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State Dept. review  
completed

#0121/1 0621040

O 031635Z MAR 74

FM CAIRO

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 031507Z MAR 74

SECTION 1 OF 2

IMMEDIATE

MARCH 3, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: AMBASSADOR ELTS, CAIRO 121

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO THE SECRETARY BY MOST  
EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:

MORI C05141622

2. THIS MORNING I WAS ASKED TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT AT NOON. WHEN I ARRIVED, FAHMY WAS ALSO THERE. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE ON THE LAWN OF HIS GIZA VILLA. SADAT WAS RELAXED AND DRESSED INFORMALLY. AFTER EXTENDING FELICITATIONS, HE SAID HE WANTED TO GIVE US A BRIEFING RE HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO. SINCE FAHMY WAS TAKING NOTES, I INFER THIS WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME HE HAD HAD THIS BRIEFING. SADAT SPOKE FROM MEMORY AND AT TIMES HIS ACCOUNT WAS REPETITIOUS. I HAVE SOUGHT BELOW TO DISTILL BOTH ITS ESSENCE AND FLAVOR.

3. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, SADAT SAID THAT SINCE YOUR FIRST VISIT A "MISUNDERSTANDING" APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN HIM AND THE SOVIETS, DUE LARGELY TO THE SOVIETS' METHOD OF DEALING WITH HIM. SOVIETS HAD MADE A "COMPLETE SITUATION" OUT OF IT AND HAD ADOPTED A "NEW POLICY." GROMYKO SPOKE VERY CANDIDLY AND INSISTED NO ONE ELSE, NOT EVEN AN INTERPRETER, BE PRESENT AT THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO'S ENGLISH IS POOR, THEY MANAGED TO COMMUNICATE. SINCE DEVERSOIR, SADAT CONTINUED, SOVIETS THOUGHT THEY HAD HIM "IN A FIX." THEY SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THIS TO THE UTMOST. THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS, THIS SOVIET ATTEMPT HAS FAILED. "WE HAVE ACHIEVED MUCH AND CHANGED THE SITUATION COMPLETELY." SOVIETS, IN SADAT'S VIEW, HAVE MISCALCULATED. THEY BELIEVED NOTHING WOULD COME OF OUR COOPERATION. THEY HAVE BEEN "DAZED" BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED. AS A RESULT,

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SECFL

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THE POLITBURO, OF WHICH GROMYKO IS NOW A MEMBER, HAD APPARENTLY REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT GROMYKO BE SENT TO EGYPT AS A "VANGUARD."

4. SADAT SAID HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO HAD BEEN FRANK AND COMPREHENSIVE. HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THE POST-DEVERSDIR SITUATION BY NOT REPLACING THE ARMS THAT EGYPT HAD REQUESTED. IN RESPONSE, GROMYKO MADE TWO POINTS. FIRST, HE STRESSED THAT EXCLUDING SOVIET UNION FROM MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IS A "MOST SERIOUS AND DANGEROUS PROBLEM" FOR THE SOVIETS AND THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT IT. SECOND, THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO REDRESS WHATEVER HAD HAPPENED AFTER DEVERSDIR OR EVEN BEFORE IN AN EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. THE SOVIET "BIG THREE" ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. THEY WISHED ONLY TO BE ASSURED BY SADAT THAT HE WILL NOT SEEK TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

5. SADAT SAID HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE HAD BEEN LARGELY THE RESULT OF YOUR INDEFATIGABLE ENERGY, E.G. THE SIX POINTS, YOUR DECEMBER AND JANUARY VISITS, ETC. HE HAD ASKED GROMYKO WHAT THE SOVIETS CAN DO WITH THE ISRAELIS, NOTING THAT USG ALONE HAS ANY INFLUENCE ON THE LATTER. WHEN GROMYKO GRUDGINGLY AGREED WITH THIS JUDGEMENT, SADAT HAD ASKED WHY SOVIETS ARE SO SENSITIVE ABOUT US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED SADAT IS "DRIFTING TOWARD THE WEST." SADAT HAD RESPONDED THAT IF THIS BENEFITS HIS COUNTRY, HE WILL DO SO. HE REMINDED GROMYKO OF EVENTS OF 1972 AND STRESSED HIS INDEPENDENCE. IN '72, WHEN SOVIETS HAD THOUGHT "YOU HAD ME," HE HAD EXPELLED ALL SOVIETS MILITARY ADVISORS. HE SHOULD HAVE DONE SO AGAIN LAST MONTH, SADAT TOLD GROMYKO, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE EGYPTIAN-SOVIET TREATY AND SOVIET FACILITIES ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. SOVIETS, HE CHARGED, HAD CONSTANTLY SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.

