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REPORT ON CONDUCT OF WAR RELEASED; EL'AZAR RESIGNS

## Agranat Committee Interim Report

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 2 Apr 74 M

[Report on interim report by committee investigating Yom Kippur war failures]

[Text] The committee investigating the Yom Kippur events this evening published an interim report containing conclusions and recommendations on institutional and individual affairs.

The committee is recommending that Chief of Staff Lt Gen David El'azar end his service, that Maj Gen Shemu'el Gonen not fulfill active role in the IDF until the committee completes its investigation of matters connected with the continuation of the fighting, that Maj Gen Eliahu Ze'ira not continue to serve as chief of intelligence in the General Staff and that the services of Brig Gen Arye Shalev, Lt Col Yonah Bandmann and Lt Col David Gedalya in intelligence duties end.

The committee, headed by President of the Supreme Court Judge Shim'on Agranat, rules that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was not obliged to order additional precautionary measures or precautionary measures different from those ordered by the IDF General Staff according to joint evaluation and consultations between the chief of intelligence and the chief of the General Staff.

The committee also notes that on 21 May the defense minister issued a directive to the General Staff in which he predicted that the war would break out in the second half of last summer. The defense minister, the committee rules, was not responsible for the operational details of the deployment of forces and that this was under the jurisdiction of the chief of staff. Also, no request or proposal was submitted to the defense minister to mobilize the reserves before Yom Kippur.

The committee says that in view of Mr Dayan's special abilities in army affairs, it was possible to reach a conclusion different from that which was proposed to him unanimously by his technical experts, but a matter of this kind does not come under the jurisdiction of the investigating committee in view of the fact that correct and proper order within the state calls for [word indistinct] when determining the personal responsibility of the holder of a public post and the fact that [word indistinct] which changes according to the personal disposition of the holder of the post, should not be used.

The committee says that it questioned the defense minister and the prime minister as to whether their decision on the mobilization of the reserve forces was influenced by the fact that the elections for the Knesset were scheduled to take place at the end of October. The two emphatically denied this and the committee believes that Mrs Meir and Mr Dayan did not think of letting party considerations take preference over their obligations to the state on this matter.

It was right for the prime minister to give information about the situation on the borders during the cabinet meeting convened 2 days before the war broke out, the committee says. The prime minister also was not expected to know of the (?absence) of ministers who were not in Tel Aviv on the eve of Yom Kippur.

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At the same time, the committee is convinced that the activities of the prime minister in the decisive days which preceded the war indicate an approach appropriate to the heavy responsibility which the prime minister shouldered.

The committee points out that the prime minister had the great right [of decision] and that she made correct use of the right of decision on the morning of Yom Kippur. Mrs Meir adopted a decision with wisdom, good sense, and speed in favor of mobilizing the reserves despite weighty political considerations, and thus carried out a very important act for the defense of the state.

The committee rules that with the passage of time, confusion has taken place in regard to the duty that the government has to fulfill in discussions and adoption of decisions on defense matters at the highest level. This confusion is connected with the absence of the ministerial committee for security affairs in its original framework and the fact that the cabinet has turned into a ministerial committee for security affairs. The leaks from cabinet discussions made it difficult to bring information to cabinet sessions and the investigating committee recommends the setting up of a ministerial committee with a limited number of members and adherence to the implementation of the law and government regulations which insure secret discussions on security matters. The investigating committee says in this way there will be no excuse for transferring the center of gravity of the discussion of security matters to an ad hoc body outside the cabinet.

Regarding the personal responsibility of Lt Gen David El'azar, the investigating committee says the following: We reached a unanimous decision that the chief of staff bears personal responsibility for what happened on the eve of the war, both with regard to the evaluation of the situation and to the preparedness of the IDF. The committee says this with particular regret, because the person in question is a soldier who has served the state for many years with dedication and distinction and has accomplished glorious achievement.

