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DISPATCH NO. MGMA 13186

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TO : Chief, SR Division
 Chief, RE Division
 FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 23 June 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Material on Micheal KORZAN.

Ref: WASH-45063

*also Micheal WALAWICZ
 aka [unclear] XVORK HEIM*

1. In accordance with request contained in reference transmitted herewith is detailed data on Micheal KORZAN's training and work with the Abwehrstelle and the OUN.
2. The above report does not contain information regarding:
 - A. Micheal KORZAN's life from birth until entry into the OUN.
 - B. Micheal KORZAN's activity since his arrival in Germany.
3. This information will be transmitted soonest.

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RI/AN	
RI/MIS	
RI/Files	

Approved:

cu

- Distribution
- 2 - SR w 2/Att. (Direct)
 - 1 - RE w 1/Att. (Direct)
 - 2 - COS w 2/Att.
 - 2 - CSOB (MOB) w 1/Att.

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BIOGRAPHY

1. Subject's work with the German Counterintelligence service was performed with Abwehrstelle III, KRAKOW. Prior to making any statement regarding his Abwehrstelle service, Subject wished to give the following reasons for breaking the vow of secrecy that he signed when he originally went to work for German intelligence. They are as follows:

a. The German Government to which he gave his vow of secrecy no longer exists.

b. In 1947, [redacted] read to Subject data in the possession of U.S. Intelligence in which one Frans TAREK describes in detailed fashion the work which was done by the Subject for German intelligence.

c. Subject is convinced that the disclosure of the following information would not have any detrimental effect on any of the personnel with whom he was associated during his intelligence work.

Subject feels that the above three points free him from his moral obligation to keep his association with the German intelligence service secret. Subject feels that the Americans to whom he is giving the biographical information will not deem it necessary to investigate and/or prosecute the friends about whom he is giving information and who have kept secret their connection with the Abwehrstelle. Many of these have emigrated to the U.S.

2. On or about the first half of November 1939, Subject went from RADDHO to KRAKOW, where at 28 or 24 Zelena Ulica he met Colonel Roman XSEUSKO, who was at that time a member of the Provid OUN. The meeting with

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SHUSKO was arranged by his friend Walter ~~WALTER~~ ~~WALTER~~ staff member of the UPA Command. Colonel Roman SHUSKO was not known personally to Subject prior to this meeting. Subject knew only that he was a member of the OUN Provid and operating for the OUN in Germany. Before Subject met SHUSKO, the latter often sent him instructions via couriers travelling from Germany to the Western Ukraine. This was during the years 1935 to 1937. SHUSKO often sent instructions to Subject through Mariya ~~CHMERINSKA~~ who used to come to Western Ukraine through Czechoslovakia. Through her Subject also sent reports, describing the activities of the OUN in Western Ukraine, to Roman SHUSKO in Germany. (Until 1939, Subject's acquaintance with Roman SHUSKO was only through the above association. During their meeting in 1939, Roman SHUSKO revealed that he had excellent connections with the German General Staff and wished to organize a Ukrainian section of the German Counteringintelligence service. He was interested in bringing into this section the best available personnel from the organization OUN. He wanted the best trained, the most trusted and those with the strongest character. He wanted these people to gain experience working for the German CE service in order that they might work in the CE service of the Ukraine in the event it became independent. Colonel SHUSKO, who knew that the Subject was a successful organizer in the OUN, WANTED HIM TO work for the German CE. Subject agreed. When Subject parted with Colonel SHUSKO, he was told that he would be contacted by a member of the OUN who would give him further details about his new work. On or about the end of November 1939, Eng. Eugene ~~WRECHONA~~, Eng. Yaroslav ~~HLADKY~~ and Subject's close friend Lubow ~~HLADKY~~ visited Subject and gave him detailed information about his future work with the Abwehrstelle. Eng. WRECHONA told Subject that he would be given identity documents, a gun and a permit to carry it. Subject's job was outlined as follows:

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a. The organization of a network of personnel on the border running from YANOSLAV through RADIMNO to ^{PZAVMIL} PEREMYSL for the purpose of gathering information on the persons who crossed this border illegally.

b. Subject's job was to determine either personally or through his informers whether the illegal crossers were ordinary refugees or Soviet agents.

c. Using these escapees, some of whom would be double agents, he was supposed to run a net into the Soviet Union for the purpose of getting the following information.

- 1) Determine the towns in which the border guard detachments of the NKVD were stationed.
- 2) Determine how many men were in each detachment.
- 3) Determine the names of the officers and non-commissioned officers in these detachments.
- 4) Determine which of these officers were concerned with dispatch of Soviet agents into Germany.
- 5) Determine which crossing points were used by the Soviets to send their agents across the border.
- 6) Determine which of the border residents were working as agents for the NKVD.
- 7) Determine the town in which the command post of these border detachments was located.
- 8) What cover stories were being used by the Soviet agents.
- 9) How much money was paid the Soviet agents who crossed the border.
- 10) The missions of the Soviet agents.
- 11) Whom the Soviet agents met on the German side of the border.

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Subject's immediate job when he received his documents was to effect liaison with the German commander in the area of his work. He was to present himself to the local German Army Commanders and explain that he was connected with the Abwehrstelle, show his supporting documents and work in conjunction with the Army commanders on the above tasks. The local Commander was obligated to give Subject all aid he requested but Subject was not authorized to transmit any of his reports to the German Commander. WRECHONA, in addition, told Subject that the appropriate Army commanders would be notified that he was to work in their area. The above were all the instructions given Subject when he first went to work for the Abwehrstelle.

3. WRECHONA told Subject that he, as an old member of OUN, would know what details to organize to carry out the work. WRECHONA left Subject his address in KRAKOW, which to the best of Subject's recollection was 27 Bahnhofstrasse. WRECHONA told him that he could always go there to talk over any problems that might arise. He also gave Subject a Postal Box number to which he was to send his reports. All of Subject's reports in sealed envelopes were to be given to the Postmaster in RADOMNO for transmittal to KRAKOW. Further, WRECHONA instructed Subject on the method to be used in writing his reports. All of Subject's reports went to KRAKOW under the identity number R 2. Reports were to be written in the following form:

- a. What Subject personally saw or heard.
- b. What Subject's informers told him they personally saw or heard.
- c. What Subject's informers learned from their sources.
- d. Evaluation of the source.
- e. At the end of each report Subject was to put down his opinions and his plans for further investigation.

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Subsequent to giving Subject the above information, WRECHONA and HLADNY left for KRAKOW and Subject began organizing his network. Subject considered this job as easy since, just prior to this time, he had a job as city inspector under the Mayor of RADIMNO, which gave him freedom of movement to do his organizing. Subject was personally acquainted with the Mayors of the border towns who often came to RADIMNO in connection with their administrative work.

Subject began his work by going to each of the border towns in his assigned area for discussions with priests, teachers and mayors to determine which individuals in their localities were communists or had connections, family or otherwise, with the Russian zone, and which individuals were strong Ukrainian nationalists. Subject compiled this information in order to determine whom he could approach to recruit as his informers. Subject personally met and talked to all of the likely prospects in order to formulate his own opinions about them. This preparatory work took about two weeks. Two weeks after his talk with WRECHONA, Subject received his documents. These documents stated that the bearer of the document was in the service of the German army, that the military police and all civilians were ordered to aid the bearer in carrying out his duties and that the bearer had the authority to carry a weapon. On the other side of the document there was a photograph of the Subject and the pseudonym Michael WALAWICZ. Upon receipt of this document, Subject presented himself to the Commanders of the Army units in YAROSLAV, RADIMNO and PERKMYSL and also to the Commissioner of the German border guards. Subject told these persons that he worked in the Abwehrstelle in KRAKOW and requested their help in his work. They gave their promise of help. Subsequently, Subject travelled to the towns on his border area and gave instructions to his recruits. Those recruits

