is more effective than the National Society as an agency for staging demonstrations and general campaigns. Corps membership provided the chief source of agitation against the cease-fire negotiations and for the recall movement launched against the Assembly in early 1952.

The Youth Corps has a female counterpart—the Korean (*Taehan*) Young Women's Association. The women's group appears to be independent of the corps and is significant primarily as a base of operations for its adviser, Helen Kim, President of Ewha University and publisher of the semiofficial *Korea Times*, and its leader, Mo Yunsuk, a Korean poetess who has long worked for Rhee.

The Korean (*Taehan*) Women's Association, on the other hand, is theoretically on a par with the National Society, of which it was originally the women's branch. Its chairman is Assembly mem-

ber Pak Sunch'on of Seoul. Mrs. Syngman Rhee was made honorary president when the organization became a separate entity in May 1949. The number of women who belong to the association is not known. The association probably continues to function as an integral part of the National Society except for the activities of its central leadership and some feminist activity in urban centers.

The Korean Federation of Labor is, together with the National Society and the Youth Corps, a principal agency for rallying mass support for Rhee (for a discussion of this organization, see Chapter IV, SECTION 44, under Organization and control of labor). Ch'ŏn Chinhan, chairman of the federation, has long been a Rhee supporter, and the organization as a whole is pro-Rhee, joining with the Youth Corps to provide the central core of political demonstrations. Government neglect of the needs of labor and Rhee's lack of interest in labor problems, however, have made the organization principally an instrument of control over labor. This condition has produced some disaffection from Rhee within the organization, thus limiting its usefulness to him. In late 1951, Ch'ŏn was reported to be covertly dealing with Rhee's opposition.

The Society for Diffusion of the "One-People" Principle is of importance only as an agency to provide philosophical rationale for coalition of the above-mentioned theoretically nonpartisan organization as a support for Rhee. The society is directed by An Hosang, Education Minister from 1948 to 1950 and present head of the Youth Corps.

In the fall of 1949, Rhee put forward the "One-People" Principle, calling on the people to join whatever mass organization adhering to it which best suited their interests: the National Society, Youth Corps, Women's Association, or Korean Federation of Labor.

The "One-People" Principle rationalized Rhee's strong propensity to work politically through non-party organizations, illustrated by the fact that it was not until the summer of 1951 that he gave public recognition to the need for party organizations. Rhee has frequently cited the position of George Washington, who urged abandonment of party spirit in the United States. In recent years the opposition has accused Rhee of declaring in effect: "All the Korean people should work together in unity, under my leadership." As part of the "One-People" Principle, Rhee endeavored to associate nonparty organizations—particularly the National Society—directly with the government, placing government officials at lower levels in charge of equivalent levels of the mass organizations and substituting units of these organizations for the "neighborhood associations," the smallest communal unit, used for police purposes (see this Chapter, SECTION 54, under South Korea). How-

ever, Rhee was prevented from realizing these plans because of Assembly censure, emanating principally from the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party. Thereafter, the Democratic Nationalist Party has championed the role of parties in democratic government.

Despite the frustrations Rhee encountered in attempting to put the "One-People" scheme into effect, and his subsequent interest in party organizations he has not entirely abandoned use of the principle. The concept has been kept alive in part by the continued existence of the Society for Diffusion of the "One-People" Principle. In line with this concept Rhee avoided overt connection with the Korean (*Taehan*) Nationalist Party, which was his principal instrument in early 1950, and even though he organized his own Liberal Party in 1951, he heavily emphasized at that time the concept of a party for all the people. The "One-People" Principle, bordering upon a one-party system, remains a potent factor in Korean politics, especially since existing parties are so completely dominated by leaders or cliques and lack popular appeal. The principle is also admirably suited for rationalizing Rhee's present dual political position as a great national leader heading movements encompassing the entire population and as a leader of an individual political party. So long as he gives lip service to the "One-People" Principle, Rhee and his followers can continue their highly partisan activities within the framework of a political party, and at the same time they can endeavor to draw mass support for this party from the National movements led by Rhee.

(3) *Political parties*—The Korean (*Taehan*) Nationalist Party was Rhee's first experiment in "political parties." It was established in September 1948 by elements of the National Society who had long pressed for a party organization but had been frustrated by Rhee. Two of its most forceful leaders, Sin Ikhi and Chi Ch'ŏngch'ŏn, moved to merge the party with the opposition Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party, despite counterefforts by Rhee. The Democratic Nationalist Party created from this merger became in February 1949 Rhee's principal opposition. A slim majority of the central committee of the Nationalist Party under the leadership of Pae Unhŭi, however, refused to join the merger. This pro-Rhee element remained largely inactive and weakened by financial difficulties during 1949, while Rhee was pressing ahead with his "One-People" Principle.

In late 1949, in the face of mounting opposition from the Democratic Nationalists, Rhee covertly supported the revitalization of the Nationalist Party. Yun Ch'iyŏng and Louise Im were called upon to give it militant leadership. In February 1950, the party won a plurality position in the First

National Assembly and played a key role in defeating the restrictions of presidential power proposed by the opposition. The Nationalist Party subsequently organized a strong campaign in the 1950 elections and won 24 seats, making it the largest party bloc at the outset of the Second National Assembly. The Democratic Nationalist opposition secured 22 seats. During the campaign, the Nationalist Party operated as an instrument of the Yun Ch'iyŏng clique, which was apparently involved in the reshuffling of police officials immediately before the elections, instigated the infamous Political Action Corps scandal to discredit other elements of the administration as collaborators with the communists (see this Chapter, SECTION 57, under Republic of Korea), and encouraged the police to interfere with the electoral process.

The Korean Nationalist Party appeared to have little organization as of April 1952. Yun Ch'iyŏng was a member of its supreme committee, the other two seats being held by Assemblyman Yi Kyukap and former Justice Minister Yi. Advisers to the party were Pae Unhŭi (leader of the "rump" party in 1948 and early 1949), Louise Im, and Cho Pongam, vice-speaker of the assembly. A party member published an unimportant newspaper called *Samil Sinmun* (*March 1 News*). Judging from the 1950 elections, most party adherents were recruited from the nonparty organizations supporting Rhee. Continued existence of the party was evidenced by the election to the National Assembly on February 5, 1952 of Pae Unhŭi and Yun Ch'iyŏng on the Nationalist Party ticket. However, the Liberal Party appeared to be replacing it as Rhee's party support.

The Liberal Party, formed in late December 1951, is Rhee's first overt experiment in organizing a party structure. Following the election of Kim Sŏngsu of the Democratic Nationalists as Vice President of the Republic in May 1951, and to combat increasing opposition by the Democratic Nationalists and other factions of the Assembly, Rhee in the summer of 1951 began openly to call for the formation of a political party for the masses of the people—the farmers and laborers. Efforts to organize such a party continued during the fall of 1951 among leaders of all the pro-Rhee organizations. Rhee's supporters in the Assembly contributed to his efforts in the fall of 1951 to organize a new party but later refused to join with leaders outside the Assembly. Two Liberal Parties were formed in late December as a result of this schism. The Liberal Party described immediately below is the one organized outside the Assembly and directly associated with Rhee. The other one, organized by members of the assembly, was repudiated by Rhee in January 1952 and will probably wither away in a short time or join the other Liberal Party.

The Liberal Party, of which Rhee is chairman and former Defense Minister Yi Pŏmsŏk vice-chairman, launched its first campaign in preparation for the National Assembly by-elections of February 5, 1952, and won 2 of the 8 contested seats. Like the members of the Nationalist Party after the 1950 elections, the Liberal Party members were difficult to distinguish from those of the nonparty pro-Rhee organizations.

(4) *Negotiating groups*—The Republican People's Political Association was theoretically the pro-Rhee negotiating group in the Second National Assembly. Its alignment with Rhee has been even more tenuous, however, than that of previous pro-Rhee clubs and negotiating groups in the Assembly. Especially in late 1951 and early 1952, the association could hardly be regarded as pro-Rhee and had in fact been repudiated by Rhee.

During his tenure as president, Rhee has never organized effective support within the Assembly, partly because of the lack of strong organizational support outside that body and partly because of his frequent conflicts with the Assembly members. Soon after the first National Assembly was installed in 1948 groupings therein formed themselves into clubs. The "One-People" Club was Rhee's principal support in the First National Assembly but, weakened by the defection of its head, Sin Ikhi, to the opposition, was never particularly effectual. In the summer of 1949, the clubs were reorganized by changes in the Rules of the Assembly into "negotiating groups." The individual importance of these negotiating groups, to one or the other of which nearly all Assembly members belong, derives from the facts that party control, except with respect to one important minority party which opposes Rhee, is virtually non-existent, and that the Assembly by constitutional provision elects the President of the Republic. (In FIGURE 53-1 such groupings are shown under the heading "Assembly groupings.") After the defeat of the constitutional amendment to restrict presidential powers, proposed by the Democratic Nationalists in early 1950, the Nationalist Party organized a negotiating group that for a short time held the position of a pro-Rhee bloc in the Assembly with a large plurality. When the first negotiating groups were formed in the Second National Assembly in early 1951, the pro-Rhee group was known as the New Political Comrades Association (NPCA), drawn principally from Assemblymen who had been members of the National Party and the pro-Rhee nonparty organizations. Before midsummer, however, this group merged with the smaller and more independent Republican Club to form the Republican People's Political Association (RPPA). Scandals concerning misuse of military reserve funds involved several NPCA members, impeding the merger and

damaging the new group, but the RPPA nevertheless gained a majority position in the Assembly in the fall of 1951.

However, because of the conflict between the Assembly as a whole and the President and the factionalism prevalent among pro-Rhee organizations and within its own organization, the RPPA has not provided adequate support for Rhee. The frequent overwhelming Assembly votes cast against the President's policies in late 1951 and early 1952 proved that a large section of the RPPA had joined the opposition. Some RPPA members may be regarded as loyal supporters of Rhee, including Yang Uchong, publisher of *Yonhap Sinmun*, the principal pro-Rhee paper. Recently, Vice-Speaker Cho Pongam has also collaborated with the pro-Rhee elements outside the Assembly. The jealousy harbored by other nominally pro-Rhee Assembly members against Cho and the jealousy existing between pro-Rhee elements within and without the Assembly led to the birth of the two Liberal Parties mentioned above. The appearance of the Liberal Party organized by Assembly members was hailed by the opposition Democratic Nationalists. In March 1952, it was expected that Assembly members who had remained loyal to Rhee, and pro-Rhee men elected in the February 1952 by-elections, would undertake to reshape an administration bloc in the Assembly.

The South Korea Branch of the Korean (*Chosŏn*) Democratic Party (CDP) was organized in April 1946 and claimed a membership of 50,000 as of October 1949. The CDP is of special significance among the pro-Rhee organizations as the principal political institution of the conservative North Korean refugee community. It regards itself as the legitimist branch of the Democratic Party in the north, refusing to recognize the communist reorganization of the party in the north. Cho Mansik, imprisoned in North Korea since early 1946, is theoretically the CDP head. Yi Yunyŏng, a long standing supporter of Rhee and former Social Affairs Minister, is the principal leader of the southern branch.

The CDP has been useful in terms of support primarily for policies adopted toward North Korea. Although more liberal than most of the southern conservative groups, the CDP has aligned itself with the Rhee factions in control of the government—a natural course of action for an expatriate group. The CDP has campaigned long but unsuccessfully for creation of a special South Korean election district in which all North Korean refugees could vote. It has continued to play a leading role in propagandizing the Republic as the *de jure* government of all Korea. Rhee unsuccessfully nominated Yi Yunyŏng as Prime Minister on two occasions, and the men appointed in 1949 by the

Republic as governors (in exile) of the North Korean provinces were largely CDP members. During the Korean conflict, CDP members have attempted to resume activity in the north and have been among the strongest supporters of Rhee's policy of insisting upon the liberation of North Korea. In September 1951, elements of the Assembly accused the CDP of committing sedition on the basis of several party documents. One document suggested that the Assembly or the executive of the Republic be dissolved as a preliminary to the political unification of Korea. The CDP claimed that this document and several others were merely study papers that were abandoned after discussion and disavowed any knowledge of their publication. Apart from its support of Rhee's North Korean policies, however, the CDP offers little support on other issues.

(5) *Other organizations* — Other Pro-Rhee organizations are less important and perform either highly specialized supporting functions or represent organic bases for the activities of minor pro-Rhee leaders.

The League of Korean Anti-Communists is a small pro-Rhee organization formed in March 1949 by Yi Kapsŏng, one of the 33 signers of the 1919 Declaration of Independence and now a member of the Republican People's Political Association in the Assembly.

