



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DOS, NSS, Review Completed.

November 13, 1975

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To: The Deputy Secretary
From: AF - Edward W. Mulcahy ^{EWM}
INR - William G. Hyland ^{WGH}

40 Committee Meeting, November 14, 1975 - Angola

The 40 Committee meeting has been called to discuss pressing items concerning Angola (Tab A with five annexes). These items come under two major categories: the funding of future USG support to Angolan leaders and groups, and the proposed US response to the current Soviet escalation of weaponry, notably their introduction of MIG fighters.

Background. On November 10, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which controls Luanda, did the expected and declared itself the government of Angola. Simultaneously the opposing National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which control 2/3 of the countryside and population, declared their own government, based in Angola's second city, Nova Lisboa (now Huambo).

In September the MPLA's military position appeared relatively strong. It had commitments from the USSR and other outside backers to continue substantial military assistance. It counted on its ability to gain recognition from a considerable number of communist and non-aligned nations. In fact, its military position proved to be greatly over-extended. A coordinated FNLA-UNITA counter-offensive, backed by increasing amounts of US, Zairian, and, more recently, South African military assistance drove

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MPLA forces back to present positions. These generally coincide with the three movements' respective areas of ethnic strength. Soviet assistance was stepped up greatly after these MPLA reverses. An airlift began on October 31, staged through Guinea and the Congo, and deliveries have included sophisticated rocket launching systems and MIG aircraft. In addition, 1,000 or 2,000 Cuban troops have arrived in Angola and Cabinda.

Recognition of the MPLA regime has been slower to come than expected; 17 countries have so far recognized it, including 9 Africans. No state has recognized the FNLA-UNITA.

The MPLA appears to be holding the Cabinda enclave solidly after attacks mounted last week from Zaire by forces of a Cabindan liberation movement (not recognized by any of the three Angolan movements) with Zaire's support. The MPLA, with Cuban support, is counterattacking against FNLA's forces around Luanda. The UNITA/FNLA spearhead from Southern Angola has probably gone about as far as it can go. There will probably be further assaults in eastern Angola as UNITA attempts to open up the last MPLA-held stretch of the vital Benguela Railroad.

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Air Defense: Mobutu's Requests. Since receiving information pointing to an early introduction of Soviet MIG aircraft with Cuban crews into Angola via Brazzaville, President Mobutu has made requests asking us for 15 fighter aircraft, foreign pilots, a radar network to cover Zaire, Cabinda and northern Angola. We suggest that you say:

- We have reviewed Mobutu's request for air defense equipment, including radar and combat aircraft, to meet the threat he sees as a result of the Soviet supply of MIG 21s. We are not, however, convinced that there is an immediate threat to Zaire's security which would justify the provision of the equipment Mobutu has said he wishes. We at present see no serious threat of an attack on Zaire by the Soviet-provided MIG 21s in the Congo. Cuban-piloted planes in Angola would more likely be used in Angola and not for strikes into Zaire, although we would not discount the possibility of tactical strikes against Zairian military staging areas along the Angolan or Cabindan borders.
- The introduction of MIG 21s in Angola will have an immediate and seriously destabilizing effect. They could upset the present precarious military balance in the MPLA's favor and could contribute to forcing UNITA and FNLA back from gains made over the past difficult weeks.

Requests to Intercede with South Africans. The South Africans have been playing a very important role in recent military victories, notably in the capture of Bengnda and Lobito. The South Africans, however, may cut back their active participation in the fighting, fearing criticism at home that the government is sending troops to fight in Angola while withdrawing support to Rhodesia. We suggest that you make the following points:

- We understand South Africa's reluctance to extend its commitment in Angola, while at the same time, it is unwilling to provide troops to the regime in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, South Africa entered the Angolan war for its own reasons and has made a decision to continue fighting there again on the merits of the case as the South African government sees it. We do not think that the US should press the South Africans to continue or expand their involvement. They will in all likelihood operate out of a continuing sense of national interest.

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
- Should the South African involvement lead to requests for American assistance, we would have to look at the requests on a case-by-case basis. We would keep in mind, however, that there are policy and legal restrictions against our cooperation with South Africa that cannot be lightly set aside despite the importance of the Angolan problem.

Political Moves. The CIA proposes discussing political moves to deter further Soviet escalation (Tab A) and political moves to foster a peaceful solution. These include diplomatic initiatives with other governments, an approach to the Soviet Union, including a possible message from President Ford to Brezhnev, diplomatic efforts to induce an embargo on arms shipments to Angola, the recognition by the USG of an FNLA-UNITA government, and diplomatic efforts through intermediaries to dissuade Castro from the continued deployment of Cuban military forces in Angola. Concerning such a discussion, we suggest that you say the following:

- We have reviewed the CIA's recommendations on various forms of diplomatic initiatives that could be taken at this critical juncture in the Angolan war. We agree that it is time to review our negotiating posture, and a detailed negotiating scenario is being drafted in the Department of State for consideration by the agencies represented in this committee.
- The scenario may include an approach to the Soviet Union to control the provision of arms. It may also include an approach to African states to encourage them to promote a peaceful settlement and possibly a coalition compromise along the lines originally spelled out in the Alvor Agreement. The Scenario may include other initiatives. It will be ready early next week for consideration and comment.
- We regard a diplomatic initiative as essential to our Congressional posture. As you know, several members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pressed Under Secretary Sisco hard on what steps we were taking to negotiate an Angolan settlement.
- Whether we will be successful either with Moscow or in the African arena is difficult to predict. 25X1 The prospects frankly are not good. Should we not be successful, it will then be necessary to decide how we are going to continue and maintain our commitment to the contending liberation movements in Angola.

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Drafted: INR/DDC:FdeTarr
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Tab A

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The 40 Committee

SUBJECT : Items for 40 Committee Consideration

1. On 10 November 1975 the Portuguese removed their last remaining troops from Angola. The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) assumed control of the capital and ~~four~~ ^{five} or ~~five~~ ^{SIX} of the 15 provincial capitals and claimed sovereignty over all Angola. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) are setting up a rival government based in Nova Lisboa -- renamed Huambo.

2. In recent weeks the MPLA has been beaten militarily and has had to give up control of several provinces. The Soviets appear to be reacting to these MPLA setbacks by sending the MPLA more weapons, including rockets, artillery and armor. The MPLA has already been reinforced with Cuban combat troops, and there is intelligence that the Soviets are providing the MPLA with MIG aircraft to be flown by Cuban pilots.

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3. Attacks by the FNLA assisted by Zairois forces have been repulsed by the MPLA and Cubans outside Luanda. An attempt by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) assisted by Zairois troops to take control of Cabinda has not proceeded as quickly and easily as President Mobutu expected. But the overall position of the FNLA and UNITA versus the MPLA has been greatly improved.

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