

IV. 30 Oct 73

C A M B O D I A

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SIHANOUK REVEALS DISCOURAGEMENT IN LE MONDE INTERVIEW

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Oct 73 pp 1, 11 X

[Alain Bouc interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, entitled "I Will Not Return to Cambodia; I Will Remain in Peking Until I Die," and subtitled "The Head of RGNUC Criticizes Hanoi and the Khmers Rouges"]

[Text] Peking--The hour of clarification has come for RGNUC [Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia], the Khmers Rouges, and Prince Sihanouk. The prince, who had a long interview with us in his residence on Anti-imperialist Street, gave evidence simultaneously of anxiety, irritation, and even a hint of sadness. His remoteness from his country weighs on him, victory is slow in coming, and he is no longer sure of what the future and the resistance hold for him.

"Let us admit frankly, our weakness is patent; it can not be hidden. Despite all our victory bulletins, the Lon Nol regime is still there. If it is weak and we can not overthrow it, we are even weaker still. If, on the other hand, it is still powerful, why kill it?" The truth, as confirmed several times by the head of the RGNUC, is that the resistance cruelly lacks arms and ammunition. "Of course, we serve in the opposite camp, but there is such a disproportionate balance compared to what Nixon sends to Phnom Penh every day!"

Last January's Paris agreements resulted in the disruption of supplies from North Vietnam. The sending of aid from the DRV was blocked--not completely, but almost. In any case, the resistance did not have the means to occupy Kompong Cham and keep it. The prince tried to explain the Hanoi leaders' movements.

"In my opinion, the United States is seeking to stabilize the situation in Cambodia by awaiting a settlement of the whole Indochina question. It informed North Vietnam that if Hanoi aided the Khmers Rouges to the point of their being able to overthrow Lon Nol, it [the U.S.] would be obliged to intervene again. This is understandable: If we win, all their construction in Southeast Asia is liable to collapse.

"The second reason is that Hanoi cannot endanger the payment of America's war debts--what the United States calls reconstruction aid for Vietnam.

"Finally, it should be known that Hanoi and the MLF have drawn up a plan for the country's reunification, which requires time. They consider that a new confrontation with the Saigon regime is inevitable. The important thing for them is that the United States does not participate directly in the new conflict, in any case, that it does not resume bombing North Vietnam. To obtain a complete American withdrawal, some time must be allowed to pass so the United States will get used to peace, and it will become impossible for Nixon to again launch his country into war. You may note," continued the prince, with a finger on the map, "that the transport of arms between the two Vietnams does not require the taking of Phnom Penh: The Ho Chi Minh trails pass through regions to which Lon Nol's troops do not have access."

The disruption of the North Vietnamese channel is thus apparently behind the resistance's main difficulties. "Kim Il-song, the North Korean chief of state, proposed supplying us with as much as we wanted, but to what good, since this materiel could not be transported once it arrived at the DRV's borders? The same problem exists for Chinese aid, with the addition that Peking does not wish, in its negotiations with America, that it be reproached by the United States for adding fuel to the fire in Indochina; therefore, China does not show any enthusiasm for the idea of sending arms."

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Peking Must Court Washington

"Moreover, China is obliged somewhat to court Washington to prevent the formation of a hostile American-Soviet coalition."

However, in this delicate situation there appears an element of comfort: the RGNUC's recent diplomatic successes. The prince is completely satisfied with the Soviet leaders' change in attitude. "Their position is very clear. They recalled their charge d'affaires and all their diplomats, leaving in Phnom Penh only three persons who are not of diplomatic quality to guard the buildings. The GDR left only one. The Bulgarians repatriated all their personnel. The Mongolians recently recognized us. Of course, as a matter of dignity, they cannot all follow Moscow, one after the other. They allow a few days to pass between their respective initiatives. But, in the end, there is no doubt, the whole bloc is coming our way. We now have all the socialist and nonaligned countries with us. It is a very great victory for the RGNUC which Lon Nol will not be able to minimize.

Why Did the USSR Change Its Attitude?

"We must still ask ourselves," said the prince, perplexed, "what were the reasons which led Moscow to revise its attitude. Was it, as some people say, to annoy the Chinese, who have not yet broken off relations with Chile? Or rather, does it know that a large attack is being prepared and did it decide to repatriate its men? When the Russians arrive, it's always because they think that a solution is close; they are generally shrewd. They wish to push us toward a political solution." Then the prince outlined on the map several hypothetical divisions of territory which would permit the Soviets to be present and limit Chinese influence. They are still talking, though only to reject them, about tripartite or bipartite governments which would leave the heads of the Phnom Penh regime some of the power.

