

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1971

Official Transcript of Reston's Conversation With the Chinese Premier in Peking

Special to The New York Times

PEKING, Aug. 9—Following is a transcript of a recorded conversation with Premier Chou En-lai of China conducted Thursday night by James Reston, vice president and columnist of The New York Times. The conversation took place in Mr. Chou's reception hall here, and the translator was Chi Chao-chu, a former Harvard student who is on the Premier's staff. Mr. Chou authorized the official transcript on the condition that both questions and answers be printed verbatim.

MR. CHOU—Have you recovered your health completely?

MR. RESTON—I am a kind of an old dog, you know. And I've never been sick in my life, and I was rather surprised to be struck away from home.

MR. CHOU—Perhaps you had this trouble before but because of your good health you didn't quite feel it.

MR. RESTON—There are specific things, particularly in the last few days, I wanted to be sure that we understood the clarity of your thought. The first thing in my mind was whether you were surprised by Secretary Rogers's statement. In the Chinese news agency—sorry, it was said that the United States Government was saying one thing and doing another, and therefore I wondered whether you were not only surprised but perhaps felt deceived, whether you have been led to believe something by Dr. Kissinger other than what was in the Rogers statement.

MR. CHOU—I do not plan now to make a comparison for you on this. The position of the Chinese Government has all along been clear. That has been the case throughout the 16 years of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw. And that has also been the case with the whole series of statements we have recently made.

This statement issued by the U.S. Secretary of State was a self-contradictory formula worked out under the pressure of the talks between the Japanese Government and the Chiang Kai-shek representative in Tokyo. This, of course, must be pointed out by our press.

As for the position of our Government, it has never changed. It is possible that you already heard about this from the French friends because I had a talk with the French parliamentary delega-

tion, and I also had a talk with some American friends from the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. And do you want me to reiterate our position?

MR. RESTON—The central question that is in my mind is whether you felt that the statement by Rogers in any way interfered with the movement which I believe was taking place toward a normalization of relations between the United States and China?

MR. CHOU—At least it is not a step forward. And what is more, a confused debate is bound to take place in the United Nations and in the international arena, in which case we are compelled to speak out.

MR. RESTON—I thought that there was a misjudgment here, frankly, in what it was that Rogers and President Nixon were doing. I thought that the President, by seeking a conference with you before the U.N., was saying to members of the U.N. who had wavered in past years or followed our line in past years: We have now changed, we want to see the People's Republic seated in New York. And by that process he had started a procedure which inevitably would lead to the seating of your Government in the U.N., particularly on his third point, which clearly implied that he would not use the veto in the Security Council, yet as I interpreted the news agency's remark, this was not taken into account at all.

MR. CHOU—The central point of that statement is to retain the Chiang representative in the United Nations, and that means that it would be impossible for us to go in.

MR. RESTON—Perhaps this is not a subject that lends itself to useful conversation at this time. Maybe it's too delicate. And if it is, I hope you will tell me so and we'll go on to other things.

MR. CHOU—You are not planning to make clear our position in an all-round way?

MR. RESTON—I want to do that. I mean—

'We Are Seeing Some Changes'

MR. CHOU—As I have seen from your talk with our friends, your proposition is that since the United States is to recognize the People's Republic of China, then it should give up the Taiwan representative.

MR. RESTON—I believe very frankly that we've come to an unusual moment in the history of the world that neither in your life nor in mine will we see again. In my own country there are great changes taking place, philosophical and political. In Europe we are seeing a transformation, with the British coming into the Common Market. In the Middle East we see more evidence, I think, that force does not prevail for anybody. The only place where force seems to have prevailed is for Russia in Czechoslovakia. And therefore what I've come here to do is to find out, during this long period when China had not been actively participating in these affairs of the U.N. and elsewhere, how you see the world of this great transformation? Do you really believe that the United States is ready for change, as I do, or do you feel that we are engaged again in maneuvers and manipulations for imperialist purposes, as you seem to be saving in your press?

MR. CHOU—We admit we also are seeing some changes. As you said to our friends, you are also seeing changes taking place in China. But there is one question and that is we will not barter away principles. And so once this question is raised, there is bound to be a dispute.

As for Taiwan, who occupied Taiwan? And so if you want to have a change, then you should act according to a Chinese saying, that is, it is for the doer to undo the knot.

The latest discussions between Japan and Taiwan were obviously designed to create an obstacle so that it would not be possible for us to get into the U.N. After Rogers's statement, the Japanese Acting Foreign Minister, Kimura, and the Secretary General of the ruling Japanese Liberal-Democratic party, Hori Shigeru, made similar statements.

Both Kimura and Hori Shigeru said that this basic policy of the United States was determined after many consultations between the United States and Japan. And Japan's demand was put forward after two secret talks held between the Chiang representative and Sato in the latter part of July and on Aug. 1.

And so the statement made by the so-called Foreign Ministry of Chiang Kai-shek did not touch on Rogers's statement at all but concentrated on attacking the Albanian resolution.

Japan has ambitious designs with regard to Taiwan. Japan wants to control Taiwan in her hands. So it's not a

simple matter that Japan is supporting Taiwan in the United Nations.

In fact, we can even go on further from there. That is, not only will there be a question of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan—it's even conceivable that they are trying to separate Taiwan from China and, under the direction of Japan and also possibly with support from some quarters in the United States, to bring about a so-called independent Taiwan.

And because of this, we cannot but make our attitude very clear. We have stated very clearly that should a state of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan appear in the U.N., or a similar absurd state of affairs take place in the U.N. designed to separate Taiwan from China to create a so-called independent Taiwan, we will firmly oppose it and under those circumstances we will absolutely not go into the U.N.

