



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

7411584

S/S

June 21, 1974

To: The Secretary  
Thru: P - Mr. Sisco  
From: SCI - Herman Pollack

Q and A on Sale of Nuclear Fuel to Tarapur

There is attached a Question and Answer on the sale of nuclear fuel to Tarapur for use, if necessary, during your session on the Hill today.

There have been no press queries on this today. However, we do know of a leak yesterday from the AEC to one member of the staff of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigating. It is possible therefore that the subject may be raised.

DOE REVIEWED 15-Dec-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

DOS REVIEWED 07-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

Attachment:

REFER TO DOS

Question & Answer

SCI:HPollack:vm  
6/20/74:x21554

Clearance: *H.B. for*  
NEA/INS - Mr. Kux

SALE OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR TARAPUR TO INDIA

Question & Answer

- Q. Can you comment on the report that the U.S. is shipping uranium fuel to India despite the Indian nuclear test and that a shipment was loaded in New York on June 19.
- A. Two power reactors of 200 MW each were built at Tarapur in India pursuant to the 1963 U.S.-Indian agreement for cooperation with AID financing. We have a 30 year contract for provision of enriched uranium for these reactors and have been fueling the reactors since 1968 when they started. In November 1973, the Indian AEC requested the U.S. AEC to provide five additional shipments between June 1974 and April 1975. The U.S. AEC agreed and an export license covering these five shipments was issued on May 16, 1974. A first shipment of 6,150 kilograms of slightly enriched uranium was loaded on a ship in New York City June 19. The next shipment is scheduled for October 1974. The enriched uranium is covered by IAEA safeguards on Tarapur which provide for physical inspection

and other specified controls. On the basis of these inspections, the most recent in May 1974, we are fully confident there has been no diversion for use in nuclear explosive devices.

Our long standing policy in this regard is that:

- a. the use in or for any nuclear explosive device of any material or equipment subject to United States agreements for cooperation in civil uses of atomic energy is precluded; and
- b. that under the safeguards agreements related to such agreements for cooperation, the IAEA is responsible for verifying, inter alia, that the safeguarded material is not used in or for any nuclear explosive device.
- c. the continued cooperation of the United States with other countries in the nuclear field is dependent on the assurance that these understandings will continue to be respected in the future.

In light of the Indian test, we have therefore asked the Indians for confirmation of their acceptance of this policy and have made receipt of the confirmation a prior condition to further shipments.

As we said, we have no reason to believe the Indians have not acted in a manner fully consistent with our policy in handling U.S. supplied material.