"However, the idea cannot be dismissed that Peking, Moscow, and Hanoi may agree with the Khmers Rouges, without conferring with me, to prepare a massive attack in the dry season." But certainly, we asked, you would be informed, in such a case?

"That is not certain," replied the prince, "I do not have intimate relations with the Khmers Rouges, I have no more, I have almost no relations with them. Yes, it is true, I have already said that I found them Stalinistic, with their daily indoctrination instruction, the language they employ, their methods."

The prince talked on these ticklish subjects with the same ease. But his extreme sensitivity prevented him from hiding a deep-seated sadness: "You know, there are wounds which cannot be healed. I tell you, I will not return to Cambodia, I will remain in Peking until I die. My mother, the Queen, is going to come here and we will both remain in China. But, meanwhile, I will aid the Khmers Rouges. To sweep away imperialism, they can count on me."

The prince remained discreet regarding the reasons for these disagreements. But it could be felt that in the end it was a problem of authority: Who will make the decisions? The solidly united Khmers Rouges group, or the prince, or even Prime Minister Penn Nouth? It is obvious that in Peking the young members of the Cambodian resistance prefer the efficient ponderousness of collective decisions to the prince's charm and sparkle. The RGNUC head has no desire to lose his freedom of action and speech in the meanderings of democratic centralism. He has the impression he is being held aloof.

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"I am fighting to be allowed to live in Cambodia with them: There is no danger any longer, now that the bombing has ceased; this old argument is no longer valid. And even if they feared my influence with the masses, I would agree to live without contact with the people, but at least on the national territory. I have asked them to destroy this reputation of 'government-in-exile'. The ministers must be sent to Cambodia from Peking, or at least their portfolios transferred to people in the interior. Why keep this whole team abroad? We only have four ministers and six deputy ministers in the interior; the others, the majority, are in the four corners of the globe. This position is untenable. If they do not agree to this request, I might even resign. Moreover, what do they want to make the RGNUC; why obstinately keep it in Peking? What place are they reserving for me? I want to know what my status is in their view. Am I simply an employee or the chief of state?"

Envisage the Same Goal

"However, we envisage the same goal. For the moment, due to a lack of munitions, we can not end the war, but we can continue it. I want to help the Khmers Rouges realize their dream of taking power in Phnom Penh, of setting up their socialist regime there, because, you know, between the Blues and the Reds, there is not even a question of choice; between corruption and the pure and strong regime they want to set up, there is nothing in common."

NUFC RADIO CARRIES ARTICLE ON EFFORTS TO IMPEACH NIXON

Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia [Clandestine] in Cambodian to Cambodia
0400 GMT 30 Oct 73 D

[Article: "Nixon Is Being Forced by the American People To Quit the Presidency"]

[Text] Nixon is badly entangled in Cambodia. He is also deeply bogged down in the Middle East. The Arab peoples are rising up and heightening their solidarity to struggle against Nixon's aggression. Now, in the United States itself, Nixon is under fire from the American people who are getting together to drive him out of the Presidency.

In order to win reelection Nixon committed innumerable crimes to defeat his opponents, including the break-in of the headquarters of the U.S. Democratic Party. The filthy Watergate affair that broke 6 months ago has unearthed and exposed Nixon's corrupt activities before the eyes of the American people. Many of his employees at the White House, who were involved in this wrongdoing, were fired from their duties by Nixon because he was afraid that his foul activities would be exposed.

However, this step was in vain, for the American people are well aware of the truth. They are very indignant and are vigorously denouncing him. They even demanded that the Supreme Court [as heard] impeach him. The U.S. Senate then set up an investigating committee to look into the matter. Panic-stricken, Nixon appointed one of his confidants, namely Richardson, to the post of attorney general. Likewise he named Archibald Cox special prosecutor because he expected that Cox could prevent this Watergate scandal from worsening and that he, Nixon would escape unscathed.

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However, the truth remains the truth. Contrary to Nixon's expectation, his filthy scandal has become even more stinking. Both the Senate's investigating committee and the court refused to compromise with him and requested that he hand over all secret tapes relating to the Watergate scandal. Neither Richardson, the attorney general, nor Archibald Cox, the special prosecutor, could save him. Nixon was furious over their failures. He fired both Richardson and Archibald Cox as well as the under secretary of justice. He still refuses to hand over the secret documents on the Watergate affair to the court.