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whom Subject remembers are categorized as follows: (1) Have remained in the homeland and would be willing to participate in the anti-Bolshevik cause; (2) Remained in the homeland and would possibly help the anti-Bolshevik cause; (3) Emigrated to Canada or the U.S.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Town</u>
Ivan DIDICH	SKOLOSHIV (1)
Johann WIRT	RADIMNO (3)
Volydmyr PAVLICK	RADIMNO (2)
Omelan KUSHNIR	RADIMNO (1)
Dmitro LAZOR	SKOLOSHIV (1)
Ivan HRYCHUSKO	SVIATE (1)
Ottech Ivan CHERKOWSKY	RADIMNO (1)
Petro HRYCHUSKO (Lawyer)	RADIMNO (1)
Pavlo TRYHIBENKO (restaurant)	RADIMNO (1)
Olexander MATLA	YAROSLAV (3)
Lev ZAYACH	YAROSLAV (3)
Lev SHUMSKY	PEREMYSL (3)
Maria SHUMSKY	PEREMYSL (3)

b. After Subject recruited his informers, got their photographs and addresses, he reported to Eng. WRECHONA in KRAKOW, where he met WRECHONA's superior, TARBUK. TARBUK was a former Austrian officer who was at this time an officer in the German army. TARBUK was an older cultured, intelligent man with a jovial personality. He made a very good impression on the Subject. Subject was immediately accepted by TARBUK as a close friend and they addressed each other with the familiar German du form. TARBUK was very well satisfied with Subject's initial report. During this meeting, TARBUK took Subject's oath of secrecy which bound him to maintain secrecy even after he stopped working for the GIS. On the evening of this same day, TARBUK invited Subject WRECHONA and Yaroslav HLAJKO to his home for a social gathering. During the evening, TARBUK repeated to Subject the assignment already given him by WRECHONA. He also told Subject that he would get full cooperation in RADIMNO from the Commissioner of the Border guards, MANUWARDA, a good friend of TARBUK's from Vienna. Vienna was TARBUK's home town. He also related that MANUWARDA had telephone him

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(TARBUK) after Subject's visit and stated that Subject had made a good impression. MANUWARDA promised TARBUK that all the people who were arrested at the border would be turned over to Subject before being turned over to the Gestapo. As a result of the information gained from prisoners caught at the border and interrogated by Subject, as well as information received by Subject from his informers, Subject rapidly became orientated on the situation in the Soviet zone. In four months Subject knew where the Soviet border detachments were, how many soldiers and officers were in the command headquarters of these detachments and many names of the officers as well as of the intelligence officers. It was also possible for Subject to find out the border crossing points used by Russian agents.

5. In the first months of 1940 a man named Stephen REVAK crossed the German-Russian border. Stephen REVAK was a brother of Vasyl REVAK, who together with Subject had been a member of OUN P.avid in 1939 when both were arrested and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Stephen REVAK was happy to meet Subject and asked if Subject knew where his brother Vasyl was. Subject gave Stephen REVAK his brother's address in KRAKOW. Stephen REVAK related that the Soviets arrested him and that, after three weeks in jail, they set him free, whereupon he escaped to the Germans. Subject suspected that Stephen REVAK was sent by the Russians and held him up in RADIMHO to interrogate him about his Russian connections. During this interrogation, Stephen REVAK admitted that he had been recruited by the Russians and that he was supposed to go to KRAKOW to penetrate the OUN there. Stephen REVAK said that he had been recruited by a Soviet (Major) named MAMONOV, the commander of the Russian border guard in PEREMYSL. He revealed where the command Headquarters of the border guard detachments was located, gave the names of Soviet officers and the places where he had crossed the border. He explained the orders he had been given regarding his mission in KRAKOW.

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These were as follows:

- a. Determine what position his brother Vasyl REVAK had in the OUN.
- b. Determine whether or not he himself could become a member of OUN in KRAKOW.
- c. In two months, he was to return to PEREMYSL and report on his findings.

In the event that the Soviet border guard arrested him, he was supposed to tell them to take him to Major PETROV in PEREMYSL. Stephen REVAK said that he had no desire to work for the Russians but that he had agreed to work for them only because he knew that it was the only way in which he could be freed from jail. He had intentions of telling his brother and the members of OUN about his recruitment by the Soviets. Subject, knowing that Vasyl REVAK and his brother Stephen REVAK were nationalists, had no reason to disbelieve him. Subject was satisfied to get so much information from him and rode with Stephen REVAK to KRAKOW where he turned him over to WRECHONA and Vasyl REVAK. WRECHONA, HADKY and TARBUK decided to make Stephen REVAK a double agent. They drew up false reports about OUN in KRAKOW and approached Stephen REVAK with the proposition that he take these false reports to the Soviets in PEREMYSL. Stephen REVAK refused to follow through on the plan, whereupon WRECHONA changed his plan. WRECHONA sent Stephen REVAK to the hospital in KRAKOW, where the Ukrainian doctors falsely diagnosed Stephen REVAK as a tuberculosis patient and committed him to the KRAKOW tuberculin hospital. This hospital cover for Stephen REVAK was concocted because WRECHONA knew that the Soviets could easily check on REVAK's whereabouts.

6. WRECHONA and TARBUK then contacted an old, trusted delegate of OUN from Iavorov, who volunteered to go to PEREMYSL and report to Major MAMONOV in Stephen REVAK's place with the cover story that REVAK could not come because he was hospitalized but would return to PEREMYSL when he was

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again well. This volunteer was supposed to give to the Russians the reports that were worked up by WRECHONA and TAREUK. HLADKY brought the volunteer to RADIMNO, where the Subject, in coordination with the German border guards, sent the volunteer to PERMYSL. This volunteer's pseudonym was IMANN. IMANN did not return to RADIMNO for two months and Subject feared that the Soviets had broken him. In the month of April 1940 IMANN returned to RADIMNO from Permyal. He related a story about the terrible ordeals he had suffered while held in the Russian prison. Major MAMONOV, the story went, did not believe that he was sent by Stephen REVAK but instead suspected him of being a German agent. He gave the Russians his real name and place of birth and said that he had served in the Polish Army and had fallen prisoner to the Germans. The Russians were able to check his story since his place of birth was on the Russian side of the border and they found it to be true. The reports that he carried to the Russians looked authentic, because they were written in Stephen REVAK's own hand. Through their agents, the Russians checked on the hospital story and found it to be true and also found out that IMANN and S. REVAK had been known to each other before the war. These things were all in favor of IMANN. However, the Russians remained doubtful because they could not understand why IMANN had voluntarily agreed to work for them. The NKVD spent two months trying to break IMANN, without success. Finally he was brought before a mock court and sentenced to death together with another man. One night while these men awaited their execution, Major MAMONOV came into the jail and ordered them both to turn their faces to the wall. When they did, MAMONOV's men shot IMANN's cellmate who fell dead. IMANN remained silent throughout the action, spattered with his jail mate's blood. MAMONOV ordered his

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men to reload. When IMANN continued to remain silent and calm HAMONOV finally seemed to accept the fact that he was not a German agent. Subsequent to this incident, IMANN was given plush treatment and prepared by HAMONOV to return to Germany. He was given the following mission:

- a. Learn the whereabouts of a Mr. X who lived in the environs of RADIMNO (Subject does not remember the man's name.).
- b. To determine what happened to the people who formerly lived at 10 Senkevitch Ulitsa in RADIMNO and the identity of the people currently living there.
- c. After learning a. and b. he was to go to KRAKOW and tell Stephen REVAK to return to PERMYSL as soon as he was well.
- d. IMANN was not to tell REVAK that he was recruited by the Russians.
- e. Return to PERMYSL in one month to report on his activity.

Subject did not want to let IMANN return to KRAKOW alone, so he phoned WRECHOMA who sent Yaroslav ^{HLADKY} HLATKO to guide IMANN to KRAKOW. Subject began to check up on IMANN to ascertain the truth of his story. Subject looked up the Mr. X mentioned in a. above. Mr. X, a worker, lived near RADIMNO and did not know how to read or write. However, since the Russians were interested in him, Subject suspected that he was a Russian agent. Subject's informer, Ivan DIDUCH, ascertained that Mr. X was a Russian agent whose job was to take people from the Russian to the German side of the border by boat. DIDUCH further ascertained that the worker (Mr. X) was attached to the Russian intelligence branch in the town of VISOTSKO. A month and a half earlier, the Russians had sent Mr. X to RADIMNO to determine who lived at 10 Sinkevitch Ulitsa. Mr. X had told DIDUCH that he did not want to work with the Russians any ~~more~~ ^{longer}.

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7. During this time (March, 1940), the Gestapo was arresting all Polish officers and sending them to concentration camps. Among those arrested was an Edward SKWARCHINSKY, who lived on the border in RADIMNO. When Subject determined who lived at 10 SINDEVITCH, he decided that the son of the people who lived there was this Polish officer, Edward SKWARCHINSKY, who had been arrested a few months before and had been sent to a German concentration camp. Subject decided the following:

- a) Edward SKWARCHINSKY must be a Russian agent.
- b) He had been crossing to the Russian zone with reports until his arrest and now the Russians wanted to trace him.