It is indeed true that the world is undergoing changes. But these changes must not cause further damage to the Chinese people. Over the past 20 years and more, it's not we who have caused harm to others, but the U.S. Government who have been causing harm to other countries and other peoples. We have waited already for more than 20 years and we can wait for another year. That doesn't matter. But there must be a just solution.

Will Chou Attend U.N. Himself?

MR. RESTON—May I ask whether, in the event that your present position proves to be too pessimistic and the General Assembly and the Security Council without any veto by the United States decide to seat China, will you at this meeting of the Security Council go to New York yourself and represent China at this meeting of the General Assembly?

MR. CHOU—Will Chiang Kai-shek still be there or not?

MR. RESTON—No, on the assumption that he is not.

MR. CHOU—He has left?

MR. RESTON—Yes.

MR. CHOU—Only if he has really left can I express an attitude, and Taiwan must be a part of China. But if in the U.N. resolution there is anything to the effect that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined, then we will not go in.

MR. RESTON—I understand that. But I am assuming by my question that the Albanian resolution will have been put up and voted to your satisfaction in the General Assembly, and that you will go on and be voted into the Security Council, at which time Taiwan will be expelled, and my question is: Would you at that time personally go to New York?

MR. CHOU—But I was asking the question that would they still consider the status of Taiwan undetermined and the status of Taiwan an outstanding question? You cannot answer that question now, nor can I.

MR. RESTON—I don't see that that

question would be a question for the U.N. at all. At that time it's a question between you and the Taiwanese. As early as 1955 I believe that you said that this was an internal question and it should be settled between the Government of the People's Republic and the local authorities, I believe you called them at that time, on Taiwan. Is it still your view, that it should be settled in that way? And second, is there anything to Edgar Snow's remark that he believes there already has been contact between the People's Republic and officials on Taiwan?

'No Foreign Interference'

MR. CHOU—I've said on many occasions that the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair which brooks no foreign interference. That is still our position now. At the same time, I've said that the United States has committed aggression against and occupied China's Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Strait, so we are willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. Government for a settlement of this question.

This has been going on for 16 years, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw. And what is more, I've said that the Chinese people are friendly to the American people, the two peoples have been friendly with each other in the past, and in the future they should all the more live together in friendship, because the Chinese people have now stood up.

That was said far back in 1955 at the Bandung conference. Afterwards, we tried to accept the visit of some American correspondents to China, but John Foster Dulles's State Department did not approve of that. And so, since the way was blocked by the U.S. Government, then we on our side would no longer want any such contacts. We have thus been cut off for more than 20 years, but it doesn't matter.

But now since there are some changes in the world, then we should see to it no damage is done to anyone, that concern should be shown to the wronged party and the wronged party should not continue to be wronged. Therefore, the question of Taiwan is not merely an internal question. If it were merely an internal matter, then we will be able to settle it ourselves. The solution of this internal problem has been obstructed now for already 21 years, and so changes are taking place. And in this process some country has started to harbor ambitions. That is quite evident.

MR. RESTON—You mean by that Japan?

MR. CHOU—Yes.

MR. RESTON—May I ask you to state the principles again. You have been very clear about this in the past, you have told Snow, in '60 I believe. Principle one was nothing between us on Taiwan shall be settled by force or the threat of force. Principle two, there is only one China. Now are these the two and only two principles to be settled? What

- 3 -

about withdrawal of forces, what about the question of the treaty between Washington and Taipei?

MR. CHOU—When you say us, you mean China and the United States?

MR. RESTON—Yes, the United States and China.

MR. CHOU—If Taiwan is to be returned to the motherland, the U.S. forces must withdraw, because otherwise how can it be returned to the motherland? And since the United States is to withdraw all their troops and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area, then as a matter of course the so-called U.S.-Chiang mutual defense treaty, which we had all along considered to be illegal, would become invalid.

Preliminary Talks 'Possible'

MR. RESTON—I understand. It is clear, I think, since the differences over Rogers's statement, that there is a lot of underbrush to be cleared away before you and the President are to meet. I wondered what ideas you have about whether preliminary technical talks at a lower level should take place and where, between now and the President's arrival?

MR. CHOU—It is possible. But if these questions are to be solved, they can only be solved when the President himself comes. He expressed a desire to come and we have invited him to come.

MR. RESTON—Could I ask one final question about the U.N. and China? In your mind, is there a conflict between the basic principle of the U.N., namely, that all disputes between nations shall be resolved without the use of force or the threat of force, and the principle of revolution and support for national liberation movements in the world as espoused by your Government in the past? Is there a conflict between these two things?

MR. CHOU—No. Who has committed aggression against other countries? China hasn't. Over the 22 years of the history of our People's Republic, we only went abroad to assist Korea, but that was under certain conditions. We made it very clear to the so-called U.N. Command composed of 16 countries led by the U. S. We said to them that if they press toward the Yalu River, then we will not sit idly by, although at that time our Taiwan and Taiwan Strait area had already been occupied by the U.S. Seventh Fleet and the U.S. Air Force. It was the U.S. which first committed aggression against China, and not vice versa. It was only after the U.S. forces had reached the Yalu River that we sent our C.P.V. [Chinese People's Volunteers] to resist American aggression and aid Korea.

Chinese People's Volunteers

As for our help to other countries of the world, that is in the case when they are subjected to aggression. And in the view of the U.N. itself, aggression is wrong and should be stopped.

So we are merely helping them to resist aggression. And in the view of the U.N. itself, they should be given support. And a striking instance is Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, we will continue to give them assistance to the end, until the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces. At present the most urgent question is still Vietnam. You wondered very much why I said to the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars that it was our position that first of all the question of Vietnam and Indochina should be solved, and not the question of Taiwan or other questions.