Such behavior cannot be tolerated by the American people. A wave of indignation against Nixon is sweeping the United States. In Miami, Florida, the multimillion-strong CIO-AFL voiced its protest and demanded that Nixon resign from the Presidency of the United States. If he remained stubborn, the union organization would demand that the U.S. Congress pull him out of the post. The people's movement to drive Nixon from the White House has become more feverish and turbulent. Ninety members of the House of Representatives have petitioned for Nixon's impeachment, while six senators who were attending conferences abroad have hurriedly returned home to take part in the drive against Nixon. Several other senators have publicly denounced him. Many of them issued press statements condemning Nixon for blemishing the American people's honor in this scandal. Not a single senator or member of the House of Representatives dares to step in to overtly support Nixon, and even the chairman of his own Republican Party has condemned him.

We recall that Spiro Agnew, Nixon's vice president, has just been sentenced to a 3-year jail term for corruption and larceny. He is the first U.S. vice president to be sentenced to jail while in office.

Such is the fate of the Phnom Penh traitorous clique's masters. The Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam-Cheng Heng-Sosthene Fernandez traitors, their Phnom Penh lackeys, are sure to experience an even worse destiny. Both the masters and lackeys will certainly be overturned by the Cambodian people and the American people as well as the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Down with Nixon, the international thugs' ringleader!

Down with his Phnom Penh lackeys, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam-Cheng Heng-Sosthene Fernandez traitors!

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FBIS TRENDS
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SIHANOUK, SPOKESMEN SOFTPEDAL NEED FOR "ARMED STRUGGLE"

At a time of military stalemate, recent pronouncements by Prince Sihanouk and other Front spokesmen have been marked by notable restraint. They have moderated previous persistent calls for uncompromising armed struggle and have avoided authoritative criticisms of Phnom Penh leaders. The change was particularly apparent in Sihanouk's 29 September National Day message to PRC leaders which merely promised to "wage a struggle" until the objectives of the five points are achieved. Last year's message emphasized the resolve to carry out a "war of resistance" "without retreat or compromise, whatever may be the sacrifices and duration of the war." Unlike last year, the message sidestepped criticism of the Phnom Penh government leaders by name and failed to assail "Saigon and Bangkok lackeys." Another exercise in restraint has been the Front's failure so far to comment on the Phnom Penh government's 24 September reiteration of its 6 July settlement proposal. When the plan was first proposed it was greeted by harsh invective.

Sihanouk's moderation comes at a time when Peking, his major supporter, has shown sustained reserve in regard to the Cambodian situation. Peking continues to replay Front pronouncements, to press strongly for the entry of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) into the United Nations, and to feature Sihanouk prominently in reports of celebrations in Peking. However not since early July, not even on his return from the nonaligned conference last month, has Peking feted him at a banquet, an occasion requiring a major Chinese speech on Cambodia. Sihanouk, in discussions with Western newsmen, last month complained that PRC and DRV arms aid had been halted.

At the same time, Moscow has seemed to be gradually moving toward recognition of Sihanouk's government, although it still maintains its embassy in Phnom Penh. According to an 11 October TASS report published the following day in PRAVDA, Soviet ambassador to China Tolstikov paid a visit to "head of state" Sihanouk on an unspecified date in Peking and voiced support for the Cambodian struggle under the leadership of FUNK and RGNU. According to Sihanouk's statements to Western newsmen, the meeting took place on 9 October and Moscow had acknowledged his regime as the legal representative of Cambodia. A more forthcoming Soviet attitude to Sihanouk's government had been indicated in August when a TASS report of a RGNU statement included its references to Sihanouk as "head of state" and the RGNU and FUNK as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Cambodian people.*

* See the TRENDS of 22 August 1973, pages 1-3.

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CPSU SLOGANS

DETENTE DIPLOMACY, EVENTS IN CHILE, MIDEAST REFLECTED

The CPSU Central Committee's October Revolution anniversary slogans this year continue the recently established practice of deemphasizing the broader contentious issues in East-West relations and international communist relations in these semiannual statements but responding to specific trouble spots that have developed around the world. While registering Moscow's concern about events in Chile and the Middle East, the slogans, published in the central press on 14 October, also incorporate new themes that have emerged in Moscow's detente diplomacy in the six months since the May Day slogans were issued in mid-April.

+ The two Middle East slogans, abbreviated in May to a call for "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression," now call upon the world to "demand an end of Israeli aggression against the Arab states" while reactivating language used in previous years calling for "the liberation of Arab lands."

+ The slogans carry on Moscow's recent rhetorical concern about the military coup in Chile in adding greetings to the "working people and all democrats in Chile, who are waging a courageous struggle against the campaign of terror by reactionary fascist forces."

+ A slogan directed specifically at Asia as a whole was added for the first time since the foreign affairs section of the slogans was shortened considerably in 1967. The slogan calls for "collective security in Asia," reflecting Moscow's recently reinvigorated campaign in support of this now well-established plank in its foreign policy platform.