Subject gave the above conclusions to Major TARBUK, who agreed. Subject then requested that Edward SKWARCHINSKY be freed from the concentration camp and returned to RADIMNO, where Subject planned to surveil him to determine definitely if he had contact with the Russians. After two weeks, SKWARCHINSKY was released along with two other Polish officers to cast off suspicion. After SKWARCHINSKY had been in RADIMNO for three days, Subject got a report on him from the German Border guards who were surveilling him. They claimed that, at 11 o'clock at night on the roof of SKWARCHINSKY's home, there had been a red light. This was considered a signal to the Russian zone. After the light, the report went on, three green rockets were fired from the Russian zone. Subject decided that the red light denoted SKWARCHINSKY had returned to his home and that the three green lights meant that the signal on SKWARCHINSKY's home had been noted. Subject had SKWARCHINSKY surveilled day and night and, on the third day after the above-mentioned signals, SKWARCHINSKY went to the Russian zone. He returned to RADIMNO on the German side in three days, thus leading authenticity to Subject's story that SKWARCHINSKY was a Soviet agent. Further surveillance of SKWARCHINSKY disclosed that he

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had 16 persons working for his net in RADIMNO. These were former buyers, engineers, workers and restaurant owners. Most of these worked as ordinary laborers at the German military installations in RADIMNO. SKWARCHINSKY had no job but had a lot of money. He spent most of his time in a restaurant carrying on lengthy discussions with German soldiers. Subject further learned that SKWARCHINSKY was meeting with the German border guard commander, named SHMIDT, and his deputy whose name is unknown to Subject. SKWARCHINSKY always bought whiskey for them to take home and paid for their drinks. Subject immediately decided that SKWARCHINSKY had recruited SHMIDT and his deputy into the Soviet intelligence net. Subject passed a report on this to both Major TAREUK and WRECHONA. Later, Subject determined that SKWARCHINSKY was crossing the border with SHMIDT's assistance.

8. The Abwehrstelle, on the basis of Subject's reports, determined that SHMIDT had been a member of the Communist Party in Austria and, when Austria was annexed to Germany in 1938, SHMIDT joined the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party) and was a rabid Nazi. His deputy came from the Sudetenland and had communistic leanings. He had belonged to the Czech Communist Party. Subject had difficulty in surveilling both of these men and requested the assistance of Commissioner MANUARDA, who sent a man to conduct the surveillance. The Abwehrstelle in KRAKOW decided not to liquidate the net at this time but rather to watch it closely. While Subject was working on the above case, he was able to compromise several other Soviet agents. Some of them were agents because of their communistic beliefs, others because of pressure applied by the Russians. One of these Soviet agents was named Stephen WIENZ, a Ukrainian national who lived in the Soviet zone and had his family in the German zone. He was caught by the Soviets while trying to cross the border to join his family and was sentenced to ten years in Siberia. While waiting to go to Siberia, he was recruited by the NKVD to work for them

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in the German zone on the following missions:

- a) Gather information on the strength of the German Army in the area of RADIMNO.
- b) Recruit a member of his family in the town of SOBNICHA to collect information on the border crossers arrested by the Germans, their disposition and the names of border crossers sent to the Soviet zone by the Germans.

Stephen VIENIZ said that the only reason he had become a Russian agent was to forestall a trip to Siberia. Subject sent VIENIZ to KRAKOW and, after two weeks, VIENIZ returned with Yaroslav HLADKO. HLADKO said they had succeeded in making VIENIZ a double and that he now was a German agent whose job would be to carry false information to the Russians and to return with true facts for the German intelligence service. The facts that the GIS hoped to get from VIENIZ were considered very valuable because they would indicate to the GIS what material was needed by the RIB. Subject also hoped to use VIENIZ to get the names of Soviet agents, their border crossing points and their cover stories. Briefly, it was Subject's intention to learn the tactics used by the Soviets.

9. Stephen VIENIZ was given the pseudonym "OTTO". Subject now had two double agents crossing his section of the border: OTTO and IMANN. Soon Subject was able to uncover another Soviet agent. This was a young farmer from the town of HAYIE VELIKE on the Russian side of the border. His name was Ivan PODOLYAK. ^{former RIB agent} PODOLYAK was ordered by the RIB to go to the town of PEREVORSK and there to find an informer who would give him data about the German Factory Police, which had the job of guarding the factories, military installations and ammunition dumps. Subject had a short discussion with Ivan PODOLYAK and rapidly deduced that he was a Russian agent. Subject had learned from IMANN

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and OTTO that Russian agents received Polish money in silver coins. The old Polish paper currency was useless since Poland was occupied by the Germans who had issued German occupation currency. Therefore, Subject knew that anyone who crossed the border with Polish silver coins should be suspected of being a Russian agent. PODOLYAK had 150 Polish silver pieces with him when he crossed the border. Subject also learned that PODOLYAK crossed the border at a point through which the Russians normally sent their agents. All this knowledge aided Subject in breaking PODOLYAK rapidly. PODOLYAK admitted being a Russian agent and wrote a long document on what he knew about the Russian side, including names of Soviet officers that he knew. This information tallied with information that Subject already had in his possession. Subject decided that PODOLYAK was a good candidate for a double agent. Major KORAB and Yaroslav HADKO came to RADIMNO from KRAKOW and recruited PODOLYAK as a double agent. [To clarify the identity of Major KORAB, Subject stated that on or about June 1940, a (Major) ^{Francis [unclear] of the G.I.S.} KORAB came to KRAKOW for the purpose of working with the Ukrainian section of the Abwehr network. Subject had often met him in RADIMNO dressed in civilian clothes.] PODOLYAK was given the pseudonym "ALSO". His mission was to give the Russians false data about the German Factory Police. The falsified information was worked up by the German General Staff. After PODOLYAK was doubled, Subject asked Major KORAB not to recruit any more doubles on his sector of the border, since he was not able to handle any more. Subject said that each double agent, as soon as he arrived in the German zone, was not permitted to remain alone as long as he was there. He had to be in the company of Subject's informers at all times and was not allowed to talk to anyone. Trips that these double agents were required to make by their Russian case officers had to be made in the company of Subject's informers. To the best of Subject's knowledge, these three double agents (OTTO, IMANN and ALSO) made ^{Security info} approximately ten trips each into the Russian zone.

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10. In June 1941, when the war with the Russians began, the Germans occupied PEREMISL and were successful in confiscating all the files that were contained in the offices of Major MAMONOV, the chief Russian case officer in the area. Among these reports, they found information on Subject's doubled agents. Subject found proof that his doubled agents had been faithful to him and had given the Russians no more than they were told to give. This was quite a boost to Subject's prestige, since the particular agents had been doubled on his recommendation. On or about October 1939, there was a man named Joseph SCHALAJ, ^{R.I.S. agent} who joined the net being run by Edward SMARCHINSKY. SCHALAJ was a Pole from RADIMNO, about 55 years old who, during the first world war, served in the Austrian Army and was taken prisoner by the Russians. During the October Revolution in 1917, he joined the Reds and fought with them against the Tsarist troops. When the Communists took over the Russian Government, he went to the school of the OGPU and was subsequently married in Russia. In 1921, he came to RADIMNO. When SCHALAJ left Russia for RADIMNO, he was told to wait there until contacted. The Russians told him that he would be contacted in 1, 2 or 20 years. He was ordered not to join the Communist Party or any nationalist party. He was allowed to join a socialist party. When he arrived in RADIMNO, he became a tinsmith. When Subject became concerned with SCHALAJ, the latter had two grown daughters. When the Germans came to RADIMNO, SCHALAJ bought a restaurant. All local citizens regarded him as a good, honest citizen.