The committee also regrets the fact that the interim report does not deal with the subject of fighting after the fire broke out, because it is known that despite the grave crisis in the first stages of the fighting, the chief of staff led the IDF in the fighting to check the enemy at our gates. However, even if it is found that in later stages the chief of staff carried out great deeds, this does not obliterate the impressions of the initial mistakes.

The committee says the chief of staff should have recommended a partial mobilization of the reserves on 1 October and by 5 October at the latest. The committee rules that it did not accept Lt Gen David El'azar's explanation that he did more than necessary when he ordered an alert in the regular army. The chief of staff also erred in his excessive confidence that there would always be sufficient warning to mobilize the reserves and that the IDF would always and under all circumstances be able to repulse a general offensive by the enemy on both fronts through the use of regular forces alone.

The committee rules that the chief of staff did not use the means at his disposal to evaluate the situation correctly on the eve of the war.

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He did not tour the front lines to receive impressions from the warning signs which were discovered through observation or to consult commanders in the field. The chief of staff was content with information that lacked operational clarity--information that he received from the southern area commander--and thus in the difficult circumstances which occurred our forces were denied the measure of preparedness and deployment that they could have achieved. The result was that when the war broke out the armored force in the south was caught in improper deployment and the enemy gained an initial advantage. However, in the emergency situation that prevailed on the morning of Yom Kippur, the chief of staff should have seen to it that his intentions were translated into clear operational orders.

The committee ends this chapter with the following: In view of the above facts, we view it as our obligation to recommend the ending of the services of Lieutenant General El'azar as chief of staff.

Maj Gen Shemu'el Gonen, who was the southern area commander during the war, the committee says, did not carry out his duties properly when the war broke out and in the days that preceded it. Major General Gonen is also partially responsible for the dangerous situation in which our forces were caught on Yom Kippur. What has been found out about his activities and failures regarding the evaluation of the situation and the preparedness of his command in the days which preceded the war and on the day it broke out is sufficient for adopting the serious conclusion that the committee has reached regarding him.

The committee points out that Major General Gonen's command received enough information to arouse grave concern in the heart of a commander. But 2 days before the war, Major General Gonen was outside his area of command on a private visit. During the entire week that preceded the war he accepted the chief of intelligence's evaluation that what was taking place in Egypt was only an exercise. But his main failure was on Yom Kippur itself. While he should have deployed the armored corps with two thirds of that corps near the canal and the other third in the rear, Major General Gonen kept the corps in a contrary arrangement. He told the committee that he ordered the implementation of the correct deployment 2 hours before the hour of the expected attack. But the operational documents of that day do not contain such an order and when the enemy opened fire, no force from the rear began to move forward to the frontline. Not only that, but according to the command orders the forward force did not deploy near the canal at the right time and when the armor began to move forward it was confronted with an Egyptian ambush east of the canal. Artillery and tank fire was opened on these armored forces, and its functioning was thus disrupted and it was seriously hit.

The committee rules that the order not to deploy the armored corps in time was an unfortunate order. Major General Gonen gave as a reason for that action that he did not want to cause nervousness among the enemy, but the committee says it is not clear from what source Gonen [word indistinct] this limitation and his fears [about arousing the enemy] did not justify the failure.

The committee rules that Major General Gonen did not act in accordance with his ability to use the force he had at his disposal to break the surprise thrust of the enemy forces.

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The committee says that at this stage it is not making a final recommendation regarding the ability of Major General Gonen to carry out duties in the IDF, but it recommends that he not continue on active duty until the investigation regarding the stage of the war to check the enemy is completed.

Regarding Chief of Intelligence Maj Gen Eliahu Ze'ira, the committee says that he is a capable officer and he is respected at higher political levels, but that he adopted a concept with such inflexibility that it prevented him from maintaining the flexibility necessary to tackle the information which flows into the intelligence branch, and Major General Ze'ira even strengthened this concept. Ze'ira tended to view himself as the decisive factor in the state on intelligence matters. The committee rules that in view of his serious failure Major General Ze'ira cannot continue his duties as chief of intelligence in the General Staff.

