

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

2/3/72

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai

Attached is a book which we have prepared for you containing readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Included are [redacted] and analytic reports on the political philosophies and current political status of Mao and Chou prepared by CIA and by an American lawyer who was born in China and lived there for many years.

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It is of course very difficult to draw a full or wholly accurate picture of personages as complex as Mao and Chou. The CIA contributions and those of the lawyer each have their strong points and perhaps certain less strong ones as well. For example, the lawyer seems to do better than CIA in assessing the romantic, revolutionary strain which runs through Mao, while CIA is much more up-to-date on where Mao stands politically today in China. CIA impresses me as being more perceptive in commenting on Chou, who emerges in the lawyer's study as a shallower personality than he was in his conversations with me. Where CIA lacks color, the lawyer has an abundance of it.

In reading these materials, I believe that you should keep in mind that we are seeing only the tip of the iceberg. CIA has had no direct contact with the China mainland; the lawyer has, but in pre-Communist days when the Nationalists were in power. (The lawyer's main Chinese source, incidentally, falls into the same category.) But both are, in my opinion, pretty much on target.

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS  
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- A. Evaluations of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai by an American lawyer, born and reared in China.

The author presents his assessments of China's two most important political leaders. He describes how they are likely to conduct themselves during your negotiations in Peking, and suggests how an American President should deal with two men he characterizes as cunning and devious politicians. The analysis draws on several scholarly studies of these leaders.

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F. "Mao Tse-tung's Favorite Novels."

The same American lawyer who furnished us the materials at Tab A presents brief synopses of Mao Tse-tung's favorite novels. He suggests they are indicators of the Chairman's personality style, his capacity for guile, audacity, etc., and his concern with the decadence which overtook China's traditional Mandarin ruling class.

G. Meetings with Mao Tse-tung.

An NSC staff distillation of some of Mao's major philosophic and political themes. This should give you a flavor of the man and his mind for your meetings with him.

H. Chou's Phrases.

Colorful phrases Chou uses.

I. The Chinese Approach.

Basic Chinese principles and assumptions.

J. Transcript - Opening Meeting, October.

Gives flavor of Chou's style.

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Evaluations of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai  
by an American Lawyer

Mao Tse-tung

Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung without question has a deeply ingrained and implacable hatred for "imperialists" [the Western world], and he hates the United States more than all the rest. His is not a simulated emotion, to be displayed to arouse his people against a "common enemy." It is a personal aversion to all of the nations who in his view misused China in the days of the unequal treaties and during the warlord period that followed the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. Mao's intense dislike for us applies to our nation, our country, our government and our people, themselves. We are particularly singled out because we are strong and successful. If England, France, Germany and the other western powers were as strong as we, he would articulate his dislike for them more frequently and more strongly than he does. But that is a tactic. Apart from the tactic of singling us out for major criticism and attack, there is no doubt from studies of him, his life, his writings and his propaganda, and also from all of my interviews and conversations with informants, that Mao nurses a deep and permanent hatred for us. It was accentuated by Korea and by our 7th Fleet's presence in the Taiwan Straits, as it was by our support for Chiang during the Second World War, and after it. But Mao's personal antipathy for us was not caused by those events. He developed it in his childhood during the period in which China was powerless to expel the English, other western powers and us. And he will always feel hostile to us, regardless of his external appearance or his temporary tactic of cooperating with us as a hedge against USSR and Japan.

Mao will be simulating when he treats President Nixon with courtesy, and when he welcomes the Nixon group into China.

This basic attitude of hostility toward us is so great that Mao would continue with it even in the illustrative and imaginary circumstance in which the United States is postulated as a communist nation. Even under that imagined circumstance, Mao would retain his dislike for America and would be hostile to it, unless it were subservient to China.

In large measure, Mao's anti-American feeling is a manifestation of the hatreds felt by an inferior for one superior; by a slave for his master; by one who is poor for a rich man; by one who is crude for those who are genteel; and by the conquered for the conqueror. Mao's dislike for us



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also is xenophobic, but unlike the classical Greek concept that it is strangers who may be disliked, there is a Chinese overtone here which would have Mao feel the same way even if he knew us better. That is because Mao is culturally and spiritually living in a Chinese fantasy which places him back in the days of the ancient dynasties, mentally and with respect to foreigners - and his view is not only that we have harmed China, but more than that, that we are "outer barbarians," under his old China imperialistic and Sinocentrist mental outlook. Accordingly, we are to be controlled or pacified when we are strong, or conquered and driven away when he is strong. It is not a question of friendship or lack of it, because the ancient Chinese emperors and Mao, the modern Chinese emperor, could not possibly be friends with barbarians. That is the Chinese twist to xenophobia in Mao's case. So his hatred for America and the other western powers is in many layers, like an onion. And as one peels away each layer, underneath is a fresh stratum or fold of the onion. With Mao, at the heart center of his onion of Chinese-style xenophobia for America is the ancient Chinese emperor's view toward barbarians. Then, with the next outer layer, we have the supposed excesses of the equal treaty days and the warlord periods; next, moving outward, is the layer of resentment for our support of Chiang, the Korean war and the Taiwan straits and 7th Fleet period; and so on.

Accordingly, when Mao Tse-tung permitted Chou En-lai to invite President Nixon to visit, and the new dialogue began to unfold, we may assume that Emperor Mao was controlling or pacifying, either the American "barbarians," or by using them in the traditional manner in which the Han Chinese used one barbarian tribe to offset another, the American "barbarians" are intended as a bulwark against the Russian barbarians or the Japanese barbarians, or against both.

In Mao's mind, no permanent good relationship with America is either possible or desirable. He condones Chou's invitation to us for some self-serving reason, either external or internal. And it is useless to expect Mao to keep his word or to develop any genuine warmth toward us. That is not at all to say that we should not act warmly with respect to him and China, at this time. By doing so, we too serve our own interests; adjust the Asian balance of power in a way we desire; and, most importantly, re-open communications with the Chinese people, who are not at all like Mao for the most part, and thereby we can eventually help them to resume their own basic characteristics, those of warmth, friendliness and individuality. In that manner, we have good and historical reason to expect, Chinese communism can be made to erode, and finally fall.

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We can join Mao for a moment in his Chinese fantasy that we are back in the imperial era of China. Emperor Mao Tse-tung's predecessors in Peking, the Mings, in fear of a powerful brigand who was threatening the capitol and empire, invited a barbarian tribe (the Manchus) into Peking to drive out the brigands. The Manchus entered Peking in 1644 A.D., and they drove out the brigand and his men, as promised. However, the Manchus refused to leave, and established the Ch'ing Dynasty in China. In our situation, our plan must be to attempt, once back in Peking (culturally, economically and through our dialogue and what we must work to make an exchange of news, students, scientists, doctors, businessmen and merchandise), we must emulate the Manchus of 1644 A.D., and although we may help drive away the brigands Emperor Mao Tse-tung fears, let us hope we can remain in Peking in the ways described above, and thereby bring about the fall of the emperor.

The example given is fanciful. But the inner feelings of Mao, as described here, are accurate. He shows those feelings in his own actions, his speeches, his own writings and in his choice of reading matter. We must not be deceived by Mao's simple dress, plain way of living, folksy talk and writing, or poetry writing. That may not look like an emperor's characteristics to an American, but China's classics and history reflect that Mao is living the legends of the ancient emperors, in each of those particulars. Such spartan and simple qualities were highly admired by the people in some of their emperors. The addition of such traditional imperial skills as poetry writing and military conquest are appropriate for a new emperor.

Once we grasp that Mao's "revolution" and its Marxist phrases in some respects is a reversion to the concepts of some of the great Chinese emperors, it is useful to study what those great emperors did: Expand China's borders, in many instances; and expel the barbarians from within her boundaries, if they had encroached; and close the borders to all foreigners, of course, excepting for a few trading outposts, traditionally in Canton and also at the borders to the north and west; and, on occasion, burn the books and, perhaps, use forced labor to build Great Walls; and put down any intellectuals who protest; and kill off or otherwise purge all internal rival princes; and war with the Khmer and the predecessors of the Thais, if they refuse tribute; and war with the barbarians in Japan, if they threaten; and seek to seize and control Taiwan and the Pescadores; and assume a god-like presence in the eyes of the people, with a proliferation of monuments and memorials; and, if too many barbarians threaten the distant borders, then call in some other barbarians to help cope with those who threaten.

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Mao reflects all of the above, in his choice of favorite novels; in his own writings; and in his conduct. It is helpful to keep that in mind. That "emperor syndrome" can be very useful to us "barbarians," particularly in that it is helping us to establish a dialogue with the Chinese. Mao is older now, and surely will pass away soon. That and his increasing age will help us to deal with the more moderate and reasonable Chou En-lai and, hopefully, others like him.

A number of practical concepts flow from the realization that Mao is a neo-emperor:

- To use Mao Tse-tung for our own purposes and interests [to balance powers in Asia; win an honorable and secure peace; maintain an honorable and secure peace; and open China, to the full extent possible, in order to have our dialogue and increased dealings with her erode Chinese communism, and so on], we must give him dignity and treat him with some degree of respect, in the eyes of his own people and in his own eyes. We must remember his is a form of god, and must not soil his pictures or degrade his many statues.
- We must not quarrel with Mao, himself, in our government's public statements and releases. If it becomes necessary to attack orally or in a release, we must direct the attack at the People's Republic, or at some lesser individual, but never against Emperor Mao.
- Like Chou En-lai, we must not praise Mao too much, if at all; and we must not blame him, as stated above.
- In our program to develop enough good will on the part of China to establish and maintain our dialogue, we cannot and will not praise communism, because it is alien and unacceptable to us. But we can safely praise the great accomplishments of China's ancient hero emperors, and Mao will feel praised. Although he gives lip service to putting aside many old things, he himself praises the powerful old empires. We can safely praise China's art, paintings, architecture, and so on, and the qualities of her people (who do have excellent qualities, beneath the Mao-applied veneer of Marxism). It will please emperor Mao and tend to gain his cooperation, if we can praise China's history and ancient culture (and they are praiseworthy).

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- Our President can, safely in China and also politically safely, in America, praise Mao's Chinese poems - at least, the non-military ones, involving the beauties of mountains and clouds. That might seem odd here, but would be pleasing to Mao and his people, if it can be managed. Maybe a comment in a private talk would be safest.
- We need to get into a position, as to our own programs and national interests, to have our own plan be "blessed" by the semi-god neo-emperor Mao - because if he "blesses" any plan or program we want carried out, the "blessing" will carry most of the Chinese people with it, at least as of now, and will be something powerful to cite to the Chinese people after Mao dies. President Nixon's private talks with Chairman Mao will have such an effect, too.
- Mao inherently and also because of his historical bent, is and likes to be devious, use artifice, guile and deceit, and show bravery. He would make a great poker player. He has shown a number of times, including many incidents in his intra-communist fights, an ability to act unconcerned until ready to attack. And then his sudden attack is deadly.
- Mao's love of his country is genuine. He has real pride in China, its history, its accomplishments, its recent ejection of the foreigners, and the fact that he has restored a large part of the old empires. He is a patriot, but his patriotism sees a China led spiritually only by Mao.
- Mao fears (on behalf of his plans and for China's success and safety) Russia, at present; and he fears the eventual threat of Japan. However, Mao is enough of a fanatic as to his movement to order an attack on Russia even though China is much the weaker. The same would apply as to Japan, but Japan's threat to China is believed by China to be more remote in time than that of Russia. The moderating influence of Chou En-lai and his assistants has influenced Mao to hold back as to Russia, and Mao's personal day-to-day power in his own view and in fact are not sufficient for him to override that Chou moderating influence. In addition, although data is not complete, it is probable that Mao is allowing Chou to effect the present moderate program at least in part because Mao needed and needs Chou and Chou's old military friends; support against the adherents of Lin Piao's.

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- Mao is ill, but is in full possession of his mental faculties at this time.
- Mao occupies an almost legendary and god-like position with a large part of the Chinese population at this time, and is and will remain by invocation of his name by his successors, the spiritual symbol of China. Although there is a communist hard core of a few million in China, most of the Chinese revere Mao for uniting China and for driving out the foreigners. That great majority wishes in its secret minds that somehow they could enjoy and have those two advantages (unity and no foreigners) and also the at least relatively full bellies they now have most of the time, and yet be able to return to their traditional ways of family love, the family as the center of life, individuality, fun-loving ways and personal dignity. As Mao succeeds more in feeding the Chinese, this desire to regain their traditional character will grow.
- Mao Tse-tung is convinced that if his people are exposed to any outside influences or any genuine news or conflicting opinions, they will lose their rote belief in his form of communism. He shows that conviction in a number of ways, but mainly in his fear of any outside news. Mao is astute and clever. He knows his peasant armies and his millions of peasants very well. He knows China's history, and the capacity on the part of the people to switch China's history, and the capacity on the part of the people to switch views in a flash, when they get tired of faking a view, or of going along with it, in effect, "for laughs." The Chinese for centuries have shown that if reasonably content (i. e., if left alone by government, and if with sufficient food and a life of relative dignity, peace and family relationships), they will act as if they are going along with the current big movement. But if they are being bothered and interfered with, and if they feel oppressed, or if they are reaching those conditions but have not yet gone over the edge, traditionally they can be aroused by speech, by word of mouth, or by news. Mao remembers the eruption of the Taiping Rebellion, and its sudden cessation. That episode has been often repeated in China's history. Mao also knows he is playing with dangerous things, in the following, which nevertheless he is doing because he is an emperor, and he "knows they are right:"

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Mao is attacking family ties, many old traditions, and the individuality of the Chinese -- note, this does not refer to freedom, but to individuality. The Chinese does not have the fierce British and American passion for freedom, for example. To the Chinese, freedom is a form of "irresponsibility," or "licentiousness." But the Chinese is an individualist. For example, he does not like to be marched around, made to shout slogans in unison, made to listen to lectures, and otherwise restricted. The Chinese for thousands of years have prized highly the right to "do their own thing." Mao is restricting that, and trying to wipe it out. That and the attacks on family ties and old traditions are very dangerous acts on Mao's part. He fears free news, free ideas and communication, because they could fire up the Chinese and cause them to refuse to go through all of the rote drills.

Mao is making the Chinese be too grim. They are not a grim people. Their natural need, to a very great extent and even more than with us Americans, is to have fun, to enjoy gracious living and hobbies, numerous holidays and celebrations, gay colored clothes, especially for their children, leisurely chats as they rest after a hard day's work, and laughter. It is much more serious than we Americans usually imagine that Mao is making the Chinese grim. The Chinese reaction would be and I know is, on a widely shared basis: OK, we'll be grim to get rid of corruption, inflation, disease, starvation, and especially, the foreigners who have plagued us with their superior rights for so long. When those have been accomplished, then OK, we'll still be grim because emperor Mao keeps telling us what terrible danger we are in from those insane, greedy and expansionist Americans, who hate and threaten us, so. [That is the stage Mao has them in, at the moment.]

Now, to bring President Nixon and his entourage into China at that stage, with many friendly Americans looking quite human and warm, and with the President expressing friendly sentiments, it is very hard for the Chinese to keep going long with the ogre removed. The Chinese will get sick of being grim, being drilled, being heckled constantly by the communist cadres, and will suddenly begin to long for the old traits and old procedures, again. So our presence in China does two major things: it demonstrates that the most useful ogre to Mao is quite human; and with us, hopefully, we bring the free contacts which will let in the news which, eventually will bring about the erosion of communism.

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Mao knows all of the above. That is the reason for the fierce censorship and the severity of the anti-revisionist programs, and similar things. So why does Mao let Chou invite us in? Because Mao feels that the other barbarians, the Russians and Japanese, are now far more dangerous. So he will let the American barbarians come in briefly, just enough to offset the other dangers. Mao intends to repel us again sooner or later, and to close down the country, again. But we must work to give Chou En-lai and his supporters the support they need, and to remain in touch with China and her people, long enough (1) to have Mao's death occur; or (2) to have Chou En-lai and his supporters develop enough strength to open their doors wider; and/or (3) to have our dialogue and relationships with China become so extensive that the feeble Mao by that time cannot effectively interfere.

-- Mao is very shrewd. He is not widely educated nor has he traveled very much (just to Russia, and in China), but he has a shrewd mind, a keen intuition and a creative and poetic bent. He probably knows or infers all of our purposes, but still plans to play some poker with us. It is unlikely he will negotiate with our President, because (1) emperors do not negotiate, and neither do gods - they leave that to their ministers; and (2) that is Chou En-lai's job; and (3) he will feel that negotiating at his and your high levels is not proper or dignified. Probably, in his bluff and sometimes somewhat crude peasant manner, he will do his best to entertain our President; will banter in his rough but smiling way; and will argue philosophies and ideologies. This can be done in a good-natured and pleasant way.

-- What will Mao be watching for and studying in our President, when they meet? Mao has a script from which he will play this meeting - his favorite stories in Romance of the Three Kingdoms and in Shui Hu Chuan, or Water Margin (All Men Are Brothers). It is a safe assumption that Mao in his inner mind will picture this meeting between himself and the President as a courteous and ceremonious meeting between great but opposing war chieftains, two enemy "kings" or "emperors," if you will. Mao will treat the President with courtesy, and ply him with Mao's favorite tea, the famous "Dragon Well" tea, the great green tea produced in the West Lake region of Hangchow, and wines, and perhaps a boat ride around the lakes. Mao will act the gracious host, but this is what he will be searching in our President's face, eyes, bearing and manner:

\* What, Mao will wonder, is this man Nixon really like, inside - is he strong (in the decisive, confident, spartan and erect military sense); does he have the courage to order his legions

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to attack, or to keep fighting? If so, I must respect him and maintain peaceful relations with him. Or is he weak, so that I should attack him?

- Mao will study our President's mind, probe for its degree of determination and shrewdness, test to see how sturdy or weak is the American culture, as represented by this first important and powerful American he has ever met closely.



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Chou En-lai

Premier Chou En-lai is a more rational and less complicated figure than Mao Tse-tung, and can be evaluated from the Chinese standpoint and from ours, in much less space than is required as for Mao. Chou En-lai is a very loyal Chinese, intensely patriotic, ambitious for his communist party and true to its causes. But he is not a fanatic like Mao. He is rational, reasonable, cultured, informed, pleasant in manner when he wants to be, and an able administrator and statesman.

He, himself, has said, "I am an intellectual, with a feudalistic family background." He enjoys good wines, and especially the famous Shao-hsing wine produced in his home town by that name.

Regarding Chou's record in international affairs, we know that he shares with Mao and other Chinese communists a willingness to lie, break his word and otherwise violate the codes of ethics of our world, and of China's former world. But Chou does it with some grace, and one can believe that he may suffer a twinge or two, or at least does not enjoy breaches of ethics. In all events, he gives an appearance of rationality and at least logical thinking, in his worst periods even, with respect to America.

Chou En-lai has been and still is our enemy. But he is an enemy with whom we can communicate. He is not filled with the hatreds and xenophobic reactions of Mao Tse-tung. He does not harbor any terrible hatreds for Americans, and has some respect for us. Obviously, he is a Chinese, and also a Chinese communist. So he would make dangerous move against us if he believed it were in China's interest. But on the whole, his judgments as to any such moves would be based on criteria not unlike those we consider in similar situations, with an additional touch of the old Confucian grace affecting Chou's manner of making his move.

Chou En-lai can be exceedingly charming and persuasive. But he has been proven on a number of occasions to have been insincere in his protestations, and more than once has been charged with being "a complete fraud." Also, his acting ability in the course of diplomatic exchanges has been ironically praised. One close acquaintance of Chou's in the 1936-37 Sian period, has claimed emphatically that "Everything that appears to be human in Chou En-lai is false, absolutely false! And he is sharp and capable - that is what's terrible about him. He has too many tricks, and yet he can appear so touchingly innocent. He is the god of revolution, and the demon

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of bloodshed, but never a man!" However, Chou En-lai is a rational and educated man, without ungoverned passions. And he is a man with whom we can establish and maintain a dialogue. Also, he is capable of reasonably perceiving that a given course of conduct, such as increasing peaceful relations with us, may be in the ultimate interest of China, as well as in our interests.

Chou is well known as China's great administrator, and the calming influence in many of the internal differences, as well as the Chinese foreign negotiator of the most ability and experience. It is noteworthy that the survival-oriented and remarkably surviving Chou En-lai, during the 1966-67 Red Guard tumult all around him, attacked nobody personally and pacified the mobs, on occasion, intervening in disputes.

A number of Chinese sources have explained Chou En-lai's ability to survive in communist turmoil and among other sometimes violent rises and falls, because of the following characteristics and procedures identified with him:

-- Chou En-lai is exceptionally alert, charming both in the Chinese and in the Western cultures, and an able speaker. He catches nuances very quickly, and is capable of dropping skillful diplomatic hints and threats, himself. In debate, he relies on facts; precedents; logic; and the socratic device (questioning his opponent into a corner), and the syllogism (major premise, minor premise, and then conclusion). Chou is well educated and currently informed. He has a good and loyal staff, which he protected quite successfully during the Red Guard turmoil, even sending many away to remote areas, to weather the storm. He is well briefed for negotiations. And his general style is pleasant. One of my Chinese friends with Western experience has indicated that Chou En-lai is a Confucian gentleman with a Frenchman's charm and quick perception, with very mean and tough friends. Chou was in France as a student, of course, and has been outside of China on a number of occasions, in Europe and elsewhere, but never to the United States. Chou is reputed to be in the habit of trying to soften his debates by "seeing the other man's view," and similar devices, and then trying to demolish it. On the whole, he is a suave, clever and alert gentlemen with very mean and tough friends, as some Chinese have remarked. Chou, himself must be charged with involvement in some of the blood baths around him, but he always seems to have been "out for tea with a friend" when the shooting started.

-- Chou En-lai has avoided writing very many public articles, and so has not left the broad ideological trail which was left by other now departed colleagues of Mao Tse-Tung.

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-- Most important, according to Chinese sources, has been the fact that Chou En-lai since his return from the student days in France, had always been the steady "gray" administrator for the communists. Obviously, he has competence in this field. Rather than taking part in the contests and battles, Chou En-lai has usually been the man who sold tickets, ushered, announced each fight, served as referee, announced the winner, comforted the loser (or buried him) and wrote up the fights for the Foreign Office archives. In his steady survivals as each new episode of disappearances occurs, Chou En-lai is very much like the nonchalant and ubiquitous Chinese prop man, who strolls around the stage of the traditional Chinese opera while it is going full blast, dressed in his plain blue work clothes. All the actors are in elaborate costumes, fully made up with gaudy paints reflecting their various characters, and impressive head-dress, variously as ancient lords, warriors and ladies. The actors sing and shout loudly, as they bound about the stage, orating, fighting and then collapsing in death. Whenever an actor is ready to die, the prop man strolls up and provides a pillow to soften the fatal fall. If a warrior needs a spear, the prop man is there with it. When lovers finish with a flute, it is handed to the prop man, who takes it backstage, often passing between the audience and the actors. The prop man is always there; the battles rage around him; men die; and he helps them be comfortable in their death, in all administering the wild and colorful action. The comparison is apt. Chou En-lai so far indeed has been the prop man in the Chinese communists' Chinese opera. As with the prop man who is not considered a part of the battles but is there, Chou has survived.

Another factor which contributes to Chou's influence and security is the high regard felt for him by a large group of Liberation Army officers, some of high position [ranks were abolished, but "positions" remain high]. Chou's popularity with the officers stems in part from his early days as Political Commissar at Whampoa Military Academy, where the officers learned to know him and respect him. Some of those officers still survive, and by reputation, Chou's close connection with the army officers continues. Such friendships no doubt strengthen Chou's hand, today. There is no certainty as to tomorrow.

Chou En-Lai today probably is in some danger from any surviving colleagues of Lin Piao. Just by counting names and noting who is no longer around as shown in the recent press photographs, a large number of highly placed communists are now missing and in trouble, undergoing "reform," or dead. It may be that Chou En-lai has sufficient support and enough of Mao's

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blessings and approval to maintain a government stable enough to deal with us. But the potential for change in China is great, and it is difficult to estimate whether Chou En-lai can maintain a stable government; whether, if not, who might succeed him; and what will occur upon Mao Tse-Tung's death. If Chou En-lai remains and can hold the government stable, we should be able to work with him in our dialogue.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

February 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: The Chinese Approach

Attached is an extract from an article written by an Asian scholar at Harvard who is a friend of mine. I think you will find that it gives you useful insights into the Chinese mode of operation.

Attachment

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DECLASSIFIED

For  
NSC letter 4/3/08  
By EJK LC Date 5/9/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### Chinese Principles and Assumptions

Chinese operating principles for the manipulation of "barbarians" are not improvised like our policies of recent times, but are inherited from a great tradition that comes down from centuries even before the Mongols and Manchus conquered and ruled all China. From ancient times the sedentary Chinese farmers and bureaucrats have always had to deal from weakness with powerful, mobile, non-Chinese fighters and conquerors. Today, Chiang deals with us from weakness, while Mao deals with the Russians, also from weakness. Both are doing well.

1. The cardinal Chinese principle in dealing with a non-Chinese is to use friendship as a halter. Admit the outsider to a guest membership in Chinese society. Compliment him on his knowledge of aspects of Chinese culture or of the Chinese language. Entertain him with informality and frankness. Establish the personal bonds of friendship, which in the old China were stronger than in Western urban life today. Become really intimate friends and understand his unspoken assumptions and personal motivations.
2. Ask the foreigner's advice so as both to ascertain his aims and values and to enlist his sympathy and support. (Both these principles help to account for our Sinophilism.)
3. Disclose to him those Chinese vital interests which are allegedly more important than life itself, so as to preempt a position ahead of time and warn him it is not negotiable.
4. Build up the peculiar uniqueness of Chinese values and conduct (as I am doing here) so as to suggest the dangers of stormy unpredictability, preternatural stubbornness, or other traits of the powerholder, which present the foreigner with insuperable difficulties.
5. Find out the foreigner's friends, enemies, and other circumstances so as to avoid offense to him and also to know where to find allies if necessary to mobilize against him, and so on.
6. Use the foreigner's own rules to control him, especially the Western legal concept of sovereignty, the idea that diplomats are accredited to governments (not to the local people), that domestic matters are beyond foreign question, and so on.

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7. Stir the foreigner's conscience and sense of guilt so that he hamstrings himself.

8. Use some foreigners against others, to secure Chinese ends. Thus Chiang Kai-shek has cultivated American supporters of his own military doctrine, and by putting one third of his forces on Quemoy, with American help, he has made the defense of Quemoy probably necessary to the defense of Taiwan. Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung has found a staunch ally against Moscow in the state of Albania.

Behind these tactics, which are of course not really unique, lie certain traditional assumptions of Chinese politics that are rather different from our own:

1. China is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided. All Chinese belong to it.
2. There is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party) are the repository of final power. Popular consent is tacit.
3. Majority rule is mere mobocracy. Men are not equally endowed. The elite should rule. Hence plebiscites are unsound and insulting to dignity.
4. The ruler has a special virtue and prestige, which if maintained prolong his rule. Hence face is necessary to power holding, and criticism (as by a free press) is at once subversive.
5. Rule is personal. Law is not supreme, but a tool of administration. It is loyalty that supports a ruler. Hence civil rights must be limited and law subordinated to personal relations.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
October 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

COMMUNIST CHINA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMY

Conclusions

In the 1970s, Communist China's growing economic strength will be applied largely to industrial and military modernization, and its international economic role is likely to remain small.

China's economic strategy for the 1970s calls for a strong push in domestic investment. Indeed, this program is well under way as evidenced by the surprising number of industrial projects at various stages of construction – for example, iron and steel complexes, petroleum refineries, aluminum plants, and shipyards. Simultaneously, the leadership is faced with the high costs of serial production and large-scale deployment of missiles and other modern weapons systems. The agricultural sector, which must feed a growing population at gradually higher standards, needs additional support from industry and will be hard put to increase its volume of export goods in the next few years. Since China's exports consist largely of raw and manufactured agricultural products, the growth of foreign trade will be relatively slow.

Japan will continue to be China's natural trading partner because of geographical nearness, cultural ties, and a suitable offering of goods and technology. If the Chinese become less sensitive to the presence of foreign technicians, the Japanese can supply on-the-spot assistance in building new industrial capacity and developing natural resources, notably petroleum. Such a development would underscore China's subordinate role in the international economic arena.

As for the United States, the potential for US-China trade is limited by several factors. China's foreign trade is small in relation to total output

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*Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated within CIA.*

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and is likely to grow only slowly because of Peking's policy of economic self-sufficiency, its conservative attitude toward foreign indebtedness, and its limited range of export goods. And China already has well-established trading relationships with low-cost suppliers of its major import needs -- grain from Canada and Australia; and capital goods, metals, and fertilizers from Japan and Western Europe. Despite these limitations there are obvious possibilities for growing US-China commercial relationships because of a US comparative advantage in high-technology industries -- such as aircraft, advanced computers, petro-chemical equipment, and offshore drilling equipment -- and the existence of a high-income US market for Chinese luxury items.

In general, China will continue to depend on the outside world for new technology and modern machinery in the 1970s. China enters the international arena as a back runner in the technological race. To be sure, China will draw rapidly ahead of other large low-income nations, such as India and Indonesia, which lack internal momentum in investment and are burdened by crushing international debts. At the same time, China will be rapidly falling behind its neighbor Japan in total and per capita output since the Japanese economy is growing at least twice as fast on a far larger base. All the leading industrial nations will be devoting substantial resources to research and development and to the modernization of their industrial facilities. China with its heavy commitment to defense will be hard-pressed not to fall farther back of the international pace-setters.

#### Purpose of the Memorandum

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the strengths and weaknesses of the economy of Communist China as they affect China's ability to project its power into the international arena. The memorandum provides an overview of the Chinese economy -- its resources, its pattern of growth, and its place in the world economy. Appendixes contain a chronology of economic events in Communist China, estimates of key economic indicators, answers to questions frequently asked about the Chinese economy, and comparisons with other economies.

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
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## Population



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**SECRET****I. RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH****Manpower Resources**

China's huge manpower resources are uniquely suited for both military and economic development purposes.

The government needs to draft only 10% of the 10 million males reaching military age each year in order to maintain its three-million-man Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Thus only males in prime health and of unquestioned loyalty to the regime are inducted. The proportion of active-duty military personnel in the total population is only one-quarter as great as in the USSR or the United States.

China's abundant manpower is reflected also in the availability of tens of millions of reservists, militia, and members of the paramilitary Production and Construction Corps, which engages in construction projects and agricultural reclamation in frontier areas.

In terms of suitability for economic development, the basic character of the Chinese people is probably unsurpassed anywhere in the world. The average Chinese is quick to learn, industrious and frugal, reasonably healthy, and well-motivated to improve his material lot. The population is homogeneous except for the 6% made up of minority nationalities living in the border areas. Communist China for the most part has been spared the racial and religious bloodbaths of India and other less developed countries.

Estimated and Projected Midyear Population	
<u>Year</u>	<u>Million Persons</u>
1945	510
1950	547
1955	611
1960	689
1965	751
1970	836
1971	855
1975	937
1980	1,054

The geographical distribution of the population is extremely uneven, as shown on the map. The river valleys, coastal plains, and low hills of the eastern third of the nation contain 90% of the population.

Although the quality of manpower is a distinct asset, China would be better off with fewer people. The enormous population growing at 2.2% per year poses formidable problems of feeding and clothing -- even at the austere levels which the Peking government has maintained over the past 20 years. Birth control measures have been sporadic and so far have made no appreciable dent in the population structure.

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Map of China showing agricultural regions and land use patterns. The map is divided into several major agricultural zones: "OASES" in the northwest, "WHEAT" in the north-central region, "RICE" in the south-central region, and "Southwestern rice" in the southwest. Major cities like Lhasa, Kunming, and Chongqing are marked. A legend indicates "Percent in cultivation" with a scale from 0 to 30, and "Agricultural region boundary". A scale bar at the bottom shows distances in miles and kilometers.

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### Agricultural Resources

China's agricultural resources, while large in absolute terms, are small in relation to the population and to the needs of the economy for export goods and raw materials for industry.


Because of rugged terrain and lack of moisture in the western two-thirds of China, cultivation is largely confined to the eastern third. The eastern portion is divided into the predominantly wheat areas of the north and the predominantly rice areas of the south, as shown on the map. Only about 415,000 square miles – or 11% of the total land area of 3.7 million square miles – is under cultivation. The effective cultivated acreage is increased by 50% through multiple cropping.

Additional land, perhaps 3% of the total land area, could be brought under cultivation, but only at tremendous cost. At the same time, the development of urban areas, new transportation routes, and military installations is nibbling away at existing agricultural acreage.

Centuries of intensive agricultural use have resulted in the stripping of China's forest cover, the exhaustion of much of the land, and the drop in water tables and alkalization of extensive acreage through overuse of water supplies. This has left the land even more vulnerable to flood and drought. The Communist government has made substantial gains in afforestation, control of water resources, and restoration of the fertility of the land. Beginning in 1962, the government has provided increasing amounts of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation pumps and piping, and improved seeds to the agricultural sector. The recurring periods of political upheaval have prevented the government from reaping the full benefits of these policies.

Because of the continuing growth of population and the importance of agricultural products as raw materials for industry and as export goods, the government will need an even stronger effort to improve agricultural resources in the 1970s. This effort will center on the increase in yields from existing land through more fertilizer, better water management, and improved seeds. These improvements in China's agricultural resources will be at a relatively simple technological level appropriate to China's needs; it may be a decade before China can achieve the more advanced technology and higher yields of, for example, Taiwan and Mexico.

## Industry



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Industrial Resources

China has the energy resources and mineral deposits of a superpower but lacks the capital plant and technological skill to compete with the United States and the USSR on a global scale.

In energy resources, China has huge coal reserves, the world's largest hydroelectric potential, and extensive oilfields which are being rapidly developed. In metals, China's reserves of tungsten, tin, and antimony are the world's largest; sizable deposits of iron, manganese, and aluminum ores also have been found. However, reserves of three key alloying metals -- chrome, nickel, and cobalt -- are inadequate, and supplies must be imported. Finally, China remains heavily dependent upon imports for its supply of natural and synthetic rubber.

Most of China's modern capital plant is located in the major industrial areas shown on the map. The concentration of manufacturing capacity in the northeast (the former Manchuria) and in the eastern port cities is a carryover from the pre-Communist era. Peking's strategy has been to build upon this inherited base while at the same time developing -- for strategic and "local self-reliance" objectives -- new industrial areas in the hinterland.

The region stretching northeastward from Shen-yang (the former Mukden) to Ha-erh-pin is China's largest producer of petroleum, coal, electric power, steel, aluminum, cement, trucks, and railroad equipment. It also is a major producer of machine tools and armaments. Shanghai, on the east coast, is the country's largest industrial metropolis and a leading manufacturer of textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemical fertilizer, tires, steel, electronic and electrical equipment, machine tools, and merchant and naval shipping.

Peking has been extensively developed as a production base for missiles, land armaments, electronic equipment, machine tools, textiles, and agricultural machinery. West of Shanghai is the Wu-han area, important for steel, heavy machinery, and naval shipbuilding. The Ch'ung-ch'ing region produces steel, machine tools, and artillery. Representative of other fast-growing hinterland cities are Ch'eng-tu (jet aircraft, electronic equipment, and instruments) and Sian (jet aircraft, small arms, electrical equipment, and textiles).

In addition to the large industrial plants controlled by central ministries, the Communist government has supported the development of small and medium-sized plants to serve local needs. These plants typically produce cement and other construction materials, low-grade chemical fertilizer, small motors and other simple equipment, and consumer goods.

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## II. THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Trends in the Gross National Product

Overall economic growth under Communist rule has been fairly strong but erratic.

China's gross national product (GNP) has doubled since 1952, reaching a level of \$119 billion in 1970, or \$143 per capita. The severe economic damage resulting from the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) -- a disastrous attempt at instant industrialization -- shows up clearly on the top chart at the right. In contrast, the damage from the political upheavals of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) was relatively mild.

The long-term annual growth rate of GNP has been about 4%. Since population has grown at an average rate of slightly more than 2%, the growth in per capita GNP has averaged about 2%. Agricultural output since 1952 has approximately matched the growth rate of population. In contrast, industrial production since 1952 has grown at an 8% average rate, or 6% if the larger 1957 base is used.

China is no ordinary less developed country with a per capita GNP of \$100 or less. Rather, it may be considered as an economy with, say, a \$100 "basic maintenance" sector and a \$43 "development thrust" sector. That is, \$100 is needed simply to maintain the population at reasonable minimum standards, with \$43 left over for industrial investment and development of advanced weapons. As the bottom chart shows, China moved well above the \$100 per capita level by 1957, fell back precipitously as a result of the Leap Forward, and now is forging ahead with a slowly widening margin.



Prospects for substantial economic growth in the early 1970s are good, assuming no new flare-up of radical economic policies or a prolonged spell of unfavorable weather in agriculture. Agriculture should stay abreast of population growth, and industrial production should increase in the range of 5% to 10% annually. The following favorable factors for growth have been clearly identified:

- a vigorous program of construction of industrial facilities, many in the interior provinces;
- a substantial flow of machinery and technology from Japan and the leading industrial nations of Western Europe;
- a steady increase in chemical fertilizer and pumps and other equipment going to agriculture; and
- the restoration of the purged administrative structure to normal functioning together with the return to comparatively moderate economic policies.

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# Gross National Product



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
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**SECRET**Agricultural Production

Since 1962, agricultural production has benefited from a combination of favorable weather, larger supplies of fertilizer and equipment, and a permissive attitude toward private plots and rural markets.

**Population Growth and Agricultural Production**

The Communist leadership originally counted on collectivization to boost agricultural production rather than on large-scale capital investment. A sweeping "land reform" program which parceled the land out to the peasants was only the prelude to forcible collectivization of agriculture, and by 1957 the countryside had been organized into 750,000 agricultural producer cooperatives. Collectivization was followed in 1958 by the formation of 26,000 supercollectives -- the so-called "communes" -- which were to mobilize China's vast labor force for industrial and construction tasks as well as for agriculture.

The unwieldy nature of the commune plus three years of unfavorable weather caused agricultural production to plummet in 1959-61. By the winter of 1960-61, China was near starvation, and discontent had spread even to the armed forces. As suggested by the chart, the already meager ration was reduced by 25% or more over wide areas.

Threatened with the loss of control over China, the Communist leadership moved quickly to restore the situation by:

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- opening food stocks and arranging for the annual import of 4-5 million tons of grain, starting in 1961;
- decentralizing agricultural decisions to smaller organizational units, i.e., the production brigade and the production team;
- restoring the small private plot and permitting small-scale private trade in rural products; and
- initiating a program of investment which has greatly increased the flow to agriculture of chemical fertilizer, electric power, pumps and other equipment, and improved seeds.

This dramatic turnabout in policy, together with favorable weather, led to record levels of production in the late 1960s.


In addition to feeding the population, the agricultural sector is expected to supply raw materials for industry and for export. One result is a continuing competition between grain and cotton for the available acreage. At present, sufficient cotton is being grown to provide a basic ration of about five linear meters of cloth a year -- enough for a simple outfit of tunic and trousers -- and to furnish a substantial volume of cotton textile exports. As for food exports, China typically exports foods that have a high unit value while importing basic grains, primarily wheat.

Over the next few years, agricultural production can continue to expand gradually under the present policy of increased inputs to agriculture and a reasonably permissive attitude toward private activity. Peking no doubt will continue its efforts to reduce the amount of centrally controlled resources used in agriculture by encouraging the growth of local industry, by strengthening the birth control program, and by resisting pressures for a higher payout to the peasants.


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
### Representative Industrial Activities



Feeder bell for blast furnace being machined by a large vertical lathe at the Shen-yang Heavy Machinery Plant (Northeast China)



Miniature bearings being ground to close tolerances at a factory in Shanghai (East China)



Nitrogen fertilizer being produced by a small chemical fertilizer plant in Fukien Province (South-east China)

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Industrial Production

The volume and variety of industrial products have increased markedly since 1949, but China still is far behind the leading industrial nations in most branches of industry.

In the 1950s, the new government gave priority to building up the capacity and output of basic industrial fuels and materials. This priority has been maintained up to the present as shown by the following estimates of the output of key industrial products:

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1970</u>
Steel	1.35	5.35	17
(million metric tons)			
Coal	66.5	130.7	300
(million metric tons)			
Electric power	7.3	19.3	60
(billion kilowatt hours)			
Crude oil	0.44	1.46	18
(million metric tons)			
Cement	2.86	6.9	13
(million metric tons)			

The groundwork for large-scale production of machinery and armaments also was laid in the 1950s. Subsequently, the Chinese have mastered the production of several types of precision machine tools, a remarkable variety of electronics equipment (including computers, radar, and communications equipment), transportation equipment (including heavy-duty trucks and diesel locomotives), and modern weapons of both Soviet and Chinese design. The expansion of light industry -- which provides the Chinese with simple everyday consumer goods and is an important source of export earnings -- has proceeded at a slower pace.

The organization of industry reflects the normal practices of a centralized "command economy." The State Council, the highest government administrative body, translates the policy guidelines of the Party into specific directives; these orders are then carried out through a bureaucratic hierarchy of planning commissions, industrial ministries and departments, and industrial enterprises.

Large plants, controlled by the central ministries, account for most of China's modern industrial production. A host of medium-size and small plants, which process local raw materials at a simple level of technology, are controlled by local governmental units. Supplementing the efforts of the regular industrial plants is the activity of tens of millions of full-time or part-time handicraft workers, who fill the interstices of the industrial sector by satisfying those small needs that escape the planners' attention.

**SECRET**Iron and Steel

The rapid development of the iron and steel industry has propelled China into eighth place in world steel production – far behind the United States, the USSR, and Japan but well ahead of India.

Soviet equipment and technical aid were instrumental in the rapid growth of steel capacity and production in the 1950s. During the Leap Forward (1958-60), however, over-intensive use of equipment and the commissioning of 650,000 primitive "backyard furnaces" brought the orderly development of the industry to a halt. Most of the "backyard" product was unusable, and by 1961 many of the industry's major facilities had to be shut down for extensive repairs. After the abandonment of the Leap Forward, capacity and production were built up in rational fashion, with output of steel reaching 13 million tons in 1966. Following another sharp but short-lived drop in output during the Cultural Revolution, the industry today is moving ahead with a vigorous program of expansion and modernization.