6. GROMYKO HAD NOTED NO PUBLIC MENTION HAS RECENTLY BEEN MADE OF SOVIET EFFORTS. HE REQUESTED THAT SADAT INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUCH SOVIET EFFORTS IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED THAT IN THE UPCOMING EGYPTIAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF HIS VISIT, SOMETHING BE SAID ON THIS POINT. SADAT HAD IN PRINCIPLE AGREED AND HAD TOLD HIM TO TALK TO FAHMY.

7. AT THIS POINT FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT GROMYKO HAS ALREADY DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH HIM. GROMYKO WANTS AN EXPLICIT PARAGRAPH THAT EGYPT WILL HANDLE EVERYTHING IN

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GENEVA. SADAT INSTRUCTED FAHMY TO CAST ANY REFERENCE TO SOVIET EFFORTS IN GENERAL TERMS, PERHAPS BY RECALLING THAT SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF CO-CHAIRMAN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. FAHMY, SPEAKING TO ME, ASKED THAT WE NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT APPEARS IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE. HE ASSURED ME THAT WHATEVER HAS TO BE PUT IN WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH SADAT'S AND HIS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH YOU.

8. GROMYKO HAD ASKED IF EGYPT IS NOW TREATING SOVIETS AND USG "50-50"? (THE PRESIDENT POINTEDLY NOTED GROMYKO'S PHRASE.) SADAT HAD AGAIN REMINDED GROMYKO THAT EGYPT IS INDEPENDENT. NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES ARE GIVEN TO ANY OUTSIDERS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAVE IN FACT HAD PRIVILEGES SUCH AS EGYPTIAN-SOVIET TREATY, FACILITIES ON THE MEDITERRANEAN, ETC. WHY, HE ASKED, SHOULD HE NOT NOW IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

9. GROMYKO HAD RESPONDED THAT SOVIETS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS, BUT HAD NOT KNOWN THE FACTS. SADAT SAID THIS WAS THEIR OWN FAULT. SOVIETS HAVE FOR SOME TIME NOT HAD AN AMBASSADOR HERE AND HE, SADAT, IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO HAVE VINOGRADOV COME BACK. HE REMINDED GROMYKO THAT THE PREVIOUS VINOGRADOV HAD BEEN FINE AND THAT THE DIALOGUE DURING HIS PERIOD HAD BEEN GOOD. GROMYKO AGREED TO DO WHATEVER SADAT WISHES ON SOVIET REPRESENTATION.

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10. SADAT HAD THEN ASKED IF IT IS A CONDITION OF FURTHER SOVIET AID THAT HE SPEAK PUBLICLY ABOUT SOVIET EFFORTS. GROMYKO REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. SADAT HAD SAID HE WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS, SINCE AS GROMYKO KNEW HE ALWAYS SPOKE FRANKLY. IF SOVIETS INSISTED, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO EXPLAIN HOW THEY HAD SOUGHT TO BOX HIM IN AFTER DEVERSOIR.

11. ADVERTING TO SADAT'S EARLIER REMARK ABOUT YOUR ENERGETIC ACTIVITIES, GROMYKO ASKED COULD HE NOT BE ENERGETIC AS YOU? SADAT RESPONDED THAT HE COULD OF COURSE BE SO, BUT ISRAEL WOULD NOT HEED. GROMYKO HAD OBSERVED ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED FOR RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE.

12. SADAT HAD THEN TOLD HIM OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT IN MAY. WITH THIS REVELATION, HE RELATED WITH OBVIOUS SATISFACTION, "I REALLY SHOCKED HIM." HE REMINDED GROMYKO THAT BREZHNEV HAD BEEN INVITED SEVERAL TIMES, BUT HAD NEVER COME. IN CONTRAST, SADAT SAID, HE HAS VISITED SOVIET UNION FOUR TIMES, BUT IS NOT PREPARED TO GO AGAIN WITHOUT SOME SOVIET RESPONSE. MOREOVER, HE DID NOT WISH EVERY VISIT BY YOU OR BY PRESIDENT NIXON TO BE A CAUSE OF MIS-UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT BREZHNEV IS READY TO COME WHEN HE FEELS SADAT REALLY WANTS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. SADAT SAID HE MEANT WHAT HE SAID ABOUT WANTING GOOD RELATIONS IN CONTEXT OF RESPECT FOR EGYPT'S INDEPENDENCE.