The committee also criticizes and places personal responsibility on three other officers whom it recommends should end their services in the intelligence branch.

The committee rules that there were three reasons for the failure to evaluate the situation before the war. These are: The clinging of certain elements to the idea that Egypt would not go to war until it had an assured aerial capability to attack deep inside Israel and paralyze the IDF air force. A second reason was Major General Ze'ira's assurance to the IDF that intelligence would give advance warning regarding enemy intentions to launch an all-out war and the fact that this assurance was the mainstay of the IDF's defensive operations. The committee rules that there was no basis for giving such an assurance. A third reason for the failure was the readiness to justify the enemy's [word indistinct] and to justify the enemy's preparations on the frontline on the assumption that the matter did not go beyond defense preparations in Syria and exercises in Egypt. This was the result of the theory detailed above.

The chief of intelligence failed to adopt other measures that could have been adopted and which could have revealed important complementary information. Thus, the enemy was able to mislead and surprise the IDF.

The committee points out that 2 weeks before the war broke out the northern area commander expressed concern over the limitations of receiving sufficient warning in view of the dangerous situation that developed in the Golan Heights following the reinforcement of the Syrian deployment. The defense minister was impressed by the concern of Major General Hoff. He visited the area and voiced a warning to the Syrians. It was decided then to strengthen the armor and artillery on the Golan Heights.

When the prime minister returned from her trip to Europe she convened, on the initiative of the defense minister, a military and political meeting in which Ministers Alon, Galili and Dayan participated 3 days before the war. The chief of staff and Brigadier General Shalev also took part. In that meeting, Brigadier Shalev presented the intelligence branch's evaluation that war was not a likely possibility and none of the participants questioned his evaluation. It was then decided to hold a cabinet meeting on Sunday, 7 October. On Friday, the defense minister and the chief of staff met and then there were consultations at the prime minister's office with the defense minister, the chief of staff and the chief of intelligence. The chief of staff announced that on Yom Kippur there would be a very high alert in the army.

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The prime minister decided to convene a meeting of the ministers present in Tel Aviv that day. The chief of staff and the chief of intelligence said in that meeting that war was not a likely possibility although there was no proof that the enemy did not intend to attack. The chief of staff said that for the time being there was no need for a callup. The participating ministers authorized the prime minister and the defense minister to decide on the mobilization of the reserves if the need arose.

On Saturday morning, news was received of the enemy's plan to go to war. The chief of staff recommended to the defense minister that all reserve units be mobilized in preparation for a counterattack. The defense minister was of the opinion that the largest number of forces that the chief of staff thought would be necessary for defensive duties should be mobilized, but there was a delay of about 2 hours in calling up these forces because the chief of staff was waiting for the prime minister's decision regarding the mobilization.

At 0905 the prime minister approved the callup. The defense minister was convinced that it was convenient to limit the mobilization to the needs of defense so that no friendly state could accuse Israel of causing an escalation of the war. The defense minister's reasoning was connected with arms purchases. The committee says that this was a political stand that can be disregarded as a justification that was rejected. The prime minister did not agree to this contention. In the discussion at the prime minister's office, the chief of staff suggested launching a deterrent attack, but it was decided not to launch such an attack for political reasons.

The committee concludes its interim report by saying that in the Yom Kippur war the IDF was faced with a task that was one of the most difficult that any army could face. The IDF came out of this war with the upper hand despite the dangerous circumstances under which the war began and despite the mistakes committed in that stage. Moreover, the IDF was able to mobilize large and complex reserve units with unprecedented speed. While mobilizing its forces, it also halted a massive invasion carried out by enemy armies after preparing and training on this invasion plan for years.

The victory of the IDF was achieved through many dear sacrifices and thanks to the supreme heroism of its troops of all ranks, and thanks to the presence of mind of its commanders and the stability of its structure.

These facts strengthen the committee's opinion that the IDF cannot only stand against criticism and draw the painful conclusions, but also that it will be able to increase its strength.