The Emergency Citizens' League for Information and Goodwill, like the Korean Young Women's Association, is important as an outlet for Helen Kim, university president and publisher.

The Federation of Cultural Organizations, theoretically representing the interests of some seven cultural associations, acts as a vehicle for its officers. It has some importance as a pro-Rhee organization because of its two vice-chairmen: 1) Mo Yunsuk, a poetess, who is a close associate of Rhee and leader of the Korean Young Women's Association; and 2) Kim Kwangsŏp, who was press adviser to Rhee until discredited by his involvement in the embezzlement of military reserve funds.

d. THE ANTI-RHEE POLITICAL COMPLEX

(1) *Democratic Nationalist Party* — The DNP is a strong party organization which leads the party opposition against Rhee. The party is well organized and well disciplined at both central and subordinate levels of command and resembles Western political parties more closely than any other group in Korea. However, control is concentrated in the hands of a few leaders. Two factions have long existed within the DNP, drawn from the diverse elements that merged to form the party in February 1949. The DNP has 630,000 members and a broader popular following, estimated by one of its leaders to number from

5,000,000 to 7,000,000. Generally representing business and former landlord interests, the DNP appears to be the wealthiest organization in South Korea. Although several of its members have participated in the Rhee government, Rhee removed all of them in 1951.

On the basis of its organizational strength and the resources and capacities of its leaders, the DNP has assumed undisputed leadership of the non-communist opposition to Rhee. There is some feeling against the DNP among the general populace and among other political elements opposed to Rhee because of its association with former landlord and moneyed interests, but as conflict between pro- and anti-Rhee complexes has heightened the DNP has increasingly taken the lead in planning and executing political moves against Rhee.

Theoretically the party is controlled internally by the executive committees—the policy-making bodies that include the central executive committee, the smaller standing central executive committee, and a temporary central executive subcommittee created by the party national convention in October 1951. In fact, however, control is exercised by the Supreme Committee, theoretically the supreme agency only for policy execution. This committee has four members: Sin Ikhi and Chi Ch'öng-ch'ön, who led the minority of the Nationalist Party into the February 1949 merger and now direct the so-called "progressive" minority of the DNP; and Kim Söngsu and Paek Namhun, former leaders of the Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party and now of the "conservative" majority of the DNP.

The factionalism prevalent within the Supreme Committee extends to its subsidiary departments, to the DNP negotiating group in the Assembly and, less noticeably, to subordinate levels. The conservative majority exercises general control, however, and party discipline has proved strict enough and factionalism manageable enough to prevent a breach. Kim Söngsu is the principal figure among the conservative leaders who now control the DNP and formerly controlled the Korean (*Han'guk*) Democratic Party. A wealthy and well known man, Kim, like other business leaders and former landlords who dominate DNP conservative circles, is considered by many Koreans to have been too friendly with the Japanese before the liberation. As founder of Korea University in Seoul, he continues to command considerable influence in the school. For a long time he has been the owner of *Tonga Ilbo* (*Far Eastern Daily*), official organ first for the Democratic Party and subsequently for the DNP. The following of the paper's former editor, Song Chinu, comprised a key group during the underground development of the Democratic Party before the liberation. When the Democratic Party became an overt organization in September

1945, Kim endorsed Song as its head and succeeded him in that position after Song's assassination in late 1945. Although not inclined to seek publicity, Kim thereafter dominated the Democratic Party and later the DNP. He was first elected to public office as vice-president of the Republic, in May 1951, a development that came as a surprising setback for pro-Rhee forces. Shortly after his election Kim suffered a stroke which has confined him to bed, probably permanently. Other DNP leaders have refused to abandon hope for his recovery and have continued him as a member of the Supreme Committee.

The conservative majority leadership, apart from Kim, consists of old party stalwarts, such as Paek Namhun, Kim Chunyön, Hong Songha, Na Yongkyun, Sö Sangil, Ch'oe Tusön, and Cho Pyöngök. The last named politician played a prominent role under American Military Government and in the Rhee administration and was made secretary-general of the party in 1951. Defeated in the Assembly elections of May 1950 and February 1952, Cho Pyöngök is manifestly unpopular but nevertheless a forceful organizer and political operator. He is responsible for the association with the DNP of such organizations as the Korean Association for the United Nations and the Emergency League for Patriotic Mobilization.

Sin Ikhi (mentioned above), twice elected speaker of the National Assembly, is the leader of the progressive minority that is endeavoring to gain a greater share of party control and to effect some reform and liberalization of party outlook with a view to securing broader support. His associates include Yu Chinsan, Sö Pömsök, and Im Hungsun (leader of the DNP negotiating group in the Second National Assembly). Sin's prospects for gaining increased power in the DNP are not good, unless he is elected to the presidency, an unlikely possibility. Party discipline has also reduced the possibility of Sin's seceding from the party, since he would be unable to take many DNP members with him.

The DNP has consistently held the role of leader of the opposition to the administration since 1948, primarily because of its disciplined organization, financial resources, and capable leadership rather than because of any broad following among political leaders or the general population. The DNP commanded a plurality position at most in the First National Assembly and suffered loss of strength in the 1950 elections. Its negotiating group in the Assembly early in 1952 numbered only 39 out of 183 members. It has, however, seized the initiative in Assembly action against President Rhee, planned general campaigns against him, and subsidized non-DNP as well as DNP members of the Assembly.

A recurring theme in DNP action against the Rhee forces has been the effort to delimit presidential prerogatives and to increase Assembly powers. The Democratic Party initially took action in this direction during the drafting of the constitution, abandoning a parliamentary system of Western European type only when Rhee threatened to withdraw if a strong presidential system like that of the U.S. were not adopted. In early 1950, a constitutional amendment introduced to the same end met defeat largely because of Nationalist Party opposition. A similar effort to restrict presidential authority was embodied in organic legislation drafted by DNP leaders in the fall of 1951. Although it secured Assembly approval, this legislation was vetoed, assuring its defeat. The issues generally used by DNP in attacking the Rhee administration have been various scandals, authoritarianism, and executive acts inimical to the Assembly. In the 1951 and early 1952 period, the DNP secured broad support in the Assembly on critical issues. However, the breadth of positive support for DNP attitudes and the cohesiveness of the coalition opposing Rhee remain undetermined, mostly because of repressive presidential action. The DNP has completely committed itself to opposing Rhee and cannot practicably recede from this stand under any circumstances. Despite the arrest of staff members of the *Tonga Ilbo* in late 1951, the paper published bitter denunciations of the President in early 1952.

The DNP has thus far successfully resisted administration efforts to locate and cut off its sources of income. The future of the DNP and its influence in South Korea was at stake in the conflict between the Assembly and the President culminating in the presidential election by the Assembly scheduled for June or July 1952.

The Emergency League for Patriotic Mobilization, also known as the Save-the-Nation League, was founded in August 1950 and is linked with the DNP through Cho Pyöngök, chairman of the league and secretary general of the DNP. Kim Toyön, a DNP member and former minister of finance, is one of the vice-chairmen. Pae Unhüi, member of the pro-Rhee National Society and Nationalist Party, however, is the other vice-chairman. In general, however, the league is DNP-dominated, having been organized in many local areas by Cho Pyöngök, and has become a rival to Rhee's National Society. Nothing is known of the extent of its membership. It publishes two news organs: *Patriotism*, issued twice monthly, and *Review of Freedom*, issued monthly.

The Korean Association for United Nations, corresponding to other such national associations, is linked to the DNP by the fact that its chairman is Cho Pyöngök, Secretary-General of the DNP. Fur-

thermore, any Korean association supporting the United Nations would, in any event, be inclined toward the opposition because of frequent censure of the United Nations by the pro-Rhee groups.

(2) *Other groups*—The National Friends Association, a heterogeneous negotiating group of approximately 35 members in the Assembly, is among the non-DNP organized groups opposing Rhee. Of little importance in itself, the association is mentioned only because of its anti-Rhee role in the Assembly. As of early 1952, this group, together with the RPPA repudiated by Rhee, represented the independent Assembly bloc whose vote might well decide the impending presidential election.

The Young Korean Academy is the only other known non-DNP organized group of significance opposing Rhee. It consists of a few prominent individuals who have worked together since the days of An Changho, leader of the independence movement, who died in the 1930's. Among the members identified with it are: Paek Nakjun, Minister of Education; Mun Changuk, director of the Office of Foreign Affairs under American Military Government and former head of Seoul National University; Yi Chonghyön, CDP leader and former Agriculture Minister; and Yi Myomök, secretary to the Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in Korea during the U.S. occupation (Lt. General John R. Hodge) and later Minister to Great Britain. This group has considerable influence in ruling circles, has participated in various anti-Rhee activities, and has often been the target of presidential resentment. Cho Pyöngök, secretary general of the DNP, is said to have been a former member and to maintain liaison with them.

e. *OTHER GROUPS*—Groups not directly involved in the conflict between Rhee and the opposition are of little importance, generally serving as a base of operations for minor leaders and cliques. The Federation of Patriotic Organizations, founded during the U.S. occupation, has served as a central conservative front for staging demonstrations. It has periodically become inactive, however, in times of intra-rightist conflict. The following organizations may serve as political instruments for leaders not now clearly identified with the major partisan groupings: the Republic of Korea Professors' Association, headed by the legal expert, Yu Chino; the Korean Athletic Association, headed by Sin Ikhi; the Korean Boy Scouts, headed by Paek Nakjun, Minister of Education; the Ex-Assemblymen's Club, led by Yi In, former Justice Minister, and Yi Hun'gu, head of the former Korean Labor-Farmer Party; and the League for the Purification of the People's Life in Wartime, whose officers include Prime Minister Chang Myon and Minister of Education Paek Nakjun.

f. LAWS REGULATING POLITICAL PARTIES — Military Government Ordinance 55, February 22, 1946, "Regulation of Political Parties," which was still in force in 1952, requires each organization and association formed to engage in political activities to register as a political party with the Office of Public Information. The negotiating groups of the assembly, however, are excepted from this requirement. As of October 1951, approximately 50 organizations were registered.

The registration and other regulatory provisions of Military Government Ordinance 55 can be construed to provide for legal repression of political parties. The ordinance requires that registration of parties must be accompanied by the following organizational data:

- Name and symbol
- Declaration of purposes
- Names and offices of responsible officials
- Addresses of headquarters
- Date of founding
- Name of any organization with which the party has recently or previously been associated
- Size of membership by branches, and the number of financial supporters

The law further requires that notification be given of intention to relocate the headquarters, that accounts be kept and made available to employees of the Office of Public Information, that there be no secret or alien members or members disqualified by law from holding public office, and that no financial assistance be accepted from non-members. Obviously designed to prevent subversive activity, this law could facilitate government control over parties, particularly by exacting extensive information concerning finances. In the fall of 1949, all communist organizations and many inactive centrist and other organizations were formally dissolved by the Office of Public Information on the grounds they had not continued to provide the necessary information to the government. Late in 1951, the government was reported to be harassing the Democratic Nationalist Party through attempts to search out the party's financial supporters. The party headquarters instructed its local units, however, not to respond to the request of the government to supply a complete listing of members. Most of them did not, and no further action was taken by the government.

2. Electoral procedures

a. GENERAL — A major step in the establishment of the Republic of Korea was the democratic election of a constituent National Assembly in May 1948, as recommended by the UN General Assembly. After formulating a constitution, this constituent body converted itself into the first regular Assembly. In May 1950, a second National

Assembly was elected, and elections for the legislative branch of the central government are to be held every four years after May 1950. To date this has been the sole elective process in use in the Republic. Although a law enacted in 1949 provides for the establishment of elective councils at township, county, and provincial levels, its implementation has long been deferred. In the spring of 1950, it was announced that such elections would be held in the fall of that year, but they were postponed after the outbreak of hostilities in June. Elections for township and county councils were scheduled for April 1952, to be followed shortly thereafter by provincial council elections.

The decision to hold National Assembly elections in May 1948 was reached by the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea and U.S. authorities. Until these elections, Koreans had had only negligible experience in democratic processes. Regulations governing the elections to various councils established by the Japanese Government General had permitted only very restricted suffrage and indirect procedures. Moreover, the advantages of holding elections had been offset by the fact that Koreans were aware of the impotence of the councils and were strongly opposed to the Imperial Government. The independence movement, which formed the main indigenous basis for postwar South Korean politics, had operated underground and had no experience in representative government. American Military Government had succeeded in providing South Koreans with some tutelage in democratic processes preparatory to the election of a constituent assembly in 1948. Some experience, however, was gained from the elections held in October and November 1948 throughout South Korea to select half of the membership of a central advisory body, the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. The procedures were indirect: village to township, township to county, county to province, province to the Assembly. The elections were held in the midst of serious internal disorders, and irregularities in several districts required that new elections be held.

