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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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per DOI 70-17

Chief, 3P
ATTN:
Chief of Base, Munich

10 April 1957
INFO: 22
GNY/G

Operational/REASON/LEAD/PROG

ARCAPELLIS/1 Received [] Visit

- REF: 1. RMA-87009 dated 15 November 1955 (Att. 4)
2. RMA-17632 dated 28 October 1955-att. 11 (no cc at XUS)

Action Required: None; for your information.

1. During the contact on 5 April 1957, ARCAPELLIS/1 reported concerning ARKUSTAN's visit on 2 April 1957 which was arranged via ARKUSTAN's phone call earlier the same day. [] stated that he had learned of ARCAPELLIS/1's residence in Munich during a conversation with Michael MARTENS circa February 1957. MARTENS then allegedly stated that one "pylooh" ARCAPELLIS/1 is the only mutual acquaintance from the 1945 days in the Salzburg-Munich who is in Munich. MARTENS is alleged to have added he desires ARCAPELLIS/1 because ARCAPELLIS/1 speaks ill of MARTENS to others. ARKUSTAN allegedly told ARCAPELLIS/1 that the only reason for his visit to ARCAPELLIS/1 was to obtain information on MARTENS. [] said he was associated with a counter-intelligence organization (which he allegedly did not identify) which was investigating MARTENS.

2. [] allegedly added that his CI group has determined that MARTENS is the leader of a local (Mikhailov Committee sponsored) "Unipro" group which distributes leaflets in this area. ARKUSTAN stated that the central headquarters of this group is in Augsburg and is led by the former Soviet major, Ilya LADUNEV (Ilya JAKOVICH).

3. [] stated that recently he received a personal letter from the Mikhailov group in which [] was addressed by his correct first name and patronymic. The letter requested ARKUSTAN's collaboration with that group in the distribution of its leaflets. The letter also indicated that the group knew that [] place of birth was Proseburg (Bratislava) and that his true nationality was Ukrainian. For this reason, the group wanted ARKUSTAN's assistance in the group's repatriation activities.

4. [] allegedly stated that the style of the letter was that of MARTENS. Aside from this factor, [] is alleged to have said that MARTENS is the only emigre who knows []'s patronymic and PDB. For this reason, [] found a pretext to visit LADUNEV in Augsburg and

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allegedly was a typewriter with Gvillie keyboard in IAKUSHEV's quarters. When IAKUSHEV allegedly saw that [] was curious about the typewriter, IAKUSHEV transferred the machine to his bedroom.

5. [] allegedly told ASKAPILIN/1 that he broke with HARTENS in November 1945 when HARTENS is alleged to have suggested that he and ANASTAS and their wives repatriate to the East since they had washed their sins by turning in to American authorities German officers and their collaborators. [] in turn, became afraid and moved to Germany with his wife.

6. [] allegedly asked if ASKAPILIN/1 could provide information about HARTENS' activities following November 1945 in Salisbury until he came to Berlin in 1950 and his activities in Berlin during 1950-1953. Upon [] ASKAPILIN/1 felt that ASKAPILIN's visit was a provocation instigated by [] and HARTENS. ASKAPILIN/1 became very cautious and replied that he could not recall speaking to anyone derogatorily about HARTENS; he allegedly added, however, that he may have told someone about HARTENS in 1945 when HARTENS invited Dr. Yuriy [] and Dr. Leonid [] to dinner. HARTENS apparently wanted to turn over these two men to American authorities for repatriation processing; this was evident because HARTENS confiscated their motorcycles before he notified the authorities. However, ASKAPILIN/1 allegedly stated, the operation was unsuccessful. (NOTE: ASKAPILIN/1 stated that he described this incident to Leonid [] during 1956 and feels that [] told it to HARTENS who probably passed it on to [])

7. ASKAPILIN/1 allegedly added to [] that he has never suspected HARTENS of being a Soviet agent and has no interest whatsoever in HARTENS. However, ASKAPILIN/1 allegedly informed [] that HARTENS was active in Ukrainian emigre political activity, including membership in the URDP/Right Central Committee, was chief editor of Ukrayinski Visti (URDP's newspaper), was a member of the Putyans Legion, was one of the emigres who organized DOBRUS and was URDP's technical secretary. ASKAPILIN/1 allegedly added that HARTENS broke from URDP for unknown reasons, became a BORNI member, edited BORNI's newspaper, Rabat, with Yevgeniy ARYSHUK-BERCHAVIN, and is now a free-lance employee of the Institute for the Study of the USSR. ASKAPILIN/1 allegedly also indicated surprise to [] stating that he thought "nipro" leaflets were printed in East Berlin and that "nipro" was a fictitious group.

8. [] allegedly was not happy with ASKAPILIN/1's information and said that he thought that ASKAPILIN/1 was loaded with concrete data on HARTENS' association with the KIS. He left his address and asked ASKAPILIN/1 to contact him in the event he learned any information concerning HARTENS. [] reportedly added that one of his superiors might call on ASKAPILIN/1 and warned the latter not to talk until he was identified himself with documents.