The iron and steel industry is located primarily near major deposits of iron ore and coking coal, which are widely distributed throughout the eastern half of the country. The principal production facilities are located at An-shan – the old Manchurian center which produces 30% of China's steel – Shanghai, Wu-han, and Pao-t'ou. Other large facilities are being built or expanded mainly in interior industrial areas.

China's capacity for finishing steel has grown more slowly than crude steel production and does not provide a full assortment of shapes, sizes, and qualities of product. China is particularly dependent on imports of some kinds of tubing, sheet steel, and alloy steels. Moreover, in the last few years China has changed from a net exporter of pig iron to a net importer, evidence that crude steel capacity has overtaken and surpassed its pig iron capacity. China also depends on imports for substantial amounts of scrap because its industrial sector is still too young to generate much scrap.

Since 1965, when most of the Soviet-designed construction projects were finally completed, China has looked to the Free World for steel technology and has imported nearly \$100 million worth of metallurgical equipment, including sheet and tube mills, heat treating and soaking furnaces, ore beneficiation plants, and equipment for basic oxygen converters.

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Petroleum

With the discovery and exploitation of large new oilfields, China has become self-sufficient in petroleum and may even be able to export appreciable quantities of crude oil by the mid-1970s.

The priority growth of the petroleum industry has eliminated what was once believed to be a major vulnerability in China's strategic position. Whereas China could supply less than half its needs from domestic resources in the 1950s, by 1965 it was essentially self-sufficient in petroleum products. Output of crude oil has almost quadrupled over the last decade -- from 4.6 million tons in 1960 to an estimated 18 million tons in 1970 -- and refining capacity has more than kept pace. In spite of this rapid expansion, China is not a major producer by world standards -- for example, China's total annual production would satisfy the needs of the Japanese economy for only about 28 days.

The center of gravity of the industry has shifted markedly under the Communists from the remote northwest to the industrialized northeast. The Ta-ch'ing oilfield in the northeast now provides about 60% of China's crude oil. Other major producers are the older Karamai and Yu-men oilfields in the northwest and the Sheng-li oilfield in Shantung Province in the east. Offshore fields are under investigation or development in order to acquire new sources of supply.

China now is able to produce a complete range of petroleum products and is moving gradually into the production of petroleum-based chemical products. The effect of all these developments on the rest of the economy has been most apparent in the substantial increase since 1965 in petroleum-powered vehicles for military and civilian use -- aircraft, trucks, tractors, and ships.

Production of crude oil in 1975 could reach 40 million tons. After satisfying military requirements, as well as the needs of industry, agriculture, and transportation, the Chinese may have as much as 10 million tons available for export. At present world prices, this quantity would bring in \$250 million a year, a useful addition to China's present limited array of exports and a substantial contribution to its earnings of hard currencies. Japan, with its skyrocketing need for raw materials, is a logical customer. Sales to various less developed countries also would be possible and would contribute to China's political stature. Western Europe is a less promising market because of high transportation costs.

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Military Production

The industrial sector is supplying a rapidly expanding volume of equipment to all branches of the armed forces.

In addition to surface-to-air missiles and short-range naval cruise missiles, the Chinese have produced an unknown number of MRBMs and IRBMs. They are also working on an ICBM program.

The Chinese are gradually strengthening their air force by the production of Soviet-designed aircraft as well as a native-design fighter bomber. Production in 1971 probably will include more than 500 MIG-19 jet fighters, some MIG-21s, about two dozen TU-16 jet bombers, and more than 100 of the new F-9 jet fighter bomber.

Construction of naval weapons to date has been largely based on Soviet systems. These include cruise-missile equipped destroyers, guided missile patrol boats, and torpedo attack submarines. The Chinese have constructed a large modern, native-designed attack submarine which is probably nuclear-powered. They may also be developing a ballistic missile submarine of their own design.

Production of ground weapons includes substantial quantities of small arms, artillery, medium tanks, and ammunition.

In addition to armaments production, the Chinese economy contributes a heavy volume of construction activity to the military effort, e.g., the construction of shipyards, missile test sites, military bases, and airfields -- many with extensive underground facilities; the strengthening and extension of road and rail transport routes in strategic areas; the building of costly nuclear weapons production facilities in remote areas; and the construction of air-raid shelters in the cities.

The resources used in defense include a large share of China's top-level scientists, engineers, and plant managers and much of the modern machinery produced at home or imported from Japan and Western Europe. In turn, the armed forces provide support to the general economy by supplying men and trucks at harvest time, building roads and railroads, training a continuing stream of recruits in valuable technical skills, and growing much of their own food on army farms.

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Industrial Technology

China's rapid advance in industrial technology has still left China far behind the leading industrial nations.

In the 1950s the USSR supplied the equipment and technical support for the construction of about 150 modern industrial plants, including steel mills, electric powerplants, machine tool plants, and armaments plants. About 10,000 Soviet engineers, technicians, and production managers served tours in China, and thousands of Chinese scientists and technicians were trained in the USSR.

The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians in mid-1960, combined with the calamitous Leap Forward (1958-60), brought to a halt this progress in industrial technology. After the Leap was abandoned, China turned to Japan and Western Europe for modern machinery and technology with emphasis on technology in the iron and steel, chemical, electronics, and machinebuilding industries. The subsequent advance in industrial technology was again delayed by the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69).

In addition to the foreign sources of technology, China has benefited from the extensive training and on-the-job experience of tens of thousands of its own young scientists, engineers, and plant managers. Today, the level of industrial technology lags behind the technology of Japan and Western Europe from 5 to 20 years or more depending on China's industrial priorities. Furthermore, within each industry, there is a striking contrast between large modern plants and local plants which use primitive methods and large numbers of unskilled workers. Peking preaches a doctrine of self-reliance in technology, yet China must continue to rely on Japan and Western Europe for much of its modern technology in the 1970s.

A special problem concerns the replacement of the 200 Western-trained scientists and engineers, now in their 50s, who have pioneered China's nuclear and missile and other high-priority programs. The on-going Maoist revolution in education, with its emphasis on manual labor and the curtailment of theoretical academic training, conceivably could block the development of the most promising young technical people. The government, however, is exempting a small number of talented youths from the manual labor requirements and is believed to assign these youths to technical institutes to work under top scientists.

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Transportation

Rail transport is predominant in the modern sector of China's economy, with water and road transport playing important supplementary roles.

Railroads have borne the burden of increased economic activity, particularly in industrial areas such as northeast China. Since 1950 the Chinese have added more than 11,000 miles of main and branch lines to the railroad network, which now totals about 25,000 miles, as shown on the map. Chinese railroad construction has concentrated on correcting the uneven distribution of the rail system. A striking example is the line linking Ch'eng-tu in Szechwan directly with K'un-ming in Yunnan. This line was recently completed after more than a decade of high-cost construction through rugged mountainous terrain. Although China's railroad system is primarily steam-powered, diesel locomotives have been introduced at an increasing rate since 1965. China is presently experiencing the revolution in railroad motive power completed in Western countries more than 10 years ago.

The Chinese road network totals more than 300,000 miles, about six times the length of serviceable roads in 1949. More than half the system consists of natural earth roads; the remainder is made up primarily of gravel roads and a few thousand miles of bituminous-bound and hard-surface roads. In most sections, truck transport provides short-haul service to the railroads and inland waterways. Motor trucks are supplemented for local haulage by large inputs of such primitive native transport means as wagons, carts, pack animals, and coolie porters. The quality of China's roads does not permit extensive long-distance truck haulage, except in the west where railroads do not exist.

China's navigable inland waterways total more than 100,000 miles; routes on streams suitable for modern motorized vessels amount to some 25,000 miles. Inland waterways supplement the railroads and carry bulk cargoes for long distances when speed is not of major importance. Navigation on the Yangtze River - historically the great commercial artery of China - has steadily improved. Oceangoing vessels can sail as far inland as Wu-han, while junks, barges, tugs, and large river steamers sail as far as Ch'ung-ch'ing. The dense network of waterways in the populous eastern third of China provides low-cost local haulage for an infinite variety of foodstuffs and industrial goods.

Civil aviation is of minor importance in China. Air cargo is characteristically made up of high-value, low-volume items such as expensive machinery needed at remote construction sites or medical supplies required on an emergency basis. Passengers are mostly government officials and foreign visitors.

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## Principal Transportation Routes



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
### III. CHINA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

#### Foreign Trade

China's foreign trade, rigidly planned by the central government and controlled through a handful of state trading corporations, effectively supports China's industrial and agricultural goals.

The total trade volume of \$4.2 billion is small in relation to domestic output, partly because a vast country such as China can produce a wide variety of products for its own use and partly because so much of China is a subsistence agriculture economy. Nonetheless, for some items – grain, chemical fertilizer, steel, rubber, and certain nonferrous metals and transport equipment – China ranks as an important purchaser; its practice of giving single large contracts increases the impact on individual Western firms and even individual countries.

China has made selective use of trade as a political tool, most recently in placing all its wheat import business with Canada, leaving none for Australia. On the other hand, Japan – China's largest, most convenient, and least-cost trading partner – has been increasing its primacy in China's trade in spite of festering political problems. And West Germany sells more to China than the United Kingdom or France despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations.



In the first decade under the Communists, China's total trade grew steadily from \$1.2 billion in 1950 to \$4.3 billion in 1959; in the second decade the trend has been cyclical, with trade dropping off after the collapse of the Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution and regaining the 1959 level only in 1966 and again in 1970. Trade in 1971 should move up to a new peak. Along with these fluctuations in the volume of trade there has been a dramatic shift in China's trading partners. In 1970, some 80% of China's trade was with the Free World; a decade earlier almost two-thirds was with the Communist countries, with the USSR being the predominant partner.

China exports foodstuffs, textiles, unprocessed agricultural materials, and an

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increasing range of miscellaneous manufactures in exchange for machinery and equipment, grain, chemical fertilizer, metals, and other industrial materials. China's trade in 1969, by commodity category, is given below:

	Million US \$	
	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>
<i>Total</i>	2,020	1,835
Foods	615	350
Crude materials	450	310
Chemicals	90	310
Textiles	500	30
Metals	70	465
Machinery and equipment	25	240
Other manufactures	270	130

Machinery and transport equipment for China's industrial modernization come from Japan, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. Japan and Western Europe supply the more advanced technology and also most of China's imports of steel and chemical fertilizer. Canada and Australia have been China's grain suppliers, with occasional shipments by France. Principal imports from the Free World less developed countries include rubber from Malaysia, Singapore, and Ceylon; copper from Zambia, Chile, and Peru; and textile fibers from Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, and East Africa.

Hong Kong and the countries of Southeast Asia with sizable Chinese populations buy large quantities of specialty foods, cotton textiles, and light manufactures. This area provides China with hard currency earnings to finance the substantial deficits in trade with the developed countries of the Free World. For example, China's trade surplus with Hong Kong was \$355 million in 1970. In addition, China obtained another \$175 million from remittances handled by the Hong Kong banks from Chinese residing abroad and from business and investment profits remitted back to the Mainland.

China has followed a conservative international financial policy and is free of long-term international debt. China's reserves of gold and foreign exchange now amount to more than \$700 million. Short-term commercial credits have been extensively used to finance imports of Western grain and fertilizer. Repayments have been prompt and outstanding short-term indebtedness was about \$350 million at the end of 1970.

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~~SECRET~~Foreign Aid

China maintains a sizable foreign economic and military aid program in selected Communist and non-Communist countries at an annual cost of roughly \$400 million a year.

North Vietnam is the largest single recipient of China's foreign aid, having received by the end of 1970 \$660 million in military aid and \$945 million in economic aid. Military and economic aid to North Vietnam have each been running at about \$95 million a year in 1968-70. Military aid is made up primarily of small arms and ammunition; economic aid of foodstuffs, clothing, coal, and trucks.


China also is a source of aid to insurgent movements in Southeast Asia – for example, the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Communist guerrilla forces in northwest Thailand – but compared to its aid to North Vietnam, Chinese commitments to these other movements are small. In an endeavor to foster independence of the Soviet Union, China also has furnished large-scale economic and military aid to Albania since 1961 and has recently entered into aid agreements with North Korea and Romania. As for Cuba, China for the last few years has been buying Cuban sugar at a price that represents a subsidy of roughly \$50 million per year.

In the period 1956-70, China extended a total of \$1.7 billion in economic aid to the Free World less developed countries, mainly in the form of long-term low-interest loans. Only about one-third of this amount has been actually drawn; thus the outpayments have been at an average rate of \$40 million per year. The most spectacular single aid project is the \$400 million railroad to connect Zambia's copper belt with the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam. In addition to economic aid, China extended by the end of 1970 some \$200 million in military aid to non-Communist countries, of which two-thirds went to Pakistan primarily in the form of jet aircraft and tanks. The chart on the facing page gives further details on China's aid to the less developed countries of the Free World.


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## Economic and Military Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World Extensions and Drawings, by Area

	MILLION US \$										
	TOTAL FOR 1956-60	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
ECONOMIC EXTENSIONS	181.0	76.6	12.3	88.1	310.9	70.7	119.0	49.5	54.3	11.7	708.1
AFRICA	26.5	39.2	1.8	71.6	138.2	24.7	42.5	21.5	0.3	11.5	452.8
EAST ASIA	76.5	27.6				18.0	42.9				
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA	78.0	9.8	10.5	16.5	172.7	28.0	33.6	28.0	54.0	0.2	255.3
ECONOMIC AID DRAWN	68	9	13	22	65	76	89	94	46	49	45



	MILLION US \$										
	TOTAL FOR 1956-60	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
MILITARY EXTENSIONS	33				4	74	10	17	5	53	
AFRICA	12						7	1	5	1	
EAST ASIA	21				4	4	3	3			
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA						70		13		52	
MILITARY AID DRAWN	30	3			2	3	56		22	26	6



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US-China Economic Relationships

Over the next several years, US-China economic relationships are likely to be overshadowed by the political issues between the two powers.

The US embargo on trade with China was lifted in April 1971, permitting commercial transactions between US firms and Chinese trading corporations for the first time in two decades. US importers have moved quickly to initiate certain specialty imports through intermediaries in Hong Kong and other countries. But Peking has been in no rush to expand its trade ties with the United States, indicating that trade expansion with the United States would follow, not precede, the solution of the Taiwan problem, UN membership for Peking, and a US withdrawal from Vietnam. At the same time, China has not been penalizing itself by refusing to purchase equipment embodying advanced US technology. Where advantageous, it has been procuring American goods through subsidiaries of US companies or indirectly through third parties. It also is preparing for direct trade by hinting to US traders that they may be invited to the October 1971 trade fair in Canton.

The potential for US-China trade is limited by several factors. China's foreign trade is small in relation to total output and is likely to grow only slowly because of a policy of economic self-sufficiency, a conservative attitude toward foreign indebtedness, and a limited range of export goods. And China already has well-established trading relationships with low-cost suppliers of its major import needs of grain, fertilizer, and machinery.

Nevertheless, there are obvious possibilities for commercial relations between the two countries. Potential Chinese exports to the United States include specialty foods, crude animal materials such as bristles and feathers, and luxury products such as rugs, embroideries, silks, art objects, and curios. China would have difficulty in achieving large-scale penetration of US markets with its major exports of textiles and staple foodstuffs.

For the near future, China is most likely to be interested in US industrial goods embodying advanced technology and not available from other sources. And the key question for any sale would be whether or not such goods would be licensed for export to China. Advanced computers, petrochemical equipment, and offshore drilling equipment are prime examples of such goods. China may also include US goods in its worldwide search for commercial aircraft, trucks, truck components, and scientific instruments. Finally, China may occasionally purchase US grain, steel, or chemical fertilizers if it wishes to make a political gesture or if it faces greatly increased domestic requirements for these items.

In summary, political uncertainties make any estimate of the future volume of US-China trade highly speculative. Perhaps by the mid-1970s imports and exports might each be in the range of \$100-\$200 million annually.

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## Appendix A

## Economic Chronology

- 1949-52: Rehabilitation: restoration of railroads, factories, and water control systems to operation; provision of stable currency; evening out of food supplies; establishment of economic law and order.
- 1953-57: First Five-Year Plan: successful Soviet-style plan for building up capacity and production in basic industries - steel, coal, electric power, cement, simple machinery; good start on defense industries; collectivization of agriculture with emphasis on investment from local resources; import of machinery and technology from Communist countries.
- 1958-60: Great Leap Forward: attempt at instant industrialization through frenzied increase in tempo of industry and agriculture; backyard steel furnaces and other wasteful small industrial projects; unwieldy supercollectives (communes) in agriculture; ban on private plots; breakdown of planning and statistical system; withdrawal of Soviet technicians in mid-1960; poor harvests in 1959, 1960, and 1961; acute food shortages especially in the winter of 1960-61.
- 1961-65: Readjustment and Recovery: emergency measures to regain tolerable food balance, including annual import of 4-5 million metric tons of grain beginning in 1961, restoration of smaller collective units in agriculture, permissive attitude toward private plots, and increase of industrial inputs to agriculture; shutting down of wasteful industrial production and concentration of industrial investment on weapons, petroleum, electronics, and fertilizer industries; shift of trade from Communist countries to Industrial West.
- 1966-69: Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Maoist attempt to revitalize revolution by reversing trends toward bureaucratization, "expertism," and material incentives; unleashing of youthful Red Guards with subsequent assumption of power by army; damage to industrial production in 1967-68 (down 15%-20%) and foreign trade (down 10% in 1967-68), but little damage to agriculture which had good weather and might even have benefited from lessened control.
- 1970-75: Resumption of Regular Planning: general trend to political and economic moderation and announcement of Fourth Five-Year Plan for 1971-75; record industrial and agricultural production in 1970; petroleum and armaments industries as pace-setters; release of a few national production figures, possibly foreshadowing lifting of 11-year statistical blackout.

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**Appendix B****SECRET****Economic Indicators**

	1952	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
GNP (billion 1969 US \$)	57	79	91	88	86	69	76
Population, mid-year (million persons)	570	642	658	674	689	701	710
Per capita GNP (1969 US \$)	101	123	139	131	125	98	107
Grain (million metric tons)	154	185	200	165	160	160	175-180
Cotton (million metric tons)	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	0.9	0.9
Industrial production index (1957 = 100)	51	100	130	163	160-162	103-105	106-109
Crude steel (million metric tons)	1.35	5.35	8.0	10	13	8	8
Coal (million metric tons)	66.5	130.7	230	300	280	170	180
Electric power (billion kilowatt hours)	7.3	19.3	27.5	41.5	47	31	30
Crude oil (million metric tons)	0.44	1.46	2.26	3.7	4.6	4.5	5.0
Aluminum (thousand metric tons)	0	39	49	70	80	60	70
Cement (million metric tons)	2.86	6.9	9.3	10.6	9.0	6.0	5.5
Chemical fertilizers (million metric tons of product weight)							
Supply	0.4	1.9	3.0	3.1	3.5	2.4	3.1
Production	0.2	0.8	1.4	1.9	2.5	1.4	2.1
Imports	0.2	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0
Trucks (thousand units)	0	7.5	16.0	19.4	15	1	14
Locomotives (units)	20	167	350	500	600	100	25
Freight cars (thousand units)	5.8	7.3	11	17	23	3	4.0
Cotton cloth (billion linear meters)	3.83	5.05	5.7	7.5	5.8	4.0	4.2
Foreign trade (billion US \$)							
Total	1.89	3.03	3.74	4.26	3.97	3.02	2.68
Exports	0.88	1.60	1.91	2.20	1.94	1.52	1.53
Imports	1.01	1.43	1.83	2.06	2.03	1.50	1.15

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Appendix B  
Economic Indicators

1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	
79	87	95	104	100	97	107	119	GNP (billion 1969 US \$)
721	735	751	766	783	800	818	836	Population, mid-year (million persons)
110	118	127	136	127	121	131	143	Per capita GNP (1969 US \$)
175-180	180-185	190-195	195-200	210-215	195-200	200-205	215-220	Grain (million metric tons)
0.9	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.7	Cotton (million metric tons)
117-123	133-141	155-165	177-190	142-154	147-162	178-198	208-233	Industrial production index (1957 = 100)
9	10	11	13	10	11.5	14.5	17	Crude steel (million metric tons)
190	200	220	240	190	200	250	300	Coal (million metric tons)
33	36	42	47	41	44	50	60	Electric power (billion kilowatt hours)
5.5	6.9	8	10	10	11	14	18	Crude oil (million metric tons)
85	100	115	125	145	180	195	230	Aluminum (thousand metric tons)
7.3	8.7	10.9	12.0	10.2	10.5	12	13	Cement (million metric tons)
								Chemical fertilizers (million metric tons of product weight)
4.9	4.7	6.8	8.0	8.3	8.8	9.9	11.8	Supply
2.9	3.5	4.5	5.5	4.0	4.8	5.8	7.0	Production
2.0	1.2	2.3	2.5	4.3	4.0	4.1	4.8	Imports
16	26	34	47	34	31	66	75	Trucks (thousand units)
25	25	50	140	200	240	260	280	Locomotives (units)
5.9	5.7	6.6	7.5	6.9	8.7	11	12	Freight cars (thousand units)
4.5	4.9	5.4	6.0	4.8	4.8	6.5	7.5	Cotton cloth (billion linear meters)
								Foreign trade (billion US \$)
2.77	3.22	3.85	4.20	3.86	3.71	3.86	4.25	Total
1.57	1.75	2.00	2.17	1.92	1.89	2.02	2.07	Exports
1.20	1.47	1.86	2.03	1.94	1.82	1.84	2.18	Imports

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## Terrain



0 500 1000 Miles  
0 500 1000 Kilometers

NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION  
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

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**QUESTIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT THE CHINESE ECONOMY**

**Q. Is China likely to spill across its boundaries to seize the "rice bowl" area of Southeast Asia?**

**A. No.** The rice surplus in this area at the most is 5 million tons, which is only 2%-3% of China's current grain production. Furthermore, if the Chinese took the area, the surplus could well vanish because of disrupted incentives; at the minimum, the surplus could not be procured and transported cost-free. Finally, China could obtain 5 million additional tons of grain at much less risk and cost by other means -- for example, by buying additional grain or fertilizer abroad or by reallocating resources at home. Of course, China's leadership could move into Southeast Asia for political or military reasons or because of an erroneous assessment of the economic issues involved.

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**Q. Are the Chinese people better off economically under the Communist government than they were before 1949?**

**A. Yes.** With the exception of 1960-61, the Chinese have had enough to eat since the Communists came to power, and the stability of economic life has been greatly improved because of the elimination of large-scale famine, inflation, brigandage, civil war, and epidemics as well as of the marked reduction in the effects of flood and drought. The majority of the people lead more secure lives, economically speaking. The 5%-10% of the people at the top in pre-Communist days fled the country, were killed, or were dispossessed.

**Q. Is the distribution of income egalitarian under the Chinese Communists?**

**A. Yes.** The distribution of income and perquisites is more nearly equal than in any other major country. Distinctions in pay, dress, mode

**SECRET****Appendix E**

of transport, and life style are surprisingly small between the average worker and the plant manager. Party members are enjoined to live frugally, and opportunities for conspicuous consumption are few. The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao in part because he thought the cadres were losing this egalitarian spirit.

**Q. Does Communist China have an inflation problem?**

**A.** No. Prices, wages, and rents in the modern part of the economy are fixed by government fiat and effectively enforced. In the countryside, much economic activity is contained within the household and another large share is conducted on a barter basis. The "share-out" of the crop at the end of the harvest season is largely in kind. Still another part of rural output goes for taxes paid in kind to the government or as a quota sold to the government at fixed prices. Inputs of fertilizer and equipment are paid for by the collective unit at fixed prices. Local markets may have fluctuating prices, but buying for resale is prohibited and prices far out of line normally would be the subject of official action.

**Q. How do the Chinese manage to have a balanced foreign trade account?**

**A.** State foreign trade corporations are authorized to contract for only those goods which are covered by export earnings. When exports falter, as happened during the Cultural Revolution, imports are correspondingly tightened. The trade with individual nations does not necessarily balance -- for example, China uses its large trade surplus with Hong Kong and Southeast Asia to cover its trade deficits with Japan, Canada, and Western Europe.

**Q. How have the Chinese Communists eradicated the opium problem?**

**A.** Stringent controls over opium poppy production and use were adopted at the 21st session of the State Council on 24 February 1950. Basically the statute prohibited the private importation, processing, and sale of opium and other narcotics. However, government controlled production continues and is reflected in the small quantities of raw opium and poppy husks which are legally exported from time to time. The tight political control exercised by the government over its citizens has probably made the enforcement of these laws quite effective in most areas of the country.

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Control over production and trade in the southern border areas has probably been more difficult, and scattered reports in recent years indicate that small amounts of illicit opium are produced and traded in the tribal areas of the south.

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**Appendix F**  
**International Economic**  
**Comparisons, 1970**

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	<u>China</u>	<u>Taiwan</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Japan</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>
Land area (million square miles)	3.7	0.014	1.2	0.14	8.6	3.6
Cultivated (percent)	11	24	50	16	9	20
Forested (percent)	8	55	22	69	37	32
Population, mid-year (million persons)	836	15	550	104	243	205
Average annual increase (percent)	2.2	2.3	2.5	1.0	0.9	1.1
GNP (billion 1969 US \$)	119	5	47	186	508	928
Imports (billion US \$)	2.18	1.52	2.15	18.9	11.7	40.0
Exports (billion US \$)	2.07	1.56	1.96	19.3	12.8	42.6
Grain production (million metric tons)	215-220	6	83	16	150	186
Industrial production index (1965 = 100)	138	222	117	215	139	117
Hard coal (million metric tons)	300	4	72	40	441	539
Electric power (billion kilowatt hours)	60	13	62	349	740	1,760
Crude oil (million metric tons)	18	0.09	7	0.8	353	475
Crude steel (million metric tons)	17	0.3	6	93	116	119
Cement (million metric tons)	13	4	14	57	95	68
Railroads (thousand miles)	25	3	36	18	86	224
Highways (thousand miles)	325	10	590	622	934	3,698
Telephones in use (millions)	0.2	0.3	1.2	23.1	13.0	122.0
Radios in use (millions)	8.5	1.4	9.3	23.2	49.1	336.0

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## Mao Tse-tung's Favorite Novels

### Introduction

The following descriptions of Mao's favorite novels reveal some of his character traits: The stories involve military heroes, who demonstrate acts of daring and cunning; a band of brigands who live in the mountains and in Robinhood style, prey on arrogant and corrupt officials and the wealthy, and are kind to the poor and helpless; wars and intrigue among noblemen and their cohorts, in the early days of China; and a large Chinese family, living in former days of the emperors, with all of its members' daily happenings, romances, quarrels, happy and sad events, intermixed with numerous mystical events and spirit interventions, replete with symbolism.

Judging from the tales and from Mao's comments about them, from his youth and still [recently, he announced he had just completed a re-reading of one of the novels], Mao has been and is very much involved with:

- a) - China's military conquests and ancient military traditions;
- b) Physical bravery, especially in combat;
- c) Solutions to various problems through use of force or cunning;
- d) Robbing the rich and powerful and helping the poor and oppressed;
- e) Mystical happenings;
- f) Crude and often cruel humor, in human relations;
- g) Life in the days of the emperors;
- h) Merciless and hostile treatment of outsiders or foreigners;
- i) An appreciation for nature's beauty, especially in the mountains;
- j) Lust and lusty living; and
- k) Delicate and often poignant human relationships, especially between lovers.

Whether Mao Tse-tung reads and re-reads his favorite novels because they are excellent Chinese "escape" entertainment and purely for entertainment, or because he, himself, identifies with the characters depicted, of course can be debated. However, when linked with his own comments about some of the novels and his own writings, including his writings about combat, and also in the light of Mao's record, we are justified in concluding that Mao is not reading solely for entertainment or to escape, but rather he identifies with the characters. As is true of everyone and usually to a greater degree in national leaders who have gained and held their power in large measure by force and device, Mao is a complex man. He has all of the characteristics suggested in the list of topics, a) through j), above. Of course, he has other characteristics as well.



But it is clear not only from his record and his own writings but also from his favorite reading materials that Mao is a militant, devious and brave (to the point of being rash) man, utterly without scruples by western standards, and not only cannot be trusted to keep his word, but can be expected to use trickery and to do whatever he feels is in his or his side's interest and within their capacity. Mao not only is willing to indulge in artifice, both in human dealings and in combat-- he prefers to do so and considers tricks and devices as the best possible route to his objectives.

One theme which runs through two of his novels, above all, is the winning of battles, cities or wenchies, by trickery. Failing that, the central theme is sudden force. Judging from his reading materials and mainly from two of the favorite novels (Shui Hu Chuan, or Water Margin, called All Men are Brothers in Pearl Buck's translation; and San Kuo Chih, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms), it is fortunate for us from the long-range view that Mao Tse-tung is now well advanced in years. It may be hoped that the leaders of the People's Republic who succeed him may at least in degree be men of some personal honor by eastern standards. Of course, Mao's very traits described above, under pressure from Russia and Japan against China at this time, may be part of what has enabled him to turn to us for some sort of implicit or greater assistance, notwithstanding the fact that ideologically we are not acceptable to him. In other words, the very traits in Mao which are dangerous to us also are dangerous to Russia and Japan. As with the heroes in the two novels mentioned, Mao will not permit any ideological differences to prevent him from temporarily cooperating with us. But we must not expect anything permanent from him in the area of cooperation, unless it lies in his own interests and those of China.

#### The Novels Which Mao Describes as His Favorites

- a) Shui Hu Chuan, or Water Margin, called All Men are Brothers by Pearl Buck in her translation
- b) San Kuo Chih, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms
- c) Hung Lou Meng, or generally called Dream of the Red Chamber

### Description of the Novels

#### a) Shui Hu Chuan (Water Margin or, All Men are Brothers).

The book originated with a series of orally told tales, and evolved through many forms. In its present form it was probably written in the early or middle part of the Ming Dynasty, in the fourteenth or fifteenth century. However, written editions of portions of the book existed in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries.

The story is set in the thirteenth century at a period in Chinese history when the Sung Dynasty was falling into decadence and disorder under the reign of the Emperor Hung Chung.

The characters are 138 men, thirty-six of whom are chief characters. For various reasons connected with unjust officials, oppressive government and evil social conditions, the men variously have been compelled to flee from society and take refuge on a great mountain (Liang Shan P'o) set in a lake and surrounded by a reedy marsh. The mountain is situated in Shantung Province. Here the fugitives gather and join forces as an organized group. It is believed that the story is based on history, and that the thirty-six chief robbers were men who lived at the end of the north Sung Dynasty and ravaged central China and defied the state soldiers. They were popular with the poor people, whom they never harmed.

The book was banned by the Chinese emperors, and its printing, sale, purchase or reading were forbidden, for example, in the written imperial mandates of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

The episodes are entertaining and lusty reading. In addition to being good yarns, they manifest the traits and topics listed under the Introduction.

#### 1) Mao's Comments About the Story Shui Hu Chuan

A number of comments about the story by Mao Tse-tung have been reported, all of course complimentary. Perhaps significant is the following:

When Mao was a student in Changsha, and a group of his friends and he were discussing ways of saving China from its decadent conditions under the Ch'ing Dynasty and in a period involving

Western encroachments and internal disorders, a number of suggestions were made by the other students, including going into politics or teaching future generations of students to reform. Mao is reliably reported [by a former friend, who at the time of his report was on Taiwan] to have objected to the other methods as taking too long. Mao then offered his own solution: "Imitate the heroes of Liang Shan P'o." [the robbers' mountain hideout]<sup>1</sup> The probable authenticity of that report tends to be confirmed by a similar report by Edgar Snow, who wrote that the fighting methods of the mountain robbers of Liang Shan P'o were being taught to recruits by Mao Tse-tung and his fellow revolutionaries, in their Yen-an training area.<sup>2</sup>

## 2) Edgar Snow's Comments About the Story Shui Hu Chuan

Edgar Snow, in his book Red Star Over China,<sup>3</sup> describes an episode in Yen-an, in which he was alarmed by sudden wild shouts near him and saw recruits brandishing spears, pikes and rifles and uttering fierce battle cries. He reported that later he learned that the curriculum for partisans included the rehearsal of ancient Chinese war cries, just as in the days of feudal tournaments described "in one of Mao Tse-tung's favorite books, the Shui Hu Chuan. One is reminded, also, of the wild war cries and constant bugle calls reported of the Chinese communist soldiers in Korea during our war there.

## b) San Kuo Chih Yen-I, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms

The novel began its existence more than one thousand years ago<sup>4</sup> in the form of stories orally told. It progressed, in various segments and in various forms, through a number of increasingly lengthy versions. The one commonly read by the Chinese dates from the seventeenth century. The work is an historical novel based on the wars of the Three Kingdoms which fought for supremacy at the beginning of the third century A. D.

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1. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 43

2. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, 1st Rvsd. Edn., Grove Press, p. 67

3. Ibid, p. 67

4. Arthur Waley in his Preface, p. x, to Hung Lou Meng, English edn. translated by Chi-chen Wang, Doubleday, Doran & Co., N. Y. 1929

The three kingdoms were named Shu, Wu and Wei, and the period covered is from around 220 A. D. until 265 A. D., when the last ruler of Wei fell to the state of Chin (Tsin), and the China of that day again became united under an emperor. The main outline of the events related in the novel is historical, and the chief characters in the book are all historical figures from China's past. However, most of the hundreds of incidents are fictional, having resulted from centuries of slow accretion and collection. Even hundreds of years before one of the earlier written versions is reported to have circulated in the fourteenth century, generations of popular storytellers, dramatists and poets were adding to this epic.

The chief characters in the novel include Liu Pei, the legitimate heir to the fallen Han Dynasty throne, who is idealized; Kuan Yu, a brilliant and learned man; and Chang Fei, who is plebeian and unlettered, very human in the Chinese sense and, therefore, a man of warmth, gusto, energy and humor. Another important character is Ts'ao Ts'ao, the wily, cunning, treacherous and merciless "villain-hero" of the novel. The story begins with the prologue, "Empires wax and wane; states cleave asunder and coalesce." It then deals with the fall of the Chinese Han empire, the adventures of the three central characters (Liu Pei, Kuan Yu and Chang Fei, the wars among the three kingdoms for control, the defeat of the Shu and Wu kingdoms by the Wei kingdom, and Wei's eventual collapse before the emergent new Chin (Tsin) empire.

1) Keys to Mao's Character Traits, and to Those of His  
Colleagues, Derived from This Novel

Frequently, an attempt to read a man's character traits by examining his favorite books is a dangerous exercise. Many different motivations either control or at least affect choices of reading material. However, when it has been established that a particular book or group of books have been read and re-read by the subject of one's scrutiny, and when as in Mao's case the books are frequently quoted or discussed, the possibility that the book, its subject matter and its characters at least to some substantial degree mirror the reader's interests and leanings becomes stronger.

Both novels illustrate a frank departure by their characters from the noble concepts of Confucius, and a lusty passion for artifice intermixed with violence, in dealings with all opponents, "allies," outsiders, and

even each other. In these novels, one finds echoes across the centuries of such modern-day People's Republic attributes and procedures, as the sudden falls of Liu Shao-ch'i; Lin Piao; and others; and the Hundred Flowers episode, in which criticism was invited and then the critics were trapped and punished; and the sudden Korean attacks, with war cries and blowing bugles; and the techniques of warfare, involving extraordinary and dangerous night river crossings, attacks from "impossible" mountain peaks, and guerrilla tactics; and the use of the Red Guards to destroy or try to destroy a rival faction; and many other things we have seen the Chinese communists do.

The difference between these novels and our own approximately similar stories (e.g., King Arthur; Charlemagne; Richard the Lion Hearted and the Crusades; John Paul Jones) involves two significant distinctions: (1) Our leaders do not almost worship and constantly read our legendary stories, and do not cite them and quote from them, at frequent intervals, but the Chinese communists do exactly that; and (2) our western such legendary stories stress courage, strength, the direct and usually frontal assault on the enemies, and honor, in the sense that artifice is not admired, but the Chinese heroes in Mao's favorite novels almost always use guile and artifice, and are greatly admired for using those devices.

One example from Romance of the Three Kingdoms is typical of hundreds like it, and should be considered in connection with Mao Tse-tung's boasts that he equipped his armies, sometimes by feints and tricks, from the enemy armies. Consider this episode from Romance of the Three Kingdoms: [Paraphrased to avoid undue length]

The great commander Chu-ko Liang's forces were short of arrows, and needed to replenish them. He sent a force of some twenty ships to feign an attack on the fleet of his powerful enemy; Ts'ao Ts'ao. The decks of Liang's ships were apparently covered with large numbers of fighting men, but these in reality were only straw figures stuffed into soldiers uniforms. On each ship there were only a few sailors and some real soldiers with gongs and other noisy instruments. Reaching their destination, as had been carefully calculated beforehand, in the middle of a dense fog, the soldiers at once began to beat their gongs as if about to go into action; whereupon Ts'ao Ts'ao, who could just make out the outlines of the vessels densely packed with fighting men bearing down on him, gave orders to his archers to begin shooting. The latter did so, and kept on for an hour or more, until Liang on one of his ships was satisfied with the enormous amounts of arrows by then sticking in his straw soldiers. So he passed the order to retreat, again fully equipped with arrows for his forces.

2) Contrast Between Confucian Teachings and the Views Reflected in Mao's Favorite Novels, and by Mao and His Colleagues

The practices of deceit, artifice, guile, military action, force and similar things so valued by Mao and his colleagues and with which his favorite novels are filled, all were looked upon with disgust by Confucius and most of China's other great philosophers and teachers. The traditional Chinese teachings stress the moral qualities we Westerners admire, although of course we ourselves are not wholly moral, by any means. We are talking about ideologies, and what we strive for, rather than perfect conditions. Under the teachings of Confucius and most of the other philosophers, and pursuant to our own Western codes of conduct, the characteristics shown in Mao's favorite novels and in the expressions and actions of the People's Republic are abhorrent. The People's Republic expressly and by its actions has made heroes out of the villains in China's history, under the teachings of Confucius and the other philosophers. And they have made heroes out of the men in Mao's favorite novels. One example of the People's Republic express and official reversal of a former villain into a hero is Ch'in Chih Huang Ti, who by force of arms and guile between 255 B. C. and 214 B. C., unified China; re-established the empire, as the Ch'in Dynasty; burned all books, and executed any scholars caught with the forbidden books; completed the Great Wall, with slave labor and the deaths at the Great Wall, of hundreds of thousands of such slaves; and ruled as a tyrant. Confucius held that emperor as an example of the worst possible kind of emperor; and Mao and his colleagues praise him, as an historic hero. He is praised for his military ability, for his administrative ability, for unifying China, and for his strength. His excesses are explained away, in effect as necessary under the circumstances and as acceptable in the light of what he accomplished.

In understanding the pre-Mao Chinese and what Mao is trying to make them into, in the context of these novels and what they reflect, it is important to note that during the periods of the Confucius and similar impact on the Chinese, their ideals and goals involved a high order of morality. Tyrants existed, but they were held in contempt. Actually, as far as her rulers for the most part were concerned, during the periods guided by the Confucius and similar ideals, Confucianism was a noble procedural and ritualistic cloke, covering an absolute and often cruel and militant emperor (and his cohorts). But the point is, Confucianism had a moderating influence on the rulers, and did tend to guide and deeply affect the populace. And as for Mao's favorite novels, which also have been the favorites of most of the literate Chinese since

they were written, although they were read and hugely enjoyed, it was with a sense of "oh my, how terrible--but that was in the ancient days," and not with the Maoist sense of candid, even exultant, delight and admiration. The Maoists and especially Mao Tse-tung himself, recommend that the heroes of the favorite novels be admired, praised and emulated.

c) Hung Lou Meng - Dream of the Red Chamber

The English title for this novel, although effective, is not a correct translation. Actually, Hung Lou Meng literally translates as, "Dream of the Two-Storeyed Red Building," which of course is a bad title in English, and not as romantically suggestive as the title, Dream of the Red Chamber. It is possible that the Chinese title is describing the home in which the family involved in the novel lived.

The novel is semi-autobiographical, and was written around 1757 by a middle-aged gentleman named Tsao Hsueh-chin. He was a son of a man of wealth and scholarship, and his family for generations had held the Inspectorship of the Imperial Silk Factories in the Province of Kansu. The author in his early life enjoyed luxuries and similar advantages. Although apparently a gifted youth and an accomplished poet in later life, the author failed at the Imperial Literary Examinations. Without the political and financial success then going with success in the examinations, he suffered hardship when his family experienced financial and social reverses. He was in poverty when the novel was written, and died at the age of forty-five.

Dream of the Red Chamber is extremely long, and in the Chinese usually is published in 24 volumes, each of about thirty pages, or approximately 4,000 pages in all. Over four hundred characters are involved in the story. Basically, the story is that of the author and his family, and it is a panorama of life of a distinguished but increasingly troubled Chinese family. It depicts the members' and their friends', lovers', enemies' and servants' inter-reactions and daily relationships. The novel is also a love story, full of humorous and pathetic episodes of everyday human life, interspersed with short poems of high literary finish. The opening chapters deal with the world of spirits and the supernatural. Then the story unfolds on an everyday basis, but punctuated with the near presence of spiritual influences.

The novel is a good and detailed report as to the Chinese customs, family life and thinking of the mid-Ch'ing dynasty. The People's Republic-approved commentaries describe the work as of historical interest, and as an example of the feudal and imperial periods. Certainly, it is both of the things it is stated to be, but it is somewhat difficult to understand the People's Republic's condonation of the publication of any novel containing so much of the magic, supernatural and similar aspects of Chinese life in the "old days." Although replete with symbolism, magic, fanciful and spirit-world ideas, and although interesting at points in its depiction of what appears to be an almost word-for-word history of a well educated and formerly wealthy family in the recent imperial age, at least in the English version, the novel sometimes makes difficult reading.

Moreover, the work does not seem to dovetail with Mao Tse-tung's other reading preferences, or with his speeches and writings, in that it portrays tragic failures; some individuals who are listless; and a sad spiral downward, on the part of the family and the two lovers. Perhaps, Mao wants his people to read a novel showing the decadence of the old system. Or perhaps, he himself enjoys the excellent poetry which occurs throughout the work, in that Mao, himself, in an accomplished poet. Or, perhaps, it is not a fact that this is one of his favorite novels, as has been claimed by authorized comments by representatives of the People's Republic.