When duly constituted, the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was encouraged by the Military Governor to consider electoral processes and in 1947 enacted, with the consent of the Military Governor, Public Act Number 5, Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. This legislation, considerably modified after careful review by the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, was promulgated in U.S. Army Military Government Ordinance Number 175, a Law for the Election of Representatives of the Korean People, March 17, 1948. The law established in detail the electoral procedures that were used in the May 1948

election of the constituent assembly. The constitution formulated by the constituent national assembly elected in May 1948 does not detail electoral procedures but does declare in Chapter I, "Rights and Duties of Citizens," Articles 25 and 26, that all Korean citizens have the right to elect, and be elected as, government officials, in accordance with the provisions of law. In addition, Article 32 states that the central legislative body, the National Assembly, shall be elected on the basis of secret, equal, and direct popular vote. In April 1950, the Assembly enacted a new election law that differed from Military Government Ordinance 175 only in a few respects.

The electoral procedures for the National Assembly accept single-member districts as a fixed principle. In 1948, there were 200 electoral districts; in 1950 there were 210. These electoral districts are based upon counties and the equivalent urban levels. If these governmental subdivisions have jurisdiction over 150,000 persons or less, they are single-election districts. In like manner, they gain one additional district for each 100,000 additional population. The President establishes the districts. Gerrymandering is theoretically possible but has not yet become a problem because of weakness of party organization.

The principal administrative authority in the electoral process is the Central Election Committee, a body of nine men selected by the President of the Republic. Election committees are also formed at three lower levels: the province, 7 members; the electoral district, 7 members; and the voting district (polling place), 5 members.

The President has unqualified power to appoint the members of the Central Election Committee but may not remove them from office. Members of the subordinate election committees are appointed by the election committee immediately above them from a list prepared by the administrative official at the government level of the committee being appointed. The 1950 law abandons the 1948 procedure of delegating a prominent role to the judiciary in making committee appointments and also discards the 1948 requirement that no more than one-third of the members of a given committee below central government level may belong to the same political organization. This hierarchy of committees has prime responsibility for administration of the elections during 4-year terms in office.

Poll registers are prepared by township level administrative officials every year on March 1. Both men and women over 21 have the right to vote. The only persons disenfranchised are: 1) those adjudged mentally incompetent, 2) inmates of prisons and those awaiting sentence or who are under suspended sentence, and 3) those deprived

of civil rights by court decision. The 1950 law continued, for the 1950 elections only, to disenfranchise various categories of Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese. The number of disqualified voters is probably negligible. The local administrative officials post the poll registers each year for 10 days beginning March 21. Appeals of any sort concerning the poll registers may be made to the local officials subject to review by the electoral district committee. The register becomes final on April 30.

The candidates file with the electoral district committee between the announcement of the election (at least 40 days before the election) and 25 days before the election. In order to file, a candidate must present a recommendation signed by 100-200 registered voters. He must be at least 25 years of age and must meet the same qualifications required of voters. He must also not have been imprisoned during the three years preceding his application. Public officials and officers of "associations organized under the sponsorship or guidance of the Administrative Branch" must have resigned their positions 90 days prior to the election. This provision was inserted to bar officers of the National Society, Korean Youth Corps, and other such organizations from filing, but it was not enforced in the 1950 elections. The candidate need not be a resident of the electoral district in which he files or have other connections with it; the Assembly rejected proposals to establish such requirements in formulating the 1950 law. A candidate may file in only one district.

The regulations implementing election procedures provide extensive guarantees of equal facilities and opportunities for all campaigners. Public buildings are made available on an equal basis to the various candidates at regular rental rates, and all enjoy a limited franking privilege. These rights were spelled out more fully in the 1950 law than in 1948.

The voting process itself follows procedures scrupulously devised to guarantee secrecy of voting and noninterference. Representatives of candidates may sit at the polling place. The chairman of the committee is directed to prevent electioneering activity within 100 meters of the polls. Police are permitted to enter the polling place only upon request of the chairman, or for the purpose of voting. The ballot itself is excellently devised to facilitate voting, even for illiterates. The U.N. Temporary Commission is primarily responsible for the unusual ballot form used. The candidates are listed on the ballot in order predetermined by lot. Names are printed in both Chinese characters and Korean script together with symbols, such as the Chinese numbers. Photographs supplied by the candidates are posted

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outside the polling place, together with the names in both script and symbols. A blind person is permitted to mark his ballot with the assistance of a second party. The voter receives his ballot from the committee, marks it in private, and places it in an envelope, which he deposits in the box in the presence of the committee and other observers. No government agent is allowed to question any voter regarding his choice of candidate.

In 1948, 95.2% of the registrants voted, or 75% of all eligible persons in the Republic. In 1950, approximately 90% of the electorate voted.

The voting district committee locks the ballot box after all votes have been cast and carries it to the electoral district committee, which tabulates the votes and announces the results. The candidates or their representatives and the general public may attend the counting of the ballots. A candidate with the plurality of votes cast is the winner, and a tie is settled in favor of the older candidate. In addition to appealing through election committee channels, defeated candidates have recourse to the Supreme Court. The court may declare an election void if it is found that the law has been violated. The election law provides for severe penalties for violations.

D. THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE — Careful implementation of election procedures and close surveillance exercised by successive U.N. commissions over elections has generally prevented any perversion of election machinery. Within these limitations, however, the government has attempted to interfere with the elective process in many respects. In the spring of 1950, President Rhee tried to postpone to the latter part of the year the National Assembly elections scheduled for May, in order that he might govern almost without restraint during the interim period. Since his attempt provoked vigorous popular protests, an expression of concern from the U.N. commission, and a note from the U.S. Government, he quickly gave way on the postponement issue. In the pre-election period, however, he transferred a large number of key police officers in local areas. These personnel changes were apparently made largely for the purpose of eliminating police pressures in favor of the opposition Democratic Nationalist Party in the local areas. They may have had some bearing, however, upon the police function of preventing subversion of the electoral process. A number of candidates and their campaign managers were arrested, despite the fact that the election law prohibited their arrest except in case of *flagrante delicto*. The administration charged that a number of candidates were receiving covert support from the North Korean regime. This charge had been made by Rhee before the 1948

elections, but in this instance it reportedly had some basis in fact. The report of the U.N. Commission of Korea on the 1950 elections found that:

There was certain concrete evidence of interference by the authorities with candidates and their election campaigns. This interference, in the main, was carried out by local police. Some candidates who were under arrest were actually elected, and the voters seemed to react against police interference by supporting those candidates with whom the police had interfered. . . . It is the view of the Commission that notwithstanding some cases of interference, the voters were able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice among candidates and cast their votes accordingly.

C. ROLE OF PARTIES IN ELECTIONS — The role of partisan political organizations in National Assembly elections has been complex and generally ineffectual. Contrary to general opinion, the great majority of candidates are identified with partisan political organizations; in 1948, 576 of the 942 candidates and 115 of the 200 elected actually listed party affiliations. Of the 210 members of the Second National Assembly, only 77 had listed affiliations as candidates. However, confusion was created owing to the fact that election procedures entrust the listing of political affiliation entirely to the candidates. Most of those who listed no affiliation were probably inaccurately termed "independents" by the press. This is confirmed by the fact that there was little reticence on the part of these candidates to pledge their party allegiance in campaign literature in the 1950 Assembly election in Pusan.

The tendency toward "independent" listing in the elections, however, is symptomatic of the genuine weakness of party electoral activity, which is discouraged by election procedures. Any legally qualified person requires the signatures of only 100 voters in order to file his candidacy and he may list his political affiliation without the approval of the organization concerned. In the 1950 National Assembly election campaign the major parties entered selected slates of candidates but, even in the case of the disciplined Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP), their respective campaigns were confused and hampered by unapproved candidates running under the party banner and by party members who ran without listing any party affiliation. In many districts the party's vote was split among two or more candidates. The DNP was unable to restrain its members from entering the campaign, but it did effect a few "gentlemen's agreements" requiring that the unapproved candidate refrain from listing his party affiliation. Despite its relatively extensive financial resources, the DNP did not subsidize the campaign expenditures of most of its planned candidates. Thus, the candidate had to rely largely on personal resources

to secure election, and being on the party slate was of only negligible importance to him.

Many candidates purposely refrained from listing party affiliations because of the disadvantage it involved. Assembly members running for reelection were particularly hard pressed to please the voters; they were baited severely because of their failure to improve the livelihood of the people, and only 31 of the 200 incumbents were returned to office.

Overt political issues have emerged even in the capital only very recently and are almost wholly concerned with the struggle for predominance rather than with fundamental differences in policy. Except for some muckraking, there have been no party issues in the local campaigns. In keeping with traditional social patterns and structure, the candidates generally campaign on the basis of personal and family prestige, using broad generalities and platitudes in their speeches. Although there is widespread use of posters and soap-box speeches, the main events of the campaign—forums sponsored by the election committees in which all the candidates speak—are out of keeping with party-dominated campaign procedures.

d. **PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS**—The development of electoral bodies at provincial and local levels was long delayed in the Republic of Korea by controversies within the National Assembly and between the National Assembly and the President. The National Assembly's provisional law on local administration, promulgated November 17, 1948, called for popular election of heads of towns and townships but was never implemented. More definitive legislation was passed the next year, after having been twice vetoed, and was promulgated on July 4, 1949. Since that time, it has been amended twice, once late in 1949 and once in July 1951. After considerable pressure from the Assembly in 1950, the administration announced in May 1950 that the local and provincial elections would be held in the summer or fall of 1950. These plans were blocked by the outbreak of fighting in Korea, however, and implementation was deferred indefinitely. In the fall of 1951 President Rhee announced that elections would be held. Subsequently elections for town, township, and city councils were scheduled for April 25, 1952, to be followed by provincial council elections on May 10, 1952. Shortly thereafter these elective councils were to appoint the heads of cities, towns, and townships and presumably members of the county councils.

Members of these local and provincial councils are to be elected directly for four-year terms. They may not serve concurrently as National Assembly members or members of more than one council. In the first election, the qualifications

of candidates and voters are to be the same as for the National Assembly. Thereafter, while the age requirement for voters remains 21 and for candidates 25, other qualifications for candidates are reduced to the following proscriptions: 1) those adjudged mentally incompetent; 2) those under prison sentence, including those granted suspended sentences; 3) those whose civil rights have been forfeited by law or by court decision; 4) members of election committees or public employees involved in the election district in question; and 5) public prosecutors and policemen. The first three of these requirements apply also to voters. Candidates for provincial office must be recommended by 51 voters, and, for lower councils, by 11. Provincial and local election districts vary markedly from those used for the National Assembly elections. Government units are used strictly for districts. When the population of such units at the electoral district level is large enough for more than one representative, two or more may be elected from the same electoral district. In all other essential respects, the provincial and local election procedures are the same as those used in the National Assembly elections.

3. Pressure groups

a. **GENERAL**—The activities of special interest groups are of very great importance in South Korean politics, but because of the complex nature of South Korean political activity and organization, the activities of special interests in South Korea rarely conform to the normal Western concept of pressure groups or lobbies. Diverse methods of influence are utilized, most frequently based upon the personal relationships that predominate in South Korean politics. In general the influence of such groups is brought to bear upon political party leaders or executive officials rather than upon the National Assembly. Inasmuch as party leaders have not yet become responsive to the desires of either their constituents or the people as a whole, certain special interests have filled the void and come to wield undue authority in political and governmental affairs.

Open or subtle bribery of all echelons of government officials and important political leaders is a very common method of exercising influence. The old tradition of "squeeze" is still one of the most critical problems in government. A serious scandal developed in the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly early in 1948, involving many of the centrist political leaders, including Kim Kyusik. Special interests associated with prostitution activities were reported to have paid out large sums of money to postpone the prohibition of legalized prostitution. Personal financial influences of this nature, however, are more commonly exercised in a subtler

manner, through contributions of money or expensive gifts to politicians or political organizations. Pak Hŭngsik, the extremely wealthy former aircraft manufacturer who was brought to trial as a national traitor early in 1949, maintained considerable personal political influence by making large contributions to almost all the rightist youth groups and political factions. There have been numerous apparently reliable reports that Syngman Rhee, Cho Pyŏngŏk and many other leading politicians and governmental figures have covertly received substantial personal financial support from wealthy individuals or small groups. It has long been apparent that the strength of the Democratic Nationalist Party is derived in large part from the financial support of the group of wealthy businessmen and former landowners who long formed an inner circle within the preceding Democratic Party. General poverty in Korea virtually precludes the basing of party finances upon membership dues or similar revenues and makes both the parties and political and governmental leadership extremely susceptible to financial influences. Even the salaries of most high officials are ridiculously low in proportion to their actual expenditures.