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9. Before leaving [] allegedly stated that his CI group surveilled MARTENS and learned that the latter often meets a young unidentified Ukrainian from the Ukrainian newspaper (unidentified; however, ASCAPELIN/1 deduced that this is Stefan HUBRYK) at Zepelinstrasse 67. These meetings take place at the 7nd Bruckenstrasse, not far from Deutsches Museum and then they have lengthy discussions in a restaurant where the Ukrainian takes notes.

10. During the social intercourse following the above discussion, [] allegedly stated that he accepted his job with the CI group because he was promised if he collaborated honestly his record would be wiped clean of arrests concerning his counterfeiting of gasoline coupons and thus he would be able to emigrate.

11. ASCAPELIN/1 told the undersigned that he first met ASUSTANG and MARTENS in April 1945 (see reference A for details of this narration as ASCAPELIN/1 is presumed to have described them to Boris LEVITSKY; this is material which LEVITSKY left with ASCAPELIN/1 for safe-keeping). Note that ASCAPELIN/1's version is contradicted by [] who told Skeelke that ASCAPELIN/1 was a member of the German Werewolf unit which was organized in Austria by ASUSTANG and MARTENS. ASCAPELIN/1 stated that the commandant of the unit was a Colonel from WAGNER whom ASCAPELIN/1 added, is not his personal acquaintance; according to [], ASCAPELIN/1 knew WAGNER personally and alleged that ASCAPELIN/1 stated that WAGNER was in Munich recently.

12. ASCAPELIN/1 stated that [] may be associated with the Americans or Germans; however, he discounts this theory in the belief that if [] really has the letter containing the pitch from "Unipro" (i.e., the RIS), then the CI outfit with which he claims to be associated would have confiscated the "Unipro" letter [] allegedly stated that he would let ASCAPELIN/1 read the letter at a later date). ASCAPELIN/1 went on to say that if [] is not associated with any Western IS group, then [] visit was a provocation prompted by MARTENS; he does not exclude the possibility that either one or both may be Soviet agents. The purpose of the visit, as ASCAPELIN/1 sees it, was to determine if ASCAPELIN/1 has any IS contacts and to learn if ASCAPELIN/1 really has spoken negatively concerning MARTENS; if the latter is true, then [] was bent on learning information ASCAPELIN/1 possessed which evidenced this allegation.

13. ASCAPELIN/1 assessed [] as a clever and shrewd operator who, for unknown reasons, compromised his CI affiliation. However, ASCAPELIN/1 added, if [] original intention was to reveal his connection with a CI unit, then it was a clever maneuver; however, ASCAPELIN/1 beamed, [] obtained no success in obtaining any information from him. ASCAPELIN/1 said that because of [] training in document counterfeiting, photography, etc., he does not exclude the possibility that

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Received such training from the NKVD before or during World War II. He does not believe that any Western IS would hire [] because of his well-known background of arrests.

14. ASCHERLIN/1 said that he revealed the above-mentioned visit to Ivan KASHUBA who became more than ever convinced that is a Soviet agent and local "inpro" leader and that KASHUBA's informant, MARTINS, is not associated with the Soviets. KASHUBA allegedly sent MARTINS to [] on 27 March 1957 to elicit information and learned that [] mother or mother-in-law, a Slovak, was receiving documents necessary to repatriate herself to Bratislava where she wants to reclaim her property. KASHUBA also stated that he was aware of the "inpro" letter which [] received (ASCHERLIN/1 deduced that KASHUBA learned this from MARTINS). KASHUBA allegedly was sorry that ASCHERLIN/1 did not elicit information from ASCHERLIN/1 concerning Volodymyr [] and the latter's contacts before the latter was liquidated by the NKVD; according to KASHUBA, STANISLAV [] feared kidnapping by the NKVD and hired a number of bodyguards who were known personally to ASCHERLIN/1.

15. ASCHERLIN/1 stated that, because KASHUBA was so stubborn in his defense of MARTINS, he has become wary of KASHUBA insofar as concerns KASHUBA's comments concerning MARTINS and possibly others suspected by KASHUBA. He appeared to feel so strongly about this that he said that he does not exclude the possibility that perhaps ASCHERLIN/1 was sent unwittingly by MARTINS and KASHUBA to sound out ASCHERLIN/1.

16. While recalling the background concerning POKS and MARTINS, ASCHERLIN/1 said that during 1945-46 Byron KASHUBA sent when BILVA (now in Australia) three times to MARTINS to obtain information because MARTINS was known to have had contact with the Soviet Repatriation Mission (ASCHERLIN/1 allegedly learned this from BILVA). Putting the facts together, ASCHERLIN/1 deduced that MARTINS now cannot obtain permanent employment with AmComLib because CIC files contain such derogatory information; BILVA allegedly continues to maintain MARTINS on AmComLib rolls as a free-lancer but cannot hire him on full time basis because, as KASHUBA says, CIC will not permit this.

17. ASCHERLIN/1 concluded that following the end of World War II [] transferred his radio sending equipment to retire KASHUBA who passed it on to the NKVD.

18. [] information on the above will be found in the Progress Report for April 1957. KGB has no copy of reference E which is one of ASCHERLIN/1's reports on MARTINS.

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