

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET / SENSITIVE

REFER TO DOS

March 9, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass the following report of his meeting with President Sadat to you:

"I hope this round will be fruitful and decisive.' These first words, spoken by Sadat at the opening of seven hours of talks here in Aswan, characterize the mood of hope, expectation and quiet determination which Sadat reflects. He also added at the press conference that 'this will be a hard round' -- meaning it will be a tough negotiation.

"I covered in some detail the principal points which Sadat is willing to consider in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the strategic passes and the oil fields. I got him to delete the point on linkage to a Syrian agreement which I knew in advance would result in a very adverse reaction in Israel. A number of the points which Sadat has given me are positive, and while some will not be acceptable to the Israelis, I am bringing enough with me to at least get the negotiations started in a serious way. The most positive element we have received is a willingness by Sadat to in effect agree to a no-war pledge. The form of words in which this is expressed is likely to be haggled over.

"Sadat is having a monumental problem with the military. Significantly he had with him throughout the day, General Gamasy, his Minister of Defense, whose support for any agreement is crucial. He brought in Gamasy to give us a full conceptual explanation from a military point of view of the next step as seen by the Egyptians. All of the possibilities discussed by Gamasy would move Egyptian forces east of the passes. I felt that it was essential that I tell Sadat ahead of time when I spoke to him alone afterward that Israel will not accept Egyptian soldiers east of the passes. We discussed as a possible alternative, a possible small advance of Egyptian troops to the present Israeli line which is west of the passes.

OSD REVIEWED 01 MAR 2011 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

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DOS REVIEWED 07-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.

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"Gamasy said that the agreement should be based on the following principles: (1) any line manned by one side should be secure from the other side's troops; (2) the agreement should not give either side any military advantage; (3) there should be a balance of troops in the Sinai for both sides; (4) the new lines should be a sufficient distance away to give security to the Egyptian people in the cities in the Suez Canal area and to navigation through the Canal; (5) the buffer zone should be wide enough to avoid clashes between the two sides; (6) navigation through the Suez Canal, once opened, would be an obstacle to Egyptian military reaction in event of renewed hostilities, thus making it necessary for Egypt to have more forces in Sinai.

"My plan is to return to Aswan on Wednesday. In the meantime you will have seen that Esenbel has invited me to come to Ankara. I am planning on having talks with the Israelis on Sunday night and Monday a.m., after which the Israelis will have 24 hours to think over what I have brought from Egypt. During this 24 hour period -- Monday afternoon and Tuesday morning -- I will be in Ankara to discuss the Cyprus situation with all of the principal Turkish leaders, including Ecevit and Demirel. I will use the occasion to explore possibilities, but will make no moves in this regard without further consultation with you. The principal focus of the discussions will be on what the Turks would be willing to give in return if we are able to get a commitment from the Greek Government to the concept of a bizonal federation.

"I leave Aswan early Sunday morning; I will make a brief five hour stop in Damascus before arriving in Israel Sunday night."

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FM USDEL ASWAN

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 06
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 009
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 04
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 01
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 01
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 08
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 01
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 00
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 25

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USDEL ASWAN 01
JERUSALEM AND ANKARA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR PINT EG XF US
SUBJ: SADAT BACKGROUNDER FOR EGYPTIAN PRESS

1. PRESIDENT SADAT CALLED EDITORS OF EGYPTIAN DAILIES TO ASWAN FOR BACKGROUNDER MARCH 10. SESSION WAS CONDUCTED IN PRESENCE SENIOR GOE ADVISORS ALSO SUMMONED TO ASWAN FOR PRIVATE MEETING WITH SADAT. THESE ADVISORS INCLUDED PRININ HEGAZI, MININT SALIM, ASU HEAD HAFIZ GHANIM, PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MARI, AND MININFO ABU AL-MAGD, IN ADDITION TO FONMIN FAHMY AND MINWAR GAMASI, WHO WERE ALREADY IN ASWAN FOR KISSINGER VISIT.

2. RELIABLE JOURNALISTS WHO ATTENDED BACKGROUNDER, TELL US SADAT ADVISED PRESS TO TAKE HIS OWN BALANCED AND TRANQUIL VIEW OF EVENTS. REFUSING TO COMMENT ON ANY FACET OF SECRETARY'S VISIT PER SE, HE EMPHASIZED THAT WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED OR FAIL, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR EMOTIVE REPORTING. IF NO PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED, THEN GOF MUST SIMPLY TRY AGAIN. THERE WOULD

***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT,LL

PSN:019359

PAGE 01

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DTG:101635Z MAR 75

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BE NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED IN DEAFING USG OR US DIPLOMACY,
HE ADDED.

3. ASKED ABOUT VARIOUS OTHER FOREIGN AFFAIRS ISSUES, INCLUDING
GDE RELATIONS WITH SARG, LARG, AND PALESTINIANS, SADAT SAID
NOTHING NEW, USING THE OCCASION TO PROJECT CALM, SELF-
CONFIDENT IMAGE. ON PLO, FOR EXAMPLE, HE REPORTEDLY CON-
FINED HIS REMARKS TO PRO FORMA STATEMENT OF PALESTINIAN
NATIONAL RIGHTS.

COMMENTS: PURPOSE OF BACKGROUNDER WAS APPARENTLY TO
ENSURE LOCAL REPORTING REMAINS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD
AND NON-SENSATIONALIST, PARTICULARLY IN EVENT OF FAILURE
OF CURRENT EFFORTS ARRANGE SECOND STAGE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT.
"BE LIKE HE," SADAT REPORTEDLY SAID, "RELAXED AND SELF-
CONFIDENT."

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FM SECSTATE SECT0157

TO USDEL ASWAN IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASH DC IMMEDIATE

SECRET

R.O. 116921 GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER HARRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO SADAT
EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM ME THROUGH PANNY FOR SADAT,

2. BEGIN TEXT: AS I DEPART FOR ANKARA, I WANT YOU TO KNOW AS AN INTERIM REPORT THAT I AM IN THE MIDDLE OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND WILL RETURN TO ISRAEL FOR EVENING DISCUSSIONS TUESDAY.

3. THE TALKS HAVE GONE ABOUT AS I EXPECTED. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT YET GIVEN A CONSIDERED REACTION TO MY REPORT, BUT I EXPECT THIS WHEN I RETURN, AS I ASSUMED. THEY WILL HOLD A CABINET MEETING WHILE I AM IN TURKEY, AND I HAVE CAUTIONED THEM ON THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF EXERCISING CARE IN INFLUENCING HOW THAT DISCUSSION IS PLAYED IN THE PRESS.