The interim report is signed by the five committee members: Judge Shim'on Agranat, Judge Moshe Landau, Dr Yizhaq Nibintzal, Professor Yigal Yadin and Mr Hayyim Iaskov.

#### El'azar Disputes Report, Resigns

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[Text] The cabinet, which began a meeting 4 hours ago, is still in session. The chief of staff took part in the first part of the cabinet meeting and read the following letter:

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Madame Prime Minister: I have just read for the first time the report of the [investigating] committee. I am convinced that a wrong was done to me. I do not agree with a number of the committee's rulings which are not in my favor. I shall here give examples of some of them. The committee ruled that according to information which the chief of staff had in his possession he should have recommended a partial callup of the reserve units of the land forces at the beginning of the week preceding the war in order to establish the right balance between the enemy forces, who were in a full state of alert and who were prepared against us, and our forces. I state that during my service as a chief of staff, and before that, the IDF has never had the right balance between the prepared enemy forces and our forces for a number of basic reasons which are known to all responsible elements. Among these reasons was our reliance on intelligence warning. This time, there was no such warning and the committee rules that I was not to blame for that.

I reject the committee's ruling that no proper defense plan was prepared for the eventuality that the regular army would have to halt by itself a general enemy attack on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at one and the same time. The truth is that there was such a plan in the northern and southern commands. The plan was known and trained for, even in the lower ranks.

I reject the ruling that on that morning no clear directions were given to the southern area commander. The truth is that in addition to the operational plan that was prepared in advance, I gave directions to the area commanders on the morning of 6 October and I even invited them to a meeting at noon to make sure of their readiness for the fighting. The committee itself does not say anything about the directions which were given to the northern area commander, despite the fact that they were given to the two area commanders in the same way.

It is not the duty of the chief of staff and it is not within his ability to go into minor tactical details. I testify that during my service as northern area commander in 1967 I submitted general plans to the then chief of staff, but I did not receive detailed directions either for defense or for attack.

I reject the committee's ruling that the difference between me and the defense minister on the morning of 6 October 1973 was in connection with the forces needed for defense as though I requested additional forces only for a counterattack. My demand for the mobilization of the entire reserve force emanated from a general concept regarding the need for forces for war when counterattacks are an organic part of a useful defense plan.

My request proves that I did not have excessive confidence in the IDF's ability to stand against a general enemy attack on two fronts with the regular forces alone. This is an unfounded claim. I never said or thought so. I said the opposite. I do not know what the committee bases this assumption on. My request to mobilize reserves on a larger scale, which was approved by the prime minister, proved to be justified and decisive in the course of war. Had it not been adopted, undoubtedly, there would have been a disaster at least in the northern area command.

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There is no truth in the claim that the chief of staff awaited the prime minister's decision regarding the mobilization of all the reserves. The defense minister did not approve my mobilization of reserves that morning. The approval for the mobilization was given afterwards, during a discussion with the prime minister and on the basis of my proposal.

I reject the basic approach that the committee adopted regarding the authority of the defense minister and the chief of staff. This incorrect approach has misled the committee.

According to the standing authority, the defense minister is the operative authority above the chief of staff and all operational plans and questions were brought to him for approval before the war. Only during the war itself did the defense minister cease in practice to constitute an operational authority.

I do not accept the committee's ruling that the chief of staff did not make a genuine effort to evaluate [word indistinct] on his own. According to information that I had in my possession, I could not reach an evaluation different from that of the intelligence branch. Only through the investigating committee did I learn of intelligence information of warning value that I did not know about. Had I known of that, perhaps I would have made a different evaluation, as happened in April and May 1973.

I reject the committee ruling that I engaged in planning counterattacks instead of concentrating on [word indistinct] the warning. I acted in the two spheres and it was my duty to lead the IDF a number of stages forward. I did so throughout the war.

Why does the committee believe that I should have reached the conclusion that reserves should be mobilized on 5 October 1973, when the defense minister was unable to reach the same conclusion, although both of us had the same information, and when no one in the general staff thought of or suggested mobilizing the reserves. This can only be explained by saying that the committee did not treat both of us equally.