The present predominance of personal relationships in South Korean politics increases the influence of special interests through close personal contact with political leaders, apart from contributions or other financial support. Every principal political and governmental figure in South Korea is surrounded by a clique that can exercise considerable influence upon the leader and serve as an entree for special interests.

Probably the most important of such groups is the one described as President Rhee's "American Kitchen Cabinet." Since Rhee's election to the presidency, a number of his private U.S. associates have become his personal advisers. These are men who worked with Rhee as members of the "Korean Commission" in Washington, D. C., the agency that represented the "Korean Provisional Government" in China during and before World War II. Most of them are registered as foreign agents with the U.S. Department of Justice. Harold W. Lady, son-in-law of John M. Stagers, a leader in the "Korean Commission," was personal adviser to President Rhee, principally on economic affairs, from early 1949 to the outbreak of the Korean conflict. He participated in numerous discussions between the Korean Government and the U.S. Embassy and was appointed to the Korean staff negotiating the trade agreement with Japan. Stagers and M. Preston Goodfellow have also been active in Korea, the latter endeavoring to promote U.S. military aid to the Republic. Dr. Robert T. Oliver, the Washington representative of the *Korea Pacific Press*, who has

long been employed as a public relations and personal adviser to Rhee, served as the President's public relations adviser in Korea during the spring of 1949 and late 1951. This group of private advisers evidently exercises a strong influence over the President. Their activities have in some instances embarrassed official U.S. agencies in Korea and have unquestionably been resented by Korean officials.

Special interest groups are extremely numerous and diverse in purpose in South Korea. They take the form either of party factions or social organizations. Organizations with highly specialized objectives are known to associate or even integrate themselves with political factions to a degree and in a manner unlike Western-type pressure groups or lobbies.

In civic and political demonstrations and other general campaigns, many highly specialized organizations are almost as active as the political factions. Most of the larger, more active special groups participate in political activities, and Christian groupings, Catholic and Protestant, are particularly active. The Protestant organizations and schools have often opened their public buildings to general political activities, and often their leaders have been closely associated with rightist political factions. The Catholics have exercised considerable political influence through Prime Minister Chang Myon, and through the *Kyonghyang Sinmun* (*Rural and Urban News*), in which Chang has been active.

The identification of special organizations with political activities is generally more than mere cooperation or vague connection with party factions. When parties and social organizations were permitted to apply for consultation with the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission in 1947, on the subject of the form of provisional government that should be adopted, the range in size and purposes of these organizations was surprising. They included, in addition to political parties, labor organizations and youth groups; such organizations as the Korean Civil Engineers and Architects Association; the Society for the Study of the Korean Language; the Idealistic Korean Buddhist Institute; the Seoul Lawyers' Association; the Merchant Association of Great South Gate Market of Seoul; the Korea Young Women's Christian Association; and the Roman Catholic Church.

There are also a few organizations closely corresponding to Western-type pressure groups or lobbies. Strongest of these is the Korean Chamber of Commerce and its provincial and city chapters. Other such lobbies include the Korean Medical Association, the Korean Educational Federation, the Fisheries Guild of the South Korea Six Provinces, and the Korean Lawyers' Society.

D. KOREAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE — The Korean Chamber of Commerce corresponds closely to other Chambers of Commerce in other countries. It is based upon city chambers of commerce of varying size, the largest in Seoul and Pusan, and is an association of commercial and industrial managers and entrepreneurs. Membership in the chambers of commerce is restricted, requiring nomination and election. Their activities are limited to the promotion of the interests of the managers and entrepreneurs, but they are aggressive and influential within that field. The chambers of commerce are not new organizations; they date back to the pre-Japanese period, although at that time and until 1945 they were dominated by the Japanese.

Because of the conditions prevailing in South Korean commerce and industry in recent years, the chambers of commerce have an especially intense interest in the industrial and foreign trade policies of the government of the Republic of Korea. The policies supported by the chambers of commerce do not reflect clear-cut capitalist attitudes *per se*, but instead represent general interest in industrial development and the particular interests of the managerial and entrepreneurial membership of the chambers of commerce within a state-controlled economy. During the period of U.S. Military Government, members of the chambers of commerce were very successful in securing control of former Japanese industries whose control had been vested in the government and endeavored to influence officials in the allocation of materials. Upon the establishment of an independent Korean Government committed to an advanced degree of nationalization of industry, the Korean Chamber of Commerce promoted active support for its own detailed programs of nationalization of industry, control over materials, industrial development, and controls over foreign trade. These detailed programs were publicized in the Korean press and were presented to leading officials of the Korean Government and the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration. The Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry has been the most active propaganda unit of the Korean Chamber of Commerce.

A large measure of the influence of special interests represented in the chambers of commerce is exerted not through open propagandizing or lobbying but through powers given its individual members who hold offices in the government. The chambers of commerce have in the past been directly implicated in politics through membership in the rightest Federation of Patriotic Organizations.

C. OTHER LOBBIES — Since the establishment of independent government, there have been evidences that other special interest groups are endeavoring to influence governmental policies. The establish-

ment of a Department of Health early in 1949 to assume the public-health functions of the Department of Social Affairs was a direct result of intense lobbying by about 25 organizations in the public health field under the leadership of the Korean Medical Association and the Korean Dentists' Society. Early in 1949 the Fishery Guild of the South Korea Six Provinces presented a petition to the National Assembly asking that harbor facilities be developed for fishing out of Yonp'yong-do. The petition received support from a large element in the National Assembly. The Korean Lawyers' Society, through its Seoul branch, lobbied unsuccessfully during the drafting of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea for the establishment of a judiciary independent of presidential appointment. Early in 1949, the Korean Educational Federation, convinced that provisions of the Local Government Bill then under consideration by the National Assembly were damaging to the independence and finances of local schools, aggressively lobbied against the bill.

C. North Korea

1. Political parties

a. THE LABOR PARTY (COMMUNIST)

(1) *Evolution and role* — In North Korea the Labor Party is the locus of power, and within the party power is held by its small elite leadership. The evolution of the Labor Party to its position of primacy in North Korea took place under close Soviet tutelage during the 1945-48 period. It was during the same period that the allocation of power within the party to Soviet agents was determined. Since political activity under the Japanese had been virtually dormant, the formation of the party's structure involved the development of leadership and of broad membership. Such political forces as had survived Japanese suppression existed either among Korean colonies abroad or among small clandestine groups within the country, and it was from among these groups that the political leadership for North Korea was drawn. Within North Korea there existed a small, politically uninfluential group of old communist revolutionaries and a more influential body of nationalists, the National Foundation Association, established by the conservative anti-Japanese leader, Cho Mansik, who, in August 1945, had potentially the strongest political following in the area. Three émigré groups, all part of the communist movement, also entered the competition for political power. Numerically the largest group consisted of the several thousand Koreans who returned in mid-November 1945 from the communist areas in north China. In China, these Yen-an Koreans had been organized militarily as the Korean Volunteer Corps and politically as the Korean Independence

Alliance. In Korea, they preserved their political organization and gathered new support, in good part from the middle class and "intelligentsia." From the U.S.S.R. with the Red army in August 1945 had come the major elements of the two other émigré groups: the ex-partisans who had fled Manchuria around 1940; and the returnees drawn from the Korean colonies in Uzbek S.S.R. and Kazakh S.S.R. The latter, known as the Soviet-Koreans, were for the most part long-term residents of the U.S.S.R., students in leading Soviet technical and political schools, members of the Soviet Communist Party, and participants in local government in their Soviet Central Asian communities. A few had even held government or party posts in Moscow. All of the returnees from the U.S.S.R. were conspicuous as hardbitten political practitioners (trained under and loyal to the U.S.S.R.) but with virtually no background as theoreticians.

The event that transformed this conglomerate of political forces into a coherent organization of political power was the dramatic propulsion into major political prominence of a relatively unknown Korean who was given the alias of Kim Il-sŏng, a renowned hero of Korean resistance against the Japanese. On October 3, 1945, the new Kim Il-sŏng was introduced to the North Korean people by Cho Mansik as an exponent of Korean nationalism. Kim, who had returned in August as a captain in the Soviet Army and had served obscurely for several months in minor posts, was born Kim Ongju. He had migrated to Manchuria in 1930, became a minor partisan and bandit leader, and finally disappeared into the U.S.S.R. in 1941 or 1942. His sudden public prominence had immediate and widespread consequences.

Kim Il-sŏng asserted his leadership role at a Korean Communist Party meeting held in late October—the Five Provinces Conference. At that time, Kim succeeded in wresting party leadership from both the local North Korean group and from the titular head of communism for the entire country, Pak Honyong, who subsequently returned from the conference to South Korea to head its party branch. Although the old Korean revolutionaries still retained some major party positions after Kim's emergence as party chairman, their influence thereafter was definitely on the decline and they were used and discarded at will. Coincident with Kim's rise, the Communist Party organization at the central and provincial levels was infiltrated by Soviet-Koreans and the Soviet-trained fellow partisans of Kim Il-sŏng. Typically, these men became provincial party chairmen and headed the key central organs in the party central executive.

Kim Il-sŏng and the Korean Communist Party moved into the general political arena, and their efforts soon brought the eclipse of Cho Mansik and

his newly founded party, the Korean (*Chosŏn*) Democratic Party (see under Minor parties, below).

The process of concentrating political power was virtually completed by August 1946, when the Korean Communist Party and the New People's Party, a group controlled by the Koreans trained in Communist China, were amalgamated to form the North Korean Labor Party. The amalgamation or, more properly, the absorption of the New People's Party, submerged the Yen-an-Koreans in the Labor Party complex. Although some retained positions of prominence, none retained positions of actual or potential political power in North Korea. The amalgamation, in eliminating the anomaly of two communist parties, also eliminated the somewhat milder approach of the Koreans trained in Communist China to such issues as land reform, Christianity, and private enterprise. With the amalgamation, the Soviet-Koreans further strengthened their hold over the party apparatus and Hŏ Kai, a former Soviet Communist Party official, emerged as the chief figure in the Labor Party executive staff. The Soviet-Koreans, through the Labor Party apparatus, extended their influence not only over the government but also over the social organizations and their directorate, the North Korean People's Democratic Front.

From September 1946, the Labor Party concentrated on strengthening its mass membership and organization. Between September and December 1946, party membership was almost doubled, reaching about 600,000. A critical survey made in late 1946 revealed inadequacies as an aftermath of this rather feverish expansion. As a result a general purge of the party was undertaken shortly thereafter.

The purge, painlessly administered in the course of issuance of party membership certificates, affected an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 members—"the foreign or heterogeneous elements (landlords, industrialists, profiteers, and lagging elements of the laboring class)." The party reorganization following the purge involved an expansion of the party's educational system and the establishment of new party units in the government, social organizations, railroads, factories, and other economic facilities. By late summer, a series of general party reports and inspections and a final increase in membership to 700,000 concluded the process of party growth. The party was then prepared to fulfill with increasing vigor and efficiency the responsibility it set for itself "to provide strong leadership and full cooperation to the work of the people's committees and the social organizations."

In August 1949 the North and South Korean Labor Parties were amalgamated to form the Korean Labor Party. Although this new party ostensibly represented both the north and the south, it did

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not differ in any essential respect from its predecessor party in the north, was completely dominated by North Korean officials, and in effect constituted the party organ of the North Korean regime. It has changed little since the amalgamation of 1949.

Although the Labor Party is undoubtedly the most powerful organized element in the regime, it is clearly differentiated from the government and has no official standing in it. It is not prepared to step into the managerial role, that is, to "manipulate the raw materials of society directly." For evident reasons, the party is able to perform its functions of supervision, coordination, check, and support only through the medium of governmental administrative mechanism and a structure of social organizations.

The power to take state decisions insofar as it is lodged in North Korea as opposed to the U.S.S.R. apparently resides in a small group of people who, although heading the various branches of the government, are united in no organization except the Labor Party. At the head of this informal group is Ho Kai, Soviet citizen and First Secretary of the Labor Party until he was made Deputy Prime Minister in November 1951. Its most outstanding public personality is undoubtedly Kim Il-sŏng, who holds the two key posts of Prime Minister and chairman of the Labor Party. Other influential members are Pak Ilu, ex-partisan, Minister of Internal Affairs, and member of the party's Political Committee; Kim Yul and Pak Ch'angŏk, Soviet-Koreans who are important officials in the party's Central Headquarters; Pang Hakse and Kim Pa, Soviet-Koreans who are officials in the political police; Pak Hŏnyŏng, an old revolutionary with Soviet training, Foreign Minister, and a Political Committee member; Nam Il and Kim Il, two leading military figures; and Kim Chan, head of the Central Bank.