4. WHEN THE TUESDAY EVENING TALKS ARE OVER, I SHOULD KNOW HOW MUCH MORE TIME I SHALL NEED IN ISRAEL AND SHALL BE ABLE TO LET YOU KNOW THE TIMING OF MY RETURN TO ASWAN WEDNESDAY. WE SHALL HAVE TIME THEN FOR ME TO GIVE YOU THE FULL ACCOUNT AND FLAVOR OF MY MEETINGS HERE. END TEXT.

KISSINGER

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ACTION NODS-00

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Egypt

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FM USDEL ASWAN
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INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T ASWAN. 94

NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPT PASS SECRETARY

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT FROM THE SECRETARY

REF: SECTO 157

1. I GAVE FAHMY THIS EVENING YOUR ORAL MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT SENT UPON YOUR DEPARTURE FROM ANKARA. PURSUANT SECTO 158, I ALSO TOLD HIM YOUR PRESENT ETA IS 1530 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12. FAHMY OBSERVED THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THE MESSAGE AND WONDERED HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONSTRUE IT. I TOLD HIM YOU WERE SIMPLY CONFIRMING TO THE PRESIDENT WHAT YOU SUGGESTED WOULD BE THE SCENARIO IN ISRAEL. I ASKED THAT HE SEND IT TO THE PRESIDENT, WHICH HE RATHER RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO DO.

2. FAHMY THEN ASKED ME TO CONVEY SEVERAL THINGS TO YOU:

A) HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE UPCOMING MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL (FOREIGN MINISTERS) IS TO BE HELD IN CAIRO ON MARCH 24.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ALL THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE EXPECTED TO BE PRESENT. FAHMY HOPES THAT THE SECOND STATE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT CAN BE CONCLUDED BY THAT TIME TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT.

B) HE ALSO AGAIN RAISED THE MATTER OF EGYPTIAN RED CRESCENT SUPPLIES FOR SINAI. EGYPT DOES NOT ACCEPT THE ISRAELI CONTENTION THAT ALL NEEDED RELIEF SUPPLIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED. IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF EGYPTIAN RED CRESCENT SUPPLIES ARRIVE LATE, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO GOE THAT SUPPLIES PROPERLY MARKED AS RED CRESCENT BE PERMITTED TO BE SENT TO SINAI.

C) HE ALSO RAISED AGAIN THE MATTER OF LANCE MISSILES. HE NOTED YOU HAD BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON THIS, BUT THAT THRE PRESIDENT FURGOT TO ASK YOU HOW MANY LANCE MISSILES ARE BEING SUPPLIED. EITHER HE OR THE PRESIDENT WILL ASK YOU THIS QUESTION WHEN YOU NEXT ARRIVE. FAHMY IS CONCERNED THAT THE PROVISION OF LANCE MISSILES TO ISRAEL WILL BUILD UP PRESSURES WITHIN THE GYPTIAN MILITARY, AND ESPECIALLY AMONG THE "GUNNERS" TO OBTAIN A COMPARABLE WEAPONS SYSTEM AND THAT MORE MILLIONS WILL HAVE TO BE SPENT TO DEVELOP A COUNTER CAPABILITY.

D. FINALLY, HE ALLUDED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS TO LOCAL EDITORS TODAY (ASHAN 91) AND EXPLAINED THAT THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE INTENDED TO DAMPEN LOCAL EUPHORIA. HE RECALLED YOU HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT THE NEED TO DO SO AND NOTED THIS WAS SADAT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS REQUEST.

3. COMMENT: FAHMY REMAINS TOTALLY CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT IS ALREADY "COOKED UP," NOTWITHSTANDING ALL YOU, JOE SISCO'S AND MY EFFORTS TO DISABUSE HIM OF THIS NOTION. HE INSISTS HE IS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS NEGOTIATION AND THAT IT IS SOLELY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND YOU. HE STILL SPEAKS ABOUT RESIGNING IF HE DOESN'T LIKE OUTCOME, BUT I AM INCREASINGLY GETTING IMPRESSION HE IS RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING WHATEVER THE PRESIDENT AGREES UPON. EILTS

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NOTE: Not passed Secretary by OC/T.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

FROM PERM JERUSALEM CLASSIFICATION SECRET

Egypt

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, EG, US
SUBJECT: ISSUING EXPORT LICENSES
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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REF: STATE 053941 (TOSEC 285)

FOR MC CLOSKEY, VEST, SOBER FROM SISCO

Secretary wants issuing of export licenses for Egypt and all related briefing deferred for a few days until you receive go-ahead from him.

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ISSaunders:kk DRAFTING DATE 3/11/75 TEL. EXT. CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: S:BOG/ADAMS

CLEARANCES: P:JJSisco S/S: ~~XX~~
RSherman

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Egyptian side:

President Sadat
 Foreign Minister Fahmy
 General Gamasy (part of meeting)

US side:

Secretary Kissinger
 Under Secretary Sisco
 Ambassador Eilts

SUBJECT:

Meeting with President Sadat,
 March 12, 1975

PLACE:

Aswan, Egypt

After the Secretary had briefed the President on the status of Turkish-Greek negotiations and on his talks in Syria, he reported the results of his talks in Israel as follows:

The Secretary had worked on Israel in the manner which he had previously described to the President. A frontal confrontation had been avoided since this would have split the Jewish community in the US. Instead, an effort had been made to create a body of support for the desirability of some movement toward. We had also worked on individual Israeli leaders and as a group. All of this takes time. During the Secretary's February trip, the dominant mood in Israel and in the US public media was to go to Geneva and have a stalemate. This has now changed.

The Israelis, the Secretary continued, have never made a decision on any other other than that which Ambassador Eilts presented in December and which the President rejected. The Secretary has been dealing with an Israeli negotiating team consisting of Rabin, Allon, Peres and General Gur. The team has no authority from the Cabinet to go beyond what has already been authorized. The President's paper has been shown only to Rabin and Allon. No one in Israel has yet had to make a decision on the oilfields and the passage

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At the present time, the Secretary opined, Rabin and Allon are probably prepared to go along with such a decision. Peres, in his judgment, will probably not make a public uproar about such a decision. Peres, however, is still maneuvering. Rabin's problem is to keep such speculation out of the press. He has kept his Cabinet in the dark. He wants to move slowly. The Secretary returns to Jerusalem on Friday. Thereafter, on Sunday, Rabin will want to propose some of the geographic limits to the Cabinet after which we can work out details. The Secretary believes a situation has been created in which Rabin and Allon will push for an agreement. They appear to understand the need for a different attitude toward Sadat. On the other hand, they need the maximum obtainable quid pro quo in order to carry the Cabinet. The Secretary knows what they want; the President will have to tell him what he can do. Some things can be handled in the context of the paper already given us. The Israelis need a record of having raised all the Cabinet's instructions.