Because the status quo of Taiwan has remained for 21 years. There is no war there. That is because of restraint on our part. But this is not the case with Vietnam. Not only did the U.S. send troops to commit aggression there, but the U.S. is expanding the war there. When President Nixon took office, he started withdrawing troops from Vietnam, that is anyhow changing the former situation. But in March last year, the peaceful rule of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia was subverted, and then the U.S. troops went in. Even your New York Times criticized that action.

MR. RESTON—Especially The New York Times.

MR. CHOU—And then this year there was the attack on Route 9. Isn't that an expansion of the war?

MR. RESTON—Yes, I think so.

The Cost of the Vietnam War

MR. CHOU—And so that has brought even greater harm to the Vietnamese people and the Indochinese people as a whole. Such a small place as Indochina, with a small population. Yet such a huge sum has been spent. The American Government itself admitted that in 10 years' time it spent \$120-billion and suffered such heavy casualties. And the American people are unhappy about the American casualties. We on our side feel they are needless casualties. But the Vietnamese people have suffered even greater casualties.

MR. RESTON—I agree.

MR. CHOU—Just take a look there and you can see that. Shouldn't we sympathize with them?

MR. RESTON—Absolutely. It's a tragedy.

MR. CHOU—So why shouldn't the United States. It's aggression?

MR. RESTON—Yes. Now what do you think we should do to stop it? I went straight there from Pamunjom in 1953, and I have been fighting against our involvement in that war ever since. As a matter of fact, when I went to Saigon in 1953 I saw the British brigadier who was the observer there at that time and I asked, was there any way in which the West can possibly deal with the Vietminh, as they were then called. And he said, yes, there may be one way: If you would give foreign aid, military program to the Vietminh, especially tanks,

then you might be able to find them. That will be the only way, said he, the West will ever win a war in this part of the world.

MR. CHOU—You did some work, your New York Times, by making public some of the secret Pentagon papers.

MR. RESTON—Yes.

MR. CHOU—Indeed, back in the time of Truman, the U.S. Government started helping the French in their aggression and colonial war in Indochina. And after Dulles took over from Acheson, this further developed.

Aid to Vietnamese Described

MR. RESTON—Are there some Peking papers on that period on the war that have not been published. If there are, then The New York Times would like to accommodate you and publish them.

MR. CHOU—We have no secret papers like that. But we did send some weapons to the Vietnamese people to help them in their resistance. The French Government is aware of that. Within less than half a year after the founding of our People's Republic, we recognized the DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] headed by President Ho Chi Minh. Actually the French Government was prepared to recognize the P.R.C. [People's Republic of China], but because of that matter, France put off the recognition until the time of General de Gaulle. So if you are interested in secret documents, this is a document but not a secret one.

MR. RESTON—Yes. Your commentator the other day made it quite clear that your Government is opposed to the Geneva conference for a settlement of the Indochina war. Now, do you see the Laotian and the Cambodian questions being settled separately from the Vietnam question?

MR. CHOU—This is a matter within the sovereignty of the Government of the DRVN, of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of SVN [South Vietnam], of the royal government of national union of Cambodia and of the Laotian Patriotic Front. It is within their sovereignty to decide whether the Indochina question is to be settled together or separately.

Judging from the present situation, negotiations are going on now only on Vietnam. And so maybe the Vietnam question will be first solved. As for Cambodia, the U.S. refuses to recognize Prince Sihanouk's Government, and Prince Sihanouk has clearly stated his just position in his message No. 24 to his compatriots. I haven't heard anyone say anything more on that score. As for Laos, they are planning to discuss among themselves. And there is correspondence between Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong, and the Laotian Patriotic Front has put forward a five-point proposal, one of which is cease-fire throughout Laos.

We support this five-point proposal of the Laotian Patriotic Front. As for the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples, the four sides of the three

-4-

countries issued a joint statement in April last year and they put forward a common proposition. They demand all troops from countries outside of Indochina to completely withdraw and let the three peoples of Indochina solve their question by themselves. And we support this principle.

MR. RESTON—You are not interested in mediating this struggle between the U.S. and the North Vietnamese and Liberation Front?

MR. CHOU—We don't want to be a mediator in any way. And we were very badly taken in during the first Geneva conference. If you are interested, I can go into it now. If not, we can discuss it at the dinner table.

MR. RESTON—Yes, but I want to hear all about your confrontation with John Foster Dulles at dinner. You know, nothing has surprised me quite so much since coming here as the vehemence of your feeling about Japan.

MR. CHOU—You too were victims of Japanese militarism. But you said the Americans are more forgetful. But I know you still recall the Pearl Harbor incident.

MR. RESTON—Yes, but this is one of—in my view—the endearing qualities of the American people: They have no memory. They have every reason to be aggrieved, if not full of hatred, about Japan and about Germany. There is no hatred in our country toward Japan or Germany. And if there is one thing that has troubled me a bit since I have come here, it is a sense that, while you are, in your domestic policy, looking forward toward the 21st century, in your foreign policy I think you are looking backward to the old disputes. And that saddens me. Now am I being unfair to you? Because I don't want to be.

MR. CHOU—It is unfair. Because you didn't have any direct talk with us about our foreign policy, you just heard about some of our slogans.

Why is there such sentiment among the Americans? Because the U.S. benefited from both World Wars, and the U.S. losses were rather small. Why is it that the American people have a rather deep impression about the present U.S. war of aggression against Vietnam? Because they have really suffered. And so the American people demand the withdrawal of the American troops. It is not that the American people don't summarize their experience.

