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CAIRO RADIO 'TEXT' OF AS-SADAT SUNDAY TIMES INTERVIEW

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 30 Nov 76 JN/LD

[Text] President Anwar as-Sadat has stated that the peace he wants in the Middle East is one that will end the state of war and establish a normal situation in the area on the basis of Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a Palestinian state and insuring international guarantees for the two sides. In an interview with the London SUNDAY TIMES chief editor Henry Brandon, the president asserted that this peace agreement does not mean establishment of diplomatic relations or a trade exchange--matters which the Israelis are trying to use as a pretext. He said that no one can logically ask this from the Arabs after 28 years of confrontation, bitterness and hatred.

The following is the text of the interview, which focused on the character of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his method in tackling the Middle East crisis. The president said:

Our first contact with Kissinger was in February 1973. I had announced my decision to expel the Soviet experts in July 1972. I expected after that that Kissinger would seek to contact us. This actually happened. Ten days after that decision, we received a proposal from Kissinger asking to meet with an Egyptian official. At that time Kissinger was a star. He had ended the Vietnam issue, and it was clear that he wanted to complete his success by solving the Middle East question.

However, Kissinger did not have time for real contact until February 1973. We agreed that he would meet with the national security adviser in Paris. I sent the national security adviser with my instructions to review our position clearly for Kissinger--that we wanted honorable peace based on justice which could achieve our aims for complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the territories occupied in 1967 and guaranteeing the Palestinian people's rights. My instructions also specified that we would then be after to sign a peace agreement.

But Kissinger told the national security adviser: If you really want the United States to help you, you must be practical and face the fact that you are defeated. Unless the situation is changed militarily, we can do nothing. Kissinger said: Personally, I do not advise President as-Sadat to try to change the situation militarily. I ask you to convey this to him. The Israelis are much stronger than you imagine. Consequently, I advise you to be practical and ask only for what is consistent with the fact that you are defeated.

The president said: At the time the Soviets realized that I had not had any contact with the Americans before the decision, which was purely an Egyptian decision with the causes I had declared. Field Marshal Isma'il was in Moscow at the time. We managed to reach a new agreement on arming with the Soviets. For the first time, they sent us part of the arms provided for in the agreement in an extremely short period--a fact which astonished us. When the national security adviser returned and conveyed to me all that had taken place between him and Kissinger, I said: Yes, we are indeed defeated. We must expect others to deal with us on this basis. Then I said to him that we did not want further contacts with Kissinger.

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In April of the same year Kissinger contacted us again. I sent the national security adviser again. This was without result or hope because Kissinger again wanted us to realize that we were defeated and that the help that the United States could give us would be very limited. Eventually I realized that it was a hopeless case and, with this meeting in April, I ended our contacts with the United States.

The president continued: We began the war on 6 October. Later Kissinger told me that he was worried about the future because, if the Israelis had won once again, as they did in June 1967, nobody in the entire world, including the United States, would have been able to face them, that is, face their arrogance.

The president said: The Americans were astounded. The Israelis contacted them in October and told them: Give us just 2 days and we will crush the bones of the Egyptians. Kissinger waited 2 days for our bones to be crushed. He was confident that we would face another defeat, similar to the 1967 defeat. The Israelis contacted the U.S. Department of State once again and asked for 2 more days because, they said, they had not yet completed their mobilization in view of Yom Kippur.

On the third day, Dayan, weeping, faced reporters and told them: We cannot budge the Egyptians a single inch. I will announce this on television. However, Mrs Golda Meir prevented him from doing so. At that time an S.O.S. went out from Israel saying "Save Israel." This call for help took Kissinger by surprise. He contacted Golda Meir, who told him that Dayan sent this call after it was (?approved) by the Israeli cabinet. Kissinger's reply was: You are asking for 400 tanks which you say you lost on the Egyptian front. Meir replied: Yes.

President as-Sadat added: At this particular moment Kissinger's genius as a farsighted man of strategy becomes clear. He told Mrs Golda Meir: We will send you the tanks from the depots of the U.S. Army itself because the production of 400 tanks in such a short time is beyond the U.S. capabilities. But the fact is, Mrs Meir, you have lost the war and whatever happens now will not change the fact that you have lost.

The president said: Anyone who utters such words must be a man with a strategic mentality and a capacity for sound farsightedness.

The president then spoke of Kissinger's moves toward a cease-fire. He said that Kissinger began his move by first contacting the Soviets, who agreed to the cease-fire immediately. Kissinger then submitted his first plan for a cease-fire, which provided for the return of each side to the positions it had occupied before the war. But I refused to accept this plan. Kissinger then submitted his second plan, which provided for halting at the lines each side occupied on the day the fighting ceased. Israel accepted this plan, but I rejected it as well. That was the first contact between me and Kissinger.

After explaining how the U.S. airlift to Israel began, how the United States helped Israel with the American satellites, after which the breach operation took place, and how Israel was using the most modern U.S. arms including even those which were still being tested by the U.S. Army itself, the president said: In view of this airlift of U.S. weaponry, such as the Maverick and the smart bomb [al-qunbulah at-televizyoniyah], I said: I cannot fight the United States--particularly as I had begun to prepare to destroy the breach, and I could have annihilated it--and Kissinger told me: If you try it, we will strike you, and strongly. We know that you are surrounding the breach with 800 tanks and that you are capable of destroying it. However, we will strike you.