11. In 1940, the Germans and Russians made an agreement about the exchange of civilians. On the basis of this agreement, the Germans on the Russian side were supposed to be sent to Germany, if they wished to go, and the Russians, if they so desired, could go to Russia. Both governments sent Repatriation Commissions to make preparations for the move. The Head of the Soviet Repatriation Commission in the territory of YAROSLAW, RADIMNO and PEREMISL

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on the German side, was Major MAMONOV. Subject and his informers soon determined that MAMONOV was the same man who was head of the Russian intelligence in PEREMYSL on the Russian side of the border. MAMONOV drove into the German zone with his commission every morning and returned to the Russian side every evening. He occasionally slept in the building where the Soviet Repatriation Commission did its work. Subject informed KRAKOW Abwehrstelle Headquarters of these facts. From this time on, MAMONOV was under surveillance. At the end of October or November 1940, Major MAMONOV with his commission personnel paid a visit to the mayor of RADIMNO, who was named CHERKOWSKY. MAMONOV ~~was~~ asked CHERKOWSKY to give him a car to take him to YAROSLAV, since his car had ~~been~~ broken down. CHERKOWSKY sent for a car while MAMONOV went to supper. In the meantime, CHERKOWSKY told Subject, MIRCH MICHAILIV and Ivan VARTZABA to watch MAMONOV. MICHAILIV and VARTZABA were Gestapo recruits and their job was to keep close watch over the work of the Soviet Repatriation Commission. Subject, MICHAILIV and VARTZABA followed MAMONOV and noticed that he went to the restaurant owned by Joseph SCHALAJ. After supper, MAMONOV went into a back room of the restaurant with SCHALAJ and remained there for twenty minutes. Subject assumed that MAMONOV was either trying to recruit SCHALAJ or was eliciting information from him. About midnight, a car arrived and MAMONOV left for YAROSLAV. Subject then ordered his informers to conduct a surveillance on SCHALAJ. Subject soon learned that SCHALAJ was meeting MAMONOV periodically. A few days after the restaurant meeting with MAMONOV, SCHALAJ went to the Russian zone and returned in two days. SCHALAJ told Subject that his trip to the German zone was for the purpose of purchasing beer. Subsequent surveillance of SCHALAJ after his trip to the Russian zone disclosed that Edward SKWARCHINSKY, who was also under surveillance, was now spending time in SCHALAJ's restaurant. Subject noted that ~~the~~ most intelligent of the suspicious persons

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SKMARCHINSKY. Subject assumed that SKMARCHINSKY was the resident officer. Subject knew that both SCHALAJ and SKMARCHINSKY made trips (or were planning to go) to the Russian zone, but did not know what their missions were. In order to find this out, Subject began visiting with Joseph SCHALAJ. At first, SCHALAJ gave Subject no hints about his work. However, when rapport was established, he began to ask Subject the following questions:

- a) Whom were the Germans arresting at the border?
- b) What were the phone numbers of Commissioner of the Border Police MANVARDA?
- c) How many German border guards were there on the border and how often did they change border guards?

Subject felt that, in addition to eliciting information, SCHALAJ was trying to recruit him. SCHALAJ knew that, on occasion, Subject was an interpreter for MANVARDA and that persons who were arrested at the border were sent to a prison over which Subject had some control. To cover his interest in border matters, SCHALAJ said that he occasionally smuggled goods across the border. Subject immediately called KRAKOW and asked Major KORAB to come to RADIMNO. After a few hours, KORAB came to RADIMNO. Commissioner MANVARDA, KORAB and Subject held a conference to determine what information Subject would be permitted to give in answer to SCHALAJ's questions. It was decided that Subject could tell SCHALAJ the times when the guard changed at the border since they decided that it was during these periods that SCHALAJ and SKMARCHINSKY would attempt to cross the border. After a few days, Subject met SCHALAJ and told him that the border guard changed at 2200 hours at the point between RADIMNO and OSTRIW and that from 2200 until 2230 hours this particular border point was

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unguarded. Actually, the border guard at this point had been doubled in size during the hours concerned. The additional guards were dressed in white and hid in the snow. The additional guards were instructed not to arrest anyone crossing, merely to write down their descriptions. After a few days, the border guards reported that Joseph SCHALAJ, whom they knew as a restaurant owner, had crossed to the Russian zone. One of the border guards, who was on the shore of the river SAN close to the Russian guard post, heard SCHALAJ answer that he was going to meet Captain IVANOV when he was challenged by guards at the Russian border point.

12. After several months of close surveillance of SCHALAJ and SEMARCHINSKY by Subject and his informers, the KARKOW Abwehrstelle headquarters decided to liquidate the network. On or about December 1940, they arrested about twenty-five people who had been uncovered by Subject and his informers. During the arrests, the following compromising materials were uncovered:

- a) Plans of the layout of military installations in the area of RABIMNO, YAROSLAW and PEREVOSK.
- b) A list of German officers stationed in the above areas.
- c) Troop strength of the German units in the above areas.
- d) Other compromising data, political, economic, etc.

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(All of the arrested persons were taken to a prison in TARNOW and later transferred to KRAKOW. Almost all of them confessed that they were Russian agents. The German Military Court in KRAKOW sentenced them in 1942 to long prison terms.

Subject had previously had an agreement with Major KORAB that Subject would not remain in the area of RADIMNO after the arrests, since the local population knew that Subject had had contact with the arrested persons. Subject suggested that he be arrested along with the rest and sent to the same prison as they were. His suggestion was accepted. Subject was arrested in a conspicuous manner and was sent to TARNOV. From TARNOV, Major KORAB took Subject to KRAKOW. In KRAKOW, Subject shaved his goatee, cut his hair, obtained a new set of false documents with the pseudonym "Eng. Lorenz VORKHEKIM", a German from Latvia.

Abwehrstelle KRAKOW decided to send Subject to another border point at the Village of SANOK. For his cover story in SANOK he was made head of an export firm which represented a brewery in SANOK. While Subject operated in RADIMNO, SKWARCHINSKY was the only one who suspected Subject as a possible German agent who could compromise his net. In SANOK, however, Subject was so well covered that even the German Administration in the town did not know who he actually was. In spite of his good cover, Subject spent most of his time in KRAKOW while his export firm was run by a Polish man named PRISCHEVSKY, who was once a captain in the Polish Army. PRISCHEVSKY was recommended to Subject by a (Dr.) SCHMIDT, who was a personal friend of Lt. Col. TARBUK in VIENNA and who lived in Poland since 1934 because he was of Jewish origin and had to flee Germany.

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In addition to Subject's work for the Abwehrstelle in RADIMNO with the three double agents and the 25 arrested personnel of the SKWARCHINSKY net, he also uncovered a Soviet agent, ~~METHODI STAWNICH~~^{STAWNICH}, who was a member of the OUN.
R.I.S. - agent

In the month of March or April 1940, Mayor CHERKOWSKY told Subject that a student of theology had come to his office. The student, METHODI STAWNICH, had letters written by Archbishop SHIPTITSKY to the Pope and Cardinal TISSERAN in Rome, to Cardinal SAPIEHA in KRAKOW and to Cardinal FAULHABER in Munich. STAWNICH was known to the Subject since his school days in the Greek Catholic theological seminary in LVOV, where STAWNICH was the head of the student body. He was also known to Subject as a member of the OUN, in which they worked together.

Subject asked Mayor CHERKOWSKY to tell STAWNICH to look him up. When STAWNICH failed to do so, Subject went to Mayor CHERKOWSKY's office and met his old friend there. Subject invited STAWNICH to his office where they talked for several hours. STAWNICH told Subject that he came to Germany to study theology and that before he left the Soviet zone, he visited Archbishop Andria SHEPTITSKY, who gave him a packet of letters which STAWNICH had with him. STAWNICH had been instructed to give the letters to Cardinal SAPIEHA in KRAKOW who was supposed to send them to their final addressees. This indicated to the Subject that SHIPTITSKY had a great deal of faith in STAWNICH. STAWNICH told Subject that he had crossed the border near the

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town of VISOTSKI on the Russian side and arrived at the town of OSTRIV on the German side of the river SAN. He further told Subject that he had dried his clothes at a Polish farmer's place in the town of OSTRIV. Subject immediately suspected STAWNICHI of being a Soviet agent, because the point at which STAWNICHI crossed was known to Subject as a point where the Soviets sent their agents across the SAN river in a boat. During the discussion, Subject stepped out of the room and sent his informers out to check on the farmer's home where STAWNICHI claimed to have dried his clothes. This farmer's place was just a few kilometers from RADIMNO. After ~~immediate~~ two hours, Subject's informers called him away from his discussion with STAWNICHI and told him that STAWNICHI had arrived at the Polish farmer's place in dry clothes and without muddy feet, which immediately indicated to Subject that STAWNICHI had lied and was probably a Soviet agent. During further discussion, Subject determined that STAWNICHI had no Polish money but did have 50 American dollars. Subject knew that the Soviets paid their agents with American money. When STAWNICHI asked Subject about his (STAWNICHI's) friends, Subject mentioned Alexander ~~MATLA~~, who was at the time working as an informer for Subject. STAWNICHI told Subject he would like to visit MATLA, and asked Subject to lend him Polish money. When Subject said he had none, STAWNICHI gave him \$50 (American) which he asked Subject to exchange for Polish money. This Subject did. Subject after completion of his talk with STAWNICHI borrowed Commissioner.