13. SADAT THEN GAVE ME WHAT HE CALLED HIS "CONCLUSIONS" AFTER HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO, AS FOLLOWS:

A. SOVIETS FEEL KEENLY THAT HIS EMERGING RELATIONS WITH YOU ARE UNDERMINING THEM AND ARE TRYING HARD TO REDRESS SITUATION.

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SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

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B. THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR PREVIOUS POLICY WAS IN ERROR SINCE, DESPITE SADAT'S DEVERSOIR DIFFICULTIES, IT NEITHER EMBARRASSED NOR HARRASSED HIM. THEY ARE NOW TRYING TO RECTIFY POLICY.

C. THEY ARE SEEKING TO UNDERMINE "WHAT WE HAVE DONE TOGETHER," STARTING FROM SIX POINTS TO PRESENT. HE HAD LEARNED THIS FROM GROMYKO AND SEPARATELY FROM THE SYRIANS. THUS, GROMYKO HAD POINTEDLY NOTED THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND ANY FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. SADAT HAD CORRECTED HIM AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT KNOWS WHAT HE WANTS. THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A MILITARY AGREEMENT. THROUGH IT NOT ONLY THE OCTOBER LINES BUT MORE HAD BEEN GOTTEN. OTHER ASPECTS OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT WILL BE. (FAHMY INTERJECTED HERE THAT GROMYKO HAD ALSO TAXED HIM ON THIS POINT. HE HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYONE OFFERING EGYPTIANS ANYTHING BETTER.)

D. SOVIETS ARE DOING UTMOST ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT TO RESTORE THEIR PRESTIGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, GROMYKO SOUGHT TO OBTAIN SADAT'S APPROVAL FOR A 5-MEMBER MISSION AT GENEVA (SOVIETS, US, EGYPTIANS, SYRIANS, AND ISRAELIS) TO CONDUCT PERTINENT DISCUSSIONS. WHEN TELLING ME THIS, SADAT EXPRESSED AMUSEMENT SINCE ASSAD HAD BY THEN ALREADY AGREED TO SEND SOMEONE TO WASHINGTON. HE HAD NOT SO INDICATED TO GROMYKO, HOWEVER, AND CHUCKLED ABOUT WHAT GROMYKO'S REACTION MUST HAVE BEEN WHEN HE READ THIS NEWS IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS.

14. SADAT HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE IS ANXIOUS FACILITATE SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ASSAD DOES NOT WANT A SYRIAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE, FEARING THAT SUCH WOULD CAUSE HIM TO BE BRANDED "TRAITOR." SADAT WAS READY, THEREFORE, TO HAVE SYRIANS PARTICIPATE IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE AND HAD ALREADY TALKED TO YOU ABOUT THIS. GROMYKO'S PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO GET A NEW COMMITTEE OF FIVE ESTABLISHED HAD BEEN REJECTED. (FAHMY INTERJECTED HERE THAT GROMYKO WANTS TO PUT SOMETHING ABOUT THIS IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE. SADAT CAUTIONED HIM TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT SYRIA.) HE HAD ALSO TOLD GROMYKO THAT IF SOVIETS AND US WISH TO JOIN THAT COMMITTEE, HE COULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. HE HAD POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO SIVIET/US PARTICIPATION.

15. GROMYKO HAD THEN ASKED THAT A REFERENCE TO SOVIET AND US PARTICIPATION IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY COMMITTEE BE INCLUDED IN COMMUNIQUE. IN MY PRESENCE, SADAT INSTRUCTED FAHMY TO "FIND SOMETHING" ANDDYNE TO PUT INTO THE COMMUNIQUE, AND SUGGESTED GROMYKO BE TOLD HE SHOULD SPEAK TO ASSAD

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ABOUT THIS.

16. IN CONCLUSION, SADAT ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO YOU THAT "WE MUST CONTINUE TO COOPERATE ON SAME LINES AS BEFORE. NOTHING HAS CHANGED FROM MY SIDE. EVERYTHING WE AGREED UPON WILL BE CARRIED OUT AT PROPER TIME." HE ADDED THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT AFTER YOUR MOSCOW TRIP.

17. SADAT AND FAHMY ASKED THE ABOVE BE SENT TO YOU THROUGH THIS CHANNEL. SOME OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ARE REPORTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGES.

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