So I don't quite agree with your estimate that the American people are easily forgetful. Any nation is bound to summarize its own historical experience. Just yesterday I met a friend who had come from the U. S. some time ago, and he said that among the Americans there are now some changes toward the black people and that is a good thing. And it shows that many white people in the U.S. are becoming awakened to the fact that it is not right to continue the exploitation and oppression of the black people left over from history. So isn't that a summary of historical experience? And it is very good.

MR. RESTON—Yes.

Japanese 'Reactionaries' Opposed

MR. CHOU—We oppose the Japanese reactionaries. It is not that we have any hatred for the Japanese people. After the end of the Pacific war, we have not stopped our contacts with the Japanese people. New China has never imposed a blockade against them. The Japanese people have kept on visiting China, and we are also willing to go there.

The Japanese people are a diligent and brave people and a great nation. And it was the U.S. Government which after the war strengthened the Japanese reactionaries. And when they have developed to the present stage they are bound to develop militarism.

Just look at the economic development of Japan. According to your President, the steel output of Japan is about to catch up to that of the U.S., as he said in Kansas City on July 6. Why is it that Japan has developed so quickly? I've heard that you also admit that the reason was that not only was no indemnity exacted from Japan, but Japan was protected and provided with raw materials, markets, investments and technology.

And then there is another thing. That is, the U.S. has promoted the development of Japan toward militarism by the indefinite prolongation of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. The Japanese people are opposed to this treaty. And according to the report of the American congressmen who went to Japan to study the matter, Japan does not need such a huge defense budget for its fourth defense plan for the purpose of self-defense.

The budget for the fourth defense plan reached the amount of more than \$16-billion. And Defense Secretary Laird himself admits that according to Japan's present economic strength and industrial and technical ability, she will not need five years (1972-1976) to complete that plan, and two to two and a half years will be sufficient.

In Japan, in South Korea and when he returned to Washington, Laird said that there were three pillars to the Nixon doctrine. The first is to arm your partners, and of these partners, the principal one will be Japan. The second is nuclear protection, and only thirdly is negotiation. And what is more, he made it clear that these negotiations have to proceed from a position of strength. And without the previous two pillars, there would not be the third.

MR. RESTON—Could I ask you, sir, what you want us to do about Japan? Because it seems to me there is a dilemma here. If we stay allied to Japan, with some control over her, particularly in the nuclear field, that is one thing. If we end the security pact with Japan, is it in your view that it is more likely then that Japan will become more militaristic or less militaristic?

It seems to me that, confronted by two nuclear powers in the Pacific, both China and the Soviet Union, and freed from us and our pact, she would almost certainly have to go nuclear, would she not? Therefore I find myself puzzled by your desire to see this pact with the US broken.

MR. CHOU—That argument is quite a forced argument. Despite this treaty, Japan with her present industrial capabilities is fully able to produce all the means of delivery, she is able to manufacture ground-to-air, ground-to-ground missiles and sea-to-ground missiles. As for bombers, she is all the more capable of manufacturing them. The only thing lacking is the nuclear warhead.

Japan's output of nuclear power is increasing daily. The United States supply of enriched uranium to Japan is not enough for her requirement, and she is now importing enriched uranium from other countries. And so her nuclear weapons can be produced readily. She cannot be prevented from doing so merely by the treaty. You have helped her develop her economy to such a level. And she is bound to demand outward expansion.

Economic expansion is bound to bring about military expansion. And that cannot be restrained by a treaty. Look at all your nuclear bases in Japan. Even if you are to withdraw your nuclear weapons, the nuclear bases are still there, and they can make use of them.

When you said that there is no militarism, well, I'll argue with you on that score. This is borne out by the film which we have shown you and by the activities of Mishima, who had committed suicide.

Just when you were ill in Peking, you probably heard of the incident of a Japanese fighter colliding with a Boeing civil airliner, causing heavy casualties. Why? Because the air corridor in Japan is very narrow.

You have been to Japan. You know that the Japanese air corridors are divided into several levels, the higher for the Boeings, the lower for the propeller-driven aircraft. And with the Japanese Air Force being equipped with more and more planes, they just fly everywhere with them at will for training. And the pilot of that fighter parachuted to safety but let his fighter collide with the Boeing. And when asked why they did that, the trainer just said there was no place for training. What could they do?

That of course gave rise to public indignation. And among those voicing indignation were the opposition with the ruling Liberal-Democratic party itself, who said this is one of the harms of militarism. It is not something said by the Chinese alone; they themselves are saying that.

MR. RESTON—You are really worried about Japan, aren't you?

50 Years of Suffering

MR. CHOU—Because you know we suffered a long time, for 50 years. Such calamities can be prevented by opposition from us and from the Japanese people together.

Of the four opposition parties in Japan, only the Japanese Communist party has differing views with China; that part supports Sato on this.

The Japanese Socialist party admits the revival of Japanese militarism. The Komeito party admits that Japanese militarism is being revived, the Democratic Socialist party does not deny this

fact, and the opposition wing of the Liberal-Democratic party also admits this fact.

When you oppose a danger, you should oppose it when it is only budding. Only then can you arouse public attention. Otherwise, if you are to wait until it has already developed into a power, it will be too strenuous. If the Far East situation is really to move towards relaxation, and if Japan gives up its ambitions of aggression against Korea and China's Taiwan, then it will be possible for China and Japan to conclude a mutual nonaggression treaty on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

MR. RESTON—Could I ask you at that point whether you can foresee an expansion of such a pact to include the United States and the Soviet Union?