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MANUARDA'S car and went to YAROSLAW to warn Alexandr MATLA of STAWNICHY's impending visit and of Subject's suspicions that STAWNICHY was a Russian agent.

Subject instructed MATLA to further question STAWNICHY, then take him to KRAKOW and put Abwehrstelle Headquarters on his trail there. STAWNICHY was under constant surveillance from this time on. He began to contact members of OUN in KRAKOW and tried to learn about their plans. When one of the informers of the Abwehrstelle named Roman MIROVITCH, learned that STAWNICHY wished to return to LVOV, STAWNICHY was arrested. After his arrest, he confessed to the following:

1. From January 1940, he had been an agent of the NKGB.
2. He had been instructed to contact Archbishop SHIPTITSKY for the purpose of obtaining letters which SHIPTITSKY wrote to people living abroad and to transmit these letters to his Russian intelligence chief to be photocopied. The Russians were, at this time, compiling information on SHIPTITSKY to prove that he was an espionage agent for Rome and Berlin.
3. All the letters entrusted to STAWNICHY by (Archbishop) SHIPTITSKY were turned over to the NKGB to be photocopied.
4. In KRAKOW, he was supposed to determine whom the OUN was sending to LVOV for the purpose of directing underground work there.
5. For his work, he received 100 American dollars, 50 dollars of which he had Subject exchange for Polish currency in RADIMNO.
6. Russians had brought him to the town of VISOTSKO in an automobile and had taken him across the river SAN in a boat.

Since STAWNICHY had operated against the Ukrainians and not against the Germans, He was sentenced by the German court to only three years in prison.

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At the end of 1943, or the beginning of 1944, he was released from jail and went to rejoin his wife in the town of ZOLOCHIV where he was killed by the SB/OUN.

Subject stated that in addition to all of the above CE jobs that he performed, there were several other minor operations he ran but he does not remember the names of the individuals nor the exact details involved. All personnel who confessed to being Soviet agents were sent to German concentration camps and those who did not admit their Soviet connections were also tried and sentenced.

15. Subject claims that during the year he spent in BADIENNO, he was successful in uncovering almost 50 Soviet agents. Reasons he gave for his success were as follows:

1. Excellently organized system of informers.
2. In BADIENNO, Subject had support of the local police. The entire staff of the Mayor's office, all night watchmen, various workers, servants in many homes, waiters in restaurants, and street walkers were all part of his net.
3. Subject had excellent cover as inspector of the town.
3. Almost all Soviet agents were either Ukrainian or Polish and Subject knew how to approach them psychologically.
4. Subject's close liaison with the German border guards.

16. WORK IN SANOK AND ON THE EASTERN FRONT: January 1941 - May 1942

Subject arrived in SANOK in January 1941 under the pseudonym of Lorenz VORKHEIM. Subject's major co-worker was named Roman LEVITSKY. With LEVITSKY's help, Subject organized a small counter espionage net. In the SANOK area, as early as January 1941, Subject was successful in uncovering a few unimportant

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Soviet agents. The general public believed that there would soon be war between the Germans and the Russians. Lt. Col. TARBUK and Major KORAB told Subject and his colleagues that in the event of war, some of them would be transferred to the Eastern front. Subject received brief training for eastern front duty in the following subjects:

1. Organization of the Soviet Army.
2. Organization of the Intelligence sections of the Soviet Army.
3. Subject had to read many reports on the methods of the Soviet Intelligence Service as well as case histories worked up by the Germans.

17. In June 1941, when the war began, Subject together with Yaroslav ~~HLADKY~~ and Roman ~~PASHKEVICH~~ were attached to Abwehr Command # 4, Abwehr troop # 4. Subject's chief was (Captain) ~~Willie VECHORICH~~, who was from Königsberg. Abwehr command # 4 was attached to the 6th German Army (AOE 6). The sixth German Army was pushing East across the border at YAROSLAV, RADIMNO, PEREMYSL towards the Donbas region via TARNOPOL, ZHITOMIR, BILAZERKVA, VINNITSA, POLTAVA. A man named Mikola ~~STAROVID~~ joined the Abwehr No. 4 in LWOV. He had previously worked in RIASHIV with (Col) ~~SEANUTIN~~. In the Autumn of 1941, Yaroslav ~~HLADKO~~ was transferred from POLTAVA to KREMENCHUG to the Head Command of Abwehr # 4.

The job of the ABWEHR # 4 was as follows:

1. In each town that the Germans occupied, they were to collect all the archives of the NKVD and the local police; study these documents and determine what plans the enemy had.
2. On the basis of these documents, determine who of the local population were Soviet informers, who worked with the local police, and arrest them.

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3. Determine who of the Russians were left behind the lines to do espionage work, diversionist activity, or sabotage and to arrest them.
4. Uncover and arrest all Soviet spies and parachutists that the Russians dropped behind the German lines.
5. Anything else that might be classified as counter-espionage activity.

18. The most important operations that Subject can remember are:

1. In the city of CONSTANTINIVKA in the Donbas Region, Subject uncovered a group of 16 Soviet diversionists who had been instructed to blow up bridges. They were captured with 20 kg of dynamite as well as other explosive materials. Subject did not remember the names of any of these men.
2. In the city of KRAMATOROVKA, Subject uncovered a group of Soviet agents whose chief was the Mayor of the city, a German of Russian descent.
3. In the town of CONSTANTINOGRAD, Subject uncovered a group of Soviet agents. Subject does not remember their names.
4. In the city of CONSTANTINIVKA, Subject uncovered 2 Soviet radio stations which were transmitting troop movement information to the town of IZUMA, about 100 km away.

Besides these matters, there were other less important activities which Subject cannot remember.

19. In April 1942, Subject's commander, Capt. VYEHORICK, sent him as a courier to KREMENCHUHA Abwehr Post. Enroute, Subject was supposed to stop at the Resident Officer's home in VINNICA and give him his mail. While in VINNICA,

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Subject met Maj. KORAB who had just arrived from KRAKOW. KORAB asked Subject how he was getting along at the front. Subject answered that he had liked it better than in KRAKOW. KORAB said he would try to transfer Subject and Yaroslav HLADKO to KRAKOW. Subject continued on his way to KREMENCHUKA to complete his courier mission.

One month after Subject's return from his courier mission to the Donbas Region, Captain VYEHORICK got a radiogram in which he was ordered to send Subject back to KRAKOW.

At the end of May or the beginning of June 1942, Subject arrived in KRAKOW where he turned in his gun, and uniform and again became a civilian member of the Abwehrstelle 3 in KRAKOW. In KRAKOW, together with Yaroslav HLADKY, Subject was given the job of organizing the Ukrainian counter-intelligence office anew, which, during the war had become disorganized. Eng. WREGHONA, Roman MIROVITCH and Lubomir HLADKO moved to LVOV. Yaroslav ROMANUK, Bogdan PROTZ, and Volodymyr SENKIV remained in KRAKOW. Omelan MATLA was in YAROSLAW and Lev SHUMSKY in PEREMYSL. *and also former ally of B.I.S.*

WORK IN THE DIVISION OF RADIO COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, ABWEHRSTELLE, KRAKOW

June 1942 - August 1944

20. After Subject's transfer to KRAKOW, Major KORAB made Yaroslav HLADKO the chief of the section and Subject was his deputy. Major KORAB gave the section the job of finding the Soviet Agent radio stations that were left behind in Poland when the front moved about 1000 km east. KORAB had Subject learn all Soviet ciphers and codes, and the technical aspects of radio transmission and reception. His teacher was a (Mr.) SHINKER, the chief radio man in Abwehrstelle, KRAKOW. There was also another teacher whose name Subject does not remember, and a radio engineer named HOSHKOSKY, who worked in the German firm Telefunken

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in KRAKOW. Within two months, Subject learned what was necessary. To carry out their new assignment, they organized a network consisting of the following personnel:

Omelan MATLA
 Lev SHUMSKI
 Yaroslav ROMANUK
 Volodymyr SENKIV
 Dr. Bohdan PROPE
 Lubomyr HLADKO
 Lev HAYATOH
 Eng. HUSHOWSKY
 Anna PIHUS
 Yaroslav BIHUS
 Olena VARENITCHA
 Bogymil TCHMOLA
 Christina TCHMOLA
 Constantin TUCHOPSKY

from Dept of G.I.S.

there were other minor helpers, the names of which Subject does not remember. The section's monthly budget was 220,000 Polish zloty or about 120,000 Deutsche Marks. All of the personnel were well paid and therefore not subject to being bought by the enemy. Some of the above individuals had their own sources of income.