Digressing for a moment, the Secretary alluded to the Egyptian interest in sending Red Crescent help to Sinai. In principle, the Israelis are willing to permit this and also are willing to give up some of the POWs (but not one or two murderers). If the President would also approve the return of 39 Israeli bodies, this would help. President asked Fahmy to so instruct Gamasy.

Continuing, the Secretary pointed out that the Israeli problem is that they can only defend an agreement as a step toward peace. The President noted that all of his statements indicate Egypt wishes to push the peace process. However, the Israelis are seeking to give some political significance to this, which he is unable to accept. The Secretary observed that in the final analysis, the Israelis will claim one thing and Egypt can claim another.

Some statement is needed in the agreement, the Secretary said, that it is being made in furtherance of peace. The President said he has no objection to this. The Secretary thought this might be stated in terms of a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. The Israelis, he noted, will want something concrete. They want a renunciation of belligerency. He had told them that the President refused to accept this. The Israelis will, in the Secretary's judgment, ask something similar to what is in the Fahmy paper and also a reference to settling disputes through

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negotiations. The President observed that if this takes place through the negotiating process and is associated with pushing peace, it is agreeable. The Secretary thought it might require a phrase to the effect that the two parties refrain from the use of force and settle disputes by peaceful means. The President responded that if such a statement is indefinite, he cannot go along. Syria must be considered. If the statement applies to the peace process or until the fulfillment of the agreement or during negotiations, it would be agreeable. Otherwise, it is not, since this would constitute non-belligerency.

The Secretary noted the Israeli objection to the phrase "unless Israel attacks Syria" on the grounds of fuzziness. Syria might, for example, begin a war of attrition; the Israelis might then hit back and it becomes a matter of who attacks whom. The President commented that if it is only a war of attrition and not an invasion, some phrasing ought to be possible and asked Fahmy to consider this.

The Secretary noted that he had changed his mind about Rabin and Allon. They are not involved in auctioneering. They have a problem in getting any agreement through the Cabinet. (Mordechai) Gazit, who is doing some of the Israeli drafting, has pointed out some of the Israeli concerns. Specifically, if a new agreement is not something more than a cease-fire, what is it? Something more than a normal cease-fire is needed. The President observed that he had agreed in principle to pushing the peace process. Fahmy contended that the initial Disengagement Agreement is not a cease-fire agreement. The Secretary asserted it is. He asked in what way is paragraph 8 of the Fahmy paper different from what is already in effect? Fahmy noted that the first part of paragraph 8 deals with Egypt and the second, with Syria. The Secretary said that the Israelis question both parts.

Fahmy read the pertinent paragraph, contending that if Israel attacks Syria, this is not a war of attrition. Moreover, Egypt does not spell out therein what kind of action it might take. The Secretary noted that if a peace agreement is signed and any party wants to go to war, it can do so in exercise of its own sovereignty. Hence, such a statement is more symbolic than substantive. The

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two questions that have to be asked are: a) how is the first sentence of paragraph 8 different from what is already in the Disengagement Agreement, and b) the whole matter of a second sentence. If the first sentence applied only to Egypt, this might help. Some thought should also be given to appropriate language regarding an Israeli attack on Syria. The Israelis claim the Syrians are sending brigades to Lebanon and are worried. The President conceded this might happen. The Secretary noted that the Israelis are concerned that, in the event of strong reprisals for Palestinian raids or a war of attrition, the agreement might be affected. Fahmy said that if the action takes place in Lebanon, this is not covered. However, some reference to Syria is necessary in any agreement. He had had in mind a preemptive war on the part of the Israelis. The Secretary said that the Israelis do not want a situation where they cannot retaliate. They must show the appropriate language to their own public.

Stop toward peace ↓

On the matter of progress toward peace, the Secretary continued, there is no problem with the general point. A number of specifics were proposed to symbolize the progress toward peace. Specifically:

a) passage through the Canal of Israeli cargoes and non-discrimination against Jews transitting the Canal;

b) suspension of economic boycott practices and restrictions. The President observed that this has to be done discreetly and selectively. Egypt is vulnerable to attacks in Arab meetings if this is not done carefully. The Secretary said publicity Arab boycott has received in the US also does not help.

c) A reduction of hostile propaganda activities. The Secretary recalled that Fahmy had told Ambassador Eilts that this might be toned down. The President responded, "Willingly."

d) Greater movement of people between the occupied parts of Sinai and Egypt. The Israelis would be prepared to permit visits of Arabs back and forth across the border. The Israelis had noted that there had been a "ferry" for students from Arish to Gaza. If they could present this

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as a step toward peace, this would be helpful. The President observed that this could be difficult. He recalled that attacks on King Hussein for allowing transit of the Allenby Bridge. If it takes place, it should not be mentioned. If it can be done discreetly, he had no objection. The Secretary observed that the Israelis will not be discreet. Fahmy asked what the Israelis mean by this point? The Secretary explained they want some movement along the dividing line and a maximum amount of transit. Fahmy asked if they are talking about Egyptians, foreigners or American travellers. The President thought this was not possible. The Secretary expressed the view that the Israelis will settle for Arabs in the area simply leaving transit rights. The President said he could not agree to tourists coming across the lines. However, a reunion of families and students could be arranged through the Mixed Commission as long as it is under the UN. Only Egyptians might be involved. The Secretary commented that the Israelis also include tourists, but opined if such an option is limited to families, it will already help. He observed that the Israelis see these points as substitutes for a declaration of non-belligerency.

e) Reduction of Egyptian pressure on third countries. The President interjected that this is impossible. Fahmy noted that Egypt has considerable influence with the African countries. The Africans might go along as a by-product of Egyptian action.

Regarding the Voice of Palestine (VOP), Egypt cannot consider this. To do so would be political suicide. If this is what the Israelis have in mind, Egypt cannot do it. The President noted he could, however, promise to control the VOP and Fahmy said "little by little."

The Secretary again noted that the Israelis are trying very hard. It is important that we give them something. Rabin, unfortunately, had publicly stated a short time ago that Israel would withdraw from the passes and the oilfields only for a non-belligerency pledge. Begin had asked him to repeat this and Rabin is now stuck with it.

f) Ships, planes and travellers coming to or going from Israel should be able to stop in Cairo.