+ Moscow's general satisfaction with international developments over the last six months and its continuing interest in detente diplomacy were registered in a new slogan reiterating the April 1973 plenum's call for steps to make the relaxation of international tension "irreversible" and to place the principle of peaceful coexistence at the basis of relations between states with different social systems.

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Statements By

Prince Norodom SIHANOUK

1965 - 1973

1. Statements on the Cambodian Communist Movement
1965-1970
2. Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
(Hu Nim, Hou Youn & Khieu Samphan)-- 1970-1973
3. Statements on Who Controls the Cambodian
Insurgents -- 1970-1971
4. Statements on His Future Role -- 1970-1971
5. Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance -- 1970-1973
6. Statements on Effect of Bombing -- 1973-
7. Statements on Negotiations -- 1972-1973

SIHANOUK - Statements on Cambodian Communists

1965-1970

LAST month I wrote . . . I have never had the slightest illusion about the fate that awaits me at the hands of the communists, as well as that which is reserved for "my" government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the "free world" and the US in particular . . . I concede again that after the disappearance of the US from our region and the victory of the communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

JUNE 1965

As for such socialist countries as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we support them politically and diplomatically without reservation. But we cannot support certain among them in their efforts to neocolonialise Cambodia and turn it into a satellite by using Khmer Reds as their trojan horse.

MAY 1967

If the Khmer people find that Sihanouk and the Sangkum are good for nothing or are traitors or have done something bad, and if the Khmer people therefore want to expel Sihanouk and the Sangkum from the country, we will have nothing to say about it because it is the will of the Khmer people. But we cannot let the Khmer Reds say that Sihanouk and the Sangkum must be replaced by China. We cannot accept this because China has no right to come and rule over Cambodia.

SEPTEMBER 1967

I will step down and turn the country over to General Lon Nol . . . Out of indignation with the Khmer Reds who do nothing but call others US lackeys, I am inclined to say that I want to side truly with the Americans. Out of indignation I want to submit really to the Americans because these people never stop speaking of my submission to the Americans. As to them, they who are lackeys of the Chinese and the Vietnamese, they have not said anything about that.

MARCH 1968

I am planning to ask the Russian and Chinese leaders to urge the Vietcong to leave us alone. I will always defend the neutrality of my country. I do not want it aligned to the West or the East. Neutrality is the condition for the survival of the Cambodian people . . . the rightists do not need to stage a coup d'etat against me. I am not really attached to power. If the people and the army wanted to go to the right, I would certainly let them go to the right. [In Paris, just before leaving for Moscow]

MARCH 12 1970

"They launched these attacks because they want to create civil war. . . .

"If we fail in our operations against them and if the Khmer [Cambodian] Viet Minh emerge victorious, they can transform the nation into a Communist country. If not they must continue to accept independence and neutrality

"The masters of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong."

May 9, 1967:

"Concerning the Communists, dear companions, we say that we trust the Chinese and Vietnamese. But when the moment comes what will happen between us and the Vietnamese?"

"I must tell you that the Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong negotiated with us three or four times but that absolutely nothing comes out of the negotiations. They did not sign a pledge of respect for our present frontiers. That is the first problem. The second problem is the fact that the pro-Viet Minh Khmer [Cambodians] have had the habit of permitting the Viet Minh to come into our country. Formerly, after I had expelled the French and after the French troops left Cambodia, the Viet Minh remained in our country in order to conquer it. How can we have confidence in the Viet Minh? Will we be able to escape falling into their hands once we turn Communist?"

" . . . If we side with the Viet Minh, we will lose our independence. . . ."

May 9, 1967

SIHANOUK - Statements on Cambodian Communist Leaders
Hu Nim, Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan - 1968-1969

"Today there are about 10 persons being tried by the military court, and some of the Khmer Reds who found this out have taken flight into the forest, such as Hu Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim, who have sold their country to foreigners -- the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong and the People's China. And now these guys who are plotting with the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong must leave the country at once for Vietnam."

[February 1, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

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"Then the Prince discussed the disappearance of Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan [Khmer Red leaders] who fled to a foreign country. He said: Their master had sent them here to stay."

[February 5, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

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"Sihanouk read a letter from a Khmer intellectual who had just returned to Cambodia from the United States, in which he praised the Sangkum's development. Sihanouk then commented on past events, recalling the time when Cambodia was infiltrated by the Viet Minh, the masters of Hu Nim."

[October 14, 1968 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

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"Sihanouk said he will again offer his sympathy and paternal and brotherly feelings to the Khmer Red leaders -- such as Hou Youn, Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim -- whenever the latter change their attitude and again become nationalist, royalist, Buddhist, or socialist Buddhist. He said that as long as they remain enemies of the nation, he is obliged to counterattack them."