21. In KRAKOW, Subject and HLADKO had at their disposal twenty apartments with telephones for use as safe houses. There were only three people who remained in the office constantly: Subject, Yaroslav HLADKO, and the Secretary Olena VARENITCHA. The first Soviet agent that fell into their hands was Eng. Radio Constructor ^{P. I. S. - Dept} ~~Petr DATSKO~~. DATSKO came from the town of BUTCHACH in the Eastern Ukraine. He worked in a radio firm in WARSAW until 1939. During the Polish-German war, he went to BUTCHACHA where he was met by the Russians. He was arrested together with others of the intelligencia and taken to KAZAKSTAN in Asia as slave labor. In 1941, the NKVD began a recruitment drive among these laborers to get personnel to send to Poland. DATSKO was recruited to be a radio man. He received instruction in W/T in the village of OOFA and later in

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MOSCOW. In June 1942, the Soviets parachuted him into Poland with radio apparatus.

His orders were as follows:

1. Search out the Soviet intelligence officer in KRAKOW, Stoyan VLODOV. VLODOV was a Bulgarian national and secretary of the Bulgarian agricultural department.
2. Send the information given him by VLODOV about the movements of the German Army in the east.
3. Gather information himself on the military targets and transmit them to MOSCOW.

DATSKO met with an informer working for Yaroslav HLADKO (Yaroslav ROMANUK, Subject thinks) and asked him to get DATSKO a contact with the German Army. DATSKO told the informer that he was a Soviet agent, that he did not want to work for them and wanted to explain this to the Germans. He said that he did not want to work for them because of the way they had made him suffer while he was in the slave labor camp and because some of his relatives died there from rough treatment. He claimed that his only reason for agreeing to become a Soviet agent was to get to Poland. In a month, with the help of DATSKO, Subject was able to effect the arrest of the Soviet Resident officer Stoyan VLODOV. ^{RIS - Dept} VLODOV confessed that he was a member of the Comintern, had been taught intelligence work in MOSCOW and upon instructions from Col. SEMENOV in MOSCOW, had worked at first as a Soviet agent in Switzerland and later in Paris. At the end of 1938, he came to Poland to organize an intelligence net for the Soviets. When the war started, he lost contact with MOSCOW. He revealed all information about his cipher system. Subsequent to giving this information, VLODOV was sent to prison. DATSKO in the meantime agreed to work with the Germans. Major KORAB decided to use this set-up by making Subject the resident officer of the

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Soviet network in KRAKOW. Subject's job was as follows: "

1. Receive Soviet couriers arriving from Moscow as if he were VLADOV.
2. Send information to MOSCOW on the movements of the German army as prepared by the German General Staff via Petro DATSKO's w/t set.

Petro DATSKO sent a message to MOSCOW telling them that he had made contact with STOYAN VLADOV. After a few days, the Germans, using the cipher codes obtained from VLADOV, sent a series of fabricated messages to MOSCOW via DATSKO's radio link. SEMYNOV in MOSCOW was satisfied that his radio link was free from control. During the months of July, August, and September 1942, DATSKO sent messages from Subject in role of Stoyan VLADOV. In September 1942, Major KORAB ordered a message to MOSCOW which said that Peter DATSKO was overworked and would have to have an assistant from MOSCOW. In a few days an answer came from MOSCOW requesting an address in KRAKOW where the new operator could report, and a set of recognition signals to be used by DATSKO and the new operator. Subject's office gave DATSKO the address of Anna BIEUS, who was characterized as an informer of Stoyan VLADOV. In about a month a message came from MOSCOW giving the date on which the new radio operator would arrive at the given address.

22. The new operator reported on the given date to Anna BIEUS. After tendering the proper recognition signals, the new operator was satisfied that she had reported to the proper party. This operator brought with her an American agent set (TENSOR) manufactured by the Soviets and \$2,000 (American dollars) for operational needs. The money was wrapped around a flashlight battery and disguised as part of the battery. The agent-set came in two parts, one part was

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the transmitter and receiver, the other the power supply. Both parts were small enough to be carried on one's person. The new operator was named Inna KORINSKA (pseudonym). She was an 18 year old girl, the daughter of a school teacher, from the area of BILO STOK. Her father was Polish and her mother Russian. Her father was communist and, when the Germans occupied BILO STOK, he escaped to the Russians. The Russians sent him to Siberia to a labor camp, Inna KORINSKA worked in a Soviet factory where she was recruited as an agent radio operator and was sent to school in OOFA. Her schooling took about six months. In addition to her radio training, she went through a parachute school. She was dropped near LUBLIN, where there were Soviet partisans. The partisans took her to KRAKOW. About two hours after her arrival, Subject met her at the apartment of Anna BIHUS and introduced himself as Stoyan VLQDAV. Subject spent several hours with the new girl and did everything to gain her confidence - whiskey, etc. Subject had spent a long time learning the history and personal habits of both SEMYONOV and VLQDOV and at this time asked the new operator many questions regarding the personal characteristics of SEMYONOV. Subject especially mentioned the pipe that SEMYONOV constantly smoked. On the following day the new operator, thoroughly convinced she was in the proper hands, wanted to send a message to MOSCOW telling of her safe arrival. Subject delayed her arrival message in order to learn all the details pertaining to her cipher system. In two weeks Subject was able to get all the necessary information about her codes. Subject's informer, Anna BIHUS, who lived constantly with the new operator Inna, had found out where her cipher codes were hidden. After learning all about her codes, subject let her send her safe-arrival message. This message was received also by Subject's control station to check whether Inna was really convinced. For 6 months Inna sent MOSCOW

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controlled messages which arrived at Subject's office from the Command Staff of the German Army. On or about February 1942, a message came from MOSCOW ordering VLODOV (who was then the Subject) to go to Germany to the town of SOSNOVITZ to an address which Subject could not remember to determine whether a Polish worker MICHEAL, last name Subject could not remember, and his girlfriend Maria still lived at the given address. Subject went to SOSNOVITZ and found that the persons concerned did live at the given address and Inna sent a message to MOSCOW attesting to the fact. After a few days Subject got a message from MOSCOW composed with a new cipher system with orders to pass the message to Michael and Maria in SOSNOVITZ. KORAB, HLADKY, and Subject decided that there must be an agent Radio Station in SOSNOVITZ which for some reason was not operating. In a few days Subject took the message to SOSNOVITZ. He had been given the recognition signal ("I come from Uncle Semen and he asked me to give you greetings"; the answer was supposed to be "How is Walter getting along?" Subject met and was recognized by Maria, gave her the message, and asked for an immediate answer. Maria was afraid to decipher the message in the apartment, so she and Subject went out to a field where she deciphered it. In this message Col. SIMYENOV asked why he had not heard from them in the last 6 months and requested a ciphered message in response. After Maria deciphered the message she tore it into little pieces and asked Subject for a match to burn the pieces. Subject pretended he did not have any and suggested that she bury the pieces in the sand. After this, Subject took her home and told her he would return in a week to get an answer for MOSCOW. In the evening after 2000 hrs, the police curfew hour, Subject dug up the message and took it to KRAKOW. In KRAKOW the new cipher system was broken.

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During his conversation with Maria, Subject learned that 6 months prior, Maria and Micheal had been parachuted into the area of SOSNOWITZ with two agent sets and had been instructed to send information on the movements of the German Army. After they landed they buried one set in the woods and brought the other to SOSNOWITZ. Since they were Poles, the Germans had cut the electricity to their apartment and they were unable to operate.