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// The President called this "absurd." When we reach the frontiers, such items can be discussed. Suppose they have Israeli passports, the President asked? In the case of foreigners, however, this might be possible. The Secretary explained there are two problems: first, travellers coming on the same plane to Cairo. The President said this is not yet possible. The second involves individuals who visit Israel and come to Cairo. The President observed that this is possible and can even be done on the same passport.

g) The area evacuated by the Israelis should be established as a buffer zone. The President asked if they had mentioned any specific area. The Secretary responded that they have not. He had given them Gamasy's map. As he had earlier told the President, they will not have the Egyptian line east of the passes. They feel strongly about this. He had suggested that the Egyptian line be moved forward a bit and that the Israelis withdraw from the passes. The President asked whether they will hold the eastern entrance to the passes? The Secretary reiterated that at the moment he has no specifics. Perhaps he could get the eastern end of the passes, but he was not sure.

/// The President noted Egypt has been insisting that it hold the eastern end of the passes. However, as a final fallback position he could agree to holding the western end of the passes, leaving the rest, including the eastern entrance, in UN hands. The Secretary thought it might be possible that they will give up the eastern end of the passes but doubted they will agree to Egypt's holding the western end of the passes. He thought it might be possible to move the Egyptian line forward to the present Israeli line. The President said this was satisfactory. If the Israelis do not hold the eastern end, he could agree. The Secretary again noted that they want the entire evacuated area as a buffer zone. The President observed that if Egypt gets the present Israeli line, this is on the entrance to the passes. The Secretary pointed out this is not so. He reiterated his doubts that the Israelis will allow Egypt to hold the western end of the passes with military forces. Civilian occupation had not yet been discussed. The Secretary noted his idea was to put the areas evacuated under Egyptian civil administration.

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h) Establishment of new zones of limited armaments east of the new line. The President said this was agreeable. General Gamasy, who had been invited in by the President, was asked about the relationship of the present Israeli line from the west end of the passes. He noted the line is about ten kilometers west of the entrance. The Secretary affirmed that supervision in the buffer zone will be carried out by UN forces through a mixed committee. The Israelis will call such a committee anything other than an Armistice Committee. Fahmy suggested that it be called a Committee under the UN, such a group could discuss alleged violations, but not move around. It would consist of Israeli, Egyptian and UN personnel to look into alleged violations. The Secretary commented that the Committee could not check out violations on either side, but wondered about its doing so in the buffer zone. Gamasy thought this was the responsibility of UNEF. The Secretary said he understood that the President would not want Israelis behind the Egyptian lines. In the case of the buffer zone, this ought not to be an issue. If there is Egyptian civilian administration, such a Committee might help give reassurances. In any case, he was just raising the point.

i) Each side be permitted to maintain an "alert system" in the buffer zone. The President refused and the Secretary agreed this should be dropped.

j) Air reconnaissance missions by both sides over the edge of the buffer zone. The President said that if this is reciprocal, then he could agree. Gamasy pointed out in Arabic that any such arrangement would raise problems for both sides. The Secretary explained that Gur's concept is that each side give the other a schedule of the number of flights during a given period of time. The flights should be on a north-south axis. Gamasy insisted the Israelis can already detect from their side what the Egyptians are doing. Moreover, the UNEF will have its own reconnaissance for both sides. Fahmy noted Israeli reconnaissance will only be on the Egyptian side. Why, he asked, have a buffer zone? The Secretary noted the purpose is to check on the limited armaments zone by flying over the buffer zone. The President asked why the US cannot do this in the buffer zone. The Secretary said we are doing so now in the area between the Egyptian forward line and the Israeli forward line. However, the Israelis complain that they do not get the photos for ten days or so after each flight.

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(At this point, Sadat explained to Gamasy in Arabic that the evacuated territories would be a buffer zone.)

The President opined that the Israeli positions were "very mild."

Duration
UNEF

The Secretary noted we had previously agreed on no time limit on the agreement. The Israelis would like to express this in terms of the agreement remaining in force until superceded by another agreement. The President said all parties will go to Geneva to work out a new agreement. What, however, if one is not obtainable? The Secretary wondered if the term "indefinite" might be used. He noted the Israelis are trying to present this as an element of greater permanence than before. Even with such an agreement, he observed, sovereign states can go to war. They also want UNEF to be extended for the duration of the agreement rather than on an annual basis. The President said he could agree to one year. The Secretary referred to paragraph 6 of Fahmy's paper on this point. Fahmy observed that the language of his paper re annual renewal makes it routine and gives it continuity. The President noted that he would agree to this at the borders, but at this time the term "annual" should be sufficient. The Secretary noted it will not be. The President then said he could not give this to the Israelis, but could give it to us. We could say that assurances have been received for annual renewals as long as the peace movement continues.

The Secretary then asked about the President's views on Geneva. The President said they will ask for the '67 borders. The Secretary said Israel will refuse. The Israelis are concerned that if they refuse at Geneva, Egypt might repudiate the agreement. The President agreed this needs be solved. He thought something could be reached on the point.

President Sadat then said he had some points on the Egyptian side. First, what about the Palestinians and Geneva? The Secretary recalled he had already said Geneva would result in a stalemate. He doubted that the Israelis would receive the Palestinians. On our part, we are ready to establish contact with the Palestinians, but only after an agreement is reached. To do so earlier will only cause problems.

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It will be a complicated question. Last week's raid on Tel Aviv is the sort of thing that makes it more difficult. We, in fact, stopped the Israelis from retaliating at a time when it would be embarrassing for the President.

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The President then asked about the Syrians and the next new move. The Secretary recalled he had already told Asad he is ready to make a major effort after Sinai. The President wished to know if this could be before the UNDOF renewal. The Secretary said it will take a massive effort. We are ready to make the effort and are ready to talk to Asad along these lines. The President then asked if something could be done before the end of April. The Secretary said we could begin, but progress might be limited. Alternatively, we could go to Geneva. Fahmy suggested that the Secretary visit Damascus in early May to help with the UNDOF problem. The President reiterated this should take place in late April.

The Secretary asked about the President's idea with respect to Geneva. The President responded by asking for the Secretary's views. The Secretary noted that Asad would go to Geneva now to prevent Sadat from getting an agreement. If, however, Sadat gets one, Asad will not want to go to Geneva. The President said this agreement should first be fulfilled and then the reconvening of Geneva be faced.

Finally, the Secretary noted that the Israelis are willing to give up the oilfields, but first want time to build a new defense line before relinquishing the passes. They want to keep their present lines until a new line is built. General Gur had suggested nine months. The Secretary had said this was too long. Gamasy expressed concern that such an arrangement would mean Egyptian engineers going to the oilfields will have to pass through Israeli lines. The President stressed that the return of the oilfields is the most important thing even if it means going through Israeli lines. Fahmy observed that the oilfields might be surrounded by UNEF Force. The President agreed and noted that the Egyptian engineers can be protected in the enclave. Gamasy opined that Gur is anxious to keep his present positions. The Secretary thought Gur would agree to an enclave surrounded

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by the UN. Gamasy, however, continued to be worried about the position of the Egyptian engineers. Gamasy observed that there should be no problem for the Israelis to leave a corridor on the coast for the engineers. The Secretary thought Gur was reasonable, but Gamasy remained skeptical.