[September 24, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

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"Sihanouk then called on the families of Hu Nim and Hu Youn, Khmer Red leaders, to try to convince the two men to stop creating trouble and insecurity. Sihanouk said: It's just like they [Khmer Reds] have opened the door for the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh to enter and stay in the country. There are so many of them now. When I asked our Royal Armed Forces, how many Viet Cong and Viet Minh were in the country, I was told 40,000."

[October 13, 1969 - Sihanouk Speech - Radio Phnom Penh]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Who Controls the Insurgency 1970-1973 (a)

"He said that the strategy and tactics of the "people's forces" were worked out in Cambodia itself by Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister of the Cambodian Royal Government of popular union and his general staff, and nowhere else.

"As for eventual negotiations between himself and the United States, Prince Sihanouk toughened his position in declaring that even for preliminary contacts before any negotiations the decision rested with the "interior resistance" and not with himself."

[Sihanouk Interview - AFP - April 28, 1972]

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"If they (the U. S.) attempt to contact me, I shall consult Khieu Samphan and let him make a decision."

[April 28, 1973 - Reuters from Peking]

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"...Inside Cambodia, he added, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim and Prince Norodom Phuressara are leading this government and running the country collectively."

[April 13, 1973 - Press Conference - Peking NCNA]

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"Sihanouk commented: Here are the three men (Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim and Hou Youn) who according to Lon Nol's propaganda have been shot by Sihanouk... It is they who are leading today's Cambodia and it is they inevitably who will lead the Cambodia of tomorrow."

[April 13, 1973 - Sihanouk Filming Conference - AFP Peking]

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"The RGNUC is not a government in exile, because the RGNUC means the leadership of Messrs. Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim and, first of all, the people's power that has already been solidly installed in 90 percent of Kampuchea."

[April 9, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi - VNA]

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"That is why its government, even if it is composed of a majority of 'Red Khmers,' is called and will always call itself a 'royal government.' But as a regime, it is and will always be a pure people's democracy. It is the people and the people alone that exercises, and will exercise, all the powers, and not any

'sovereign,' be he called Sihanouk."

[April 10, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech - VNA]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Who Controls the Insurgency (b)

"Sihanouk stressed that the 'last word' on this matter (GRUNK reevaluation of war policy) belonged to Khieu Samphan."
[Sihanouk Press Luncheon Speech - AFP - January 31, 1973]

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Sihanouk cabled the New York Times: "If they (Interior Resistance leaders) refuse to let me return to Cambodia within 2 months at the latest, I will offer to them my resignation from my present position and will retire to France."
[January 31, 1973 - New York Times]

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"With regard to the managing of the country (education of the people, organization and defense of national territory, administration of the liberated townships, districts, provinces and cities, etc. ...), I have entrusted it entirely to the patriotic persons who are now leading the national resistance in the country, particularly comrades Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim. Thus, all of you who participate in the struggle are fighting for the motherland, for yourselves and for your families."
[May 12, 1970 - Sihanouk Message to Armed Forces - Peking NCNA]

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Sihanouk was quoted as saying to a European television correspondent that he was "frankly ... out of touch" and lacked "direct control of the situation in Cambodia."
[October 1970]

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"Prince Norodom Sihanouk said today that the majority of the Royal Cambodian National Union Government is now Red Khmer, and the power already belongs to the Cambodian Communist Party.

"I am giving everything to the Red Khmers. They are pure. They will do what is necessary for the people. They are patriots. They will keep Cambodia independent."
[September 26, 1970 - Interview with Sihanouk in Peking]

SIHANOUK - Statements on His Future Role

"But if I go on as chief of state after victory, I run the risk of being pushed out the window by the Communists, like Masaryk, or I might be imprisoned for revisionism or deviationism. . . . It isn't that I lack physical or moral courage, but what I have to do is to rehabilitate myself and retire in beauty, in an exit that it is, if not triumphant, at least honorable. Obviously, it is possible that I might go on for a few years after liberation as chief of state. Even the Communists have asked me to. During the reconstruction period, Cambodia may still need me to represent the nation, to accept credentials from ambassadors, to do public relations. But I shall have nothing to do with domestic politics. That has cost me too much already.

"I am struggling for the liberation of my country. I have the strength to do that. But to fight to keep myself in power? No, I won't fight."