The book is included on the PRC's "approved list" because it does reflect against the way of life in the imperial days, because the Chinese regard it as fascinating to read, generally, and because Mao enjoys reading the story of a courtly family, within the imperial circle, in some measure because he, himself, was raised as a farm boy and the son of a peasant, and never experienced any of the gracious and courtly aspects of Chinese culture in his youth. I believe that although Mao is against decadence and wealth, nevertheless he enjoys looking through the windowpane at what is going on inside, to stare in amazement and fascination before turning away in official disgust.



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- A. Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: Report from China." The Atlantic Monthly, November 1971.
- B. Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: China and the World." The Atlantic Monthly, January 1972.
- C. "Mao Tse-tung and the Party Debate on a Strategy for China's National Development."
- D. "Mao Tse-tung and the Sino-Soviet Dispute."
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Books

Dennis Bloodworth, Chinese Looking Glass.

C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World.

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Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung.

• Mao Tse-tung:

## THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

*September 16, 1949*

The Chinese should thank Acheson, spokesman of the U.S. bourgeoisie, not merely because he has explicitly confessed to the fact that the United States supplied the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people and because he has thus given Chinese progressives evidence with which to convince the backward elements. You see, hasn't Acheson himself confessed that the great, sanguinary war of the last few years, which cost the lives of millions of Chinese, was planned and organized by U.S. imperialism? The Chinese should thank Acheson, again not merely because he has openly declared that the United States intends to recruit the so-called "democratic individualists" in China, organize a U.S. fifth column and overthrow the People's Government led by the Communist Party of China and has thus alerted the Chinese, especially those tinged with liberalism, who are promising each other not to be taken in by the Americans and are all on guard against the underhand intrigues of U.S. imperialism. The Chinese should thank Acheson also because he has fabricated wild tales about modern Chinese history; and his conception of history is precisely that shared by a section of the Chinese intellectuals, namely, the bourgeois idealist conception of history. Hence, a refutation of Acheson may benefit many Chinese by widening their horizon. The benefit may be even greater to those whose conception is the same, or in certain respects the same, as Acheson's.

What are Acheson's wild fabrications about modern Chinese history? First of all, he tries to explain the occurrence of the Chinese revolution in terms of economic and ideological conditions in China. Here he has recounted many myths.

Acheson says:

The population of China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries doubled, thereby creating an unbearable pressure upon the land. The first problem which every Chinese Government has had to face is that of feeding this population. So far none has succeeded. The Kuomintang attempted to solve it by putting many land-reform laws on the statute books. Some of these laws have failed, others have been ignored. In no small measure, the predicament in which the National Government finds itself today is due to its failure to provide China with enough to eat. A large part of the Chinese Communists' propaganda consists of promises that they will solve the land problem.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly the above sounds plausible. Too many mouths, too little food, hence revolution. The Kuomintang has failed to solve this problem and it is unlikely that the Communist Party will be able to solve it either. "So far none has succeeded."

Do revolutions arise from over-population? There have been many revolutions, ancient and modern, in China and abroad; were they all due to over-population? Were China's many revolutions in the past few thousand years also due to over-population? Was the American Revolution against Britain 174 years ago<sup>1</sup> also due to over-population? Acheson's knowledge of history is nil. He has not even read the American Declaration of Independence. Washington, Jefferson and others made the revolution against Britain because of British oppression and exploitation of the Americans, and not because of any over-population in America. Each time the Chinese people overthrew a feudal dynasty it was because of the oppression and exploitation of the people by that feudal dynasty, and not because of any over-population. The Russians made the February Revolution and the October Revolution because of oppression and exploitation by the tsar and the Russian bourgeoisie, not because of any over-population, for to this day in Russia there is a great abundance of land as compared with people. In Mongolia, where the land is so vast and the population so sparse, a revolution would be inconceivable according to Acheson's line of reasoning, yet it took place some time ago.<sup>2</sup>

According to Acheson, China has no way out at all. A population of 475 million constitutes an "unbearable pressure" and, revolution or no revolution, the case is hopeless. Acheson pins great hope on

this; although he has not voiced this hope, it has often been revealed by a number of American journalists -- through the allegation that the Communist Party of China will not be able to solve its economic problems, that China will remain in perpetual chaos and that her only way out is to live on U.S. flour, in other words, to become a U.S. colony.

Why did the Revolution of 1911 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because it overthrew only the Ching Dynasty but did not overthrow imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation.

Why did the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 not succeed and why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, surrendered to imperialism and became the chieftain of the counter-revolution which oppressed and exploited the Chinese.

Is it true that "so far none has succeeded"? In the old Liberated Areas in northwestern, northern, northeastern and eastern China, where the land problem has already been solved, does the problem of "feeding this population", as Acheson puts it, still exist? The United States has kept quite a number of spies or so-called observers in China. Why have they not ferreted out even this fact? In places like Shanghai, the problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, arose solely because of cruel, heartless oppression and exploitation by imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the reactionary Kuomintang government. Under the People's Government, it will take only a few years for this problem of unemployment, or of feeding the population, to be solved as completely as in the northern, northeastern and other parts of the country.

It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus<sup>3</sup> that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago, but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China after their revolutions. Basing itself on the truth that revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has issued orders to Party organizations and the People's Liberation Army throughout the country not to dismiss but to retain all former Kuomintang personnel, provided they can make themselves useful

and are not confirmed reactionaries or notorious scoundrels. Where things are very difficult, food and housing will be shared. Those who have been dismissed and have no means of support will be reinstated and provided with a living. According to the same principle, we shall maintain all Kuomintang soldiers who have revolted and come over to us or been captured. All reactionaries, except the major culprits, will be given a chance to earn their living, provided they show repentance.

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed. We are refuters of Acheson's counter-revolutionary theory. We believe that revolution can change everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly groundless.

"The impact of the West" is given by Acheson as the second reason why the Chinese revolution occurred. Acheson says:

For more than three thousand years the Chinese developed their own high culture and civilization, largely untouched by outside influences. Even when subjected to military conquest the Chinese always managed in the end to subdue and absorb the invader. It was natural therefore that they should come to look upon themselves as the center of the world and the highest expression of civilized mankind. Then in the middle of the nineteenth century the heretofore impervious wall of Chinese isolation was breached by the West. These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness, the unparalleled development of Western technology, and a high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China. Partly because of these qualities and partly because of the decay of Manchu rule, the Westerners, instead of being absorbed by the Chinese, introduced new ideas which played an important part in stimulating ferment and unrest.

To those Chinese who do not reason clearly, what Acheson says sounds plausible -- the influx of new ideas from the West gave rise to the revolution.

Against whom was the revolution directed? Because there was "decay of Manchu rule" and because it is the weak point that is

attacked, it would seem that the revolution was directed against the Ching Dynasty. But what Acheson says here is not quite right. The Revolution of 1911 was directed against imperialism. The Chinese directed the revolution against the Ching regime because it was the running dog of imperialism. The war against Britain's opium aggression, the war against the aggression of the Anglo-French allied forces, the war against the Ching regime, the running dog of imperialism, by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,<sup>4</sup> the war against French aggression, the war against Japanese aggression and the war against the aggression of the allied forces of the eight powers – all ended in failure; hence the Revolution of 1911 broke out against the running dog of imperialism, the Ching Dynasty. That is modern Chinese history up to 1911. What is the "impact of the West", as Acheson calls it? It is the effort of the Western bourgeoisie, as Marx and Engels said in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* of 1848,<sup>5</sup> to remould the world after its own image by means of terror. In the process of this impact or remoulding, the Western bourgeoisie, which needed compradors and flunkies familiar with Western customs, had to let countries like China open schools and send students abroad, and thus "new ideas were introduced" into China. Concurrently the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat were born in countries like China. At the same time, the peasantry was bankrupted, and a huge semi-proletariat was brought into existence. Thus the Western bourgeoisie created two categories of people in the East, a small minority, the flunkies of imperialism, and a majority which is opposed to imperialism and consists of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the intellectuals coming from these classes. Those in the majority group are all grave-diggers of imperialism, who were created by imperialism itself, and the revolution originates from them. It was not that the so-called influx of ideas from the West stirred up "ferment and unrest", but that imperialist aggression provoked resistance.

For a long time in the course of this resistance movement, that is, for over seventy years from the Opium War of 1840 to the eve of the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese had no ideological weapon with which to defend themselves against imperialism. The ideological weapons of the old die-hard feudalism were defeated, had to give way and were declared bankrupt. Having no other choice, the Chinese were compelled to arm themselves with such ideological weapons and political formulas as the theory of evolution, the theory of

natural rights and of the bourgeois republic, which were all borrowed from the arsenal of the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie in the West, the native home of imperialism. The Chinese organized political parties and made revolutions, believing that they could thus resist foreign powers and build a republic. However, all these ideological weapons, like those of feudalism, proved very feeble and in their turn had to give way and were withdrawn and declared bankrupt.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 awakened the Chinese, and they learned something new, Marxism-Leninism. In China, the Communist Party was born, an epoch-making event. Sun Yat-sen, too, advocated "learning from Russia" and "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party". In a word, from that time China changed her orientation.

Being the spokesman of an imperialist government, Acheson naturally does not want to breathe even a word about imperialism. He describes imperialist aggression thus: "These outsiders brought with them aggressiveness. . . ." "Aggressiveness" - what a beautiful name! Having learned this "aggressiveness", the Chinese did not aggress into Britain or the United States but only created "ferment and unrest" inside China, *i.e.*, carried out revolutions against imperialism and its running dogs. But unfortunately they never once succeeded; each time, they were defeated by the imperialists, the inventors of "aggressiveness". The Chinese therefore turned around to learn something else and, strangely enough, they immediately found that it worked.

The Chinese Communist Party "had been organized in the early twenties under the ideological impetus of the Russian revolution". Here Acheson is right. This ideology was none other than Marxism-Leninism. This ideology is immeasurably superior to that of the Western bourgeoisie, which Acheson calls a "high order of culture which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China". The clinching proof of the effectiveness of this ideology is that Western bourgeois culture, which the Achesons can boast of as a "high order of culture" compared with China's old feudal culture, was defeated the moment it encountered the new Marxist-Leninist culture, the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution, which the Chinese people had acquired. In its first battle, this scientific and revolutionary new culture acquired by the Chinese people defeated the Northern warlords, the running dogs of imperialism; in the second, it defeated the attempts by another running dog of imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek,

to intercept the Chinese Red Army during its 25,000-li Long March;<sup>6</sup> in the third, it defeated Japanese imperialism and its running dog, Wang Ching-wei; and in the fourth, it finally put an end to the domination of China by the United States and all other imperialist powers as well as to the rule of their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and all the other reactionaries.

The reason why Marxism-Leninism has played such a great role in China since its introduction is that China's social conditions call for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it. Any ideology -- even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself -- is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people. We are historical materialists, opposed to historical idealism.

Oddly enough, "Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, particularly in terms of economics and Party organization". What was the effect produced on Dr. Sun by the "high order of culture" of the West, of which Acheson and his like are so proud? Acheson doesn't say. Was it an accident that Dr. Sun, who devoted the greater part of his life to seeking from Western bourgeois culture the truth that would save the nation, was finally disappointed and turned to "learning from Russia"? Obviously not. Of course it was no accident that Dr. Sun and the long suffering Chinese people he represented were all infuriated by the "impact of the West" and resolved to form an "alliance with Russia and the Communist Party" in order to wage a life-and-death struggle against imperialism and its running dogs. Acheson dare not say here that the Soviet people are imperialist aggressors and that Sun Yat-sen learned from aggressors. Well, then, if Sun Yat-sen could learn from the Soviet people and the Soviet people are not imperialist aggressors, why can't his successors, the Chinese who live after him, learn from the Soviet people? Why are the Chinese, Sun Yat-sen excepted, described as "dominated by the Soviet Union" and as "the fifth column of the Comintern" and "lackeys of Red imperialism" for learning the scientific world outlook and the theory of social revolution through Marxism-Leninism, linking these with China's specific characteristics, starting the Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution and founding a republic of the people's democratic dictatorship? Can there be such superior logic anywhere in the world?



Since they learned Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese people have ceased to be passive in spirit and gained the initiative. The period of modern world history in which the Chinese and Chinese culture were looked down upon should have ended from that moment. The great, victorious Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great people's revolution have rejuvenated and are rejuvenating the great culture of the Chinese people. In its spiritual aspect, this culture of the Chinese people already stands higher than any in the capitalist world. Take U.S. Secretary of State Acheson and his like, for instance. The level of their understanding of modern China and of the modern world is lower than that of an ordinary soldier of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Up to this point, Acheson, like a bourgeois professor lecturing on a tedious text, has pretended to trace the causes and effects of events in China. Revolution occurred in China, first, because of over-population and, second, because of the stimulus of Western ideas. You see, he appears to be a champion of the theory of causation. But in what follows, even this bit of tedious and phoney theory of causation disappears, and one finds only a mass of inexplicable events. Quite unaccountably, the Chinese fought among themselves for power and money, suspecting and hating each other. An inexplicable change took place in the relative moral strength of the two contending parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the morale of one party dropped sharply to below zero, while that of the other rose sharply to white heat. What was the reason? Nobody knows. Such is the logic inherent in the "high order of culture" of the United States as represented by Dean Acheson.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The bourgeois revolution of 1775-83, known as the War of Independence, in which the people of North America opposed British colonial rule.

<sup>2</sup> In their struggle for liberation in 1921-24 the Mongolian people, under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, drove out the Russian Whiteguard bandit troops and the armed forces of the Northern warlords of China, both of which were backed by Japanese imperialism, overthrew Mongolian feudal rule and founded the Mongolian People's Republic.

<sup>3</sup> T. R. Malthus (1766-1834), Anglican clergyman and reactionary economist. In his *Essay on Population* (1798), he wrote that "population unchecked . . . increases in

geometrical ratio . . . [while] the means of subsistence . . . could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio". Basing himself on this arbitrary assumption, he came to the conclusion that all poverty and all evils in human society are permanent phenomena of nature. According to him, the only ways to solve the problem of poverty of the working people were to shorten their life-span, reduce the population or stop its increase. He regarded famine, pestilence and war as means to cut down population.

<sup>4</sup> The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war waged against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty in the middle of the 19th century. Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and others, the leaders of this revolution, staged an uprising in Kwangsi in January 1851 and proclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army proceeded northward from Kwangsi and marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 it captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse. Part of its forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin, a major city in northern China. Because the Taiping army failed to build stable base areas in the places it occupied and also because, after establishing its capital in Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors, it could not withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary troops of the Ching government and the aggressors, Britain, the United States and France, and suffered defeat in 1864.

<sup>5</sup> See *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Chapter I, "Bourgeois and Proletarians". The bourgeoisie "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image".

<sup>6</sup> In October 1934 the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,000 li (12,500 kilometres) on this march and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

Authority

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**CONFIDENTIAL****INFORMATION****February 16, 1972**

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT**  
**FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER**  
**SUBJECT: The Chinese Approach**

**Attached is an extract from an article written by an Asian scholar at Harvard who is a friend of mine. I think you will find that it gives you useful insights into the Chinese mode of operation.**

**Attachment**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**HAK:WL:ms:2/16/72**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Chinese Principles and Assumptions**

**Chinese operating principles for the manipulation of "barbarians"** are not improvised like our policies of recent times, but are inherited from a great tradition that comes down from centuries even before the Mongols and Manchus conquered and ruled all China. From ancient times the sedentary Chinese farmers and bureaucrats have always had to deal from weakness with powerful, mobile, non-Chinese fighters and conquerors. Today, Chiang deals with us from weakness, while Mao deals with the Russians, also from weakness. Both are doing well.

1. The cardinal Chinese principle in dealing with a non-Chinese is to use friendship as a halter. Admit the outsider to a guest membership in Chinese society. Compliment him on his knowledge of aspects of Chinese culture or of the Chinese language. Entertain him with informality and frankness. Establish the personal bonds of friendship, which in the old China were stronger than in Western urban life today. Become really intimate friends and understand his unspoken assumptions and personal motivations.
2. Ask the foreigner's advice so as both to ascertain his aims and values and to enlist his sympathy and support. (Both these principles help to account for our Sinophilism.)
3. Disclose to him those Chinese vital interests which are alleged more important than life itself, so as to preempt a position ahead of time and warn him it is not negotiable.
4. Build up the peculiar uniqueness of Chinese values and conduct (as I am doing here) so as to suggest the dangers of stormy unpredictability, preternatural stubbornness, or other traits of the powerholder, which present the foreigner with insuperable difficulties.
5. Find out the foreigner's friends, enemies, and other circumstances so as to avoid offense to him and also to know where to find allies if necessary to mobilize against him, and so on.
6. Use the foreigner's own rules to control him, especially the Western legal concept of sovereignty, the idea that diplomats are accredited to governments (not to the local people), that domestic matters are beyond foreign question, and so on.

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7. Stir the foreigner's conscience and sense of guilt so that he hamstring himself.

8. Use some foreigners against others, to secure Chinese ends. Thus Chiang Kai-shek has cultivated American supporters of his own military doctrine, and by putting one third of his forces on Quemoy, with American help, he has made the defense of Quemoy probably necessary to the defense of Taiwan. Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung has found a staunch ally against Moscow in the state of Albania.

Behind these tactics, which are of course not really unique, lie certain traditional assumptions of Chinese politics that are rather different from our own:

1. China is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided. All Chinese belong to it.

2. There is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party) are the repository of final power. Popular consent is tacit.

3. Majority rule is mere mobocracy. Men are not equally endowed. The elite should rule. Hence plebiscites are unsound and insulting to dignity.

4. The ruler has a special virtue and prestige, which if maintained prolong his rule. Hence face is necessary to power holding, and criticism (as by a free press) is at once subversive.

5. Rule is personal. Law is not supreme, but a tool of administration. It is loyalty that supports a ruler. Hence civil rights must be limited and law subordinated to personal relations.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OTHER

CHINA

READING

MATERIAL

(F) ppc trip

## INDEX

- A. Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung," Life, April 30, 1971.

Edgar Snow recounts his conversation of December 1970 with Mao Tse-tung in which the Chinese leader confirms your invitation to visit the PRC, and muses on a range of social and political topics.

- B. Edgar Snow, "China Will Talk from a Position of Strength," Life, July 30, 1971.

Snow recounts his December 1970 conversations with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung as they relate to the foreign relations aspect of your meetings with the Chinese leaders.

- C. "Mao Tse-tung and the Party Debate on a Strategy for China's National Development."

An analysis of the policy disputes among CCP leaders during the 1950s and early 1960s over the question of how to modernize peasant China.

- D. "Mao Tse-tung and the Sino-Soviet Dispute."

An historical survey of the origins of conflict between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, and an analysis of the evidence that Mao Tse-tung escalated the dispute with the Russian Communists in the mid-1950s to break China's dependence on the Soviet Union.

- E. "Communist China: An Overview of the Economy"

A CIA analysis of the PRC's resources for economic development, the Chinese pattern of economic growth, and China's role in the world economy.

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- F. Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: Report from China,"  
The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1971.

An Australian political scientist who toured China in the summer of 1971 describes the contemporary condition of Chinese society, and what it is like for a foreigner to tour the country.

- G. Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: China and the World,"  
The Atlantic Monthly, January, 1972.

Mr. Terrill describes the current orientation of China's foreign relations in the context of your forthcoming visit to the PRC.

#### BOOKS

- Dennis Bloodworth, The Chinese Looking Glass.

A Singapore-based British journalist married to a Chinese develops a light-hearted but very perceptive interpretation of Chinese culture and social life.

- John K. Fairbank, The United States and China.

The "dean" of American China scholars' comprehensive survey of China's political traditions, the modern revolutionary movement led first by the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and then the Communists, and the continuing efforts to transform Chinese society under CCP leadership.

Chapters 13, 14, and 18 explore the evolution of America's relations with China over the past 150 years.

- C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World.

A brief essay by a British historian of China's historical place in the world, and Chinese foreign relations during the past century.



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Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, pp. 405-472.

France's Minister for Information under De Gaulle recounts his conversations with Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders on the eve of the Cultural Revolution (1965).

Stuart R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung.

A political biography of Mao which describes in detail the rise to power of the Chinese Communists and Mao's central role in the political movement.

LIFE, 30 April 1971

# A CONVERSATION WITH MAO TSE-TUNG

by **EDGAR SNOW**

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Mr. Snow, author of *Red Star over China* and a number of other books, has known Mao since 1936. He recently returned from a six-month stay in Communist China.

*During a five-hour discourse with me in Peking on Dec. 18 last year, Chairman Mao Tse-tung expressed some of his views on Sino-American, Sino-Russian and other problems of foreign relations as well as on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.*

*The chairman criticized the ritualism of the Mao "personality cult," explained why it had been a necessary nuisance during the Cultural Revolution and forecast its gradual modification. He said that the government of the People's Republic would shortly admit to China some visitors representative of a broad spectrum of American political and press opinion from the right, the middle and the left. He spoke in favor of opening conversations with American officials at the highest level, including Mr. Nixon. He expressed admiration for American achievements in production, science, technology and universal education and said that he held great hopes for the American people as a potential force for good in the world.*

**C**hairman Mao emphasized that he did not wish to be interviewed. What we had was a conversation. Only recently I was able to confirm, however, that he would not object to publication of certain of his comments without the use of direct quotation. During most of our talk, notes were taken by Nancy T'ang, American-born daughter of T'ang

Ming-chao. (Mr. T'ang was editor of the *Overseas Chinese Daily* in New York City until 1949. Since then he has served in China as a leader of cultural and political relations with foreign countries.) One other person was present—a Chinese woman secretary. It was interesting that neither of the young women wore a Mao badge: this was the only occasion on which I met an official when the badge was not on display.

I recorded our dialogue from memory immediately afterward and also was given a copy of Miss T'ang's notes.

Chairman Mao's residence in Peking lies in the southwestern corner of the former Forbidden City, surrounded by vermilion walls and not far from the T'ien-an Men, or Heavenly Peace Gate, where he reviews the October anniversary parade. Behind these high walls, topped by glistening yellow tiles, the old imperial regime also housed its officials. Today members of the Politburo live and work here in close proximity to the chairman and Premier Chou En-lai. One enters through the West Gate, flanked by two armed guards. Circling around an empty wooded drive, one quickly comes to a one-story dwelling of modest size, built in traditional style.

At the entrance one is greeted by two unarmed officers, who wear no insignia of rank. "They are generals," confides Nancy T'ang. How

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does she know? They disappear when the chairman meets me at the door of his study. I apologize for keeping him waiting. I had been asleep when summoned without advance notice.

It was early morning. We had breakfast together and talked until about one o'clock. He was slightly indisposed with a cold and he wondered out loud what doctors were good for; they could not even prevent a simple disease like colds, which cost so much lost time. I mentioned Dr. Linus Pauling—he had heard of him—and his advocacy of large doses of ascorbic acid as a cold panacea. I offered to send him some. He said he would try it. If it helped I would get the credit. If it poisoned him I would not be blamed.

Mao's large study was completely lined with shelves filled by hundreds of Chinese books, with a sprinkling of foreign volumes. From many of them dangled slips of paper used as annotated bookmarks. The large desk was piled high with journals and scripts. It was a working writer's shop. Through the wide windows one could catch a glimpse of garden where the chairman is said to grow his own vegetables and experiment with crops. It is not a "private plot"; it belongs to the state. Perhaps he needs the output, since he is said to have taken a recent cut of 20% in his subsistence "wages."

We discussed my account of our last talk, in January 1965, in which I had reported his acknowledgement that there was indeed a "cult of personality" in China—and moreover there was reason for one. Some people had criticized me for writing about that.

So, he said, what if I had written about a "cult of personality" in China? There was such a thing. Why not write about it? It was a fact . . . those officials who had opposed my return to China in 1967 and 1968 had belonged to an ultraleftist group which had seized the foreign ministry for a time, but they were all cleared out long ago. At the time of our 1965 colloquy, Mao continued, a great deal of power—over propaganda work within the provincial and local party committees, and especially within the Peking Municipal Party Committee—had been out of his control. That was why he had then stated that there was need for more personality cult, in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy.

Of course the personality cult had been overdone. Today, things were different. It was hard, the chairman said, for people to overcome the habits of 3,000 years of emperor-worshipping tradition. The so-called "Four Greats"—those epithets applied to Mao himself: "Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Supreme Commander, Great Helmsman"—what a nuisance. They would all be eliminated sooner or later. Only the word "teacher" would be retained—that is, simply schoolteacher. Mao had always been a schoolteacher and still was one. He was a primary schoolteacher in Changsha even before he was a Communist. All the rest of the titles would be declined.

"I often wonder," I said, "whether those who shout Mao the loudest and wave the most banners are not—as some say—waving the Red Flag in order to defeat the Red Flag."

Mao nodded. He said such people fell into three categories. The first were sincere people. The second were those who drifted with the tide—they conformed because everyone else shouted "Long live." The third category were hypocrites. I was right not to be taken in by such stuff.

I remember," I said, "that just before you entered Peking in 1949 the Central Committee adopted a resolution—reportedly at your suggestion—which forbade naming streets, cities or places for anybody."

Yes, he said, they had avoided that; but other forms of worship had emerged. There were so many slogans. Pictures and plaster statues. The Red Guard had insisted that if you didn't have those things around, you were being anti-Mao. In the past few years there had been need for some personality cult. Now there was no such need and there should be a cooling down.

But after all, he went on, did not the Americans have their own personality cult? How could the governor of each state, how could each President and each Cabinet member, get along without some people to worship them? There was always the desire to be worshiped and the desire to worship. Could you, he asked me, be happy if no one read your books and articles? There was bound to be some worship of the individual and that applied to me too.

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Chairman Mao has obviously pondered very much over this phenomenon—the human need for and to worship, about gods and God. On earlier visits he had discussed it at length. Now, at 76, he was in general good health but once again he said that he would “soon be going to see God.” It was inevitable; everyone eventually had to see God.

“Voltaire wrote that if there were no God it would be necessary for man to invent one,” I said. “If he had expressed himself as an outright atheist it might have cost him his head, in those times.”

Mao agreed that many people had lost their heads for saying much less.

“We have made some progress since then,” I said. “And man has been able to change God’s views on a number of things. One of them is birth control; about that, there is a great change here in China compared with five or 10 years ago.”

No, he said. I had been taken in! In the countryside a woman still wanted to have boy children. If the first and second were girls, she would make another try. If the third one came and was still a girl, the mother would try again. Pretty soon there would be nine of them; the mother was already 45 or so, and she would finally decide to leave it at that. The attitude must be changed but it was taking time. Perhaps the same thing was true in the United States?

“China is ahead in that respect,” I said. “A women’s liberation movement in the United States is making some impact, however. American women were the first to achieve the vote and they are now learning how to use it.”

At this point we were interrupted by the arrival of some glasses of *mao t’ai*, a fiery rice liquor made in Kweichow Province. We drank a toast. To my mortification the chairman noticed that I had omitted to toast the ladies present. How could I have done so? I had not yet accepted women as equals.

It was not possible, said the chairman, to achieve complete equality between men and women at present. But between Chinese and Americans there need be no prejudices. There could be mutual respect and equality. He said he placed high hopes on the peoples of the two countries.

If the Soviet Union wouldn’t do [point the way], then he would place his hopes on the American people. The United States alone had a population of more than 200 million. Industrial production was already higher than in any other country and education was universal. He would be happy to see a party emerge there to lead a revolution, although he was not expecting that in the near future.

In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President.

I, unfortunately, could not represent the United States, he said; I was not a monopoly capitalist. Could I settle the Taiwan question? Why continue such a stalemate? Chiang Kai-shek had not died yet. But what had Taiwan to do with Nixon? That question was created by Truman and Acheson.

It may be relevant to mention—and this is not a part of my talk with Chairman Mao—that foreign diplomats in Peking were aware last year that messages were being delivered from Washington to the Chinese government by certain go-betweens. The purport of such communications was to assure Chinese leaders of Mr. Nixon’s “new outlook” on Asia. Nixon was firmly determined, it was said, to withdraw from Vietnam as speedily as possible, to seek a negotiated international guarantee of the independence of Southeast Asia, to end the impasse in Sino-American relations by clearing up the Taiwan question and to bring the People’s Republic into the United Nations and into diplomatic relations with the United States.

Two important Frenchmen were in China in 1970. The first was André Bettencourt, the minister of planning, the second was Maurice Couve de Murville, premier under De Gaulle’s regime. M. Couve de Murville completed arrangements for a visit to China by General de Gaulle which was to have occurred this year. It was to Gen-

eral de Gaulle, I was authoritatively informed, that Mr. Nixon had first confided his intention to seek a genuine *détente* with China. Some people had anticipated that De Gaulle, during his visit, would play a key role in promoting serious Sino-American conversations. Death ruled otherwise. Chairman Mao's tribute to the general, sent to Mme. de Gaulle, was the only eulogy which he is known to have offered for any non-Communist statesman since Roosevelt died.

Meanwhile, other diplomats had been active. The head of one European mission in Peking, who had already made one trip to see President Nixon, returned to Washington last December. He bypassed the State Department to confer at the White House, and was back in China in January. From another and unimpeachable diplomatic source I learned, not long before my departure from Peking in February, that the White House had once more conveyed a message asking how a personal representative of the President would be received in the Chinese capital for conversations with the highest Chinese leaders. About the same time, I was enigmatically told by a senior Chinese diplomat who had formerly maintained quite the opposite, "Nixon is getting out of Vietnam."

I must once more stress that none of the above background information was provided to me by Mao Tse-tung.

As we talked, the chairman recalled to me once again that it was the Japanese militarists who had taught revolution to the Chinese people. Thanks to their invasion, they had provoked the Chinese people to fight and had helped bring Chinese socialism to power.

I mentioned how Prince Sihanouk had told me a few days before that "Nixon is the best agent for Mao Tse-tung. The more he bombs Cambodia, the more Communists he makes. He is their best ammunition carrier," said the prince. Yes, Mao agreed. He liked that kind of help.

I reminded him that when I had spoken to him two months before, during the October Day parade at T'ien-an Men Square, he had told me that he was "not satisfied with the present situation." I asked him to explain what he meant.

He replied that there were two things of which he highly disapproved during the Cultural Revolution. One was lying. Someone, while saying that the struggle should be carried out by reasoning, not by coercion or force, actually gave the other fellow a kick under the table and then drew back his leg. When the person kicked asked,

"Why did you kick me?" the first person said, "I didn't kick you. Don't you see my foot is still here?" That, Mao said, is lying. Later the conflict during the Cultural Revolution developed into war between factions—first with spears, then rifles, then mortars. When foreigners reported that China was in great chaos, they were not telling lies. It had been true. Fighting was going on. (I was told by Premier Chou on another occasion that the army suffered thousands of casualties before it took up arms to suppress factional struggles.)

The other thing the chairman was most unhappy about was the maltreatment of "captives"—party members and others removed from power and subjected to reeducation. The old practice of the Liberation Army—freeing captives and giving them fares to go home, which resulted in many enemy soldiers being moved to volunteer and join their ranks—had often been ignored. Maltreatment of captives now had slowed the rebuilding and transformation of the party.

If one did not speak the truth, Mao concluded, how could he gain the confidence of others? Who would trust one? The same applied between friends.

"Are the Russians afraid of China?" I asked.

Some people said so, he replied, but why should they be? China's atom bomb was only this size (Mao raised his little finger), while Russia's bomb was that size (he raised his thumb). Together the Russian and American bombs were (putting two thumbs together) that size. What could a little finger do against two thumbs?

"But from the long-range view. Do the Russians fear China?"

It was said that they were a bit afraid, he answered. Even when there are a few mice in a person's room the person could become frightened, fearful that the mice might eat up his sweets. For instance, the Russians were upset because China was building air raid shelters. But if the Chinese got into their shelters, how could they attack others?

As for ideology, who had fired the first shot? The Russians had called the Chinese dogmatists and then the Chinese had called them revisionists. China had published their criticisms, but the Russians had not dared publish China's. Then they had sent some Cubans and later Romanians to ask the Chinese to cease open polemics. That would not do, Mao said. The polemics would have to be carried on for 10,000 years if necessary. Then Kosygin himself had

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come. After their talk Mao had told him that he would take off 1,000 years but no more.

The Russians looked down on the Chinese and also looked down on the people of many countries, he said. They thought that they only had to speak the word and all people would listen and obey. They did not believe that there were people who would not do so and that one of them was his humble self. Although Sino-Russian ideological differences were now irreconcilable—as demonstrated by their contradictory policies in Cambodia—they could eventually settle their problems as between states.

Referring once again to the United States, Chairman Mao said that China should learn from the way America developed, by decentralizing and spreading responsibility and wealth among the 50 states. A central government could not do everything. China must depend upon regional and local initiatives. It would not do (spreading his hands) to leave everything up to him.

As he courteously escorted me to the door, he said he was not a complicated man, but really very simple. He was, he said, only a lone monk walking the world with a leaky umbrella.

*As a result of this and other informal conversations, I believe that in future Sino-American talks, Chairman Mao will surely adhere to the basic principles which have guided China in all her foreign policies, her ideological and world view as well as her regional policies. On the other hand, I also believe that, following an easing of international tensions, China will seek to cooperate with all friendly states, and all friendly people within hostile states, who welcome her full participation in world affairs.* ■

LIFE, July 30, 1971

# China will talk from a position of strength

by EDGAR SNOW

**M**any are the answers and speculations offered to explain why President Nixon sought and accepted an invitation to Peking, but why were the Chinese responsive? Is it forgotten in Peking that Nixon built his early career on witch-hunting and climbed to the Senate and vice-presidency on the backs of "appeasers in the State Department" who sold China to Russia? Why should Mao Tse-tung, with a fierce domestic purge safely behind him, seeing America's Vietnam venture a shambles and believing its political and economic position to be in serious trouble abroad and at home, accept a belated olive branch? And if Nixon is not going to China just to eat shark fins, what may his hosts serve as side dishes—and what may they expect in return?

The question about Nixon has been partly answered for us by Chairman Mao in my earlier report. He told me that Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, should be welcomed simply because at present the problems between China and the U.S. would have to be solved with him. In the dialectical pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people can be made good—by experience and right teaching. Yes, he said to me, he preferred men like Nixon to social democrats and revisionists, those who professed to be one thing but in power behaved quite otherwise.

Nixon might be deceitful, he went on, but perhaps a little bit less so than some others. Nixon resorted to tough tactics but he also used some soft tactics. Yes, Nixon could just get on a plane and come. It would not matter whether the talks would be successful. If he were willing to come, the chairman would be willing to talk to him and it would be all right. It would be all right, whether or not they quarreled, or whether Nixon came as a tourist or as President. He believed they would not quarrel. But of course he would offer criticism of Nixon. The hosts would also make self-criticism and talk about their own mistakes and shortcomings—for instance, their production level was lower than that of the United States.

What has happened since January 1965 to change Mao's mind? At that time I asked the chairman if there was any message I might deliver to President Johnson, and his answer was *Pu-shi* (No!) and nothing more. Even so, Mao said then that one possible solution to the Vietnam conflict still was a new Geneva conference to end the fighting and guarantee Indochina's independence. That message reached the State Department, but the "option" was almost immediately closed out by Johnson's bombing of North Vietnam.

In an unprecedented gesture toward an American, Mao had author Snow at his side last year as he reviewed the October Day parade.

In that 1965 interview Mao had made it clear enough that he did not expect the Americans to desist until they had learned, the hard way, that they could not impose their political will on revolutionary Vietnam by military violence.

The Chinese believe that the lesson of Vietnam, and no mere change of Presidents, is what made it possible for Mao in 1970 to speak differently about Nixon. "Experience" had made Nixon relatively "good." Other major changes had also altered their view: antiwar resistance inside the United States; the formation of an alliance linking Hanoi, the VC and resistance forces in Cambodia and Laos, unilaterally backed by Peking. And there had been changes inside China itself, including the sobering growth of nuclear missiles and delivery capacity.

Theoretically, the Chinese believe, Nixon had various options along the way and did make use of them as tactical threats for a time—as in Cambodia and Laos. But the end was near. Once the decision was taken to get out of Vietnam, clearly a U.S. understanding with China became imperative. The President had not only to safeguard his rear against possible destruction by a China-backed North Vietnam offensive, but also to cope with domestic and world political repercussions of withdrawal.

That was the general view in 1970 from the Heavenly Peace Gate, but preparations continued for the worst. (Bad can also come out of good.)

In the summer of 1969, the Nixon administration had publicly urged an easing of tensions with China; later that year it had stopped the Taiwan Straits patrols and the Chinese took note, of course. The administration also proposed to resume the suspended Warsaw talks at any mutually agreeable time or place. In January 1970 preliminary Sino-American talks opened in Warsaw. They were immediately suspended after the Cambodian invasion. But Nixon went ahead, carried out a stage-by-stage elimination of trade embargoes against China, and lifted travel bans between the two countries. Early this spring a presidential commission advocated a U.N. seat for mainland China, for the first time officially calling it the People's Republic. Peking leaders remained suspicious—especially of a double-cross play between Moscow and Washington.

By late autumn of 1970 several urgent and authentically documented inquiries reaching China had indicated that the President wished to know whether he or his representative would be received in Peking. An indirect answer was contained in an interview given to me by Chou En-lai in November when he said that Sino-American conversations could be opened but only if the Americans demonstrated a "serious" desire to negotiate. To the initiated, "serious" meant, first of all, a realistic attempt to work out a program to deal with the Taiwan problem. As Mao and Chou see it, that was and is the key to all other Asian settlements. Evidently sufficient assurances were forthcoming. When Chou En-lai led my wife and me to stand beside Chairman Mao's side last October, and to be photographed at the anniversary parade, no American had ever been so noticed. Nothing China's leaders do publicly is without purpose. Discerning people realized that something new was happening. Then came the Ping Pong gesture. Chairman Mao had talked to me in December, and after the Ping Pong gesture I was able to report that he would welcome Mr. Nixon or his personal representative to Peking. A new horizon was already in sight.

My LIFE article was translated and widely circulated in China among political and army leaders. They could not, therefore, have been much astonished by the recent Peking-Washington joint announcement. Though China's press may carry only a few lines, the whole subject today is undoubtedly being cautiously discussed and explained down to the commune level. Only one thing may have surprised the Chinese: Mr. Kissinger's success in keeping his visit secret. Experience with American diplomats during World War II had convinced Chinese leaders that Americans could not keep secrets.

The Chinese are, of course, well aware not only of the international impact of Mr. Nixon's plans, but also of the domestic effects and side benefits to his present and future political career. Discussing Nixon's possible visit to China, the chairman casually remarked that the presidential election would be in 1972, would it not? Therefore, he added, Mr. Nixon might send an envoy first, but was not himself likely to come to Peking before early 1972.



By 1970 China had passed through the ordeal of a great purge, much time had been lost in domestic construction, and many fences had to be mended or newly built to end China's international isolation. The period of internal tension was largely over. Now, if there was a chance to recover Taiwan—Mao's last national goal of unification—and for China to be accepted as an equal in recognition of her great size, achievements and potential, why not look at it? Nothing in Mao's thought or teaching ever called for a war against the U.S. or for a war of foreign conquest, and nothing in Mao's ideology places any faith in nuclear bombs. The burden of building bombs and counterattack silos is very heavy indeed and likely to become more so; China has more than once called for their total abolition.

Very high among the reasons why Sino-American rapprochement interests China is to improve her strategic position in dealing with Russia. With America off the Asian continent, the danger of a Soviet-American gang-up dispelled and a seat of her own in the U.N., Peking's maneuvering power would obviously be enhanced.

Did Mr. Kissinger understand, then, that China was ready to talk from a position of strength, not weakness? China's leaders respect Kissinger. They know him through their own intelligence system and through his writing. Discussing him with an old friend and close comrade-in-politics of Premier Chou one evening in Peking, I was struck by his frank delight at the prospect of crossing verbal swords with such a worthy adversary. "Kissinger?" he said. "There is a man who knows the language of both worlds—his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With him it should be possible to talk."

The immediate issues examined at the meeting between Chou and Kissinger—and the agenda ahead—are very concrete and could scarcely have been anything very new to either side. As the Chinese see it, solutions would involve these turning-point decisions for Nixon: (1) seating the People's Republic in the United Nations and the return of Taiwan to mainland sovereignty, (2) total U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and arrangements for an international conference to guarantee Indochina's independence, and for a negotiated Hanoi-Saigon settlement which would preserve some shell of the American-made regime, at least for a decent interval, and (3) the establishment of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations. On all these matters, some rough negotiable script had to be brought back to Nixon to enable him to accept Premier Chou's invitation.

China's formula for Taiwan has always been negotiable whenever American leaders so wished. As repeatedly defined, it requires two steps: first, that the U.S. and China jointly declare their intention to settle all disputes between them, including the Taiwan dispute, by peaceful negotiation. Second, that the U.S. recognize Taiwan as an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic and agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Specific steps on how and when to withdraw would be matters for subsequent discussion.\*

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China contends that the dispute with the U.S. over Taiwan is an international question whereas her interrupted civil war with Chiang Kai-shek is a strictly internal question. Once American agreement to withdraw from Taiwan is conceded in principle, many terms would have to be defined. Peking is likely to be found reasonable in both the procedures for the dissolution of the American position and in dealing with Taiwan itself—perhaps even granting a degree of autonomy to Chiang Kai-shek if he should wish to remain governor there for his lifetime.

China will never publicly renounce what it considers its ultimate sovereign right to recover Taiwan by force if necessary. However, there is now a likelihood that a non-military solution will be worked out by the Nationalists and the Communist Chinese themselves. The opening of serious Sino-American talks may have already provoked renewed covert conversations between Taiwan and Peking in a search for the possible terms of assimilation. That is no doubt one of Nixon's hopes. Mao Tse-tung has pointed out to me that peaceful assimilation of Taiwan is his aim—reminding me of several cases in the Chinese civil war when other provinces acceded without fighting.

Nixon has now declared his readiness to see China seated in the U.N. But he also wishes to retain a seat there for the Taiwan regime. China will not enter the U.N. on that condition. Whether the U.N. members themselves seat Peking and simply drop Taiwan, or whether Taiwan withdraws its delegation in protest, the Chinese believe that Taiwan cannot long function in the U.N. once a majority of its members cease to recognize it.