The Secretary also noted he had raised with the Israelis the President's concern about having too many forces in Sinai. The Israelis had responded they are willing in principle to discuss force disposition. The President expressed pleasure. The Secretary noted the Israelis also claim Egypt is deploying its forces for an attack. Egypt had moved one division closer to the Canal. Gamasy insisted the division is 30 kilometers west of the Canal and in a training status. The President noted that after the Canal is reopened, it will be difficult for Egypt to attack. The Secretary said the Israelis believe that even with the Canal opened, Egypt can get troops across the Canal in eight hours.

AMB:HF:Elts:ajc - 3/12/75

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

GOE SIDE:

President Sadat
Foreign Minister Fahmy
General Gamasy

US SIDE:

Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Eilts

SUBJECT:

Meeting with President Sadat,
March 13, 1975.

PLACE:

Aswan, Egypt

After welcoming the Secretary, the President indicated that he, Fahmy and Gamasy had been working all morning. Alluding to a former British official adept at developing alternative formulations, the President noted that Fahmy had prepared two formulas. He described the first as a compromise; the second as a final fallback position.

The Secretary indicated that if there is anything in the first formula, he would begin with that. If this is not possible, he would utilize the second. The President noted the two formulas differ only in Article III. Fahmy claimed he used the Secretary's own wording in his formulations. The Preamble, he noted, is to give the impression that more than a Disengagement Agreement is involved. Point No. 2, having to do with ^{new lines,} will not be in the agreement, but in an annex. The Secretary said these formulations would not be the agreement, but simply points. Both Sadat and Fahmy agreed.

The Secretary said he wished to make a few observations regarding the likely Israeli reaction. He would do so first in terms of the contents of the paper and second in terms of omission or points to be explained.

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a) On point 1, having to do with the area of withdrawal, The Secretary thought it might be possible, although the phraseology might have to be different. The subject will probably have to be phrased in terms of mutuality. Fahmy observed that the first point is a position.

b) On point 2, the Secretary noted that the first sub-paragraph (a) is what we are talking about. Re sub-paragraph (b), he asked what the Egyptian side means by the western end of the passes? If this is intended to be taken literally, he thought it was unobtainable and certainly not unless Israel is at the eastern end of the passes.

Sub-para (c) is in principle all right. (See qualification below.)

On sub-para (d), the Secretary speculated Egyptian absorption of the UN zone might be attainable, but Israel will have trouble accepting this. Sadat inquired if this would still be true if the forces are exactly the same on the western end of the passes. General Gamasy thought Egypt should be at the western entrances. The Secretary asked if Sadat wished the Israelis out of the eastern end?

Gamasy indicated his preference that the western entrance be held by Egypt even if the Israelis hold the eastern entrance rather than giving it to the UN. The Secretary opined this will be a totally new thought to the Israelis. The Israeli idea, still without Cabinet approval, continues to be a 30-50 kilometer withdrawal with all the areas evacuated under the UN. He doubted they have yet addressed themselves to a significant forward movement of the Egyptian line.

Sub-para (d) they would accept, but if sub-para (c) means the zone of unlimited armaments is across the Canal, this will create monumental difficulties. The President noted if Egypt opens the Canal, it will be hard to close it. The entire Egyptian military posture is defensive.

The Secretary pointed out that the Israelis have been briefing the press about Egypt's now having an offensive capability.

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(f) On point No. 3, having to do with formal assurances, the Secretary said he does not know which of the two formulations they would be likely to prefer. The Israelis will contend that the prohibition against introducing military and para-military forces is already in the last Disengagement Agreement. In that agreement, it is applicable to both sides. Now it would appear that only one side is being asked to do so. Fahmy observed that Egypt would be willing to put it into a Disengagement Agreement. The Secretary speculated on likely arguments which will be made by those who want the agreement. There is a subtle distinction between resort to the use of force and military and para-military operations, but what is it?

Sadat commented that in the future, we should not resort to the use of force. There eventually may be non-belligerency. The Secretary agreed, but noted that for the duration of the Agreement, something less will be required. The Israelis will say that as long as the process of moving toward a just and durable peace continues, it is agreeable. However, they will also want to know what will happen in the event they do not agree with Arab proposals at Geneva. Will force prohibitions then be ended?

Digressing, the President raised the matter of the Palestinians. The Secretary said he was convinced that to introduce the matter of the Palestinians will simply produce a prolonged stalemate. He would have to explain some of the language tomorrow. The certain Israeli reaction will be one of doubt that they can put these proposals to the Knesset.

With respect to point 4, having to do with Syria, the Secretary thought the Israelis will refuse, and probably so if there is harassment on the Syrian front. He opined that the term "attack" is better than the existing language. Fahmy stated that this is what is meant by preemptive war.

Point 5, having to do with the right of self-defense, the Secretary opined is agreeable. The same holds true with Point 6, though this should be done between and among the Arabs themselves. Re Syria, the Secretary thought we might say our efforts will be exerted to get a negotiation begun before the middle of 1975.

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On point 7, concerning the duration of UNEF, the Secretary expressed concern about the clause, "as long as efforts for a just and lasting settlement are proceeding." This, the Israelis will view as an escape clause. The Secretary noted we have two problems with this article. First, we are dealing with a group of 6 or 7, which must carry the Cabinet of 25 and then the Knesset of 100. Second, they are not statesmen. The Secretary noted the concept of "annual renewal" seems to mean that one can get them out. Something about refraining from resort to force is also necessary. In practice, it is meaningless. The Israelis, he acknowledged, would like to give the agreement some permanence. Fahmy contended this would be political suicide.

The Secretary expressed understanding that if there is no movement, there will again be war. He observed that he is aware of the President's problem. Sadat noted what the Israelis want is that anything not resolved will not be handled through military action. The Secretary agreed.

Point 8, having to do with cooperation with UNEF commander, the Secretary noted, will be acceptable, but will have to be in more institutionalized form. The Israelis will want some kind of commissioner committee.

Point 9, spelling out no destruction of roads or properties, should pose no problems.

On point 10, the Secretary noted two weeks for the relinquishment of the Abu Hodeib oilfields is too short. It should be a little longer. Three months is too long.

Point 11 on the Geneva conference poses no problem.