[Interview with Tribune De Geneva, December 10, 1971]

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"In an interview given in Peking to M. Alexandre Casella, an interview broadcast by the French Swiss radio station, Prince Norodom Sihanouk reaffirmed his intention of retiring from the political scene once General Lon Nol's Phnom Penh Government is overthrown. 'I shall hand over power to the young,' he said, 'and settle in France' Will Prince Sihanouk's departure mean the end of Cambodian monarchy? 'Undoubtedly,' the Prince replied, 'but, you see, we can do nothing about it. Assuming that Cambodia turns Red, it will be a Yugoslavia or a Romania at the most, but I believe that I will be rather pink than red.'"

[Paris LE MONDE, December 5, 1970]

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"Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would resign as head of state after the liberation of Cambodia, and retire to Moujins, in southern France. He said: After the liberation, there will be problem of the Communists and non-Communists now assembled in the United National Front of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Will the front then hold together? I do not know, but I do not want to have to deal with the Communists after the liberation. That will be a problem for the young generation."

[Paris AFP, July 3, 1970] * * * * *

"I only wait for the day of complete victory of our people to tender them my resignation as the legal head of state and transfer them the legitimate power of the state given to me by the people in 1960. Moreover, I shall be able very soon to entrust all the responsibility of state affairs to the qualified representatives of our progressive people and youth who make up the new government of national union.

[Sihanouk's Third Message, Peking NCNA, April 21, 1970]

"Last month I wrote in the monthly review Kambuja, published in Pnompenh: 'I have never had the slightest illusion on the fate that awaits me at the hands of the Communists, as well as that which is reserved for my government, after having removed from our region the influence, and especially the presence, of the 'free world,' and the U. S. A. in particular.'"

In an editorial which will appear shortly in this same review, I concede again that after the disappearance of the U. S. A. from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene.

I know the Chinese well enough to understand that they cannot be 'bought' and that it is perfectly useless to bend before them, or to play their game occasionally in the hope of extracting some ulterior advantage. If I acted thus, I would be despised, and rightly so, by the Chinese people, who would not alter their plans one iota so far as my country is concerned. "

From a letter to the New York Times dated May 16, 1965, published June 4, 1965.]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (a)

"He said the only North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the ranks of his forces were there on liaison missions. He said these North Vietnamese and Viet Cong dealt with such questions as getting supplies in the 'liberated' zones of Cambodia. He said his forces occasionally authorized the passage of Vietnamese units through Cambodian territory in the region near the border with South Vietnam but that these transit units did not take part in the fighting in Cambodia."

[April 28, 1973 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

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"This great victory is also yours, that is of all the glorious Democratic Republic of Vietnam which, in a very fraternal manner, has taken upon herself the very heavy responsibilities of organizing and realizing my historic trip, a realization of the most heroic of all peoples, the Vietnamese people, through the travel was a very perilous one in view of the ill intentions of U. S. imperialism and the constant, incessant and impudent violations of the Paris agreements of January 27, 1973 by the Nixon government."

* *

"Your new, historic and decisive aid adds to the innumerable aids you have accorded to our people and our national resistance. It confirms in a most convincing manner in the eyes of the whole world that your support of the NUFC, the RGNUC, the CNPLAF and Norodom Sihanouk is total and indefectible. . . . Nothing and nobody in the world can ever separate us from one another. We have always intimately shared weal and woe."

* *

"Respected and beloved Mr. Prime Minister, of the DRV, you are one of the greatest heroes of our Indochina, one of the most noble supporters of Kampuchea and one of the most admired, most affectionate friends of the Khmer people and myself. Each of your words toward us and each of your gestures bear the highest significance."

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"With regard to weapons and munitions, I can affirm that on the one hand our great and indefectible friends -- the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- had helped us, prior to January 27, 1973, to build up a very important stock that enables us to carry on our armed struggle all by ourselves until 1975."

[Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi, VNA Hanoi, April 10, 1973]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (b)

"... We have just concluded a new military aid agreement with China and shipments are already on route." (Two agreements for military and economic aid were in fact signed in Peking on January 13, 1973)
[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP in Peking]

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"Our troops sometimes launch combined operations with our friends -- the North Vietnamese and national liberation forces -- along the Cambodia-Vietnam borders. But our armed forces assume sole responsibility for all military operations within Cambodia. We grant to the troops of our North Vietnamese and national liberation forces friends the right of passage across our national territory, but these friendly Vietnamese troops do not have any permanent base within our country. The question of their evacuation from Cambodia is not posed and will not be."
[October 29, 1972 - Sihanouk cable to Indespress Correspondent - Answers his Questions - Broadcast by AKI]

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"Prince Sihanouk on October 4 told an AFP correspondent that he had recently received assurances from Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho that even if a separate cease-fire took place in Vietnam or Laos, Peking and Hanoi would continue to furnish arms and logistical support to the Cambodian combattants. Sihanouk said that Le Duc Tho told me that... if you fear that we will achieve peace before you, please be assured that we will always continue to give you our support..."
[October 4, 1972 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