The members of this group are united by their specialized talent in the exercise of power and by their unquestioning obedience to the U.S.S.R. They enjoy the prerogatives of a very select elite: e.g., party leadership, great prestige, extra rations, freedom from surveillance by the North Korean political police, exemption from the self-criticism requirement, and exemption from the sanctions of local authority.

These attributes distinguish the Soviet clique from other party leadership elements, who, while holding positions of ostensible power, have exercised little actual influence over party decisions. Among the latter group, the Yen-an-Koreans have recently become the most important, since the Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict has apparently served to increase their prestige and influence, particularly in military circles. In the

long run, the possibility of the Yen-an-Koreans' gaining increased influence depends upon the future role played by Communist China in the area.

(2) *General features* — For its basic operating principles the Korean Labor Party drew largely on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The party constitution calls for the organization of party units on the principle of "democratic centralism"; that is, majority rule, the "election" of executive agencies, the submission of reports by lower party units to higher, and strict enforcement of a chain of authority from higher to lower party units. Provisions for membership, discipline, duties, and organization are much the same as those of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

But the Korean Labor Party's status of leadership had to be made consistent with the fiction of a multiparty system and a coalition government. For purposes of guiding a broad national front, the party developed "mass" features that had not been permitted in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In this respect, it closely resembles the communist parties of eastern Europe.

The Korean Labor Party's 1949 membership of more than 700,000 accounted for 8% of the population of North Korea. Comparative figures for the parties of eastern Europe are roughly 5% for Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; 9% for East Germany; and 13% for Czechoslovakia. In North Korea, as in Rumania and Poland, virtually the entire party membership was recruited after 1945.

Understandably, the Communist Party includes more peasant members (62%) in North Korea, regarded by the communists as a "colonial" area, than in Poland (19%) or Yugoslavia (49%). Industrial labor constitutes only 20% of its membership (Yugoslavia 30%, Poland 51%) and white collar members 13% (Poland 29%). In terms of age of members, the Korean Labor Party presumably does not differ radically from the recently recruited communist parties of Poland and Rumania. In 1948, more than 70% of all party members were under 35 years of age, more than 50% were under 30, and more than 30% were under 26.

Superficially at least, the 1947 purge of the Korean Labor Party had few of the manifestations of the more extreme paring of party rolls that took place in East Germany in 1951 and that in 1949 and 1950 resulted in substantial reductions in the membership of communist parties in Eastern Europe. One possible explanation is that Soviet control of the North Korean party apparatus was always fairly secure. The Soviet Union did not have to contend with the problem of "national communists," and European " Titoism" created practically no stir in North Korea. By infiltrating "activist" leaders and Soviet-Koreans into top party posi-

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tions, the Kremlin had secured its power in North Korea. And, in any event, the Kremlin undoubtedly preferred to postpone the excision of weaker party elements until after unification.

The absence of a major purge, the want of speculative doctrine, and the predominance of peasant and youthful members may suggest that the North Korean Communist Party is in an early stage of development by the standards of early "revolutionary" communism. However, the North Korean Labor Party has the attributes of mass membership, a tight party bureaucracy, and highly-disciplined Soviet-trained leadership. Recent Soviet efforts to achieve similar features in the satellite parties of Europe, most notably Bulgaria, suggest that in these respects the North Korean movement was fairly advanced, from the communist viewpoint, before the Korean conflict.

(3) *Basic units* — The constitution of the Korean Labor Party provides for a democratic façade within the party by vesting authority in elected congresses and committees. Nominally, the highest organ of the party is the national congress, which met once a year before the armed conflict. Theoretically, the leading party organizations in the provinces, larger counties, and cities and in the major factories and institutions are their respective congresses. In counties and cities with party membership of less than 100 and in the townships and larger farm villages, supreme authority is vested in the party meeting or assembly.

Between the infrequent sessions of congresses or assemblies power is technically exercised by elected committees, of which the highest is the Central Committee of National Headquarters. But these again meet only once every two or three months and, like the congresses, generally ratify decisions already reached.

Decisions are actually made and central and local party operations supervised by standing or executive committees containing various departments or sections that actually run party affairs from day to day. These departments have been under the direct supervision of the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the standing committee.

At the provincial and county levels these departments are as follows:

PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENTS	COUNTY OR CITY DEPARTMENTS
Organization	Organization
Personnel	Personnel
Propaganda	Propaganda
Labor	Labor (where necessary)
Farmers	Secret documents
Secret documents	General affairs
General affairs	Membership certificates

Before 1947 there had also been departments for youth and women's affairs, but these departments

were abolished in the party reorganization of that year and were apparently not reinstated at provincial and county levels following the reorganization of 1949. Counting the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of the standing committee as paid employees, the provincial party headquarters employ some 150 people and the county party headquarters about 35 to 40 people.

It is not known how many party workers are employed by the township committee, but for the administration of party affairs in industrial installations described later under this topic, the party committees are allowed paid secretaries according to the number of party members, as follows:

SECRETARIES	PARTY MEMBERS	SECRETARIES	PARTY MEMBERS
1	100-250	3	400-1,000
2	250-400	5	1,000 and over

No paid help is permitted in party offices in farm villages.

The basic units of the Korean Labor Party are its nearly 30,000 cells. Wherever more than five party members are located in a single area or place of occupation, they form a cell. Cells exist in factories, mines, railroads, villages, schools, city wards, and street committees, people's committees, the police, ministries, and even in Labor Party regional and central headquarters. The only exception to the cell form of party organization is the North Korean People's Army.

The activities of each cell are directed by a chairman and vice-chairman. Cells with 20 or more members elect a cell committee, which in turn chooses a chairman and vice-chairman. When the membership of cells in villages or work places exceeds 100, the cells are permitted to form a governing unit, the primary committee.

To inspire better party leadership in local government and social organizations, the party headquarters in 1947 established a new party unit, the "team." Party teams were organized in people's committees and social and other organizations containing more than three Labor Party members.

(4) *Central Headquarters* — The job of administering this vast network of party organizations falls to the Central Headquarters in P'yŏng-yang, composed of the various continuously functioning committees of the Central Committee, the party secretaries, and the executive staff (see FIGURE 53-2 for the organization of the Central Headquarters after the merger of 1949).

The top policy-making body of the party and of the nation, for that matter, is the Political Committee, composed of nine members after the merger of 1949. This committee chooses and is technically headed by the chairman and vice-chairman of the entire party, two dominant but not all-powerful




FIGURE 53-2. CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION, KOREAN LABOR PARTY. After the merger of 1949.

officials in the party. Actual authority is exercised by only five members of this committee, the remaining members being prominent but uninfluential communist leaders most of whom were South Koreans.

By taking on two additional members the Political Committee, as constituted in 1949, could convene as the Organization, or Standing Committee. Before the 1949 merger most of the membership of this committee appeared to be different from that of the Political Committee. Its original functions were to interpret the broad directives of the Political Committee and supervise the day-to-day activities of the executive departments of Central Headquarters in guiding the government ministries and social organizations. After the 1949 merger this committee apparently continued to exercise many of its previous functions but in conjunction with the party secretaries.

The party secretaries had been abolished at the time of the formation of the North Korean Labor Party in August 1946 but were reinstated in August 1949. There are three party secretaries; as in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the party secretaries are apparently the administrative hub of the party and initiate action to carry out party decisions.

In conjunction with the Organization Committee, the secretaries supervise the operations of the executive departments. These departments were set up to oversee the party itself and the nonparty agencies responsible for the chief national activities. An organization department establishes and maintains party units and defines their responsibilities to each other. A personnel department keeps dossiers on all party members and higher government officials and supervises all national appointments of official personnel. A propaganda department defines propaganda policies and passes upon programs laid out by the Propaganda Ministry and the social organizations. A farmers' department passes upon party activities in the whole field of government agrarian policy, and the labor department is responsible for party activities in the field of labor policy. The finance department deals solely with problems of party budget. And finally, three departments that were either installed or reinstated in 1949—youth, women, and social—keep track of the activities of the social organizations in their various fields of endeavor.

It is to be noted that, unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Korean Labor Party has no separate departments dealing exclusively

with military or industrial affairs. These matters, however, are supervised by the executive staff.

A third committee is the Inspection Committee, which reviews the general performance of party branches and personnel in all their affiliations with the government. Although elected by the Central Committee from its members, the Inspection Committee, according to party philosophy, holds a position aloof from the policy-making and operating units of the Central Headquarters.

Finally, there is an Auditing Committee, the sole function of which is to audit the accounts of Central Headquarters.

(5) *Special operating procedures*—The party's function is to direct, check, and support the constitutional government and social organizations but never to take over direct management. In accordance with this principle, the Korean Labor Party follows the unvarying rule that the responsible managerial official in a given organization is never simultaneously chairman of the party cell, branch, or department in that organization. Thus, not the manager of a factory but some workman would be cell chairman in that factory, and not the chief of the standing committee of a country people's committee but some employee from the propaganda department, for example, would be cell chairman in that standing committee.

In conformance to the principle of "democratic centralism," orders from higher to lower party agencies are always funneled from chairman to chairman and never through subordinates.

Possibly the most complex procedural problems are those arising from the existence of functional party units—in factories, colleges, certain ministries, and so on—that do not fit neatly into the established regional party system. In general, party precepts require that functional units be subordinate to a regional headquarters (a few to the Central Headquarters itself) but that the point of subordination be determined so as to preserve the integrity of the functional party organization and to take account of any special role the parent institution may play in the processes of government. Examples of these precepts in operation are the party units in Kim Il-sŏng University, the railroads, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defense.

At the Kim Il-sŏng University, both teacher and student party members are organized into cells, and in pursuance of party rules their respective cells conform to the major subdivisions and departments of the university (for example, medicine). To preserve its functional integrity, this party organization is at no point required to report to a party authority lower than the provincial party headquarters. Likewise, party cells or branches

in factories come under no lower jurisdiction than that of the county or city in which they are located. Cells in primary or middle schools, similarly, report to township or city party headquarters. And, for the majority of government agencies and social organizations, no problem is involved, since each is broken down on the same regional basis as the party.

A special problem was created by the railroad employees, however, owing to their mobility. After innumerable orders, Central Headquarters apparently solved this problem by bringing railroad party cells under the jurisdiction of special railroad party districts. While these districts might work closely with city or county party units, their final responsibility is to the party provinces offices.

The railroad police presented Central Headquarters with an even greater problem, since their parent agencies—the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Defense Ministry—as the two guardians of state security were exempt from certain of the provisions of Labor Party organization and command.

At one time, party units in the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported only to Central Headquarters and not to any regional party organization. Subsequently, this vertical integrity was destroyed in part by having, for example, township units among the ordinary police report to township party headquarters. Then, in August 1950, Central Headquarters ordered party units in all the bureaus in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, except the Political Defense Bureau, to place themselves under the supervision of local party units. For obvious reasons, the party organization in the Political Defense Bureau (secret police) continued to report only to Central Headquarters.

With respect to party organization, the Defense Ministry has been granted an even more favored position. In the actual military branches of the armed forces (chief of staff, ordinance, supply, medicine, and navy) and there is no formal party organization, on the theory that the military forces themselves, in which all officers are nominally party members, form a perfect hierarchy of party discipline. Instead, party indoctrination is conducted through a so-called culture bureau, staffed with possibly 30 officers per division, which holds frequent meetings for officers and men down to the battalion and company level. However, the procurator and court bureaus of the Defense Ministry are all organized into party cells, reporting vertically to party representatives in the Supreme Procurator's Office and the Supreme Court. Army officers or men who are Labor Party members and reside outside army compounds are required to form cells, and some of these cells come under regional party jurisdiction.

(6) *Statistics and reporting*--Each party cell and branch is required to send up a periodic and detailed statement of activities, plus numerous reports on special occasions. Outside the party these reports can be seen only by the Political Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Following the discovery in 1947 that party workers were spending an inordinate amount of time in compiling statistics and sending in reports, Central Headquarters reduced and standardized all reporting. The paper work remained voluminous, however, as the following reporting requirements indicate: 1) Party cells were instructed to send in periodic statistics on membership certificates, expenditures, and the training of new members. They were also required to prepare two copies of minutes of their weekly meetings, one for filing and one for submission to city or county headquarters. 2) Factory and township branches were likewise ordered to submit two copies of minutes of all types of meetings and quarterly reports of all activities. 3) City branches, county branches, functional party branches, and provincial branches were also required to file copies of minutes of all meetings, one copy to be sent to Central Headquarters. 4) In addition, all units down to the township level were required to report, when necessary, on projects of national importance--the implementation of the economic plan, the bond drive of 1950, and so on.