A settlement in Taiwan obviously cannot be separated, however, from a cease-fire agreement and withdrawal in Vietnam, nor can the latter await the former. Nothing less than total evacuation of all foreign forces from Vietnam will satisfy Peking's Hanoi allies, as indicated by protests already coming from Hanoi and warnings to Peking against Nixon's perfidy. Peking cannot permit Russia to exploit differences of this nature, and it has surely been made clear to Kissinger that no Geneva conference solution can be advanced by China that does not have the full support of Hanoi and the NLF.

Such are the regional issues that must be settled before any across-the-board *détente* can be reached in East Asia and the broader Pacific. To define China's less immediate but parallel aspirations on a global scale is beyond the scope of this report, but that they include continued support for revolutionary struggle—"in the interest of China and the whole world," to quote the new party constitution—is obvious.

On his visit to Peking the President would be entering a nation with which his country has no diplomatic relations and one in which the real chief of state holds no executive office. Meet the party chairman Nixon certainly would, but in all probability Chou would do most of the negotiating.

What sort of man will the President see in Chou En-lai? Chou is clearly one of the world's ablest negotiators. Handsome and exuding charisma, he is, now in his 73rd year, tireless. In August 1967, Chou negotiated his way out of his most perilous moment in the Cultural Revolution. Though idolized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders—some later arrested as counter-revolutionaries—were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee—and Chou himself. Mao and Lin Piao were both absent. By talking to small

groups, day and night, Chou gradually persuaded the masses—so Chou called them in talking to me—to disperse. It was only following that incident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops into the capital, and the disarming and breakup of the Red Guards began in earnest—with heavy casualties.

Kissinger is said to have spent 20 of his 49 hours in Peking talking to the premier. That is nothing extraordinary. One of several interview-conversations I had with him lasted from the dinner table one evening until six the next morning. I was exhausted, he seemingly as fresh as ever. "I must let you get some sleep," I mumbled.

He threw back his head and laughed. "I've already had my sleep," he said. "Now I'm going to work." His night's rest had been a catnap before dinner.

Chou told me that he had taken one vacation—a week when he was ill—in ten years.

Carefully avoiding any thrust for personal power, he has been a zestful worker in pursuit of national and revolutionary power politics. Chou's affable manner masks viscera of tough and supple alloys; he is a master of policy implementation with an infinite capacity for detail. His personal contacts are innumerable. He combines an administrative efficiency hard to reconcile with his ubiquity. His self-effacing dedication makes him Mao's indispensable alter ego.

Symbiosis is perhaps the best word to describe their relationship. Very different in working style and personality, Mao and Chou complement each other as a tandem based on 37 years of trust and interdependence. Chou was never a mandarin but his grandfather was, and he confesses to a feudal background, although he spent 20 years in peasant surroundings as a guerrilla. Mao is a peasant-born intellectual genius to whose intuitive and experienced knowledge of the people Chou habitually defers.

Mao is an activist, a prime mover, an originator and master of strategy achieved by alternating surprise, tension and easement. He distrusts long periods of stability and is never satisfied with the pace of change, but he is practical and capable of great patience in achieving a goal by stages.

Chou welcomes the detailed execution of a plan—which bores Mao—and the more complex the problem the better. Chou quickly cuts to the heart of matters, drops the impractical, dissimulates when necessary, and never gambles—without four aces. Chou works best when the revolutionary pendulum has swung to a point of stability. He is a builder, not a poet.

In talks I have had with China's two great men it usually is Chou who meticulously answers the main questions and Mao who listens, adds a few words of caution or elucidation, and enlarges the broad and dialectical view. Chou attends countless large banquets, apparently with relish. Mao detests feasts and prefers small groups. Chou is an epicure but eats frugally, Mao likes simple food cooked in the hotly seasoned Hunan style. Both men drink very little, and each is highly disciplined in his own style. In negotiating with President Nixon, Chou will probably do the nitty-gritty work, in close collaboration with Mao behind the scenes. But the final decisions will be Mao's.

Whatever the Chinese may think of Nixon's motives, he has earned their appreciation by the courtesy of coming to see them, thereby according prestige to Mao Tse-tung and *amour-propre* to the whole people. Vassal kings of the past brought tributes to Peking, but never before the head of the world's most powerful nation. The gesture in itself may go far to assuage the rancor and resentment accumulated during the past two decades. There is some risk that the gesture could be misinterpreted to the Americans' disadvantage, but more likely it will be accepted with full grace and improve chances of mutual accommodation.

The millennium seems distant and the immediate prospect is for the toughest kind of adjustment and struggle. China must satisfy Korea and Vietnam, and the U.S. cannot jettison Japan. The danger is that Americans may imagine that the Chinese are giving up Communism—and Mao's world view—to become nice agrarian democrats. A more realistic world is indeed in sight. But popular illusions that it will consist of a sweet mix of ideologies, or an end to China's faith in revolutionary means, could only serve to deepen the abyss again when disillusionment occurs. A world without change by revolutions—a world in which China's closest friends would not be revolutionary states—is inconceivable to Peking. But a world of relative peace between states is as necessary to China as to America. To hope for more is to court disenchantment. ■

MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE PARTY DEBATE  
ON A STRATEGY FOR CHINA'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution purge of high leaders of the Chinese Communist Party represents, in part, the culmination of more than a decade of debate over the most appropriate policies for modernizing peasant China. What began in the mid-1950s as disagreement over economic policy evolved into a conflict of basic differences in the conception of a "socialist transformation" for Chinese society. By the early 1960s this debate began to pass into matters of personal authority; and in 1964 Mao raised the issue of succession to his leadership. The aging Party Chairman had come to fear that his policies would be repudiated by long-time Party colleagues, just as Khrushchev had repudiated Stalin. The succession issue directly shaped Mao's Cultural Revolution purge of the Party, and continues to be a major source of contention within the post-Cultural Revolution leadership. It is likely that this issue is at the center of the current instability evident within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

This memorandum summarizes the main lines of debate within the CCP leadership over the question of a strategy of national development, and points out how Mao Tse-tung's forceful political initiatives of the 1950s led other Party leaders to attempt to restrict the Party Chairman's power in the early 1960s -- thus setting the stage for the Cultural Revolution.

The CCP came into power in 1949 with only vague notions of how Chinese society could be modernized. CCP leaders had defeated the Nationalists more rapidly than anticipated in three years of civil war; and as revolutionaries committed to the Communist vision of society they instinctively turned to the Soviet Union to provide a guiding model of national development. As Party leaders shifted from military operations to economic management, however, they gained practical experience which gradually called into question the relevance of the Soviet model for China's development problems. Mao Tse-tung "led" other Party <sup>the</sup> leaders in his early questioning of the Soviet development experience, and in <sup>the</sup> search for an alternative suited to Chinese conditions.

Between 1949 and 1953 the Communists used their armies and the Party bureaucracy to dismantle the remnant organizations of Nationalist rule, and to destroy the power of the landlords in China's vast rural hinterland. In 1953 the Party quietly initiated its first Five Year Plan, which drew inspiration from the Soviet precedent. The CCP created a centrally-directed economy, and a governmental bureaucracy to implement Party policy. The Party's basic commitment was to industrialization; and the assumption was that development of a modern industrial sector through technical and organizational reform would establish the basis for bringing China's peasants -- more than 80% of the population -- into the modern world. Industry was to lead agriculture, and most capital investment in the First Five Year Plan was allocated to heavy industry.

In 1955, however, the goals of the First Five Year Plan had to be revised downward, for the agricultural sector was unable to meet its planned targets, thus hindering capital investment in industry. The Party gradually came to see that low agricultural productivity constituted the bottleneck to China's economic development. Without major increases in the level of productivity of China's peasants, there would be insufficient food to cope with population growth. And without substantial increases in per/acre grain yields it would be difficult to feed a growing urban population, turn over agricultural lands to the production of raw materials for light industry (such as cotton for textiles, or oil-bearing crops for secondary processing), and earn foreign exchange through the sale abroad of rice and other agricultural products.

In an important speech of July 1955, Mao challenged the relevance of the Soviet precedent for China's development problems. He criticized the "industry first" approach and the view that increases in agricultural productivity would have to await technological modernization -- also a function of industrialization. Mao asserted that the Party could use its revolutionary political experience to mobilize China's one great resource -- her underemployed and inefficient labor force -- through political and social means to bring about increases in agricultural productivity. Mao's views were resisted, however, by a state bureaucracy and urban-oriented governmental planning system committed to a technical and industry-first approach to modernization. Mao expressed concern with Party "conservatism." Fearing that the lessons of the revolution would be lost, the Party Chairman succeeded in the fall of 1955 in prodding the Party to mobilize the peasantry in forming elementary collective farms and managing, through political means, an effort to bring about a "leap forward" in agricultural productivity. The state bureaucracy was shunted aside as politics and the Party took command.

Mao's initiative was successful, and in early 1956 the Chairman followed on his efforts of the preceding fall with the promulgation of a twelve-year program for agricultural development. Mao further demanded that the

collective farms be enlarged into advanced stage Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives. Against growing resistance from other Party leaders, Mao's plans were put into effect.

Khrushchev's February 1956 attack on Stalin and the "cult of personality" radically changed the atmosphere within the CCP, bringing to the surface fears of a Maoist "cult of personality." Party leaders who objected to Mao's forceful leadership and his economic development strategy acquired the leverage to restrict the Party Chairman's influence in a context of "collective leadership." In April of 1956, the drive to form Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives was criticized. Efforts were initiated to consolidate the changes in rural life of the preceding fall and winter, and to reaffirm the "industry first" approach to economic development. In frustration at this restriction of his leadership, Mao twice swam across the Yangtze River in the spring, and wrote a poem on "Swimming" in which he said "better this [swimming the Yangtze] than leisurely pacing home courtyards." Political divisions within the leadership had been established which, in time, would lead to Mao's July 1966 swim in the Yangtze, and to his Cultural Revolution purge of Party opponents.

Into the fall of 1956 efforts were made to speed the pace of China's economic development by encouraging the country's precious few skilled intellectuals -- less than 4 million out of a total population of about 600 million -- to lend their efforts to the industrialization drive. Mao has a long record of distrust of the intellectuals; and in the fall of 1956 his concern with the Party's urban-oriented development program -- and the "alliance" with the intellectuals that it required -- was confirmed in his eyes by the disturbances in Poland and the Hungarian uprising against Communist Party rule. Mao now claimed to Party leaders that a "cult of personality" was not the problem facing China, but bureaucratic conservatism and the Party's "alliance" with the intellectuals which -- he asserted -- had led to the Hungarian upheaval.

In early 1957 Mao attempted to confront this problem in a campaign to "let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought content" -- in fact an effort to establish a critical dialogue between Party bureaucrats and intellectuals which would expose conservatism and bureaucratic behavior on the part of the former, and "anti-socialist" attitudes held by the latter. As has long been the case, Mao asserted that China's development could only be promoted through controlled "class struggle."

The "Hundred Flowers" strategy was undermined in the late spring of 1957 by a Party bureaucracy that resisted public criticism of its errors, and by criticism from the intellectuals which challenged the very foundations of

Communist Party rule. While Mao's policy of a disciplining dialogue between Party and intellectuals was discredited, the Chairman was able to assert to other leaders that the Party bureaucracy -- by its resistance to criticism -- needed further "rectification." He also stressed that a national development strategy which placed reliance on politically unreliable intellectuals would only create further problems for China. As in 1955-1956, Mao asserted that the Party had to deal with the basic problem of low peasant productivity if it was to spur economic development.

The fall of 1957 and first half of 1958 saw the evolution of Mao's ultimate conception of a development strategy for China. The core of what came to be called the Great Leap Forward was the People's Commune, a self-contained economic and political organization for China's peasants. The Communes grew from township-scale amalgamations of Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives, which placed approximately 20,000 peasants under unified political and economic management. Each Commune was to be self-reliant in investment capital -- accumulated from local savings -- and was to maximize the application of labor power by organizing the peasant work force into quasi-military "production brigades." The Communes were further integrated into Mao's new national defense policy of 1958 by combining militia organization with the production brigades to form a self-contained and decentralized structure of Chinese society. Through the Commune concept, Mao's propagandists asserted in the summer of 1958, China's people would soon realize Communism. Through the Great Leap Forward, Mao told the Party leadership, China's industry and agriculture would be able to develop simultaneously at such a rapid pace that the country would be able to surpass the British in GNP within fifteen years.

Mao pressed the organization of People's Communes throughout China's countryside in September of 1958, fearful that resistance from more cautious Party leaders would undermine support for his concept of a way to organize Chinese society for the "transition to socialism" -- as had happened in 1956. The speed, and concomitant lack of planning, with which the Communes were formed, however, came to be part of their undoing. Party cadres were inept at the new tasks of large scale management. Fearful of political reprisals, they grossly inflated their production figures. The peasants, still committed to family-centered agriculture, resisted the organization of "production brigades." By the summer of 1959 it was becoming evident that Mao's Great Leap in fact was generating a great production disaster.

In July of 1959 China's Defense Minister, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, sought to mobilize opinion within the Party leadership against Mao's Great Leap policies. P'eng's move was given weight by the signs of a growing production crisis, and

by Soviet anger at Mao's defense policies and the Chairman's claim that China was near to realizing Communism (and by implication, before the Soviet Union). Mao was able to mobilize a counter-attack with the support of other leaders, and had the critical Defense Minister removed from office; but in the deepening economic crisis -- which reached its low point in 1962, when tens of thousands of peasants, in fear of starvation, fled into Hong Kong -- Mao found his political influence seriously eroded. In the depth of the Great Leap crisis some leaders encouraged intellectuals to write veiled satires of Mao, criticizing him for acting like a dictatorial emperor and failing to consider the interests of the peasantry or the importance of friendship with the Soviet Union for China's national development and defense.

In these circumstances Mao retreated, in part to build a base of support within the army. More cautious leaders directed the economic recovery from the Great Leap, largely by allowing the peasants greater individual freedom and private land. Party policy shifted to emphasizing agriculture as the foundation of the national economy, with industrialization given a second-order priority.

By 1962, however, Mao once again became actively concerned about the loss of his authority within the Party, and with the increasing dissolution of the Communes in the countryside. At a series of leadership meetings in the summer of 1962, the Party Chairman called for renewed "class struggle," and for strengthening Party leadership in the Communes. Other leaders superficially went along with Mao's further initiative, but they began to actively resist his policies in application. The divergencies within the leadership began to grow into a basic conflict over organizational power. By 1964 Mao felt he had sufficient political support from the army to begin to challenge his opposition within the Party. This he did by indirectly raising the issue of succession, thus hoping to divide the most powerful Party leaders on the one issue where his remaining prestige gave him great political leverage. By this strategy Mao was able to fragment his opposition and one-by-one remove key leaders from power beginning in late 1965.

In July of 1966 Mao felt his position sufficiently secure to challenge the entire Party and state bureaucracy. The Chairman swam in the Yangtze again, as a sign of his enduring political vigor and a symbolic expression of his determination to challenge the Party leaders who, since 1956, had resisted his program for modernizing peasant China. Matters of economic development were shelved as the Chairman confronted the elemental problem of political power.

At present the lingering leadership problems of the Cultural Revolution seem



to be the primary focus of China's rulers. The internal crisis of August-September 1971 seems basically related to conflict between military and civilian Party leaders over the distribution of power within Chinese society, and the still-unresolved question of Mao's successor.

China's economy was able to operate rather autonomously during the Cultural Revolution struggle, with only temporary production dislocations resulting from disruptions of the transportation network and episodes of "class struggle" in the urban centers. There was not, however, a basic disruption of the economy such as occurred during the Great Leap Forward. There have been recent references to a Fourth Five Year Plan, but no such plan has been given formal publication or approval. China seems to lack a sense of overall economic coordination and the kind of concerted drive for production goals which characterized the economy in the 1950s. The People's Communes remain semi-active organizational structures in the countryside, but with the villages--the old Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives--apparently the center of rural management. The central economic managers appear to be focussing their attention on key industrial projects related to national defense.

When China will resume a more active and coordinated effort to develop the economy, and whether Mao's organizational and investment concepts of the Great Leap period will shape such an effort, remain questions which will probably be answered only after the current state of leadership crisis has passed.

## MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Evidence of a serious breakdown in China's alliance with the Soviet Union began to accumulate in the early 1960s; and in 1969 a series of armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border brought the two major powers of the "socialist camp" to the verge of open warfare. China's current openness to the United States, coming as it does in the context of this military confrontation with the Russians--and in the wake of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia--implies that fear of a Russian invasion is a major element motivating the present "thaw" in Sino-American relations. There is thus an important contemporary point of convergence in Chinese and American views of the world in the concern (long held in the United States) with the Soviet Union as an "imperialist" power. Indeed, since 1969 Chinese polemics have described the Soviet Union as a "social imperialist" state--that is, a socialist country that has taken the road of imperialist aggression.

This memorandum summarizes the long history of tension between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties, and presents the recent historical evidence--derived from Cultural Revolution documents--that Mao Tse-tung himself was responsible for the worsening of relations between China and the Soviet Union beginning in the late 1950s.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded with the guidance of the Comintern (Communist International, based in Moscow) in Shanghai in 1921. Two years later the Comintern advised the small CCP to establish a "united front" with the more powerful Nationalist Party of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin wanted a strongly nationalistic government in China which would exclude foreign influence--primarily British and Japanese--and thus protect the young Soviet Union against its "capitalist" enemies. The CCP entered into this united front reluctantly and at Russian insistence. The Chinese Communists feared that their party would be swallowed by the larger Nationalist movement. By 1927, however, the Communists had become sufficiently powerful that Chiang Kai-shek, fearing that his CCP "allies" would take over the Nationalist Party from within, launched an armed suppression of the Communists. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders of the CCP fled to safety in the mountains of south China; but tens of thousands of Communists were killed by Chiang's armies in coastal and inland cities.

By 1930 the remnant leadership of the CCP had built an army in the rural areas of south China beyond Chiang Kai-shek's control. Stalin continued to attempt to direct the CCP by sending a group of young Chinese students trained in Moscow back to China to take over Party leadership. Mao Tse-tung found his growing authority within the CCP undercut by these "returned students." Guided by Comintern agents, these Moscow-trained Chinese reversed Mao's relatively cautious political and military policies in an effort to speed up the pace of their revolution. This radical leadership provoked renewed Nationalist military actions against the CCP in the early 1930s, and by 1934 Chiang Kai-shek's armies were almost able to destroy the Communist base of operations, and the Party's military forces, in south China. Mao Tse-tung and other leaders once again fled Chiang's armies in what they term the "Long March" to safety in China's northwest provinces bordering on the Soviet Union.

In 1937 the Japanese attack on China prevented Chiang Kai-shek from destroying the remnant CCP leadership; and Stalin again urged the Communists to enter into a "united front" of national resistance with Chiang Kai-shek in order to prevent Japan from gaining control of China at Soviet expense. Mao and other CCP leaders superficially followed Stalin's advice; but there was no real cooperation between the CCP and the Nationalists in the fight to defeat the Japanese. During this period Stalin repeatedly gave semi-public evidence of his displeasure with Mao and the Chinese Communists. For example, in a talk with Averell Harriman the Soviet ruler characterized the CCP leaders as "margarine Communists," that is, not genuine revolutionaries, only peasant rebels.

With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, Stalin advised Mao that the CCP should not use its army to wage a civil war against the Nationalists. As Mao recalled to Party leaders in a speech of 1962: "Stalin tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying there should not be any civil war and that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek." As in earlier periods, Stalin feared that civil war in China would draw in outside powers hostile to the Soviet Union--in this case the United States, which continued to support Chiang Kai-shek. Mao rejected Stalin's advice, however; and with the failure of General Marshall's efforts to mediate a cease-fire between the Nationalists and the CCP in 1946, the Communist armies attacked and defeated the Nationalist forces in three years of civil war.

When the People's Republic of China was founded in October of 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that his country would "lean to one side," that China would become a member of the Soviet-led "socialist camp." Why did Mao turn to Stalin, given the clear record of the previous three decades of bad Soviet advice to the CCP, and Stalin's distrust of Mao as its leader?

Three reasons seem to account for this paradoxical situation: First, Mao's attempts in 1944-1945 to initiate contacts with President Roosevelt in an effort to gain U.S. support for the Communists in the war against Japan had led to nothing. Mao interpreted the exclusive American support for Chiang Kai-shek as hostility to the CCP; and in 1949 Mao very likely feared that the U.S. would continue to be hostile to the newly founded People's Republic of China. His turn to the Soviet Union thus was in part an effort to protect the People's Republic from anticipated U.S. opposition. Second, Mao and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist movement deeply believed that the Soviet approach and experience in national development represented the most appropriate way to modernize China. Hence, the alliance with the USSR represented commitment to the path of "socialist transformation" in their efforts to make peasant China an industrial state. Third, in 1949 Stalin had great prestige within the Chinese Communist Party, as in the International Communist Movement at large. The Russian leader had the power to influence any struggle for leadership within the CCP. Given Stalin's demonstrated reserve in supporting Mao in past years, Mao very likely feared that without public acceptance of Stalin's role as leader of the International Communist Movement, Stalin might repudiate his leadership of the CCP. At least the Soviet leader might seek to influence internal CCP leadership struggles against him, as he had done in the past. Thus, Mao's continued support for Stalin had the quality of an effort to gain Stalin's approval for his leadership of the CCP.

Stalin's backing, however, was at best grudgingly given. Mao went to Moscow in December 1949 to negotiate a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with the Russian leaders. But as Mao recalled, this effort to establish the Sino-Soviet alliance involved "a struggle:" [Stalin] did not want to sign the treaty, but finally agreed to do so after two months of negotiations." Mao asserted that he finally gained Stalin's confidence when Chinese troops were committed to the Korean War. "He [Stalin] finally believed that we were not going to be another Yugoslavia, and that I would not be another Tito [for breaking away from Soviet leadership]." When Stalin died in 1953, Mao had thus succeeded in gaining Soviet protection against "imperialist" attack, was publicly committed to Stalin's policies of national development, and had gained the Soviet leader's approval of his leadership of the CCP.

Stalin's death left Mao a senior figure in the International Communist Movement, as well as the leader of the world's largest Communist Party and country. In 1954 Mao made his prestige felt when he gave backing to Nikita Khrushchev, then struggling to win out in the succession crisis precipitated by Stalin's death. Mao was soon to regret his support of Khrushchev.

In 1956 Khrushchev, in an effort to undercut Stalin's political heirs and consolidate his leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, launched a secret attack on the dead dictator and his "cult of personality." This criticism of Stalin came at a time when Mao Tse-tung had been pressing a reluctant Chinese Communist Party to adopt radical agricultural policies in order to stimulate a lagging economic development program. Given Mao's close public identification with the now-discredited Stalin, Chinese leaders opposed to Mao's policies were able to restrict his leadership amid fears of a Maoist "cult of personality" and in a context of "collective leadership." Khrushchev's attack on Stalin thus constituted a great personal embarrassment for Mao, for it undercut his authority within the CCP. Mao has dated the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute from the time of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 gave Mao an issue to throw back at his critics within the CCP, and at Khrushchev. In the wake of this uprising Mao claimed that corruption of a Communist Party by bureaucratism, not a leader's "cult of personality," was responsible for the Hungarian events, and for less serious disturbances in Poland. Mao thus gained political leverage over Party bureaucrats who had opposed his agricultural policies. This was to be used by Mao in shaping the 1957-1958 public criticism of "bureaucratism" and "rightist conservatism" within the CCP known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Internationally, Mao sent Chou En-lai to Eastern Europe in early 1957 to mediate between the Soviets and the now more independent-minded satellite Communist Parties. Khrushchev was angered by this Chinese diplomatic initiative, fearing that it represented Chinese efforts to undercut Soviet leadership of the Bloc.

Late 1957 was the onset of the most critical period of testing in the increasingly tense Sino-Soviet relationship. Khrushchev attempted to gain Mao's support for his leading role in the International Communist Movement by offering the Chinese leader a nuclear sharing agreement, an offer which carried the added weight of the recent Soviet "Sputnik" breakthrough in an ICBM delivery capability. Mao at this time was willing to affirm Khrushchev's leadership of the Bloc, but only on the terms that the Russian Party, in fact, exercise active leadership in support of the national goals of its allies. For Mao this was to involve efforts to have the Soviets back his initiative of the fall of 1958 to confront the Nationalist and U.S. over the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

While we do not know all of the politicking which went on between Mao and Khrushchev in 1958, the evidence is clear that in the spring of that year Mao urged the Chinese military establishment to free itself of Soviet controls and develop an independent nuclear capability--even at the price of alienating Soviet support. Mao was highly distrustful of the impulsive Khrushchev, and wanted to show his colleagues within the CCP that the Soviets were unreliable allies in matters of China's national defense. As planning for the Taiwan Strait confrontation progressed in the summer of 1958 Khrushchev secretly journeyed to China to dissuade Mao from provoking a confrontation which risked a Soviet-American clash. Mao appears to have told Khrushchev that he could confront the Nationalists without direct Soviet assistance, and without the danger of drawing in the U.S. Mao pressed ahead with the military adventure, apparently confident that he could undermine U.S. support for the Nationalists, and show Khrushchev that the United States was a "paper tiger." The failure of Mao's gamble, however, only infuriated Khrushchev and increased the Chairman's political vulnerability within the CCP.

In the summer of 1959 Mao's military and economic policies were attacked by the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, at a leadership conference in south China. Khrushchev may have encouraged the Chinese Defense Minister in his criticism of Mao's policies, for P'eng had met with the Soviet leader in Eastern Europe shortly before his attack on Mao. Subsequent criticism of P'eng asserted that he had "colluded with a foreign power" in his attack on the Party Chairman. While Mao was able to defeat the Defense Minister's challenge to his policies--and have him removed from office, to be replaced by Lin Piao--relations between Mao and Khrushchev were at the breaking point.

The final breakdown in personal relations between the two leaders occurred in September-October 1959. Khrushchev came to China to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China right after his meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David. At the official anniversary banquet Khrushchev indirectly criticized Mao's military adventure of the previous year in the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese later recalled that Khrushchev had tried to "read them a lesson" about the dangers of testing by force the stability of the capitalist world. Foreign accounts of the anniversary banquet recall that when Khrushchev voiced his veiled criticism of Mao's policies, Mao turned his back on the Soviet leader.

While Mao's difference with Khrushchev had their personal dimension, the basis of the dispute lay in conflicting national policies, and in the manner in which Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and his advocacy of a "peaceful coexistence" line in international relations were undercutting Mao's position within the CCP. These political differences broke into view in early 1960 with indirect public criticism in the Chinese press of Soviet "revisionism." Mao had made a basic decision to protect his leadership of the CCP and undermine the possible appeal of Soviet-style "peace" policies within China by launching a vigorous campaign against Khrushchev's policies. Khrushchev responded to Mao's challenge first by breaking the nuclear sharing agreement of 1957, and then, in the summer of 1960, by withdrawing all Soviet aid advisers from China. The Sino-Soviet split was now a fact.

Into the early 1960s public recriminations between the Chinese and Soviets gave increasing evidence of the depth of bitterness now dividing the two Communist powers. The Russians attempted to convene a meeting of the International Communist Movement to criticize and expel the Chinese, but were unable to gain substantial backing from other Communist Parties who feared that a permanent split in the International Movement would undermine their own struggles for power. In 1964 Khrushchev's fall from power further strengthened Mao's position in the dispute between the two countries; yet within the CCP other leaders were increasingly distraught at the costs to China not only of the dispute with the Soviets, but also the damage wrought to the country's political and economic life by Mao's Great Leap Forward policies. Mao was finding himself resisted by other Party leaders. To reverse this trend Mao turned increasingly to the army for political backing.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in late 1964 brought these international and domestic political tensions to a head. Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese leaders opposed to Mao's policies appear to have called for "united action" by Bloc countries against the increasing U.S. military presence. These leaders knew that Mao was relying on the People's Liberation Army as his base of power, and they had inklings that he was thinking of a purge of his opponents within the CCP. Thus their call for "united action" with the Soviets represented an effort to pull the army into a more active national defense posture--and out of Mao's hands as an instrument of domestic political conflict.

Mao, however, resisted these pressures, and in the late summer of 1965--apparently confident that the United States would limit its involvement in Vietnam short of directly threatening China's security,--the Party Chairman initiated his "Cultural Revolution" attack on the Party. The fact that in this

purge Mao characterized Liu Shao-ch'i as "China's Khrushchev" gives some idea of how much Mao had come to fear repudiation of his leadership by Chinese leaders, just as Khrushchev had repudiated Stalin. The Sino-Soviet dispute and Mao's effort to preserve his leadership within the CCP had become fully intertwined.

The transformation of the Sino-Soviet conflict from a political to a military confrontation occurred gradually during the 1960s. The Soviets watched with increasing dismay as Mao's 1958 national defense policy of independence from the Soviet Union acquired greater reality, in 1964, through the successful test of a nuclear device. Tensions along the Sino-Soviet border increased in the early 1960s with armed clashes resulting from the movement of minority nationalities across the heretofore unguarded frontier. And as the Cultural Revolution increased in intensity, the Soviets began a military buildup on the Chinese border, in part as a cautionary move against the militant and unpredictable Mao, and in part as an effort to strengthen the hand of those Chinese leaders less hostile to the Soviet Union by making fully apparent to the CCP the costs of Mao's "anti-Soviet" policies. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia only increased Chinese distrust of Russian intentions; and in early 1969 the Chinese apparently provoked a limited military clash along the disputed Ussuri River border in order to show their determination to resist Soviet pressures. Mao may also have intended this clash to call the world's attention to the Soviet military buildup, and to undermine Soviet support in the Eastern European countries still fearful of Russian intentions in the wake of the Czech invasion. Subsequent to this initial border clash, the Soviets escalated the military confrontation, bringing the two countries to the verge of war in the summer of 1969.

At present the Sino-Soviet dispute remains suspended in an uncertain state of neither peace nor war. Talks between the two governments to resolve the border dispute continue without resolution of outstanding issues. The Soviet military buildup on China's northern border continues, with a present strength of over 40 divisions and nearly 400,000 troops. Trade between the two countries is at a low level, but continues. Relations between the two Communist Parties are virtually non-existent. As long as Mao lives, it is most unlikely that the present situation will take a dramatic turn for the better, inasmuch as for more than a decade the Chinese leader has sought to prevent "revisionism" within China by confronting Soviet "revisionism". There is indirect, but mounting, evidence that in the CCP leadership crisis of August-September 1971 military leaders may have pressed for an easing of China's hostility toward the Soviet Union. Mao apparently remained unyielding in his opposition to Russian "revisionism"--and in his effort to



balance the Sino-Soviet confrontation with an easing of Sino-American tensions. While efforts to moderate the dispute short of war seem in China's interest--and perhaps may be intensified by Mao's successors, who will be less committed to an anti-Soviet position--the dispute between the two Communist powers has passed well beyond a leadership conflict to one of a rivalry of nations.

This rivalry will continue to be based in the political and military confrontation dividing the two parties; yet given China's growing nuclear potential, and the costs to the Soviets of a land invasion of China (brought home to them, no doubt, by the U.S. experience in Vietnam), the Sino-Soviet dispute seems likely to be played out in the coming decade indirectly, in peripheral political and geographical regions. Three arenas of conflict seem most likely to contain this evolving dispute: rivalry within the International Communist Movement; competition for influence in third-country areas between the two major powers, primarily in Asia, the Middle East/Africa, and Eastern Europe; and an evolving balance in the "super-power triangle" of the U.S. /China/USSR.

Developments in the International Communist Movement over the past year indicate continued jockeying between the Russians and Chinese for influence and support for their positions. The Chinese have made significant gains among the Balkan Parties, primarily the Yugoslavs and Roumanians. They can be expected to actively continue their efforts to erode Soviet support in Eastern Europe--just as the Russians are attempting to improve their relations with European states in order to free their Western flank for military and political operations directed against China. The Chinese recently have gained influence at Soviet expense with the North Koreans; but in the process they have driven the North Vietnamese somewhat closer to Moscow. This vying for influence among both ruling and nonruling Communist Parties is likely to continue, with marginal effect on the political positions of both powers.

A more substantial area of rivalry will be in third-countries where Russian and Chinese defense, economic, and political interests clash. At present the India-Pakistan conflict holds the greatest danger of dragging the Soviets and Chinese into a direct confrontation over a peripheral military rivalry. Chinese fear of such an eventuality is indicated by reluctance to sign a defense treaty with the Pakistanis (as the Russians recently did with the Indians), and by heightened military activity in Tibet.

Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East and Africa continues to intensify. The Russians undoubtedly view access to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal as an important objective in their efforts to outflank China from the south.

Their efforts seem intended to increase the Russian sea-borne military presence and influence in India and Southeast Asian states. The Chinese, despite limited economic resources, at present are increasing their efforts to rival the Soviets in Africa--as is indicated by their recent hosting of Haile Selassie and the aid agreement they signed with his Government, as well as their activities in the Sudan and Tanzania--in an apparent move to undercut Russian access to the Indian Ocean and political influence in the region.

In the Far East, the Sino-Soviet rivalry is only beginning to move to a more active level; but in the coming years it can be expected to manifest itself in rivalry for influence with the Japanese. Soviet willingness to discuss ownership of the disputed "northern territories" with Japan will be an important bellwether of their concern with China. Taiwan itself may become involved in this dimension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. In 1969 the Soviets sent a semi-public agent to the island on an exploratory mission, apparently intended to further unnerve the Chinese about possible outflanking moves against them. While a ROC-Soviet relationship did not develop, there are current signs that growing Nationalist Chinese distrust of the U.S. may incline them to seek safeguards to their security through the Russians (or Japanese), as was attempted in earlier treaty arrangements between the ROC and USSR.

The third major factor influencing the future Sino-Soviet relationship is the U.S. itself. Our position as a "balancer" in the evolving triangular relationship among the superpowers, and our influence in third-country areas such as Japan, Taiwan, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East/Africa, will have a major role to play in shaping the future rivalry between the two giants of the Communist world.

# THE 800,000,000

## Report From China

by Ross Terrill

The China we do not know is opening to view, albeit slowly and selectively. Back from his second extended visit to the mainland, Professor Terrill, a native Australian now teaching at Harvard, tells what life is like in China today.

**S**himmering mirage, a China is conjured in our minds by scraps of news and speculation. Devilishly well organized; neat and regimented; striding ahead to overtake Russia and America; clean, abstemious; an army of sexless puppets, their daily life an incarnation of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Absence from China feeds the mirage. Fear, buttressed by ignorance, hints that China is formidable, or awful, or awfully formidable. How cunning those Chinese are! Do they not constantly surprise us? Such sacrifice of indulgence today for glory tomorrow!

We can be like Voltaire, philosophic China-watcher of another age. Sitting in Paris, he spun a mental tapestry of China less from facts than from disenchantment with the Europe of his day. The picture of Confucius in his study was a totem; maybe our pictures of Mao are too. As if the Chinese millions were mere moving illustrations of a Concept. Walk-on actors in a Drama of Historical Optimism or a Drama of Historical Pessimism!

The actual world of sweat and cicadas, boiled rice and bicycles, is a bit more complex. After seven years, I was back again. Did the mirage lift for a moment? Instead of "China," here were rivers and mountains, and people getting up, working, eating, singing, arguing, planning, going to bed. Not objects for investigation, but situations, in which I seemed to be involved only a little less than the people around

Of course a visit has its illusions, as does absence. You feel the human simplicities of China too acutely.

You get talking to Shanghai citizens about bringing up children, to a professor in Peking about how he teaches modern history. As if you and they stood on the same ground, wrestling with the social problems of the 1970s and the human dilemmas of all time. That is illusory. For while we remain grouped in nation-states, as long as East Asia remains a place of collision between American substance and Chinese shadow, China is another world. Mao rules them; Nixon rules us. Our human solidarity is at the mercy of what they cook up between them. You leave Canton, cross the border at Shumchun, and China again becomes "China." One corner of the triangle of hope and terror, the United States, Russia, and China. Stage play of Communism, before the beaming portrait of Chairman Mao. Belly of real estate at the southeast tip of Eurasia, which fifty nuclear bombs could turn into charcoal and gas within a week.

But the separateness is not forever. The strangeness of China is not objective, like that of the platypus. Separateness and strangeness both stem from the past relationship between China and ourselves. Here there are changes; will soon be more. Countries' "images" of each other can depart terribly from fact. U.S.-Chinese relations give rich illustration. Yet international politics and our human existence do play out a crazy dialectic. It means that visiting China has its bit of the future to reflect. "Being there," like waking up at 3 A.M., gives its own special angle on the totality of things.

Being in China in 1971 means realizing that although in the United States Vietnam looms large on our mental screens, with China a big country behind Vietnam, in Peking Vietnam fades into one of many countries down beyond the Middle Kingdom's southern provinces. It means observing that chance and distraction fleck Chinese politics no less than ours; a Foreign Ministry official remarked, when Peking in late June did a long (and favorable) commentary on the Common Market: "During the Cultural Revolution we rather neglected the Common

## Our socialist country will not be controlled by anyone.

**Market:** now we're catching up and getting our position straight."

Being in China means fielding queries at a university in Sian about how we dealt, at Harvard in the spring of 1970, with the question of giving or not giving grades and exams to students who went on strike because of the invasion of Cambodia. It means finding propaganda less depressing when spoken than when one reads it from afar on the printed page, because people do not always mean what they say, and when they do mean it, do not always believe it. You read a tirade about the high tide of African revolution; then next day a Chinese diplomat who has worked in Africa remarks on the immaturity of African movements and their inability to make revolution as China made it. Paraphrasing the ancient writer Sun Tze, he smiles: "They don't know themselves and they don't know the enemy; that's the trouble."

To be there is to recall—did I need the reminder?—that Chinese cooking is not just a "great cuisine of the world," but a daily joy to 800 million and the major factor in any calculation of bright and dark sides to the Chinese people's life in 1971. To hear a high official say, when speaking of Western leftists who stay away from Taiwan for reasons of conscience: "They should go, see what the place is like. When foreign leftists come to Peking, I urge them not to stay away from Moscow, but to stop over there and look around." "Being there" means boredom and humor, clashes of personality, getting up at 5 A.M., finding time to read the newspaper, deciding between the ballet and the cinema for tonight's entertainment.

I suppose each man has his China, as his Rousseau. A visit does not do much to replace the subjective with the objective. But the subjective has its own scale of truth and falsehood. The visitor is a human being: what hits him?

*Appealing imprecision.* People wander round; daydream. They will, when marketing, or in conversation, let the world go by in search of the pearl of great price. They don't mince like Japanese, but amble as men in secure possession of the earth under their feet. They will stand and stare at you, then win you with a grin if you look up in anxiety or irritation. Officials at banquets, faces pink with wine, lean head-in-hand across the table, forgetting their elbows in the excitement of a line of talk. Men on duty in trains, when every passenger has been served his tea and all is calm, turn down the radio and play poker, or draw the blinds, swing two seats together, and snooze in the peace of the afternoon sun. China is comprehensively organized, but not perfectly organized—

have happily not been organized out of existence.

*Asia's heart.* China has a staggering cultural self-confidence, and she is beholden to no one. In the timeless haze of Peking you realize that today's Bangkok, Saigon, Taipeh, are not cities of Asia's Asia but of America's Asia. Here in the "Forbidden City" is the real challenge to Western hegemony. Today but an embryonic challenge, partly of the spirit, tomorrow it will develop the sinews of a power challenge. The importance of China is being transmuted from symbol to actuality by the increasing powerlessness of the West in Asia. In China you feel a strength which comes from belief in oneself. America's Asia cannot match this kind of strength. But then America's Asia is China's periphery. And in Peking, China seems to Southeast Asia as the garment to the hem.

*China's touchy pride.* I went to the East Room of the Great Hall of the People on July 5 with E. Gough Whitlam, leader of the Australian Labor Party, for a late-night talk with Chou En-lai. Recounting China's bitter experience with Russia, the Old Tiger warned us against trusting *our* ally, the United States. His point was a passionate assertion of each country's right to run its own affairs. Whitlam said America had not treated Australia badly, as Russia had China. The Premier threw apart his arms. "But they both want to control others." He beat his wicker chair for emphasis. "Our socialist country will not be controlled by anyone."

Chou summed up what is evident up and down China: deep sensitivity about China's dignity as an independent power. It goes back to the humiliation of the Opium Wars, when Britain bullied a weak China into a falling-domino torrent of concessions.

### A READER'S GUIDE

yuan (Y)	Chinese monetary unit, forty cents
PLA	People's Liberation Army—the Chinese Army
Liberation	Chinese term for 1949 revolution
mou	one sixth of an acre
catty	half a kilogram

## The Chinese nation is studying as if for some cosmic examination.

You are constantly reminded that "those days are gone." The East wind prevails over the West wind. China has stood up. She will not be controlled by others.

*The past is very present.* Halfway between Sian and Yen-an, in the orange loess-country where Chinese civilization began, lies the market town of Hwang Ling. I drove there to see the tomb of the Yellow Emperor, father of the Han people. My Chinese companions (who had suggested this visit) entered with awe the gray-green gardens, lit up by the red pillars of a temple of commemorative tablets to the Yellow Emperor. It was 7 A.M., and the gnarled trees, one said to date from the time of the Yellow Emperor (some 5000 years ago), were ghostly in the still, clear morning air.

My Communist companions gazed at the elegant inscription: "Cradle of the Fatherland's Civilization." One of them, a diplomat called Chou Nan, who does calligraphy with a brush daily and writes poems in the traditional style, quoted suitable lines by heart from the Chinese classics. The five Chinese clustered round the hoary tablets, as Mr. Chou pointed out passages to his eager colleagues.

Not a single slogan or Mao quote is found near the mound in which the Father of China may (or may not) lie. "It would be unsuitable here," a Shensi provincial aide explained crisply. I looked around the site, well kept by the Communist government. Apart from the historical inscriptions, some in Kuo Mo-jo's rich hand, the only writing nearby was a placard on an old gray tree. "Protect the forest, fight fires."

*Mental unity.* Chou En-lai urged me to study the essay Peking put out to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. "As you are a professor in America and Australia, it can be reference material for you." That essay was, in early July, a Bible in China.

Drivers read it. The girls in the elevator at the Peking Hotel read it, between passengers. The radio broadcasts it. Companions cite it. Hosts ask my reaction to it. In Shanghai it is no less omnipresent; the same in Nanking, in Wusih. Sometimes a visitor to Harvard might think students read only books by Harvard faculty. A parallel impression, magnified a thousandfold, I had in China. It is intellectual incest on a Gargantuan scale. Information, opinion, comes down from the mountain of authority to the plateau of public consumption. The people all have this official information; they have no other. The whole country, from Canton to the northeast, from the east coast to Sinkiang, has at least a surface mental unity unmatched in China's history. (Just as the whole country has the chronological unity of being on Peking time.

lines, a solidarity by syntax. In the beginning was the Word . . .