MR. CHOU—That must go through a whole series of steps and I cannot at the present time give an immediate answer. Because at the present time the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, are involving themselves in affairs throughout the world. And it is not an easy thing to bring about a solution of world problems, so we would rather like to have a discussion with your President.

MR. RESTON—On this subject—

MR. CHOU—Various questions can be discussed. This question, too, may be discussed.

MR. RESTON—This is too serious a question to be dismissed lightly. Could you define as you have done so often in the past and so helpfully in the past, what are the principles that must precede such a far-sighted move as such a four power nonaggression pact.

MR. CHOU—This question can be thought about only after we come to it because international questions are too complicated. It is easy to say the five principles of peaceful coexistence which we advocate. But to go into an examination to see whether or not these principles are observed, then many problems will arise.

For instance, it was with India that we had first reached an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Because both China and India are two big countries, and in history there was no aggression by either against the other, with the sole exception of Genghis Khan's descendants, who went to the subcontinent but then stayed here and intermarried with the local inhabitants.

As for the two peoples, we had lived together in friendship for generations. As for the boundary question, it was something left over by British imperialism. But precisely over this boundary question, they fell out with us.

On this question, it was India which occupied Chinese territory. They even crossed the so-called McMahon Line. As for us, we did not press forward and were ready to solve the question by negotiations. As for Aksai Chin, in the

western sector, that had all along been Chinese territory, there was never a boundary dispute over that territory before, but suddenly they raised the question about the western sector.

It went to India to negotiate this boundary question with the Indians on three occasions, and no solution was reached. What is more, they want to further occupy our territory north of the so-called McMahon Line. You didn't know much about this. Now you should know about it. A very good proof of the facts about this situation was a book written by a British author, Mr. Maxwell.

MR. RESTON—Yes.

MR. CHOU—That book is similar to the Pentagon papers which you published. They did not make use of a single Chinese document. All are from Indian sources.

Control of Nuclear Arms

MR. RESTON—May I ask you, sir, how you view the control of nuclear arms? You are now one of the nuclear powers.

MR. CHOU—No, we are not a nuclear power. We are only in the experimental stage. And what is more, that has been the case throughout the period from 1964 to the present, seven years already. We will not test when there is no need. We know it is quite expensive and a waste. And it is not beneficial to the improvement of the livelihood of the people.

It is quite clear, we can see, that the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, having embarked on the mass production of nuclear weapons—cannot get down from the horse, so to speak. But can they thereby monopolize nuclear weapons. No, they cannot.

We produced nuclear weapons by ourselves. We manufacture nuclear weapons because we are forced to do so in order to break the nuclear monopoly. And our aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. And so every time we make a test, we declare that we will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. You will see what we Chinese say counts.

MR. RESTON—Do you want to see a world conference on this question? How can this ghastly problem be solved when the world is now spending about \$220-billion a year on arms. It is a disgrace to the intelligence of the human family. What are we to do about this question, and what can China do to help?

MR. CHOU—We do not agree with the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers. They want to lasso us by that means. We have expressed our disapproval, Britain said that she would not take part in the conference, and France too now says that she would not take part either.

We are calling for the convening of a conference of all countries of the world, big or small—because all the countries of the world, regardless of their size, should be equal—for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step, on the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Once everyone agrees on the nonuse of nuclear weapons then what will be the need for the production of nuclear weapons?

'How Can We Sign Them?'

MR. RESTON—Why do you use the word "lasso"?

MR. CHOU—When I said "lasso," it means if they want to drag us into such an affair. They will, first of all, demand that we sign on the partial nuclear test ban treaty, on the nonproliferation treaty and so on. How can we sign them?

But we undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The people of the world have indeed noted the fact that these two big powers are using so much money on nuclear weapons. Your Defense Secretary, Laird, himself admits that with so many nuclear weapons it is not possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to fight a nuclear war. The two peoples will oppose such a war.

MR. RESTON—True.

MR. CHOU—Since you do not want to have a nuclear war, then the United States and the Soviet Union should first undertake forthrightly that neither of them will be the first to use nuclear weapons, and then to go on to the next business. Because by reaching such an agreement, people will feel at ease. Secretary Laird said, now the U. S. should be prepared for conventional warfare. So Laird is telling Japan to strengthen the modernization of conventional weapons in Japan.

MR. RESTON—Is there a conflict between the so-called Nixon doctrine or Guam doctrine and our efforts to reach an accommodation with China? The thought I have in mind is this: I am afraid there is a puzzling and troubling point here that as we try to reduce our commitments in the Pacific, we encourage Japan and other countries to assume a larger military role, and that, in turn, leads to a greater dismay and anxiety on the part of China. Is there a conflict here? Is this one of the things to talk about with President Nixon when he comes to Peking?

MR. CHOU—You put it well. It is indeed a contradiction. I also discovered this contradiction because this is to encourage the militarization of Japan. There should be an effort at relaxation by all parties concerned. Indeed, there are a lot of questions. And as you know, your President spoke to the correspondents on the fourth after Rogers

made his statement. We have not yet seen the full text of his interview, we have read only a partial text. Have you seen it?

MR. RESTON—You mean the Rogers?

MR. CHOU—No, Nixon's.

MR. RESTON—No, I have not seen it.

MR. CHOU—I have only received very fragmentary reports, and probably I might get the full text tonight. President Nixon said that there were no pre-conditions for the forthcoming talks with China. Neither side has made any commitments. That is, there was no tacit understanding previously reached between the two sides.

MR. RESTON—I think it is useful to clarify this point because I think your allies and ours have both been a bit suspicious on this point.