(7) *Finance*--The party finances itself from membership fees, party dues, and sources characterized as "donations," and "other income." Each candidate pays a five *won* membership fee. After becoming a member he pays dues on the following basis:

CATEGORY OF MEMBERSHIP	DUES PER MONTH
Students	1 <i>won</i>
Farmers	5 <i>won</i>
Others with incomes of:	
500 <i>won</i> or less	1% of income
500 to 1,000 <i>won</i>	2% of income
Over 1,000 <i>won</i>	3% of income

In view of the small income derived from this source, it is probable that the party depends heavily on sources of "other income." One such source reportedly is the Korean Trading Company, a large state trading concern with numerous industrial and commercial interests. Although this company is nominally under the control of the Ministry of Commerce, the bulk of its capital reportedly is supplied by the Labor Party, and the bulk of its profits accrue to the party.

The nature of party outlays is perhaps indicated by the budget of the South P'yongan branch of the party for 1950. Out of a budget of 42,500,000 *won*, roughly 38% was allocated for salaries and wages;

nearly 19% for special expenditures (not detailed); more than 7% for conference expenses (primarily for the provincial party congress); nearly 8% for business expenses (printing, communications, "consumers goods," etc.); 9.5% for housing; just short of 5% for propaganda and agitation; between 7% and 8% for school expenses; and minor amounts for "leader's activities," labor projects, communications expenses, dining-room expenditures, and others.

(8) *Membership* -- With regard to eligibility for membership, conditions and procedures of entrance, discipline, rights, duties, and conditions and procedures of severance, the Labor Party regulations closely follow the statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Those eligible for party membership are, as variously defined: 1) "Laborers, farmers, and working intelligentsia who submit to party principles and rules"; 2) "Positively ardent elements"; 3) former members of the Korean Communist Party and New People's Party, all members of the Soviet Communist Party, most members of the Chinese Communist Party, and most members of the South Korean Labor Party.

In practice, qualifications for membership are set as follows: The candidate must: 1) be at least 20 years of age, 2) have the proper family background, 3) show capabilities for leadership, 4) have no criminal record, and 5) possess no concubines. Family background is possibly the most important qualification. Although the party prefers new members from the stratum of poor farmers and workers, it positively excludes only those candidates: 1) who have a record of collaboration with the Japanese or service in the Japanese police or army; 2) whose parents were former landlords; 3) whose parents were Christians; or 4) who have relatives or connections in South Korea. And it specifies that candidates with proper family background should not be denied membership by reason of illiteracy or ignorance of party doctrine.

To gain admittance, the candidate must find two party guarantors within his prospective cell who will submit a written statement as to his character and good behavior during the previous year. These guarantors bear full responsibility for the applicant's behavior after admission to the party. After investigation, the applicant goes before the county or city party committee and, if certified by the chairman, becomes a member of the party. If he has belonged to another political party the candidate must receive the approval of provincial party headquarters; and if he has been a leader of that party, the approval of Central Headquarters.

The chief right of the Korean Labor Party member is to enjoy all the privileges of special status in North Korea--in particular, prestige and govern-

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ment position—and his chief duty is to be a model citizen and leader in North Korean society. The worst crimes of which he is capable as a party member are those of joining the armed forces of foreign governments or going to South Korea without the approval of Central Headquarters. For these crimes the delinquent member is summarily expelled from the party.

In most first instances of misconduct, the party member is let off with a warning, which is recorded in his instruction book. Second offenses, however, can be punished with expulsion. County or city units cannot expel a member without provincial party approval, unless there is danger of his fleeing or divulging party secrets. According to directives from Central Headquarters, the purpose of party punishment is to make members "genuinely contrite" followers of party principles.

(9) *Education*—The task of party education is to turn the 700,000 party members into pliant instruments of Stalinist policy. Some measure of the magnitude of that task is gained from the educational background of the party cohorts at the end of 1947: 78,000, or 11% of the party's total membership were illiterate; 235,000, or 33%, were literate but uneducated; 335,900, or 47.5%, had had only primary schooling; 53,000, or 7.5%, had completed middle school; and 6,800, or not quite 1%, had been graduated from a college or university.

Central Headquarters has met this problem by segregating the party into cadres and rank and file for educational purposes, adapting the literature of Stalinism to their varied educational backgrounds, and establishing numerous party schools and classes in which oral lectures are stressed.

The fountainhead of party wisdom is the Central Party School in P'yŏngyang. The school is presided over by a Soviet-Korean, Kim Sunghwa (who is also vice-president of Kim Il-sŏng University), and its rotating staff of lecturers include the top party figures in North Korea. It is attended by party officials down to county level (especially from the propaganda departments of the various headquarters), staff members of the ministries from section chief up, leaders of the various social organizations, higher rank cultural officers in the military services, and top party members from all responsible agencies except the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Classes are held by echelons and consist either of short courses of intensive training lasting possibly a month or of sessions lasting only three or four days but repeated every two months. In these courses, trainees are taught in the principles of the Labor Party, Marxist methods in leading the masses, comparative government of the "people's democracies," history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "democratic reforms" in

North Korea, world politics and geography according to Stalin, the international situation, and history of Korea.

Party propagandists and agitators trained at the Central Party School return to the provinces, cities, and counties to train propagandists from local party branches and other organizations and to indoctrinate party cadres in general. According to party directives, the following regimen is prescribed for the education of cadres and rank and file:

Top level party and government officials in the provinces attend three-day classes every two months. Lower level party and government officials in provinces, cities, and counties attend two-day classes every three months. In addition, these cadres are formed into self-study groups, using as their text the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* and meet for discussions or lectures twice a month.

Seminars for all leaders are organized according to the educational background of these leaders and cover two days every two months. Cell classes two hours in length are held four times a month and are geared to the members' educational level. City and county night schools have been established for "enthusiastic" party members, with four-hour classes held twice a week. In addition, all nonparty members of social organizations attend special classes conducted by the party four times a month.

The literature of Stalinism, never esoteric even at the Central Party School, is progressively simplified as it goes down the reverse funnel of the lower party schools. For example, the syllabus of lectures at the city and county night schools reads as follows:

- Fundamental steps in the development of human society, 14 hours;
- Korea under the Japanese regime, 12 hours;
- Korea after liberation, 46 hours;
- Soviet Union, 20 hours; and
- Party experience in leading the masses, 47 hours.

(10) *Functions*—The first duty of the party is to preserve and strengthen itself as an effective entity. An important, although by no means major, part of the party apparatus, therefore, spends most of its energies looking inward. The organization departments, from Central Headquarters down to the county, concern themselves with increases or decreases in membership, send out orders that laborers should be given preference in admittance, warn the township if its rosters show too many youthful members, and constantly reshuffle the railroad cells and branches. The personnel departments keep on the lookout for infiltration by "reactionary elements," maintain a check on performance of individual leaders, disci-

pline members, and keep their eyes open for new party timber. The finance departments supervise the inflow of dues and the outflow of party expenditures. When party inspectors from national headquarters make their annual check of each of the units, county or above, their first objective is to ascertain the party's organizational health. Thus, their reports comment on the growth of membership, the strength of the cell network, the elimination of sectionalism or factionalism, the preference given to working classes, the soundness of committee finances, and so on.

But the party itself is meaningful only as it functions within some administrative body. For this reason most of the party apparatus turns its attention outward, its concern being to maintain party leadership in the various component agencies of the state.

This is accomplished first by personal participation of party members in the decision making process in the national administration (see this Chapter, SECTION 55, under North Korea.) From the province down, participation is guaranteed by the simple expedient of channeling all government orders to party headquarters at the same time as or even slightly before their receipt in the corresponding people's committee. Thus, if the orders call for a new irrigation project, county party headquarters can immediately call on its members at the top of each responsible agency to discuss the project in a party meeting. While never attempting to administer the problem directly, party headquarters thus plays a leading role in interpreting the elaborating directives, which in North Korea constitute the decision making process at lower levels.

Secondly, the party assures its leadership by providing the impetus to the administrative process and supporting it once a decision has been made. This facet of the party's role at the level of national administration may be seen in work plans of the Central Standing Committee in P'yöngyang covering the years 1946 to 1950. The agenda of that committee for the month of June 1948 included:

- Leading the drive for circulation of goods stocked in the consumers' cooperatives
- Cooperating in carrying out second quarter plans for the Rungnam Fertilizer Plant
- Helping to fulfill production plans at the Nampo Shipyard
- Inspecting and guiding party political educational activities
- Publishing a Korean geography for the fourth class
- Cooperating in the prevention of summer epidemics
- Exhibiting popular art
- Sponsoring holiday celebrations
- Cooperating with the social organizations to improve farm production

It may be noted from these plans that the standing committee is always careful to adhere to the principle of working only through the state apparatus. It thus uses such terms as "strengthen the local cells to spur production" instead of "the party shall attempt to increase production."

The party cell in a factory helps publicize production orders among the workers, studies ways and means of increasing labor efficiency and productivity, works through the trade union to discipline absent workers, takes the lead in explaining longer working hours, encourages the trade unions to improve working conditions, supervises the celebration of national holidays, and in general shores up the whole mechanism of management. In a girls' middle school in P'yöngyang, for example, the party cell attempts to instill the proper political attitudes into the students, sponsors activities on the part of the Youth League and trade union, and leads in the celebration of national holidays.

Third, the party is able to guarantee its control of administrative agencies, public and private, by regular inspection and surveillance. Few secrets are kept from the party. Work plans of the Central Standing Committee of the party show that cabinet ministers and their subordinates are frequently called upon to report on the vital areas of national policy, and their reports are invariably checked against reports by party experts in the same field. All party headquarters are in this fashion always kept abreast of government activities in their areas. Cell chairmen in factories, educational institutions, and government agencies make secret reports to party headquarters on management. In effect, this reporting amounts to party espionage.

The various headquarters of the Labor Party either draw up the lists of candidates for elective positions in government and social organizations or else pass them on. Moreover, the personnel departments of the central and regional standing committees select or approve the more responsible paid officials of their organizations. In the county, for example, the party chooses all paid personnel of the people's committee with the rank of section chief or above.

Finally, this octopus organization indoctrinates all officials of the government, social organizations, and public institutions and guides the indoctrination and education of the masses. Once each year all professors at Kim Il-söng University are required to submit to party refresher courses on Stalinism. Party education of the social and government leaders has been discussed above. From the Propaganda Ministry down to the township propagandists of the Youth League, the party closely supervises preparation and dissemination of the

ideological materials that rationalize the North Korean state.

(11) *Effects of Korean hostilities* — Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1950 little change has been apparent in the structure of the Labor Party. The party has retained to a large degree its powerful and central position in the satellite political apparatus, although neither it nor the regime as a whole is capable of operating with the effectiveness and decisiveness characteristic of the prewar period. The primary effect of the war has been a weakening of the lower levels of Labor Party organization as a result both of wartime casualties and the need to shift many of the lower officials into the military forces or into areas closely aligned to the military. In addition, the membership has probably declined considerably below its 1950 level.

At lower levels, proportionately heavier casualties in addition to purges of incompetent cadres have eliminated a fairly large proportion of the prewar party cadres. The regime has attempted to fill this gap, of course, through recruitment of new cadres, but broadcasts in 1951 have indicated that the new cadres in particular, and the lower levels of the party in general, have fallen short in implementing the agricultural program, reactivating propaganda, and maintaining effective general programs.

In addition, the position of the Soviet-Koreans, while still supreme in party circles, is, according to reports, not quite as secure as before the Chinese intervention. There have been repeated reports of controversy and dissension within the Labor Party. Party leaders with Yen-an background reportedly have at times sought to exploit the fact of Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict to improve their position with the party. There have been no firm indications, however, of any broad schism within the higher levels of the party on the basis of Soviet versus Chinese orientation or of Soviet versus Chinese sponsorship. Feeling between elements of the former South Korean Labor Party and the former North Korean Labor Party appears to have been aggravated by the public announcement of the secret merger of the two parties in 1949 and by the conflict over direction of communist occupation activities in South Korea. The party is reported to have made special efforts to check and reorient its southern elements. In any event, the southern element's position in the party is so weak that this friction can hardly be a serious problem. It is unlikely that dissension has yet become serious or disturbed the solidarity of the party in general.

b. *MINOR PARTIES* — In North Korea, two minor political parties were permitted to continue as members of the Democratic Front during the 1945-50 preinvasion period: The North Korean Democratic Party and the *Ch'ondokyo*, Young

Friends Party, a semireligious group. In addition, representatives of left-wing parties in South Korea—the People's Democratic Party, the new Progressive Party, and others—were assigned ministerial posts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948. However, only the first two parties were permitted to organize a following in North Korea, and they were used by the regime merely to create the appearance of multipartisan and non-communist support.