To the visiting writer, information is like melons in the market. If it's available, you get it. If it's not, your hands are empty. There is nothing in between. No point in trying to get light on government policy from a Chinese who has not received it from above. When you get something, however, it is reliable. The system would surely delight an eighteenth-century philosophe; the "Word" is sovereign. On the other hand, it is a nightmare for the diplomat who has to put something in the pouch every week. Mingling one night with foreigners in Peking, I recalled a remark of a French diplomat who served in China, then in the United States: "In Peking we had too little information. In New York we had too much. In neither case did we know what was going on."

*Formidable children.* Here is a French class at the Middle School attached to Peking Normal University. The faces are pictures of concentration. The class screams in unison: "*Vive le parti communiste; Vive la solidarité des peuples du monde.*" I ask one pretty lass in a colored blouse why she studies French. "To further the world revolution." The answer seems ridiculous, but the ardent hunger for knowledge behind it is not.

The Chinese nation is studying as if for some cosmic examination. The bookshops are stiff with schoolchildren reading and buying textbooks, a lot published in the last year. A laundryboy is wrestling with Marx's *The Class Struggles in France*. A taxi driver has a recent pamphlet, *Philosophy for Working Men*. Tots in Shanghai sport aprons sewn with characters: "Love science, Love hygiene, Love learning."

Nor do they stuff their minds and forget their bodies. Rise at six and you find Chinese young people exercising in parks, on the waterfront, on rooftops. They twist and spin, jerk and wheel, doing "hard" exercises (forms of karate), "soft" (forms of *T'ai Chi-ch'uan*, the snakelike, rhythmic art), and countless improvisations of their own. Some do theatrical swordplay; many walk on their hands, first steadying their up-turned legs against a wall.

In short, China's 300 million young schoolchildren seem a formidable prospect for tomorrow's China. True, research is in many spheres backward. True, present professional opportunities are cruelly limited. But generations of scientifically minded, intellectually hungry, fit, earnest youth will be a magnificent base for more sophisticated advance in the 1980s and 1990s.

*Equality is dull.* Stroll along the Whampoa River bank (the "Bund") in the evening, and you think at

lights up the river's ripples, but every single sign is a slogan. The row of tall British buildings, Shanghai's greeting to the Western world across the water, are shabby, and many unused. The former British Consulate, its furry lawns stretching out toward the junction of Whampoa River with Soochow Creek, is just a sailors' club. Not one prostitute, hardly a car. Some blocks beyond, "Great World," once a sparkling place of entertainment, is silent as a morgue.

Nor do the vast billboards have anything to quicken the pulse. Posters and commentaries tell the story, congress by congress, of fifty years of the Chinese Communist Party. The car cannot vary the story. "Sailing the Seas Depends Upon the Helmsman" fills the air. The vast Big Ben of a clock on the Customs House strikes the hour, but instead of a chime, it booms out a rusty rendition of "The East Is Red." Is this Shanghai, or have I come upon a May 7 school (rural place of mixed labor and study for those found in the Cultural Revolution to need "remolding") set amidst a cardboard replica of the great Chinese port?

The Shanghai Bund is nothing, yet it's many things that matter. Forget the images; attend to the people. Watch them in the light of a full, bright moon, heads to the breeze off the water—a nice change, after work, from the heat of their houses. They read, lick ice creams. Lovers leave their bicycles against the rails and seek a dark spot in the park (two cents admission, full of unlighted nooks). Listen to their talk, some on haunches in groups, young couples discussing future plans, old men at chess, precocious boys who ask me about my country.

Here are people in bland possession of a sector where once they were little better than things. For the Western visitor the Bund is nothing. Yet the fact that *he* is nothing as he wanders unheeded proves that what was once a preserve where he felt his authority now belongs to the Chinese people. And, there is an obvious, to some people moving, egalitarianism in the social relationships of these streets and parks. Of course it is "dull" for the spender or the adventurer. Justice is not necessarily exciting, and it is the face of international and social justice which smiles behind the blandness of the Shanghai Bund.

My visit, from fluttery-stomached entry to exhausted exit, spanned forty days. It took in seven major cities, as well as towns and rural pockets. When possible, I took a train or drove, in a "Shanghai" or "Volga" car; by road to Yenan, a train trip from Changsha to Canton. The long hops were generally by air, in British Viscount, large Ilyushin 18, or the coachwork of an Ilushin 14 in

which you sit (at a giddy angle until takeoff) without seat belts, beside panoramic oblong windows. This *shao feiji* (small plane), as the Chinese call it, roars angrily but flies low, and there are splendid views.

There below is the flat, geometric somnolence of Sian, ancient capital of China and now capital of Shensi Province, specked with Tang Dynasty pagodas. Its boulevards are lined with six and eight rows of trees and punctuated with four massive Ch'ing Dynasty gates, sentries to a civilization. Down here now, the swelling mountains between Hunan Province and Kiangsi Province, which we bounce across flying from Nanking to Changsha. At their foot, a world of river canals, ponds, shimmering dusty blue in the morning heat, watering a patchwork of rice and cotton fields now alive with harvest activity and new planting.

The hostesses of China Airlines are cheerful and informal. On a four-and-a-half-hour flight from Canton to Peking, after eight hot hours of delay at White Cloud Airport, I fell asleep when the meal of fruit and biscuits was done. A hand banged my shoulder. "*Pu yaw hsui-chao le! Daw le, Daw le!*" ("Stop sleeping, we're here!") But Miss Wang had a pretty smile as she handed me chewing gum with an inscription on the wrapper: "China Airlines: Safety, Speed, Comfort, Convenience." Dressed like navvies, their hair straight and short, these girls are nevertheless often pretty.

My Chinese companions—diplomats, officials of the Revolutionary Committee in each province, aides of Luxingshe, the China Travel Service—did not warm to comments on physical appearance. One night there was a dinner in Nanking given by the Foreign Affairs Section of the Revolutionary Committee. Chiang Kai-shek's old capital was living up to its reputation as one of China's "three furnaces" (Chungking and Wuhan are the others). As a sweet wine called *hwang chiu* spurred the theme of "friendship between the Chinese and Australian peoples," I remarked upon the good looks of the hostess on that day's Shanghai-Nanking flight. My host looked with concentration at his "fish mandarin." "It is not the physical side but the thought which counts," he pointed out. So I rephrased my sentiment and won all-round approval: "The thought of today's hostess seemed, from whatever angle you viewed it, admirable and inspiring."

Specializing on foreign-policy and education issues did not prevent visits to factories and communes; to hospitals—to see how Chinese medicine and Western medicine fit together; literary and historical spots; and the beautiful village in Hunan where Mao Tse-tung was born and raised, full of memories and monuments. Impossible to miss performances of the "rev-

olutionary operas and ballets"—eight new excellent if not very varied dramas, of universal household familiarity in China today.

Summertime makes a vast difference in visiting China. People sit languidly outside their houses, eating and even sleeping in the open air. Opportunity to observe social life, and talk informally (in winter, folk go inside to their stove or *kang*—combination stove-and-bed in northern peasant homes—and the air of community conviviality is gone). Scant clothing thickens the air of sensuality, which is anyway seldom absent from Chinese life. Few men wore more than shorts and singlet in Shanghai, Changsha, and Canton—different in Peking—and the brassiere, though widely available in shops, was not, it seemed, in frequent use.

I wandered into parks. Nowhere better to watch and chat with people as they lounge around, roller-skate, play chess or *wei ch'i* ("go"), boat, and swim. Elaborate parks, such as Peihai in Peking, are still closed from the Cultural Revolution. But not ordinary ones, such as the vast People's Park around Lake Xuan Wu in Nanking. Here I wanted to swim, this led to over-careful preparations for my safety and comfort.

A car went on ahead to select a secluded spot. Irritated, I remarked as I got ready to dive in that it was not safe to swim alone. Alas, a casual sentence, uttered only to reinforce dissatisfaction at not being able to mingle with other swimmers, brought fresh complications. A motorboat was summoned from the far shores of the lake. While Chinese companions watched from the bank, the boat circled this poor swimmer, spitting out oil and fumes. How to protect me from my protector? I said I wanted to ride in the boat. Before anyone could say no, I sprang in and joined four young fishermen in a trip round the lake. Now I could swim where others swam, chat with people without feeling like an exhibit. A trivial incident, no doubt, yet one case of many where the line between "well cared for" and "isolated" seemed a little too fine.

Were there serious restraints? Formal restrictions exist. No photos from the air, nor at certain industrial areas (such as the docks looking north from central Shanghai). Among the provinces closed to nearly all foreigners is Szechwan, whose hills and rivers and spicy cuisine I would like to have savored. Generalized control, too, stems from the practicalities of a visit. Rarely does the visitor select which factory, school, commune he will see. Taxi stands are few, so personal mobility is limited. The Hotel Peking, though a palace in its way, is also a prison, since there is no taxi rank outside; you must phone and state your destination. Somehow, my Luxingshe aide

always knew when I came into the hotel (even when I did so alone). For no sooner was I in the room than he would phone to discuss the next part of my program.

Yet many things I did in perfect freedom. Two legs and some knowledge of Chinese are wings indeed in the cities. Few people closed up on a simple talk; some opened like a rose. Professional men dined alone with me in Peking restaurants. I strolled in on families at random in a Shanghai apartment block. As for officials, they allowed visits to some places which were not yet open to anyone, foreigner or Chinese: former residences in Peking and Shanghai of the great socialist writer Lu Xun; an array of Han, Chou, and Tang treasures unearthed during the Cultural Revolution. And at the Chinese border there were few formalities. I brought out unexposed film, tape recordings, and notebooks—but the Chinese officials didn't know, because neither going in nor coming out was there any baggage examination of any kind.

One day I meandered in Foochow Street, central Shanghai, looking for its renowned secondhand bookshops. None remain. Some are turned to other uses (the former "Foreign Literature Bookshop" is selling textiles); some are open only for new books on the ground floor, closed on the second floor which (I suppose) holds the secondhand books. But nearby was a *Lü-kuan*, a simple Chinese hotel where foreigners never stay. I looked in; was welcomed, given fruit cordial, and chatted with guests and staff. Over the inside of the doorway, in fresh red characters, I noticed the warning, "When leaving watch out for your purses and money." That should not be a surprise, for there is theft in China like everywhere else—though less than most places. Bicycles are often padlocked in the street, and houses, so far as I could see, are generally locked.

Foochow Street is scarred on one side with earthworks. Air-raid shelters are being painstakingly built, often with intricate underground links between them. The finished shelter is well concealed—a small door leads down from certain shops which are well known in the neighborhood. Among the well-stocked, well-patronized food shops the pastries look good, and I go into a small place to buy some. The shopkeeper, a genial and worldly Shanghai-type of sixty-seven, tells me he graduated in commerce from a Shanghai university in 1927. Until Liberation, he owned a tea shop a few blocks away. It must be hard to adjust, I say, from being an owner to being a shop assistant. "Not really," he replies, gazing out into the street, "given all the circumstances." What are the circumstances, I wonder? "The change in society. Look outside the shop, at the people, what they wear; ask



## Two legs and some knowledge of Chinese are wings indeed in the cities.

them who they work for." He turns back inside the shop and pauses. "It's a big change; exploitation has gone—my change from owning a tea shop, you have to see it in that context." My pastries are wrapped up. But anything with flour in it is rationed. "Where are your coupons?" the old man inquires, his face long in mock desolation. Of course I have none, but he lets me off as a "friend from across the seas."

Further down the street is a billboard with a vast world map in bright colors. Captions on the various countries show the "excellent situation" for revolution that seems, in the Chinese view, to prevail almost everywhere. A young man stares intently at the heading: "People of all the world unite and put down American aggressors and their running dogs." The map is conveniently placed at a bus stop. A newsstand on the sidewalk does good business, especially in technical magazines—and that is a sign of the times in China. A new one has recently appeared, *Science Monthly*, with popularized articles on the contribution science can make to society. I buy its first three issues, and some recent fiction—but am refused Shanghai newspapers.

Turning back toward the hotel, I pass a Protestant church—its closed gates bearing the banner "Carry through the Cultural Revolution to the end"—and then come upon a municipal "cultural and scientific library and reading room." Step off the crowded street, and you find at once an air of quiet concentration. At battered wooden tables, young and old pore over books, magazines, and newspapers. Again mostly technical stuff. Though a studious man is reading *Hung Ch'i* (*Red Flag*, the monthly theory journal of the Party), and some have Marx or Lenin, no one at the tables I circle is reading Mao. At the counter I ask for *Dream of the Red Chamber*. The lady seems pleased to be asked—but, no, she does not have it. Lu Xun? "We have almost all of his works; which would you like?" But few are reading fiction.

Getting nearer to the waterfront, the streets are lined with people, and more arrive each minute in trucks, to be marched in columns of two, then spread out three-deep along the road. The bell on the old British Customs House strikes five; most of the crowd seem to have come direct from work. I draw near and find no air of excitement. But why are they here? People readily answer the question. "We are here to welcome foreign guests to Shanghai." I rack my brains and recall that a French Parliamentary Delegation is in China and that a Korean group is due in Shanghai soon. But my curiosity is not shared by the welcomers themselves. None of a dozen or so asked know who is coming or seem to care. "It's just foreign friends," one girl sums up with a trace of impatience.

Soon the fussy marshals have got everyone in line and black limousines glide into view. The crowd stiffens into ceremonial festivity, faces beam with joy, hands clap vigorously. I dash into the Peace Hotel, climb to the eighth floor, and watch the scene from the dining room. A panorama of international friendship! The limousines, looking long and flat from high up, creep slowly enough for the elated faces of the foreign guests to be visible—they seem moved indeed by the reception. It was the Koreans—I found out that night at the ballet *White-haired Girl*, which they also attended—but I suppose the afternoon throng didn't know that any more than I did.

A friendly tension existed between the authorities and myself. Some things they apparently thought I did to excess ("mingling"). Ruses were found to limit my mingling. At intervals of a ballet or acrobatic show, I would be whisked to the luxury of a side room, to sit in sullen boredom with my companions. Yet they did not make mingling impossible. At a Shanghai concert, I declined to enter the side room, smoked in the foyer, and watched an amusing and vigorous struggle by a hundred people to get tickets for the next performance. And often there was banter about my waywardness. "Mr. Terrill, we have to protect you: please go by car." "But Mr. Wang, China is the 'safest country on earth': I'm going to walk." Walk I did, and no hard feelings resulted.

The overnight trip to the delightful Tsung Hua hot springs near Canton was typical. It is a valley of tranquillity. Also a sensitive place. Leaders come to take rest and the waters. Kuo Mo-jo, after a tough time during the Cultural Revolution, came here to recover. A major army base nestles in the nearby hills. Both aspects—esthetic, military—tickle the ear at 5:30 A.M. The air is rent not by "Sailing the Seas Depends Upon the Helmsman" or "The East Is Red" (China's two inescapable political songs), but—long live Chairman Mao!—by a faultless trumpet rendition of reveille! No need here for a political message to nerve the soul at dawn.

Necessarily there are restraints. The scenery lures me walking. Yesterday's typhoon has left things fresh and beaten. Winds still bend the fine bamboos deeply to one side. A severed tree-portion leaps crazily along the river's broad white sandbank. A stone bridge squats comfortably across the blue-yellow waters. Higher up is a towering waterfall in jostling whiteness. "Like ten thousand horses galloping," wrote a Tang poet. But wherever I walk, there is a People's Liberation Army man with boyish grin and fixed bayonet. "Back the other way." Well, it is a sensitive area, and they did not have to bring me here. There was, in sum, an openness and a practical root to nearly all the restraints that met me in China.



## Tight clothes are no good for working in; Loose clothes are.

I wondered about differences from 1964. Of course the military are more prominent. Army men in baggy green uniforms, with a red star on the cap. Navy men, the same thing in blue-gray; you could mistake it for pajamas. Air force, blue trousers with green jacket. Curiously, police uniform is the same as air force—with one variation. The policeman's cap has a red circle, not a red star like the cap of the three services.

At Canton Airport, during long hours of waiting for a storm to clear, most of the passengers were military men. Indeed, the delay's consolation was a chance to chat nimbly with Chinese generals. Earthy, amiable, informal men. With a Szechwanese officer, I talk as we drink tea from porcelain mugs. The face is leathery, eyes deep-set, smile disarming. Trousers rolled up to the knee—but he rolls them down as I sit beside him. His floppy uniform bears no insignia—the Cultural Revolution put an end to that—but I think he is a general. Two aides are with him (their sandals are not the usual plastic, but leather). His wristwatch is not inexpensive. I ask him why clothes in China are so loose and big. Were these floppy garments, I mused, designed to mask the human form—keep passion at a distance? His answer was different. "Tight clothes are no good for working in; loose clothes are." Stationed in Fukien, his business in life is to keep prepared against Chiang Kai-shek. His views on Chiang are not angry, just totally scornful. Yes, he said without zeal, China is stronger since the Cultural Revolution. More roused, he explained how Szechwan is much prettier than Kwangtung.

But what really stirred him was an Iraqi Airlines jet which zoomed into the tranquil haze of the afternoon. With his colleagues (and nearly everyone else in the terminal), he dashed outside to watch it land. China has no jets on commercial service (though it possesses Tridents, and has just bought six more). PIA (Pakistan) is the only airline which lands passenger jets at White Cloud; the Iraqi plane was a "special," containing ministers. To watch a big jet is quite something to a Chinese. Even to a general. "Not bad," he grinned as he sank back on a couch and reached for his tea.

Not only do you see many military, you meet a lot in institutions. When the Cultural Revolution reached its pitch of factionalism, People's Liberation Army (PLA) men went into factories and schools. Mostly, they are still there—as politically reliable managers. The (PLA) Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee at the Peking Petroleum Refinery, he told me, never been to school. He learned all he knew in the "great school" of the army. Yet he now administered a factory with 10,000 workers.

Another PLA officer, a tough, cheery man who confessed his total ignorance of medicine, was head of a Peking (Chinese Medicine) hospital. His first act on coming to the hospital, others told me, was to spur all personnel to more devoted service by offering his own body for experimentation. Acupuncture needles were put three to four inches into him in a test to find the root of certain nerves. It was his way of living up to Mao's idea that the whole nation should "learn from the PLA."

A third PLA officer, the new Minister of Foreign Trade, I met with Mr. Whitlam. (Six of the eight ministers whose names are known are military men.) Pai Hsiang-kuo is a practical man, who showed a detailed grasp of Australia's trade position. In the business talks, the word "capitalism" was never uttered, nor Mao's name. Gentle in manner, yet strong in argument, Pai appeared for the sessions in army uniform, without mark of rank, and left his cap on throughout. (Even at our meeting with Chou En-lai, which he attended but without speaking, he never took his cap off.) None of this military presence was evident seven years ago. Indeed, I can't remember a single conversation with a military man on the 1964 visit.

I found cultural life far more politicized. In 1964, I talked with the director of the Peking Library (which has some seven million volumes) and browsed in his library. I went to church services in Canton and Peking, and interviewed Chao Fu-san, a leader of Chinese Protestantism (his barbs against Russian divines and the World Council of Churches caused reverberations in church circles of various countries). This kind of thing was, in 1971, out of the question. Public libraries, and museums too, are closed. Churches are boarded up, empty, and checkered with political slogans. National religious organizations are "suspended," while religious workers undergo an indefinite phase of "struggle, criticism, and transformation." Chao Fu-san is "not available." In 1971, you simply do not find, as you could in 1964, segments of social and intellectual life around which the tentacles of politics have not curled.

The politicization has its visual testimony. Cities are striped red and white with slogans and quotations. It is hard to locate buildings, for during the Cultural Revolution their nameplates were mostly replaced with a (more or less appropriate) slogan. The Industrial Exhibition in Canton has on it simply "Long Live Our Great Leader Mao Tse-tung." Since it is not the only big building which displays that irreproachable sentiment, the newcomer cannot easily find his way around. Even garden plots have been ingeniously planted in the shape of characters expressing a political message; the flowers in their beds

## The greatest change since 1964 is a heightened sense of citizenship on the part of ordinary people.

must bend and sprout to uphold Chairman Mao!

Reaching Canton, I was hit by this political gaudiness. It looked as if the left wing of the Signwriters Union had taken over China! But the impact is a double one, and the second aspect is as striking as the first. The city is plastered with banners and posters. *But they are faded.* They date from 1966-1968. There has been no apparent move to refurbish them. So Canton has a face of shabby militancy. Not having been there since 1964, I was struck by the plastering. Yet an Australian scholar who had visited in 1968 was more struck by how much it has faded. The slogans are much less obtrusive in the life of the city, he said as we walked around, than three years ago.

One might welcome the fading of banners, as my fellow countryman did, because of the new political moderation it signifies. Aesthetically, however, it gives Canton a shabby, run-down look—like a city after a bad flood. Parks I had enjoyed in 1964 were now scrawny and overgrown. The beautiful grounds of the Sun Yat Sen University had not recently seen a hoe or a mower. The Cultural Park, a diverting place for Cantonese, is less well cared for. So is Shaan, the shaded haven isle which in colonial days gave secluded comfort to the British and French.

The Cultural Revolution, of course, accounts for this neglect. The former political boss in Canton, T'ao Chu, was attacked in 1967 for spending too much time and energy on prettifying Canton. He wanted, said his detractors, to impress foreign businessmen arriving for the Canton Fair, and the Hong Kong folk who come to visit their families. It was, Red Guards reasoned, a wrong use of time and resources.

I recalled T'ao Chu's civic zeal at a banquet given me in Canton the night before I left China. The restaurant, one of China's finest, was the Pan-chi (now changed to "Friendship"). Its elegant balconies, furnished in ebony and mother-of-pearl, overlook a lake bordered with willows. Some quite fantastic sweetmeats were being served. One especially took my fancy—a spiced coconut puree wrapped in a hot pancake—and I ate several. The host, himself a hearty eater, tried to broaden my approach. "Do you know, Mr. Terrill, this restaurant has more than *one hundred* varieties of sweet cakes. Recently some foreign businessmen could hardly believe this. So I ordered all one hundred kinds brought to the table!" Mr. Yang was ready to do the same for me, but my stomach was not equal to the challenge. Yet what price T'ao Chu's "errors"? Was not Cantonese chauvinism rearing its delightful head once more? I realized, not the first time on this trip, that much backpedaling has taken place since the excessive leftism of the Cultural Revolution.

But the greatest change since 1964 is a heightened

sense of citizenship on the part of ordinary people. I am not saying people's minds are full of Mao's Thought—who knows what is in their minds? The point is not about political orthodoxy, but about sense of involvement. The lady from whose roadside stall I buy tea in Nanking knows which four provinces still have not established new Party Committees. Shopkeepers in Shanghai venture comment on world affairs. Singers and dancers in Yenan had been to Peking during the Cultural Revolution, and now had fresh interest in the capital and what goes on there. They quoted to me an adage of their province: "*Ko Shan, Ko Ho, Pu Ko Yin*" ("separated by mountains, by rivers, but not from the voice of Peking"). It had, they said, a new meaning for them.

Drivers and Luxingshe aides showed no timidity or subservience—in 1964 there had been some. One morning in Canton my driver launched into a discussion of how intellectuals should behave. I don't know if he had me in mind when he spoke of the uselessness of theoretical knowledge divorced from practice. "Some intellectuals are hopeless," he observed, "electrical engineers who can't replace a fuse." A Luxingshe aide in the north was no less forthright. Often he would proffer political views. They were straight from the *People's Daily*; yet the illustrations were his own.

One afternoon at the Tomb of Sun Yat-sen in Nanking, a small argument flickered (there were several arguments in Nanking; the air seemed tense for some reason). It concerned "local" newspapers—the Chinese use the word "local" (*ti-fang*) to apply to all papers other than the *People's Daily*. The day before, in Shanghai, I had tried to buy the *Wen Hui Pao*, a Shanghai paper. Six times at six newsstands I was refused it. "Foreigners," it was explained, "may not buy local newspapers." Well, at the Tomb in Nanking, an official happened to remark, in the course of a conversation about freedom in China, that a foreigner could buy "anything he likes." I refuted him with the Shanghai example—perhaps too vigorously. My Luxingshe aide, the junior man in the group, turned to me: "Mr. Terrill, you will learn more if you are modest." In 1964 I did not find such forthrightness.

There were other differences. Service frills had been cut here and there. No beer on the planes now. In 1964, I had drunk my way across the Gobi Desert on the plane from Irkutsk to Peking, with the dusty-flavored Tsingtao beer. In Peking, you can no longer dial from your hotel room for weather forecasts, theater tickets, or subscriptions to magazines. Yet for the Chinese themselves, variety of consumer goods may be wider. Clothing is certainly more colorful. More household utensils are available. Supermarkets

have speeded matters for big-city shoppers—as often the husband as the wife. It is only an impression, but it seemed to me, judging by the crowded state of simple restaurants, that eating out has increased in the big cities.

These neighborhood eating houses are full of interest. Here is one in Shanghai's Nanking Road. It is in the middle of a shopping district, and people come in with bags and bundles—food, textiles, and now and then a camera, radio, or watch. Noodles (boiled or fried) are the specialty of the house. They are, of course, the preferred staple in Shanghai, as boiled rice is in South China. A hearty restaurant, a carrefour of gossip, noisy with chatter and laughter.

The range of diners reflects the relative prosperity of Shanghai, with its sophisticated industry and higher wages. Here are four men, colleagues it seems, who take their noodles swimming in soup (*tang mian*) and already have four empty beer bottles in front of them. Beside us a quiet couple, intellectuals carrying books whose titles I can't catch, who eat fried noodles (*chao mian*) and later hefty slices of the universally popular watermelon.

Decor is at the level of a public toilet. Chairs are the old wooden kitchen variety, and the wooden floorboards are hospitable to many a splash or piece of food (but no cats or dogs or flies). The excellent food costs us under Y3 (the yuan is forty cents) for two. To remember what dishes to bring to what table, waiters fix a numbered clothespin on a bowl in the center of the table: "7" is "noodles with fish," "16" is "chicken soup." No writing down is called for, and the evidence of what you've eaten and will pay for sits there as a row of pins; "7," "7," "16," "11," "4": total, Y2.90. Stacks of small red stickers hang on the walls. A notice says: if you have an illness, put a sticker in your bowl when finished, and special care will then be taken in washing the bowl.

In 1964, there was in Peking more sense of foreboding about the international scene. And today, where there is anxiety it seems to center on Russia, whereas in 1964 it centered on the United States. Some symbols sum up the change.

In 1964, I reached Peking the week after the clashes in the Gulf of Tonkin. One of the first sights, as the plane from Russia slid over the lovely hills into the heat-haze of the capital, was a vast mass rally. It was one of many in those weeks, at which a total of twenty million Chinese raised their voices and fists against U.S. actions in and off North Vietnam. The mood of Vietnam, and even more important, foreboding that Washington might escalate the war into China's southern provinces, hung over the entire visit.

In 1971, foreboding is replaced by buoyancy. The

only American missile talked about in Peking this summer was Henry Kissinger. And when war pokes its nose in, it is not from South Asia but from North Asia. The mounds of earth in the streets of the northern cities tell the story. The air-raid shelters are insurance against "our northern neighbor"—the Prime Minister's sardonic phrase, the night we met him, for the Soviet Union.

One morning in Peking, I talked about trends in China with an official (he once worked as a journalist in New York) senior enough to speak his mind. For three hours we sat on a vast white couch, then at a nearby table where one reckless dish after the other was relayed by wide-eyed boys. Mr. Y—I cannot use his name—suddenly asked me: "What do you think of the propaganda?" Unsure of his line of thought, I murmured an inconsequential remark. "I think it's awful," he resumed, screwing up his face. "It's boastful. And too many adjectives and adverbs. Take the exhibits at Shaoshan [Mao's birthplace]. They are overdone. And why must it end with the atom bomb—as if the point of the revolution was to make the bomb!" My own tongue was loosened by his remarks; I added criticisms. "But you know," Mr. Y continued, "it's not as bad as it was."

That is true. Giant-sized white plaster statues of Mao have come down in Peking and other cities. His photo no longer adorns the daily Hsinhua news bulletin. The *Red Book*, you might say, has given way to books. (A statistic got in Sian shows how far the glorifying of Mao went: during the Cultural Revolution, in Shensi Province—whose population is about 25 million—100 million copies of works of Mao were published!) And not only books by Mao. A driver in Canton has Engels' *Anti-Dühring*. No longer do sessions at factories and communes and flights on planes begin and end with readings from Mao, as they did during the Cultural Revolution. Study has gained an edge on incantation. A workaday spirit has squeezed out rhetorical excess.

I stumbled across two startling examples of the trend. On Peking's Street of Eternal Revolution are the offices of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee. In the late-afternoon rays, as Peking sang with the bicycle bells of people riding home, I passed this building on my way to dine at Rewi Alley's house almost next door. Behold, four workmen were swiftly removing the huge Mao portrait from over the doorway! Random thoughts peppered my mind. A coup in the Revolutionary Committee? Making way for a larger portrait? Neither. Part of a general winding down of the personal display of Mao and his aphorisms.

## At seventy-seven, he is learning English, and he likes to toss around newly learned phrases such as "law and order" and "anti-Mao."

Another afternoon, I returned to the Hotel Peking after a visit to the Peking Petroleum Refinery. On our sixth floor, the smell of fresh paint. Two quotations from Mao, in white upon red, had been painted out since lunch. I almost missed them, so cheery had they been beside the dark panels. But no replacement went up in ensuing days. Maybe the exhortation had won its incarnation in labor—the word become flesh.

New shoots appear in intellectual life, after the winter blight of the Cultural Revolution. Certain of them were revealed to me in an interview—reported in *People's Daily* and other organs within China—with the leading intellectual of the Chinese government, Kuo Mo-jo, Vice President of the Congress and President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. A rich, in some ways theatrical, personality, Kuo has trailed an astonishing array of writings and cultural activities, and is now one of the most prominent members of the regime. He has the square, rugged Szechwan face; expressive and arresting eyes—more so when he takes off his glasses. Heavy lines arch between eyes and nose, and two more curve down from nose to mouth. His hair is receding, and he relies on hearing aid. The strongest impression of his mind is of facility, suppleness. To use favorite Chinese images, he seems a willow, not a pine. After photos, he signaled the taking off of jackets, and we sat down in the cavernous splendor of the Great Hall of the People and talked for almost three hours. Nearly eighty, Kuo looked at me and said: "You are like the rising sun at eight." Since the Cultural Revolution, "young" (up to thirty-five), "medium-age" (thirty-six to fifty-five), and "old" work together in China as a "three-way combination" on many tasks. "I suggested to Chou En-lai," joked Kuo, "that we need to add a fourth category for those over seventy-five—super-old. But he thought it sounded too much like super-power!"

The President of the Academy of Sciences acknowledged that research had been affected by the Cultural Revolution. The scientific sections never stopped work. But the humanistic and social-science sections have been suspended for a period of "struggle, criticism, and transformation"—with the interesting exception of archaeology. Digging for national treasures went on through the turmoil. It even benefited at times, as Red Guards, coursing through the country, hit upon the edge or sign of an unearthen piece. Mr. Kuo talked with an antiquarian's enthusiasm of the finds in the Cultural Revolution period, an exhibition of which I got a preview that morning in the Forbidden City. Of many of them—one superb jade "death-suit" from the Han Dynasty, its tiny green pieces stitched to-


gether with wire of pure gold—he had read and written, but now could examine for the first time.

Research in all fields is poised for fresh advances. Kuo announced a new phase in the remarkable story of Chinese research on insulin. In 1966 insulin was synthesized, in work done jointly at the Academy and Peking University. Now the second stage, structural analysis of insulin, has been completed. It began in 1967, and was done in the Institutes of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry of the Academy. Amino acids have been synthesized, surpassing even the work done by Hawkins in Britain. Important implications follow for our understanding of the origin of life. The results of the second stage, Mr. Kuo told me, were assessed at a meeting on July 15. They will soon be made public in detail.

From Mr. Kuo and other high sources comes news of further activity in research and publication. The *Modern History* by Fan Wen-lan, distinguished historian who died two years ago, is being revised and augmented by new chapters. The work is proceeding in the Institute of Modern History of the Academy and will appear before long. The archaeological journals, *Kao Ku* and *Wen Wu*, will shortly resume publication. A large new batch of the writings of Lu Xun is on the way. "Normal" intellectual contacts between China and other nations, Mr. Kuo explained—"students, lecturers, materials"—will be resumed as "struggle, criticism, and transformation" are wound up. An upsurge in language teaching is due. Main stress will now be upon English, French, German, Arabic, and Spanish—in that order. The Peking Foreign Languages Institute will again enroll students "this winter." Mao himself, Kuo Mo-jo informed me, is setting an example. At seventy-seven, he is learning English, and he likes to toss around newly learned phrases such as "law and order" and "anti-Mao."

Forays into bookshops confirmed the upward cultural trend, though actual stocks are still meager except on the technical side. Recently published fiction, mostly short stories written by young "workers, peasants, and soldiers," is available. Its quality is not arresting. Mr. Kuo confessed as much himself, comparing them sadly with Lu Xun's "unshakable" work, and with the famous Chinese historical novels *Dream of the Red Chamber*, *All Men Are Brothers*, and *Western Pilgrimage*. These last are not in the shops, yet people of all ages manage to read them. Chairman Mao, Mr. Kuo said, not long ago read *Dream of the Red Chamber* for the fourth time.

Handbooks on technical subjects pour from the press and sell briskly. I bought a new one on Chinese medicine. It is in two parts, to cope with the widely differing climate and vegetation of the country. One



for North China, one for South China. Books long unavailable have reappeared. In the Hsinhua bookstore in Peking, I bought Hao Ran's 1966 novel *Bright Sunny Day* (in Chinese). A week earlier I could have got the great classic, *Book of History* (ten volumes, in *Bai hua*). It had sold out almost as soon as it arrived.

I bought one of the two works by Mr. Kuo on the history shelf, essays entitled *Chung-kuo Ku-tai She-hui Yen-chiu* (*Research on Ancient Chinese Society*). He is supposed to have said during the Cultural Revolution that it should be burned. I asked him, nevertheless, to sign my copy. He was surprised that it was on sale, and had not before seen this edition. I can report that he made no effort to burn the book. Yes, he "rather regretted" having written it, he said without earnestness. That did not stop him from autographing it with a flourish.

Secondhand bookstores, where still open, are disappointing. At the Eastern Market in Peking, in 1964 a great place to rummage for old books, little now but engineering texts and dictionaries. In Canton I chanced upon a more promising one. From the door I could see sections on history and social studies. Young people browsed in silence. But I got no further than the door. A man sitting in the entrance barred my way with his leg. Quietly and quickly he said, "Foreigners are not allowed in here."

It was a bad afternoon in Canton. From the bookstore I went to the old Catholic cathedral. Massive Gothic, with towers 160 feet high, visible all over Canton, it was done by a French architect in 1863. I

did not expect it to be open for services. No churches in China have been since the Cultural Revolution. I found it being used as a distribution center for building materials. Stacks of bricks and timber were on the grounds. Up the "aisle" steered a girl with a wheelbarrow. The "altar" bore red-and-white quotations from Mao. As Mr. Liu—my Luxingshe aide—and I beheld the hum of activity from the gate, a man came out of a nearby doorway and said: "He can't go in there." Mr. Liu replied: "I know." We watched for another moment, and I took a photo. Back we drove, in unaccustomed silence, to the Dong Fang Hotel.

A current trend in China is criticism of "ultraleftism." That may seem puzzling; is not Mao an . . . ? The point is, ultraleftism had its day, when the main job was putting down "revisionists," but that day is past. Yesterday a weapon, today a target. The rebels have been called off, damped down. The order of the day is noses to the grindstone of productive work. Has the wind changed because the Cultural Revolution succeeded, and now it's back to routine? Or because the "line" of the Cultural Revolution was Utopian, did not work, and had to be replaced by a rebuilding of the Party along old lines, and by a dispersal of the hot rebels to turning lathes and feeding pigs? Here I can only describe the fresh mood.

At the Red Star commune near Peking, I saw a laundry. But it was not a laundry. Those were not clothes pegged to a line, but *ta tze pao*, posters newly done in black on green paper. Members of the brigade had written them willy-nilly and awaited re-

## In factories, students are often the target when ultraleftism is criticized.

sponses from the Party Committee. I had time to read only three before companions led me elsewhere. The theme was unmistakable: "AND WHAT OF THE ULTRALEFTISTS? WHAT WERE THEY DOING DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION? THEY WERE NOT AT WORK—WHAT WERE THEY DOING?" Little doubt but that they were demonstrating. Coursing up and down China lighting fires of revolution.

I doubt that those posters would have been written if the Party did not welcome their message. In fact, the message is omnipresent in China. In schools, you are told that ultraleftists wanted to do without teachers altogether. Some urged an end to universities, saying simply that life is the classroom. Some said you learn *only* by practice—theory is useless. These ideas are now all rejected.

At the No. 61 Middle School in Canton, it seemed that even some of Mao's own (more "leftist") ideas about education are pruned in their application. The chairman of the School's Revolutionary Committee—the only white-haired man I met in China—referred to "naughty" pupils. What do they do wrong? "Well, they come late to class—and they leave very early." I quoted Mao, who said if a student is bored let him leave the class; that is all right. There was laughter at the table, some of it a bit nervous. How would the jovial Hunanese chairman meet this? He spoke with a touch of intimacy, his tone an appeal to common sense. "Look, if the teacher is really bad, pupils may leave. But they must come back."

In factories, students are often the target when ultraleftism is criticized. I found this especially so in the smaller cities. "They lacked experience." "Easily deceived." "Bad elements led them to extremes." The "bad elements" are usually identified as the "May 16 group" (an extremist network which—it is now said—mouthed Mao's line while actually planning an overthrow of the government in 1967), to be distinguished from ultraleftists, in most explanations, but not all, by three points. They were an organized conspiracy, not merely, like the hotheads, a wind blowing where it listeth. The contradictions between them and the people are "antagonistic." Between ultraleftists and the people, the contradictions are "nonantagonistic." Third, the May 16 group took armed struggle to the point of committing criminal offenses. At a Nanking factory I came across an example. A PLA officer, sent to meld the factions, had been kidnapped and held for three days by elements now suspected of being "May 16."

Nationally, the tone was set during my visit by the trial of two public meetings of the "Red Diplomat," Yao Feng-shan. Yao had crossed the threshold into crime by burning the British Office in Peking in 1967. This was not his only crime—Yao even detained

Chou En-lai during the former's giddy weeks of power as "head" of the Foreign Ministry in the summer of 1967. But the British Office affair has been made a symbol of leftist excess. No opportunity was missed in my presence to condemn it.

The French Ambassador, Etienne Manac'h, told me how Mao himself raised the matter in conversation. Maurice Couve de Murville was in China, and Manac'h went with him to see the Chairman. "Were you in Peking when the British Office was burned?" Mao asked Manac'h. No. "Were any of your present staff?" No, a complete turnover of Embassy staff had occurred since then. Mao persisted. "Well, you must have *read* about the incident?" He wanted to speak of it. He criticized it as "indefensible." It is ultraleftism, he said; "I myself am a center-leftist."

An apartment block, part of a "New Workers Village," in a textile-mill district of Shanghai. We knock on doors and talk with those we find at home. It is 4 P.M., and those on day shift are still at work. Children play noisily under the spreading plane trees which shade the space between blocks. A group of neighbors sit fanning themselves, talking about prices, drinking tea. Mrs. Tan is at home with her son, who is back from Anhwei Province for a month to see the family. He was sent there for practical work after finishing Middle School. The family of five have two rooms, plus a kitchen shared with two other families. Father earns Y72 per month, mother Y58 (a pension, three quarters of her wage before retirement). Rent is Y5 per month. Another son, graduate of Communications University at Sian, works in a mining-machine factory in remote Tsinghai Province. A third is on a state farm not far away, earning only Y24. Furnishings are of the simplest. But the beds, mosquito-netted and covered with tatami, are comfortable. There is a radio and a bicycle. Mrs. Tan is saving to buy a sewing machine, which will cost her Y150. Food for each person costs about Y15 per month. Meat is not cheap; Y.65 for a kilo of salted pork. Only grain products are at present rationed.

The Tans' conditions of life are fairly typical. Communal provision in the Workers Village is cheap and above the standard of private provision. Medical care costs Y1 per person per year. Many go twice a week to the cinema—at tiny cost. TV is available, with two and a half hours of programs each day, only at the factory; no worker has his own set. "Pure entertainment" put on by advertisers does not exist. Drama, political commentary, documentary these are the staple, and technically they are quite well done. TV has little hold over people, and I often



found myself—perhaps in a hotel lounge—the only person watching a program. People in China *talk*—endlessly, over tea, through long meals—at times when Westerners might sit at the TV or dash out to organized entertainment. Nevertheless, the government is pushing ahead with experimental development of color TV.

Political meetings take a certain amount of the workers' time. Few seem either gripped or repelled by them. In hotels or factories I once or twice peered into a study meeting that reminded me, in its tight-lipped zeal, of an Evangelical Bible class. More often the ambience seemed languid; books drooping from the wrist, eyes far away—even, once at Canton's Dong Fang Hotel, a card game going on simultaneously. The issues of the Cultural Revolution did not seem to affect greatly these placid folk in the New Workers Village. But its aftermath has—especially the sending of youth to far-flung spots for experience in factory, farm, and mine.

Here are six silk-spinners in Wusih. Four women are Party members; the two men are members of the Communist Youth League. I spoke with them just after the announcement of Mr. Nixon's visit to China. On that they had little to say, and only, it seemed to me, what they had been told to (except one youth—did he miss the briefing?—who amidst the polite nothings about "traditional friendship between the Chinese and American people" burst out refreshingly, his fist to the bench: "Nixon is a bad, bad man"). But of their own lives they talked freely.

Mr. Wang earns Y41 a month, his wife (who works at another factory) Y48, of which they save about Y200 each year. In the bank, gaining 4 percent interest, is Y1200. They have two children, and Mr. Wang's mother lives with them in their three rooms.