MR. CHOU—China is a country which was blockaded by the United States for more than 20 years. Now since there is a desire to come and look at China, it's all right. And since there is a desire to talk, we are also ready to talk. Of course, it goes without saying that the positions of our two sides are different. And there are a lot of differences between our points of view. To achieve relaxation, there must be a common desire for it, so various questions must be studied, and all these questions may be placed on the table for discussion. We do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke. That is not possible. That would not be practicable. But by contacting each other, we may be able to find out from where we should start in solving these questions.

Prospects for a Settlement

MR. RESTON—We are a very impatient people, you know, Mr. Prime Minister. In the old grocery stores up in our countryside there used to be little signs which said the improbable we do today, the impossible tomorrow. How long do you anticipate that is will take for reasonable men to resolve these problems of Taiwan, Vietnam and get the principles solved and get down to diplomatic relations between these two countries.

MR. CHOU—We hope that the Indochina question will be solved first, because the war is still going on there. I have read some of your articles, and you said in one of your articles that you felt that your President lacked courage. But of course, in deciding to come to China this time, it is something which even the opposition party say others dare not do. So on this point he has some courage. Mr. Mansfield himself said that.

MR. RESTON: Courage or lack of courage, those are fighting words. What I was trying to say is that I do not think that he is a bold-minded man in the sense that de Gaulle was when de Gaulle said, "I was wrong about Algeria, therefore, I stop it, and I move to change it now."

I think the trend of the President's thought is bold and even right on both Vietnam and China. His timing and his politics are rather ambiguous. That was what I meant, not a lack of courage—it is not a lack of courage, it's a lack of clarity and definition and boldness to cut and end the killing and end the stupidity of isolation of China.

You asked me before about what did I mean by favoring China and the end of the Taiwan relationship. It's very simple. We cannot resolve the problems in the world without China. It's just that simple. We can resolve the problems of the world without Taiwan. It's not a question of sentiment, it's a question of reality and power.

That is why I want to see this resolved, and resolved at a moment when the country is ready for it. That is why I am worried about the China news agency and their story of the other night. If we leave it to journalists, the world will be in a mess. It has to get down to quiet diplomacy.

MR. CHOU—Well, some things can be dealt with quietly, but when some things have been openly declared by the other party for several times, then it must be openly answered in the press.

I agree to your estimate of the character of President Nixon, and of course there is also the question of the position he is now in. The then position of General de Gaulle in France was a bit different. But as there is going to be conversations between us, I hope he will clearly see the future, as you said, to look forward.

For instance, a complete withdrawal from Vietnam will be quite an honorable thing. What is there dishonorable about their withdrawal from Vietnam. I think that is most honorable. When General de Gaulle withdrew from Algeria, the whole world expressed their approval, and the Algerian people expressed approval, too. The relations between France and Algeria improved in de Gaulle's time.

MR. RESTON—I should say one thing to you privately about this. I think it is very important that you say you should look forward. I think the President does look forward. I think there are two things about him that are particularly interesting.

One, he is a Californian and he looks to the Pacific in the way that we who live on the other side of the continent do not. Second, he has an ambition. His ambition is to preside over the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in 1976. There is one small barrier in the way of that, which is he must get re-elected in 1972. And beyond that, I think he is a romantic, and I think he is dead serious about China.

I think he sees an historic opportunity here to repair the damage that has been done and even the injustice that has been done to China, and also perhaps in his own sense, a certain rebuke to his own past and a feeling that the

role he has played in the cold war is something that might be altered by a great and generous move to unify the peoples of the Pacific before he ends his term.

MR. CHOU—Thank you for providing me with this information. And you are motivated by your concern about the over-all world situation.

MR. RESTON—Yes, one doesn't come abroad to criticize one's own President, and I don't do that. It is true and it is still part of the mythology of America—I believe it's true—that the White House—you know, Woodrow Wilson once said that in the White House a man either grows or he swells, but most men are ennobled by it, and I think President Nixon is focusing on China, where he sees a historic role. This I think is terribly important psychologically.

MR. CHOU—We've noted this.

Demand for Withdrawal

MR. RESTON—May I, because I don't want to impose on or weary you. There is one thing I want to have you clarify for me if you will. You see we can talk philosophy, and that is interesting. But when we get down to it and I listen to all the specific conditions to which I've heard since I have come to Peking, I get rather depressed. The condition on Vietnam I understand, and I can see that it can be met. The conditions and the principals of Chou En-lai on Taiwan, I think, can be met. But when I hear General Huang say that we must withdraw from the Philippines, we must withdraw from Japan, we must withdraw from Thailand, I think this is asking us, in a way, to withdraw from the Pacific, and I get depressed at that point because this doesn't seem to me to be a realistic basis which any President could accept.

MR. CHOU—If one really wants to achieve a relaxation throughout the world and not the aggravation of tension, then the troops of all foreign countries, not only the U.S. troops, should be withdrawn from the territories of the countries they have occupied and let the peoples of various countries solve their own problems by themselves.

This is a question of principle. But as to when and where these withdrawals are to take place first, and how to discuss and reach agreement with the governments concerned, they are concrete matters.

When the principle has been put forward, and if one really goes in this direction, there are many specific details which have to be discussed for the implementation of this principle.

MR. RESTON—I have a feeling that perhaps we'd better end on this point. There are two great movements in the world today. There is a movement of withdrawal by the U.S. in Vietnam and a retrenchment of its commitment overseas, and, on the other hand, the most visible movement it seems to me is the

enlargement and the expansion of Soviet power across the Middle East and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and once the Suez is opened, into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Is one justified in being troubled by this Soviet movement in your view? Are you bothered by it?