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"On September 4, Sihanouk told an AFP correspondent that 'the March offensive in Vietnam did away with dependence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the transport of material for South Vietnam and Cambodia... weapons and material now come directly from the North to the South through Quang Tri Province.'"
[AFP, September 4, 1972]

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"Sihanouk stated on July 3, 1972 that China and North Korea gave equipment and medical supplies but that the Vietnamese supplied the instructors and that 'our instructor-in-chief is General Giap....'
'It is true,' he said, 'that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia.'
[July 3, 1972 - AFP Interview]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (c)

"China is giving us all kinds of aid, which enables us to exist as a state.

"Before, there were a great many Vietnamese units helping us, but now our units are overwhelmingly Cambodian, and we don't even have any more Vietnamese advisers or instructors."
[December-10, 1971 - Sihanouk Interview with Tribune De Geneva]

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"He added that heavy artillery had been supplied to Cambodian 'reactionary forces,' while his own side had no heavy guns, only rockets and mortars. It is difficult for us to transport heavy artillery from China through North Vietnam and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, said the prince, who once spent two years as a student officer at the French tank and cavalry school."
[October 19, 1971 - Phnom Penh Domestic Service]

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"Our regular troops are entirely equipped by China, including heavy equipment, and our militia are equipped by (North) Korea."
[September 26, 1970 - AFP Sihanouk Interview]

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"Sihanouk said: It is true that there are Vietnamese in Cambodia. But why should anyone be astonished that the Indochinese unite? In Vietnam, the Americans erased the line of demarcation and they have turned the Vietnam war into an Indochinese war. Henceforth, Indochina must be considered as a single battlefield, and the Indochinese will remain united until final victory."
[July 3, 1970 - Paris AFP in English]

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"We renew to the DRV, to its respected President, its respected leaders ... the assurance of our ... gratitude for their... backing, their total support and precious assistance to our government. Our people's struggle is inseparable from the struggle of the Vietnamese people... together we are fighting, together we shall win. Together our peoples will fight until all their countries are liberated... after our common victory we will always remain inseparable brothers... and... our three countries will cooperate closely in conformity with the resolutions of the Indochinese peoples summit conference."
[May 27, 1970 - Sihanouk Speech - VNA]

SIHANOUK - Statements on DRV/PRC Assistance (d)

Sihanouk also told Norman Webster of the Toronto Globe and Mail in July 1970 that he had been tempted to call in North Korean troops to help liberate Cambodia and that Kim Il Sung has urged him to accept 'volunteers' but that a 'majority of the members of his 'government' in exile felt that the job could be done by Cambodia 'resistance fighters from the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.' These statements of Sihanouk earned a rapid rebuttal from NCNA which on July 13 quoted a GRUNK statement 'refuting the distorted report ... of Norman Webster.' The GRUNK statement nevertheless did not exclude all mention of the VC/NVA, but referred to 'Khmer forces and the United Front of the Indochinese peoples as being sufficient for the fighting.'

SIHANOUK - Statements on Effect of Bombing

"I am surprised that in spite of the U. S. wanton bombings and the drought of last year, the liberated zone is very prosperous economically."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking NCNA]

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"The towns in our hands are not being bombed but only the bridges and airports giving access to them are being bombed."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, April 13, 1973, Peking (AFPC printed Washington Post, April 14)]

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"He added that the B-52 bombings are not causing many casualties in the liberated areas."

[Sihanouk Press Conference, AFP from Peking, April 17, 1973]

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"Asked about his own forces rocket attack on Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport earlier this week, in which a number of civilians living in makeshift homes were killed or injured, Prince Sihanouk said: 'That's war.'"

"The Prince cited two main reasons for the decision not to launch a final assault on Phnom Penh at this stage. One was the possible massive response to such an attack by the United States Air Force."

[Interview with Reuters in Peking, April 28, 1973]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (a)

He added, I can assure you solemnly that neither Peking nor Hanoi will ever lead us toward negotiations, they are wary of it and on our side. We have told them, and they well know, that we will not budge one inch.

"We will never negotiate with Lon Nol and his band. Their fate is the gallows."

[April 28, 1973 - Sihanouk Interview - AFP]

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"I have four times expressed willingness to speak with either Nixon or Kissinger during their visits here. But it was rebuffed, he said.

"If they attempt to contact me, I will consult Khieu Samphan (the Khmer Rouge guerrilla leader in Cambodia) and let him make a decision.

"But such an approach would mean the Americans knew they were beaten and there would be no purpose in talking with them."