Since the outbreak of the hostilities, these two parties have generally disintegrated. With some exceptions, leaders of these parties were at first deferred from military service like members of the communist hierarchy. Increased political surveillance combined with vastly greater general regimentation, however, accelerated the deterioration of the two parties. When U.N. forces were advancing into North Korea in 1950, local non-communist leaders were often arrested or executed by the withdrawing communist officials and police. On the other hand, members of the two non-communist parties, many of whom had hidden to evade the draft, formed a nucleus of spontaneous anti-communist groups who attacked the fleeing communists, welcomed the U.N. forces, or cooperated with them during the brief occupation. With the withdrawal of U.N. forces from North Korea many leaders and members of the two non-communist parties fled to South Korea, and others were arrested, taken away by the communist police, or kept under special surveillance in their local areas. At any rate, the two parties now exist largely in name only, with little more than their top cadres comprising communist puppets left of their none too substantial prewar organizations.

(1) *The North Korean Democratic Party* — Renowned Cho Mansik was originally the leader of this party. Cho's downfall began in November 1945, however, at the founding of his party, when two and possibly three agents and close associates of Kim Il-sŏng (including Kim Ch'aek, later a member of the communist inner core) were installed as Democratic Party officials. His loss of position became complete in January 1946, following his refusal to support the provisions for Korean trusteeship agreed upon at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference. His party was thereafter forced to take a secondary role. It remained relatively inactive during the drive of the Korean Communist Party early in 1946 to become the sole mass political organization in North Korea, and Cho himself subsequently disappeared.

Ch'oe Yonggun and other communists were appointed in January 1946 to replace Cho Mansik and the other original officials, most of whom had been purged. Ch'oe later revealed that this almost wholesale purge of original leaders had been due

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to their connections with South Korean reactionaries. The new leaders drafted a platform of innocuous and "democratic" character and pledged the party's support of the programs initiated by the Labor Party. The rank and file remained generally conservative in outlook but lacked an outlet for expressing their views. The Christian middle class elements, who had always been prominent in the party, attempted in the early summer of 1947, particularly in P'yŏngyang, to form a Christian Freedom Party that would show broad sympathy with the United States by holding demonstrations to welcome the U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission. This effort was immediately suppressed.

Christians and other middle class elements preponderant in the party were undermined by actions taken by the regime against religious movements and the middle class. Moreover, as soon as the North Korean regime was established, membership in the Democratic Party became an obstacle to government employment, higher education, special training, and other opportunities. The old rank and file that remained as of June 1950, located in P'yŏngyang and in many rural areas and even forming the majority of the population in some villages of the three western provinces of North Korea (Hwanghae-do, P'yŏngan-pukto and P'yŏngan-namdo), had long resented increasing repression but were marked as potential opposition and kept in an impotent position.

(2) *The Ch'ŏndokyo Young Friends Party* —

The nature of the control exercised over the *Ch'ŏndokyo* Young Friends Party by the regime differed from that imposed upon the Democratic Party. Many of its non-communist leaders were not replaced, and the party was not as completely reorganized. Instead, intimidation and other pressures were used as a means of control, and infiltration techniques were used to some extent. The Young Friends Party was as clearly non-communist as the Democratic Party. Its membership was largely drawn from the middle class, was almost wholly rural, and was concentrated principally in the P'yŏngan provinces. A less repressive policy was followed toward the *Ch'ŏndokyo* Party, probably because the latter never represented as great a threat to the communists as the Democratic Party before Cho Mansik was purged.

The *Ch'ŏndokyo*, both religious sect and parties, derived from the Eastern Learning (*Tonghak*) revolt of the late nineteenth century and in many respects resembles the Taiping movement in China. Since the origin of the *Ch'ŏndokyo* movement, its religious and political activities have been almost indistinguishable. After World War II the Young Friends Party was the sole political form of the *Ch'ŏndokyo* movement in North Korea. The

party's relationship to religion was explained from various perspectives; it was the extension of the religion's principles—strongly influenced by Christianity, mysticism, and idealism—into the political field. The religious organization was considered to be the mother of the party. The party, moreover, had its own organization and officials, separate from the religious group. Yet membership in both organizations was, for all practical purposes, concurrent. The *Ch'ŏndokyo* school in P'yŏngyang and those in the various provinces were subsidized by the religious body but operated by the party. The course of study in these schools and the substance of articles appearing in *Kaebŏk* (*Foundation*), the party newspaper, was largely concerned with religious principles. The top religious leaders and philosophers advised the party and exercised a decisive influence on its policies.

The history of the party from 1946 to 1950 was one of progressive compromise to survive under increasing governmental pressures. The only evidences of resistance to the regime were abortive conspiracies, reported to have been instigated by *Ch'ŏndokyo* leaders in South Korea. The first, planned for March 1, 1948, resulted in the arrest or disappearance of two of the principal North Korean party leaders and widespread arrests. Kim Talhyŏn, head of the party, scrupulously avoided direct involvement in this conspiracy and the later one and is said to have endeavored without success to secure the release of one of the arrested leaders. Kim Chungju, another leader, was appointed Minister of Communications to create the impression of a multipartisan participation in the government. Communist efforts to extend their control over the party culminated during the national convention held in February 1950, shortly after the disclosure of the second conspiracy, again instigated by elements in the south but not as widespread as the first. At this convention Kim Talhyŏn and the non-communist leadership won an apparent victory. The pro-communists, however, did score several successes. Pak Uch'ŏn, a communist, was named editor of the *Kaebŏk*. His predecessor, Kim Tohyŏn, was elevated to the less influential vice-chairmanship of the party. Chŏn Ch'anbae was removed from his dual position of secretary general and head of the propaganda department, and Chŏng In'gwan, a conservative theologian of the central school, was purged from the party. After the convention, the influential religious leader Paek Sem-yong was expelled from the religious body as a result of objections to him by the pro-communists on the grounds that he was a former landlord.

As of June 1950 the position of the *Ch'ŏndokyo* party members was generally similar, though not quite as serious, as that of the Democratic Party rank and file. For some time they had been sub-

jected to communist pressures and discriminatory tactics. As a rural grouping, the *Ch'ondokyo* party probably was a focal point of farmer antipathy against the communist regime. Unlike the Democratic Party, the *Ch'ondokyo* still retained many of its non-communist leaders, despite some infiltration. On the other hand, party leadership had lost much of its vitality through its long standing policy of compromise under pressure.

2. Electoral procedures in North Korea

a. ELECTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC FAÇADE —

The North Korean regime makes extensive use of a number of political institutions and techniques common to the Western democracies; e.g., its constitution guarantees individual rights; power is formally vested in representative bodies; and a multiparty political system has been adopted. However, these institutions perform a completely different function in North Korea. In effect, they are used to provide a democratic façade in accordance with the communist view that authoritarian controls require provision for the formal participation of the citizen in government, even though the electorate does not in fact have the power to choose between alternative policies or personalities. These democratic forms, moreover, had the virtue of great popular appeal among North Koreans, who had been completely excluded from government and politics under the Japanese.

The North Korean constitution of 1948, like the Soviet constitution of 1936, is replete with democratic phraseology:

The sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic rests with the people. All representative organs of sovereignty from village People's Committee up to the Supreme People's Council shall be elected by the free will of the people . . . in universal, equal and direct elections by secret ballot. Representatives and members of committees of all government organs shall be responsible to the electors . . . and may be recalled in event of loss of confidence.

Article 12 guarantees all citizens over 20 years of age the right to vote and to be elected to any government position, except persons disqualified by the courts, the insane and the pro-Japanese. A bill of rights is added, guaranteeing citizens equality before the law, freedom of speech, press, organization, assembly, and religious practice.

The electoral procedures followed in North Korea are probably the most important element in the democratic façade. Representative bodies are popularly elected at all levels, from the village and city people's committees to the Supreme People's Council. The judges of the people's courts are also elected by popular vote. In the Labor Party, the minor parties, and the social organizations, the electoral procedure employed provides for "elections from the bottom"; that is, all members the-

oretically participate in the selection of the governing committee which committee in turn appoints standing committees.

b. ELECTION PROCEDURES — The elections perform essentially the same function as in the Soviet Union; namely to arouse the political consciousness of the people, to convey the feeling of popular participation in government, and to excite popular enthusiasm for the policies of the regime.

That the elective processes are not *bona fide* in any Western sense is indicated by the composition of the electorate and by the devices for guaranteeing the selection of candidates chosen in advance by the state. As in other communist states, the "citizenry" does not include all the people but only those elements who had been "exploited," in North Korea, by the Japanese. The regime defines "citizenry" to include only the true "working" class: peasants, urban workers, and certain intellectuals. All the former "elite" elements of the society, who were accused of having collaborated with Japan or of harboring pro-U.S. sympathies, have been disenfranchised. Disqualified in this manner were former landlords, Christians, persons denounced as pro-Japanese or "traitors" by the people's committees, those disqualified by the court and those with relatives in South Korea. The regime has been able to exclude voters disqualified on these grounds through registration procedures under which the administrative organs of the city and township people's committees—both controlled by the Labor Party—compile the voting registers, from which there is no appeal.

The purely passive and nominal role of the voter in the elective process is demonstrated both by the method of nominating candidates and by the nature of the ballot. The election law states that candidates (any eligible voter over 20) may be sponsored by "registered" political parties or social organizations or "confidences" of workers or farmers, regardless of the size or residence of the membership of such groups. Candidates must then be nominated by the Democratic Unification Front in the locality. The law does not prohibit the nomination of more than one candidate for any one office. In fact the Labor Party selects the candidates and dictates their nomination by the various organizations that nominally exercise authority to sponsor and announce nominations. At each administrative level, the local Labor Party organization, in conjunction with minor parties and social organizations, selects the candidates and submits its selections to the next higher headquarters of the party and to the Democratic Unification Front for approval. This procedure invariably results in a single slate for candidates backed by all parties and organizations recognized by the regime. On the ballot, therefore, the existence

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Separate parties is completely ignored. This is submitted to a public rally of the voters and accepted by acclaim after the required speeches extolling the wisdom of the party, the political leadership, and the successes of the government have been delivered.

A well-organized election campaign is then set in motion, using speakers, rallies, posters, handbills, and house-to-house canvassing as well as radio and other media. Official propaganda facilities are made available to campaigners free of charge. The campaign is conducted primarily by the Youth League and other social organizations, although it is carefully prepared and directed by Labor Party headquarters. In general, campaign speeches and literature do not place general questions of policy before the public but instead deal with the achievements of the regime, the improvement in living standards and future prospects and production levels. Some campaigns on the other hand, simply try to depict the happy life of youth under the regime. Students, villagers, and factory workers are mobilized to give plays in conjunction with election propaganda work, thus creating an atmosphere of active electioneering.

On election day, all eligible citizens are induced to vote, with very few excuses accepted. A tremendous propaganda barrage stresses the importance of going to the polls. The elections are supervised by committees whose members are selected by the Labor Party on the basis of reliability. As a final safeguard against election results unfavorable to the regime, open ballot boxes are used. At the polls, voters are allowed to accept or reject the official slate in its entirety. The white ballot box signifies "yes," the black box "no." These ballot boxes are placed at one end of the room and the chairman or a few members of the election committee are seated at the opposite end. A screen is placed in front of the boxes but is only a few inches higher than the boxes. There is a curtain behind the boxes. After the voter is identified by a member of the election committee, he is given a voting card or marble. To vote for a candidate he places this card or marble in the white box and to vote against him he places it in the black box. Voters are sure they could be observed in the act of voting and are convinced that if they cast their ballot in the black box they will be considered enemies of the regime and treated accordingly.

Devices of "political democracy," such as elections, people's courts, and the Supreme People's Council are of value to the regime. In the broadest sense they create ostensible popular sanctions for an authoritarian regime and conceal the fact that the regime appoints all its officials. They give the citizenry, restricted though it is, a sense

of participation in basic political processes. In a narrower sense, they provide an efficient medium for moulding public opinion and obtaining support for policies that are centrally determined and then disseminated through a ritual of popular initiative and consent. The superficiality of these forms is not fully apparent to the Korean people, who are without experience in representative government. In addition, they are useful as a means of misleading the South Korean people as to the true nature of the North Korean system.

c. ELECTION RESULTS—Three major election campaigns have been conducted in North Korea since 1945. In all these elections, according to North Korean official reports, virtually all registered voters appeared at the polls; there were no contested election seats; and the official slate of candidates was almost unanimously approved. In view of the elaborate precautions taken by the regime to secure a complete turnout and unanimous approval for the government, the above claims are probably substantially correct.