Point 12, the Secretary noted, is impossible. While conceding it to be a mild formulation, he thought this will have to be taken out. He noted if the Israelis leak this to the press it will mean trouble. In the US, the Palestinians are regarded as murderers. We must start the process of rehabilitation of the Palestinians. If Israel can get the Arab-Israeli issue focussed on the problem of the Palestinians, it has succeeded. Fahmy said he had an idea how to solve the matter based on the Secretary's comments, but did not specify.

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Fahmy said that, judging from the Secretary's comments, the sides may be far apart on an agreement. There are several basic points on which Egypt cannot give way to Israel, viz

(a) the passes and the oil fields. There should be progress not only from the Egyptian point of view, but also in the Arab world. No one will believe Egypt achieved anything if only the Israelis withdraw.

(b) a second problem is political. Egypt cannot agree to language which gives public expression to the fact that it is an interim political solution. The Secretary thought this could be avoided. The Israelis could probably agree to phraseology along the lines of a "continuance of the process of peace." As to the second formula, they would like to present it to their public that henceforth disputes will be settled by peaceful means and that after the conclusion of an agreement, the danger of war has decreased. The President indicated agreement in principle.

(c) Fahmy noted that only remaining problem was that of linkage. The Secretary suggested that any reference to the "alestinians be dropped. Fahmy agreed to drop it from the agreement, but contended it should still be discussed. A letter from the US on the subject would be helpful. The Secretary observed this would be dangerous to him. Fahmy proposed language similar to that used by President Nixon with Brezhnev and by President Ford at Vladivostok. The Secretary said we can give an oral assurance. We would have had political contact with the Palestinians in November had it not been for Rabat.

The Secretary asked if his understanding is correct that Egypt wants a commitment in the agreement to continue the process of peace. The President agreed. The Secretary again alluded to the related point that settlement of disputes would be through peaceful means. The President again agreed. A third problem, the Secretary continued, is to prevent the process of peace from becoming an excuse to abrogate the agreement. The Israelis are likely to interpret all phrases the way they want. If worded positively, however, this should be agreeable. Fahmy asked what would happen if nothing

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transpires. The process of peace must continue, but why should they constantly assume Egyptian mischievousness and what is wrong with Geneva.

The Secretary responded that the Israelis state that Sadat tricked them once and he can do it again. This might not be so, but the Israelis believe it. The Israelis are afraid that Egypt will engage in another Yom Kippur War, and need something for their public opinion. Israel, Egypt and the US, the Secretary continued, need an agreement. The costs of no agreement are out of proportion. He noted that the President had described the Israeli terms as more moderate than anticipated.

Sadat observed that earlier in the morning, when meeting with Fahmy and Gamasy, he had expressed a desire to make the agreement a turning point toward peace. He recognized that the Israelis are confused and do not know where they are heading. He would open the door for the Israelis.

The Secretary thought he should give the Israelis the ideas in the President's paper but not the paper itself. We could then take their views and prepare an American proposal.

The Secretary asked how the Israelis might be answered if they query in what way the present ideas differ from the earlier Fahmy paper. The President and Fahmy noted it is a step forward. On basic issues, the President said he was still confused. Would they give up to Egypt the passes? If the Israelis believe that Egypt would forego the passes, there is no agreement. The Soviets and Syrians will say what did Egypt get? It is not just a case of withdrawal but of regaining some territory. If they think only they are to move and turn over the territory to the UN, this is nothing. When the Secretary suggested Egyptian civilian administrators, Fahmy said this means nothing.

The Secretary thought if the Israelis were on the eastern end of the passes and Egypt on the west, this might just be possible. The President agreed. So did Fahmy, who said this could be sold to the Egyptian people. The Secretary reiterated that the Israelis are not really

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discussing on this. They are not thinking of the balance of forces in the Sinai. Gamasy thought this means that the Israelis will want to keep their troops in the western entrances. The President said he had not discussed this. On the West Bank, the forces should be larger than under the first Disengagement Agreement. He was thinking about reopening the Suez Canal and Egypt's obligation to protect it. The Canal, he noted, is a serious barrier to a pre-emptive war.

The Secretary noted the Israeli obsession with an Egyptian attack. He conceded that it is conceivable that Egypt would do so. However, Israel has talked itself into a frame of mind where it feels threatened. He recalled that the Israelis asked for some sign from the President to rebuild the Suez area as a sign of his peaceful intent. The Israelis want it both ways. Fahmy added that Egypt cannot present any agreement as an interim agreement. To do so would be harmful to Egypt.

The Secretary wondered if some way could be found to express the two points:

- a) The agreement is not final, and that the process for peace must continue, and
- b) both parties pledge they will seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The President agreed. Fahmy thought such language should be in connection with UNSC Resolution 338.

The Secretary reiterated he will not present the paper, but only the ideas. Some decision is needed in Israel to agree to some lines. There are four positive Egyptian points:

- a) This is not a final step toward peace.
- b) All disputes will be settled by peaceful means.
- c) To refrain from resort to use of force.
- d) Annual renewal of UNEF.

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On its side, Egypt wants a) a forward movement of the Egyptian line (Gamasy interjected that this is very important), and b) how the balance of forces is defined after the lines move forward.

Fahmy asked how the Israelis expected 7,000 soldiers in so large an area. The Secretary asked why not. Gamasy contended that the Israeli military position is better if they are on the other side of the passes. The Secretary said the Israelis will not see it this way. Having a mountain in back of them gives them great psychological assurances.

Asked about the other points which the Secretary had mentioned yesterday, the President said they had tried to put these into the paper. The Secretary asked if this means anything not now in the paper was unacceptable. He reiterated several of the points:

a) Families should be allowed to visit in the Sinai. Sadat agreed. This should apply to Egyptians and Palestinians in Gaza.

b) Travelers may use the same passport going to Israel and to Egypt. The President agreed.

c) Controlling progaganda. The President noted that nothing can be done about the Voice of Palestine. As far as Radio Cairo is concerned, this should be no problem. In any case, nothing of this sort can be put into an agreement.

d) Arab diplomatic pressures against Israel. Sadat said nothing could be done on this score.

e) Freedom of navigation through the Bab-el-Mandab.

f) Transit of Israelis through the Canal. The President noted cargo only, not crews. Fahmy noted people will kill the Israelis aboard the ships. The President observed if there are one or two Israelis aboard the ship, this will be all right, but not many. Fahmy thought they would make a test case out of it.

g) Arab restrictions and economic boycott. Sadat said this can begin on a selective basis. Fahmy

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noted the President had the previous day ordered a change of the Egyptian representative on the boycott commission. The new man has a new spirit and new instructions.

h) Mixed Committee. Fahmy thought this was covered by his point 8. The Secretary noted that Egypt and Israel would set up a committee to assist the UN commander. Fahmy said it is not clear what is wanted. The Secretary noted it will help to have the commission or committee consist of Egyptian and Israeli officers to assist the UN commander. The President thought it was dangerous to have Israelis in the UN area. In principle, he agreed, but a formula had to be found.

i) Reconnaissance flights. The President turned this down. If the US provides Egypt with the same equipment as it does to the Israelis, then it will be all right. The Secretary said our aircraft have been flying farther out in international waters. Sadat noted this is not the case with the Israeli planes which fly reconnaissance flights every day.

j) Agreement in force until superseded by a new agreement. The President agreed in principle, but wanted better phraseology developed.