The other four who are married earn an average husband-and-wife wage of Y109. Average annual savings for each couple are Y275; bank balance, Y830. Affably, the women giggling now and then, they told me things which show the persistence of the "old" in new China. Of the six (whose ages average thirty-five), five visit the graves of ancestors not less than once a year. Of the five married ones, four used "go-betweens" to get their spouses. The go-between either introduced them (with marriage in mind), conveyed the proposal, or served as intermediary to satisfy the queries of the spouse's parents. From Y50 to Y100 was spent on the wedding frock. (For marriage, three days off work are given, for maternity, 56 days, all on full pay.)

These silk-spinners I found not untypical of city workers. Here are four women at a chemical-fiber factory near Nanking. The wages are a little higher (average Y124 per couple each month), houses

roomier. All have two or three children and use birth control pills, available free at the factory, as a matter of course. Most have one or more grandparents living with them—taking care of the infants. The two children of one woman are living with her parents in Shanghai. She sends Y30 each month for their food and sees them three times a year. None of these mothers have ever, they said, struck one of their children. None would talk about sex education.

None use any cosmetics; three of the four have bicycles in the household; all have radios; three of the four have sewing machines. Between them they can name and discuss the careers of six Chinese women prominent in national affairs. The militia, to which they all belong, keeps them fit with running, shooting, swimming in the Yangtze. It also involves them in study groups on Vietnam and World Revolution.

What do these makers of chemical fibers feel about their work, and what do they like to do after work? I asked each of the four: "What has been the most exciting day in your life?" Two said the day they joined the Party; two said the day they started work. Later as we strolled to the car, I tried to get one of them, a pretty mother of three, to spin out her answer. "Was having babies exciting?" I asked casually. "Was that as exciting as first coming to work?" She lit up like a torch. "Of course it was—but, oh, that's different, isn't it?" We reached the car, but she could hardly be stopped . . . about what grandma said . . . why the girl was rowdier than the boy. She spoke of Spring Festival, for which there is three days' holiday. "It comes next to Sunday, so we have four days for a big family reunion." Yes, they go to the cinema—"Have you seen *Red Women's Detachment*?" she asks. Of course they drink a lot of wine . . . "Yes, babies are very exciting," she mused as I left her. "except when they're naughty."

The girls heartily praise the social amenities of the factory. Working conditions, I could see for myself, are also good. The cut in bureaucratic personnel brought by the Cultural Revolution is popular among workers. In this Nanking factory it was a cut of nearly 50 percent—elsewhere I found an average of about 40 percent. "They were not necessary," said one of the girls simply, referring to the excess administrators. On the other hand, there are no trade unions in the factory, or anywhere in China. Industrial theory, if it existed, would be based on an assumed harmony—stemming from the Thought of Mao—not on conflict. And the worker cannot decide that he'd like to work in another factory, or another trade, and simply seek and get a different job. I inquired of the spokesman of the factory Revolutionary Committee. "Can a worker transfer work by his own individual decision?" I might have asked if the

## You must find your freedom in the collective; you cannot bid for it as an individual.

leopard can change his spots. "*I-ting Pu-shih!*" ("Certainly not!") You must find your freedom in the collective; you cannot bid for it as an individual.

Some statistics by province, supplied to me by Revolutionary Committees, show why the worker is better off than in the recent past. Take Shensi. The value of fifteen days' industrial production in the province equals that for the whole year of 1949. The value of industrial production in 1970 was double that of 1965. (Shensi, it should be added, is one of the inland provinces particularly built up by the effort to reduce industrial concentration on the eastern seaboard. Textiles, a leading Shensi export, used to have to go to Shanghai for dyeing and other processing. Today all is done in Shensi, and finished products go direct from Sian to the foreign market.) At Liberation, there were 20,000 pupils in the Middle Schools of Shensi. Today there are 710,000 (population has about doubled).

In rural areas, standards are lower, and in remote counties you seem to step back in time. Many old folk are illiterate. Planting and harvesting are often done by hand. Few young people (ten a year from this commune, five from that) have gotten to a university in recent years. The shadow of the past is long. I found ex-landlords and ex-rich peasants still referred to as such, even after twenty-two years, and up to 30 percent of them still not considered sound enough to be given the rights of ordinary commune members.

Household income averaged Y70 at the Ma Luh commune in the Yangtze Delta (one of China's four "rice-bowls"—others are the Pearl Delta, Szechwan Basin, and Hunan); Y65 at the Red Star commune near Peking. Under the work-point system, wages depend upon work done (and since the Cultural Revolution, on "attitude"). At Red Star, highest household income was 80 percent more than lowest. From "private plots" (which took up 5 to 7 percent of the total land in the communes I examined) comes additional income. A Ma Luh commune official estimated the products from plots to be worth only Y18 per person per year. Yet I knocked on a door and was told by the lady who answered that her family's plot brings in Y200 by raising three pigs a year, and keeps the family in vegetables as well. Again at Red Star, a family who were expecting my visit—a seven-year-old boy had rehearsed an aria for the occasion—said they earned only Y100 a year from their plot, but informal questions in the fields brought forth higher figures.

Enormous variation marks rural conditions. In ten hours' driving through the wheatlands of north Shensi, I saw only two tractors. In Hunan, by contrast, the nippy two-wheeled tractor, now made in

many Chinese cities, was everywhere, and here and there four-wheelers also.

Along the unpaved roads of north Shensi you do not see much sign of "modernity." Carts inch by, with rocks for the building of the Sian-Yenan railroad—they are pulled by a man or woman. At a brick kiln near Tong Chwan (Copper River), there seem to be no power vehicles to carry the finished bricks, let alone a branch rail track; donkeys or people pull the loads. By the roadside, scores of people of both sexes and all ages squat, breaking up big rocks into smaller rocks by hand for the railroad construction. Mostly the wheat is harvested with a rude scythe—often a piece of metal tied to a handle with string.

As for threshing, I learned a new method on the rolling plains of Shensi—and promised the laughing peasants I'd transmit it back to Australia. These brown, wily types—who look quite dramatic in their headdress of toweling, a provincial feature—take the wheat, after they have cut it, and spread it out on the road. On the paved part of the journey north from Sian we drove over frequent stretches of it. The vehicle is the thresher: when enough trucks or wagons or cars have passed over it, boys take away the husks, and the wheat is swept up by grateful farmers and put in bags. Of course north Shensi is not among China's richest parts. Yet the vast majority of its villages are electrified, which cannot be said of the really backward areas of China.

Birth control campaigns do not meet with equal success in all places. In Kwangtung, the birthrate figure given me was 3 percent. In Hunan, 1.5 percent (in Changsha it was down to 0.97 percent last year). Seldom did I find such earnestness as when provincial officials talked of their birth control efforts. A cloud came over a lively banquet in Canton when the 3 percent rate was announced. "It's the old problem," explained a senior editor of the *Nanfang Jih-pao* (Southern Daily). "Peasants have a daughter. They think, that's no good. So they keep going till they get sons."

Industry is being made to "serve agriculture." In Shensi I found a new price system in operation since the Cultural Revolution. Transport cost, to any part of the province, is included in the set price of the item at the city of Sian. Previously transport, so backward in China, was a heavy additional item of cost. Hence the purchasing power of the commune, and of the individual peasant, is enhanced. Industry grumbles, of course, but at present it grumbles in the air.

Traveling through the hills of Kwangtung, I had been impressed by the amount of terracing done since I saw the province in 1964. Of course it enlarges the cultivable area. Yet I wondered. Won't eventual mechanization be extremely difficult? Next day, a



Canton official jumped at the question. He put down his chopsticks and turned to me for emphasis. "Our factories will have to adjust. This is China; this is the situation. They will have to produce machines, design new ones, which will work on terraced hillsides."

Certain basic achievements in rural life are undeniable. Simple education improves by leaps and bounds. Kuo Mo-jo disclosed a new figure on literacy in China. Just under 10 percent, he said, are now considered illiterate. This is the lowest figure ever given for illiteracy in China. It compares with perhaps 70 to 80 percent at Liberation.

The power pump, as a boon to water control, is a thing of emotion in the Chinese countryside today. The pumps are on the banks of waterways. On the plains, wells are dug. In the hills you find reservoirs. In these ways, the ancient evil of flood and drought has been considerably throttled. In Shensi a vivid statistic is offered. Last year, 3.5 million mou of land were newly irrigated in the province. From 1949 to 1965, 7.5 million mou had been irrigated. In the 2000 years before Liberation (yet how do they know?), 3.5 million mou—the same figure as for the one year of 1970! In Hunan, waterworks done in 1970 made 9,000 mou of land newly available for cultivation.

There is still the saying in Kwangtung. "Whether you get a harvest depends on water; whether you get a good harvest depends on fertilizer." But here progress is mixed. Organic fertilizer is generally relied upon. Not enough chemical fertilizer is yet made in China, nor is it always of good quality. Much has to be got from Japan. (Mr. Whitlam tried to interest the Chinese in Australian chemical fertilizers—but the price was too high.) Agricultural production figures suggest steady but not rapid advance. Grain output in Kwangtung, for instance, is now just double what it was in 1949 (population is up by more than one third).

One morning, on the overnight train from Changsha to Canton, I awoke to the sights of South China's rural life. There is a tranquil and unhurried air. By 6 A.M. peasants are in gentle circulation, washing themselves, standing around in singlets with mugs of tea. Smoke issues from kitchens, and children in gaudy clothes run around and point at the train. By contrast with the north, the houses are generally not mud but brick, and the donkey has given way to the water buffalo. The train enters the Nanling mountains and snakes through valleys and rounded hills which are almost feminine in their curves and undulations. Every available niche is under rice or vegetable. Now and then—to satisfy the perverse principle of "overall development"—there is inferior wheat, just as in the area near Peking peas-

ants are required to raise an inferior, dry-grown rice.

You can see the point of the Kwangtung saying, "*Ko Shan Ko Su*" ("Each valley has its own customs"), for the land is broken constantly by mountains. And from this topography you get a clue to the independent-minded Kwangtung mentality. Communization is more difficult here than on the northern plains, not only because of the hills but because of the hill-people and the localism of their ways. Soon the early morning sun glitters on the water of the rice paddies.

With shoots protruding here and there from the silver expanse, the fields look like flawed mirrors. We cross the Bei Kiang (North River), in which logs float obediently downstream to the paper mill. On a riverside path, an old woman makes her way with baskets on a pole. Brown as a nut, she wears the old-style black garments of oiled silk, and in the brilliant sun she seems for all the world a shining ebony spider.

Education is a mirror to key values and problems in China today. I looked at six universities: Peking University, which is not often open to foreigners; Tsinghua University, a polytechnic praised by the government for its high level of political consciousness; the Communications University, formerly in Shanghai but moved in 1956 to Sian to help spread development more evenly over the whole nation; Fu Tan, a fine general university in Shanghai; Hunan Normal College for teacher training in Changsha; Sun Yat Sen University, a leading southern school at Canton. I also made visits to Middle Schools in Peking, Sian, and Canton, to a Physical Education College near Peking—where the basketball players, men and women, dwarfed my 6'1"—and to a lively School of Performing Arts at Sian.

Schools, and especially universities (which I will stick to mainly), are in the grip of drastic experiments. Maoists—here I mean those who came out on top after the Cultural Revolution—said "revisionists" led by Liu Shao-ch'i sabotaged the 1958 reforms. These would have made education more egalitarian, and linked it more with the world outside the classroom. "Liuists" allegedly favored professionalism, competition, overspecialization, and individual ambition. They liked to have "professors rule the universities." Exams for them meant "ambush of the students." The Cultural Revolution, claim the Maoists, fulfilled the hope of the 1958 reforms and set China on the path to a truly socialist education system. It had two principles: unity of theory and

practice: education to "serve the working people." I went to see how this works.

You wonder at first if you are on a campus at all. Here at Communications University (C.U.) in Sian are people, dressed in conical hats and blue peasant jackets, threshing wheat (80,000 catties were produced on campus this year). In the Middle School attached to Peking Normal University, girls are making chairs. Next door are boys, helped by "veteran workers" from a nearby factory, making semi-conductors. In Canton at Sun Yat Sen University (S.Y.S.U.) I found professors tending a vegetable garden, and many classrooms turned to strange uses. One is stacked high with peanuts, the next with rice—grown by the university (the campus has seventy mou under rice). When you sit inside these schools and talk, you find a sizable part of the management to be neither students nor teachers but People's Liberation Army men, manual workers, and Party cadres.

After two or three years without classes, many universities began again last fall with a small, hand-picked enrollment. At Peking University, where there used to be 9000 students, the new class of September, 1970, numbered 2667. At Fu Tan in Shanghai, formerly with 9000, there were 1196; at S.Y.S.U., 547 where there were previously 4700; at Hunan Normal College, 440 compared with 6000 before the Cultural Revolution. Teachers outnumber students at present. Here are a few current figures for teachers, those for students in parentheses: Fu Tan, 1263 (1196); S.Y.S.U., 863 (547); Tsinghua, 3000 (2800).

These hothouse students are a new breed. None come direct from Middle School, but only after two to three years on farm or factory. They must be "politically sound" as well as bright and physically fit—much stress on health. If a would-be student is a "sturdy pine" politically, and has been strongly recommended by local units, it is not even necessary that he be a Middle School graduate. An astonishing number of the new students are members of the Party or the Communist Youth League. At S.Y.S.U., for instance, 229 of the 547 students are Chinese Communist Party and another 240 are CYL members. At Fu Tan, 359 of the 1196 belong to the Chinese Communist Party and another 458 to the CYL. Almost all of the new classes are offspring of "workers, peasants, or soldiers." At Fu Tan, whereas in 1956 only 25 percent were in this category, the figure is now 98 percent; at S.Y.S.U., 97 percent.

At Shanghai's Fu Tan, I drew aside one of the new students, Wu Fu-chieh, a political science major. Dressed like everyone else in voluminous blue trousers, white cotton shirt, and plastic sandals, he is a peasant's son, thirty years old—the average age of the

new students at Fu Tan is 24. Between Middle School and coming to the university, he worked in the Bureau of Sea Transportation, and joined the Party. In the Bureau he earned Y49 each month, and following the rule for students who worked for ten years or more after Middle School, he keeps that wage while at university. (Other students get a state bursary of Y19.5.)

Wu is a canny man who knows and believes in Marxism. But he's sober as a judge—nothing at all of the panting Red Guard about him. He knows just why he's at university, and is grateful for this chance to study politics. He will probably go back to the Bureau when his course is done. Neither from Wu nor others of the 1970 batch of students I met was there any sign of student organizations of the kind that mushroomed during the Cultural Revolution. These students are handpicked, mostly from the countryside, outnumbered by teachers and cadres, and simply have their noses to the grindstone.

Life at university has changed. Courses are shorter: two or three years at Tsinghua, where it used to be six; three years at C.U., instead of five—the reduction is similar in all six universities I looked at. What has been left out, I asked repeatedly. At H.N.C.—a teacher-training college—they have dropped the courses on "methods of teaching." Not a great wrench, I gathered, partly because they'd been based on the ideas of the Russian educationist, Ivan Andreevich Kairov. At S.Y.S.U., math courses have been integrated into dynamics, physics, and electronics. The student gets his math along with one or more of these three subjects, and the math department has been dissolved and poured into these three departments. At P.K.U., ancient history is cut back and attention placed mainly on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

These cutbacks have brought problems—and temporary confusion. One distinguished scientist, whom I talked with on four occasions, discussed this matter of shortened courses round and round. Yet I still felt puzzled about how, as at his university, five years' scientific training could be put into two and a half. Our last meeting was at Peking Airport, and we touched the question again. He concluded on a note he had not struck before: "I was not myself opposed to keeping the five-year course. Now, well now, we just have to work out what we can realistically omit."

In the classroom, lectures are less frequent. Teachers must distribute in advance what they used to give as lectures; the class then becomes a forum. Though proportions vary a lot, often half the students' time is spent outside the classroom, on labor and "sharing experiences" with people in other walks of life. Exams have lost their terror—at least for students.

## The exam is considered a test of the teacher no less than of the student.

Mostly, they are now open-book exams. Often there is no exam at all; the student is assessed by exercises done throughout the term. Exam questions are worked out with student participation. Not memory but analytic ability is weighed. The exam is considered a test of the teacher no less than of the student—and an educative experience for both. At the end of the course, no diploma awaits the student. Certificates may be given—practice varies widely—with written comments on the student by his teachers and some of his fellow students.

At P.K.U. I saw the English class which was reading and discussing Aesop's fable "The Peasant and the Snake." They received me with clapping—though few, I found, knew what or where Australia is. On the walls of the airy old classroom was a picture of Mao, some quotes from him in English, and a world map. The teacher, a graduate of the University of Nanking, addressed the simply clad students by their full names. "Comrade Wu Tse-tung, would you like to answer the Australian visitor's question?"

Since the teacher spoke with a BBC-British accent, so in their halting way did her enthusiastic students. This group of thirty-five had begun English only ten months before, yet could talk in simple phrases—remarkable compared with U.S. students after ten months of Chinese. Mostly, the students quizzed each other, in staccato English, about the fable. The courtly politeness amused me. "Who - will - answer - my - question?" Someone rises, is acknowledged, and with infinite pains stabs a reply. The questioner then says with a coast-to-coast smile: "Thankyou - very - much. Please - sit - down - now."

In a mixture of Chinese and English I questioned them (my Aesop was too rusty to go far into the fable, but I could see the moral being drawn from it: never trust appearances—that's what the peasant did, and he got bitten). Had they been out of the classroom on practical work, as the new order requires? "Well, it's not so suitable with English," explains the pink-cheeked daughter of a navy man. "The class learning Mongolian did—they went to Mongolia for several weeks. What we do is spend one day a week on a [nearby] commune." Were they sons of toil? Three of the thirty-five had military fathers; one an intellectual father; the others were sons or daughters (sexes about equal) of workers or peasants. All had, of course, spent the two or three years prior to September, 1970, in manual work—and they looked fit, even tough. I could not help concluding, after thirty minutes with this bright-eyed bunch, that P.K.U. had recruited new students who are both working-class and able.

Curriculum changes are big and complex. Let me draw their flavor, by illustration. Here is Chou

I-liang, Harvard-trained professor of history at P.K.U. After meeting him at the university, I invited him some days later to a quiet dinner *à deux* in the city. Middle-aged, of scholarly mien, Chou has close-cropped gray hair and large serious eyes. His specialty was once Buddhism—"but we don't do that sort of thing anymore." Now he works on Asian history.

But there has been little time for research in recent years, and his main writing work now is a modern history textbook, which will take account of "new interpretations" since the Cultural Revolution. Thus Li Hsiu-cheng and Shih Ta-k'ai, figures in the Taiping Rebellion, were previously thought admirable, but are now seen to have been "traitors." The team working on the textbook is a three-in-one combination of youth (Red Guards in this case), middle-aged (historians thirty-six to fifty-five), and older scholars. Until the textbook is published, many lesser colleges—who take their lead from P.K.U.—will not resume teaching modern history.

Professor Chou's own students have centered their studies this term on a nearby coal mine. One day a week for a ten-week period, they worked as laborers in the mine (Chou too). Concurrently, they studied its history. It had been an American mine in the 1890s, then Belgian, and later again, British. Three work groups each chose a special topic to delve at research level. One traced the story of strikes in the mine. Another did the story of child labor: once, they found, 40 percent of the workers had been children. The third wrote a biography, based on oral data, of a veteran worker and his family. Drafts of it they read out to miners involved—a fiery baptism for the budding historians. Meeting history in the flesh this way, Chou thinks, has proved an excellent pedagogical method.

At Fu Tan, I talked with Liu Ta-chieh, professor of Chinese literature. He was perhaps the only man I saw in China who looked like an old-style intellectual—which he is. The deliberate manner; the careful, almost ponderous way he would split a straw; the style with which he gripped his umbrella and wielded his fan. What was the main change since the Cultural Revolution in the teaching of his department? "Well, my textbook has been dropped," replied Professor Liu, gravely yet with no emotion, referring to his influential three-volume work *History of the Development of Chinese Literature*. It had insufficiently stressed "class aspects" of literature. Among other changes of emphasis, *Dream of the Red Chamber* is now treated "less as a love affair—as if there's a kind of love beyond class, which comes from so-called human nature." Professor Liu had, it seemed, taken a buffeting in the Cultural Revolution. On the other hand, his salary was unchanged at

## There will be fewer electrical engineers ... who cannot replace a fuse.

Y348 a month—just under six times the lowest teacher's salary at Fu Tan (Y60).

He had assigned his new students an interesting project to blend theory with practice. He selected a 1936 work by Hsia Yen, a leading writer of the 1930s but no longer admired. Called "Bao Shen Kung" ("Contract Work"), its setting was a mill in Shanghai, now Number 15 Cotton Mill. Hsia Yen, it is said, portrayed the workers in his story as disunited and subservient in mentality, silently accepting capitalism. "We told our students to study this work of Hsia Yen, then test the accuracy of the picture it presents. They live in Shanghai. They can go to Number 15 Cotton Mill, talk to old workers there, trace matters through. Was it as the author suggested?"

While Professor Liu recounted this, my Luxingshe aide whispered that when at Middle School, he himself had read this story, and it was then presented as a fine, sound piece of work. But today, Hsia Yen is known as an adversary of the great Lu Xun. Needless to say, the students who went to the Number 15 Cotton Mill found "grievous distortions" in "Bao Shen Kung." I am not saying the "given" nature of the conclusion means the exercise had no value for the students; since I couldn't talk with them, I don't know.

I have given tiny glimpses of a vast and varied educational experiment. The blend of theory and practice looks promising. There will be fewer electrical engineers, to recall my Canton driver's remark, who cannot replace a fuse. The learning process may benefit permanently. More to the point for the government, graduates will be more immediately useful to the economy, and the social gulf that always threatens China, between peasant and professional, will be minimized.

Yet problems are not lacking. In Changsha a student reasoned: "I come from the countryside. Yet no sooner had I come [to H.N.C.] than I had to go back for 'practical experience.' I don't need that again." He felt that as one of the new breed, he was "born red" and could now get straight down to study. In Canton there were grumblings from workers. This endless stream of students coming to the factory to get experience . . . It takes time to supervise them . . . Time is just not always available. Less serious, a new student at S.Y.S.U., who had been years on a commune, told me he found classroom discipline a bore. "I'm used to moving round all day, but now I have to sit like a stone at a desk."

The new order is egalitarian to a striking degree. The true of the atmosphere of the colleges; respect based on mere status has apparently gone. And what education exists is open as never before to sons and daughters of the ordinary man. This is especially so of Middle Schools where the new order is fully oper-

ational. By cutting the years of schooling to ten, and taking pupils on a basis nearer to simple geographic proximity than to merit as tested by exam, China is making Middle School education almost universal. In Kwangtung Province these figures were given: in the past six years Middle School enrollment has leaped from 500,000 to 2.6 million (population of the province is 45 million); 95 percent of those who finish Junior Middle School now go on to Senior Middle School. It remains to be seen whether this Middle School explosion can be matched by expansion at university level. At present, the road ends for nearly everyone after Middle School. I could get no figures, but clearly only a trickle of graduates from (expanded) Middle Schools can go on to (shrunken) universities.

And if universities expand, what will happen to the present experiments? Can they be sustained if numbers in the universities climb back to pre-Cultural Revolution levels—some five to ten times the enrollment now? Enrollment, I was told at all six universities, is to be stepped up this fall. But can special coaching for those not graduates of Middle School still be given, when there are ten times as many to coach? Can the pitch of "political soundness" be kept up—surely there cannot continue to be 80 to 90 percent of students belonging to the Party or the Communist Youth League? What about the increased burden on factories and communes which must receive students and guide their practical work? Will not troublesome student organizations reappear? Can decisions still be made by "discussion"—rather than by rule, or entrance exam, or a grading system—when there are ten times as many decisions to make?

I talked about the future with Professor Fu at S.Y.S.U., a biologist whose Ph.D. is from the University of Minnesota. Fu's own research has been redirected by the Cultural Revolution. No more esoteric topics that tickle his fancy, or publishing the results in learned journals. Now he heads a research project dictated by the needs of Kwangtung Province. How to get rid of insect pests without using pesticides—which harm crops. He is developing new species which he calls "insects to kill insects" (as we inspected some of these monstrosities, Chou Nan dryly observed: "It's like the Nixon Doctrine—'Asians to fight Asians'"). This way biology at S.Y.S.U. serves the peasants of Kwangtung.

We strolled back from the laboratory to Professor Fu's two-storied home (the rent takes Y8 each month from his salary of Y360). He spread out his hands on the living room table and wrinkled his brow. "It's all experimental. We're trying to make universities more in touch with our country, its needs. We're trying to make it socialist—the door open to anyone, and

doing work that will serve workers, peasants, and soldiers. But what the future holds is unclear. When you're on a new road you just don't know what is round the corner."

Leaving China by train through the technicolor lushness of Kwangtung's rounded hills, I felt an emotion hard to understand, dangerous to trust. Fazed by South China's beauty on a summer morning, I did not yet see two diverse currents in this opaque emotion. First there was a feeling that rubs off from the buoyancy of corporate aspiration in China. The people seemed like Rousseau's "Spartan mother," putting country before self, living as lambs of Shepherd Mao—and that is ennobling. But—here was the second current—also a feeling of painful separation from the high pitch of collective spirit. I could not live like that—how can others do so?

Behind the pain and separation lies anxiety at the "Mental Unity." Mao rules them. Nixon rules us. I said before; yet the systems of government have almost nothing in common. We have no mental unity, we have "freedom," and of our kind of freedom China has none. Peking has a parliament, but it has no more power in China than Queen Elizabeth has in England. The individual in China, insofar as he reaches beyond the practicalities of life—I don't know how many do—is enveloped by an Idea, the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. The myth of Mao Thought has reached into homes and even spirits (which Leninism or Stalinism hardly did in Russia).

This near-total control is not by police terror. The techniques of Stalinist terror—armed cops everywhere, mass killings, murder of political opponents, knocks on the door at 3 A.M. and a shot soon after—are absent in China. Though force remains the ultimate basis of any state, control of the people in China is more nearly psychological than by physical coercion. Its extent would be hard to overstate. As these pages suggest, politics reaches into every corner. Yet the method of control is amazingly light-handed by Communist standards. The informal way PLA men mingle and work with the population is remarkable to see. Peking trusts its citizens in their millions with rifles at home (members of the militia). What it does not trust them with—for the Dictatorship is by Idea—is their own minds.

There is paradox in the impression, got especially in rural parts, that people proceed with their daily lives in a relatively unpressured way. On one hand, Mao Thought pervades. On the other, the family (for instance) is extremely important to Chinese I met on this trip. The bridge is the age-old social discipline of the Chinese. The CCP has used the traditional bonds.

An instance is reverence for ancestors. The Party does not stop the girls at the Nanking factory from visiting ancestors' graves, but it tries through propaganda to turn ancestor-reverence as much as possible toward *revolutionary martyrs*.

It is no longer simply "Communists" on one hand and "Chinese society" on the other. A merger has occurred at many points—a new kind of *tao* (way) emerges. This makes possible a Dictatorship by Idea (rather than by force). It is not like Poland or Hungary, where the Communists are a blanket spread over the body social. This may be what gave me an impression in China of pervasive yet light-handed control.

Is it not worse in China than Poland or Hungary, in that the people seem to cooperate in their own unfreedom? No, because the Idea fits the experience of most Chinese. At the Peking Chinese Medicine Hospital, I met a railway worker who'd been hit by a train, and the resulting spine disorder paralyzed him from the waist down. His legs had shrunk, his hope had dwindled, and he had lain in bed like a vegetable for eighteen years. In the Cultural Revolution, when doctors were urged to tackle "even the impossible," a team at the hospital began acupuncture treatment on 151 such half-paralyzed people. One hundred and twenty-four can now walk with a stick (fifteen of these without a stick; eight of the fifteen are at work again). Most had lain in bed for years, and the marks of the bedsores were on them like burns.

The railway worker hobbled across the room on crutches to greet me, and said: "I am out of bed because of Chairman Mao's Thought. Soon I will go back to work for the sake of the revolution." At that moment the remark seemed embarrassing, yet the Myth of Mao is functional to medicine and to much endeavor in China. Was the schoolgirl really studying French to "further world revolution"? No, but the myth of revolution gives her the zeal to study French well. "Myth" is not falsehood but dramatization with a kernel of truth. The myth of Mao sums up bitter Chinese experience and lends hope. It seemed to give the railway worker a mental picture of a world he could rejoin, and his doctors that vital extra ounce of resourcefulness.

For the nation, it gives a recognizable (if distorted) summation of past struggles against landlords and foreigners, and an impulse to keep going further in the collective drama of China "standing up."

When Professor Fu at Sun Yat Sen University said his new research was aimed to serve "workers, peasants, and soldiers," he invoked a myth. This "Blessed Trinity" suffuses China today. Everything is weighed against its service to these three groups. I

## Control of the people in China is more nearly psychological than by physical coercion.

sometimes found that what this Trinity put out the front door it let slip in the back (a violinist at the School of Performing Arts in Sian said his father had been a "peasant," but he'd been a landlord who later corrected his ideas: a cadre's daughter at Peking University contrived to call her father a "worker"). But though inaccurate as portrayal of reality, the "Blessed Trinity" has meaning as an alchemy of fact and hope which suggests what the collective drama of China's revolution is about.

**Workers** stands for industrialization. They come first, since according to Marx, workers make the revolution. Workers didn't in China, but modernizing China is a good part of the revolution's aims. Mao has not made an idol of industrialization as some Marxists have in Russia. But ever since the impact of the materially superior West shattered the Ch'ing Dynasty, China's opinion leaders have defined the national power they seek partly in terms of large-scale production. Here Marxist theory and national aspiration and the instinct of the "modern" Chinese mind all coincide.

**Peasants** stands for the reality of a China still 80 percent rural. The revolution came from the villages. It had to; there was no other adequate source. Mao became its leader by grasping this, and he still resists notions of development (perhaps Liu Shao-ch'i's) which would leave rural China lagging behind the industrial sector. Producing enough food for 800 million people is the great daily task of the Chinese nation; three quarters of Chinese spend their time growing their own food; the industrial and tertiary sectors are tiny beside the food-producing sector. To keep the country ticking over and hold it together, peasants are the key. To pursue equality, as Mao is doing, the peasants are also, of course, the key.

**Soldiers** stands for the international defense of the revolution, and also for a crucial fact about the politics of the revolution. Peking's leaders won power by the gun. They have always felt threatened by U.S. encirclement. At any moment it may have been necessary once more, as against Japan, to mount "people's war." Soldiers are in this way central to China's revolutionary drama.

But the People's Liberation Army is also the linchpin of China's politics today. For it is the bridge between the peasant reality of China and the modernizing tasks. It is a peasant army. As such it is the national institution which best represents the political reality of China. Better than the Party, better than the state administration. That is why Mao used it in the Cultural Revolution for a political task—as he had used it before. It is his weapon against "revisionists" (but perhaps they are China's most orthodox Marxists!) who put their socialist faith in histori-

cal process propelled by transformation of the material base, and would leave the peasants behind. It is his weapon against "ultraleftists" (but perhaps they are China's purest Maoists!) who took Mao's idea of uninterrupted revolution all too seriously, and spiraled into the factionalism of 1967.

Workers, peasants, soldiers. Like so many slogans in China, it has a practical kernel. It ties together aims, methods, and resources. It is a myth with roots in reality.

I cannot say in blanket fashion whether this Mao Myth is "good or bad." For the ordinary Chinese it seems to give meaning to things. He can see such spectacular benefits from this present government that the collective drama—which the Mao Myth expresses—seems an acceptable way to try and get the further improvements in his life that he would like. It also stirs his national pride. The "privatistic" alternative, anyway, in a country with *per capita* income perhaps one twentieth of America's, is not a glittering one.

It is the intellectual who pays the big price. A scholar in a Chinese city, at the end of an evening's conversation, said three big things have happened since Liberation. China has "stood up." Class exploitation has gone. The nation is being "proletarianized." The first two he elaborated effectively, but he didn't convey much of the third. Either the idea seemed forced, elusive to him, or he had regrets about the way it has worked out.

Was he thinking of how the Mao Myth had "proletarianized" his field of study, twisting bits of the past to prettify the collective drama? I thought of his daughter, a bright graduate of a major university now working as a farm laborer. He had said of her in a rather flat way: "We hope that later she may be given a job that will make use of her abilities." For this man, the Mao Myth leaves high and dry his own concerns (and those of three of his children, and many of his colleagues). Whether the spoiling of these "careers" is worthwhile for the sake of the Chinese millions whose interests are put first—it is a question of values, in Peking as in Boston. In a new way, each man still has his China, as he has his Rousseau.

I can only say that the feeling of painful separation on the train from Canton was a tiny glimpse of how hard I think it is for Chinese intellectuals to accept the Mao Myth. Of course they can and do support the revolution's nationalism. That China has "stood up" puts a flash of pride in any Chinese eye. Yet they can hardly approve—especially since the Cultural Revolution, which several seemed embarrassed to talk about—of Dictatorship by Idea.

People ask, "Is China free?", but there is no objec-



## The flux of 1971 may turn out a watershed in the way people look at China.

tive measure of the freedom of a whole society. Observation in China, as study of China, suggests that the revolution has been good for workers and peasants but problematic for intellectuals. It is hard to go on from there and make overall value judgments that are honest.

First, there are so many gaps in our knowledge of China that it can be like judging America on the basis of Kent State and Angela Davis' case (I know this because I used, before I came here, to judge the United States mainly by its spectacular lapses). Second, our experience has been so different from China's. Not having plumbed the depths of brokenness and humiliation that China did in the century following the Opium Wars, we cannot know the corporate emotion that comes with the recovery. Third—a related point—the relatively powerful should judge the less powerful with caution. It is easy for the rich man to scorn the loose morals of the poor man who steals his dinner. Easy for pluralist America, which has 6 percent of world population and about 35 percent of its wealth, to attack the regimentation of China, which has about 25 percent of world population and 4 percent of its wealth. Easy, too, for tired America to shake its head at the psychological simplicities of China's nation-building mood, and forget that America was itself once in a proud, naïve stage of nation-building, bristling with a sense of innocence and mission.

Yet at one point we and China face the same value judgment. Which gets priority: the individual's freedom or the relationships of the whole society? Which unit is to be taken for policy and moral judgment alike: the nation, trade union, our class, my cronies, me? This is the hinge on which the whole issue turns. Professor Fu at S.Y.S.U. did not make his own decision to take up the problem of insect pests—it was handed him. Is that wrong? The writer, Kuo Mo-jo recalled, cannot now do books for 3000 or at most 8000 readers, as Kuo used to in Shanghai in the 1930s, but must write for the mass millions—and he's judged by whether he can do that well or not. Is that wrong?

I am not a good guide here. I felt the double emotion on the train from Canton because I am both moved by the collective priorities of China's new order and sad at the lack of individuality and choice. As a democratic socialist (not an American, but an Australian), I am (to use caricatures) against both the "jungle" of capitalism and the "prison" of Communism. This is not a popular position today, when revolution and reaction snarl a *pas de deux*. I criticize the Dictatorship by Idea in China, but not with capitalism's yardstick. To put a big matter in three sen-

tences, I criticize China not for lacking capitalism's freedom, but for distrusting the creative personality. The yardstick used—the dignity of each person, the fellowship of all persons—is the same as what I use against capitalism. Capitalism opens the door to tyranny of wealth; Chinese Communism opens the door to the tyranny of a corporate design.

After leaving China, I met in Hong Kong a young man caught between "jungle" and "prison." Vincent swam from Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong, ten hours by night in the water, mainly to get better educational opportunities. (In 1971 some 20,000 will leave China for Hong Kong, many of them young people who wanted to go to college and got sent to a village instead.) But his father, a teacher of Japanese in Hong Kong, would not or could not pay the big sum of money needed to educate him, so Vincent went to work in a factory. Now he is disillusioned with Hong Kong. "I work hard—and for nothing. To work hard for my country, that's all right. But here, it's not for China: it's not for anything. All you can do in Hong Kong is spend." Vincent is capable, and left China because he wasn't using his abilities there. Now the lack of social purpose and the jumbled priorities of Hong Kong weigh on him. As we parted he asked my advice—should he go back?

I am not going to end with moral judgments, because history is just now scrambling up our moral categories rather drastically, not least those used between Americans and Chinese. A symbol catches the change. In Taiwan today you watch Chinese boys play baseball—America's game. In Hong Kong you watch Chinese boys play cricket—Britain's game. This year Peking launched its new America policy with table tennis—China's game.

The point is that China, so long the object of our policies and our judgments, is no longer a passive but an active factor in the world. Moral judgments are inescapable, but the formulation of the issues is often at history's mercy. The flux of 1971 may turn out a watershed in the way people look at China. What we think of China will matter a little less. What China thinks of us will matter a little more.

This happens by delicate nuance; yet it adds up to a major historical mutation. The Chinese are going to start asking some of the questions. No doubt they will be just as odd as some of our questions. A Chinese official who follows American affairs asked me in a train one day: "Why do you think the novel is dead in America?" Another, unable even to conceive that Daniel Ellsberg may have acted alone in divulging the Pentagon Papers, inquired in a confidential tone: "Are the Morgans or the Rockefellers behind him?" □

(Coming: Part 2, China and The World)

# THE 800,000,000

## China and the World

by Ross Terrill

"Now Dulles has a successor," said Mr. Chou with a laugh that was not a laugh of amusement, "in our Northern neighbor." Part II of Professor Terrill's report from China reveals the thoughts of Chairman Mao's associates on the Kissinger and Nixon trips, the Sino-Soviet-American power balance, the United Nations, and Japan. He shows how the ideologues of Peking are also masters of *Realpolitik*.

### I. Chou En-lai

The prelude to a meeting with a Chinese leader is always the same. There is no fixed appointment time, but word is one day given "not to leave the hotel." Suddenly a phone call comes to say that the man you are to see has just left the compound where the Chinese leadership works. You leave immediately for the Great Hall of the People. The idea is to have the two parties arrive at the same time.

With Chou En-lai, Prime Minister for twenty-two years and (last summer) number-three man in China's government, the call is likely to come late at night. This war-horse of revolution, "seventy-three years young," works until 4 A.M. or 5 A.M., then sleeps until midmorning. Our group (I was with my countryman E. Gough Whitlam, leader of the Australian Labor Party) was advised late on July 5 to stay about the Peking Hotel. There would be an "interesting film" that evening. The Foreign Ministry official did not explain why we were advised to put on suits and ties for the occasion. Just after 9 P.M. a call came: the film was off, Chou En-lai was on.

The Great Hall of the People is really the Great Hall of the Government. Only on highly formal occasions do the masses view its murals and tread its crimson carpets. A stone oblong in semi-Chinese style, it was built in a mere ten months around the time of the Great Leap Forward. Its fawn solidity stands guard over the biggest square in the world, Tien An Men; the Imperial City is to the left, the big museums opposite. The building's area of 560,000 square feet includes an auditorium for 10,000 people, a room decorated in the style of each of China's provinces, and sparsely furnished halls such as the East Room, where we found the Prime Minister.

He enters from one door, we from another. A red badge with the Chinese characters "Serve the People" lights up his tunic. He is all in gray except for black socks inside leather sandals and black hair showing strongly through silver fringes. Introduced to him by Ma Yun-chen of the Foreign Ministry (the man who attended James Reston at his hospital bed), I suddenly realized that he is a slim, short man. We talked for a moment of the background to the Whitlam visit; then he asked where I learned Chinese. Told "in America," he smiled broadly and said, "That is a fine thing, to learn Chinese in America!"

Recalling his amazing career over half a century, I marveled at his freshness. This man has been a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party since 1927 (well before Mao); was forty-five years ago a close colleague of Chiang Kai-shek's in Canton; played leftist politics in Europe at the time of Lenin; covered the last miles of the Long March through north Shensi in 1935 on a stretcher, gravely ill. Now he reaches across an epoch of China's modern history to face Richard Nixon in the ping-pong diplomacy of the 1970s.

Though he is like David to Mr. Whitlam's Goliath (the Australian is 6 feet 4), you quickly forget his height; it is his face and hands which rivet every eye



in the room for the next two hours. The expression is tough, even forbidding, yet sometimes it melts into the disarming smile which used to flutter the hearts of foreign ladies in Chungking (Mr. Chou was the Communist representative in Chiang Kai-shek's capital during World War II). The eyes are steely, but they laugh when he wants them to. The voice, too, has double possibilities. One moment he is nearly whispering, weary and modest. The next he is soaring to contradict his visitor, and the streaky, sensual voice projects across the hall. From a side angle, a rather flat nose takes away all his fierceness. The mouth is low in the face and set forward tautly, giving a grim grandeur to the whole appearance.

The small, fine hands, moving sinuously as if direct from the shoulder, serve his rapidly varying tone and mood. Now they lie meekly on the blue-gray trousers, as he graciously compliments Mr. Whitlam on the Labor Party's "struggle" to get back to power in Australia. Now they fly like an actor's in the air, as he denounces Prime Minister Sato of Japan. Now the right hand is extended, its fingers spread-eagled in professorial authority, as he instructs me to study well a recent editorial in the *People's Daily*.

Sitting back in a wicker chair, wrists flapping over the chair's arms, he seems so relaxed as to be without bones, poured into the chair, almost part of it, as persons seem part of their surroundings in old Chinese paintings. Beside this loose-limbed willow of a man, Mr. Whitlam, hunched together in concentration, seems stiff as a pine.

But the conversation is a freewheeling give-and-take. The Australian style, blunt and informal, fits in well with Mr. Chou's. The evening has a lively, argumentative note rare in talks between politicians of different countries, rarer still when the countries represent different civilizations. When he disagreed—as on how widespread militarism is in Japan—the Prime Minister would interrupt in English: "No, no, no!" Talking of Australian affairs, he twice frankly said he hoped the Labor Party would win the next election in 1972. Occasionally he struck a didactic note. "As you come to China," he said after suggesting a lesson Australia ought to draw (about the United States) from China's experience with Russia, "we ask you to take this as a matter for your reference." Both sides enjoyed themselves making barbs against John Foster Dulles' policies. The ambience was, in brief, keen and frank.