The major election in the 1945-50 period was held for representatives in the Supreme People's Council in 1948. The regime claimed that 99.97% of the North Korean electorate participated and that, in addition 8,600,000 South Koreans elected delegates to a convention which selected 360 assemblymen to represent the south. According to a reliable U.S. source, the latter claim is considered almost wholly a fabrication of North Korean propaganda. The regime claimed that the official slate of 212 candidates in the north was approved by 98.49% of the registered voters. Of the 212 elected assemblymen, 102 were members of the North Korean Labor Party, blocs of 35 each were from the North Korea Democratic Party and the *Ch'ondokyo*, and the remaining 40 were either independents or members of key social organizations. The occupations of all the assemblymen, including those from South Korea, were as follows:

Serving with political parties	276	Teachers	16
Working for the government	47	Doctors	3
Laborers	35	Intellectuals	9
Farmers	92	Religious followers	16
Engineers and technicians	5	Enterprises	14
		Merchants	10
		Handicraftsmen	5
		Others	44
		Total	572

Two sets of local elections have been conducted in North Korea: one in late 1946 and early 1947, and the other in March and November-December 1949. Almost all eligible voters cast their ballots in these elections. The first local election was held on November 6, 1946 to choose 3,459 members of the provincial, county, and city people's

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committees. The North Korean regime reported that 99.2% of the voters favored the official candidates, while other sources indicated that from 7% to 13% of the voters voted against these candidates. On February 24 and 25, 1947, elections were held for 53,314 members of the people's committees; at village level 99.55% of the eligible electorate were reported to have participated in the voting, with 3,859,319 ballots cast. On March 5, 1947, 13,444 candidates were elected to the township people's committees, with 99.98% of eligible voters participating.

The first 1949 election was held on March 30, 1949, for the 5,853 representatives of the people's committees at province and county level. Seven provincial people's committees, 92 county people's committees, 11 city people's committees, and the 5 P'yongyang (capital of North Korea) ward committees, together with the P'yongyang city people's committee were elected. It was reported that out of 4,574,235 registered voters, 4,573,916 ballots were cast. The average support obtained by the candidates was reported to be about 98%. All of the elected candidates had been approved by the Labor Party. In the November-December 1949 election for township, and for village and rural precinct people's committees, over 3,800,000 people, or 99.9% of the registered voters, participated, according to official report. The opposition vote was negligible—2.5% and 1.1%, respectively, according to official announcements for village level elections.

3. The Democratic Front

a. GENERAL.—In North Korea, there have been no private organizations exerting influence upon government policies similar to pressure groups. Instead, the communists fostered the development of new social organizations, and later established a Democratic Front to bind these organizations and the parties together. No social organizations were tolerated other than those encompassed in the Front. The average North Korean's closest and most frequent contacts with the state are through his membership in the particular social organizations of which he performs a member. The membership of these organizations includes persons of both sexes, most age groups, all social strata, all occupations, and all shades of opinion permissible within the North Korean population. The "private" sector of social activity is brought thoroughly under the control of the regime through these organizations. Far from pressuring the regime these social organizations are actually the foundation for much of the control exercised by the regime over the populace.

Social organizations were founded in ten major fields of group activity during late 1945 and early 1946 as part of the general Soviet program of instituting Soviet political techniques as a means of mobilizing and controlling group activity in North Korea. There are social organizations for:

- Labor (North Korean Federation of Trade Unions)
- Agriculture (Farmer's League)
- Youth (Democratic Youth League)
- Women (Democratic Women's Federation)
- Culture and technology (Teacher's Union, League for Writers and Artists, League of Industrial Technicians, Korean Soviet Cultural Association, Physicians' Union, Scientists' Union, Lawyers' Union, Health Association, Language Society, Athletic Association, and some 15 others)
- Publishing houses (People's Press and others)
- Cooperatives (Cooperative Society)
- Civilian-military organizations (Student-Soldier Alliance, and others)
- Relief (Red Cross)
- Religion (Christian Union, Buddhist Society)

There were others for miscellaneous activities (various anti-Japanese committees, World Congress for Peace, and others). Their membership varies widely. The Youth League accepts members on the basis of age and the cooperatives recruit among consumers. Social organizations vary greatly in size and importance, the Youth League claiming 1,500,000 members and the Artists' League a mere 2,500.

In June 1946, these organizations and the political parties were incorporated into the Democratic People's Coalition Front (commonly referred to as the Democratic Front), an agency designed to give the appearance of mass support for the regime and to permit the Labor Party to supervise the member organizations. During the formative period of the social organizations, both the Democratic Front and the Labor Party maintained units in the provinces, countries, and cities to oversee social activities. In 1947, however, the Labor Party abandoned its local social departments, and in June 1949, when the Democratic Front was reorganized as the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland, or Democratic Unification Front, and enlarged to encompass the South Korean front organizations, it also gave up most of its regional apparatus. Thenceforth, the Democratic Front served solely to govern the social organizations and minor political parties.

Since the Korean war many of the minor organizations have virtually ceased functioning, while the larger ones have had to be reorganized and partially restaffed to adjust to wartime conditions.

It would be a grave error to assume that because the Democratic Front is designed to supply the regime with a popular façade, the social or-

organizations have no functions beyond those of participating in elections and staging demonstrations. Actually, they furnish the regime a major tool for manipulating the society. Through them the regime disciplines, educates, and keeps close watch over each social group. Even more important, through them the regime rallies the energies and talents of the people behind its economic and social programs. The trade unions aid in the mobilization of labor; the Artists' League and the People's Press provide the means for censoring as well as disseminating ideas; the Technicians' League helps the government make more effective use of limited technical skills; the Youth League provides a training ground for future party members and rallies youthful energies to aid in state projects; the cooperatives constitute an important element in the distribution system of the state; and the Women's Federation helps break down the traditional influence of the family.

In addition, the social organizations, many of them members of Soviet international front organizations, give the illusion of complete solidarity between the people of North Korea and the people of the Soviet world camp, and within North Korea provide an important vehicle for the transmission of Soviet culture and the rationalization of Soviet policies. The North Korean Federation of Trade Unions belongs to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and North Korean associations such as the youth, women's, students, scientists, and peace organizations hold membership in their Soviet world counterparts.

In the intensity and nature of their activities the social organizations obviously vary widely. Documents reveal that the Democratic Youth League carries out projects in many fields: it 1) organizes celebrations of national holidays, 2) supports new irrigation projects, 3) rallies mass energies behind the economic plan, and 4) educates people on the virtue of buying state bonds. Records of the Korean-Soviet Cultural Association show its exceptional diligence in 1) sponsoring lectures, 2) holding writing contests, 3) publishing books, 4) conducting Russian-language courses, and 5) propagating Soviet art forms. On the other hand, the League for Writers and Artists in its day-out work schedules deals with a special problem and with a small number of individuals. At present one organization, the large Democratic Women's Federation, apparently has never measured up to expectations. Sources indicate that women have been reluctant to change their traditional way pattern of life. For example, a league recently criticized women for reading Japanese magazines instead of Stalin's polemics and for showing only a perfunctory interest in juvenile welfare work and in the operation of day nurseries.

In their organization, all the social groups are fashioned after the Labor Party; they all have elected congresses, standing committees, and work teams. Where justified by age, sex, or occupational factors, they are permitted to organize units in schools, economic installations, or government offices. Many of the larger organizations have local offices paralleling those of the government and the Labor Party, but the smaller ones frequently do not have offices below the county level. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to the Labor Party the social organizations do not form cells; further, they do not seriously overlap the functions of the party or intrude noticeably into the government proper.

b. THE YOUTH LEAGUE — The Democratic Youth League deserves examination in detail as the most influential, although perhaps not the most typical, social organization of the Democratic Front. Persons of either sex who are within the ages 16 to 26 automatically become members of the Youth League. According to league spokesmen, the function of its members is to assist the government's administrative and security organs in carrying out their operations. Depending upon the area, youth leaguers are to:

- Help the township and village officials carry out land reform
- Help in the preparation for collection of tax-in-kind
- Assist with conscription
- Assist in campaigns against disease
- Assist in elections
- Help with adult education
- Take part in projects to build or repair roads, bridges, and irrigation systems
- Lead in the celebration of holidays
- Assist the army and garrison forces in training, sanitation, and maintenance of discipline
- Assist the police as informants and auxiliary local guards
- In general, set the example in supporting the government

For these purposes a large organization with over 2,000 full-time employees has been set up, with central headquarters in P'yongyang and departments paralleling the departments of the Labor Party from the province down to and including the township. The township committee of the youth corps, for example, employs seven full-time workers, with responsibilities for such matters as organization, personnel, propaganda, supply, and agriculture.

General meetings of the township Youth League are held twice a month. During such crises as floods, special meetings can be called. Youth League assemblies are also held every few weeks in constabulary and army regiments. At these meetings, officers criticize performances during the preceding period and lay out work for the coming

period. No other social organizations are represented at or participate in any way in these meetings. Each organization maintains its separate activity and separate lines of authority, and the only intermingling that occurs is by reason of dual membership in social organizations (a peasant might be a member of both the Youth League and Farmers' League, for example) or participation in Labor Party work. In addition, the Youth League conducts lengthy indoctrination sessions three nights a week for village members. At these sessions the brighter members of the village clubs, who have been specially instructed by the paid propagandists of the township, "enlighten" their fellow members with respect to "human history, science and superstition, the struggle for Korean independence, the U.S.S.R. in World War II, prin-

ciples of the Youth League, the Youth League of the U.S.S.R., and the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Following a round of lectures, township officials conduct examinations of the membership. For those who miss the lectures there may be public ridicule at the next general meeting. Disciplinary action usually involves reprimands and intensified education. Habitual rule-breakers may be expelled, with consequent social ostracism and economic hardship. As with the Labor Party, however, repentance or contrition paves the way for readmittance to the league.

In this fashion, the youth in North Korea are made a disciplined force at the service of the state. And the Labor Party and the state thus develop a reservoir of trustworthy future officials.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**D. Comments on principal sources****1. Evaluation**

The principal source materials used in preparing this Section were the reports of U.S. Government agencies, the published materials listed below comprising a secondary group of sources. Except for some gaps in information on the independence movement, covered in Subsection A, and on some phases of North Korean political activity, covered in Subsection C, the materials afforded generally reliable and adequate information.

Discussion of the independence movement is based principally upon *Sources 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 16, Source 8* providing the most reliable general coverage. *Source 16* was used for the development of Korean Communist activity within the U.S.S.R. and the Comintern. The Soviet publications upon which *Source 16* is based appear to afford reliable information on principal developments, but detail is lacking. These sources collectively permit formulation of generally reliable treatment of the major phases of the independence movement, but broad gaps remain in information on several phases of the movement: 1) the Yen-an activities, 2) the Manchurian activities, and 3) developments after 1930 in all areas, particularly in the U.S.S.R. and within Korea.

Sources 3 and 5 and reports of U.S. Government agencies give adequate and reliable coverage of developments within Korea other than the independence movement, and *Sources 4 and 7* are adequate and reliable for the even more limited treatment given developments before the twentieth century.

U.S. Government reports and *Sources 10 to 15* furnish reliable and generally adequate information upon South Korean political parties and elections, discussed in Subsection B. *Source 5* is of only limited reliability and adequacy on these subjects. *Source 15* contains the texts of the ordinances and other laws of the military government period referred to in Subsection B. The volume of information on political parties is great, but few general reports have been prepared, and these are now outdated. Particularly because of the fluidity of the parties, the information available is not completely adequate, particularly in regard to the nonparty organizations, such as the National Society and Emergency League for Patriotic Mobilization. *Source 10* supplies exhaustive primary materials on the election system, as of 1948, and, together with reports of U.S. Government agencies, affords reliable and adequate information upon the elections. Material supplied by a Department of State analyst who spent April-June 1950 in South Korea reporting upon the 1950 election has been useful. The

only important lack of information concerning South Korean elections is with regard to details of the elective posts below the central government level.

The discussion of pressure groups in South Korea, in Subsection B, is based largely upon newspaper translations. It is believed to be generally reliable, and the information appears adequate for the coverage of this unimportant phase of South Korean politics.

Except for *Sources 11 and 14*, which give limited information on the North Korean elections, the discussion of North Korean parties and elections in Subsection C is based entirely upon reports of U.S. Government agencies. Much of the information was secured by a Department of State mission to North Korea in late 1950, supplemented by the later work of a Department of State analyst in Korea in 1951. These sources provided relatively adequate information of the organization and activities of the Labor Party, the general structure of social organizations, and the pattern of election procedures. There was less complete information on the minor parties, the detailed activities of the social organizations, and on certain aspects of Labor Party organization, notably, the internal structure of leadership and the day-to-day relationships between the party leaders and the Soviet Union.

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