After a five-minute recess and meeting of the American side, the Secretary said he again wished to sum up as follows:

We must get the Israeli Cabinet to agree this Sunday on principles. We will meet with the Israeli negotiating team Friday. Sadat thought that perhaps Mrs. Meir might help. The Secretary said he would not present the paper since this will confuse the drafting process with the conceptual process.

On the positive side, he would say President Sadat is ready to agree to:

a) A statement that this is not a final peace settlement, but a step in the process leading to peace according to UN resolutions;

b) In the peace process, solutions to disputes will be found by peaceful means;

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- c) some reference not to resort to force;
- d) as long as we make it clear that this is not the final agreement, something along the lines, "This agreement is valid until superseded by a new agreement."
- e) Mixed commissions.
- f) Annual renewal.
- g) the various items on the list.

On the Egyptian side, they want:

- a) some balanced disposition of forces;
- b) the various technical points, e.g. the non-destruction of property, roads, etc.

The Syrian and Palestinian points will have to be handled separately. The President said he would like to mention Syria in the agreement in some way. The Secretary expressed the view that the Israelis are not planning a preemptive attack. However, in the event of a war of attrition or Palestinian raids, they want the opportunity to retaliate. Some formula will have to be found for this. The Israelis are afraid of Egypt and not Syria.

At the end of the meeting, Gamasy told the Secretary that he hopes Egypt will be supported on the military side. Failure to do this could complicate matters. Subsequently, while waiting outside, Gamasy told Ambassador Eilts that if military arrangements are not acceptable, there will be no agreement. He would see to that. (The General did not speak threateningly, but almost resignedly.) Gamasy added that, in his view, it would be better to make a try for the Arish-Ras Mohamed line and in that context try to settle some of the broader issues.

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TELEGRAM

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TAGS : OVIP (KISSINGER, H.A.)

SUBJECT : Remarks of Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat following
Meeting in Aswan, March 13, 1975.

ACTION : SECRETARY WOULD IMMEDIATE

INFO : AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
USCIBO WASHINGTON

AMEMBASSY CAIRO, Jerusalem Immediate, Riyadh Routine

UNCLASSIFIED AND UNSEL ASWAN 0162

SECTO 249

REF : STATE 24911

1.QUOTE. Dr. Kissinger : The President and I have had very
constructive and fruitful meetings. We have examined a number of
principles and some concrete ideas, and I'll be taking some of these
concrete ideas with me to Israel tomorrow.

2. Question : Mr. President, do you have anything to add?

3. Answer : President Sadat : I confirm Dr. Kissinger's statement.

4. Question : I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger whether he thinks

USIS: TA HCHAN:sh	3/14/75	APPROVED BY: [Signature]
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AMB: RANDOLSON
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that on the basis of the concrete ideas he is taking back to Israel, the Israeli Cabinet will be in a position to make concrete ideas of its own on Saturday?

5. Answer : Dr. Kissinger : I am of course in no position to ~~speak~~ speak for the Israeli Cabinet, but I expect that there will be some concrete Israeli ideas when I return.

6. Question : Mr. President, there have been reports this evening of troop movements on the Egyptian ~~and~~ front, ^{Can} ~~Can~~ you tell us if these reports are based on anything substantial?

7. Answer : President Sadat : Not at all, the Egyptian side not at all.

8. Question : There has been no concentration of Egyptian forces along the Sinai Front?

9. Answer : President Sadat : Not at all, we are ~~honoring~~ honoring our signature on the disengagement agreement. We have with us General Gamasy.

10. (In Arabic) garbled.

11. Answer : President Sadat : (Translation from Arabic) In my talks with Dr. Kissinger we have moved from generalities to specifics, which Dr. Kissinger will take with him to Israel, after which he will return to us. At this stage there is no room for guesswork. We wait Dr. Kissinger's return. (End translation)

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12. Question: Mr. President, you told us last time that you expected this to be a hard round. Do you still feel that way, or do you think it will be any easier?

13. Answer: President Sadat: I expect it to be difficult and hard.

14. Question: Mr. Secretary, do you have a better estimate now of how long the shuttle might last?

15. Answer: Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to make any estimates as to the length of time. Of course, I think all parties have an interest in moving it as rapidly as possible.

16. Question: Mr. President, is Egypt now prepared to give written assurances to refrain from beginning hostilities against Israel?

17. Answer: President Sadat: Well, maybe you remember the statement I made in Paris. We are not aiming at all to start any hostilities, but assurances must be on a reciprocal basis, and it is premature now to speak about specifics.

18. Question: Mr. President, on the basis of the progress that has been made so far, do you believe ~~that~~ that an agreement is now likely?

19. Answer: President Sadat: I hope so, but I can't confirm it until after Dr. Kissinger returns.

20. Question: Dr. Kissinger, are you carrying anything on paper to show anything at all in the form of maps, drawings?

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21. Answer : Dr. Kissinger : We have not reached that point

yet. I have had long discussions with the President and his associates on two successive evenings and I think I can reflect their thinking in a rather precise fashion, without the help of maps.

22. Question (Unclear)

23. Answer : President Sadat : Well, as I have said before, I think the mission of Dr. Kissinger has two main aims. The first is to defuse the explosive situation that exists in the area now, and second to push the peace process. I have stated also that the defusion of the explosive situation means that there must be some Israeli gesture of peace on the three fronts.

24. Question : Mr. President, could you give us some hint what your ideas are about?

25. Answer : President Sadat : It is premature, still premature.

26. Question : Mr. President, is it possible that the agreement will be in some sort of phased format, in other words, a series of stages of actions by Israel and by Egypt? Is it possible it will be more along those lines?

27. Answer : President Sadat : Why don't you wait until it is achieved?

28. Question : Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger has said that he believes that both sides in these negotiations want peace, do you

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believe that Israel wants peace?

29. Answer : President Sadat : Well, I shall be waiting the return of Dr. Kissinger here. Dr. Kissinger can see both the ~~side~~ both sides, but I can't see the other side myself. I shall be ~~waiting~~ awaiting the return of Dr. Kissinger.