Mr. Chou's aides from the Foreign Ministry and the State Council office had prepared him well. He knew, from reports of what his visitors had said to the Chinese Foreign Minister, that on Taiwan and China's United Nations seat no great problem existed between Peking and the Labor Party. Mr. Whitlam said a Labor government would switch Australia's diplomatic ties from Taipei to Peking, and vote for Peking's installation in the China seat at the UN. (Prime Minister McMahon's Liberal regime supported Washington's unsuccessful "two Chinas" proposal in October.) So the Prime Minister hardly

touched these bilateral issues, but instead pitched a complex argument about the overall problems of Asia. (The efficient briefing continued throughout the week. At the evening's end, Mr. Whitlam happened to recall that his birthday was near. Five days later in Shanghai, the Australian found his birthday observed with a festive dinner and a large cake—tactfully adorned with a single candle.)

Mr. Chou painted a picture of China threatened by three adversaries: the United States, Russia, and Japan. In one way or another, the Chinese press has given this picture ever since November, 1969, when Japan—following the communiqué signed by Nixon and Sato—seemed to step up to the status of major enemy in Peking's eyes. Interesting in the Prime Minister's remarks was the pattern of relationships he sketched between the three adversaries.

After preliminary talk, Mr. Chou reached for his mug of tea, sipped, swilled with deliberation, then asked a question which turned the conversation where he wanted it to go. He was going to be very direct, he warned. What was meant by saying, as the Australians had said the previous day, that the ANZUS treaty (which binds the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in mutual defense) was designed to meet any restoration of Japanese militarism? "That is a special approach to us, so I would like to ask you to inform us what articles or what points of that treaty are directed toward preventing the restoration of Japanese militarism?" Mr. Chou was fingering the apex of Peking's triangular anxiety.

The Australian background was explained. After World War II, Australia was much less anxious to sign a peace treaty with Japan than was the United States (and to this day Australians are slower to forget Japanese aggression than are Americans). The United States signed ANZUS (in 1951) in large measure to reassure an Australia (and New Zealand) still fearful of Japan. This perspective on ANZUS "down under" was agreed on by all shades of political opinion. The treaty was a purely defensive arrangement, concerned not with Communist revolutions in Asia, but with Japan—the only country that has ever attacked Australia.

The Chinese leaders leaned forward attentively. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Chi P'eng-fei) and Foreign Trade (Pai Hsiang-kuo) were present with senior aides, but the Prime Minister did all the talking. "You know, we too have a defensive treaty, concluded one year before the treaty you have." He recalled with a grim, ironic smile: "That treaty was called the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid. And its first article was that the aim of the treaty is to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism!"

But what has happened, the Premier asked rhetorically, his eyes and hands now stirring to life. His an-

swer, in a word, was that both Australia's ally (the United States) and China's ally (Russia) have gone back on their pledge to forestall any new danger from Japan. He charged that the Pentagon "is considering whether to give Japan tactical nuclear weapons or even something more powerful." Does not the fourth Japanese defense plan total \$16 billion, one third more than the amount spent on the three previous plans put together? The Nixon Doctrine, he noted, turns Japan into "a vanguard in the Far East." With a shrewd addition to the usual slogan ("using Asians to fight Asians"), designed to make his visitors feel their potential importance, he assailed the doctrine's motives. "It is in the spirit of using . . . 'Austro-Asians to fight Austro-Asians.'"

Then Mr. Chou weighed the actions of the Soviet Union. He never referred to it by name but by sarcastic indirection. "And what about our so-called ally? What about them? They have very warm relations with the Sato government." Unveiling China's vision of the world, the Premier wove in two further themes. The Russians, he observed, are also "engaged in warm discussions with the Nixon government on so-called nuclear disarmament." Now his point came home: "Meanwhile we, their *ally*, are being threatened by *both* [Japan, the United States] *together!*" He finished with an application to Australia's situation. "So we feel our 'ally' is not so very reliable. Is your 'ally' so very reliable?"

The Premier had a formidable case. He had put it with passion and embroidered it with detail apt for Australian listeners. It was, Whitlam conceded, a "powerful indictment," and the Australian took a few moments to marshal himself and probe its questionable parts.

- The first theme had been Japanese militarism.
- The second, the failure of Washington and Moscow to resist it.
- The third, the charge that the United States and Russia are in collusion with each other.
- The fourth, a deep skepticism that any country can really be the ally of any other, an assertion that each country is utterly alone in the world, with nothing but its own resources and its "independence" to gird it.

Throughout forty days in China, these four themes met me at high levels and low. In a moment there is more to say of each. But stay now with Mr. Chou, for he had a fifth theme in his analysis of the triangle of menace facing China. It was introduced by another of the curious historical analogies he is fond of deploying.

During the talk Mr. Chou showed a kind of fascination with John Foster Dulles. I remembered with a certain shame what had reportedly happened between these two men at the Geneva Conference in 1954. After lunch one day Dulles walked into the chamber and found only one man there—Chou En-

lai. An embarrassing turn of events! Chou held out his hand. Dulles declined it (the Reuters journalist at Geneva told me he murmured "I cannot"), gripped his hands behind his back, and strode out. But this evening Mr. Chou displayed no bitterness, just amusement, at Dulles; and a hearty contempt for his policies. Recalling the circle of defense pacts, multilateral and bilateral, which Dulles made with nations on China's southeastern borders—and showing accurate knowledge of Dulles' role as an adviser to the Truman Administration before he became Secretary of State—the Premier mused that it seemed to be an imperative of the "soul" of Dulles to throw a military harness around China. He spoke, I felt, as a man gazing down the corridor of history rather than as one faced with burglars at the door.

Suddenly it became clear that this historical excursion was for the purpose of analogy. He switched to the present. "Now Dulles has a successor," said Mr. Chou with a laugh that was not a laugh of amusement, "in our Northern neighbor." The Premier was launched in earnest on his fifth theme. *Today's military encirclement of China is by Russia.*

This emphasis—that the Dulleses of the 1970s sit in Moscow—was confirmed when discussion turned to present trends within the United States. Mr. Whitlam said that the "soul of Dulles does not go marching on" in America. American public opinion, he judged, would not again permit its government to practice the interventionism in Asia that resulted from the "destructive zeal" of Dulles. Mr. Chou responded: "I have similar sentiments to you on such a positive appraisal of the American people." By implication he agreed that Dullesism was now eclipsed in the United States.

Later he spoke admiringly of the strength of anti-war feeling from coast to coast in the United States ("Even military men on active service and veterans have gone to Washington to demonstrate"). He frankly revealed the source of his confidence about the future course of U.S. policy: "The American people will *force* the American government to change its policies." Casting around the room, Mr. Chou asked if his visitors had "in the past two years or so" been in the United States. They had. He then summed up with heavy stress "So you realize from your own experience that in these past years the American people have been in the process of change."

Of course, the Chinese Premier disapproves of particular current U.S. actions in Asia; his words on Indochina made that quite plain. But when he mapped trends, the United States did not seem to loom largest among his concerns. And when he analyzed the dynamics within the triangle of threat, the United States was evidently not the ultimate focus of opposition. He lashed Washington less for its own activities than for its support of Japanese activities and for its collusion with Russian activities.

Caution would be wise in construing what Mr. Chou said. Maybe the three threats to China are so

diverse in character that comparing their magnitude is invalid. The Japanese threat is "rising." The Russian threat is "immediate" in a crude military sense. The U.S. threat may yet be the "biggest" if the three were to be measured objectively against each other at the present moment. A conversation cannot give systematic finality to this caldron of slippery variables. Nevertheless, it was all very different from what Peking was saying in 1964 or even two years ago. Here was a picture of the world that featured power more than ideology, fluid forces more than rigid blocs, emerging problems more than well-worn problems.

Recall that the Premier was talking to Australians, and to Australians whose views on Taiwan did not greatly differ from his own. So the two chief bones of bilateral contention between Peking and Washington—the UN seat, the U.S. military presence in Taiwan—did not even come into the conversation. Maybe Mr. Chou calculated that of the three threats to Chinese security, Japan was the one to stress to these visitors. The Russians are far from Australia. The American tie is intimate, and no Australian leader is about to break it. Japan, however, is both important to Australia and a country about which Australians have ambivalent feelings. Yet it was remarkable that Mr. Chou did not raise—nor did his Foreign Minister the previous day—queries about the substantial and sensitive American bases (some related to nuclear weaponry) that dot Australia. Mr. Whitlam told me he had expected—as I had—that the Chinese would harp upon these bases.

It was easy to see that Japan was in the forefront of the Prime Minister's mind. Whichever country came up, he linked it somehow with Japan. He quoted the Japan Socialist Party to buttress his point of view. Broaching the subject of nuclear weapons, he seemed more worried by potential Japanese weapons than by existing massive American and Russian stockpiles. Discussing the Australian Labor Party's international connections, he wondered in particular if it was close to the Japanese socialists. Should not Mr. Whitlam, when he left China for Japan—Mr. Chou had somehow unearthed this unpublicized fact of Mr. Whitlam's itinerary—make a point of having serious talks with the Japanese socialist leaders as well as with Mr. Sato? The Komeitō ("Clean Government") Party especially kept popping up. Mr. Chou had met with its leaders the previous week (I had traveled into China in their compartment and watched them photograph each other, the train, and the countryside all the way from Hong Kong to Canton). Was it not "quite something for a Japanese, Buddhist, pacifist party" to make the shift it has this year (to a rather pro-Peking position)? Musing on the Labor Party's prospects of winning power in Australia next year, the Prime Minister again brought in the Komeitō Party, and made a comparison with it. But seeing its inaptness, he diplomatically qualified himself: "Of course it's different; your party is very near to power."

## II. Behind the Kissinger Trip

Let us leave Mr. Chou there, broaden the canvas a little, and consider more of his remarks as they come into the story. As to diplomacy, I found Peking in a springtime mood of growth and hope. Some Western ambassadors, glazed by long years of boredom in Peking, flexed their muscles like invalids just out of bed. New ambassadors were arriving every few weeks, as the list of countries which had recently recognized the People's Republic of China lengthened: Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Italy, Nigeria, Chile, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Iran, Cameroon, Austria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkey. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, severely short of personnel since the time of the Cultural Revolution, resembled a marketplace bursting with products but short of salesmen.

A bevy of ambassadors accredited to Peking had just returned from a "diplomatic tour" of South China. Nothing like this had occurred for years—for some it was their first sight of a Chinese city other than Peking—and they were accompanied in cordial fashion on the trip by a Vice Foreign Minister. Contacts between foreign diplomats and Chinese officials have this year increased manifold. The French Ambassador remarked over dinner that his last guest had been Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister and perhaps the leading architect of China's policy toward the West. (Ch'iao arrived in New York in November to head China's UN delegation.) The Indian and British chargés, so long in the doghouse, still glowed from getting a warm smile and pleasant words from Chairman Mao at the last May 1 festivity. It was all like rain after a long drought.

But the most poignant element was the contrasting stance of the Russians and the Americans. The whole situation had put the men from Moscow in a foul mood.

The pinnacle of the summer's excitement—it was salt in Russia's wounds—was the Sino-American meeting in Peking in the second week of July and the announcement that Nixon himself had arranged to visit the Middle Kingdom. During my first week in China, I spent a morning at the Peking Arts and Crafts Factory, where delicate work is done in jade and ivory carving, lacquer, and the incredible *nei-hua* (painting a picture on a tiny bottle from the inside). Here were superb things—one piece just done was going on the market at 100,000 yuan (\$40,000)—and several craftsmen, exponents of *nei-hua* and designers of gaudy birds, were ripe with fifty years' experience. But the factory's star project, now in the design stage, was an intricate ivory-carved memorial—paddles, balls, Glenn Cowan's long hair and all—of the visit to China by the American ping-pong players! No wonder the Russians gnash their teeth.

In the Chinese capital, during June, there were occasions to glimpse the unfolding of an apparently new America policy. It is a story of caution, uncer-

tainty, yet basic consistency from the Chinese side. Saturday morning, June 19, two Chinese diplomats invited me for a talk in a faded lounge of the International Club. Beer and cakes were served—ambitious fare for nine thirty on a Peking summer morning. I expected a *tour d'horizon* of Chinese foreign policy, and some exchange on Chinese-Australian relations.

But these two officials had other fish to fry. America was their interest, and I was hard put to get any questions in on other matters that concerned me. We went into the various positions within the U.S. Administration and among Democratic senators on China policy. We considered how McGovern differed from Kennedy on “one China” and “two Chinas.” Why the Pentagon seemed tougher on Taiwan than certain elements in the White House. What the nuances of Harvard Professor John Fairbank’s “culturalistic” approach to the Taiwan issue are, in contrast to his colleague Professor Jerome Cohen’s “legalistic” approach. The center of gravity of their interest was entirely concrete and practical. Impossible to miss the difference from talking on equivalent topics to Americans. In America the thrust of the questioning of a foreigner is often “What do you think of us?” But these Chinese officials, caring little what the foreigner thought of China, were concerned instead with the question “How can China get what it wants?”

The second issue was the 1972 election. It was a thing of wonder to hear these officials of the most secretive foreign policy establishment on earth discuss the foreign policy angles of an American election. The cast of mind was like a blend of Jeane Dixon and the most ambitious kind of social science. They expected a statement, free of any ifs or buts, of who was going to win. It dawned on me that Peking might prefer to deal with a monolithic, dictatorial Washington rather than with the cacophonous pluralism of voices which democratic America is.

Like terriers to a favorite bone, they seemed to come back always to one issue. It boiled down to this. Which was the better prospect: the reasonable China policy of certain Democratic senators—with the uncertain chance of its becoming U.S. policy; or the less reasonable but evolving China policy of Nixon—with the certainty that here was a real live government you could do business with? I later learned that this was perhaps the crucial question on America policy facing Peking in the late spring and early summer.

The third issue was Henry Kissinger. How much power does he have over U.S. policy? Is it true that he is more “open-minded” toward China than key officials in the Pentagon and the State Department who also advise Mr. Nixon? Kissinger’s alleged hostility to the Soviet Union struck them as one of his positive attributes. I added that I knew that Kissinger finds Moscow’s methods baffling: he sees decisions suddenly reversed, as if there were a “government A” and a “government B” tugging away in dif-

ferent directions. One of the Chinese said that that was exactly Peking’s impression of Moscow. It reminded him of a saying dating from the fluid Warring States period (fourth century B.C.): “*Ch’ao Ch’in Mu Ch’u*” (“In the morning for Ch’in, in the evening for Ch’u”). “The Russians are just like that,” he said; “you never know where you stand with them.”

Struck by the interest in Kissinger’s mind and writings, I did not yet know how immediate these matters were for Peking officials. But two features of the conversation at the International Club stuck in my mind: the apparent pragmatism of the analysis of American trends, and the isolation of two policies—Taiwan and the UN seat—to a degree that they seemed erected into absolute goals in themselves, not to be qualified by other goals.

Over the next few days I went to talk with more Chinese officials and with five European ambassadors (or *chargés*, in the case of countries which do not have full-fledged embassies in Peking) about Peking’s America policy. Three points of note emerged concerning the genesis of the Sino-American flirtation.

A basis was laid in 1969, when Nixon saw De Gaulle and De Gaulle reported the talk to the Chinese, for an American move toward China which made it a little less difficult, two years later, for Peking to bring itself to believe that the U.S. President meant business. It is no secret that Nixon admired De Gaulle (this at least he has in common with Mr. Mao). He seemed moved to talk to the French President about some of his long-term goals. From the man whom De Gaulle chose to relay the points to Peking, I heard of Nixon’s words and of what the Chinese thought of them. Nixon declared to De Gaulle—in his third month in office—that he was going to withdraw from Vietnam come what may, and that he was going, step by step, to normalize relations with China. Peking was impressed with the first point, and as events unrolled and U.S. troops came back from Saigon, began to realize that Nixon had meant what he told De Gaulle.

On the second point—normalizing relations with China—Peking was more cautious. Could this traveling salesman in the lurid merchandise of anti-Communism really bury the past on China policy? But at least an intriguing seed had been planted in the back of Peking’s mind. Subsequent events—including Nixon’s zigzag steps along the path of Vietnam withdrawal—suggested to the Chinese that the gap between words and deeds might be less in Nixon’s case than it had been with Johnson. If he was doing what he said he would on Vietnam, perhaps he would on China also? This background—as European go-betweens testify—steadied Peking’s hand during the Sino-American flirtation that swelled in the spring of 1971.

The second point is a double one about Laos. The

✓ "incursion" into southern Laos last February deeply alarmed China. One of the highest officials in the State Department cynically styled the attack a "widening down" of the war. Peking was more struck by the "widening" aspect than the "down" aspect. I had known last January—through friends of China's whom Peking consulted on the matter—that China was concerned at the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in conjunction with the buildup on the southern Laos border (and the evacuation of South Vietnam's northern provinces). When the "incursion" began, Peking was anxious lest the government of Souvanna Phouma cave in under the pressure and fall to a rightist coup. Concerned also about northern Laos—Hanoi's chief concern, of course, was the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos—China had some thirty divisions alerted in its bordering province of Yunnan.

But did Washington not assure Peking that the aims in Laos were "limited"? A Northern European ambassador discussed this with Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister of China. "We can never be sure," observed Mr. Ch'iao. He recalled the self-unleashing of General MacArthur on the Chinese-Korean border while Truman protested the "limited" nature of the United States's Korean operation. "We were fairly confident of Nixon's limited intentions in Laos, but not sure some general wouldn't take it into his head to provoke China, or cover failure with a drastic escalation." This Chinese view of events, said Mr. Ch'iao, can be discerned between the lines of the speech that Chou En-lai made during his March visit to Hanoi.

When the U.S.-backed incursion by Saigon into Laos failed, bringing none of the military and political complications that Peking earlier thought possible, Peking was buoyed. If anything, Chinese optimism about Indochina was now higher than it had been before the Laos operation began. Saigon had "picked up a stone to throw against the people's forces only to drop it on its own feet." It had merely given fresh evidence of its military and political weakness. Peking's conviction that effective U.S. force in Asia is in a large and long decline also deepened. For Washington did nothing drastic to salvage the Laos incursion. In fact, the flirtation with the United States would not have unfolded if the U.S.-Saigon thrust into Laos had gone well (or greatly widened the war). Yet its lack of success provided all the more reason—given the logic which underlies Peking's whole America policy—to put aside doubts and press on with the flirtation.

The third point concerned tactics, and hinged on Peking's reading of the American domestic political scene. In the early spring, Peking had reached the point of being ready to permit one or more leading Democratic senators to visit China. It was part of the ping-pong package: there would be opposition politicians, as well as sportsmen, journalists, and scholars. But before the decision could be implemented, the

mutual coaxing between the Nixon government and Peking accelerated. Hesitations about the Democratic senators occurred. The option was the one that the two diplomats had suggested to me at the International Club: to coax Nixon further, or to cultivate the Democratic opposition? The Chinese were not sure they could do both. For the time being, at least, they (evidently) resolved to keep the line open with Nixon and see where it would lead. Exchanges continued between Washington and Peking. Neither McGovern nor Kennedy came to China in June, though at one stage it had seemed certain that they would.

On July 2, I spent four hours with an eloquent spokesman of the Chinese government in a suite at the Peking Hotel. "Mr. Y" I called him in Part I (*The Atlantic*, November, 1971), in quoting his low opinion of Chinese propaganda; he, too, came to New York in November as a member of China's UN delegation. Though we planned to talk mainly of social developments and political thought, America (where he once lived) was also much on Mr. Y's mind.

This strategist and "ideas man" has for many years dealt with international matters. He was like a ship in full sail when explaining the new phase in China's foreign outlook. It clearly pleased him. He had argued for it; he knew its rationale. He made several points which are crucial to understanding why Peking is going down the path of détente with Nixon.

"The opening up is going to go far," he told me; "it's a big thing." He added sharply: "And it's about time we did it, too." But why has it now become possible? We spoke of the Taiwan problem, on which he gave the long-standing Chinese position and said that "everything" in Sino-American relations depends upon the removal of this bone in the national throat of China. But why, I asked, had China started people-to-people diplomacy with the United States at a time when Washington's policy on Taiwan was just as it had always been? Nothing on the Taiwan question, it seemed, could account for the genesis of the ping-pong diplomacy. Mr. Y had quite a different reason to give. "Yes, you are right. The U.S. government made no change on Taiwan. We did it because of the new attitudes among the American people."

Unfortunately, he did not enlarge on that, but swept on to his central point. *America no longer has the capacity to work its will in Asia.* Now he was onto broad historical themes; the loquacious Cantonese swelled in him. The gist lay in the distinction between military power and political goals. Washington has the first, but is muddled about the second. Hardly new to those who have lived through the "Vietnam years" in America.

But to hear it in Peking is to hear it in quite a fresh tone. Mr. Y is not bent on a theoretical discussion of



ons. This is not a "dissenting" quibble from within the camp. The hour is long past when Washington missed its chance to grasp the fact that military power from outside Asia is unlikely to attain political goals within Asia. Now I was listening to a Chinese official coolly describe the consequences in Asia of Lyndon Johnson's failure to grasp the point. An abstract truth at home had become concrete truth here in Peking. At home one debates the point dialectically—still hoping that wisdom may prevail. From a Chinese in 1971, the point somehow strikes home with a more final logic, if only because it comes from outside you, and with the weight behind it of Asia's most influential government.

There was therefore a curious authority to Mr. Y's analysis. A point I had made in the wilderness of theory and dissent since 1965 now stared me in the face as a cold, hard fact of international politics. The Far East is now the way it is because people like Mr. Y saw, and Johnson did not, the political limits of alien military force. I realized, as Mr. Y discoursed, to what effect the Chinese, with their long memories and their infinite patience, had waited and watched through the "Vietnam years" while America bloodied its head against a wall of its own making.

"The U.S.A. put a million men around China," Mr. Y did not say "in Vietnam," "off Japan," "in Thailand," and so on, but "around China." And to what avail? "It simply has not worked." There was not a trace of moralism; he was like history's physician. "You can't do that for long. First, you have to pay for them while they are out there, far from home. You have to feed them, supply them, and this takes taxes which the American people will not sustain."

Some of his remarks came in Marxist dress, and the reasons he gave for the subsidence of U.S. power in Asia could be questioned. But his summaries conveyed a gut assessment of America's failure to prevail in Vietnam and of why China is now ready to sit down and talk with the United States.

He came to a second problem that Washington has faced. "You have the troops there; you start a war, fought with no clear aims; but how do you end it? It is so easy to start these kinds of wars, but not so easy to wind them up." Finally he spoke of the various forms of power. "The third problem was that spreading all those troops around China did not even increase the bargaining power of the U.S."

Do nuclear weapons increase a country's bargaining power? "Only if the other country fears them," he replied. "If the other country does not fear them, then nuclear weapons are not a deterrent, much less a decisive force in international struggles." Mr. Y was making an assumption that seemed basic to his view of the United States—that the United States almost certainly would not use nuclear weapons. Here was one more sign of its flagging will. He is less confident that the Russians lack the will to use nuclear weapons.

But Mr. Y did not merely mean that nuclear weap-

ons are without power because they are unlikely to be used. He meant that they are literally without any power to change the world! For a country cannot be "captured"—occupied and ruled—by the use of nuclear weapons; only physically laid waste. And the importance of nuclear weapons short of their actual use—their deterrent effect—exists only if the potential victim fears them.

Mr. Y gave a picture of a China less pressured than in the past. More buoyant about its options. Possessing more room to maneuver. I sensed a link between the enhanced international security and the readiness to be self-critical. Mr. Y tells me about the overselling of national historical monuments. "We have had so much escalating rhetoric here," he confessed. "Once I even went to two tombs in different places, each of which claimed to contain the same Han Dynasty emperor!" The next moment he rather confidently dissects the troubles within the United States. It seemed that America's troubles were a kind of encouragement to this Chinese official (who does not hide from himself how great China's own troubles are).

And America's troubles, Mr. Y felt, meant that America would now give China less trouble. Having lived for so long in a world they never made, encircled by those one million Americans under arms, the Chinese are starting to think that they may take a share in shaping at least Asia's future patterns. Like the two diplomats at the International Club, Mr. Y put greatest policy emphasis on Taiwan and the UN seat. He believed—and events so far have certainly not shown him wrong—that there was a better chance now than in the past of China's getting an acceptable arrangement with the United States on these two long-standing goals.

Mr. Y was not blind to the sweetness, from China's point of view, of the displeasure caused in Moscow by the Sino-American flirtation. With his eagle-eyed watch on the U.S. scene, he had noticed things I had written. I recalled to him that in 1968 I had published (in *Motive* magazine) the prediction: "There will come eventually one small sign that Washington has accepted the Chinese present as a chapter in world history: the readiness of officials . . . to refer to 'Communist China' by its name, the 'People's Republic of China,' the way they brought themselves to refer to 'Communist Russia' by its name, the 'Soviet Union.'" Mr. Y had heard about the first occasion on which Mr. Nixon had publicly used the phrase "People's Republic of China"—when the Rumanian President visited Washington. He had also heard that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, phoned Henry Kissinger in agitation the same evening to find out the meaning of this outrageous verbal accuracy. The incident made him chuckle. Pleasant that China, which Mr. Y was old enough to remember as the hopelessly "sick man of

Asia," could without lifting a finger cause a ruffle between the "superpowers." It seemed to me, however, that he saw the frustration of Moscow as a by-product of the Chinese-American détente, not as a major Chinese goal in the pursuit of that détente.

That week in Peking, Kissinger's name cropped up with a frequency that puzzled me at the time. On the morning that Mr. Y nused on Kissinger's readiness to disregard Russian sensibilities if the science of power required it, Hsinhua, the Chinese news agency, reported Kissinger's arrival in Saigon. I did not know—no foreigner in Peking did, and precious few Chinese, since the Politburo kept the Chinese Foreign Ministry even more in the dark about the trip than Mr. Nixon kept the American State Department—that a later stop on the same journey would be Peking. But three days later, on July 6, the professor was again brought into the conversation, by Kuo Mo-jo, Vice President of the Congress. Amidst an interview about intellectual life in China, he interpolated musings about Kissinger's trip to Asia. Not again, I thought with a sinking feeling, for I wanted to draw the Chinese leader out more on cultural matters. But Mr. Kuo would make statements about Kissinger that sat in the air inviting response. "We don't know enough about the thinking of this man . . ."

There were others in Peking who would have liked to know more about the "thinking of this man." On July 10, Kissinger's main day of talks with Chinese leaders, I found myself at the North Vietnamese Embassy. The Hanoi official didn't know of Kissinger's presence—he would not have talked to me at length that day if he had—but he smelled a rat in Sino-American relations. His informality—putting a hand on my knee, drinking despite the morning hour—did not hide but rather underlined his anxiety at some of the developments of the spring which we talked about.

Of course, Hanoi was pleased that Peking stressed so much, and so unusually, the seven-point peace proposal that Madame Binh of the Viet Cong made in Paris on July 1. But Nixon had launched "sinister schemes," said the Vietnamese diplomat. He grew more explicit. "We know that the ending of the U.S. trade embargo against China was designed to produce a response from China which might pose problems for our struggle." Hanoi's nightmare, I gathered from other sources, was that a "linking" might somehow be effected between Indochina issues and the Taiwan issue. Knowing that some people in Washington have toyed with this idea, I now asked directly if North Vietnam had any fear that Peking might under some circumstances agree to such a linking. The answer was nonexistent but eloquent. The man from Hanoi alternately smiled and furrowed his brow. He leaned forward and put his hand on my knee. "What have the Chinese comrades indicated to you about this?"

### III. Issues: The UN, Taiwan

Six days later I arrived by train from Nanking at the lakeside resort of Wusih (the town's name means "No Tin." In the Han Dynasty, 2000 years ago, the district exhausted its tin mines). Driving to a hotel in the midday heat, I heard the radio announcement of Kissinger's visit and Nixon's impending visit to China. Unadorned by commentary, it was identical with the seven-line story in the next day's *People's Daily*. There was no follow-up coverage, much less an orgy of speculation, as in the American press. The Chinese government closed up like a clam on informal talk with visitors about foreign affairs. Rich conversations of previous weeks were not repeated after July 16. Nor was I able, despite earnest requests, to go back immediately to Peking.

My hosts in Wusih, like workers in the city's factories, showed interest in the announcement, but were reticent about commenting on it. The Foreign Ministry official traveling with me, however, did not hide his satisfaction. The U.S. President was coming to China; this he stressed. Nixon said he wanted to come; Peking graciously agreed; the meetings would take place on Chinese soil.

Into policy matters the official did not venture. This was not merely because the phone call he had just received from Peking briefed him only in outline. He seemed totally confident that China's policies (touching Sino-American relations) had not changed and would not need to change. He spoke as if China were a fixed point in a fluid world. The United States was rethinking matters. That is interesting, and can only be for the better. China is always ready to talk should America drop its hostility toward China.

Such blandness lay also, it seems to me, behind the lack of public attention in China to the turn of events. Of course, foreign policy options are not debated out loud in China as in the United States. Still, you cannot overlook the almost offhand confidence of Peking's approach to the flirtation with Washington. The Chinese want certain things from the United States. But they have waited a long time for them. They can wait longer. Especially since they see American opinion stirring unilaterally in rejection of rigid and expansionist policies of the past.

It is Nixon who is committing himself most. It is he who is under pressure to deliver the goods. So the Chinese attitude is, in a certain measure, to sit back and see what Nixon will bring to Peking. Peking has worked out an eight-point agenda of items to discuss with the U.S. President. On these items the Chinese position has not noticeably softened. But the Chinese think that Nixon will have to soften his positions on some items, if his requested trip to Peking is to prove a boon to him and not a liability.

The Chinese feel that they gain more than they risk from détente with the United States. They have

been seated in the UN. Equally important, the international status of the government of Taiwan slides quickly downward. A wedge, too, is inserted between Taipei and Washington. As a result of these developments, Peking's desired solution to the Taiwan issue becomes more likely. Russia will be stung. Not least, Peking gets a dose of generalized prestige from the fact that President Nixon visits China, at his own request, before he visits Moscow or Tokyo. (Indeed, Peking will be ahead of Moscow and Tokyo in having any U.S. President visit it.) On the side of cost, there is a possible loss of credibility with various anti-imperialists. But Hanoi's anxiety—now less deep than last summer—is the only serious problem here.

A barometer of the atmosphere at the Kissinger-Chou talks is the UN issue (though it has never been the most important issue in Sino-American relations). I do not believe that Kissinger and Chou set the UN issue "aside" when they met last July—as was often said in the press. Nor that Peking was ready to go ahead with détente regardless of what happened in the UN. I believe the issue was set aside, after July, because the two sides knew what was going to happen in the UN. Fragments of information available to me about the July parleys add up to a picture of delicate diplomacy-at-a-tangent. During the many hours of rather tough talks, the two sides gave each other a statement of intention on the UN issue. Since the talk dealt with votes and agendas in an international organization, each side could state what it would seek, but not guarantee what it would attain.

The distinction was crucial. It permitted two statements of intention to seem—to a beholder who wanted to see it that way—like an agreement on what would result. The Chinese were satisfied with what they concluded from this diplomacy by indirection. No sign exists that the United States was deeply dissatisfied.

First, it seems, the Americans indicated that they would support the seating of Peking in the China seat at the UN this year—which means a Security Council seat, as one of the permanent five members wielding a veto. Second, the visitors served notice that, should Taipei fight to keep some sort of UN place for itself, the United States must support this attempt. This place would be, at most, membership in the General Assembly. Third—here we enter the twilight land of signals—the U.S. side said it "did not know" whether the attempt to keep Taipei in the UN would succeed or not.

The Chinese responded also in three parts. They took note with undemonstrative approval of Washington's decision to back the installation of the People's Republic of China in the China seat. Second, they warned that should the effort to retain the Kuomintang regime in some UN role be mounted, Peking would vigorously fight against it. Finally, the Chinese gave their own signal with all its overtones: the government of China was confident that the effort to salvage a role for Taipei would fail.

Given the context—that the mutual coaxing during the spring had gone well enough to bring Kissinger over the Himalayas to Peking, and that Nixon wanted to come to China within a year—the U.S. position in these talks could be interpreted as having an element of shadowboxing about it. Secretary of State William Rogers' subsequent statement of August 2 did not mean quite what it said on the printed page. Yes, the United States will fight to keep a UN place for Chiang Kai-shek. But if the U.S. "does not know" whether this will succeed, and China is sure it won't, the two sides are not as far apart as they seem. Peking was not as outraged by Rogers' statement as its press made out. Though enticed to do so by journalists, no Peking official said Rogers' statement meant Washington had gone back on anything Kissinger conveyed to Chou. Yes, the Chinese called the Rogers formulation "absurd." But they did not say that the United States had deceived China or broken a promise.

In Washington a certain backpedaling began. Mr. Rogers confessed, with more sorrow than anger, that the United States had found through international consultations that "there is a good deal of support" for assigning the China seat in the Security Council to Peking rather than Taipei. He added: "We haven't made a decision about our own policy." Two weeks later, Mr. Nixon decided—in Peking's favor. Washington then came out with a double proposal for the UN debate: Peking to have the China seat; a separate, lower place to be salvaged for Taipei in the Assembly.

Meanwhile, U.S. spokesmen underlined that though every effort was being made, success for this position could not be guaranteed. By the time Foreign Minister Fukuda of Japan came to Washington in early September, it smelled as if Mr. Rogers were foreshadowing failure and looking around for others to share whatever blame failure might trigger. If Japan did not cosponsor the U.S. resolution, he warned, this would have "a detrimental effect" on the resolution's chance of success. Japan did cosponsor, but the resolution failed.

The grief in Washington was not searing. Mr. Nixon seemed more upset by the "manners" of the voters than by the vote itself. Mr. Rogers cried out "We tried hard" more relentlessly than sincerity would seem to have required. George Bush, American Ambassador to the UN, was not unhappy with his image as a mighty arm-twister. (People have wondered why Mr. Bush fought so hard for Taiwan if the Nixon Administration was in fact reconciled to losing the fight. First, after Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's words, on and off the record, about the danger of a right-wing rampage in America in the event of calamity for U.S. fortunes in Asia, no one should be surprised that Bush was assigned the role of making an elaborate effort to hold a General Assembly seat for Taiwan. Second, the newspaper photographs of Kissinger conferring in

*the vote was  
substantiated  
in our  
view  
to the delay  
of the vote.*



Peking as the UN voted were more eloquent than anything Bush said or did in New York.)

The gap between "seek" and "attain" had richly served Sino-American relations. Nixon lost a battle on October 25, but salvaged a campaign (perhaps two campaigns). The Pakistani delegate at the UN aptly said just after the vote that one big reason for the outcome was Nixon's new China policy. Nixon's new China policy, in turn, will ultimately benefit from the UN vote, as may Nixon's prospects for re-election. Meanwhile, Peking took it all so calmly that not a single Chinese newspaperman was sent to the UN to cover a drama climaxing twenty-two years of struggle in which China was the key party involved.

Within China, the UN issue seems a bagatelle compared with the Taiwan issue. At the Museum of the Peasant Institute in Canton, a vast wall map gives details of the Revolutionary Committee of each province. When you press a button, a light flashes on with the date on which the Committee was established. I pressed Taiwan (Taiwan is invariably included on any map of China within China). A red light flashed with the characters: "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan!" The phrase is a theme song all over China.

In the beautiful hills near Sian lies the craggy cliff where Chiang Kai-shek was captured in 1936 by one of his own disgruntled generals—the famous Sian Incident. The place is now a lush and tranquil hot-spring resort. Emperors of the Han and Sui dynasties had summer palaces here, and the Communist government has built superb pavilions in traditional style to fit the history-laden ambience. My companions laughed and joked as we inspected the room from which Chiang fled—leaving his dentures behind—when shots pierced his windows.

We climbed the hill where Chiang had clambered in his nightdress. At the place of his capture stands a handsome portico. But it was built not by the Communists, to mark this spot of personal and political humiliation of Chiang, but by Chiang's own government, in 1946, apparently to try and blot out with glory an ugly memory! After 1949 the new government left the portico intact. Beside it, in red paint on the cliff face, they have simply added: "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan!" As if to suggest that, just as Chiang was nabbed here, so in the fullness of time he will be nabbed in Taiwan.

No issue seems more important than Taiwan when you talk with Chinese, official or nonofficial, about international affairs. It is pointed out that in 1950 the U.S. government reversed itself on Taiwan. Until that time, Washington considered Taiwan part of China, and planned no support for Chiang Kai-shek's bid to set up an alternative China. Came the Korean War. As part of its military encirclement of China, the United States, it is recalled, then backtracked and began the long, increasingly ludicrous

sponsorship of Chiang and his dreams. Ignoring that Chiang had lost out to a stronger and more popular force, the United States from then to this day has (officially) considered his remnants the government of China.

But now the movement at the UN has unfrozen the Taiwan issue. As Peking envisaged, the displacement of Taipei from a UN seat begins a "softening up" of the Taipei regime's front of bravado.

The signs are that they expect a political bargaining process to take place eventually, in which Peking will make—at least for a transitional period—concessions to whatever elements in Taiwan are able to demonstrate political strength.

But this political bargaining cannot begin in earnest until Taiwan is fully defused as an international issue. The UN developments have done this to a degree; the big next step will be military withdrawal by the U.S. from Taiwan. I understand that in July, 1971, Kissinger talked to the Chinese about this matter. Before the Chinese agreed to invite Nixon, the U.S. side intimated that by the time Nixon reached Peking, further reductions in the U.S. military presence on Taiwan would have taken place.

In the Chinese view, there are two parts to the Taiwan problem. One is the U.S. military presence on the island. The other is the political gulf between Peking and Taipei, and the methods of bridging it. Only the first part, say the Chinese, concerns the United States (or any other nation). Washington is not being asked to "hand over" Taiwan to Peking—only to stop regarding its government as the government of China, and to take its bases away. This leaves the door open to give-and-take between the two sets of Chinese, and to a process of reabsorption that could stretch out over decades.

In his talk with me, the nimble-minded Mr. Y observed: "There's an easy way out for the U.S. on Taiwan. Simply announce a return to the position Truman stated in 1949-1950: that the U.S. is not going to interfere in the destiny of Taiwan."

#### IV. How China Runs Its Foreign Policy

Lights burn late in the new cream-brick monolith which houses China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the Cultural Revolution, the number of personnel at the Ministry was slashed by almost one half. Those who remain must work fantastic hours to cope with a swelling volume of business. Some work who are too tired and ill to work, like Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua this past summer. Some who speak a Western tongue fluently must punctuate policy work with translating tasks. "Peking wives"—it occurred to me—must have even more to put up with than "Washington wives" (I say "wife," but in fact the Chinese no longer use the established word for wife, "t'ai-t'ai"; they use "ai-jen," "lover," for spouse or amorous friend alike.

Yet morale is high. Officials are naturally encouraged that their Ministry has become as much a focus of attention as any foreign ministry in the world. The more so because it firmly relegates to an unlamented past the period of 1966-1967 when the Chinese foreign policy establishment was very nearly derailed by a hot avalanche of ultraleftism. Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister at that time, was harassed and "supervised" so unrelentingly by Red Guards that Mao eventually declared: "How can Ch'en be struck down? He has been with us forty years and has so many achievements. He has lost twenty-seven pounds in weight. I cannot show him to foreign guests in this condition."

Ch'en Yi no longer works on foreign policy, but I do not believe he has been purged. A senior Chinese military man, when it was remarked to him by a European ambassador that Ch'en's going was a "loss," replied with a broad smile: "Your loss is our gain." One of China's true military experts, Ch'en Yi, ill as he has certainly been, is probably now working on high military matters. He resurfaced last summer as a vice chairman of the top Military Affairs Committee. Of other high officials in the Ministry, it is remarkable how few were blown away by the storms of the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, the two Vice Ministers most assailed by the zealots were Chi P'eng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua. Yet how little the huffing and puffing availed. Today, Chi is Acting Foreign Minister, and Ch'iao is the Vice Minister in charge of Western affairs and top man at the UN.

At one point in the struggle of the Cultural Revolution, ninety-one senior men in the Ministry put up a manifesto backing Ch'en Yi against those who reviled him as "poison" and classified him as "bourgeois." Almost every responsible man one meets in the Ministry today is one of the ninety-one, as are most of the ambassadors who have been flying out to occupy new posts and dust down old ones. I often talked with one official, of middle age, as much a scholar as a diplomat. Like his wife, he is a graduate of Yenching University. His home is as well furnished with books as his mind is with ideas. I asked if the zealots (in conversation they were always called "*chi-tso fen-tzu*," "ultraleftists") had tried to get at his books. For there was a bit of "book burning" in 1967. Self-appointed maestros passed the wand of ideology over certain works, and pronounced even gold to be dross. "No," he answered with an expression that gave nothing away. And if they had come? "If they had quoted Chairman Mao to me, I would have quoted other parts of Chairman Mao to them—and I would have won."


We find continuities in the history of new China's foreign policy community that rival Andrei Gromyko and J. Edgar Hoover. There have been only two regular Foreign Ministers in the regime's twenty-two years. Most of China's senior diplomats come from a small circle of negotiators and propagandists who cut their teeth on four diplomatic

operations prior to Liberation. First, a liaison group headed by Chou En-lai at the Nationalist capital of Hankow (and after Hankow fell to the Japanese, at Chungking); second, a branch outfit at Kweilin which put out a news service. A third knot worked out of Hong Kong; Ch'iao Kuan-hua distinguished himself there. Fourth, the Chinese Communist Party was represented on the "truce teams" which the Marshall Mission operated in North China and Manchuria. Huang Hua, the present ambassador to the UN, was an active part of the Marshall Mission machinery. He ran the information work at the Mission's Executive Headquarters in Peking. So many of China's senior diplomats are Averell Harrimans of the East, their resilient careers interlaced with decades of their country's (or Party's) foreign policy.

What does the Chinese foreign policy machine consist of? It is small by U.S. standards—the Foreign Ministry has no more than 1000 people—but not simple. Chou En-lai as Premier heads the State Council. It is a kind of cabinet at the pinnacle of the state administration. Its well-staffed corridors include a Staff Office for Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister feeds to this office—for the benefit of Chou and his staff—papers from his Ministry. Into the Staff Office also goes material from the "international liaison" section of the Party Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party. This section may well be extremely important, especially for relations with Communist countries, but the visitor learns nothing about it.

The Ministry itself seems in some ways a very conventional place. You cannot altogether wonder that the zealots of 1966-1967 considered it a "bourgeois" island cut adrift from the seething Maoist mainland. Diplomatic procedures are much as in a European foreign ministry. There are ambassadors, and there are third secretaries; commercial counselors and military attachés. Very few become ambassadors who have not been career diplomats for many years. Secret files exist. Zealots briefly challenged this practice in 1967, one crying out as he rifled the files on May 13: "What's so terrific about secrets? To hell with them." Yet the attempt in the middle of the Cultural Revolution to transform the style of Chinese foreign policy in the end went little further than frills like what clothes to wear and how many courses to serve at diplomatic dinners.

