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DF [redacted] #0223 0451721  
O 141718Z ZYH FEB 74  
FM SANTIAGO 25X1

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T 141557Z FEB 74 [redacted]

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

PERSONAL TO DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER.

[redacted] SANTIAGO 223

[redacted] I SAW GENERAL PINOCHET ALONE AT HIS OFFICE IN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. [redacted] HE SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE ME AGAIN. HE WAS RELAXED AND MOST CORDIAL AND RECALLED OUR LUNCH TOGETHER IN QUITO IN 1959.

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WE CONVEYED GREETINGS FROM THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AS WELL AS OUR FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT, TOGETHER WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUCCESS OF HIS EFFORTS TO ENSURE CHILE'S RECOVERY.

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WE EXPRESSED OUR DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTRAINTS PLACED UPON US BY CONGRESS AND OUR WISH TO BE HELPFUL IN A DISCREET WAY. GENERAL PINOCHET SAID HE WAS VERY HAPPY TO HEAR THIS AND TO HEAR IT FROM AN OLD FRIEND. HE HAD A VERY DIFFICULT TASK AHEAD AND NEEDED ASSISTANCE TO INSURE THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RECOVERY OF CHILE AND ITS DEFENSE.

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WE NOTED THAT WE HAD NO CURRENT PLANS TO CHANGE OUR POLICY TOWARDS CUBA. HE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION ON HEARING THIS. HE SAID THAT CASTRO WAS STILL WORKING HARD AT EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION. THE CHILEANS HAD FOUND EVIDENCE HERE THAT ARMS ORIGINALLY SHIPPED TO CHILE FROM CUBA HAD BEEN TRANSSHIPPED TO EXTREMIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. TODAY LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET ARMS WERE BEING SHIPPED TO PERU AND THIS WAS A CAUSE OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO CHILE. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUSTAIN BOTH ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ARMS RACE. CHILE DID NOT WANT THE LATTER. THEY ONLY WANTED SECURITY.

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GENERAL PINOCHET SAID HE WOULD TELL ME TWO THINGS HE HAD NOT TOLD ANY FOREIGNER. HE WAS GOING SHORTLY TO BRAZIL AND WOULD SPEND SEVERAL DAYS THERE. BRAZIL HAD BEEN AND WAS BEING VERY HELPFUL TO HIM. I SAID THAT WE WOULD WORK WITH THE BRAZILIANS IN TRYING TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIM; SECONDLY, HE SAID THAT PRIOR TO THE "MOVEMENT" OF 11 SEPT HE HAD HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE FIRRE OF THE CHILEAN SOLDIER, SINCE CHILE HAD NOT BEEN AT WAR FOR NEARLY A CENTURY. THE CONDUCT OF THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES DURING ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW HAD COMPLETELY REASSURED

\* \* \* \* \* WHSR COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

HAK, SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, ROUMAN

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HIM AS TO THEIR FIBRE AND DISCIPLINE.

"I SAID THAT AT THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE WE WOULD HAVE NO GREAT SURPRISES AND WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN CONFRONTATION WITH ANYONE.

"GENERAL PINOCHET EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD HANDLED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND PRC WITHOUT MAKING COSTLY CONCESSION TO EITHER AND FOR THE SKILLFUL WAY IN WHICH WE HAD LEFT VIETNAM WITHOUT LOSING IT. HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS SAYING THAT A GREAT MAN WAS ALWAYS BITTERLY OPPOSED. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS TOUGH AND NOTED THAT I HAD BEEN WITH HIM IN VERY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND HAD SEEN THE KIND OF COURAGE HE DISPLAYED WHEN UNDER PRESSURE OR IN DANGER.

"GENERAL PINOCHET SAID HE WAS DELIGHTED TO KNOW THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES DID NOT SHARE THE VIEWS ON CHILE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND THE WASHINGTON POST. HE KNEW THAT HE MUST RECONCILE CHILEANS IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE COUNTRY AND TO DO THIS HE WOULD USE THE BEST CIVILIAN BRAINS IN THE COUNTRY. HE CITED SAEZ, LENIZ AND THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE. HE KNEW THAT THERE WERE SOME TOUGH TIMES AHEAD AND HE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME UNPOPULAR ECONOMIC MEASURES TO MOVE THE COUNTRY TOWARDS RECOVERY. CHILE HAD GOOD PEOPLE AND ADEQUATE RESOURCES. HE INTENDED TO USE THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE.

"I NOTED THE THE U.S. WAS SENDING HIM AN OUTSTANDING AMBASSADOR WHO WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF AND HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. GENERAL PINOCHET SAID HE APPRECIATED THIS VERY MUCH AND LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING THE AMBASSADOR SOON.

"PINOCHET SAID HE WAS SETTING UP A NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND THAT HIS KEY MAN IN THIS WAS A COLONEL CONTRERAS. ANOTHER WOULD BE THE TITULAR HEAD BUT CONTRERAS WAS HIS MAN. HE WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE OUR HELP IN THE FORMATIVE PERIOD AND I TOLD HIM WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE CONTRERAS OR ANYONE ELSE COME UP TO SEE US TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THEM.

"PINOCHET EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR DR. KISSINGER'S TIRELESS QUEST FOR PEACE AND HOPED THE SECRETARY WOULD COME TO LATIN AMERICA. I SAID I BELIEVED HE WOULD AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS PART OF THE WORLD. GENERAL PINOCHET LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING HIM. WE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE CHILEANS WOULD NOT CREATE ANY PROBLEMS FOR US. AS WE KNEW THEY HAD STAGED THEIR REVOLUTION BY THEMSELVES AND HAD DONE IT WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE HELP, BUT THEY DID NEED ASSISTANCE TO REBUILD THEIR ECONOMY. HE AGAIN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE INTRODUCTION INTO PERU OF SOVIET ARMS, TECHNICIANS AND DEPENDENT FAMILIES. HE STRONGLY FELT THAT THE USSR AND CUBA INTENDED TO USE PERU AS A PLATFORM TO OPERATE IN THE CONTINENT. CHILE HAD NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS AND ONLY WANTED DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. GENERAL PINOCHET SAID HE FELT THAT PERON WAS MOVING IN A MODERATE DIRECTION IN ARGENTINA.

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"GENERAL PINOCHET ASKED ME TO THANK THE PRESIDENT AND DR. KISSINGER FOR THE MARK OF CONFIDENCE THEY HAD GIVEN HIM IN SENDING ME TO SEE HIM AND TO CONVEY TO THEM HIS ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE AND BEST WISHES IN THE NOBLE STRUGGLE THEY WERE WAGING ON BEHALF OF HUMAN FREEDOM. HE HOPED THAT I WOULD COME TO SEE HIM AGAIN.

"HE LOOKED WELL AND CONFIDENT THOUGH RECOGNIZING THAT HE HAS A TOUGH ROAD AHEAD AND MANY ENEMIES AT HOME AND ABROAD. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE VISIT AND THE INTEREST IT INDICATED. HE SHOULD NOT BE A SOURCE OF PROBLEMS FOR US IN THE INTER-AMERICAN FRAMEWORK. THERE WERE A FEW OTHER ITEMS I WILL DISCUSS ON MY RETURN."

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