MR. CHOU—Of course, for us it is an even more urgent matter. The assistant managing editor of your paper, Mr. [Harrison] Salisbury had been to Mongolia. He testified to the fact that there are massive troops concentrated on our borders in the north. So, in general, we stand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops back to their own countries so that the people of various countries may settle their own questions by themselves.

This is a matter of principle. But to put that into concrete form, of course, requires a process. In a word, in the past 25 years, first the U.S. tried to manage affairs of the whole globe, and then after Khrushchev took office it was a matter of striving for hegemony between the two superpowers.

The so-called disarmament conference is in fact a conference for arms expansion. Although there has been no world war, yet small wars have never ceased. We are not for demanding only the U.S. withdrawal and not the Soviet withdrawal, because that would be unfair. We say so in general terms, and specific matters will be dealt with concretely.

So if you say one should relax the situation, it is indeed not an easy matter. The reason is they have a few more atom bombs. But we Chinese are not afraid of atom bombs. We are prepared against their attack, against their launching a pre-emptive attack on us. That is why we are digging underground tunnels. You probably heard about this.

A Network of Tunnels

MR. RESTON—Yes, I did. As a matter of fact, you have a great network of tunnels under Peking.

MR. CHOU—Not only Peking. The great majority of our big and medium cities now have a network of underground tunnels.

[At this point the formal interview broke for dinner, but after dinner, though it was then past midnight, Mr. Chou asked that the formal discussion be resumed. The official transcript was renewed.]

MR. CHOU—There is one thing I've forgotten to mention. We have just discussed the question of Japan without discussing the question of Korea. As you know, there is still only an armistice agreement in Korea, and there has been no peace treaty. In this connection, we have to revert to John Foster Dulles.

In the Geneva conference, the first stage was devoted to the Korean question. As for the armistice in Korea, on your side it was a result of the decision taken by President Eisenhower. One of

your generals admitted that the Korean war was a wrong war fought at a wrong time at a wrong place.

MR. RESTON—Gen. Omar Bradley.

MR. CHOU—At the 1954 Geneva conference there should have been a result on the Korean question, at least a decision should have been made to continue the conference in the future. But even that was disrupted by Dulles. And so even now there is a demilitarized zone, a Military Armistice Commission which meets once every one or two weeks in Panmunjom.

On your side there is an American representative and a representative from what we call the puppet Government in South Korea. And on the northern side is a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a representative of the Chinese People's Volunteers. So the state of war has not ended. And you may recall the two incidents caused by your side, one of the Pueblo spy ship and the other a spy plane which was downed.

'Situation Remains Tense'

MR. RESTON—Yes.

MR. CHOU—And so the situation remains tense. And this is a matter which should be discussed.

MR. RESTON—Yes. If you could give me your views about that, I would be very happy to report them.

MR. CHOU—Our people's volunteers were withdrawn back in 1958. And the troops of other countries under the so-called U.N.C. have also been withdrawn. Only American troops remain there. And of the 60,000 troops or more in Korea at that time, 20,000 troops have been withdrawn and 40,000 and more still remain. And the American troops should all be withdrawn.

To solve the Korean question, a way should be found to bring about a rapprochement between the two sides in Korea and to move toward a peaceful unification of Korea. That of course requires time. But this demand is reasonable.

Now in the U.N. there is still a so-called commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea which is completely unilateral, composed of those countries of the so-called U.N.C. participating in the Korean war, and not a commission of both sides.

That presents a problem too. And so the Korean question is also linked up with the problem of Japanese militarism. If things do not go well, Japan may use the treaty it has concluded with South Korea, i.e., the Japan-R.O.K. treaty, to get into South Korea immediately upon the withdrawal of the U.S. forces.

MR. RESTON—It is extremely useful to have this view because, for one thing, we have not been able to do it to define those questions, of which I presume is one, that really should be on the agenda when the President comes here.

MR. CHOU—The Korean question

also involves a question of preventing the rise of Japanese militarism. If Japanese militarism is to expand outward, it will first aim at these two wings, Taiwan and this wing. I only deal with Taiwan. This is just what I would like to add.

MR. RESTON: Prime Minister, thank you very much for your kindness.

would like to ask the Prime Minister while I am here, would it be presumptuous for me to ask whether it is at all possible to see the Chairman?

MR. CHOU—Not very possible this time, because the Chairman is preoccupied with other matters. But of course you can come with your President next time.

MR. RESTON: No, I don't think I'll do that. I'll worry about him from now on, and let you worry about him after he gets here.

In Peking last week, Premier Chou En-lai talked with James Reston for five hours. The formal, recorded conversation is described in the article above. During dinner, Mr. Chou ranged widely in informal conversation, which Mr. Reston describes in the accompanying article.

An Evening With the Premier of China

Special to The New York Times

PEKING, Aug. 9.—The Premier of China is an austere man with thick John L. Lewis eyebrows, cool and inquisitive dark brown eyes and very white, expressive hands.

Premier Chou En-lai greets his visitors in the vast Fukien Room of the Great Hall of the People on Tienanmen Square, across from the main gate to the Forbidden City. In the formal part of our conversation, when he was discussing China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and Taiwan, he talked very slowly, as if he were tired and perhaps a little suspicious, but when we moved to dinner in another part of the room shortly after 10 o'clock, he brightened and talked on a wide range of subjects.

The Foreign Ministry stipulated before the interview that I could use a tape recorder but not for broadcast purposes, and that it was not to be used during dinner. However, my wife was permitted to take notes at the table.

The Premier, asked whether he was an optimist or a pessimist, replied with a smile that he was an optimist because he was a Communist. He then talked about

the United States and showed some interest in its race problem and in the American experts on China who were so severely criticized during the McCarthy era.