[April 28, 1973 - Reuters]

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"He said that there was no question of his resistance movement negotiating or reconciling itself with 'the traitors' in Phnom Penh. 'All we expect them to do is to resign,' he said....

"Sihanouk said: 'I tell you solemnly that the leaders of the interior will never accept any compromise with the Phnom Penh clique. It is completely illusory for countries like the United States, France or the Soviet Union to count on a compromise solution.' "

[April 20, 1973 - Peking - AFP]

"We have proposed reconciliation with the USA but maintain that the USA must put an end to this military involvement in Cambodia, end aid to Lon Nol and cease interference in our affairs....

"We will never accept cease-fire or compromise.

"When we speak of negotiations with the USA, we mean to negotiate the question of ending U. S. interference, not the question of cease-fire. They are different questions. Cease-fire means splitting our country, means recognition of the Lon Nol-controlled zone."

[April 13, 1973 - NCNA]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (b)

"In this connection, I have just had a direct contact with the CNP-LAF and the RGNUC back home. They asked me to let the whole world know that they will never accept, in any case or any circumstance, any compromise whatsoever with the regime of the traitors, any cease-fire whatsoever, any 'peace conference' whatsoever. They are not bellicose, but they will only accept a peace with the installation of the RGNUC in Phnom Penh and with the rehabilitation of the independent and non-aligned Kingdom of Cambodia, that elimination of U. S. neo-colonialism from Khmer territory."
[April 19, 1973 - Sihanouk Speech in Hanoi]

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"Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced in Hanoi yesterday that the policy of the United National Front of Kampuchea had been revised following the conclusion of the Vietnam cease-fire Agreement.

"The head of the RGNUC said that this new policy included an overture to the United States, a decrease of the military activities of the Cambodian resistance fighters, and provision for a general amnesty in Cambodia.

"He said: If the United States is willing to play the game of friendship with an independent and non-aligned Cambodia, we will be able to arrive at a quick reconciliation with the Washington Government. Prince Sihanouk added that he envisaged the resumption of a dialogue with the United States in two stages. He said: 'First, a meeting without any condition to see what each has up its sleeve, and the negotiations.' Prince Sihanouk added that the Cambodian problem could not be settled without the definitive retirement from political life of Lon Nol and his clique of traitors. He said: 'We do not want to capture them. They have sufficiently well-stocked bank accounts in Switzerland. They must leave.'"

[February 1, 1973 - Press Interview - AFP]

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"... We must adopt to the changes. We are doing as the Vietnamese do. That is the reason for our 'new look' in our policy. But we will also maintain our principles.... Sihanouk emphasized that the purpose of the new policy was to avoid inconveniencing Cambodia's neighbors who must observe the cease-fire. He said: This is why on the military level we are going deliberately to temporize, lowering the tone of air operations and not launching offensive actions."

[February 1, 1973 - Hanoi - AFP]

SIHANOUK - Statements on Negotiations (c)

"Sihanouk said that the American Government had not made any more offers to him since he rejected its offer for the establishment of a government of reconciliation in Phnom Penh of which he himself would have been head. The U. S. had suggested this solution to him last year through the Chinese Government. He had rejected the offer because for one thing it prescribed the winding up of the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union and the Phnom Penh Government in favor of a Government of National Reconciliation that would have existed until general elections were held in Cambodia."

[January 21, 1973 - Interview with AFP Correspondent - Peking]

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"On October 4, Sihanouk told an AFP Correspondent that Senator Mansfield's suggestions for a peace settlement in Cambodia was unacceptable to him (e. g. Sihanouk's return to Cambodia as the head of a Vietnam Government of National Union with the participation of Lon Nol's Government representatives).

[October 4, 1972 - Interview with AFP Correspondent - Pelon]

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"Sihanouk said his forces were opposed to such an arrangement (e. g. cease-fire/partition) and would fight until the Lon Nol regime is completely eliminated. He said: We refuse the Nixon solution -- a cease-fire with international control. We do not accept either a cease-fire or partition or international control."

[September 4, 1972 - AFP]

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"They (and Britain and others) are proposing to us the formation of a government of national reconciliation or of national coalition. To sum up the matter, these governments would have three heads: one left, which would be we resisters; one right, which would be the pro-Americans; and one center, which would be the people who were not engaged in this war and whom I will call the cowards.

"Now a government with three components is necessarily a weak government, for there is no monolithic bloc. What will happen is clear: one will find on one side the patriots who form one-third of the government, and the other two-thirds will be formed by traitors and cowards. The result is that the minority third will be forced back into the bush, as is the case in Laos with the Pathet Lao."

[July 25, 1972 - Interview with Le Soleil]