After a week Subject met Micheal who gave him a message for MOSCOW and repeated Maria's story. Since Micheal could not operate, he gave Subject all the information ~~that~~ in his own handwriting that he had compiled for the last 6 months for transmission to MOSCOW via Subject's radio link. Subject returned to ~~to~~ KRAKOW, broke Micheal's message, and sent it to MOSCOW via the Inna radio link. In a few days a message came from MOSCOW saying that Subject would soon get a battery operated Radio which he was to deliver to Micheal and Maria. Subject went to SOSNOWITZ, gave this information to Micheal and Maria, and at the same time established closer relationships with them. After a month, subject was able to learn of 10 members of the net run by Micheal in SOSNOWITZ. Before the new battery apparatus arrived, all of the personnel in SOSNOWITZ net were arrested and shot.

23. Subject knew that KORAB had uncovered another Soviet Agent set in RIASHIV. The operator of this station was a Belorussian from Poland who had fallen into the hands of the Russians when they moved into Poland in 1939. This station had operated for 3 months before it was uncovered. Subject does not remember the operator's name, but states that he knew that when the operator was captured, he revealed all of his cipher codes and his signal plan. The Abwerstelle had not attempted to double this man because he was a drunkard and a black market operator. However, the Abwehrstelle did not arrest him, but

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assigned a junior officer to operate the station and pass controlled messages to MOSCOW. After a time this station was transferred from RIASHIV to KRAKOW and MOSCOW was so notified. This made three controlled stations in KRAKOW; the station of Petro DATSTO, and Inna, between which Subject maintained liaison, and the former RIASHIV station. Subject could not remember the name of the officer operating the RIASHIV station. Although Subject knew of all three controlled stations, MOSCOW knew only that 2 stations had liaison so they used the third to check on the other two and vice versa. The Russians used the three stations to check on one another especially when one of the stations reported an incident in KRAKOW. Obviously since all three

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stations were controlled, the Abwehrstelle was able to satisfy all of MOSCOW's doubts.

(On or about May 1943 Maj. KORAB decided to arrest and liquidate INNA because he figured that she had worked long enough. Subject and KORAB agreed that INNA would be arrested in a movie house. This plan was decided upon because the Germans were known to raid movie houses to collect workers for labor units in Germany and it was essential to the Abwehrstelle that INNA have no suspicions regarding her arrest. In a few days the plan was activated. Several movie houses were raided in KRAKOW and INNA along with ANNA BIHUS, who had helped engineer the trap, were arrested. Subject, through PETRO DATSKO's radio set notified MOSCOW of INNA's arrest. In a few days the former RIASHIV station got a message from MOSCOW requesting a check on the KRAKOW movie house arrests. The answer was obviously a back-up for the arrests. For the next few weeks Subject sent all his messages to MOSCOW through the station of Petro DATSKO. A few days later, upon orders of KORAB, Subject sent a message to MOSCOW requesting a radio operator who was a German and who would have all the necessary documents to live in Germany legally. KORAB wanted to see what type of German they sent and wanted to have first hand information on the Soviet's capacity for making false documents.

24. In August or September 1943 a message came through the station of Petro DATSKO alerting the Abwehrstelle to meet a new radio operator of German descent in KRAKOW. The date of her arrival was given and she was to appear at a building called SUKINNITS in KRAKOW. This operator arrived and was met after the exchange of proper recognition signals. She brought about 250 American Dollars with her as well as radio parts, an agent radio set, and three sealed METAL packs which, it was later found, contained money for other operators. The

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radio parts were supposed to be for agent radio sets at locations she did not know. The new operator was named ERNA. She was about 32 years old and subject believed that she was of Czechoslovakian decent. (She was a hard-shelled Communist and very secretive. She brought her own cipher which she used for technical purposes such as requests for parts, supplies, money, etc., and which it was impossible for Subject to break prior to 1 month after her arrival. The key to her CIPHER system was written on a small card and was hidden in an inside corner of her agent radio. ERNA was prevented from sending anything until her cipher had been broken. ERNA was a difficult person to get information from, however, the Abwehr finally won her complete confidence and learned all she knew. When she was arrested, under a prepared arrest comparable to that of INNA's, she did not reveal the names of any of the Subject's Abwehrstelle colleagues to her Abwehrstelle interrogators.

INNA and ERNA were permitted to have their radios only during the periods when they needed them to transmit or receive messages. Subject took their equipment away as soon as contact was completed. Each message sent by any of the operator's was intercepted and broken by a central station in the vicinity of KRAKOW. During the entire time that INNA and ERNA were under control of the Abwehrstelle they were under the supervision of one of the women informers of Subject's office.

One of the Moscow messages requested the KRAKOW controlled Russian agents to find three places in the KRAKOW area for use as Dead Drops. Subject found these dead drops and sent complete information to MOSCOW on exactly where they were and how they could be used. Subject picked these dead drops in a spot that could be observed without the observers being noticed by the person servicing the drop. In about a week a message came from MOSCOW ordering Subject

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to place one of the small metal boxes and some radio parts, which ERNA brought, into one of the dead drops. Subject did this; at the same time 12 Abwehrstelle men stationed themselves at vantage points and watched for the Dead Drop servicier. Three days later at 0700 hours a man approached the Drop and removed the material. He was surveilled and followed to the town of RADOM. In RADOM he was further surveilled and led his surveillers to another agent radio station. The operator was arrested and doublet. Subject had no more information on this operation.

25. On or about May 1944, Major KORAB ordered a message sent to MOSCOW asking for money to continue work in KRAKOW. In a few days an answer came stating it was not possible at that time to send a courier to KRAKOW and asked that the KRAKOW station send a courier to the town of BEREZA KARTUZKA, not far from WARSAW, to a partisan, Major LDOV, who would give them money. Major KORAB made an agreement with the Abwehrstelle in BIALY STOK which sent a Polish courier to the KRAKOW unit. KORAB sent the Pole to ^{P. 7. 5. 13. 4} (Major) LDOV. LDOV received him cordially, wined and dined him for three days and gave him about 5000 marks which the Pole, whose name Subject could not remember, brought to KRAKOW. The Pole gave a complete report on the strength of the Soviet Partisan unit, its disposition, arms, and plans. ERNA worked as an unwitting double for about 8 months. In June 1944 MAJOR KORAB decided it was time to liquidate her. An arrangement was made to arrest her while she was sending a message to MOSCOW. During a 4 a.m. contact at which Subject was present, the German police arrested them both. The police took Subject and ERNA to Gestapo Headquarters, where Subject was released. During her interrogation ERNA admitted that the Soviets had sent her to KRAKOW as a Radio operator but said nothing that might incriminate Subject. In a few days PETRO DATSKO notified MOSCOW via his radio link that ERNA had been arrested

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on the street because she was suspected of being a Jew. Subject still acting as STOYAN VLODAV also asked in this message that they send another radio operator. Whether or not a new operator was sent Subject does not know because in August 1944 the entire Abwehrstelle was taken over by the Gestapo. This happened immediately after the attack on Hitler in July, at which time Himler decided to have all the Abwehrstelle placed under the SS and the Gestapo. Subject was later informed by YAROSLAV HLADKO that the Gestapo worked with PETRO DATSKO and with the Radio operator from RIASHIV and continued the controlled W/T contacts with MOSCOW. Subject has no further knowledge of these operations. Subject added that the Abwehrstelle had been sending false messages to MOSCOW for two years over these controlled radio links and that MOSCOW thought they were clean.

26. Subject stated that the greatest mistake made by the Russians was recruiting agents from groups that had been subjected to the cruelty of Russian slave labor camps. These recruits were not Russian fanatics and therefore easy to double. Another weakness was the Russians' failure to brief their agents properly on the dangers they might encounter in Germany. The Soviet Intelligence officers had a very simple approach and knew nothing of the circumstances of life beyond the borders of the USSR.

27. In the first days of August 1944, Major KORAB was recalled to Berlin where he was interrogated to determine if he had any ties with ADMIRAL CANARIS. KORAB said that he had a service contact with him but that there were no personal ties between them. When KORAB returned to KRAKOW he was relieved as Chief of the KRAKOW Abwehrstelle post and replaced by an SS officer, whose name Subject does not remember. KORAB was allowed to open his own office of informers and passed the results of his work to the Gestapo in

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KRAKOW. The Gestapo sent to Subject's office new questionnaires which required workers who wanted to remain on duty to sign a new oath of allegiance and oath of secrecy. The entire office wanted to refuse work with the Gestapo but KORAB advised the members not to do this since the Gestapo would consider it an act of sabotage. Subject together with VOLODOMYR HLADKO and LEV ZAYATCH quit the KRAKOW radio office and attached himself to the private office of KORAB. YAROSLAV HLADKO and all personnel previously listed above remained with the Gestapo. This arrangement lasted only four months because on 17 January 1945 KORAB's entire office as well as the office of Yaroslav HLADKO, who remained as chief of the Ukrainian unit under the Gestapo, had to leave for PRAGUE because the Soviet Army was approaching KRAKOW.