30. Question : Mr. President, are you more optimistic now than ~~you~~ you were before you heard the latest Israeli response through Dr. Kissinger? What is your ~~feeling~~ feeling now?

31. Answer : President Sadat : I'am still optimistic, Yes.

32. Question : More than before?

President

33. Answer : ~~Mr.~~ Sadat : Still optimistic, because it is my mood. I am optimistic always.

34. Question : Mr. President, could you describe or would you define for us what is the most difficult ~~in~~ areas of the talks? Do you have any specifics about what has been the most difficult area of negotiations?

35. Answer : President Sadat: I think you should ask Dr. Kissinger this question.

36. Dr. Kissinger : At this point it is not possible to make a judgement on which is the most difficult point.

37. Question : Mr. President, have you considered having joint patrols instead of a UN Force to police the area that would be ~~demilitarized~~ desilitarized?

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38. Answer: Mr. Kissinger : Remember our agreement Mr.

President. (laughter)

39. Answer: President Sadat : As I said, in all these details it is premature to say anything now.

40. Question : You do not rule it out, ~~are~~ exclude it?

41. Answer : President Sadat : Certainly, certainly, but as I said, it is premature.

KISSINGER *YAW*

X

CONFIDENTIAL

- ① If it was not the would not have touched it.
- ② Have received March 12, 1975 + will keep it
- ③ Will not forget it

Your Excellency,

As I address this letter to you I am fully aware of the extraordinary nature of the act. However, the fact that I can entrust it to our mutual friend, Dr. Henry Kissinger, ensures its confidentiality.

Agree

The long conflict between our two countries has brought much suffering to our peoples. Both our nations have been victims of tragic historical circumstances and I now express the sincere hope that Providence will extricate us from the vortex of warfare and enmity.

Agree

It has always been my firm conviction that Egypt, by virtue of its cultural heritage, its strength, its size and its influence, carries a leading voice with respect to the peace-making effort in our region. From what Dr. Kissinger has conveyed to me, as well as from your public statements, I feel assured that you are determined to make strenuous efforts to achieve a settlement.

I, on my part, am determined to make all efforts to promote peace between us, and it is in this spirit that I express the aspiration that we shall yet succeed in reaching an agreement that will do honor to our two peoples. Please know that, though I am on the other side, I am endeavoring to understand your problems and to see things from your perspective. I know that no agreement

Main thing I want to say is that I know that you will never use force again.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/02/13 : LOC-HAK-131-3-4-8

My spirit is that we will never have use of power again.

Will make it easier for Rabin, to must make it easier for me.

I willing to candle that people if the candle Israeli people.

With you shall be claiming it on a separate basis may be a successful lead for you

is possible without difficult decisions but I am ready to grapple with them for the sake of the cause of peace between our countries.

With this in mind, permit me, Mr. President, to bring to your attention a concern which we in Israel consider of crucial importance.

The step-by-step approach, as I understand it is intended to bring our countries closer to peace and thereby provide momentum towards peace for the region as a whole. Hence, my people have to know that through the process of withdrawal to a new agreed line we have reached a turning point and that we are now entering an era in which we will be able to settle all our differences by peaceful means only. As Prime Minister, I must be able to convince both people and Government in Israel that in surrendering physical strategic positions we shall not be exposing ourselves to increased hardships created by lengthier and inferior lines in a resumed conflict. This can be possible only if it is visibly shown that the act of withdrawal marks the real beginning of progress towards peace by deeds and words that demonstrate the intention of peace.

Agree everything is step by step approach

Agreed to most of suggestions

These, Mr. President, are some thoughts I thought worthy of bringing to your attention. They, together with the suggestions and ideas I have asked Dr. Kissinger to convey have the single purpose of contributing to an understanding of our respective problems. You will, no doubt, want to react and comment on the proposals received through Dr. Kissinger. This will enable the negotiations to develop further.

Understand next year

January. I am going to mention Knesset

Diplomatic message all pts agreed.

I conclude with the hope that we shall be able to advance understanding on the important matters that engage our two Governments.

Quite right

With expressions of highest esteem,

Y. Rabin
Yitzhak Rabin

Shall keep letter British & answer at this stage for simple reason at any moment of this is known & whole process will be damaged.

Quite right on pt. Hence withdrawal to agreed line by peaceful means only must be the only pt. Peaceful means only

Both sides parties consider that this conflict will not be solved by military force & therefore will solve it by peaceful means and

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

March 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS* *DR7*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report...

"I met with President Sadat and his key advisers, Foreign Minister Fahmi and General Gamasy, for about three hours, to present the points of a political character which the Israelis want included in any agreement in return for Israeli withdrawal from the passes and the oil fields. I explained to Sadat that the key problem is the Israeli domestic situation and that in order for Rabin to get the cabinet to take the decision to withdraw from the passes and the oil fields he must be in a position to show specifically the political quids he has received in return. I stressed that Rabin cannot agree to a purely military withdrawal, but it must be presented to the Israeli people as a tangible step toward peace. Sadat listened intently, commented decisively on points which he felt he could include, and, equally decisively, where he felt that certain Israeli demands were beyond his political capacity.

His two principal advisers, Fahmi and Gamasy, were, not unexpectedly, more cautious, and Sadat intends to review with them each of the points I discussed today and to give me his considered reply sometime tomorrow evening to take back to Israel. I am cautiously hopeful that Sadat will give me enough to maintain the momentum of the negotiations which could bring us in a few days to the beginning of the actual drafting stage. How much I bring back from Aswan will influence Rabin very significantly on whether and when he places before the cabinet a recommendation to withdraw out of the passes and the oil fields. My impression is that Rabin, Allon, and Chief of Staff General Ghur have taken a positive attitude towards the agreement and even Peres seems to be coming around.

Sadat continues to reflect confidence that he can manage Syria's opposition to an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and he would like us to undertake a further effort with Syria

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once his agreement with Israel is consummated. He wants something started with Syria by the end of April so as to provide Syria with the justification for renewing in May the UN force in the Golan. I said I would consider this, but I made no final commitment. He did not seem perturbed at the prospect that the PLO issue might immobilize a Geneva conference at the outset, and he left this matter for further discussion between us at a later stage.

There was one particularly interesting moment when I talked to Sadat alone. I presented him with a letter from Rabin which I had suggested and in which, in very human terms, Rabin expressed his strong desire to achieve the agreement with Sadat. This letter moved Sadat to tears, and he said, that this was the kind of thing which he had always wanted. I believe this was a good psychological stroke, and I hope that it will have an impact on the considered version which Sadat will convey to me tomorrow night for subsequent presentation to the Israelis.

I will go to both Damascus and Amman on Saturday, and return to Israel on Sunday afternoon."

Warm Regards

SECRET-SENSITIVE