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I knew that the United States had begun this airlift to transport arms to the Israeli forces, using the huge Galaxy transport planes which landed at Al-'Arish airport. I was sure I could not fight the United States, despite the fact that the breach was no more than a theatrical operation with no strategic value. The French general Beauvallet described it as a television battle. My forces were still in their positions and did not retreat an inch until the cease-fire.

Kissinger came in November. This was the first time I had met him. Our meeting lasted 3 hours, and after only 1 hour I realized I could trust the man. For the first time, I sensed that here was a U.S. secretary of state who was openminded, who had studied everything about the problem and learned all its dimensions with all their complicated details. At this meeting, Kissinger gave me the impression that he was a man who could be trusted by both sides. After discussing the problem and its complications, I discovered that he was a man with sound vision and has, as I have already said, a strategic mentality.

At the end of the meeting, we reached an agreement made up of six articles whereby I released the Israeli captives. The implementation of this agreement made me trust Kissinger more and more because the Israelis, who are accustomed to stalling and breaking promises, implemented the agreement fully. This made me respect Kissinger and consider him trustworthy.

The president said: There is always a need for a third party who is trusted by the other two in view of the complexity of the problem. The situation then was as follows: We did not trust the Israelis and they did not trust us. Even if we had sat down together, we would have achieved nothing. Hence, we needed a third party who can be trusted by both of us. Kissinger gave me the impression that he could be that party.

Asked whether he had doubts about Kissinger because he was a Jew, the president said: Absolutely not. Perhaps this was the case before I met him and after what my adviser for national security told me about his meeting with him. However, after I met him I respected his frankness. I do not judge people before I test them. Thus, I do not pass judgment on people from reports, no matter what the content or the source of them. I always judge people after I test them and not from reports. For this reason, I was openminded when Kissinger came. After a 3-hour meeting, I felt I could trust the man.

The president added: When Kissinger told me that he had a plan for a disengagement of forces, I asked him: When can it be implemented? He said: Next January. It was December then. This is another point that added to Kissinger's assets with me. On the date he set, he came to Aswan and traveled between Aswan and Tel Aviv. Then he fulfilled the first disengagement of forces. He is thus a man who keeps and respects his word.

I do not know what he said to the Israelis to convince them. He was honest. He did not tell me what went on between him and them, and I also believe that he did not tell them anything of what went on between him and me. This point confirms that he is a man who can be trusted. It is for this reason that he succeeded where others failed. He gained my trust--the trust of an Arab. He was also worthy of the trust of the Israelis as a secretary of state who undoubtedly saved them by sending them arms during the war. Also, because he is a Jew, they cannot claim that he is biased in favor of the Arabs. That was a psychological moment which Kissinger's farsightedness helped him to realize, and it is for this reason that he succeeded.

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Asked whether it was then possible to reach a comprehensive agreement instead of the step-by-step method adopted by Kissinger, the president said that it was not possible. A comprehensive solution was the alternative to the step-by-step method. However, because of Watergate and the U.S. election year, and in view of the fact that U.S. President Ford was not an elected president, when we discussed the subject of a comprehensive agreement--and the Americans favored such an agreement--there was no force in the United States strong enough to do this. Of course, the Israelis knew this. They rejected a total agreement at that time. They even tried to turn down the second disengagement of forces agreement because they knew that the U.S. Government was not strong enough to face them and bring pressure to bear upon them. Had it been possible then to reach a comprehensive solution, would I have missed the chance?

Answering a question on his visualization of the nature of the coming move and whether this move will require a form of conventional diplomacy following Kissinger's characteristic method, the president said: In my opinion the matter still needs a party which is trusted by the two other sides. This is a priority and a necessity. The only state which can act as such a party is the United States because it is fitted to play a major role in solving the problem. Personally, I do not believe that the change which might take place regarding the U.S. secretary of state will prompt me to make any changes in the plans and stands which I have clearly and frankly announced. Perhaps Kissinger would have produced it more rapidly because we could have saved a great deal of time which might be lost due to a change in the new administration. This administration must study everything. Perhaps, one of the dimensions of the problem will be lost sight of due to this.

Asked about the kind of peace which the president would like to see in the Middle East and international guarantees, his excellency said: The peace I want is one which ends the state of war and establishes a normal situation in the area, based on an Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a Palestinian state and international guarantees to both parties. This peace agreement does not mean the establishment of diplomatic relations, movement across borders, trade exchange and so on and so forth, points which the Israelis are trying to use as pretexts. In the wake of 28 years of confrontation, four wars, bitterness and hatred, no one can logically ask this of the Arabs. The United States did not recognize China for many years. The United States only recognized China a few years ago. It was only after a few years had passed that the United States recognized even the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the topic of diplomatic relations is one of sovereignty. Mr Rabin, however, is trying to use this point as a pretext. Thus, the kind of peace we want is the peace which is known all over the world.

~~FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST WITH LORD CARADON~~

~~Cairo MENA in Arabic 1438 GMT 30 Nov 76 JN~~

~~[Text] Cairo, 30 November--Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Isma'il Fahmi met today with Lord Caradon, member of the British House of Lords. They discussed current developments in the Middle East crisis and exchanged views on various aspects of it. They also discussed the efforts made to establish peace based on justice in the area as well as the convening of the Geneva conference to reach a permanent just settlement in the Middle East.~~

~~Lord Caradon, Britain's former delegate to the United Nations and the one who drafted the famous Resolution No 242 for 1967 on the Middle East crisis, arrived in Cairo last Friday for a weeklong visit to Egypt.~~