Mr. Chou said a friend of his just back from the United States had told him that the American blacks were making progress and he seemed pleased about it. He asked whether many of them worked in the Government, and when he was told that 64 per cent of the population of the District of Columbia was Negro, and that many worked in the Government, he observed that this was a good thing because you get used to them.

He said he had no old friends in the United States except the journalist Edgar Snow, but he inquired about John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent, formerly of the State Department, and the Orientalists Prof. John K. Fairbank of Harvard and Owen Lattimore, formerly of Johns Hopkins.

When I said that it would be good if they were able to come back and see the country they had devoted their lives to studying, he replied that it was a worthwhile idea. "Take good wishes to them," he added. "If they

want to visit China we will welcome them."

Premier Chou expressed some admiration for the late Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, United States commander in China during World War II, mainly because he quarreled with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But he was rather grudging in his praise for Gen. George C. Marshall, who tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, though he expressed a preference for him over Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and Patrick J. Hurley, who also served the United States here during the postwar period.

Cost of the Marshall Plan

At one point Mr. Chou's mind jumped from General Marshall to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe, and he was particularly interested in what the plan had cost the United States and whether it got any of the money back.

The United States has apparently not learned in Vietnam the lessons of its failures in China, he said, and is trying a Vietnamization program of arming and supporting reactionary forces that does not have the backing of the people. That, he observed, was precisely what the United States tried in China — America had a "Chinaization" program of supporting President Chiang, who had five million men and

plenty of American arms.

That was where the Communists got their arms, he said, by destroying General Chiang's millions and taking their arms. There was a very interesting photograph, he recalled, showing Mao Tse-tung entering Peking in an American jeep and reviewing whole rows of American guns and tanks.

The Premier had taken time to read what I wrote from China before the meeting and brought up, without offense, an observation I had made that China was an old civilization that seemed vigorous and young but was run by "old men."

The reason for this, he said, is that China's revolution has gone on for 22 years and actually for 28 years before that, from the founding of the Communist party. Accordingly, the leaders grew old in the struggle and did not come to power until they were in their fifties.

Inventors of Guerrilla War

The American Revolution was quite different, he observed, lasting only a few years, and the early Presidents were young.

The Americans numbered only three million at the time of the revolution yet were able to resist a colonial power of 30 million, so they depended on guerrilla warfare, he said. It was Americans who started guerrilla warfare, he added; George Washington started it.

China is thinking about the problem of succession and younger men, Mr. Chou said. It operates on the three-in-one combination, he added, explaining that all instruments of government are now run by a combination of the old the middle-aged and the young.

Never-Ending Stream

"President Nixon will see that young and middle-aged people join us in the talks," he added.

While Premier Chou talked an elaborate dinner was served. Also at the table were Chang Wen-chin, director of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Australian, European and American Affairs;

Chen Chu, director of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department; Chi Chao-chu, the Premier's principal interpreter, who did all the translating, and three other interpreters, including Chin Kuei-hua, who has squirmed us around since we arrived July 8.

It would be misleading to say that the meal was served in courses. It was a never-ending stream. First hors d'oeuvre of prawns, green beans, cold duck and chicken, and delicious morsels of fish. Then the first of three soup courses, this one oyster broth with tiny oysters the size of a quarter and floating slices of cucumber, followed by a dish of shrimp balls, quails, eggs, cabbage and sea slugs.

There were small glasses of sweet red wine and a strong liquer called mao tai, which Mr. Chou used to propose a toast, without swallowing a drop.

At about this point he began talking about the Chinese revolution and Stalin.

I observed that parents owed their children a record of the years before a child has its own memory and asked whether the leaders of the Chinese revolution felt the same obligation. Had they kept personal records in the form of diaries or journals of their long political struggle?

"No," Mr. Chou replied, "none of us have kept a diary—not Mao or Lin Piao or I, and none of us want to write our memoirs. Maybe, though, he continued, a history of China from the Opium War or from the Opium War on should be prepared, and perhaps it would be a good idea to try to get the record down on tape, but," he added, "we are not quite accustomed to the tape recorder in China yet."

Premier Chou, who, in the formal part of the conversation, had criticized the Soviet Union, nevertheless expressed his admiration for Stalin. Looked at from certain points of view, he said, Stalin no doubt had his shortcomings, and even from a Chinese point of view he was not good for China at the

Yalta Conference with Roosevelt and Churchill, but from a world point of view there was much to be said for him.

'Great Marxist-Leninist'

"We consider him to be a great Marxist-Leninist," Mr. Chou said. "Also, you must admit he made great contributions to the world war."

Unfortunately, Mr. Chou added, Lenin died early, and after his death "no one but Stalin could have held the Soviet Union together—no one." Without the 15 years of Soviet construction before the outbreak of World War II, he added, it would have been impossible to defeat the Germans.

Though the dinner had run through almost two hours and many courses, Mr. Chou never let the conversation loiter. His mind seemed to jump from one topic to another, and as it was getting on toward midnight, he suddenly began talking about America again.

"America has its merits," he said. "It was composed of peoples of all nations and this gave it an advantage of the gradual accumulation of the wisdom of different countries. You are also a big country. We both have about the same amount of land and room for development."

"Of course," he continued, "you plead that your economic and political system is good, but let's not argue about that. You will not oppose progress, and if you are going to make progress, of course you must expect change."

You will undoubtedly develop faster because of your industrialization, he added.

Great Interest in Language

That turned his mind to the question of language, which seemed to have a special fascination for him. He said, English was now the second language in China though the Chinese attach considerable importance to French. There is a tendency in China now, he added, that he did not quite approve of: too little attention to Russian. A lot of people speak Russian and there is a lot of knowledge to be gained through it, he commented.

END