The chief of staff ended his letter by saying that he does not see any possibility of continuing his duties and that his duties should be carried out until further notice by head of the General Staff Maj Gen Yizhaq Hafi.

#### Resignation Accepted; Meir Expresses Regrets

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0100 GMT 3 Apr 74 M

[Text] In an extraordinary session tonight the cabinet discussed the interim report of the committee investigating the Yom Kippur events. The justice minister analyzed the report and a preliminary discussion was held on the committee's recommendation.

In the meeting the chief of staff read his letter to the prime minister and asked that he be released from his duties. The cabinet responded to the chief of staff's request with regret. Replying to the chief of staff's words, the prime minister said: Without taking it upon myself to judge the chief of staff's reaction to the committee's report, I am confident that I am speaking on behalf of each one of us, and particularly on my own behalf, in saying to you that our sorrow that we have arrived at this situation is deep and genuine.

None of us will forget and none wishes to forget your contribution to the security of the state throughout many years until the end of the last war. It is impossible to forget that you commanded the liberation of a dear and important part of the country from the threat of Syrian shelling. In 1967 you commanded the capture of the Golan Heights. We saw you throughout the days of the Yom Kippur war until the end. We heard the proposals that you brought then to obtain the government's decisions. No doubt your proposals were in great measure responsible for deciding the results of the war. You appeared before the government very frequently. There was always a feeling within the government that we were lucky that we had such a commander for the IDF.

In these hours, which are most difficult for a man like you, I want you to know that the heart of each one of us is with you. You have been and will remain in Israel's history a great and glorified commander.

Regarding the other IDF tasks discussed by the committee report, the cabinet adopted the operative conclusions. The cabinet will discuss the other conclusions and recommendations of the committee in a later meeting.

It was decided to ask the Knesset speaker to convene the Knesset during the Passover days to hear the cabinet's statement on the interim report of the investigating committee.

The cabinet took note of the defense minister's statement that he appointed Head of the General Staff Maj Gen Yizhaq Hofi as acting chief of staff.

The defense minister reported on his talks in Washington.

Minister Mikha'el Hazani reported at the beginning of the meeting about his intention to resign from the government and he submitted a letter of resignation to the prime minister.

#### Government To Issue Statement

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 3 Apr 74 M

[Text] It has been decided that the cabinet ask the speaker of the house to convene the Knesset by the middle of the Passover holidays to hear the government's statement on the partial report of the inquiry commission.

#### Military Reshuffles Reported

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 3 Apr 74 M

[Text] Maj Gen Shelomo Gazit was, as of today, appointed head of the Intelligence Branch on the General Staff, replacing Maj Gen Eliahu Ze'ira who ended his office and went on leave.

Maj Gen Refa'el Vardi today assumes the office of coordinator of activities in the territories after he ended his work as head of the staff for the examination of the release of men and mobilized transport from the IDF.

Brig Gen Arye Shalev was, as of today, appointed commander of the Judaea-Samaria region.

Maj Gen Shemuel Gonen today ended his office as commander of the Merhav Shelomo region.

The announcements about the reshuffles have just now been reported by the IDF spokesman.



Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1818 GMT 28 Sep 74 L

[Relay of Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat's speech from ASU Central Committee Hall on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir's death--live]

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Studies show that after the world and its great powers became confident of what science has achieved in terms of obtaining information and studying the movements of armed forces by means of artificial satellites, reconnaissance planes and others, October proved that knowing about movements is one thing and knowing about the intentions of these movements is another and that strategic diversion and the element of surprise are still possible if they are well prepared despite all listening and photographic devices.

This is proven by the fact that the United States was watching our movements but did not understand them. After military doctrines decided that natural barriers like the Suez Canal and manmade barriers like the Bar Lev Line were deterrents against the element of surprise and that they could not be stormed except from limited gaps, October came to see the scene of the storming of these barriers in hours and days along the entire length of the front and the transfer of two complete armies across the canal in a few days in accordance with the planned timetable.