Lt. Col. TARBUK, who had returned from the eastern front, was the chief of the Abwehr service in Prague under the guiding hand of the Gestapo. KORAB and Subject affiliated themselves with TARBUK and worked for him as private informers. Subject could not do anything on this job because the territory and people were foreign to him and he left at the beginning of April for Austria to get away from the Russians who were approaching Prague at the time.

Subject met the chief of the German SB, Walter ZINECKE and Willie TRADEMACHER through KORAB. These people helped Subject to get from Prague to the town of RAURIS in the KREIS of ZELL AM SEE in Austria. Major KORAB went to MARIAN BAD and from there to Linz, Austria. Subject had no more contact with KORAB after this. Subject travelled with the following people from PRAGUE to RAURIS.

1. (DR.) YURI GERITCH
2. (DR.) LEONID MOSENS
3. PETRO BASHUK
4. Subject's wife

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The convoy leaving Prague also contained a larger group of Czechs under (DR) YANKEVICH and people from the Vlassov Army whom Subject did not know. After two weeks in RAURIS, the Americans arrived. Subject remained in RAURIS until September 1945 at the home of a farmer named Antony SWEIGER. In September 1945 Subject went to Salzburg and there met his old friend from LNOW, (DR) VOLODYMYR KALINA, who was organizing a Ukrainian Gymnasium in Salzburg; he gave Subject a job as a teacher in the school.

SUBJECT'S INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLING

28. Subject's intelligence training began when at the age of 18 he became a member of the OUN in 1928. The OUN was then an underground organization and each of its members had to know underground working methods. The slightest slip could have blown himself and members of his organization. The OUN placed great importance on underground methods of operation. All underground newspapers such as SURMA, ROZBUDOVA NATZII, UNATSTVO contained articles written on methods of conducting secure underground operations. The following subject matter appeared in these papers:

1. Basis of Conspiracy
2. Action in the event of arrest
3. Report Writing
4. Surveillance
5. Clandestine meetings
6. Hiding underground literature, guns, etc.

The subject learned more detailed methods of clandestine work in 1934, when he became an instructor of the youth of OUN.

Subject's instructors in 1934 were:

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1. OSIP HRYTSAY, a member of the OUN, former Polish officer, later Chief of Staff of the UPA and General of UPA, died in January 1946 in a prison in Prague, arrested while trying to cross the border to Germany. He killed himself in prison to avoid interrogation.
2. OLEKA HASEN, member of OUN, former Polish officer, later Col. of UPA and Chief of Staff in UPA, was killed in about 1950 in Ukraine.
3. IVAN TESSLA, member of UVO and OUN, former Polish officer, now a teacher of Geography in Canada.
4. DIMITRO MIRON, member of the executive of OUN, former Polish officer, died in 1941 in KIEV - shot on the street by Gestapo.
5. OSIP MASCHAK, member of OUN now in Canada.

The program of instruction was the same as above but much more detailed. During training, they used underground literature as well as books available on the Polish Army and Police methods. Authors of these books are not remembered by the Subject. According to Subject, the book most used was one written by the Polish Police Commissioner FEDUNIEVITCH. Subject's training in OUN lasted about 6 months. Students were given practical problems on the streets of LWOW and occasionally in the woods between LWOW and BRUKOVITCH on clandestine meetings, dead drops, etc.

Subject remembers the following people who took the course with him:

1. DAMIAN KORDUBA *"member of staff"*
2. ALEXANDER MATLA
3. TARAS HUTZALUK
4. VOLODYMYR KUK
5. VASYIL IVANOTCHKO
6. BORIS LEVITSKY
7. VOLODYMYR LEVITSKY

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Subject does not remember any other names. The entire training was termed by Subject as counter-espionage. Subject also knew that the OUN had a school to teach personnel in agent infiltration methods. He knows of the following personnel, most of whom had previous military training, who performed this type of work: *D. U. H. members*

1. BOHDAN PIDHAINY
2. DAVLOV GENGALO
3. (DR) BOIVAN HNATEUVICH
4. MYKOLA LEBID
5. OSIP RUDAKEVICH
6. PETRO SAIKEVICH

During Subject's work with the Abwehrstelle he learned the following counter-espionage subjects:

1. Organization of the Soviet Agent nets,
2. Organization of NKVD and NKGB,
3. Organization of the Soviet border units,
4. Working methods of Soviet agent nets,
5. Cover stories used by Soviet agents,
6. Methods used by the Russians in sending messages to the USSR,
7. Methods of recruiting agents used by Soviets -
 - a. Agents with Political motivation
 - b. Agents for money
 - c. Agents under duress
 - d. Agents (unwitting)
8. Passing of information by radio link
9. Russian cipher and code systems,
10. Schooling received by Russian Agents.

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These courses were made up on the basis of material worked up by Eng. WRETCNONA YAROSLAV HLADKO, TARBUK, and KORAB and on the basis of material captured by the Germans when they took Warsaw. Occasionally Subject studied Soviet books but considered them as worthless.

Radio training was given Subject by the head of the radio training section of the KRAKOW Abwehrstelle named SHIMKE, a German non-commissioned officer, name unknown and Radio (Engineer) HOSHOWSKY. Subject learned most of his radio by practical work. Subject never had any formal classroom schooling, all of the above instruction was on a piece meal basis, which he picked up reading newspapers, case histories, and through practical experience.

29. When Subject arrived in Salzburg in September 1945 he had no intention of working with the Ukrainians for the following reasons:

1. Subject worked in the Abwehrstelle KRAKOW and this was known to some Ukrainians and Subject did not want this to come to light.
2. Subject feared that the Americans would send him back to the Russians as a collaborator.

For these reasons Subject spent six months doing nothing other than teaching school completely apart from all Ukrainian Political entanglements.

In about the middle of March 1946 a friend of Subject, (Dr) YURI GERICH, arrived in Salzburg from Innsbruck and asked Subject to work with the AEW. Subject refused for the above reasons. GERICH said that sooner or later the Western Allies would clash with the Russians and that Subject should have no reason for worry. Subject was convinced and agreed to work with AEW. GERICK made Subject a representative of AEW in the area of Salzburg and Austria. His job was to make contact with all nationalities whose territories were occupied by the Russians. Subject recruited a Ukrainian named (Eng) HILO,

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and an Hungarian (Professor YOLI MIKOSH, a Belo-Russian whose name Subject does not remember, an Austrian, IVAN ZILA, who worked with the Abwehrstelle during the war, and several other persons.

Since the ^{Abwehrstelle} AEN worked very closely with ZCH/OUN, DR. GERICH gave Subject a contact to the Chief ZCH/OUN in Salzburg, MILOLA KORNELUIK, Subject's school friend. After contact with KORNELUIK, Subject met all the members of ZCH/OUN in Austria.

30. The best work done by Subject was with the Hungarian Professor MIKOSH, who had contact through couriers to BUDAPEST and through him it was possible for the AEN to send propaganda leaflets to BUDAPEST.

On or about August 1946, MIKOSH asked Subject if he would want to talk with an American who was interested in work of the AEN. Subject agreed and in a few days he met with an American in the company of MIKOSH. Subject called this man "Uncle Tom". Subject noted that he thought he was of Hungarian decent since he spoke perfect Hungarian with MIKOSH. Subject gave the American officer all the information he wanted about the AEN and all the English-language literature AEN had. "Uncle Tom" wanted to meet with Subject's Chief, Dr. YURI GERICH. After a few weeks this meeting was arranged. "Uncle Tom" said that the Americans could not work with the AEN at present, but that they wanted to stay informed on the work AEN was doing. During Subject's third meeting with "Uncle Tom" he proposed that Subject meet with another American who was concerned with Ukrainian problems. This new American presented himself as (Dr.) NOVAK. Subject thought he was probably of Austrian decent because he spoke perfect German. He asked about Subject's background and Subject told him he had worked in the Abwehrstelle. He was interested in the Ukrainian problem and asked if Subject knew anyone in ZCH/OUN, ZPUHVR or

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