One important change in organization did occur (beyond the cutting down in size). A Revolutionary Committee now runs the Ministry, and several sources style it a most effective example of this new kind of organ. It is chaired by Chi P'eng-fei, top man among the Vice Ministers, and Acting Foreign Minister. But the second and third figures in the Revolutionary Committee are not Vice Ministers. They are People's Liberation Army men. At a banquet given late in June by the diplomatic corps, to thank the Ministry for the recent diplomatic tour of various provinces, it was made clear in the ways the Chinese make these things clear that the two PLA men



*Photos by Ross Terrill*

*1. Chou En-lai with Chang Hsi-jo, head of the People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, in the Great Hall of the People.*


*2. Site of Chiang Kai-shek's capture by his own forces in 1936 (the "Sian Incident"). Slogan reads: "We shall certainly liberate Taiwan!"*


*3. At the Peking Handicrafts Factory. Artisans produce jade and ivory carvings as well as pottery.*

*4. Boating has changed little over the centuries on the Pearl River, Canton.*

*5. Soldiers and others relax on Sunday afternoon at the Great Wall of China, near Peking.*

*6. A Physical Training School. Slogans beside Mao's portrait spur ideological zeal.*






4.



5.



6.

ranked above Ch'iao Kuan-hua and other Vice Ministers. So the Army has found its way to the highest levels of the Foreign Ministry. What looks like genuine collective leadership has been set up in the Revolutionary Committee. It is quite different from the days when Ch'en Yi ran the Ministry with brusque authority. PLA men and Vice Ministers work things out together. The amiable and somewhat reticent Chi is no strong man. Having set this new pattern and found it good, China may not appoint a full-fledged successor to Ch'en Yi for some time.

Outside Peking are officials who work in the "foreign affairs section" of each province's Revolutionary Committee. These people, twenty or thirty strong in the provinces I visited, deferred on all nonlocal points to the Foreign Ministry people who traveled with me from Peking. They have no policy role, and concentrate on receiving foreign visitors with charm and informed conversation. One in Canton had dug up a fact about Australia that few Australians know. "Oh, you are from Melbourne," he remarked the morning he met me at the Canton train station. "It is, of course, the former capital, in the days before Canberra was built." There is little point in talking about foreign affairs to most of these provincial foreign affairs officials. They seem to specialize in what might be called the "kangaroo" or "fauna and flora" aspects of foreign lands. ("China has never had a Prime Minister drown in the sea, as your Prime Minister did in 1967.") But they can give the visitor data about their province.

Officially separate from the Foreign Ministry are a number of "people's organizations" essential to the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Their personnel circulate like satellites in the outer orbit of the Ministry. One of these bodies is the People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. It was for years a mysterious body until it surfaced last summer. It receives ex-statesmen, such as Clement Attlee in 1954 or the ex-President of Mexico some years later, and it receives people "who are not governmental but too distinguished to come to China in an ordinary way." Its former research function has in recent years been "neglected." Only a dozen people work full time at its offices now. Its directors are mostly former ambassadors or distinguished professors, many of them extremely able, most of them fairly old.

The chairman of the Institute, Chang Hsi-jo, is a former Minister of Education and one of China's most prominent non-Party intellectuals. Chatting with him at banquets and receptions, I found myself in yesterday's spacious, languid world. The patrician head of well-groomed white hair, the silk clothes, the polished walking stick which he wields with authority suggest an Oriental aristocrat from the pages of Somerset Maugham. Here is a man who participated in the 1911 revolution and went soon after to study in London, yet who is part of Mao's foreign policy establishment in the post-Red Guard era. The elegance and cultivation are matched by a certain strength re-

served for occasions of need. During the Hundred Flowers period in the spring of 1957, Professor Chang assailed the Chinese Communist Party for having "contempt for the past" and a "blind belief in the future." He is still capable of caustic comment on bureaucrats, and gentle irony about ideologists who talk as if they had history's agenda tucked in an inside pocket.

We discussed political science, which he studied at Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and taught for many years at Tsinghua and other leading Chinese universities. This meant neither the Thought of Mao nor computerized social science. In the warm Peking afternoon, banners of Mao's quotations above us, we talked about the ideas of Harold Laski, Graham Wallas, and A. L. Lowell! Required by the occasion one evening to allude to Australia, Professor Chang managed to recall two famous Australian tennis players he had once watched play in New York. It was "people's diplomacy" of a casual and catholic kind. You could mistake Chang for a retired professor presiding over a lawn tennis association, rather than a retired professor presiding over Chinese Communist semi-official diplomacy.

**O**f the training of new diplomats the visitor discovers little except that it is done not by a single method but by many. A few have a background in the Institute of International Relations of the Academy of Sciences. But this has been suspended since the Cultural Revolution. Its members have gone off to communes to exchange the care of nations for the care of pigs. The Foreign Language Institutes are an important source. They began the path back to regular work late in 1971 (with even more emphasis than before on Western tongues). There used to be an Institute of International Relations in Peking, which taught at the graduate-student level. But some of its former students (who include foreigners) told me that it no longer functions.

In the next few years, diplomats, with an army training will emerge in China's embassies. Just how they are being trained is not known, but two interesting points surround the Army's role in the foreign policy corps. One is that a number of able men were sent into the Army, some at Chou En-lai's own instigation, to "hide" from the furies of the Cultural Revolution which might otherwise have cut them down. This is one more case of the Premier running the Cultural Revolution with his left hand while limiting its destructiveness with his right. It is also one more case of the Army extending its role beyond military tasks. The result is that there are many diplomats (and other professionals) in the Army who are not ordinary army men, but whose career patterns are now bound up with the Army.

The second point can be put simply. Watch out for the Navy and the Air Force. Since Lin Biao took over Defense from the less "Maoist" P'eng Teh-huai, the

Army has swelled up with prestige as a "model" and "school" for the whole nation. A little resentment stirs in the other two services. They feel that the colossal stress upon politics has left the more professional and more technical aspects of military work enfeebled. The Navy and the Air Force are the natural repositories of these neglected aspects. In recent months there has been pressure to give more prominence than Lin Piao's regime has done to air and naval work and weapons. This may well affect defense and foreign policy by the end of 1972. Already in the fall of 1971, it became one of several issues surrounding the eclipse of Lin Piao, and accompanying changes in the relation of the Army to politics.

I will not soon forget the teaching of the Korean War in Chinese schools. Few events are better known to Chinese students of society than this one. There is a double stress (beyond the themes of patriotism and Chinese-Korean solidarity). It was one episode in the long story of the United States trying to "get at" China. Three paths to China's heartland, it is said, were mapped out by Washington: via Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam. Dulles said as much, and events have richly confirmed it. The second stress is upon Russian selfishness. It is not asserted, though it is hinted, that Moscow cooked the whole adventure up. At any rate, China had to bear the burden. Every gun and bullet China got from Russia she paid for at the highest prices."

It is odd to hear the Korean War taught this way. You have heard American students taught that Russia and China, composing a "monolithic Communist conspiracy," together hatched the whole thing. You have been told that the U.S. could never have wished to "get at" China. Actually, the version I heard in Chinese schools is nearer the truth than that taught in the United States. China did *not* push North Korea into war. General MacArthur *did* get at China—and Peking did not enter the war until he had bombed bridges on Chinese territory. But beyond the soundness of what was being taught, the seriousness of the tone in these classes on Korea was haunting. In American classes, students take up this political topic or that, but how few topics really grip them. Fewer still if we think only of international politics. But these Chinese students talked about the Korean War with a clear and immediate sense of its connection to their own lives. A threat to China stirred in them deep personal feelings. If some will tomorrow be diplomats, the Chinese Foreign Ministry will not lack conviction and purpose.

## V. Foreigners in Peking

The diplomatic community in Peking is marked by irony and by a sense of brotherhood rare in the bitchy world of diplomacy. Irony because of a gap between repute and reality. The im-

age: diplomats in Peking are intimate monitors of Chinese foreign policy, agog at each fresh twist of Middle Kingdom intrigue. The reality: diplomats in Peking often sit around and drink, and some are so cut off from the Chinese that they wonder if they mightn't be better off in Hong Kong. Brotherhood because this state of affairs binds the diplomats together in the furtive secret of their shared dilemma, and because Peking has few distractions, and diplomats are thrown relentlessly into each other's company.

I have caricatured, yet no one could deny a leisured ambience and signs of boredom within the embassies of the Chinese capital. It is a delightful world for the scholar-diplomat, and ideal for those who like to bring up their children by paying much attention to them. There is no superfluity of paper to read. Much of what there is cannot be read by most ambassadors, for it is written in Chinese. In the summer, few chancelleries work after lunch. Parties begin early and end late. They are lavish because there is time to make them so. It comes as a shock to find Chinese servants of an older breed, schooled in deference and discretion before Liberation, when you walk off the street into certain European legations. A silver-haired, impassive butler clips cigars in the Dutch residence as he has been doing for decades. A waiter at the French Embassy walks with Gallic lightness (no resemblance to the Chinese shamle). He handles a capacious wine cellar with informed calm and the French language without disaster.

At embassy functions, there is a tendency for stories and rumors to bounce back repeatedly like ping-pong balls in a small room. Yet the absence of "news" has a good side. Long-range reflection germinates in those with a taste for it. Some ambassadors will stroll on their verandas, and talk very well about the larger trends concerning China and the world. If Peking is seldom a good place for an ambassador to report from, it is not a bad place for him to think in.

There are really two diplomatic quarters in Peking. The old "legation quarter" lies just east of the Tien An Men Square. Architecturally it is a hodgepodge of nineteenth-century European turrets and gargoyles and pillars. But it is picturesque and not without charm, and some of Peking's most splendid villas sit among its trees. In this area, only nations which are (or recently were) friendly toward China remain. The Burmese are in the former Belgian mission. Prince Sihanouk has the old French Embassy. The Rumanians are busily here. The Hungarians occupy the superb mansion built in the days of colonial largesse by the Empire of Austria-Hungary.

The other diplomatic quarter is bland and remote. Northeast of the city, it accommodates all the countries which recognized China substantially later than 1950, and all those which wished to put up new buildings. Not far away is a forest of new apartment blocks for Chinese workers. This section is almost like Manhattan, with its soaring heights and geomet-



ric regularity. But the new diplomatic area itself is flat and placid. Pink mimosas line the dusty yellow streets. A pale blue sky above fits the delicate and understated color tones of the scene. Noise, too, is muted, and with virtually no traffic the cicadas have the airwaves all to themselves. PLA soldiers guard each embassy gate without martial fuss. They will chat and laugh freely with a passerby. The tensions of 1967—when these streets rang with the sounds of demonstration and sometimes of battle—have totally gone.

Many embassies contain one or two younger China specialists poring over documents. The Russian, French, and East German offices have quite a lot of them. These Sinologues do not often see responsible Chinese officials. Yet they pick things up from living in Peking with a knowledge of Chinese. They can sift the bookshops; they chat with people in the street. Ambassadors vary enormously from the brilliant to the bovine. Effectiveness depends on how Peking at any point of time regards their country, and what background and interest they have for the job. Peking is a post that can make a poor diplomat worse and a good one very good. If he is cut off from the country and the leadership, and cannot overcome this, he withers into a clerk. If he can get an angle on events in this vast nation, and a foot in the door with officials, the challenges to mind and spirit (and digestion) are limitless.

Observing the foreign policies of China from a Peking chancellery is quite different from reading Chinese foreign policy documents in Washington or Canberra. First, you realize that China's political language loses point and freshness on the printed English page. Breathing the air of China, where the cryptic, earthy Chinese language has constant spoken life, and where you hear political language as debate and exchange as well as read it as pontification, the whole effect seems more serious and lively.

Second, you are better placed to see that the practice of Chinese foreign policy is not a mechanical reflection of its theory. In Hong Kong you have the ideological documents, and you have the reports of what Peking actually does. Relating the two is not always easy. In Peking you may discern the "middle ground"—those sinews of reason and judgment which link ideology with day-to-day decision. Third, the diplomat in the Chinese capital can supplement public statements with private talks. This is the crucial superiority of Peking as a vantage point. For it is in these talks that the thought processes of the Chinese reach the non-Chinese world.

Ambassadors at Peking generally praise the competence of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. A Scandinavian ambassador about to return after four and a half years in his post looked back: "Going to the Foreign Ministry here has been just the same as going to the Quai d'Orsay. The level of knowledge is similar. You have the same kind of free, frank exchange about world affairs. Of course, it's not as close as

when we talk to Washington or London—for with these two my country has a special tie. But it's about like talking with the French."

**H**ow the mountain looks, of course, depends on what path you approach it by. Some ambassadors have excellent access to the Chinese leadership. Others are like fish upon the sand. Here are three cases:

*France.* Etienne Manac'h is perhaps the outstanding ambassador in Peking today. This stems both from the cordial Paris-Peking relationship and from Manac'h's acuteness and long background in Asian affairs. A precise, modest man, he has long been a socialist. Enjoying a good relationship with De Gaulle, he was chosen personally by the General for the Peking embassy. Trade between France and China did not leap after diplomatic ties were set up in 1964, though many Frenchmen expected it would. Indeed, it is smaller than Chinese trade with West Germany, which has no diplomatic relations with Peking. In 1970, for instance, total French-Chinese trade turnover was \$151 million. Total West German-Chinese trade turnover was \$253 million.

But there is a similar way of thinking about "independence" and "superpowers" in Peking and Paris. Both are sticklers for "national sovereignty." Both suspect that Russia and America would like to divide and order the world on their own terms. Both lack a little bit in power what they think they have in status. Both berate superpowers. Yet this prevents neither from thinking of itself as a *supercivilization*. These modes France and China share.

France is busy as intermediary between Peking and certain hesitant nations. Thus during 1971, China and Thailand nibbled at each other through the grille of French diplomacy. Paris has been China's major diplomatic base in Europe and a site for wider activities. New agreements to establish relations—such as that with Turkey last summer—have been hammered out in Paris.

Manac'h sees the Chinese leadership regularly. More than once Chou En-lai, inveterate night owl that he is, has drawn Manac'h aside after a reception and started (at midnight) a two- or three-hour chat in a side room in the Great Hall of the People. The Frenchman sees Chairman Mao from time to time. He has found Mao an eager student of French history: fascinated by Napoleon and the Paris Commune, avid for details on the Siege of Toulouse, impressed by De Gaulle.

The Chinese statesman, for his part, admired both De Gaulle's realism about the world of nations and his poised style and tendency to take a lofty view of politics. (The visitor to China often hears praise of De Gaulle. Chou En-lai invoked him—in scorn of SEATO—when debating with Mr. Whitlam. Officials more than once drew to my attention the fact that Mao took the unusual step of sending a message on

the death of a foreign leader when De Gaulle died in 1959.)

Laos is an opposite case. Not because Laos is unimportant to China. But China supports the Pathet Lao, which is in rebellion against the Vientiane government that is represented in Peking. So Kienthong Keorajvongsay, the polite and stoic Laotian chargé, in his neat villa on a quiet street of the new diplomatic quarter, is truly a fish upon the sand. He might as well be on the planet Mars. He watches the Pathet Lao leaders trip to Peking for talks with Chou and Huang Yung-sheng (Chief of the General Staff). Yet he himself from one year's end to the next sees no one higher than a desk officer at the Foreign Ministry. No one in his tranquil little embassy speaks or reads Chinese.

This charming man knows in full measure what Chinese aloofness can be like. All he can do is talk with other foreigners and make detached social observations. "How hard the Chinese work," he said with a certain awe as we sipped a morning cognac. "Not like Laotians." He gestured outside to the street where PLA men were on duty. "You don't see them drinking as they work. They eat frugally. They come home from a meeting, and you ask them what happened. They tell you not a word. In Laos people will chat about it: this man was criticized, that man was amusing. But here the discipline is so strong. Oh, no, not like Laos at all . . ." He took more cognac, and said I really ought to visit Laos sometime.

Britain. John Bull is something else again. He is not stranded like the Laotian, but he does not enjoy Manac'h's entrée. Britain was one of the first countries to recognize the Chinese Communist government (January, 1950). But in their usual manner, the British did not make a clean sweep of things; they tried to have a shilling each way. They kept a consulate on Taiwan (accredited not to the Republic of China but to the provincial government of Taiwan, which Chiang Kai-shek pretends has a separate life of its own). London also supported (until 1971) America's "important question" resolution in the UN, a procedural device to make it more difficult than it would otherwise have been for Peking to take its seat.

These two points China has held against Britain. For twenty-one years Peking has declined to exchange ambassadors with London. Each country has in the other only a chargé d'affaires office, not an embassy. In Peking, the Chinese maintain the distinction fastidiously. Even the taximen are schooled. If in haste you ask to go to "the British Embassy," they correct you and say they are prepared to take you to "the British chargé's office."

The British have an able staff of a dozen or so in Peking—a lot smaller than the French. Face red and white, the chargé, John Denson, looks a colonial type but is not. He purrs with pleasure that relations between the two countries have been improving ever since he crossed the bridge at Lo Wu in 1969. The

dark days of 1967, when the British office was burned and its staff imperiled, are altogether gone. London abandoned the "important question" nonsense at the UN in 1971. It has made the decision in principle—nothing is yet announced—to remove the offending consulate from Taiwan. Even if trade with Taiwan suffers, the loss cannot be great. Britain's trade with China is worth some ten times its trade with Taiwan. A Chinese order for six Trident aircraft nicely boosted the late 1971 trading lists.

Meanwhile, sweetness and light prevail in Hong Kong. Dealings between the Hong Kong government and Chinese Communists in the colony and in Canton have been smooth, at least since the attempted hijacking by Filipinos of a plane to China in 1970. A senior British official in Hong Kong recalled: "The Chinese hate hijacking. They're totally against it. When the Filipino incident occurred, an official at our Hong Kong airport just picked up the phone and called White Cloud Airport in Canton. Immediately, matters were fixed up. The Canton people gave the details: how much fuel, how many passengers, what time the plane would take off. Very businesslike; no problems; no politics."

The British in Peking do not enjoy easy access to the Chinese leadership. Until Denson saw Chou En-lai earlier this year, there had been very little access at all. But they feel the trend is upward. With the modulated optimism the British have always shown in China, they are slowly erecting a new residence to house the ambassador-to-be. With a new ambassador to China arriving every couple of weeks, the British frankly confess that they do not want to be left paddling in the shallows as the new diplomatic wave surges upward.

## VI. How Do the Chinese See the World?

What in the world does China want? How do the Chinese see the rest of the nations with which their own destiny is now intertwined? With China more than with most countries, what she *is* and how she *understands herself* weigh as much as what she explicitly *seeks*. A visit puts a light on some territory in back of China's approach to the world. It is four shades of this subsoil of Peking's foreign policy that I sift in these closing pages.

1. *Sense of place.* Stray from Peking and the gateway cities of Canton and Shanghai, and it is easy to forget that the world beyond China exists. You meet no foreigners, see no foreign products, hear little foreign news. You observe in the Chinese mentality such a strong "sense of place" that China seems by nature isolationist. A Chinese word for landscape is made up of two characters meaning "mountains" and "waters." One day in Yenan, I recalled with amusement a phrase used to me at the U.S. State Department in 1966: "the China that exists on the



mainland"! (And where are the others?) Of no country on earth could it be more absurd to separate the location from the *essence of the nation*. There is nothing abstract about China's view of itself (as perhaps there is of Gaullist France's view of itself).

It is not only that the Chinese have dwelt for 4000 years amidst these incomparable mountains and rivers. The rounded mountains and yellow rivers *are* China, the soil and the nation are almost one. Chinese towns and provinces are often geographically named. Hunan, Mao's province, means "south of the lake." Yunnan, the hilly province near Vietnam, means "south of the clouds." Peking translates as "northern capital," Shanghai as "on the sea." China never names towns after a great man (as Washington, San Francisco). Never after a place in another country (as New York).

In China's heartland, the cliché of China as "Middle Kingdom" (which is the literal translation of the Chinese word for "China") does not seem absurd. Here is a superior people, you reflect, but whose sense of their superiority is rooted in contentment with their own mountains and rivers. Not an active sense of superiority which pants to convert the world to its excellence. A passive sense of superiority, which basks, inward-turned, within its own possessed excellence.

Of course, a nation's foreign policy is a stew of many morsels. It refracts much more than cultural attitudes. Yet this "sense of place" deeply affects every Chinese's view of the world. It underlies China's lack of interest in conquering, subverting, or even understanding other countries. True, Marxism has brought to one level of the Chinese official mind a global sense and global concerns. Communism has "internationalized" China to a degree. No less true, there is in China today an impulse to "catch up" with advanced countries. Many factories display a poignant quotation from Mao: "The Chinese people have will and ability. In the not-too-distant future they will certainly catch up to and surpass advanced world levels." Yet my abiding impression is of cultural self-confidence, outweighing national insecurity.

The Chinese are a rooted and a continental people (they have emigrated only when their own country was in chaos). Their cultural memories run the length of the dynasties. They possess effortless assurance of their own cultural identity. This does not negate the fact that Peking sees the world through the spectacles of Communist ideology. But something in the Chinese way damps down the lust and swagger of Marxism. They take a very long view of things. Long dwelling amidst the mountains and waters of ancestors ten times as ancient as the Pilgrim Fathers has given the Chinese a patience of the ages. They do not, in fact, go around the world lighting fires of revolution, for they are genuinely skeptical that one nation can ignite another. And they believe in their hearts that few others, if any, can follow the epic Chinese way to revolution and socialism.

Most Americans would be surprised, I believe, by the tranquil confidence of China today. It is not a restless nation keen to prove itself in ambitious worldwide schemes. A fundamental contentment springs from cultural security. China seems less dismayed than amused that the chief of superpowers should fear them. Most Chinese do not *care* enough about the world to want to uplift others. Nor did they fret terribly when other nations for petty reasons kept China from its seat at the UN. They are secure and content in their habitation.

I watch lovers strolling around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Peking at sunset. Little boys pissing peacefully under a tree of the Tien An Men Square, then mounting the solemn stone lions beside the Forbidden City to play at riding and hunting. PLA men during a lunchtime break at Sian, talking with nostalgia and absorption of their home counties: what they eat there, how the accent varies, who the local folk heroes from antiquity are. Students in Canton, reading *Dream of the Red Chamber* under a tree, asking me not about Australia but about the way of life of Chinese in Australia. These people, it seemed to me, are not missionaries to the world but gardeners of their own heritage.

2. *Independence.* Five roots sit under China's insistence on complete independence (and associated principles such as "self-reliance").

- First, the cultural particularity which I have illustrated by the deep Chinese "sense of place."

- Second, the simple geographic fact that China is a continental nation cut off by sea or mountains from other major world centers. Except for receiving Buddhism from India, China drew little on other cultures. She had no experience of allying with a second nation in order to counter a third nation. China's isolation was her independence.

- Third, China's buffeting by foreign powers since the Opium Wars has made her acutely sensitive to any pressures which qualify her total independence. Having known dependence so recently, China is daily conscious of the quality of the air of independence she now breathes.

- Fourth, the Chinese Communist Party did not win power in China by following Soviet models or by virtue of Soviet help but by turning inward to tap China's own resources of sinew, mind, and will. In the Chinese Communist Party's experience, the evening cup of alliance turned sour by morning. The Chinese made their revolution by self-reliance. The experience has convinced them that no one—not even China—can make another nation's revolution for it.

- Fifth, the aggravating presence of two superpowers makes it natural for Peking to stand up for the principle of independence. Superpower hegemony threatens independence, whether it is the Russians in Eastern Europe or the Americans in Central America. China is incommoded by the "blocs" or-

chestrated by each superpower. It is the card of independence that she can best play amidst the power realities of today's world. Independence is the logical banner for a self-respecting major power which has no bloc of its own and could only be "number two" in another bloc.

Always I found the principle of independence echoing in foreign policy talks with Chinese. It accounts for their sensitivity to the pretensions of superpowers. It is the basis of their intimacy with Rumania and France. It justifies (to themselves) support for Pakistan. They are against any sympathy for Bangla Desh which implies questioning of the Pakistan government's right to run its own affairs. Chou En-lai gave the principle of independence extraordinary stress. "Why is it," he asked, "that there is a lack of any ability in the Eastern part of Europe?" Politicians rarely say such astonishing things in public. For his gasping listeners, the Premier supplied an answer. "Because the biggest country there [in Eastern Europe] wants to control the others." It was a lavish assertion of the fruits of independence (and the costs of dependence) in the husbandry of nations.

During the same conversation, Mr. Chou underlined that China likes to pay debts promptly and owes nothing to anybody. He referred to the painful period in 1960 when the U.S.S.R. suddenly took back all its aid and its experts. "But in those years of our greatest difficulty we paid back all our debts to the Soviet Union." The Premier was not finished with the theme. He recalled how China has always paid quickly and in cash for Australian wheat. He inquired with a broad smile and a gesture of both hands: "Do we still owe you anything?" (Mr. Whitlam shot back with an allusion to the lack of a wheat order from China: "I wish you did." Mr. Chou laughed. The Foreign Trade Minister smiled faintly.) Chou En-lai wanted us to understand that China is beholden to nobody.

Chinese military strategy likewise enshrines the principle of independence. "People's war"—one of Mao's central notions—is a formula for a nation standing alone. Not allies but "the people" play the decisive role. The enemy is lured in deep. He is invited to overextend himself. Then he is met by a people's struggle. By definition it can be mounted only by the inhabitants of the territory which is resisting.

If China had had allies in the 1930s, "people's war" might never have entered Chinese Communist Party military theory. But she did not. Neither Britain, the United States, Russia, nor yet the League of Nations was prepared to help China stop Japan at a time when Japan could have been stopped. So the Chinese Communist Party—which did the bulk of the fighting in China's Anti-Japanese War—had no choice but to turn inward to the resourcefulness of the Chinese people. Mao said the soldiers of the Red Armies were "fish" depending entirely on the peasant masses of China, who were "water."

The same ideas prevailed in the military controversies of the 1960s. This time the threat came not from Japan but from the U.S.A. How to resist a possible attack? Some military professionals took a conventional view. Rely on Russia and its advanced weapons. Go outside China if necessary (perhaps into Vietnam) to stop the enemy before he gets to China.

Mao and Lin Piao took a different view. Rely on nothing else but the Chinese people. Prepare them politically. That is more important than lining up allies and fancy weapons. Wait for the enemy. Lure him in. Go onto the "strategic defensive" at first; then when the enemy gets bogged down, seize the moment to go over to the "counteroffensive." Get your arms the way the PLA has always got its arms: from the enemy.

Mao and Lin won this debate over how to fight a war. Their theories are complex, and I have done them no justice. But the heart of them is "people's war" based on *self-reliance* in order to preserve *independence*. It is the motto of an army that puts "mind" over "mechanization." Of an army which knows itself weaker than the enemy at the start of the struggle. An army patient and steady-nerved enough to turn aside at times from confrontation, wait for a mistake by the enemy, then spring back selectively at a moment of its own choosing.

Above all, it is the motto of an army which can switch and turn because it keeps in its hands full independence of action. The Chinese *think* this way about war and diplomacy because they have always had to *act* this way. It is a method of coping with weakness. Independence, and the stratagems that fit with it, have often been the only strength the Chinese Communist Party had in the face of a superior foe.

3. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese reject "bloc thinking." The point touches both Chinese insistence on independence and the Chinese view of power's fluidity. One terrible American error about China from the 1930s through the 1960s was the view of the CCP as a mere appendage of Bolshevism. Shrewd men (George Kennan; most of the U.S. diplomats in China) saw from the start that the Sino-Soviet tie was not tight or enduring. Among many reasons for this are the divergent ways of thinking in Moscow and Peking about the relation between Communism and the nation-state. Through the 1960s, the divergence grew. In the two Communist giants' attitudes toward Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia after his fall in March, 1970, it is displayed in a pure form.

Moscow thinks—Stalin taught it how to—in terms of a Communist bloc. The land of the October Revolution naturally heads the bloc. National sovereignty within the bloc is not total (as Prague recalls). Should one lamb in the flock stray from the proper path of socialism, the shepherd has the right to reach into his life and set him right. It is all-important to Moscow whether a nation is inside or outside the bloc. In In-

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dochina, to choose an instance, only Hanoi really counts to the Russians. Hanoi is (Moscow hopes) part of the bloc. Everything in Soviet-Vietnamese relations follows from that. The rest of Indochina seems to be viewed from the Kremlin mainly by the yardstick of its "Leninist potential."

The Chinese are altogether more flexible. They reject "bloc thinking." First, it does not fit in with independence. Second, it tends to go against China's experience that socialism can only be won from within a nation. Third, Mao has a view of power too volatile to be accommodated by "bloc thinking."

Mao scandalizes the Russians by asserting that even a bloc has "contradictions." The Leninist fold may be divided against itself. One of its members may be "chauvinist" and seek "hegemony" over the rest. It comes as no surprise that Peking tosses around the term "superpower." In no sense is it a Marxist term. It describes not a class reality but a power reality. The Chinese have started no Comintern of their own. It is by no means only Communist Parties which interest them. So we confront a paradox. The Chinese are more rigid about national sovereignty than bloc-thinking allows. Yet they have a more flexible notion of power than bloc-thinking permits.

Today, the key unit of Chinese thinking about strategy in the world is not the *bloc* but the *united front*. What is the difference? The bloc is a phalanx of the faithful. The united front is a loose partnership set up for a specific task. The partners do not come together out of agreement on socialism. Partners change as circumstances change. A new target calls for new partners. So in the 1930s when Japan became the chief target, the Chinese Communist Party linked arms with the Kuomintang, which had in recent years been steadily murdering CCP forces. No less suddenly, a power shift may render today's partner unnecessary for tomorrow's struggle. He is tossed aside like a used Kleenex. This is the Chinese way of politics. They can be tough as a pine or as bending as a willow. But they simply do not think in terms of blocs.

Why has Peking embraced Sihanouk while Moscow continues to recognize the Lon Nol regime? Here the difference between the two capitals over bloc thinking is illustrated. Chou En-lai spoke a lot of this "extraordinary man" Sihanouk. "A Prince, a Buddhist, a pacifist," he remarked to us, "has now become a fighter against American imperialism." It seemed less than vital to the Premier that Sihanouk is not Marxist. Crucial was the Cambodian's membership in the united front against the U.S.

The Russians are more rigid. They do not trust Sihanouk, and have given him no support (though Kosygin remarked to the Prince when he [Sihanouk] reached Moscow Airport from Paris just after the coup against him: "We will support you to the end"). Sihanouk explained the Soviet attitude to me. "Their chief concern is their particular brand of Commu-

nism. One reason they stay in Phnom Penh is to propagandize among young Cambodians for anti-Maoist Communism. The same with the East Germans. They have mounted a vast effort to educate Cambodians in revisionism." Sihanouk was not Moscow's kind of socialist, so they dropped him.

The Chinese were more supple. Their view of the flux of power in Indochina is not bound in a strait-jacket of ideology. The Chinese never use the term "Maoism." They never refer—except in embarrassed caricature—to "Maoists" outside China. Sihanouk made this point at length. It is plain to any visitor to China or reader of China's press. Peking refers a lot to foreign "friends of China," but never to foreign "Maoists."

Here they have stepped out of Communist tradition. Moscow is proud to point to "Leninists" in foreign lands. But the Chinese—I feel—do not really believe in "international ideology." Sihanouk is weighed on another scale entirely. He is part of the united front against Washington. He is a welcome barrier to any ambitions Hanoi may cherish for a Cambodia made in Vietnam's image. These are notions within reach of Lenin but within even closer reach of the ancient strategist Sun Tzu.

James Reston wondered why Chou En-lai, when speaking of Soviet policies toward China, used the word "lassoo." He got no answer. A story around Peking during July gives it. Mr. Chou himself recounted the story to a French visitor. In a herd of Mongolian horses, when the leader bolts, the herdsman has but one recourse. He must lassoo the leading horse. Otherwise he will lose his herd forever. The Premier likened the herdsman to the Soviet Union. It fears for its herd. China has bolted away, and many "horses" go with her. Moscow sees only one recourse. *It tries to lassoo China.* Chou En-lai laughed for his French visitor and quipped: "But the Chinese horse is still bolting!" China will not be lassoed. And she continues to disrupt the tidy "herd," which is Russia's best vision of the world of nations.

4. *The Chinese have not abandoned their Communist theory, but Realpolitik is built into the very heart of Chinese Communist theory.* I sense the reader over my shoulder with a good question. Am I trying to suggest the Chinese leaders are Bismarckian pragmatists? No, they are Communists. They believe capitalism is in decline, that the world will one day be socialist. They take their theory of the world as seriously as any government does. Cadres in China believe as much in the Thought of Mao as lawyers in the United States believe in the American Constitution. But what is often missed is that Mao's theory is no armchair speculation. It is distilled from practice. "If you want to know the taste of a pear," wrote Mao in *On Practice*, "you must change the pear by eating it yourself. . . . All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience."

And what has the Chinese experience been? It

exists among other things of two broad yet vital ingredients: Chinese cultural history, and China's collapse before the impact of the West after 1840. From both sources an apparent pragmatism has entered Chinese Communism. Fifty years in the land of Confucius has stripped Marxism in China of the vaporous clouds of German metaphysics. As for 100 years of pressure from superior outside forces, it has mercilessly confronted China with the fact of her own weakness. She has had to learn how to "pit one against ten" and still win. This has led her to stitch many a practical patch on the splendid but unserviceable garment of Marxism.

Consider the two basic Maoist ideas of "contradiction" and "united front." Mao's method of analysis is, first, to identify the principal contradiction in a situation. After 1937 it was between China and Japan. Today it is between the revolutionary peoples of the world and U.S. imperialism. Then Mao builds a united front against the target. You "unite with all whom you can unite with." We see that pure power considerations are intrinsic to united-front thinking. Get with you whomever you can get! After 1937 Mao was even prepared to go into a united front with Chiang Kai-shek.

But there comes a fresh stage. You go over to the offensive. Press for your goals in sharper form. Mao has a theory for this transition. Each contradiction, he submits, has a principal aspect (the stronger side) and a nonprincipal aspect (the weaker side).

When do the scales tip? When does the nonprincipal aspect of a contradiction turn into the principal aspect? Mao puts it simply. When the "overall balance of forces" alters. *When we become stronger than the enemy.* Then one can be more choosy about allies—no longer having to link up with just anyone.

Again, power factors are found at the heart of Chinese strategy. "Contradiction" and "united front" are sacred vessels in the church of Chinese Communist theory. But the way they work is prosaic. The oil in the vessels is no holier than that in any other vessels of political theory. It is power. Considerations of power are not exactly in *tension* with considerations of ideology. They are the operative means of getting to the ideology's goals.

So it is not "un-Maoist" (whatever else it may be) for China to ally with Pakistan. Pakistan is an ideal member of the united front that Peking maintains against several adversaries. It is neither "un-Maoist" nor inconsistent to let Britain keep Hong Kong while loudly protesting U.S. occupation of Taiwan. The United States, not Britain, is China's main target. Certainly Peking wants Hong Kong back. But there is no hurry. Toothless Britain presents small challenge to the emerging future Mao sees over history's horizon. Meanwhile, letting Hong Kong stay in British hands brings Peking some \$600 million a year in foreign currency.

Taiwan is another kettle of fish. Peking makes it a number-one issue, not just because it wants Taiwan

back, but because the issue of Taiwan has involved a U.S. military challenge to China. To be sure, national emotions stir over Taiwan. But that does not explain Peking's stress upon it. The Chinese are always patient when there is no reason to be impatient. It was only when the United States installed itself on the island that Peking elevated the Taiwan issue to top priority.

So China's policies toward these two lost bits of her territory—Hong Kong and Taiwan—are not a case of random *ad hoc* pragmatism. The methods bend like a bamboo. Transcending methods, however, fixed and firm as a pine, is the Chinese Communist vision of tomorrow's world and China's role in it.

I am not discounting ideology or Peking's belief in its ideology. The issue is more oblique. How does ideology sway day-to-day practice? And here one more point arises. *Realpolitik* is not a science like physics. Its practice rests on how you first see the conditions around you. The perceptions of the crudest pragmatist are filtered through a honeycomb of prejudices. It is *as Marxists* that the Chinese leaders weigh and reason about international affairs.

They study a situation. What they see is not separable from the Marxist spectacles through which they peer. Take the Ceylon rebellion of 1971. Mr. Y told me why Peking did not support the rebels. "You see, there were two things wrong with them." He sounded like a mechanic accounting for a stalled motor. "They put the gun above the party. And they did not practice the mass line." Mr. Y summed them up as "Guevarist."

Now, is this really why Peking would not back the Ceylonese rebels? China's position has two inseparable roots. Peking felt the rebels would lose. That was a pragmatic reason for keeping clear of them. But the *reasons* which convinced Peking the rebels would lose were ideological. As Mr. Y detailed, the youthful Ceylonese had fallen into two errors which Peking believes fundamental.

The "reality" which the exponent of *Realpolitik* reveres cannot be measured by thermometer or scale. What you see is not unaffected by what you believe. Mao thought the Ceylon rebels were wrong—and calculated accordingly. Che Guevara might have thought them correct—and calculated accordingly.

To sum up. The Chinese are certainly among the Realists of history, not the Zealots or the Romantics. Yet their realism is at once an aspect and an application of their (China-tested) Communist convictions. The Chinese are not Communists with the left hand and Bismarckians with the right. To an extent remarkable for men of ideology, they see the world with a single eye.

Toward the U.S.A., China has a mainly negative aim: to be free of the military harness that the United States has thrown around East Asia since the Korean War. China wants to consoli-

date its revolution. The only way America can help, in China's view, is by not interfering. The Chinese know they are still weak by the standards of the superpowers, yet they know also that they are rising. They consider that time is on their side.

There are strong lines of continuity with the past in these attitudes. Not so much with the Confucian past of the dynasties. Rather with the anticolonial experience of the last century. Americans may be shocked by the suggestion, but the Chinese see post-1945 U.S.A. as a direct successor to the colonial powers which bullied and ravaged Asia. The period from the Opium Wars until the present is a seamless stretch of history to Peking. First, because throughout it, China has faced superior material force on its doorstep. Second, because the Chinese mind has felt frustration, and often humiliation, when looking during this period at the West. The West has threatened China; yet the West is more advanced than China. It is a painful mixture for the patriotic Chinese mind. To keep the West at bay and to catch up with the West have both been among China's concerns.

One reason that Communism wins wide allegiance in China is that it helps China achieve both these aims. It gives China the unity and the ideology to be anti-Western. And it is a method of modernization. But Mr. Nixon has also made a contribution to easing the first concern. He called a halt to American expansion in East Asia, and now actually reverses the process. This is what Peking has always wanted. The Democratic Administrations saw the Chinese question too much as a mere problem of communication. They offered Peking exchanges of doctors, seeds, journalists, and other good-things of life. But at the same time they kept on building up the military harness around China's throat. Peking scoffed at Johnson's honeyed offers, and deeply feared his imperialistic actions. But Nixon is delivering the goods. Month by month, he draws back more and more ground troops from China's doorstep.

With their long view of history, the Chinese sit back and talk about this historic shift with a philosopher's detachment. It was inevitable, they say, that the U.S. should have found its East Asian adventures counter-productive. China did not have to wait all that long to see it happen. America's burst of global imperialism was, by Chinese standards, an affair of a single evening. It only ran from the quivering sense of power of 1945, until the lesson of the powerlessness of power in Vietnam.

When the Australians met Chou En-lai, Mr. Whitlam started to rake over the embers of Vietnam, saying how misguided the United States had been, what a tragedy the war was. But the seventy-three-year-old Premier cut him off. With a large gesture, he said grandly: "What is past is past," and went on to chew at the bone of Japanese militarism. Mr. Chou feels able now to look beyond the twenty-five-year spasm of

American expansionism in Asia. Dozens of talks that I had in China ran along the same lines.

Some Chinese dwell much on internal upheavals in the U.S. "We notice the obsession with sex," one official remarked. "It is the sign of a crumbling order. The late Ming period was the same. Sex was everywhere. Soon the dynasty collapsed." But what occurs within the U.S. is minor to the Chinese. It is what the U.S. does in Asia that concerns them.

Of course, as China grows in power, her ambitions will increase. She will go, when she is able to, from "strategic defense" to "counteroffensive." China will not always be in a condition of relative weakness. She will not forever be in the mental situation of coping with a painful past. Positive goals will be asserted. Having "stood up" (Mao's phrase), China is likely to "stretch out."

The Nixon visit to Peking begins a dialogue that results from a shift in the balance of forces in East Asia. The United States is adjusting its role; Peking welcomes the adjustment. The tough bilateral issue is Taiwan (it is interesting—and not unpleasant in Peking's ears—that Henry Kissinger considers Vietnam essentially a problem of the past, and Taiwan the next Asian problem). If Taiwan gets settled, the way is wide-open for Washington and Peking to cooperate in whatever ways the flux of world power may at any point intimate. The conflict of interest between the U.S.A. and China is not extensive. (That between Japan and China is greater, and so is that between Russia and China.) Nixon and Mao are not rigid men, and they look out today on a strikingly fluid world.

One day in Peking I met a jade carver at a handicrafts factory. He was a shrewd, humorous old man who has practiced his art for forty years. I watched his nimble fingers and darting eyes. He was carving fruit and vegetables. Struck by the range of colors, I asked if they were natural. "Yes, the jade has many different colors," the craftsman replied. Then he explained to me an uncertainty about carving vegetables in jade. "I cannot tell, when I start, what color the jade is inside." He showed me a jade piece, cut at an angle; the edge was green and the middle red. "So I cannot be sure, at the start, what vegetable I will end up carving from the piece of jade. Take the piece I am working on now. If the inside is red, I will make tomatoes. If it is green, I will make cucumbers."

So it may be with the relationship Nixon and Mao are carving out. The lump of jade is the international context of the Sino-American dialogue. Who knows whether it will turn out "red" or "green"; whether Nixon and Mao will make "tomatoes" or "cucumbers"? The Chinese leaders may be as uncertain as the jade carver about what product (beyond a Taiwan settlement) will appear. They are so worried about Russia and Japan that they may want to go far down the road of détente with the U.S. But how far does Nixon want to go? □